

STALIN, SOVIETS and The **Question of Israel**

Selected Secret Documents 1947-1949
Conditions of

THEN and NOW



Svitlana M

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And

THE QUESTION OF ISRAEL

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Sources;

FEDERAL ARCHIVAL SERVICE OF RUSSIA INSTITUTE
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Collection of documents on SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS
1941-1953

And

MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICT 1947-1956

FROM THE DOCUMENTS OF THE EXTERNAL POLICY
ARCHIVE

Selected documents Translated from Russian by Svitlana M

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US proposal to establish guardianship over Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and Arab population, due to which it meets with a negative attitude and resistance from both Jews and Arabs

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The "neutral" position of the British on the Palestinian question cannot hide their aspirations, provoking the internecine struggle of Jews and Arabs, to thwart the UN decisions on the partition of Palestine and remain in Palestine as a third force, alone or together with the United States,

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P98- TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOKU May 18, 1948

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P99- EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN MINISTER DEJ OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND THE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV May 24, 1948

the State of Israel fully shares the wishes so generously expressed by you and reaffirms its firm hope, based on the events that led to the creation of our government,

P100- Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov May 25, 1948

The Provisional Government of Israel in its present composition has not in fact renounced a pro-British orientation and, as a tribute to the times, is ready to cooperate in many respects with the United States

P101- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

A.Ya. Vyshinsko with the EGYPT'S MESSENGER IN THE USSR BINDARI-PASHOY July 1, 1948

then said that Egypt is determined to defend the principles of its foreign policy, which are based on the desire of the Egyptian people to free themselves from the influence of Western European imperialism.

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Broad criticism of the British plan to expand the territory of Transjordan at the expense of Palestine will cause a certain split among the Arab states, which will facilitate the defense of the UN decision to partition Palestine.

P109- SPEECH BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN Ya.A. MALIKA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION July 27, 1948

They are looking for workarounds for nonfulfillment of this decision, for consigning it to oblivion in order to preserve the previous position in Palestine, to prevent a peaceful settlement in Palestine, to continue to maintain a state of instability and uncertainty there, which is harmful for both the Arab and Jewish population.

P113- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR

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USSR I.V. STALIN September 18, 1948

P126- RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY
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ZORINA WITH THE ENTRY OF SYRIA IN THE USSR F.
ZEYNEDDIN September 21, 1948

The situation in Palestine, Zeyneddin concluded, is
becoming intolerable and requires immediate
consideration.

P130- FROM THE NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR
DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA "

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS ON THE REPORT OF
THE UN MEDIATOR IN PALESTINE, BERNADOTTA "
October 1, 1948

.. essentially mean the transfer of 4/5 of the Palestinian territory to Transjordan, i.e., under the full control of the British and the refusal, to please the Anglo-Americans, from the creation of an Arab independent state in Palestine

P135- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE ATTORNEY OF THE USSR AFFAIRS IN SYRIA I.A. ISAGULOVA WITH THE P124- DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA OF SYRIA I. ISTUANI October 4, 1948

However, the fact that not a single Arab country, including Syria, has so far officially recognized the Palestinian government indicates that the British are seriously hindering this

P138- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN October 13, 1948

From the conversation with Orenstein it became clear that the Jewish government is inclined to agree with the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan and to refuse the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine

P145- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K.

TSARAPKINA WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN THE UN D. LIFSHITS October 14, 1948

The Jews are against the international statute for Jerusalem

P144- ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR ON EXIT TO ISRAEL RUSSIAN SPIRITUAL MISSION October 14, 1948

P154- NOTE "PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE POSITION OF JEWS IN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION " October 16, 1948

The Jews are positive about our proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine and consider it the main condition that can ensure peace in Palestine.

P160- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL P.I. ERSHOVA WITH HEAD OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE ISRAEL MFA SH. FRIEDMAN October 17, 1948

P166- TELEPHONOGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (B), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN October 19, 1948

P168- NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR VMMOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY. CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN October 20, 1948

...replacing the existing temporary truce between the parties with an official peace or such a truce, which is accompanied by the complete withdrawal and demobilization of the armed forces or the creation of a demilitarized zone between them under UN supervision.

P172- LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL P. IERSHOV TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN October 20, 1948

P174- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE Ukrainian SSR D.Z. MANUILSKY WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK October 22, 1948

refineries owned by private companies in Haifa with capital invested by the US, France and the UK should remain in the hands of these companies.

P176- TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D. BENGURION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN November 5, 1948

P177- NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULIN TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN November 24, 1948

P179- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. Vyshinsky with PRIME MINISTER OF LEBANON R. SALKH December 2, 1948

Our position on the Palestinian issue is determined by our foreign policy, one of the most important

principles of which is the right of nations to self-determination.

P181- RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH F. ZEYNEDDIN December 29, 1948

The principles of freedom and self-determination of nations, supported by the Soviet Union, are of vital interest to Syria as a small power

P185- FROM THE INFORMATION LETTER OF THE MISSION OF THE USSR IN LEBANON TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN April 14, 1949

A very lively Anglo-American struggle was waged around these negotiations all the time, into which both sides involved their agents and extremely nationalist reactionary elements of the Arab countries.

P191- LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULINA June 28, 1949

quite clearly reflects all the growing Anglo-American contradictions in the Near and Middle East, caused by the desire of each of these imperialist powers to strengthen their positions and influence in these countries to the detriment of each other.

P193- ABSTRACTS ON THE SPEECH BY THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES July 15, 1949

The problem of Palestinian refugees is the result of the policy of certain monopoly circles in Britain and the United States, interested in delaying a general settlement of the question of Palestine and seeking to revise the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947.

P195- DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATUTE OF JERUSALEM AND THE PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES July 15, 1949

Broad democratic freedoms for the city's population, including freedom of religion and worship, freedom of access to holy places, freedom of conscience, language, education, speech, press, organizations, meetings, petitions, etc.

P198- FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION September 3, 1949

England is taking all measures to ensure that this part of Palestine is annexed to Transjordan, and is trying to persuade Israel to transfer the southern part of the Negev to the Arabs of Transjordan and receive in return, all of Galilee.

INTRODUCTION

Any historical event should be evaluated in relation to and based on the comparison of **conditions of THEN and NOW** with the interests of class struggle and lining of forces THEN and NOW in mind.

It is well known practice of anti-communists and their left-disguised "umbrella" ideological groups - 1001 variations of Trotskyites - who **never misses any opportunity to attack Stalin and Soviets**. Recent events in Palestine gave them another opportunity to do so and in some "Muslim" countries, they echoed and reinforced the claims of religious reactionaries and fascists that "it is all Stalin's and Soviets fault who supported the formation of Israeli state".

Gross **disregard to the ideological and historical facts on the question conceals** the fundamental fact that the "question of Palestine" **was not an internal Soviet question** where Stalin and the Party could have played the **determining role**. It was a question that **so many nations were involved**, some in order to gain their independence, others as a stooge to the imperialist, and the imperialists (British and French) **who wanted to maintain their domination** of these carved and colonized region, and in the case of US, to exert their influence **at this oil rich region**.

One cannot make an objective analysis through equation of a country's, or a person's qualitative stand, the character of now and based on that makes determination **about the qualitative stand, character of then**. With the mechanical logic of equating two different condition, situation, character, Marxist Leninists who support the bourgeois revolutionaries against the feudalist, anti-colonial struggles, anti-imperialist wars etc., should condemn any given support THEN, based

on the fact that most of them have become "bourgeois dictatorships" or even fascist states NOW. Marxist Leninists are perfectly aware of the fact that any **anti-colonial struggle or anti-imperialist wars led by the bourgeoisie** will eventually transform into being the staunch enemy of labouring masses. However, this fact **does not change attitude of Marxist Leninists** toward the cause of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist wars and towards the "right of self-determination."

On the question of Palestine, it was no different in principle as stated;

"Our position on the Palestinian issue is determined by our foreign policy, **one of the most important principles** of which is the right of nations to self-determination."

One **has to study the conditions of then**, inter and intra relations among the nations involved, and **the stands, aims of each** nation involved. For this purpose, **we should rely on the historical documents**, facts not on fabrications, lies, gossips and cheap propaganda dished out by anti-communists of every shade.

What was Palestine then? A British colony? Who was fighting against the British Imperialism? Who was in alliance with the British, French imperialists? Where did each nation stand on the question of self-determination and fight against the imperialism at that given time? These questions should be answered in order to make an objective analysis of Soviets' attitude on the question.

Background summary

In search of help and assistance, the leaders of the Jewish community of Palestine, in the critically difficult period of the **war for independence from British**, turned to the Soviet Union. It was both diplomatic and military-political support of Soviet during the period of World War II, and the post-war diplomatic battles at the UN over the future of Palestine had a decisive impact on the course of events.

The position of the leadership of the USSR and its policy towards the Jewish community of Palestine became especially noticeable when the Nazis came to power in Germany. Soviet Union chose not to aggravate relations with its ally because of Palestine during the struggle against Hitler, although even then he closely followed the development of events in the Middle East, as evidenced by the memorandum of the USSR Ambassador to Egypt, and later the head of the Middle East department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, A. Shchiborin:

“The Zionist organizations in Palestine are now in every way seeking to establish contact with our missions in the Middle East, hoping to enlist the support of the USSR in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine ... **it is not beneficial for us now to make any promises of support for the Jews**, which would be perceived by the British as a step against them” (*Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents, Volume 1, p. 75.*)

However, already at the end of World War II, when the defeat of Nazi Germany became obvious, the **USSR began to revise its policy in the Middle East** in general and in relation to Palestine in particular. At the **Moscow conference, held on October 9, 1944**, Soviet representatives, in conversations with

British and American diplomats, for the **first time raised the question of Palestine.**

V. Molotov's proposal to E. Eden, was that the **British troops were completely withdrawn from Egypt and Palestine, and in return the Soviet Union would withdraw its troops from Northern Iran.** However, E. Eden and the American Ambassador to Moscow, W. Harriman, **rejected this proposal.** The United Kingdom and the United States created a joint commission charged with the task of working out proposals and recommendations for the governments of both countries regarding the future of Palestine. The **report of the Anglo-American Commission was published on April 30, 1946,** it recommended that **Britain retain a mandate** that could later be transferred to the United Nations. The Soviets **criticized the conclusions of the commission, but has not yet defined its clear position on the Palestinian problem.** As the head of the Arab department of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency E. Sasson noted in his letter dated June 28, 1946, stated:

“they [the leaders of the USSR] do not want to determine their place in the Jewish-Arab conflict in Palestine,” however, “they want to be an influential factor in The Arab East, to intervene in the problems of the region and participate in decision-making ... ” (*Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents Volume 1, p. 154.*)

Immediately after the end of the Moscow conference, **Stalin instructed the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) to develop proposals** on a possible policy of the USSR in the Middle East. For a detailed study of the issue, **three commissions were formed,** headed by I. Maisky, M. Litvinov and S. Lozovsky. **None of the conclusions of the commissions was approved** by the NKID, so at this stage the

position of the **Soviet Union was reduced to two fundamentally important points:** 1) the earliest possible withdrawal of the British mandate and 2) the establishment of the UN mandate.

In **January 1947**, Great Britain made a last attempt to independently resolve the question of Palestine and convened a conference in London (London Conference), in which all interested parties participated. Foreign Minister E. Bevin proposed a fundamentally new plan for resolving the situation in Palestine, **based not on the principle of dividing the country**, but on the **principle of cantonization** - the creation of Jewish and Arab administrative units and a triple **Jewish-Arab-British government in Jerusalem**. The proposals were **rejected by both** Jews and Arabs. As a result of the failure of the negotiations, on February 14, 1947, E. Bevin announced the transfer of the question of the future of Palestine to the UN. On **April 28, 1947**, a special session of the UN General Assembly began to work on the agenda of which was the question of the future of Palestine. **Considering the post-war balance of power in the world**, reflected in the structure of the United Nations, this or that decision depended on the positions, mainly of two superpowers - **the USSR and the USA**.

With the transfer of the question of Palestine to the UN, the Middle East department of the **USSR Foreign Ministry** adopted a **new concept of Soviet policy** towards Palestine. Now the position of the Soviet Union was that **it was necessary not only to remove the British mandate** for Palestine as quickly as possible, but also **to create a unified Arab-Jewish state there**. According to the plan of Soviet diplomats, the UN should **develop a "statute of a single independent democratic Palestine** with the provision

of equal national and democratic rights to the peoples inhabiting it."

Speaking at a meeting of the special session of the UN General Assembly on May 14, 1947, the representative of the USSR A. A. Gromyko said that **"the British mandate regime turned the country into a paramilitary police state, living in constant tension"**, and, taking into account all the disasters that befell the Jewish people during the Second World War, it is necessary to find an early solution to the **fate of the surviving Jews**. Speaking about the future of Palestine, A. A. Gromyko noted that **"the legitimate interests of the Jewish, as well as the Arab people of Palestine can be protected only on condition of the creation of an independent joint democratic Arab-Jewish state."**

However, as the Soviet representative emphasized, the **final decision** on the future of Palestine should be taken only after considering the conclusions of the UN special commission. **If she confirms that relations between Jews and Arabs in Palestine are so damaged that the creation of a two-pronged state is impossible, then "then it would be necessary to consider the second option, which provides for the division of Palestine into two independent independent states: Jewish and Arab"** (*Soviet-Israeli relations, 1941-1953. Collection of documents, volume 1, p. 217.*)

Thus, **in May 1947**, the Soviet Union officially supported the possibility of creating an **independent Jewish state in Palestine only if** the creation of a **two-pronged state is impossible**. Thus, **for the first time the USSR clearly defined its position** on this issue of Middle East policy.

The day after the meeting of the UN General Assembly, **May 15, 1947**, a special commission was created from

representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. The **commission was responsible for reviewing the current situation in Palestine and submitting recommendations to the UN**. After three months of work, on **September 1, 1947**, the commission presented its report in which, **the abolition of the mandate for Palestine and granting it independence** were approved by **all members of the commission**. Meanwhile, regarding the issue of the future structure of **an independent Palestine**, there were **disagreements**, formalized in the so-called "**Majority Plan**" (Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay spoke for it), which **assumed the division of the country into two independent states** and bringing Jerusalem under international control, and the "**Minority Plan**" (supported by Iran, India and Yugoslavia), which provided **for the creation of a single federal state** with the capital in Jerusalem.

Soon after the UN special commission formulated its proposals, **discussions on the proposed project** began in Moscow. **V. Molotov**, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, sent a telegram to his deputy A. Vyshinsky in New York:

"**You should bear in mind** that when the directive for Gromyko, known to you, **proposed the creation of a two-pronged state as the first option** for resolving the Palestinian issue, it was done **by us for tactical reasons**. **We cannot take the initiative in creating a Jewish state**, but our position is **better expressed by the second version** of our directive, that is, an independent Jewish state. Since the majority of the commission spoke in favor of the creation of a separate Jewish state, **you should support the opinion of this majority**, which corresponds to our basic directive on this

issue". (Y. Strizhov, *USSR and the creation of the State of Israel, International Affairs* No. 11–12, 1995, p.94)

Vyshinsky's telegram to Molotov dated October 15, 1947, stated:

"Our statement on Palestine was greeted by the Jews with great approval. The Arabs are disappointed, although after Gromyko's speech at the emergency session they had very little hope for the possibility of changing our position". (*"International life"*, No. 11–12, 1995. P. 97.)

Thus, the **Soviet Union reaffirmed its previous position: if the UN Commission considers the creation of a unified Arab-Jewish state is impossible, then the division of Palestine** into independent Jewish and Arab states is necessary. On **October 26, 1947**, Stalin gave his consent to support the partition of Palestine.

The Soviets **officially voiced its position** through its representative to the UN A.A. Gromyko. In response to criticism from the representatives of the Arab countries, A. A. Gromyko said that the Arabs "indicate that **the division of the territory is a historical injustice**. But one cannot agree with this point of view, if only because the Jewish people were associated with Eretz Yisrael **for a long historical period of time** ...In addition, we cannot lose sight of the situation in which the Jewish people found themselves as a **result of the last world war** ... The Jews as a people suffered more than any other people ... In **Western Europe there was not a single state** that could defend properly the extent of the interests of the Jewish people from arbitrariness and violence on the part of the Nazis ... **The proposal to divide Palestine into two independent states** and the position taken by the Soviet Union on this issue **are not directed against the Arabs**, in our

deep conviction, such a solution to the issue **corresponds to the fundamental the national interests of not only Jews, but also Arabs.** "

Three days later, on **November 29, 1947**, a UN resolution was adopted, providing for the partition of Palestine and the creation of two independent states.

The leadership controlled the votes of five UN member states at once: the USSR, Ukraine (Ukrainian SSR), Belarus (BSSR), Czechoslovakia and Poland. One vote was not enough to secure a qualified majority of two-thirds. Therefore, at the initiative of the Americans, representatives of the Philippines and Paraguay, who were absent from the preliminary vote, were urgently brought to New York. Before the second decisive vote, A. A. Gromyko made a clear and firm proposal on the creation of two states. Ultimately, in a decisive vote, **the five countries of the Soviet bloc secured** the required two-thirds majority.

In resolution **181/11**, the UN General Assembly approved the partition of Palestine and agreed to the formation of two states on its territory: **an Arab and a Jewish.**

	Jews	Arabs	
The Jewish State	498 000	407 000	905 000
The Arab State	10 000	725 000	735 000
City of Jerusalem	100 000	105 000	205 000

Jewish was allocated an area of 14.1 thousand square km (56% of the entire territory of Palestine), inhabited;

Arabs was allocated 11.1 thousand sq. km, and an international zone was established.

Although United States voted for the partition of the mandated Palestine, and immediately recognized **Israel de facto**, and imposed an arms embargo on the Middle East in March of the following year and declared that such a partition could not be carried out. Even on the eve of Britain's formal withdrawal from Israel in May, US was still urging Israeli leaders not to declare independence.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, not only voted for partition, but also became the first state to recognize **Israel de jure** three days after independence, and came out in support of the Jewish state.

Looking at the documents, **Soviets had the preference of one state solution** but seeing that it was not possible they had to **choose the only viable option of two state solution** which was better than the alternative - US Dominion, or the continuation of British mandate. **British and French had already divided the Middle East** - Arab Land in small pieces based on the oil production and already had set up its puppet leaders who were ready to fight each other with the arm supply by British. As Vyshinsky put it; two state solution could make it "possible to eliminate the enmity between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. This **plan turned out to be unfulfilled not because it is bad**, but because **the states that could have implemented this plan did not want to do it**"

It is not that Soviets was not aware, did not know or expect **the Israel will at the end side with the US**; in one of the document clearly states;

"The fact that at the moment the leading group **(Zionists) of Palestinian Jews** "are turning their eyes to the USSR," is caused **by purely opportunistic circumstances**. By virtue of their **class nature**, the

Zionists will support the United States, not the USSR."

However, this did not let them betray the Marxist Leninist principle; Gromyko states;

"The Soviet Union supports and cannot but support the aspirations of any state and any people, no matter how small its weight in international affairs, aimed at fighting against foreign dependence and the remnants of colonial oppression."

I am not sure if any of these has already been translated to English, regardless comrade Svitlana translated some selected related documents presenting the conditions and the reasons for the stand of Soviets on the issue of Palestine.

Erdogan A

**NOTE OF MINISTER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE
USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY
OF THE CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN**

October 26, 1947

Secret

In a telegram dated October 27, Vyshinsky reported that the first;

The Subcommittee of the Palestinian Committee has begun to draw up a plan for a transitional Palestine structure on the basis of the unanimously adopted recommendations and the report of the majority of the Special Committee.

Vyshinsky makes the following suggestions:

1. Cancellation of the mandate from January 1, 1948.
2. The withdrawal of British troops no later than 3-4 months from the date of the cancellation of the mandate.
3. Establishment of a transitional period of no more than one year from the date of cancellation of the mandate.
4. The administration of Palestine during the transitional period is entrusted to the UN, represented by the Security Council, through a special commission made up of representatives of the member states.

The Security Council; The seat of the commission is Palestine.

5. A special commission is carrying out measures to establish the boundaries of the Jewish and Arab states in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly on the partition of Palestine.

6. The special commission, after consulting the democratic parties and public organizations of the Jewish and Arab states, elects in each of the states a temporary government council, whose activities are carried out under the general guidance of the special commission.

7. Provisional government council of each of the states no later than 6 months from the date of its formation, it conducts elections to the constituent assembly on a democratic basis.

Election regulations are drafted by government councils and approved by a special commission of the Security Council.

8. The constituent assembly of each of the states develops a democratic constitution and elects a government.

9. Provisional government councils, after their formation, begin, under the supervision of a special commission, to create administrative bodies - central and local.

10. These government councils as soon as possible must form an armed militia from citizens of their state in a number sufficient to maintain internal order and prevent border clashes. This armed militia will be operatively under the command of its national commanding staff, but general military-political control over its activities will be carried out by a special commission.

Vyshinsky points out that the above provisions basically coincide with the opinion of the representatives of the Jewish Agency.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky's proposals.

V. Molotov

On the paper document: "Comrade. Poskrebyshev reported by HF *, that Comrade Stalin agrees. 28.X. Podcerob".

AVP RF, f. 06, op. 9, p. 22, d. 267, l. 72-73.

* High frequency ad hoc government communications.

RECORDING A CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY
MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR F.T.
GUSEVA WITH EGYPT'S AMBASSADOR IN THE USSR
BINDARI-PASHA

December 13, 1947

Secret

Today, December 13, the envoy of Egypt, Bindari Pasha, came to me on a protocol visit.

[...] 1 Bindari then turned to the question of Egypt's response to the United Nations decision on Palestine. He pointed out that. I would like to state my point of view not in an official manner and not as a representative of my country, but simply as a friend of the Soviet Union. Bindari said **he did not understand why the Soviet Union voted to partition Palestine**. In his opinion, one should vote only for the withdrawal of British troops from Palestine and the abolition of the mandate. The question of the future structure of Palestine should be left to the population itself. Bindari noted that, from his point of view, the position of the Soviet Union on the Palestinian issue contributed, on the one hand, to the growth of anti-Soviet sentiments in Egypt and, on the other hand, was a pretext for putting pressure on progressive forces in Arab countries. Bindari stressed that it would be better if the Soviet Union remained neutral on this issue and did not support the United States.

In response to these considerations, I said that the position of the Soviet Union in relation to Egypt and other countries was always clear and precise, namely, that **we adhere to the principle of equality and respect for the sovereignty of all states, both small and large**.

I further pointed out that **the position of the Soviet Union on Palestine is also clear and definite**. The Soviet Union has no vested interests in Palestine.

In conclusion, Bindari again began to say that the position of the Soviet Union on the Palestinian issue caused an unfriendly reaction in the Arab countries and disrupted the evolution that had taken place in the Arab countries in their relations with the Soviet Union in recent years.

At the end of the conversation, Bindari handed me a memo regarding the shipment of the remaining amount of cholera vaccine to Egypt.

I was present at the conversation with Comrade S. Kudryavtsev.

F. Gusev

WUA RF. F. 087. Op. 10.P.13.D. 2. L. 21-23.

**FROM THE RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S.
MALT WITH PRIME MINISTER AND INTERIM
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF LEBANON R.
SOLKH**

December 23, 1947

Secret

Due to the delay in processing the transfer of the site to us, I met with Riad Solh to remind him of the need to expedite the completion of the formalities. He, referring to his long absence from Lebanon, summoned Fuad Ammun¹ and asked me to settle the issue with him, since, in his words, the issue has been resolved in principle and the formalities should not cause difficulties.

When it came to current political issues in the Middle East, in particular, the meetings of the political committee of the Arab League² in Cairo, Solh said that the **Arab countries had finally agreed under no circumstances to agree to the partition of Palestine** and the creation of a Jewish state in it, to resist by all means. against partition and wage a struggle by all means, no matter how long it lasts. At the same time, he repeated the words already said to me once by the President of Syria, Shukri al-Quatli, that if necessary, the Arabs will fight for the preservation of Palestine for 200 years, as it was during the crusades.

When I asked whether all the consequences of such a position of the Arab countries had been discussed in sufficient detail at the political committee, he answered in the affirmative and stated that the Arab countries could not equal the strength of other powers, but **they would never agree to the partition of Palestine and the formation of a Jewish state.** because the

partition means the de facto annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan. Consequently, this **will strengthen the position of King Abdullah and those behind him.**

Thus, Riad Solh indirectly confirmed that the initiator and main inspirer of the struggle of the Arab countries against the partition of Palestine is Syria, which is afraid that after the accession of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan, the question of the creation of Greater Syria will arise, against which it will then be much more difficult to resist than currently.

Answering my separate questions about the Cairo meeting of the political committee of the Arab League, Riad Solh said that at present the Arab countries do not envisage organizing the struggle outside Palestine. The Arab armies have no intention of entering Palestine yet. Moreover, a general command for the leadership of the struggle for Palestine has not yet been determined, and the Jerusalem mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini has not been recognized as the main leader of this struggle.

His headquarters will not be located in the Lebanese city of Saida, located near the Palestinian border, as the Arab newspapers wrote about it. In addition, economic sanctions against the powers and states that voted for the partition of Palestine will not be applied for now.

At present, the basis of the struggle for Palestine is being built on the basis of the guerrilla struggle in Palestine itself. At the same time, Riad Solh made it clear that even this guerrilla movement within Palestine itself would not have a centralized command. Consequently, all those timid hints of the Arab press that at the Cairo meetings of the political committee of the Arab League no agreement was reached between the Arab countries on any of the main issues of the

practical organization of the struggle to preserve the so-called Arab character of Palestine, are fully confirmed. In other words, the contradictions existing between the Arab countries were not overcome on any of the main issues, and the Iraqi and Trans-Jordanian Hashemites remained in their positions of struggle against the Jerusalem mufti, on the one hand, and against Syria and Saudi Arabia, on the other. At the same time, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, supporting the Jerusalem mufti, did not make concessions to the Hashemites, and Egypt, apparently, remained in its positions to adhere to a certain degree of neutrality in these matters.

However, in the conversation, Riad Solkh made it very dull to understand that the deployment of an active struggle in Palestine was scheduled for some other time and, apparently, more distant. Consequently, the possibility is not excluded that, with the consent of the British, the struggle in Palestine will unfold at a time when the British begin to evacuate Palestine, and the United Nations will not have time to create an organ and military forces capable of ruling Palestine and maintaining order and security there.

When I asked whether the newspaper reports about the **British intention to settle a number of issues with the Arab countries were true**, Solkh replied that to a certain extent these newspaper reports were true, since the Iraqi leaders had informed him that they had begun negotiations with the British on revising the British government. -The Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and, according to them, the negotiations are developing successfully. Therefore, the possibility is not excluded that the existing British military bases in Iraq will soon be canceled. In addition, the Prime Minister of Transjordan, Samir Rifai Pasha, also informed him of the British consent to begin negotiations on revising the Anglo-

Transjordan treaty of 1946, and Samir Rifai Pasha would soon leave for London. When I asked him whether these negotiations were being conducted in isolation from each other or on a common basis, he replied that, according to the Iraqis and Trans-Jordanians, the negotiations were being conducted on a common basis, but he allegedly did not know what the content of this common basis was. [...]

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 7. D. 6.L. 82-85, 87.

**PRESENTATION BY THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULIN AND
DEPUTY HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT
OF THE USSR MFA MA MAKSIMOVA TO DEPUTY
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A.
ZORIN**

January 5, 1948

Secret

1. Bindari Pasha's conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador Popovich indicates that Bindari decided to find out through a third party whether the Soviet Government is firmly in its positions on the Palestinian issue and whether it is possible for the Arab countries to bargain out concessions from the USSR on this issue by threatening to crush everything progressive and, in particular, communist organizations in Arab countries.

It seems to us that there is hardly any need to react to this kind of sounding by Bindari.

2. As for our replies to the official inquiries of the Egyptian envoy, they (answers) were given on all questions that the envoy put before the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A list of questions for which no answers have been given to the inquiries of the Egyptian mission is attached.

3. Bindari Pasha and earlier in his conversations (for example, in a conversation with Comrade Ya.A. Malik on May 11, 1947) tried to show himself as a true friend of the USSR and insisted on receiving more specific statements from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on various issues related to Egypt and Arab countries.

For example, Bindari, in the period before **Egypt submitted the issue of Anglo-Egyptian disagreements to the UN**, tried more than once to find out in detail the position of the USSR in a possible analysis of the conflict in the UN.

This probe by Bindari Pasha was also reacted with restraint, proceeding from the position that we did not want to be used by the Egyptian elite during bargaining with the British. The Egyptian envoy was told that since Egypt did not refer its question to the Security Council, it is difficult to say anything about our future position on this issue.

I. Bakulin M Maksimov

WUA RF. F. 021. Op. 26. P.44. D.16.Sheet 1.

**FROM THE RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
USSR AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S.
MALT WITH PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SYRIA J. MARDAM BEEM**

5 and 7 January 1948

Secret

I met with Mardam and told him that the USSR mission in Syria insisted on investigating the November 30, 1947 attack on the premises of the Syrian Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR and the destruction of the exhibition dedicated to the Soviet Union and other property in the premises belonging to the All-Union Society for Cultural Communication with abroad. At the same time, the mission reserves the right to return to the issue of compensation for incurred losses.

Mardam took from me our note of December 7, 1947, which was returned by the Syrian Foreign Ministry to our mission during his absence, got acquainted with its content and began to explain the reasons for its return in a very confused way. At the same time, he admitted that there were indeed irresponsible elements among the demonstrators who attacked not only the Syrian Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR, but also the American and French diplomatic missions, which is incompatible with generally accepted rules, and therefore the Syrian government had to immediately adopt the appropriate measures.

At this time, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Syria Mohsen Barazi entered Mardam's office, who replaced him as Minister of Foreign Affairs when sending our note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He immediately began by saying that the note

from the Soviet mission is not acceptable because it concerns exclusively internal Syrian issues. [...]

On Wednesday, January 7, Mardam Bey, without any special preambles, immediately stated that, despite the fact that the **Syrian government is very dissatisfied with the position of the Soviet Union on the Palestinian issue**, nevertheless, it believes that there is no reason for the deterioration of relations between the two countries from for such, in fact, a minor incident, therefore, it intends to maintain in the future friendly relations with the Soviet Union, which existed before.

After discussing in detail, the issue of the incidents that occurred in Damascus on November 30, the Syrian government decided to conduct a detailed investigation of all incidents that occurred on that day, including the issue of the attack on the premises of the Syrian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union. The Syrian government has already instructed prosecutors to start investigations, and today the first demonstrations against such a government decision have already taken place in Damascus.

As for the losses incurred by VOKS in the attack on the premises of the society, the Syrian government is ready to resolve this issue in a friendly way and he personally, in particular, asks me to provide him with the value of all the property that was in the premises of the society. At the same time, he hopes that the Soviet government also wishes to resolve the incident in a friendly way, so he asks that the incident be considered settled. I replied to him that I would bring his message to the attention of the Soviet government.

Note: There is no reason for Mardam to believe that the "investigation" will yield any results, since his own people were campaigning for the attack on the premises of the

society. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that he recognized the validity of our protest, officially announced the beginning of the investigation, and agreed to "amicably," by way of settling the issue of compensation for the material damage caused, we should, under the pretext of clarifying the losses, contact the management staff of the company and try gradually restoring it to work.

Turning to the issues of current politics, Mardam said that at the Cairo meetings of the heads of the Arab governments and the meetings of the political committee, it was decided to use all the means, methods, and possibilities of the Arab countries to prevent the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Answering my questions, he said that on the issue of the general political leadership of the struggle for Palestine, no agreement had yet been reached and that the information that had appeared on the formation of an interim Palestinian Arab government was not yet known to him in detail.

There is an agreement between the Arab countries regarding the general military command of the troops assigned by the Arab countries for their deployment on the Palestinian borders, and a special military council will command them. However, he refused to name the names of the members of this council.

As for the volunteers, he only noticed that there was a shortage of weapons.

Note: Judging by the tone of Mardam Bey's conversation on the Palestinian issue, it was felt that **the Arabs were hiding something. Therefore, it is likely that the current Arab leaders have come to an agreement with the British** and the time of active operations in Palestine is apparently timed to coincide with the period that **will begin with the withdrawal**

of **British troops from Palestine** before the arrival of UN forces there.

When I asked about the possibility of the arrival of King Abdullah in Lebanon, Mardam replied that there was such an intention, but Abdallah's trip to Lebanon would not take place, and a meeting between the presidents of Syria and Lebanon would soon take place. But when I asked him what issues would be discussed at this meeting, he replied that the main issue is Palestinian.

Note: In my opinion, **it will not be the Palestinian issue in the literal sense of the word that will be discussed**, but, apparently, the issue of the **concessions that the Arab countries of Great Britain** can make in exchange for the **British offered support to the Arab countries in the Palestinian issue**.

Messenger D MALOD

WUA RF. F. 0128. Op. 11.P. 8. D. 5.L. 36-37, 39-42.

CONCLUSION OF COUNSELOR OF THE USSR MFA B.E. STEIN'S DRAFT STATUTE OF JERUSALEM DRAFTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES "

March 1, 1948

On December 1, 1947, the Trusteeship Council established an ad hoc committee to draft the Statute of Jerusalem, composed of representatives from the United Kingdom, the United States, France, China, Australia, and Mexico. The representative of the United States, Gehrig, was elected Chairman of the Committee.

On January 26, 1948, the Committee approved, as a recommendation to the Trusteeship Council, the draft Statute of Jerusalem, consisting of 45 articles and a preamble.

This draft is to be discussed in the second part of the 2nd session of the Trusteeship Council. The second part of the session of the Trusteeship Council was supposed to be convened in mid-February 1948, however, there is still no information on the date for the convening of the Trusteeship Council.

The draft of the Statute of Jerusalem is mainly based on the relevant section of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. Nevertheless, in a number of paragraphs, the draft deviates from the relevant provisions of the resolution, and all these deviations are, from our point of view, undesirable.

The main flaw in the project is to give the Governor of Jerusalem almost unlimited power to the detriment of the rights of the Legislative Council.

Extending the relevant provisions of the November 29, 1947 resolution, the draft Statute grants the Governor the following prerogatives:

1. The resolution only says that "**the governor organizes special police units,**" (part 111 4c).

The draft Statute says that "the governor will organize ... in such quantity as he considers necessary, ...

Thus, only the governor (**without any participation of the Legislative Council**) is given the right to determine the number of police units (Article 5, paragraph 4).

2. **This unrestricted right conferred** by the Statute on the Governor is further strengthened by a special clause (33), which prohibits the Legislative Council from reducing the governor's appropriation for the maintenance of the police force.

The resolution on November 29 does not contain a corresponding decree at all.

3. The resolution says that administrative staff is provided to assist the governor (part 111 2).

The draft Statute establishes a new position for the Chief Secretary, "to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council on the recommendation of the Governor," (art. 16)

Further, **this article also establishes the "Administrative Council"**, which is not provided for in the resolution, consisting of the Chief Secretary and such other chief officials and citizens as the governor may appoint," (Article 16).

Thus, the power of the governor not only expands on its own, but is also supplemented by the power of the General

Secretary and the Administrative Council, entirely subordinate to the governor and dependent on him.

4. The resolution of November 29 **grants the governor “the right of veto over bills that are incompatible”** with ... “the provisions set out in the Statute of the city” (part 111 5). Further, the resolution grants the Governor “the authority to issue temporary regulations in cases where the Council (Legislative) does not adopt in a timely manner bills deemed necessary for the normal functioning of the government,” (ibid.).

The draft Statute goes much further. First of all, according to article 24 of the draft, the governor is given the right to temporarily suspend the activities of the Legislative Council (the wording of this article is not clear enough). During this time, the governor can issue laws in the form of orders, which will be binding. Further, during the activity of the Legislative Council, the Governor may also issue orders having the force of law unless the Council has passed such a bill or such resolution at such time and in such a manner as the Governor may deem reasonable and appropriate. (Article 23 p. 5).

Such an expanded formulation, deviating from the November 29 resolution (which speaks only of the timeliness of the adoption of bills), **gives the governor truly unlimited rights.**

5. The **infringement of the rights of the Legislative Council** takes place in the draft Statute also in the following respects:

a) The Chairman of the Legislative Council, according to the draft Statute, may “Not be a member of the Legislative Council, (Art. 25 p. 2).

6) The budgetary right of the Legislative Council is limited by the fact that "only the governor submits budgets to the Legislative Council," (Article 33) and nothing is said about the budget initiative of the members of the Legislative Council. Another limitation was stated above (budget for the police).

c) The rights of the Legislative Council in the field of external relations are also limited, since the governor can sign agreements only by consulting the Legislative Council on these agreements (we are talking about international agreements), but **without seeking either the prior or subsequent consent of the Legislative Council.**

6. The rights of the governor in the field of external relations are expanded in the direction that only he agrees to accredit representatives of any state in Jerusalem. This exclusive right may lead to the fact that the governor, at his own discretion, may not agree, for example, to the accreditation of a representative of the USSR in Jerusalem. The corresponding article (article 35, paragraph 4) of the **draft does not even establish an appeal against the actions of the governor** to the Trusteeship Council.

7. The resolution of November 29 does not establish the so-called working languages, defining only Arabic and Hebrew as official languages. There was a struggle on this issue in the Palestinian Committee since **it was proposed to declare only English and French working languages.**

Article 30 of the draft Statute establishes that English and French are the working languages.

All the provisions of the draft Statute noted above, from our point of view, should be recognized as undesirable and unacceptable.

The statute is currently being discussed by the Trusteeship Council, where, as comrade Gromyko points out, there are disagreements between the British and the Americans. While the Americans seek to strengthen the powers of the Trusteeship Council (in the issue of governing Jerusalem), **the British are doing their best to expand the authority of the governor.** Obviously, **the American position is more advantageous for us than the British one.**

The main difficulty at the moment is that the representative of the USSR is not present at this session of the Trusteeship Council. There are no states friendly to us in the Trusteeship Council, through which we could influence the results of the discussion of the Statute.

B. Stein

WUA RF. F. 47. Op. 3.P. 11. D. 29.L. 1-4.

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE
USSR MFA S.A. Vinogradov and Counselor of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs B.E. SHTEIN TO DEPUTY
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Ya.
VYSHINSKY "ON THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE
DOCUMENT OF THE UN SECOND GENERAL",
"RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PALESTINIAN
COMMISSION OF THE UN AND THE SC "**

March 15, 1948

On March 9, 1948, the UN Secretary General submitted to the Security Council a working document entitled "Relations between the UN Palestinian Commission and the Security Council," drawn up at the request of the Palestinian Commission by the Secretariat's legal experts.

The working paper drafted by the Secretariat notes that:

1. The Palestinian Commission, established by the General Assembly in accordance with Article 22 of the Charter and placed under the leadership of the Security Council for convenience and greater practicality, bears the primary responsibility for the implementation of the plan for the partition of Palestine.

2. Despite the fact that the Commission has the primary responsibility for the implementation of the plan, **the Security Council must take the necessary measures** and give appropriate instructions to the Commission in order to implement the resolution of the General Assembly, which, **however, cannot change the essence of the partition plan.**

3. The Charter, which defines the functions and powers of the Security Council, does not specifically provide for the adoption by the Council of responsibilities such as those

prescribed by the Assembly resolution. However, the interpretation of the UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference and the precedent of the Security Council taking responsibility for the territory of Trieste in the light of the corresponding interpretation of Article 24 of the Charter **makes it possible for the Council to assume responsibility vis-à-vis Palestine**, as requested by the General Assembly.

4. In view of the **current situation in Palestine**, the Security Council is empowered to enforce a General Assembly decision and **may establish an international military force** to assume responsibility for maintaining law and order immediately **after the end of the mandate**. This military force would be in the nature of **an international police force**, rather than the military force provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

Conclusions: A working document prepared by the Secretariat contains provisions that support the **right of the Security Council to enforce the decision to partition Palestine. It runs counter to the American view** that the Security Council does not have the power to impose a political solution by force on the recommendation of the General Assembly or the Security Council itself.

We would consider it expedient when discussing this document in the Security Council **to support the point of view stated** in the document.

B. Stein, S. Vinogradov

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21. P. 23.D. 346. L. 27-28.

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF THE
USSR MFA S.A. VINOGRADOVA DEPUTY MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY**

March 19, 1948

In connection with the decision of the Security Council to hold consultations on the Palestinian question **between the five great powers**, the first meeting of their representatives was held on 8 March.

Despite the fact that the Security Council dropped the relevant paragraph of the American draft resolution on consultations with the Palestinian Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the main Palestinian communities, **the US representative again raised the question of the need for such consultations.** This US proposal was supported by the representatives of France and China.

The representative of England, in accordance with his statement in the Council about non-participation in the consultations, did not appear at the meeting, however, informing him about his consent to give information.

Representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab High Committee accepted the American invitation to participate in the consultation.

On March 11, the US representative distributed to the meeting participants a list of questions (an average of 9 questions) **prepared by the US delegation for Jews, Arabs**, the Palestinian Commission, and the Mandatory Power, allegedly needed to obtain additional information.

The main questions are as follows:

1. Is the proposed partition plan **acceptable to Jews and Arabs?**
2. Can the partition plan be carried out by **peaceful means**, through an agreement between Jews and Arabs?
3. Could modifications to the adopted partition plan make it more possible to reach an agreement between Jews and Arabs?
4. Has the Palestinian Commission had new negotiations with the Mandatory Power regarding the phasing out of the mandate and the date of the commission's arrival in Palestine, and what are the results of the negotiations?
5. What are the possibilities of cooperation between Jews and Arabs with the UN administration in the city of Jerusalem?
6. Are the principles of the proposed economic union essential to the economic life of Palestine as a whole?

The questions prepared by the Americans were received during subsequent meetings, both written and oral replies from the Jewish Agency, the Arab High Committee, the Palestinian Commission and England.

Based on the replies received, it can be concluded about the attitude of the parties and the Mandatory Power to the main provisions of the partition plan.

1. About the plan of partition of Palestine into two states.

For Jews, the partition plan is acceptable, although it has not yet received "official ratification," from the Jewish community of Palestine.

The Arabs strongly oppose the partition decision and believe that "the only solution that is consistent with the

ideals of the UN Charter and that can guarantee peace and security in Palestine is the formation of an independent state from all of Palestine,”.

The Mandatory Power **refuses to take any measures** aimed at the implementation of the partition plan. At the same time, the Mandatory Power **“Will not put any obstacles** to the implementation of the plan, but cannot take an active part in its implementation.

2. On the possibility of fulfilling the partition plan by peaceful means.

According to the representatives of the Jewish Agency, **one cannot hope for the possibility of implementing** the plan as a result of an agreement between the parties. The main obstacle to the implementation of the plan, Jews consider opposition to the plan and **armed intervention from the Arab countries**.

According to the **representative of the Mandatory Power**, the partition plan will be difficult to implement if the Palestinian Commission does not rely on military force.

The Palestinian Commission does not consider it possible to **carry out the plan by peaceful means**, either completely or in its most essential part, as long as the **stubborn resistance of the Arabs continues**.

As for the Arabs, according to the representative of the Jewish Agency, **“Arabs demand from the Jews complete surrender and nothing else satisfies them**.

3. About the possibility of changing (modifying) the section plan.

For Jews, no major plan changes will be acceptable.

Representatives of the Palestinian Commission responded in the negative to this question, pointing out that, since the Commission was acting in accordance with a General Assembly resolution, it was not in a position to “undertake possible modifications to the partition plan, either substantively or procedurally.”

The **representative of the Mandatory Power** declined to answer on this matter, saying that he did not know if such modifications could be made that would be acceptable to Arabs and Jews.

4. On the gradual termination of the mandate and the date of the arrival of the Palestinian Commission in Palestine.

According to the Commission, it had **new negotiations with the Mandatory Power** on these issues. The British replied that **they were firmly committed to retaining undivided control over Palestine** until the end of the mandate, May 15, 1948. Regarding the Commission's visit to Palestine, the Mandatory Power stated that it remained the same. Cadogan confirmed in meetings that **the dates set are not subject to change..**

5. On the interim UN administration over Jerusalem after the termination of the mandate.

Jews are ready to cooperate with the UN administration in the city of Jerusalem, but insist on equal representation in the Legislative Council of Jerusalem.

The Palestinian Commission on this issue is of the opinion that the establishment of a UN administration in Jerusalem will be possible only if the partition plan receives the approval of both Palestinian communities and is carried out peacefully, since with respect to all supplies and communications with

the outside world, the city will be completely dependent on the support of the Jewish and Arab states.

6. On the principles of the economic union of the Jewish and Arab states.

According to Jewish Agency officials, **the economic union envisaged** by the Assembly's plan was not proposed at the initiative of the Jews. They believed that such an alliance curtailed the sovereignty of states, and were inclined to envisage other forms of economic cooperation between Jews and Arabs. **The Jews accepted this part of the partition plan after some hesitation.**

Conclusions:

As we expected, this information requested by the American proposal from the Jews, Arabs, the Palestinian Commission, and the Mandatory Power **gave almost nothing new to resolve the situation** in Palestine.

The last meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council took place on 17 March. Representatives of the United States, USSR, France and China developed a preliminary text of a joint statement to the Council, containing a statement of the positions of Jews, Arabs, the Palestinian Commission and the Mandatory Power regarding the plan for the partition of Palestine and the possibility of its implementation, as well as recommendations for taking measures to immediately end violent actions and restoring peace and order in Palestine. However, some points of this draft statement (on the penetration of **armed elements by sea and land into Palestine**), directed against Jews and Jewish immigration, **provoked objections from the representative of the USSR**, who reserved his position on them.

In this regard, Comrade Gromyko approached us with a proposal that he should seek to correct the unacceptable paragraphs of the text of the statement. **Comrade Molotov on March 19 answered Comrade**. Gromyko agreed with his proposal.

If the representatives of the United States, France and China **do not agree to our amendments** to the draft, then the corresponding points of the joint statement will be submitted to the Security Council on **behalf of the three powers without the approval of the USSR**.

S. Vinogradov

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21. P. 23.D. 346. L. 42-45.

**FROM THE LETTER OF THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN
LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF
THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
MFA I.I. BAKULINA**

April 8, 1948

Secret

To your No. 183 / BB dated March 3, 1948.

At the same time, I am transmitting to you some materials regarding the two Syrian proposals made at the last regular session of the Arab League, convened in Cairo in February this year, regarding:

1. changing the charter of the Arab League in the direction of **prohibiting Arab countries from concluding treaties with foreign powers** that could affect the sovereignty and independence of Arab countries, or grant these powers economic and military privileges;
2. the conclusion of a political and military alliance between the Arab countries.

[...] In conclusion, it should be noted that both proposals of Jamil Mardam Bey in their general form are a positive phenomenon for the Arab countries, for they are aimed at harmonizing their common policy, at stopping or at least weakening the differences and disagreements existing between them, to eliminate the differences between them in foreign policy issues and thereby to exclude the possibility of separate enslavement of the Arab countries by any one or more imperialist powers. In addition, the formation of a political and military alliance between Arab countries on an independent basis, of course,

would increase their overall strength and strengthen their resistance to imperialist harassment against Arab countries.

However, the current specific political conditions in the Middle East, the existing treaty relations of the mentioned some of the Arab countries with Great Britain, as well as the venality of the current reactionary politicians in power in all Arab countries, turn these intentions for Great Britain and the United States in their aspirations to organize the Eastern Bloc into a very convenient means of complete subjugation of the Arab countries, which they are more and more taking possession of.

In this regard, the Syrian proposals in their practical implementation will inevitably result in the formation of one of the types of the Eastern Bloc, completely subordinate to the Anglo-Saxons.

Appendix to the text on page 18.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 7. D. 1.L. 20, 26-27.

**NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN**

April 9, 1948

Secret

I present for approval the draft directive of Comrade Gromyko to session of the General Assembly.

V. Molotov

ATTACHMENT

Draft directives of the USSR delegation to the second special session of the UN General Assembly on the question of Palestine The **Soviet delegation should be guided by the following** in its work at the special session of the General Assembly:

1. To seek election to the Credentials Committee of one representative from the Soviet delegations or from Poland or Czechoslovakia.
2. Do not nominate candidates for the post of Chairman of the Assembly.

The question of support for the nominated candidate will be decided by the delegation on the spot, depending on the situation.

3. To seek election to the General Committee, except for the USSR, two more representatives from Eastern European countries, of which, depending on the situation: two vice-presidents of the Assembly and one chairman of the

committee, or two chairmen of committees and one vice-chairman of the Assembly.

4. To defend the General Assembly resolution of 11/29/1947 **on the partition of Palestine**, guided by the directives given to the Soviet delegations at the special and second sessions of the General Assembly.

Indicate that during the period since the adoption of the said resolution, the United Kingdom in every possible way obstructed its implementation and, in particular, opposed the visit of the Palestinian Commission to Palestine, which was therefore unable to start on-site preparatory work for the section.

Indicate also that the Security Council, for its part, has not exhausted the means at its disposal to implement this resolution.

5. Criticize the American guardianship of Palestine, noting the following:

a) The **new US proposal on the question of Palestine, aimed at overturning** a General Assembly decision adopted by a two-thirds majority, not only fails to bring peace to Palestine, but leads to an exacerbation of the struggle between Jews and Arabs, and at the same time creates a threat to peace and increased anxiety in the Middle East. At the same time, the General Assembly, which took its decision with the active participation of the United States after a detailed discussion of the question of Palestine, is put in a false position as an object of political maneuvers by the ruling circles of the United States, trying to impose on the General Assembly a new solution to the question of Palestine, regardless of the legitimate national interests of the peoples Palestine.

6) US proposal to establish guardianship over Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and Arab population, due to which it meets with a negative attitude and resistance from both Jews and Arabs. Establishing guardianship over Palestine is not a step forward from the mandate system to the national self-determination of the peoples of Palestine, but leaves Palestine in the position of a semi-colony.

c) As for that part of the American proposals, which speaks about the foundations of the organization of power in Palestine, it contradicts the principle of self-government and is imbued with distrust of the ability of the local population to organize the administration of Palestine on a democratic basis on their own.

6. Declare that due to the above considerations the Soviet delegations will vote against the American proposal.

7. Insist on the confirmation of the November 29 resolution and on the adoption by the UN members of effective measures to implement it.

AVP RF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 15, d. 160, l. 4-7.

Publ: Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. – 1998

SUMMARY OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA "SITUATION IN PALESTINE AFTER UN DECISION ON DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY"

April 13, 1948

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations, after more than six months of studying the Palestinian problem, adopted a democratic decision to create two independent states in Palestine - an Arab and a Jewish. This decision, reflecting the aspirations of the Jewish and Arab peoples to build their lives within the framework of nation states, received a positive assessment in democratic circles around the world.

Jews

The news of the creation of the Jewish state caused on November 30, jubilant Jews throughout Palestine, demonstrators thanked the United Nations, the Soviet Union, and **other countries for supporting the partition of Palestine**. Resistance of the Arabs to the UN decision and the widespread clashes between Arabs and Jews made it necessary for the Jews to prepare for the defense of the future Jewish state. The Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Council announced on December 9 the mobilization of the first conscription group (17-25 years old) for security service and use in the Jewish semi-legal military organization Kharan. Ben-Gurion, chairman of the Jewish Agency, declared on January 1, 1948, that the Jews "defended not only themselves and not only the UN regulations, but also the borders of the Jewish state. We have the right to demand that the UN provide us with moral and material support ... These are the birth pangs of the Jewish state, and we will accept them with faith and selfless devotion. "

All the growing resistance of the Arabs to partition dictated the urgency of creating a Jewish militia. Shertok, head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, insisted on January 12, 1948. at a press conference in New York that "the Jews of Palestine need a well-armed and motorized militia of 15-20 thousand people."

The events that unfolded after this forced the Jewish Agency to demand the creation of a militia of 30-35 thousand people, including aviation parts.

This militia was to be created on the Kharana base, which already has some weapons and most of whose soldiers underwent military training in the ranks of the British army during the Second World War.

Jewish organizations launched a worldwide campaign to raise funds for Palestine and purchase weapons, but these efforts met with a ban on the export of military materials from the United States (confiscation of large quantities of explosives in New York) and a thorough blockade of Palestine by the English fleet. The Jews, fearing the possibility of disrupting the UN decision on Palestine due to the resistance of the Arabs, agreed and demanded the use of the UN armed forces to carry out the partition of the country.

Beginning in January 1948, Jews began to set up a provisional government for the Jewish state. The US refusal to support the decision of the General Assembly led to the fact that the Jewish Agency and the National Council decided at a joint meeting on March 23 in Tel Aviv to proclaim a Jewish state on May 16 (the day after the end of the British mandate for Palestine). At the end of March, a Jewish military cabinet was formed in Tel Aviv, into which Ben-Gurion entered. Most of the seats in the proposed government are given to the Labor

Party and the right-wing bourgeois parties, which are closely associated with reactionary circles in the United States.

Jewish Agency rejects US custody offer even for a short period of time, since "guardianship would inevitably bring with it the deprivation of the Jews of the right to national independence.

This would put Palestine in the hands of a foreign military regime.

Meyerson, head of the Political Section of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, said that "we will never agree with the trusteeship or any other decision other than the creation of a Jewish state." Jewish terrorist organizations strongly opposed the "United States betrayal of the cause of the Jews." "In the event that US troops are sent to Palestine to exercise tutelage, we will engage in a fierce struggle with them and will treat the Americans as we treated the British invaders" (Irgun Tsvai Leumi organization, March 24). "American imperialism is no different from British imperialism. We will continue to fight for a Jewish state and against all imperialist claims, even if we are forced to fight alone. But if we carefully consider the current situation, we are almost sure that we will not remain alone in our struggle" (Stern's group, March 22).

Although the Jewish Agency continues to insist on the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine in its official statements, there are symptoms that some groups of Jews are gripped by anxiety and are trying to leave Palestine, so the Jewish Agency was forced to ban Jews from leaving the country.

At the end of March 1948, the rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and influential politician, Dr. Marnes, urged

Jews to agree to the UN trusteeship and the creation of a bi-national state.

Immigration

Despite the refusal of the mandate power to provide, according to the UN decision, a port for Jewish immigration by February 1, several steamers managed to land illegal immigrants on the Palestinian coast. On the night of December 4, 1947, a ship with 182 immigrants broke through the blockade and disembarked its passengers near Tel Aviv, while the UN ship landed 700 people north of Haifa on January 1.

The British government issues monthly 1,500 permits for Jewish immigrants held on the island of Cyprus, where all ships with immigrants approaching Palestine are sent, in particular, at the end of 1947, 2 steamers were sent there, carrying 15 thousand Jews from the Black Sea ports.

The British, having established a blockade of the Palestinian coast, deprived the Jews of the opportunity to receive more or less significant amounts of aid from abroad. England and the United States fear an influx of immigrants from Eastern European countries.

Arabs

The main Arab feudal-bourgeois organizations - the **High Arab Committee and the Arab Bureau, inspired by the British**, opposed the creation of a Jewish state and the partition of Palestine. The United Nations decisions on the Palestinian question drew strong responses in Arab circles and were marked by a three-day protest strike led by the Arab Supreme Committee. Armed uprisings against Jews unfolded with renewed vigor in December 1947 and continue to this

day. Traitors and Quislin from all over the world began to flock to Palestine and took part in the struggle on the side of the Arabs, among them scum Anders, Bosnian Muslims from displaced persons camps in Germany, German prisoners of war who fled from camps in Egypt, "volunteers" from Franco Spain.

The countries of the Arab Lira, following the decisions of the Council of Lira, will send armed Arab detachments to Palestine. The first detachment entered Palestine from Syria on January 9, 1948. It consisted of Syrian, Iraqi, and Lebanese volunteers who, having attacked two Jewish settlements, were forced to retreat back to Syria. This speech was timed to coincide with the beginning of the work of the United Nations Palestinian Commission.

From January to March 1948, they crossed the Palestinian border numerous detachments of Arabs who traveled in cars and were armed with mortars and automatic rifles.

For example, on January 30, 800 well-armed Arabs in 50 trucks crossed the Palestinian-Transjordan border. Arab armed groups are mainly located in the Samaria mountains, headquartered in the city of Nablus, where the commander of the Arab Volunteer Armies, Fawzi Kaukchi, is currently located.

The number of Arab troops was estimated at the beginning of March at 6 thousand people, and according to Arab sources - almost 15 thousand people.

(Note. According to the Jewish Agency, there are 2,500 Syrians, 2,500 Iraqis, and several hundred Egyptians and Lebanese in Palestine.) Arab policemen leave their posts with weapons and join the Arab troops.

The Arabs get their weapons from the Arab countries, which are supplied by England. In March 1948, a mission of the Supreme Arab Committee of Palestine arrived in London to purchase weapons in the amount of 500 thousand pounds, it is expected to receive 10 thousand machine guns, etc., which will be sent to Palestine through neighboring Arab countries. In France, guns and tanks are being purchased, which will be transferred to the Palestinian Arabs through the countries of the Levant. The Transjordanian Arab Legion, maintained and under the command of the British, takes part in the battles against the Jews. Legion soldiers were guarding one of the bridges across the river. Jordan and unimpeded a detachment of 700 Arabs into Palestine. The Arab Legion is the force within Palestine with which Abdullah intends to take over the country after the end of the British Mandate on May 15.

The head of the Arab Supreme Committee is a former mufti of Palestine, who moved to Damascus in March to maintain direct contact with Arab militias in Palestine.

Although the Arabs see the change in US position on the Palestinian issue as their "moral victory," the mufti opposed the custody of Palestine and reiterated the Arab determination to fight to the end. In a March 26 message from the Arab Information Bureau, it is said that "the Arabs will agree to the establishment of guardianship only after the plan for the partition of Palestine has been finally rejected."

Only the leftist National Liberation League opposes the bloody clashes between Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

Clashes between Arabs and Jews

Armed struggle between Jews and Arabs unfolded throughout Palestine. For the first 15 days of December 1947 r. each side had 100 killed and several hundred wounded. On

the border of the Arab city of Jaffa and the Jewish city of Tel Aviv, continuous street fighting, sniper fire and mutual raids have been going on for four months. Movement on the roads can only take place under the condition of a strong armed guard. Jewish convoys of cars between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are attacked and plundered. The Arabs are conducting a systematic attack on Jewish settlements scattered in the southern Nerev desert, destroying the irrigation pipes, without which it is impossible to exist in this arid region.

The scope and brutality of bloody battles is growing from day to day. On December 30, 1947, Jewish terrorists committed the irresponsible act of throwing a bomb at a crowd of Arabs at the entrance to the Anglo-Iraqi Oil Company refinery in Haifa. 6 Arabs were killed and 40 were wounded. The further bloody massacre committed by the Arabs, during which 41 Jews were killed, took place in front of the factory guards carried out by the Arab Legion and British officers.

In Jerusalem, where the population is mixed, Arab-Jewish clashes reached extreme tension. The Hebrew University, the Hadassah hospital, the editorial office of the Jewish newspaper Palestine Post, the house of the former mufti of Palestine, which he handed over to Arab organizations, the Semiramis hotel (the meeting place of the Arab military organization Najada) and a number of other buildings were blown up. For several months 1,800 Jews have been under siege in the old city of Jerusalem.

This quarter, where Jewish "holy places" are concentrated, is surrounded by Arabs and the delivery of food to the besieged can only be carried out on British armored cars. The riots in Palestine led to the development of banditry and robbery, and attacks on banks and trains increased in frequency.

The US peacekeeping statement has had the opposite effect: the fighting is flaring up, the Arabs are using cannons and machine guns, and during the clash in late March, the Jewish armed forces even had several planes.

According to the official data of the British administration, in Palestine for 4 months before April 1, 1948 almost 2 thousand people were killed, including 800 Jews.

The Arabs have recently moved to systematic and planned operations against the Jewish colonies scattered throughout the country. The colonies located in the south of the country, in the Negev, and in the north, in Galilee, are cut off from the main Jewish population of the coastal strip, and their defense, and even more, the implementation of communication between them is an almost impossible task for the semi-legal Jewish militia. Moreover, the Jews are deprived of help from outside people, they suffer heavy losses in killed and wounded, which will have a detrimental effect on the resistance of this small (only 640 thousand people) community.

The British

The "neutral" position of the British on the Palestinian question cannot hide their aspirations, **provoking the internecine struggle of Jews and Arabs**, to thwart the UN decisions on the partition of Palestine and remain in Palestine as a third force, alone or together with the United States, or to transfer Palestine to the Trans-Jordanian king, who will keep it for the UK. Therefore, the British police and army are either inactive or secretly helping the Arabs in their fight against the Jews.

The Jewish newspaper Davar wrote in January 1948 that "the British want to organize chaos of this kind so that by 15 May

large Arab gangs would be concentrated in the country, so that on its borders everything would be ready for an open invasion and that those who defend the UN decision, be deprived of weapons and the ability to defend themselves. "

The National Liberation League newspaper, Al-Ittihad, reported cases in which the British sought to incite Arabs against Jews; the British administration forbade reprinting this message, and the newspaper was closed on January 19.

British soldiers sell arms and ammunition to the Arab detachments, cases of "disappearance" of armored cars have become more frequent - all this is done against the backdrop of soothing statements by the British administration about its desire to preserve peace and order in the country. In fact, by opening the borders of Palestine with neighboring Arab countries (since guarding several bridges on the Jordan, through which Arabs cross in trucks, would not be an impossible task for a hundred thousandth British army), England strictly guards the seacoast, preventing Jews from getting help.

The evacuation of British troops from Palestine has hardly been began, although 4 months have already passed since the UN decision on the gradual withdrawal of the Mandatory Power's troops. Only on March 7, the first batch of 2,000 soldiers was sent.

The British, in whose hands all the values of the Palestinian people, are demanding \$ 74 million from Palestinian funds to pay pensions to British officials and have taken the gold reserves of Palestine to London. In November 1947, the British administration opened trading in state land in Haifa.

Economic life in Palestine Armed clashes have paralyzed many aspects of economic life in Palestine. Railways and road

transport are disorganized and transportation costs have increased significantly. There have been significant increases in food and livestock feed prices, in part due to delivery difficulties.

Palestine, unless vigorous action is taken, will face impending famine in a few months. Already now the Jews of Jerusalem receive 200 gr. bread a day. The industry suffered to a much lesser extent.

Conclusions

1. The situation of the Jews in Palestine is getting worse every day due to the lack of the opportunity to receive help in people and weapons and heavy losses that cannot be compensated due to the small number of the Jewish population in Palestine.

2. The Arabs are encouraged by the help of the Arab countries and England and the US withdrawal from supporting the UN decision. They began a systematic attack on Jewish settlements, making efforts to expand the areas of their rule and capture the city of Jerusalem.

3. The **British administration provides aid to the Arabs** and prevents the organization of the defense by the Jews.

Attaché BVO

A. Semioshkin

AVP RF, f. 0118, op. 2, p. 3, d. 11, l. 123-130.

RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky with a messenger LEBANON IN
THE USSR H. TAKI ED-DINOM

April 13, 1948

Secret

Today at 14 o'clock I received Taki ed-Din at his request. Taki ed-Din began by wanting to state the point of view of the Arabs on the question of Palestine in connection with the fact that the decision adopted by the UN General Assembly on the partition of Palestine was impracticable. Repeating his previous statements about the friendly feelings that the Arabs have for the Soviet Union (in particular, for the Soviet Union's support for Lebanon and Syria in **the evacuation of foreign troops from the territory of these states**), Taki ed-Din began to argue that the only expedient solution to the Palestinian question there will be the creation of a single Palestinian state in which both Jews and Arabs would enjoy equal rights. **He, like other Arabs, believes that the Soviet Union supported the proposal to partition Palestine only because it saw no other way out of the situation in Palestine.** He, Taki ed-Din, has always believed in the sympathy with which the Soviet Union treats the Arabs, and therefore he asks that the question of the future regime of Palestine be considered once again by the Soviet Government.

I replied that we understand the position of the Arab countries on the Palestinian issue. **The partition decision in itself was not bad**, because, thanks to it, it would be possible to eliminate the enmity between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. **This plan turned out to be unfulfilled not because it is bad**, but because **the states that could have implemented this**

plan did not want to do it. I added that the USSR was accustomed to adhering to the adopted decisions and that **we had a negative attitude towards the project of establishing a regime of custody over Palestine.** Noticing that I am not specifically dealing with the Palestinian issue, I expressed at the same time confidence that our representative will be able to cope with his task.

The conversation lasted 30 minutes. Comrade Kostylev was present.

A. Vyshinsky

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P.7, D. 4.L. 3-4.

**LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
LEBANON AND IN SYRIA D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF
THE MIDDLE EASTERN DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR
MFA I.I. BAKULINA**

April 14, 1948

Secret

In addition to our No. 25 / s dated January 23 of this year, addressed to the deputy. Minister Comrade Zorin V. And I am sending you some materials about the newly launched campaign by the Turks for the creation of the Mediterranean Entente with the inclusion of the Arab countries.

In itself, such a campaign, perhaps, would not be of particular interest, because in recent years, the Turks have not started campaigns of this kind for the first time, which invariably ended in complete failure against the Arab countries, since the latter still do not want to contact Turkey if the Americans would not be behind the Turks together with the British. In this regard, at present, the campaign for the formation of the Mediterranean Entente is of a slightly different nature and proceeds in changed conditions, namely, on the one hand, in the West, the Anglo-Saxons managed to put together the Western bloc, which they intend to expand with the creation of the Mediterranean Entente and then the Eastern bloc, on the other hand, the difficulties created by the Anglo-Saxons in resolving the Palestinian and Egyptian issues may force the current Arab leaders to make concessions to the Anglo-Saxons on the formation of the Mediterranean Entente and the Eastern Bloc at the expense of some compensation for them in the Palestinian and Egyptian issues, although the current Arab leaders are well aware that, among all other hardships, an alliance with Turkey will ultimately lead to the restoration

of 400 years of Turkish rule over Arab countries, from which they were freed only in 1918.

The instability of the positions of the Arab countries on the issue of the formation of the Mediterranean Entente in its current development, lack of confidence in their strengths and unwillingness to resist **Anglo-American harassment are manifested in the very symptomatic fact that all previous statements by Turkish leaders** about the need for Turkish-Arab rapprochement immediately aroused the sharpest objections of the Arab press and very harsh and caustic remarks on the Turkish address, while at present the Arab press in its overwhelming majority refrains from commenting on the Turkish proposals.

Despite this position of the Arab press, there is still no reason to believe that this time the Turkish initiative will be more successful than the previous ones, because the broad Arab masses more and more decisively show that they do not want to climb into the Anglo-Saxon yoke without a fight, and even more so offered by a Turkish servant.

Appendix to the text on page 23.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 7. D. 1.L. 45-46.

**LETTER FROM COUNSELOR E.R. LEMBERG TO
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A. Ya. VYSHINSKY**

April 15, 1948

Vyborg, Fortress, 37

I ask, if possible, to familiarize yourself with the attached report: the need to send a significant cadre of Jews from the USSR to Palestine.

The report was compiled by me on my own initiative and addressed to the Government in connection with the fact that, as I see it, the political situation in the M East - especially in Palestine - has become so tense and threatening in relation to our country that the USSR, from my point of view, should show particularly active interest in Palestine.

E.G. Lemberg, lawyer, demobilized guards engineer-captain,
order bearer

WUA RF. F. 47. Op. 3.P. 11. D. 29.L. 74.

MINUTES RECORD OF THE SPEECH OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATION OF THE USSR TO THE UN A.A. Gromyko AT THE SESSION OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE A OF THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

April 20, 1948

A.A. Gromyko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) shares the fears of a number of delegations that the partition plan was not implemented, that the Palestinian issue is being discussed by the General Assembly for the third time, and that one of the Assembly states does not correspond the interests of the Palestinian people and does not contribute to the maintenance of international peace.

According to the partition plan adopted by the General Assembly, the Palestinian Commission should take some measures to create Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. This commission should receive instructions and assistance from the Security Council.

The Security Council, however, not only did not take the necessary measures to implement this decision of the General Assembly, but, on the contrary, complicated the implementation of this plan.

Mr. Gromyko attributes the Security Council's inaction mainly to the position taken by the United States, which is trying to change the decision of the General Assembly. While initially the United States used all its influence to pass the partition plan, it suddenly changed its line on this issue. This change of position was clear as early as 9 December 1947 at the very first meeting at which the Security Council was to discuss measures to implement the decision of the General Assembly. Beginning on November 29, 1947, when the

partition plan was adopted, the United States prepared its own plan, which was formally presented to the Security Council on March 19, 1948, which provided for the establishment of the United Nations trusteeship over Palestine.

Since the last session of the Assembly, public opinion, even in the United States, has found that the position taken by the latter on the Palestinian question is in fact aimed at frustrating the General Assembly resolution. Nobody believed the official denials of the United States. Everyone understood that the United States was preparing a fatal blow to the adopted partition decision and was hatching some new plans with regard to Palestine. They are trying to convince us that the new plan is better than the previous one, although in reality the opposite is true.

The argument is advanced that the partition plan cannot be carried out by peaceful means. This argument would merit attention only if the Security Council took any practical steps to implement this decision, but this was not done.

The inaction of the Security Council in recent months has been the result of the position taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, and some other States.

The Security Council has been making no headway without achieving any useful results. The decision he rendered on March 5, 1948 (document S / 691) was only a simple appeal to the permanent members of the Security Council to make their recommendations to the Palestinian Commission.

The corresponding resolution also contained an appeal to all governments and peoples to do their utmost to put an end to the unrest in Palestine. This decision, however, did not help the Palestinian Commission, and it did not contain the

necessary instructions for the implementation of the partition plan. The appeal to governments and peoples to end the unrest in Palestine remained without consequences, since those to whom it was addressed knew that they could count on complete impunity for their actions.

The meetings of the permanent members of the Security Council have brought to light the fact that the United States is not only unwilling to discuss how a General Assembly decision could be implemented, but wants that decision to be reviewed. From the very beginning, the representative of the United States proposed to arrange consultations with Jews and Arabs, as if there was no decision on Palestine, after which he tried to prove that the decision made was allegedly impossible to enforce by peaceful means. He did not mention, however, that the Security Council had not exhausted the possibilities at its disposal to carry out a General Assembly decision. The last armistice resolution adopted by the Security Council (document S / 723) is not being implemented by those who from the outset decided to fight against the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947.

Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalls that after a comprehensive study of this issue and after discussing all the other proposed solutions, the United Nations has come to the conclusion that the partition of Palestine into two States is the fairest solution.

It is the most just because it meets the national interests of both peoples of Palestine, it will settle relations between these peoples once and for all and this will ensure the maintenance of peace in the Middle East. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalls that after a comprehensive study of this issue and after discussing all the other proposed solutions, the United Nations has come to the conclusion that

the partition of Palestine into two states is the most just solution. It is the most just because it corresponds to the national interests of both peoples of Palestine, it will settle relations between these peoples once and for all and this will ensure the maintenance of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Gromyko points out that the struggle between the two peoples increased during the period of the United Kingdom's mandate.

The partition plan, which provides for close economic cooperation between the two states, could put an end to this struggle. Carrying out the partition would mean the end of the semi-colonial order in Palestine and the recognition that the Jewish and Arab populations, in terms of their political, economic, and cultural development, have reached such a level that allows each of them to create their own independent state. The division would also satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Jewish people, who suffered so much during the existence of the Hitlerite regime.

When discussing the Palestinian question, everyone should keep in mind all these advantages of partition. Apparently, however, some states are ruled not by the needs of Palestine, not by the general interests of the United Nations, but by the political, economic, military and military-strategic interests of one or two powers. These states are ready to sacrifice the aspirations of the peoples of Palestine if this does not correspond to the interests of the leading circles of the United States. The change in the position of the United States on the Palestinian issue is dictated by its oil and military interests. Well-known influential circles, reflecting these interests, are trying to turn Palestine into their strategic and military base, and economically into an American semi-colony.

The trusteeship plan proposed by the United States is likely to exacerbate the struggle in Palestine, threaten peace, and heighten anxiety in the Middle East. In addition, the establishment of guardianship over Palestine does not correspond to the current cultural and political level of development of the Jewish and Arab population. This plan is incompatible with the right to self-determination of the peoples of Palestine, and it will actually put this country in a position of colonial slavery with all the disastrous consequences that come with it.

Finally, the United States plan puts the General Assembly in a false position: the Assembly, after a long study of the issue, adopted a partition plan with the active participation of the United States, and now the same plan is becoming the object of political machinations of the American ruling circles.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics further accuses the Mandatory Power of using every means available to it to prevent the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. Great Britain opposed the arrival of the Palestinian Commission in Palestine, as a result of which the latter was unable to begin on the spot the preparatory work necessary to implement the partition decision.

The Commission was only allowed to come to Palestine on May 1 -in other words, two weeks before the end of the mandate - and the United Kingdom refused even to guarantee the Commission the safety of its stay in the country during those two weeks. The Government of the United Kingdom has thus attempted to transform the Palestinian Commission into a body that could discuss the issue, but not take any practical steps to implement the decision of the General Assembly. Thus, the United Kingdom has jeopardized the entire plan for the partition of the country. It also revised the part of the

General Assembly resolution referring to the opening in Palestine from 1 February 1948. port for Jewish immigration. All these facts, together with the report of the Palestinian Commission, prove that the United Kingdom is largely responsible for all the complications that have arisen in connection with the question of the future of Palestine.

Despite all the efforts of the United Kingdom to justify its actions in Palestine, it is clear that its purpose is to undermine the partition decision and thus pander to those elements in the Middle East who wish to derail the partition plan. The Mandatory Power not only failed to ensure elementary order in Palestine, but even opened the borders of that State to armed gangs that had infiltrated Palestine in order to fight there against the implementation of the Assembly's decision.

The policies of the United Kingdom and the United States undoubtedly have a lot in common. The behavior of these two states on the Palestinian issue has dealt a serious blow to the authority of the United Nations, which, in fact, has not been reckoned with for a long time by the ruling circles of the United States. It is also clear that the responsibility for this situation lies with those states that have set themselves the goal of disrupting the partition plan and imposing the United Nations, which, in fact, has not been reckoned with for a long time by the ruling circles of the United States.

It is also clear that the responsibility for this situation lies with those states that have set themselves the goal of disrupting the partition plan and imposing on the United Nations a solution that is dictated by the selfish interests of the ruling circles of the United States. The Soviet delegation will therefore vote against the United States proposal to establish a trusteeship regime in Palestine.

The USSR delegation believes that the decision to partition Palestine is the right decision and that the United Nations must take effective measures to implement it.

United Nations. Official records of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly. Volume 1 /. G. main committees. Summary records of meetings from 16 anpe.l. R by 14 MtIJI 1948. - New York, 1948.- S. 9-10.

CONCLUSION OF COUNSELOR OF THE USSR MFA B.E. STEIN ON THE REPORT E. R LEMBERG, SENT TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR A.Ya. VYSHINSKY

April 22, 1948

By your order, I got acquainted with the report of E. Lemberg "the need to send a significant cadre of Jews from the USSR to Palestine,".

This report is a mixture of some correct propositions with completely incorrect and fantastic conclusions.

The correct propositions are, firstly, the statement that, by the combined efforts of Britain and the United States, the Middle Eastern countries are turning into a springboard from which aggression directed against the USSR is being prepared, and, secondly, that the Soviet Union must not only closely monitor the creation of this bridgehead, but also take appropriate action.

This is followed by **incorrect and unfounded propositions.**

The author of the report states that:

1. The integrity of this (Middle Eastern) anti-Soviet foothold is violated by the fact of the existence of Jewish Palestine.
2. Jewish Palestine, deceived by Britain and betrayed by the United States, turns its gaze to the USSR.
3. In the coming clash between the USSR and the anti-Soviet front in the Middle East, Jewish Palestine will not support forces hostile to the USSR.

Even if we recognize as correct the thesis, which has not been proven by the author, that in the event of war, Jewish

Palestine will be on the side of the USSR, then in this case its insignificant share in the Middle East (both geographically and economically) is unlikely to be able to violate the integrity of the Middle East bridgehead. Meanwhile, the author's categorical assertion that Jewish Palestine will not join the Middle East bridgehead, hostile to the USSR, is subject to great doubt. **The fact that at the moment the leading group (Zionists) of Palestinian Jews "are turning their eyes to the USSR," is caused by purely opportunistic circumstances.** By virtue of their class nature, the Zionists will support the United States, not the USSR. The author provides interesting data on the role of the working class in Palestine and its party and professional organizations. However, **he himself admits that all these organizations do not play a decisive role,** at least at the present time.

Precisely in order to change the balance of forces within Palestine, the author of the report puts forward a fantastic plan for the transfer of 50 thousand Soviet Jews within one year, who, in his opinion, should "be ready to defend the Soviet Union on the Palestinian sector of the front," and "before the onset of hostilities should play a large role in splitting the imperialist bloc, causing discontent among the peoples of the Middle East with both imperialist invaders and bribed Arab and other political leaders."

It is hardly necessary to prove **not only the unreality of this proposal,** but also its **harmful political consequences for the USSR,** if such a proposal were accepted. Such an event could only **strengthen the provocative propaganda of the United States** that the USSR is sending "communist agitators" to Palestine and is preparing a "revolution in Palestine,"

Due to the above considerations, the proposal of the author of the report to send 50 thousand Jews from the USSR to Palestine cannot be accepted.

B. Stein

WUA RF. F. 47. Op. 3.P. 11. D. 29.L. 75-77.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR
AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT
WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
LEBANON H. FRANGIER**

April 30, 1948

Secret

I met with Frangier, who had returned from Cairo, to find a way out of the impasse in the issue of transferring the plot to us. [...]

Referring to the decisions taken by the political commission of the Arab League on the Palestinian issue, Frangier said that Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt and, it seems, Saudi Arabia agreed to the proposal of the King of Transjordan Abdullah to occupy Palestine with his troops. When I asked whether we are talking about the whole of Palestine or only about its Arab part, as all local newspapers note, Frangier replied that the Arab part of Palestine will remain Arab anyway, so there is no need to occupy it, we are talking about the whole of Palestine. But to my additional question whether Abdallah agreed with this, because in this case he will have to conduct serious battles with the Jews, Frangier avoided a direct answer, which may mean that he himself is not sure whether Abdallah will decide to occupy the Jewish part of Palestine.

To my attempts to find out what caused the decision of the Arab countries to give their consent to the occupation of Palestine by the Transjordanian troops, since Abdallah does not hide his claims to Palestine, Frangier explained that Transjordan is not a member of the UN, therefore it is not bound by any obligations towards this organization.

In addition, the capture of Haifa by the Jews shows that the Arab volunteers are not able to achieve a decisive advantage over the Jews, so some more organized force is needed to successfully fight the Jews. Currently, the Arabs have no other choice, and besides, it will be possible to cope with Abdallah.

When it came to the general discussion of the fundamentals of the participation of Arab countries in the Palestinian struggle, Frangier noted that the Arab countries openly help the Palestinian Arabs in their struggle against the Zionists and thus violate the general provision of non-intervention necessary in such cases.

But this happened because almost all the other countries that make up the UN also openly help Zionists and Jews in carrying out continuous immigration to Palestine and in arming Jews in Palestine. Consequently, the Arab countries are doing nothing more than the rest of the countries are doing.

However, to my attempts to find out which countries are helping Jews and contributing to illegal immigration to Palestine, Frangier evaded a direct answer, making it clear that the main one is the United States. Developing his thought, Frangier added that the Arabs would allegedly agree to end the struggle in Palestine if the United Nations could completely suspend Jewish immigration to Palestine and the delivery of weapons to Jews.

When it came to the possibility of establishing a truce in Palestine, Frangier said that the Arabs were supposedly ready for a truce, and not only in Jerusalem and Jaffa, as the newspapers write about it, but throughout Palestine. As for the transfer of Palestine under the tutelage of the United Nations, the Arab countries allegedly agree to it, but on the

condition that it will be temporary and will lead to the independence of Palestine. However, Arab countries will never agree to custody in her current American proposal.

Speaking about the ongoing negotiations in Amman between the leaders of Arab countries, Frangier confirmed newspaper reports that Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Solkh left for Amman, ostensibly to finally settle the order of military events in Palestine, but when active Arab hostilities begin countries in Palestine and what their order is, he did not want to tell.

According to Frangier, Riad Solh from Amman should return to Beirut and after supposedly, together with the Prime Minister of Syria Jamil Mardam Bey, fly to Saudi Arabia for negotiations with Ibn Saud.

Note: These reports from Frangier regarding the consent of the Arab countries to the occupation of Palestine by the Transjordanian troops mean that the Arab League has completely ceded to the British on all Middle East issues and that the British have decided to keep Palestine after May 15, but through Transjordan, if the Transjordanian troops are not defeated in battles with Jews.

At the same time, there is every reason to believe that King Abdullah gave his consent to the Arab countries to occupy all of Palestine, but in reality he will limit himself only to the occupation of its Arab part in order to preserve his army and have it ready for the subsequent formation of Greater Syria, because, in the event the defeat of the Transjordanian army in the fight against the Jews, it is possible that Transjordan itself will either be completely captured by Syria, or divided between Syria and Saudi Arabia, and Abdallah, if he survives the defeat of his army, will repeat the last days of his father's

life, who just like Abdallah, dreamed of becoming a great Arab king and ended up fleeing to the island of Cyprus.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 8. D. 7.L. 82-86.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR
AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON AND SYRIA D.S. MALT
WITH A. GEYLANI**

May 10, 1948

Secret

As it was agreed upon by chance meeting, Geylani went to the mission and told the following in a conversation:

1. The development of Palestinian events has greatly undermined the authority of the Arab League, the current leaders of the Arab countries, especially in Syria and Lebanon, and the Jerusalem mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, who were the main initiators and conductors of the current course of the active armed struggle of Arabs against Jews in Palestine ... In their calls for an armed struggle and in their promises of preserving the Arab character of Palestine, they went so far that, in the end, they succeeded in convincing the broad Arab masses of a successful outcome of this struggle and instilling such strong nationalist sentiments that turned into extreme chauvinism, which in total led to general excitement in the Arab countries. However, the inability of the Arab League, the Jerusalem Mufti and the current Arab leaders to organize the struggle in Palestine, the disorganization in the Arab Liberation Army, the loss of Arab positions and especially the fall of Haifa caused extremely strong discontent among the Arab masses, pushed them away from the current organizers of this movement and led to a sharp and serious criticism even from such Arab figures as the Minister of Internal Affairs of Lebanon Kamil Chamoun and the former Minister of Education of Syria, MP, Emir Adel Arslan.

2. In the process of organizing the armed struggle in Palestine, it turned out that the Syrian army is extremely weak, poorly

organized, insufficiently trained and almost unarmed. At the same time, Geylani noted that the British put up very strong resistance to the armament of the Syrian army. He personally, through the Americans, wanted to supply weapons to the Syrian army, but the British and their supporters in the Syrian government stalled the matter.

The weakness of the Syrian army turned out to be so striking that when Syrian President Shukri al-Quatli summoned the commander of the Syrian army, General Abdullah al-Atfe, and asked how many soldiers Syria could allocate for sending to Palestine, the latter named only 1,000 people out of 15,000 of the entire Syrian army. Thus, a very scandalous situation became clear.

In addition, the Syrian government is very concerned about the extremely tense situation within the country, as such mohafezats as Jebel Druz and Latakia, in which the Druze and Alawites were persecuted and oppressed due to the unreasonable policy of repression by the Syrian government against the Druze and Alawites, may rise up against government, in the event of any movement in Syria. In addition, the Syrian Bedouins are of great concern to the Syrian government, because among them there are a large number of staunch supporters of King Abdullah, who did not abandon his project of creating a Greater Syria.

The size of the Lebanese army does not exceed 3,500 people, so Lebanon cannot allocate a single soldier for Palestine at all.

Egypt, in view of its special relations with Great Britain and the very uncertain position of the current government and the ruling classes in general within the country, is afraid to send its troops to Palestine, trying to limit itself to agreeing to financial assistance to the Palestinian cause.

Saudi Arabia refrains from sending its troops to Palestine, because, due to the increased popularity of King Abdullah of Transjordan, it does not exclude the possibility of his attack on Saudi Arabia to reclaim the Hijaz.

Only Iraq goes unconditionally along with Transjordan, but there are many internal dangers in Iraq as well.

3. Recently, the position of the King of Transjordan, Abdullah, has noticeably improved and his popularity has increased. The main reasons for this improvement in the position and growth of Abdallah's popularity are his open criticism of the actions of Arab leaders, therefore it is quite natural that the discontent of the Arab masses with the actions of the leaders turned into a favorable attitude towards Abdallah, the complete failure of the Arab volunteer army in Palestine in the fight against Jewish armed organizations, which caused more than hostile attitude towards the volunteers and transferred all hopes to the Transjordanian army, known as the Arab Legion, which is well trained, well equipped with weapons and accustomed to discipline - all this presented it in the eyes of the broad Arab masses, very warmed up to the occupation of Palestine, the only real a force capable of carrying out this occupation, the all-round strengthening of the position of Abdullah by the British and the support of their agents among the current Arab leaders of Abdallah.

4. The weakness of Syria, the indecision of Egypt, the fears of Saudi Arabia and the impossibility of retreating in front of the propagated public opinion in the Arab countries forced the named countries to agree to Abdallah leading the movement of the military invasion of Palestine. At the same time, Geylani noted that Syria does not believe Abdallah and began to gather all his opponents in Damascus. In particular, the Jerusalem mufti arrived in Damascus, which is the center of

the grouping and activation of anti-Hashemite elements. Saudi Arabia is also beginning to intensify the activities of former Iraqi Prime Minister and leader of the uprising in May 1941, Rashid Ali Geylani, who is in Riyadh, and is taking measures to achieve reconciliation between him and the mufti, since, according to Geylani, in Germany during the Second World War During the war, they allegedly differed in views. But the Hashemites also did not remain idle and began to take measures to neutralize the Geylanists. For example, recently in Iraq the former Minister of Internal Affairs in the government of Geylani Shevket Naji was released from prison. According to the plan of the Iraqi regent, he is to win over most of the Geylanists to the side of the current Iraqi government.

5. Taking advantage of the difficult situation created by the Arab Governments and the Arab League, Abdallah, even before his military entry into Palestine, achieved a number of serious concessions from the Arab countries. For example, at first Syria insisted on the formation of a Palestinian Arab government and offered to carry out all actions to seize Palestine on behalf of and under the leadership of this government, but Abdallah resolutely opposed this proposal, and Syria was forced to yield.

This means that Abdallah is pursuing his own goals in Palestine, which do not correspond to the intentions of the rest of the Arab countries. The main of these goals of Abdallah is to seize, first of all, the Arab part of Palestine. But at the same time, Geylani is sure that Abdallah will definitely try to seize the Jewish part of Palestine as well. Moreover, if the first main battle with the Jews is successful, Abdallah will certainly continue to advance to capture the entire Jewish part of Palestine, if the first battle is unsuccessful and Abdallah's

attacks are repulsed by the Jews, then he will stop the offensive and blame the rest for his failures. Arab countries.

6. The main goal of Abdallah and the British behind him in preparation for the armed seizure of Palestine, all or only its Arab part, is the subsequent creation of Greater Syria. Moreover, if Abdallah manages to capture the whole of Palestine, which is very unlikely, then his popularity, power and importance will increase to such an extent that none of the current Arab leaders dares to oppose him in his plan, if he limits himself to seizing only the Arab part of Palestine, then he will be able to bring such serious accusations against the current Syrian leaders and they will become so unpopular among the broad masses, and the supporters of Greater Syria will become so strong that it will not be too difficult for Abdallah to implement his plans, especially since the Prime Minister of Syria Jamil Mardam Bey never did not refuse to support the Bol'shessirian movement.

The advantage of Abdallah's current position lies in the fact that now no one can oppose him and against his real intentions, because Arab public opinion is still on his side, and anyone who would try to attack him from the rear will be considered a traitor to Arab case.

Touching upon the position of Lebanon in relation to the future Greater Syria, Geylani said that, according to the general opinion of the majority of the Bolsheviks, including Abdallah himself, Lebanon should remain independent outside Greater Syria, since in Lebanon such an environment is needed so that Christians do not feel fear from the Muslim sides did not seek the protection of the Christian state or would not create a pretext for the intervention of the Western European powers in Lebanese affairs.

Note: Geylani's message deserves serious attention, for in many points it corresponds to the course of the current events related to the resolution of the Palestinian question.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P. 8. D. 7.L. 102-105a

**NOTE FROM THE HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN
DEPARTMENT USSR MFA I. N. BAKULINA TO DEPUTY
MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A.
ZORIN**

May 15, 1948 z.

Secret

Until 1914 in Palestine, the Russian government had one consulate general in Jerusalem (opened in 1858) and two consulates - in Haifa (opened in 1842) and in Jaffa (opened in 1820).

In 1914, in connection with the First World War, all three consulates were closed and the buildings were seized by the Turks. In 1922, having received a mandate for Palestine, England captured the building of the consulate general in Jerusalem (only one of this building is the property of the USSR) and used it at its own discretion.

19 February 1947 Comrade Malt, in one of his letters, asked about the advisability of opening our consulate in Jerusalem, however, in connection with the Palestinian problem, this issue did not receive further development, especially since permission to open this consulate had to be asked from the mandate holder.

Currently, after the abolition of the Palestinian mandate, pending the establishment of relations with Palestine, it would be expedient to send one of the members of our mission in Lebanon to Jerusalem as a representative of the mission to protect Soviet property in Jerusalem.

I. Bakulin

AVP RF, f. 0118, op. 2, p. 3, d. 11, l. 168

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS USSR V.M. MOLOTOV**

May 15, 1948

I have the honor to inform you and ask you to inform to your government that the National Council of the Jewish State, composed of members of elected representatives of the Jewish organizations of Palestine, met yesterday, May 14, after the termination of the British Mandate, and on the basis of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of November 29, 1947. proclaimed the formation of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, which will be called the State of Israel. The Council declared that the State of Israel will be open to immigration of Jews from all countries in which they are scattered; will contribute to the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; will be based on the principles of freedom, justice and peace; uphold the full social and political equality of all citizens regardless of race, creed or gender; will guarantee complete freedom of conscience, religion, education, culture and language; will safeguard the sanctity and integrity of the temples and holy places of all religions and will devote itself to upholding the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. The Council also announced that the State of Israel would be ready to cooperate with the organs and representatives of the United Nations in the implementation of the Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. and will take steps to ensure the formation of an economic union for all of Palestine. The Council called upon the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to return to the path of peace and play their part in our development through full and equal citizenship and due representation in her government, temporary and permanent.

The Council also offered peace to all neighboring states and their peoples and invited them to cooperate with the State of Israel for the common good for all. On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel, I hereby request official recognition of the State of Israel and of the Provisional Government by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I express the hope that such recognition will soon follow, and I am sure that it will strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet Union and her peoples, on the one hand, and the State of Israel and the Jewish people of Palestine, on the other hand, as well as serve the cause of peace. and justice in international relations in general.

I take this opportunity to express the deep gratitude and understanding of the Jewish people of Palestine, shared by Jews around the world, for the firm position taken by the USSR delegation to the UN in support of the formation of an independent sovereign Jewish state in Palestine; for her consistent promotion of this idea, despite all the difficulties; for her expression of genuine sympathy for the suffering of the Jewish people in Europe at the hands of Nazi torturers and for her support of the principle that the Jews of Palestine are a nation deserving of sovereignty and independence.

JSA.! 30.02 / 2424/19.

On behalf of the Provisional Government of Israel

Moshe Shertok,

Foreign Secretary

Publ.: International life. - 1998.- No. 10.- P. 90.

**TELEGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOKU**

May 18, 1948

I acknowledge receipt of your telegram of May 16, in which you inform the Government of the USSR about the proclamation on the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 r. creation of an independent State of Israel in Palestine and ask for recognition by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government.

I hereby inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has made a decision on the official recognition of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government.

The Soviet Government hopes that the creation by the Jewish people of their sovereign state will serve the cause of strengthening peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East and expresses confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel.

AVP RF, f. 89, op. 1, p. 1, d. 4, l. five.

USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs

V. Molotov

Publ.: International life. - 1998. - No. 10. - P. 91.

**EXCHANGE OF TELEGRAMS BETWEEN THE FOREIGN
MINISTER DEJ OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK AND THE
MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M.
MOLOTOV**

1. Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel M. Shertok

May 24, 1948

I have the honor to express to you the deepest satisfaction with which my government took note of the message on the official recognition of the State of Israel by the government of the USSR, kindly conveyed to us in your telegram dated May 18. The Government of the State of Israel fully shares the wishes so generously expressed by you and reaffirms its firm hope, based on the events that led to the creation of our government, that the most friendly relations can be established between the State of Israel and the Soviet Union. To this end, we ask you to deign to inform us whether you agree that the State of Israel immediately establish its mission in Moscow, consisting of an envoy or chargé d'affaires and a consul general, and that at the same time a Soviet mission be established in Tel Aviv of the same rank.

On behalf of the Provisional Council of State of Israel

Moshe Shertok,

Foreign Secretary

AVP RF, f. For - Israel, op. /, p. /, d. 2, l. /.

**Telegram of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
V.M. Molotov**

May 25, 1948

I acknowledge receipt of your telegram dated May 24, 1948,
in

which you ask the consent of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the State of Israel to immediately establish its mission in Moscow and that at the same time a Soviet mission be established in Tel Aviv.

I hereby have the honor to inform you that the Soviet government agrees to the establishment of a mission of the State of Israel in Moscow headed by an envoy or chargé d'affaires, including the performance of consular functions, and, in turn, is ready to establish a Soviet mission in Tel Aviv.

V. Molotov

Foreign Minister: I

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

On the document of the paper: "Comrade Stalin. For approval. 25. V".

AVP RF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 46, d. 622, l. 17.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky with the EGYPT'S MESSENGER IN
THE USSR BINDARI-PASHOY2**

July 1, 1948

Secret

Today at 13.00 I received the Egyptian envoy to the USSR, Bindari Pasha, at his request.

At the beginning of the conversation, the envoy spoke at length about the friendly feelings he has towards the Soviet Union and its leaders, and about the fact that he, Bindari Pasha, made a lot of efforts to thoroughly explain the foreign policy of the Soviet Union to Egyptian statesmen. ... The envoy emphasized that he used his recent stay in Cairo to tell the Egyptian leaders in detail about the true aspirations of the Soviet Union, which are deliberately distorted by Anglo-Saxon propaganda. At the same time, the envoy noted that he managed to do a lot towards finding a basis for close and friendly cooperation on an equal basis and on the principles of mutual respect between Egypt and the USSR. In this regard, Bindari Pasha stated that his government and especially the king, who is a great nationalist and firmly defending the national independence of Egypt, gave him, Bindari Pasha, high confidence and instructed him to continue to carry out his mission in Moscow in the interests of strengthening friendly relations between Egypt and the USSR.

After such an introduction, the envoy, on behalf of his government, proceeded to set out the main purpose of his visit, warning that he was doing this in a strictly confidential manner.

The envoy said that the main principle of Egypt's foreign policy is based on the geographical and economic characteristics of the country. Egypt is the undoubted factor of peace. He is fighting for his independence and does not want to join any bloc. In accordance with this policy, the Egyptian government rejected the offer of the Greek government for Tsaldaris to visit Cairo in order to organize a conference of representatives of Egypt and the countries of the Middle East, including representatives of Turkey, to work out a treaty based on the same principles on which the treaty concluded between England is based. France and Benelux. The envoy explained that the main purpose of the treaty would be aimed at combating communism and against the Soviet Union. The envoy said that the Egyptian Foreign Minister, on behalf of the government, categorically rejected the offer of Tsaldaris and the Greek government. At the same time, the minister said that the issue of communism is an internal affair of each country. As for the pursuit of a policy directed against the USSR, then, according to the envoy, the Egyptian government cannot join such a policy, since Egypt has no claims against the Soviet Union. This was stated by the Egyptian government to Tsaldaris.

The envoy then said that Egypt is determined to defend the principles of its foreign policy, which are based on the desire of the Egyptian people to free themselves from the influence of Western European imperialism. In furtherance of these principles, Egypt refused to sign a treaty with Britain and will not sign a similar treaty with any other country that would wish to use Egypt as a strategic base. According to the envoy, such a policy of the Egyptian government could lead Egypt to a conflict with the Anglo-Saxons.

Bindari Pasha then dwelled on the economic features of Egypt. He said that Egypt needs to develop its industry in the import of the necessary raw materials, chemical products, oil and products derived from it. Egypt is also in need of equipment for military factories, etc.

In this regard, the envoy said that after some success he had achieved in clearing up the gloomy atmosphere created by foreign propaganda in Egypt around the Soviet Union, he would like to discuss with the representatives of the USSR to what extent cooperation in its specific form between Egypt and USSR, the shape and volume of which will be dictated by the circumstances.

The envoy asked if Egypt could count on Soviet assistance in the following areas:

1. To obtain oil and products derived from it.
2. For economic assistance so that Egypt would be able to fulfill its program of maintaining complete independence from Western countries. In connection with this point, the envoy made a proposal to conclude a commercial agreement, similar to the agreements concluded by the USSR with Poland and Romania.

I asked the envoy to clarify the nature of the agreement.

The envoy replied that this was an economic agreement. A political agreement may follow after a certain period.

3. To provide weapons and equipment for newly built military factories.

For its part, Egypt, according to the envoy, has the ability to supply cotton and other goods to the Soviet Union. For some goods, Egypt could pay with mottos.

The envoy concluded by saying that he wanted the Soviet Government to consider as soon as possible the proposed proposal, which was of a strictly confidential nature. The envoy especially stressed that he wanted the Soviet Government to believe in Egypt's sincere desire to establish strong friendly relations with the USSR.

At the same time, the envoy noted that the king also adheres to this point of view, around whom, unfortunately, harmful rumors are spread that the USSR is working against him. The messenger stated that he sought to dispel these rumors.

In conclusion, the envoy noted that the USSR can in the future rely on Egypt with full confidence to wage the struggle against the Western imperialists.

I replied to the envoy that the USSR is always positive about the possibility of strengthening cooperation and friendly relations with those countries that are striving for the same. With regard to the statement, I heard and the proposals set forth by the envoy, I believe that both the statement and the proposals deserve serious attention. I firmly denied the provocative rumors spread by hostile propaganda in Egypt that the USSR was allegedly working against the king, stressing that, as the whole world knows, the USSR does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

In conclusion on this issue, I made it clear to the envoy in a general way that the issue of providing weapons to the country should be resolved within the framework of a UN resolution in connection with the war in Palestine.

The envoy made an attempt to start discussing the Palestinian question. But I rejected this attempt, stating that the position of the Soviet Union on this issue is completely clear, and therefore I do not see the need to consider this issue. The

envoy hastened to declare that the main issue he raised in today's conversation is in no way connected with the Palestinian problem, and therefore he does not intend to dwell on it. At the same time, the envoy noted that the British are trying to drown the Egyptian question into the Palestinian problem.

Then the messenger handed me two notes (see appendix) 1. In the first note, the Egyptian Government asks the Soviet Government to allow it to send its representatives in accordance with the existing agreement on the supply of grain dated March 3, 1947 to the points of grain dispatch to establish control over the quality of the shipped cargo. In a second note, the Egyptian government asks the Soviet Government to support its request to determine the location of the UN Economic Commission for the Middle East in Cairo.

I told the envoy that both notes would be transmitted by me to their destination.

Before leaving, the envoy made a personal request to assist him in organizing his trip to Siberia. I did not engage in the envoy, referring to the difficulties in organizing this trip, since Intourist did not develop its work in this direction. At the same time, the envoy asked to help him in the opportunity to go in for water sports.

I promised to take an interest in this issue. The conversation lasted 1 h. 30 m.

A. Vyshinsky

Comrade Starikov was present at the conversation.

WUA RF. F. 087. Op. 11.P. 16. D. 5.L. 16-21.

**FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
DEPARTMENT OF THE USSR MFA "THE PALESTINIAN
QUESTION AFTER THE UN DECISION ON THE
PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND THE END OF THE
ENGLISH MANDATE (NOVEMBER 29, 1947 - JULY 20,
1948) "**

July 22, 1948

Secret

[...] The Soviet Union is the only great power taking a principled position on the Palestinian issue. Soviet representatives in the Security Council have consistently defended the General Assembly resolution on the partition of Palestine of November 29, 1947.

In response to M. Shertok's telegram comrade Molotov, in his telegram of May 18, said that "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has made a decision on the official recognition of the State of Israel and its Provisional Government,".

When the war in Palestine became a fact, the Soviet representatives on the Security Council worked hard **to bring about an end to hostilities**. On May 27, the Soviet delegation presented a draft resolution demanding an immediate cessation of hostilities, taking into account the fact that "the situation in Palestine poses a threat to peace and security in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter,". Soviet representatives objected and are opposed to giving Bernadotte 5 broad powers, which he uses to revise the UN decision of November 29, 1947.

June 7 Comrade Gromyko raised the question of the method of recruiting military observers for the armistice, since it was not reflected in the armistice resolution of May 29, 1948.

June 15 Comrade Gromyko raised the issue of military observers again and proposed a draft resolution stating that "military observers should be appointed by member states of the Security Council wishing to participate in the appointment of such observers, with the exception of Syria,".

The Soviet resolution was rejected.

On July 13, the US representative introduced a resolution to end hostilities in Palestine under threat of sanctions. During the discussion, its Soviet representatives supported the proposal for a cessation of hostilities, but objected to the clauses concerning the "demilitarization" of Jerusalem and the broad rights granted to the UN mediator, since these clauses enable Britain and the United States to continue to conduct behind the scenes machinations aimed at disrupting the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, using the "intermediary," the UN. This is evident from the fact that before leaving the United States on July 16 this year, Bernadotte frankly stated that the plan for the partition of Palestine, adopted by the UN on November 29, could be revised in order to resolve the Palestinian problem.

In this regard, on July 15, during the final voting of the resolution, the Soviet representatives as a whole abstained from voting.

Considering that the United States and England, apparently, agreed among themselves on the further fate of Palestine, which was reflected in the proposals of the UN mediator Bernadotte, who recommended leaving in Palestine the "curtailed" state of Israel in its sovereign rights, bound by

foreign policy and issues defense with Transjordan, 2 the position of the USSR should be to defend the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine and the formation of Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. At the same time, it is necessary to decisively reject any proposal to expand Transjordan at the expense of Palestine, which to a certain extent will be supported by some Arab states (for example, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt).

Broad criticism of the British plan to expand the territory of Transjordan at the expense of Palestine will cause a certain split among the Arab states, which will facilitate the defense of the UN decision to partition Palestine.

I. Bakulin

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 22-23.

**SPEECH BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE UN Ya.A. MALIKA IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION**

July 27, 1948

The **Soviet delegation considers the draft resolution proposed by the representative of Syria unacceptable** due to the following circumstances:

The draft resolution, **proposed by the representative of Syria**, is a belated and poorly disguised attempt to turn the entire Palestinian question backward. We know and understand why Syria is making such a proposal. It is also **known that some major powers are also interested in this**, which are not satisfied with the decision taken by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947 on the question of Palestine. They are **looking for workarounds for non-fulfillment of this decision**, for consigning it to oblivion in order to preserve the previous position in Palestine, to prevent a peaceful settlement in Palestine, to **continue to maintain a state of instability and uncertainty there**, which is harmful for both the Arab and Jewish population.

The first paragraph of the draft notes that the United Kingdom ended its mandate on May 15, 1948, without creating a government body to assume administrative authority. But **the United Nations did not assign such a task to the United Kingdom**. On the contrary, the General Assembly, in its resolution of November 29, 1947, recommended to the United Kingdom, as a mandate state, and to all other member states of the United Nations, to accept and implement, on the question of future governance in Palestine, **a plan for partitioning Palestine into two independent states**: Arabic and Jewish. This plan, as you

know, was approved by the General Assembly. The partition plan is silent on the need for the United Kingdom to establish any government body in Palestine. Moreover, it follows from the General Assembly resolution that the creation by the **United Kingdom of any governmental body in Palestine is excluded**. The General Assembly resolution is limited only by specifying the date for the termination of the mandate and the procedure for the withdrawal of troops from Palestine by the mandate country.

Consequently, **there is no reason** to proceed from the premise that Britain should have created some kind of government body in Palestine.

The draft submitted by the representative of Syria requests that the International Court of Justice, in accordance with Article 96 of the Charter, issue an advisory legal opinion on the international statute of Palestine following the termination of the mandate. It is strange that the representative of Syria considers it possible to turn to the International Court of Justice **on an issue that has already been considered and decided** by the General Assembly. It is no less strange that the representative of Syria proposes that the Security Council should seek legal advice from the International Court of Justice on an issue already decided by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly has carefully and thoroughly dealt with the Palestinian question and decided on the future structure of Palestine. The Assembly's decision is both a political and a legal decision on the Palestinian question. Consequently, there is no need for any special additional advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on this issue.

We are offered to **return again to the issue** that has been **comprehensively studied and resolved**. Moreover, such a proposal cannot but be viewed as an attempt not only to revise this decision of the General Assembly, but also to give the International Court of Justice the functions of an arbiter in issues on which there is already a decision of the highest body of the United Nations - the General Assembly.

Article 96 provides that the General Assembly may request advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice on any legal question. But it goes without saying that it makes sense to ask for such opinions before deciding on such issues, and not after they have already been taken. If a decision has been made - and it has already been taken on Palestine - then it makes no sense to ask for an opinion from the International Court of Justice.

In view of the above circumstances, the Soviet delegation cannot agree to the Security Council appealing to the International Court of Justice on the Palestinian question, on which the General Assembly has already decided. Those who are not satisfied with the said decision of the General Assembly on the future of Palestine have tried to frustrate this decision before, but they failed. Subsequent resolutions on the Palestinian question did not change the substance of this decision.

The Soviet delegation believes that the Security Council should take measures to facilitate the implementation of the Assembly's decision on Palestine, and **not revise it, delay or complicate the implementation of this decision**. The argument that recourse to the International Court of Justice would not interfere with a peaceful settlement does not hold water. This is an absolutely unsubstantiated reasoning and assertion, for an appeal to the International Court of Justice

will contribute to the continuation of the state of instability and uncertainty in Palestine and will hamper the cause of a peaceful settlement in Palestine.

Based on the foregoing, the Soviet delegation does not consider it possible to support the draft resolution proposed by the representative of Syria.

WUA RF. F. 434. Op. 3.P. 20. D. 39.L. 51-53.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH EGYPT'S MISSION TO THE
USSR BINDARI-PASHA**

August 5, 1948

Secret

Today at 14.00 he received Bindari Pasha at his request. After exchanging the usual greetings, Bindari said that the Egyptian government had received a message from one source that 6 Sturmovyu bombers and 2 squadrons of fighter-bombers had arrived in Durazzo, Albania. These planes are piloted by Jewish pilots and intended for the Jewish Zionist government in Palestine. The Egyptian government instructed him to find out if this message was true. "Personally," Bindari added, "I do not believe in such reports, for such facts would contradict the friendship between the USSR and Egypt and would violate the agreement on the armistice in Palestine. However, I must fulfill the instructions of my government and inform him of the answer of the Soviet government.

I said that I was very surprised by the messenger's message and did not understand what relation we have to Durazzo, which is located outside the territory of the USSR.

Then Bindari said that, according to information received by the Egyptian government, these aircraft are allegedly Soviet.

I replied that although **every message requires verification**, in this case it is quite clear that the message that the messenger is talking about **is clearly not true**. I added that I was even more surprised by the very formulation of this question, for **everyone knows that Soviet policy is a policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries**. Therefore, I

resolutely reject such a formulation of the question, as it does not correspond to the policy of the USSR, which is well known to the Egyptian government. I added that the statement of the Egyptian government was obviously inspired from the outside, for I do not think that Egypt, knowing Soviet policy, could make such a judgment on its own. **I can only regret that the Egyptian government believes such reports.**

Bindari replied that this information was indeed obtained from a foreign source. The Egyptian government was quite surprised by this report and wanted to find out. "Now," Bindari added, "I can, to my great pleasure, inform my government that this message is wrong and that the policy of the Soviet Union on the Palestinian question remains unchanged."

I noticed in this connection that the policy of the USSR on the Palestinian question was always clear and quite clearly expressed by the representatives of the USSR in the Security Council and at the sessions of the UN General Assembly. This is well known to the Egyptian government. If the Egyptian government itself carries out the correct policy on the Palestinian issue and does not listen to all false reports, it will benefit peace in the area.

Now there is a lot of fuss about the Palestinian question, and there are some circles that want to rake in the heat with someone else's hands. Obviously, someone is interested in passing off the USSR as a supporter of interference in the internal affairs of the Middle East. The collapse of their own plans in Palestine causes these circles to try to shift the whole matter from a sore head to a healthy one.

Bindari said, as he put it - "privately," that "this unfortunate Palestinian problem," spoils the atmosphere of friendship

between the USSR and Egypt and prevents the establishment of close relations and fraternal ties between the two countries. If it were not for the Palestinian question, the Soviet Union and Egypt would have lived in close cooperation and alliance. However, there is hope that all the clouds will disperse.

I replied to Bindari that, in my personal opinion, Egypt in its actions should be guided by its own interests and less listen to others.

Bindari said that there are some circumstances that prevent Egypt from following its own path.

Concluding the conversation, Bindari asked me how, in my personal opinion, international affairs were going.

I replied that international affairs, as far as we are concerned, should, in my opinion, improve.

The conversation lasted 35 minutes. The OPSV attaché, comrade Gnedykh, was also present.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

AVP RF. F. 087. Op. 11.P. 16. D. 5.L. 30-31.

**CONVERSATIONS OF THE ADVISOR OF THE MISSION
OF THE USSR IN ISRAEL ML. MUKHIN WITH ISRAELI
CITIZEN S.V. TSIRULNIKOV**

August 13, 1948

Secret

(Extracts S.M)

(...)

Currently, the main political force is the Mapai Party, the Palestinian Workers' Party, which is most represented in the State Council and in the government. All of its leaders, in particular Ben-Gurion, Shertok, Remez, and others, hold key government posts. The party also dominates the trade unions. The Davar newspaper, which is formally the organ of the Histadrut, actually serves as the organ of the party.

The proportion of the Mapai party in the labor movement is about 60% and 40% - in national political life.

The second party in this respect is Mapam - the United Workers' Party, which has two portfolios in the government: public works and agriculture - and a serious influence in the army, since it unites a significant part of the country's agricultural communes, kibbutzim, which are an important reserve for recruiting not only the private, but also the commanding staff of the army. This party was created by uniting Akhdut ha-avoda - "Unity of Labor" with Poalei Zion - "Workers of Zion" and with the party Hashomer ha-tsair - "Young Guard". Party leaders: Tabenkin, Hari Heder, Sne (Kleinbaum). The Communist Party is extremely small and does not enjoy significant influence.

The Provisional Government of Israel in its present composition is not in fact renounced a pro-British orientation and, as a tribute to the times, is ready to cooperate in many respects with the United States. Anti-England governments have nothing to do with the real thoughts of their authors. This is just an attempt to increase their prestige in the eyes of the British, to show that they are worth doing, that they can be of interest to them. In fact, the current government leaders did nothing to find the right paths for the development of the young state in the face of the split of the world into two camps.

(...)

These leaders came to power at the time of camouflage, on the crest of international events. It is not enough to define their actual attitude towards the Soviet Union as neutral, it is hostile. This is proved by Ben-Gurion's rude and offensive phrase in relation to J.V. Stalin, which he admitted in the circle of his supporters, which has now become known more widely.

During a request to the State Council about the motives that served as the basis for the appointment of Golda Meyerson as an envoy to the USSR, Shertok replied that Meyerson is strong because she is not able to be guided by feelings of sympathy and go along with other people's policies. At the same time, her pro-American views are well known. As for Weizmann, he is now kept in the shadows, because he is too entangled in the English networks, and this circumstance can harm now not only his personal authority, but also general politics.

The desire of our leadership to go to direct negotiations with Arabs - nothing more than a desire to find a common language with the top of the Arab circles, which are directly dependent on the Anglo-American masters.

(..)

Even the war with the Arabs itself wore, unfortunately, in many cases, not the nature of the liberation movement, but a nationalist war, accompanied by completely unnecessary repression and robbery of the Arab population, i.e., and in this case, there was no unity of action necessary and useful for strengthening the prestige of Israel's policy. These are the first days of the confused and complex life of our state.

Tsirulnikov led the underground youth Zionist organizations, shared the Menshevik program. For his activities he was repressed and spent a long time in many prisons in various cities of the Union. In 1928 r. allegedly at the request of a number of Jewish Palestinian organizations, he was allowed to leave for Palestine. At present, he is a companion of the owner of one international trade enterprise, which provides him with an independent economic position. He sees political independence in his broad theoretical training ("unlike the current leaders of the country"), he completely shares the Marxist ideology, which gave him the opportunity to free himself from loads of old mistakes. He is not a member of any party; this gave him the opportunity in difficult conditions to freely and independently act and work in favor of the Soviet Union. Recently, he has been mainly engaged in personal affairs, he is going to write a book criticizing his previous positions.

Tsirulnikov leaves the impression of a rather developed and informed person.

(...)

Counselor to the USSR Mission in Israel M. Mukhin

AVP RF, f. 089, op. 1, p. 1, d. 4, l. 30-33.

M.P. FEDORINA ABOUT THE MEETING OF A LEAGUE OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

August 14, 1948

Secret

(...)

On August 14, 1948, on behalf of the envoy, Comrade P.I. Ershov, I was present as a representative of the Soviet mission in Israel and BOKS at a solemn meeting organized by the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR in honor of the visit of our mission to Israel.

The meeting took place in the hall of one of the largest cinemas in Tel Aviv "Esther". It was attended by about 1800 people.

In addition, about a thousand people gathered on the street. Inside and outside the building was radio-equipped. The hall was decorated with the flags of the Soviet Union and Israel. Above the presidium table was a large portrait of Comrade Stalin, under it was the slogan in Russian and Hebrew: "Long live friendship between the State of Israel and the USSR!"

When I appeared in the hall with the Secretary General of the League, Tarnopler, those present stood and greeted us with prolonged applause. The presidium was: Secretary General of the League Tarnopler, from the Israeli Communist Party - S. Mikunis, from the so-called. Jewish Communist Party.. Harari, from O. United Labor Party Mapam - Dr. Sne, Ilanit, Zerubawel, from Labor Party Mapai - Friedman, and others.

(...)

Dr. Sne said in his speech:

"I will allow myself to frankly tell our guest, the representative of the Soviet Union, that our people love the Soviet Union, our people believe in the Soviet Union, which supported us and never let us down, and we, for our part, swear that we will never let the Soviet Union down. and we will devote all our efforts to strengthening friendship and an inviolable alliance with our Great friend, defender of humanity - the Soviet Union. "

Mikunis made a bright speech, who called on everyone to fight against Anglo-American imperialism, for the complete independence of Israel, for strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union, etc. Ero's speech was repeatedly interrupted by prolonged applause and cheers. All speeches were interrupted by loud applause at the mention of the Soviet Union, Soviet representatives in the UN (Comrades Gromyko, Manuilskoro, Tsarapkina), the first Soviet envoy to Israel, etc. After the greetings, the chorus of working youth sang the Jewish anthem, the anthem of the Soviet Union and the Internationale, which was sung by almost everyone in the hall. After that, the choir sang several Soviet ("March of the Artillerymen", "Song of Budyonny", etc.) and Jewish songs.

Second Secretary of the USSR Mission in Israel

M. Fedorin

AVP RF, f. 089, op. 1, p. 1, d. 4, 11.54-55.

**LETTER OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE BSSR K.V. KISELEVA DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR**

V.A. ZORIN

August 20, 1948

Secret

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the BSSR received a telegram from the mediator in Palestine, Bernadotte, in which he appealed to the Government of the Byelorussian SSR with a request to provide material assistance to the population of Arabs and Jews in Palestine, in connection with the difficult conditions that had developed as a result of the events.

Due to the fact that the current tense situation in Palestine is caused and created by the Anglo-American ruling circles and they are fully responsible for what is happening, therefore I consider not to provide any material assistance and not to send an answer.

I ask for your instructions.

APPENDIX: On 2 sheets only to the addressee

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian SSR K Kiselev

AVP RF. F. 089. Op. 1. P.2. D.13.Sheet 3.

**NOTE OF THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR G.M. MALENKOV 'TO
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC CPSU (B),
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
USSR I.V. STALIN**

September 18, 1948

Comrade Stalin.

Before leaving, you gave instructions to prepare an article on Israel.

The case was somewhat delayed due to the absence of Ehrenburg in Moscow.

Ehrenburg arrived the other day. Kaganovich, Pospelov and Ilyichev and I had a conversation with him. Ehrenburg agreed to write the article and spoke out against the article being published with several signatures.

I will emit for you an article by I. Ehrenburg "Concerning one letter".

If there are no other instructions on your part, we would like to publish this article on Tuesday, September 21, in the Pravda newspaper.

G. Malenkov

ATTACHMENT

(Extract S.M)

(...)

Representatives of the Soviet Union in the United Nations said that our people understand the feelings of Jews who survived the greatest tragedy and finally got the right to exist

on their land. Wishing success to the workers of Israel, the Soviet people do not close their eyes to the trials that await all honest people of the young state. **In addition to the invasion of the Anglo-Arab hordes, Israel knows another invasion, less loud, but no less dangerous - the Anglo-American capital.** For the imperialists, Palestine is primarily oil. Competition between predators - Standard Oil, on the one hand, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and Shell, on the other, interferes in the life of a fragile state. The interests of the Potash Palestine Company concern, the issue of the **Kirkuk-Haifa oil pipeline**, the American projects of concessions and military bases - this is what threatens Israel after the thugs of King Abdullah. The state of Israel is not headed by workers' representatives. We have all seen how the bourgeoisie of European countries, with their great traditions, with their old statehood, betrayed their national interests in the name of the dollar. Moryr whether the Soviet people expect that the bourgeois of Israel will be more conscientious and perspicacious than the bourgeoisie of France or Italy?

Unlikely. We trust the peoples, but if in Israel the people are fighting and fighting bravely, this does not mean that the people rule there.

There are many workers in the State of Israel, both urban and rural. The whole burden of the country's defense fell on them. At the same time, they have to fight against the greed of their bourgeoisie, for which the war, as well as for any bourgeoisie, is, first of all, profit. It is not for nothing that Mikunis, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the State of Israel, recently said: "We have neither property tax, nor profit tax, our industrialists have shamelessly raised their profits."

I believe that the advanced people of Israel, her workers will find the right way in extremely difficult conditions. I am convinced, that socialism will triumph throughout the world, it will triumph in Palestine as well. But if I believe in the future of Israel, then to the second question of my correspondent, who asks whether the creation of this state is a solution to the so-called Jewish question, **I must answer in the negative.**

I have always thought and continue to think that the "Jewish question" can be resolved everywhere only by a general social and, consequently, spiritual process. To resolve it is not a matter of utopians, and not of diplomats, but of workers of all countries. I admired the courage of the Israeli fighters when they repulsed the attacks of the British mercenaries, but I knew that the resolution of the "**Jewish question**" **did not depend on military successes in Palestine, but on the victory of socialism over capitalism**, on the victory of the high international principles inherent in the working class over nationalism, fascism, and racism.

(...)

Yes, many Jews left their homeland and emigrated to America. But they did not emigrate because they did not love their land, but because violence and abuse deprived them of this beloved land. Did some Jews sometimes seek salvation in other countries? ... Jewish workers, like all others, are firmly attached to the land on which they were born and raised.

(...)

The fate of the Jewish workers of all countries is connected not with the fate of the State of Israel, but with the fate of progress, with the fate of socialism.

Soviet Jews, together with all Soviet people, are now rebuilding their socialist homeland. They are not looking to the Middle East; they are looking to the future. And I think that the working people of the State of Israel, far from the mysticism of the Zionists, who seek justice, are now looking to the north - to the Soviet Union, which is ahead of humanity towards a better future.

Ilya Ehrenburg

On the document: "Comrade Stalin agrees."

AP RF, f. 3, op. 65, d.7, l. 167-177.

**RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE DEPUTY
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A.
ZORINA WITH THE ENTRY OF SYRIA IN THE USSR F.
ZEYNEDDIN**

September 21, 1948

Secret

Today, September 21, at 14:00. 00 minutes received the envoy of Syria Zeyneddin at his request.

Zeyneddin stated that he came to me on behalf of his government to make a statement on the Palestinian issue. Then Zeyneddin set out his lengthy statement on a previously prepared text, the essence of which boiled down to the following.

1. The position of the Syrian government on the Palestinian issue is well known throughout the world. It **opposed the decision of the League of Nations to turn Palestine into a mandated state**, it spoke in favor of granting independence to Palestine. However, not all governments shared the views of the Syrian government. The Syrian government, like the governments of other countries in the East, viewed the Jewish question as one of the most vexing issues, as a matter of concern.

The Syrian government **followed the development of the Zionist movement**, the desire of the Jews to achieve independence. **The Syrian government viewed this movement as an obstacle to the spread of imperialism in the east.** It has always believed that the Jewish movement will take shape and produce the desired results.

However, **in reality, everything turned out to be different.**

On the territory of the **Jewish state, created as a result of the Zionist movement**, a serious crime was committed. A group of people dressed in the same military uniform as the troops of the Jewish state killed the UN representative Count Bernadotte and Colonel Sero¹. Despite the fact, Zeyneddin remarked, that you or we can think about the activities of Count Bernadotte, he still managed to achieve a lot in Palestine. He has won respect for himself in many countries. This criminal act must be condemned. I am sure, continued Zeineddin, that the Soviet government shares my government's stated opinion. According to Zeyneddin, the interim government of the State of Israel washes its hands. This crime shows that the government of the **State of Israel is unable to cope with the unrest prevailing in the territory of the state.**

My government, Zeineddin went on to say, wishes to **draw the attention of the government of the Soviet Union to the significance of this fact and its consequences.**

2. The Soviet government recognized the State of Israel. Now the question of the admission of the State of Israel to the UN membership may arise. In this regard, two sides of this issue should be pointed out: first, a state that accepts a membership in the UN must be able to fulfill the UN Charter and the obligations of the international order imposed on this state by the Charter; secondly, there is currently no harmony among the UN members. The **admission of the State of Israel to the UN can hardly contribute to the creation of such harmony.**

3. The Palestinian question is now attracting the attention of the whole world and, naturally, the attention of the UN. But the United Nations currently has a mandated majority. This provision does not and cannot satisfy a number of states interested in a fair resolution of this or that issue.

The situation in Palestine, Zeyneddin concluded, is becoming intolerable and requires immediate consideration. The Soviet Union has always stood for peace and security in the world, and I hope that the Soviet government will take into account the stated position of the Syrian government on the Palestinian question when considering the question of Palestine.

After listening to Zeyneddin, I stated that the fact stated in the first part of his statement (about the murder of Bernadotte) had nothing to do with the question of the policy of the Soviet government, which is guided by the interests of its country, the interests of maintaining peace and strengthening cooperation between peoples, and that this fact cannot have influence on the policy of the Soviet government.

I promised Zeyneddin to bring the envoy's statement to the attention of the Minister.

Before leaving, Zeineddin began to say that throughout their struggle for independence, the Syrians have always thought about closer relations with the Soviet Union, that they will always remember that the Soviet Union was the first to recognize the Syrian state, and that the Syrian government wants relations between the Soviet Union and Syria improved. He expressed regret that the Palestinian question to some extent delayed the development of these relations. He expressed the hope that the Soviet government would show its readiness to establish closer relations.

In response to this, I remarked that the Soviet government always wants to have friendly relations with other countries and the establishment of such relations depends not only on the Soviet government.

The conversation, which lasted 45 minutes, ended there.
The conversation was attended by Comrade Slyusarenko.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21. P. 4. D. 61. L. 31-33.

FROM THE NOTE OF A MEMBER OF THE USSR
DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA "
CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS ON THE REPORT OF
THE UN MEDIATOR IN PALESTINE, BERNADOTTA "

October 1, 1948

[...] 111. Conclusions on the proposals contained in the Bernadotte report Bernadotte's latest proposals are basically a reiteration of his proposals submitted on June 27 to Arabs and Jews, which were then rejected by both sides. The difference between the current proposals of Bernadotte lies only in the fact that in them he refused to create a united state of Transjordan and Palestine in the form of an alliance, one of whose members is the Arab state of Transjordan, which includes the entire Arab territory of Palestine and the other member is the Jewish state of Israel. **Bernadotte's latest proposals, as well as those of June 27, conflict with** the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. This applies in particular to the issue of boundaries. According to the November 29 resolution, the Negev region should be almost entirely part of the Jewish state. Bernadotte proposes to transfer the entire territory of the Negev, which makes up more than 2/3 of the Jewish state, to the Arabs. If we take into account the reservation contained in paragraph 4 "C" (special conclusions) of Bernadotte's report, it turns out that the entire Arab territory of Palestine, including the Negev, should go to Transjordan, and as compensation to the Jews for the loss of the Negev Bernadotte proposes to hand over to them the tiny territory of the Western Galilee. This proposal by Bernadotte is clearly calculated not only to further incite hostility and border clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, but also between the Arab states themselves. This will inevitably lead

to the implementation of Bernadotte's recommendation to merge the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, "subject to such corrections of the borders with other Arab states, which may be considered practically possible and desirable."

The proposals in Bernadotte's latest report are **fundamentally unacceptable for the following reasons:**

1. They provide for the revision of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 in the most important part - **in relation to the border between the Jewish and Arab territories.**
2. If the General Assembly resolution of November 29 last year provides for the creation in Palestine of two independent states - a Jewish and an Arab, then Bernadotte's proposals run counter to this resolution and essentially mean **the transfer of 4/5 of the Palestinian territory to Transjordan**, i.e. under the **full control of the British** and the refusal, **to please the Anglo-Americans, from the creation of an Arab independent state in Palestine** within the limits determined by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947.
3. The latest proposals of Bernadotte are **not drawn up taking into account the interests of the Arab and Jewish population of Palestine**, but in the interests of third countries (**Anglo-Americans and the English puppet - Transjordan**) and are able to further confuse the issue and cause even greater tension between Jews and Arabs, and between Arab states.

IV. suggestions

1. For the reasons set out in the previous section 111, we consider it appropriate, when discussing Bernadotte's report in the General Assembly, **to vote against this report** and insist

on the implementation of the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947. In putting forward this proposal, we should point out that life has confirmed the correctness of this resolution and that, despite the political play of some states, intrigues and bloody provocations aimed at disrupting the General Assembly's decision on Palestine, this resolution is nevertheless implemented in one of the most significant its parts and the Jewish state on the territory of Palestine has been created and is successfully functioning.

2. Insist that the territory of the Jewish state, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, not be changed without the consent of the State of Israel.

3. To insist on the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 in the part concerning the creation on the territory of Palestine also of an independent Arab state within the limits established by the said resolution.

4. To object categorically to attempts to transfer, as proposed by Bernadotte, the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan.

5. To insist on the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly of November 29 regarding the **establishment of a special international statute for Jerusalem.**

To invite the Trusteeship Council to submit for consideration by the General Assembly at this session the draft statute of the City of Jerusalem it has developed.

The Israeli government's proposal to include Jerusalem in the Jewish state is unacceptable to us, and not to support it.

6. Support the proposal of the Jews to ensure freedom of communication by land and railways, as well as by air, between Jerusalem and the coastal territories of Israel.

7. Support the proposal in the Bernadotte report to replace the current state of indefinite truce in Palestine with formal peace.

If the proposal by the Interim Government of Israel that peace be concluded through a formal agreement between the disputing parties fails, then it is proposed that a peace agreement be concluded through the United Nations Security Council and its Palestinian Commission.

8. With regard to the settlement of the Arab refugee problem, we would consider it appropriate to propose that this issue be settled through **direct negotiations between the parties concerned**, that is, between the Government of Israel and the Government of the Arab State in Palestine.

9. To propose that the Palestinian Commission, established by resolution 181 (P) of November 29, 1947, and which by General Assembly resolution 186 (S. 2) of May 14, 1948 was relieved of its duties, resume its activities ...

To entrust this Commission with the task of demarcating the borders of the State of Israel in accordance with Part II of General Assembly resolution 181 (P) of November 29, 1947, as well as carrying out, together with the Trusteeship Council, the necessary measures to bring into force the statute of the City of Jerusalem. In carrying out the task of demarcating the border of the State of Israel, the Commission may, with the consent of both parties concerned (Jews and Arabs of Palestine), make some minor changes to the border, taking into account the actual changes that have taken place in Palestine.

With regard to possible other functions and powers of the Palestinian Commission, this issue can be considered further when and if the need arises.

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 38, 46-50.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
ATTORNEY OF THE USSR AFFAIRS IN SYRIA I.A.
ISAGULOVA WITH THE DIRECTOR OF THE POLITICAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE MFA OF SYRIA I. ISTUANI**

October 4, 1948

Secret

As it was agreed at a reception at the French envoy, Ibrahim Istuani, director of the political department of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, arrived at our mission today. The initiative for the meeting came from the latter, who repeatedly expressed a desire to pay me a visit, but each time postponed it because of "excessive work,".

From what Istuani said during the conversation with him, the following deserves attention:

1. The trip of Syrian Foreign Minister Mohsen Barazi to Cairo is caused by the position of the Transjordanian King Abdullah towards the Palestinian government. Barazi will consult with the Egyptian prime minister on this matter and will probably take advantage of Iraqi Prime Minister Pachachi's stay in Cairo to find out the point of view of their governments on this issue. Istuani allegedly does not have detailed information about the results of these negotiations, however, he said, it is known that Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq support Syria's point of view towards the Palestinian government.

In this regard, Istuani, as in previous meetings with me, again spread about the position of the great powers and, in particular, the Soviet Union on the Palestinian issue, and in his reasoning came to the conclusion that to hope for the United States or the Soviet Union for a favorable solution the Palestinian question no longer exists and there remains only a

small hope on the part of the British. However, he declined to answer what he had in mind.

Note. Syrian Foreign Minister Mohsen Barazi September 26 left for Cairo, and expect his return only today.

Istvani's message that this trip by Barazi was caused by **the position of the Transjordanian king towards the newly formed Palestinian government is true. Syria**, like no other Arab country, is interested in preserving the integrity of Palestine, since its division and Bernadotte's project on the annexation of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan is viewed by it as **an immediate threat to the existence of republican Syria**. Therefore, it is making every effort to convince Cairo and Baghdad of the danger of the position of the Transjordanian king and to prevent the implementation of such a project of partition of Palestine, which could strengthen Transjordan.

According to official statements, Barazi's mission to Cairo was crowned with success. However, the fact that not a single Arab country, including Syria, has so far officially recognized the Palestinian government indicates that the **British are seriously hindering this**.

2. Turning to the question of how thorough the reports of a number of Syrian newspapers are about the steps taken by certain circles to create the Eastern Bloc, Istvani - without denying that such negotiations are being held between representatives of the countries of the Middle East - said that Syria voluntarily will not agree to participate in any bloc unless force is used. At the same time, he made a reservation that he does not mean the action of the armed force, but any other possible pressure that may be exerted on Syria.

Note. In recent days, almost all Syrian newspapers have reported new Anglo-American maneuvers to form the Mediterranean or Eastern Bloc. At the same time, they refer to the talks allegedly currently underway in Paris between representatives of the Middle East with representatives of Greece and Turkey on the initiative of the latter.

According to our information, **the Anglo-Saxons offered the Arab countries to accept the terms of "aid," according to the Marshall plan**, if these countries agree to conclude a regional alliance providing for the conditions of joint defense, the unification of weapons and close political and economic cooperation of the countries of this alliance, but that in particular Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have so far refrained from discussing these proposals.

Characteristic in Istuani's statement in this regard is that he no longer denies, as before, the possibility of such an alliance of Arab countries and Syria's participation in it, but only tries to justify Syria's entry into such an alliance by "action of force."

Charge d'Affaires of the IA. Isagulov

WUA RF. F. 0128. Op. 11.P.8.D. 5. L. 117-119.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER
OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA
WITH MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF ISRAEL IN
THE UN M. ORENSHTEIN**

October 13, 1948

Paris, Palais de Chaillot

Secret

1. Outlining the position of the Jewish delegation on the Bernadotte plan, Orenstein said that he is now preparing the text of their statement, which, as the first paragraph, confirms that Jews are in principle in favor of the General Assembly's decision of November 29 on the Palestinian issue. Such a position, as could be concluded from the words of Orenshtein, if accepted by the Jewish delegation, will be the result of persistent efforts on the part of him personally, Orenstein. Meanwhile, Shertok², as Orenshtein made it clear, is currently not inclined to adhere to the General Assembly decision of November 29. For example, at a press conference on October 6, Shertok said that they reject Bernadotte's plan as a possible basis for discussion, however, at the same time, Shertok did not say a single word about the General Assembly decision of November 29.

Then Orenshtein said that they considered it necessary for some territorial changes to be made, since in November of this year. The General Assembly defined the boundaries of the Jewish state without considering strategic considerations. At that time, decisions were taken by the General Assembly taking into account the fact that peace will be established in Palestine and that there will be an economic union between the Jewish and Arab states of Palestine, etc. Life over the past

period of time has shown the impracticability of an economic union and the illusory premise that the Jewish and Arab states, at least at the present time, can build their relations on the basis of friendship and cooperation. Taking these circumstances into account, in the firm opinion of the Jewish delegation, it is necessary to eliminate the discovered strategic weakness of the borders of the Jewish state, for which it is necessary to make such corrections to the border line of the Jewish state, which would provide to some extent the possibility of a more effective defense of the Jewish state in case of possible the future of military clashes. These corrections, first of all, include the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa. This last point is especially important for Jews, since recent military events have shown that the Jewish state and, in particular, Tel Aviv would be in a critical situation and, perhaps, they would fall into the hands of the Arabs, if the Jews had even before the invasion of Arab troops Jaffa would not have been completely captured within the Jewish state. According to Orenstein, there are now 5-7 thousand Arabs left in Jaffa out of 35 thousand.

Orenstein also stated that they were opposed to Bernadotte's plan being accepted even as a basis for discussion. However, from inquiries, I found out that Shertok and, one might say, the majority of the Jewish delegation here, as well as in the government in Tel Aviv, are not inclined to support the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29. In particular, Shertok and the majority in the interim government of Israel are inclined to agree to the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan. They do this out of political and practical considerations, arguing that it will be possible to come to an agreement with Abdallah and obtain his consent, and consequently the consent of the British, to

include the Western Galilee and the Negev in the Jewish state, meanwhile, with the Mufti of Jerusalem Husseini, for Jews it is almost impossible.

2. The second most important point in which the Jews depart from the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29 is their demand to include the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem (New City) in the Jewish state. At the same time, they agree that the Arab part of the city of Jerusalem should become part of the Arab state. At the same time, they would agree that in some form international control over the protection of the Holy Places should be established by the UN, but that this control and supervision only concern the Holy Places, in the strict sense of the word.

3. The Jews will also insist on providing them with a corridor to connect the Jewish part of the city of Jerusalem with its 90,000 Jewish population with the main part of the state of Israel (Tel Aviv).

4. Regarding the port of Haifa, Orenstein said that the delegation was in the mood (Shertok et al.), Ultimately, to agree with the proposal to declare Haifa a free port, but not the entire port, but only part of it should be allocated for this purpose, bearing in mind, of course, that such a step on the part of the Jewish state should be based on reciprocity. Orenstein did not develop what is meant by reciprocity.

5. Orenstein further advised that the proposals they are currently preparing provide for a commission for the purpose of limiting the ultimate boundaries of the Jewish state, but that they have not yet determined whether it will be a completely new commission, or whether they will propose the reopening of the Palestinian commission envisaged decision of

November 29, 1947. Orenshtein promised to give more detailed information on this issue to me at the next meeting.

6. Orenstein stated that they would strongly insist on the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine, since peace cannot be achieved until such a proposal is implemented.

7. On the issue of Arab refugees, Orenstein stated that the position of the Jewish delegation is as follows. The bulk of Arab refugees (now no more than 80-100 thousand Arab population remained in the Jewish state, while in November of this year there were over half a million of them) left the territory of the Jewish state even before the invasion of Arab troops into Palestine. This was done under the influence of the propaganda of Arab leaders, who at that time pursued a twofold goal: first, to show that the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs as part of a Jewish state is unthinkable, and secondly, to arouse national, religious and other feelings of the population of Arab states, incite militancy among them and hasten the military intervention of the Arab states by invading Palestine and the Jewish state, using as one of the pretexts the need to return to these Arab refugees their homes, property, land, etc. At the moment, all Jewish leaders and the government are united in their intention to prevent the return of Arab refugees to Israel. The majority in the government is inclined to no longer let them into the territory of the Jewish state, but to use the property and land belonging to these refugees as a fund for the resettlement of Jewish immigrants. However, the united workers' party represented by Orenstein considers it possible, after the end of hostilities and the establishment of peace in Palestine, to allow Arab refugees to return to the territory of the Jewish state, provided that they declare their full loyalty to the Jewish state and will not be the fifth column. In practice, the Jews are thinking of dragging out

the refugee issue, not by outright refusal, but by including this issue on the agenda during peace negotiations with the Arabs.

8. Orenstein said (while he made a reservation that these are still rumors that he must check) that there are allegedly direct negotiations between the Jews and the Egyptians, and in these negotiations the representatives of Egypt are trying to ensure that the Jews stop their negotiations with Abdallah of Transjordan ... As compensation for this, the Egyptian representatives propose to the Jews to divide the Negev into two parts: the northern part should become part of the Jewish state, and the southern part should become a Jewish-Arab condominium. Orenstein promised at the next meeting to inform me of the details of these negotiations and their reliability.

9. Orenstein drew my attention to yesterday's correspondence (October 12) in the French newspaper "Fran Thierer" from Bern regarding the fact that the USSR representative in Tel Aviv allegedly addressed the head of the Israeli government Ben-Gurion with a demarche, which allegedly contained warning that the Soviet Government will refuse to support the Israeli government if the latter concludes an agreement with Transjordan and agrees to the transfer of the Arab part of Palestine to Transjordan. When he asked if I knew anything about this demarche, I said that I had not heard anything about it. A translation of this correspondence is attached.

Conclusions:

1. From the conversation with Orenstein it became clear that the Jewish government is inclined to agree with the transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan and **to refuse the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine**

envisaged by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

2. The Jews will insist on the incorporation of the Western Galilee into the Jewish state and on the liquidation of the Arab enclave of Jaffa.

3. The Jews are inclined to allocate part of the port in Haifa as a free port for the Arab states, but on terms of reciprocity. What requirements will be put forward by the Jews as these conditions of reciprocity - they have not yet specified.

4. The Jews will insist on the demand for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Palestine.

5. The Jews do not intend now to give their consent to the return of Arab refugees to the Jewish state.

6. The Jews will insist on the inclusion of the New City of Jerusalem in the Jewish state and on the establishment of a Jewish corridor to connect Jerusalem with the main part of the State of Israel. Thus, the Jews are against part 111 of the General Assembly decision of November 29, which provides for the establishment of a special international statute in Jerusalem.

S. Tsarapkin

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 61-67.

**ORDER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
ON EXIT TO ISRAEL RUSSIAN SPIRITUAL MISSION**

October 14, 1948

Secret

Allow the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to give the consent of the Moscow Patriarchate to leave the USSR for the State of Israel for the permanent work of Archimandrite Leonid (Ilya Khristoforovich Lobachev) as the head of the Russian spiritual mission in Jerusalem and Vladimir Yelkhovsky as a priest missions.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

I. Stalin

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF A MEMBER
OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT THE THIRD SESSION
OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY S.K. TSARAPKINA
WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M.
SHERTOK AND MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION OF
ISRAEL IN THE UN D. LIFSHITS**

October 14, 1948

Secret

Today at 4 o'clock I met with Shertok and Lifshitz to clarify the position of the Jews regarding the Bernadotte plan in view of the upcoming discussion of this plan by the General Assembly.

Shertok first outlined the position of the Jewish state.

Bernadotte's plan, he said, is unacceptable to Jews. It is not completely unacceptable since its points such as the recognition of the existence of Israel and some others are acceptable. The main thing that the Jews cannot agree with is the proposal to deprive the Jewish state of the Negev region. This point in Bernadotte's plan is an attempt to destroy all the original plans of the General Assembly. Shertok said that at the meetings of the General Assembly they will state detailed reasons why they cannot agree to the concession of the Negev to the Arabs (economic reasons, access to the Dead and Red Seas, etc.).

On the issue of Jerusalem, Shertok said that the Jews would be ready to accept an international statute, but bitter experience has shown the impracticability of this statute. The fact is that in order to ensure its international statute, there must be troops in Jerusalem, which could at any time protect the city and its population. However, in the current

conditions, one cannot count on the creation of an international army for Jerusalem. In any case, now it will be practically impossible to implement it. But even if such an army had been created, the Jews are now unlikely to agree to rely on it, as well as on any foreign army in general. The Jews think to declare at the Assembly that they themselves will defend themselves, as they rely more on their own strength. Jews cannot rely on an international army, if one would have been created, also because at the current tense moment in the event of any international crisis, which is quite possible, the Arabs can easily take advantage of this and take Jerusalem into their own hands, since the international army in Jerusalem would then be powerless and hardly capable or willing to defend the Jewish population of Jerusalem. Therefore, Jews cannot rely on an international statute. In addition, the Jews are against the international statute for Jerusalem for other reasons. Previously, they agreed with the establishment of an international statute in Jerusalem, because in the resolution contained in the resolution of 29. XI. 48, the plan for the partition of Palestine, all the elements of this plan were organically linked, namely: the plan provided for - a) the creation of an independent Arab state, b) the creation of an independent Jewish state and c) the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem. All three elements of Palestine were united into a single economic whole through the establishment of an economic union of Palestine, which includes the Arab state, the Jewish state and the city of Jerusalem. But since now the Economic Union is not feasible and this issue has disappeared, this circumstance undermines the entire financial basis for the international regime of the city of Jerusalem, because, as you know, in the decision on the economic union, it was envisaged that from 5 to 10% of the net income of the Arab and Jewish states had to go to the

needs of the city of Jerusalem. Without additional funds, the City of Jerusalem is unable to maintain its municipal services and urban development. Now that the idea of an economic union has disappeared, it is not clear who will bear these costs. "We believe," Shertok said, "that it is necessary to review this plan of the international regime for Jerusalem and adapt it to suit the given situation."

Shertok went on to outline his revised plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem. He said that it would be possible to limit the international regime to the tricks of the Old City, that is, that part of the city that is surrounded by walls, and this border could even be slightly expanded to include, for example, the Garden of Gethsemane, and the New City would be included in territory of Israel. There would be an Israeli garrison in the Jewish part of the city. The Old City could be further delimited by granting autonomy to the Arab, Jewish and Christian communities. International control over the Old City is considered by the Jews to be obligatory and, in the opinion of the Jews, even handing over part of the New City to the Arabs would be a lesser evil than handing over the entire Old City to them. Shertok went on to say that they still have not responded to the American proposal for the establishment of an Arab-Jewish guardianship over Jerusalem. They are still studying the American proposal. This proposal, according to Shertok, preserves the framework of the international regime in Jerusalem, since the supreme body of supervision and control over the entire city would be the Trusteeship Council, and in fact, both communities - Arab and Jewish - would be masters - each over its own part of the city. Shertok said that the Americans did not fully clarify their plan, but Eban understood them so that not only the Arab part of the New City, but also the Old City should be included as a trust territory of the Arabs. This would be completely

unacceptable for Jews. "However," Shertok said, "in the worst case scenario, they will be ready to consider this proposal, but they themselves will not put forward it. As for the Americans, they may put forward this proposal in the Assembly.

Referring to the Jewish plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem, Lifshits noted that in this plan the main idea of establishing international control over Jerusalem remains and in this part their plan does not contradict the UN decision, but the Jews now only propose to limit the boundaries of the Jerusalem zone to a narrower territory, that is, only to the Old City and its Holy Places.

Shertok further dwelt on the need to establish a territorial connection between Jerusalem and the territory of Israel, stating that the ongoing war fully proved this necessity. If the Jews did not defend the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem route with all their might, the city would be doomed to death or would have to submit to the Arabs, the Jews would not be able to send reinforcements to their units that fought in Jerusalem, and the city's Jewish population would be completely cut off. Regarding the width of the corridor or zone leading to Jerusalem, Shertok said that this zone should include in its western part the strategic heights for which the fighting took place and which ensure the safety of the path and water supply. Closer to Jerusalem, this zone can be narrowed down to 2-3 kilometers. Shertok said that on the route of this corridor of 4 water pumping stations - 3 are in the hands of Jews and only the station in Latrun is still controlled by the Arabs, since the Arab position dominates over Latrun, strongly fortified by British sappers. The length of the proposed corridor will be approximately 40-45 km.

When I told Shertok about a message from Berne about negotiations allegedly taking place between Jews and Egypt

regarding the division of the Negev into the northern (Jewish part) and the southern, which would be under the Jewish-Egyptian condominium (published in *Fran-Tirer*, from 12.X. 48), Shertok denied these rumors, but confirmed that Egypt is one of the opponents of the transfer of the Negev to Transjordan, since this transfer is tantamount to handing over the Negev to the British and would negate all their efforts to bring about the withdrawal of British troops from Egypt.

On the issue of Haifa and Lydda, Shertok reaffirmed Israel's already well-known position that Israel will not limit its sovereignty. Haifa is an Israeli port and should remain so, although Israel can declare its readiness to negotiate with the Arab states on granting them port privileges (free zone) in Haifa on a reciprocal basis. "This reciprocity," Shertok said, "must be understood in a broad sense, that is, Jews may ask in exchange not necessarily for port privileges in Arab ports, but for any other privileges. Shertok categorically stated that there could be no question of imposing restrictions on their sovereignty over Haifa and Lydda on them, even on behalf of the UN or some other international body. Regarding the Lydda airfield, which is in the hands of the Jews (the city of Lydda among the Arabs), Shertok noted that they could grant, for example, Iraq the right to free air traffic through the Lydda airfield, if Iraq, in turn, gives the Jews the same right in relation to their territory. The issue of Haifa and Lydda may thus be the subject of a mutual agreement between Israel and other Arab states, but a solution to this issue cannot be imposed on Israel.

When I asked about Jaffa, Shertok said that this city was almost completely abandoned by the Arabs and was in the hands of the Jews, and the Arab enclave, which was planned

according to the UN resolution of November 29, 1947, actually does not exist.

“The question of Galileo,” Shertok continued, “they do not intend to put forward, since the Jews already have it in their hands. Section plan dated 29. XI. 47 is, as Shertok said, their starting point, but they want to make some adjustments to it. Shertok recalled that even then, in November 1947, he declared at the Assembly that this plan was the minimum for Jews. If then the Arabs expressed their readiness to peacefully cooperate with the Jews, the Jews would not have proposed any changes, but the Arabs declared war on this plan, and thereby destroyed one of the prerequisites of the entire plan. The whole plan was based on its mandatory peaceful implementation. But as in the given conditions, after the invasion of Arab troops, one can agree on the boundaries that are provided for in this plan, when the Jewish territory cuts into the Arab, and the Arab into the Jewish. If the Jews now accepted these boundaries, they would be impossible to defend. Since, instead of peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, Israel had to defend its borders, there is a need for some changes to the border lines, which is provided for in the resolution of November 29.

From the words of Shertok it was clear that the Jews with all their might will defend the preservation of the Western Galilee. He gave a number of other arguments in defense of this position. He said that the Negev cannot be cut off from the territory of Israel, since the Jewish state was created and exists within the boundaries determined for it by the decision of November 29. “As for the Western Galilee,” Shertok said, “the Jews do not take this territory away from the Arab state in Palestine, as it does not yet exist,”. The Arabs, in accordance with the resolution of November 29, 1947, should have shown

their readiness to create their own state, but this did not happen.

I noticed that this does not mean that an Arab state will not be created in Palestine either, or if it is created, then, apparently, the borders of this state should be secured in the form they were outlined in the resolution of the General Assembly. Shertok replied that if an Arab state arises tomorrow, they will be ready to enter into negotiations with him on this issue. However, Shertok immediately added that Western Galilee, as the experience of the war showed, is necessary for the Jews in order for their state to be viable and able to defend itself. In addition, the Arabs, in his opinion, must pay some price for their attempt to thwart the UN decision to partition Palestine. He reiterated that since the economic union was non-existent, maintaining the old borders is simply unthinkable. "If the Arabs agree to negotiate with the Jews," Shertok said, "then they, the Jews, will be able to concede something to them. Now, - said Shertok, - the Jews are actually conducting a discussion in conditions of war. For Jews, there are three possible outcomes:

1. If the war continues, everything will have to be decided by the war. Then the Jews may be able to conquer all of Palestine (up to Jordan).
2. If a new UN decision is adopted, Israel will defend its right to Galilee as the position it needs for defense.
3. If full agreement is reached with the Arabs, the Jews will be ready to make concessions to the Arabs in order to get a real lasting peace.

Summarizing this issue, Shertok said that if this could be avoided, the Jews will not specifically raise the issue of Galilee now, but will declare that they remain supporters of the

General Assembly resolution of November 29 on the partition of Palestine, but with certain amendments, having in view of Galilee, Jaffa, Jerusalem, and the corridor to Jerusalem.

He also stated that the Jews would undoubtedly prefer the creation of a separate independent Arab State, rather than annexing the Arab territory of Palestine to Transjordan.

Schertok further referred to Bernadotte's proposal for the creation of a wide demilitarized zone and for demobilization. Israel is opposed to these proposals, because if they were accepted, it would be placed at a disadvantage compared to the Arabs. He said that accepting these proposals would establish "false," equality, since if the Arabs only withdraw the troops, and do not demobilize them, a potential threat to Israel remains. At the same time, if the Jews are required to demobilize, this will deprive them of the opportunity to defend themselves. The same applies to the demilitarized zone. The Arabs, withdrawing their troops, would not lose anything, and the Jews would have to cede their territory.

Shertok said they would insist on the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine and believe it necessary for the Security Council to take action to prevent further incursions and renewed hostilities in Palestine. Shertok said that he is not against the guarantee of the borders by the United Nations, but only if these borders are acceptable to Israel. If Bernadotte's plan is accepted, the Jews will object to any such assurances. Bernadotte's proposal for a UN guarantee of the boundaries outlined in his plan is absolutely unacceptable to Jews. Shertok further said that the Jews would not mind the establishment of a commission to help the peace negotiations, but he would be against a commission that would interfere in these negotiations and try to control or interfere in internal affairs. The Commission should play only

a supportive role: to contribute to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere, to induce the parties to an agreement, to offer a compromise, etc. This commission would state the facts and report to the UN on the progress and success of the negotiations. Shertok also expressed his opinion about the uselessness and inexpediency of the further existence of the institution of a mediator. Shertok concluded by saying that it might be acceptable for them to resume the activities of the Palestinian Commission, created in accordance with the resolution of November 29, 47, which could replace the existing mediator and the armistice commission, but they have not yet thought through this issue properly ...

On October 15, a member of the Jewish delegation, Lifshits, told me that they were discussing among themselves the question of a possible resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission. They have not yet come to a definite opinion on this issue, but they are confused by the composition of the Palestinian Commission, in which the Dane held an anti-Jewish position and the terms of reference of the Commission, as defined in the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947.

They believe that the terms of reference of the Commission are too broad, and they fear that this Commission would not interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state, which they cannot allow. In general, the impression is that although the Jews have not yet defined their attitude to the possibility of resuming the activities of the Palestinian Commission, they clearly do not like this Commission.

S. Tsarapkin

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 70-80.

NOTE "PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE POSITION OF JEWS IN THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION "

October 16, 1948

Secret

The Jews have not yet finalized their position on the Palestinian issue.

From conversations with Shertok, we found out the following.

1. The Jews declare that they will take the position of the decisions of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, but consider it necessary to make some changes to these decisions.
2. **The Jews are positive about our proposal for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Palestine** and consider it **the main condition** that can ensure peace in Palestine.

Jews are also in favor of the Security Council taking appropriate measures to prevent the resumption of hostilities in Palestine.

Jews are in favor of conducting peace negotiations directly between the parties concerned.

3. Regarding point "B" of Bernadotte's proposals - **the Jews are categorically against the rejection of the Negev region**, but for the inclusion of the Western Galilee in the Jewish state.
4. With regard to point "C", the Jews are evasively claiming that they would certainly prefer an Arab state to be created in the Arab part of Palestine, but it does not exist.

From conversations with Jews who are not part of their delegation at the Assembly session, it turns out that Shertok himself and most of the members of the Israeli government would allegedly prefer to come to an agreement with

Abdallah Transjordan and, through their consent to transfer the Arab territories of Palestine to him, not only keep the Jewish state of the Negev , but also to include Western Galilee and Jaffa in Israel, and to achieve a solution in their favor also the issue of Jerusalem and the corridor between Jerusalem and the main part of the Jewish state.

5. On point "d" of Bernadotte's proposals, the position of the Jews basically coincides with our proposal. They are opposed to any guarantees from the UN of the borders of the Jewish state that Bernadotte is proposing; but they are not opposed to such guarantees if a border decision is made that satisfies the Jews.

6. The position of the Jews on the issue of Haifa and Lydda (points "e" and "f" of Bernadotte) basically **coincides with our proposal**. They will oppose any limitation of Jewish sovereignty, but they will be ready, on the basis of reciprocity, to enter into direct negotiations with the interested parties on these issues.

7. On the issue of Jerusalem (points "g" and "1" of Bernadotte), the Jews will insist on:

- a) the incorporation of the New City into the Jewish state,
- b) To bring the Old City under international control in order to ensure the protection of the holy places and with the granting of autonomy to the Jewish, Arab and Christian communities of the Old City.

As a second position of the Jews, it is possible that they will agree with the unofficial proposal of the Americans to establish custody of the Jewish and Arab states over Jerusalem under the control of the Trusteeship Council.

8. The Jews will insist on providing them with a corridor to connect Jerusalem with the main part of the Jewish state.

The Jews argue **all their demands regarding territorial changes** by the fact that the borders established for the Jewish state according to the resolution of November 29, could be acceptable to them only if after the adoption of the resolution everything would go peacefully, the Jewish state was not subjected to attack and an economic union of the Jewish and Arab states and Jerusalem would be established. But there is no peace in Palestine, and the economic union has proved impracticable. Since the border line, as outlined in the November 29 resolution, cannot be defended, **it must be corrected for defense reasons.**

9. On the issue of Arab refugees (point "i" of Bernadotte's proposals), the **Jews believe that this issue should be discussed during peace negotiations with the Arabs.** Now, when the Jewish state is in a state of war, the Jews cannot give any guarantees for the settlement of this problem.

10. The Jews would not object to the institution envisaged in paragraph "K" of Bernadotte's proposals to the Palestinian Conciliation Commission, provided that the functions of this Commission would be of a purely advisory nature, without any rights that would allow it to interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state or limit its sovereignty.

With regard to the institution of the Mediator and the Palestinian Armistice Commission, ¹ the Jews would consider it expedient to abolish both.

11. The question of the resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission, established by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29, is reserved by Jews. They are not satisfied with the composition of this Commission and

are confused by its terms of reference. Jews believe that the Commission's terms of reference are too broad. They fear that this Commission might interfere in the affairs of the Jewish state, which they cannot allow.

OFFERS (in addition to the offers already presented)

1. In contrast to both the proposal of Bernadotte, which provides for the possible transfer of the Arab territories of Palestine to Transjordan, and the illegally created in Gaza (an Arab city in the southwestern part of Palestine by the Mediterranean Sea) to the all-Palestinian Arab government², which declared the creation of a single independent state throughout the territory of Palestine, we it is necessary to insist on the urgent implementation of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 in the part concerning the creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine within the limits determined by the said resolution.

2. Concerning Jerusalem.

Considering that according to the resolution of November 29, Jerusalem should be governed on behalf of the UN by the governor, endowed with full powers, including the right to veto the laws that are passed and the conduct of foreign affairs.

Considering that in order to maintain law and order in the city, the governor is given the right to organize special police units, which will be recruited outside Palestine and in the size that the governor himself determines, and that, thus, through the governor, full control over Jerusalem will actually be in the hands USA and England.

Taking into account also that the question of the Palestine Economic Union disappeared, and therefore the city of

Jerusalem, which was to become a part of this Union and, as its member, had to receive in its favor from the Jewish and Arab states from 5 to 10% of net income of these states, has lost its financial base.

It would be advisable to support the demand of the Jews to include the New City, where there are no "holy places," in the Jewish state, but not the entire New City, as the Jews demand, but only a part populated by Jews. To include the Arab part of the New City into the Arab state of Palestine.

Above the Old City, where the "holy places" of Christians, Jews and Muslims are mainly concentrated, and some other adjacent places (the Garden of Gethsemane, etc.), to establish, in order to protect the "holy places," a special international regime under the supervision of UN. At the same time, provide for the granting of broad autonomy to the Arab, Jewish and Christian communities of the Old City.

3. With the support of the demand of the Jews to provide them with a "corridor" for the connection of Jerusalem with the main part of the Jewish state not to act. Instead, the decision should include a general provision guaranteeing full freedom to enter and live in the city.

4. On the issue of Arab refugees (clause "i" of Bernadotte's proposals), it would be considered possible to support the Jewish proposal that this issue be settled between Jews and Arabs during peace negotiations as part of a peace settlement.

5. We consider it expedient that the issue of guaranteeing the political, economic, social, and religious rights of Arabs on the territory of the Jewish state, and Jews on the Arab territory of Palestine (paragraph "F" of Bernadotte's proposals) should also be settled directly between Jews and Arabs during peace negotiations ...

6. With regard to the resumption of the activities of the Palestinian Commission, established by the resolution of November 29, 1947, it would be advisable to make this proposal if the proposal for the immediate creation of an independent Arab state in Palestine, as well as the proposal for withdrawal from Palestinian foreign troops and foreign military personnel. Bearing in mind our proposals set out above in paragraphs 4 and 5, we believe it expedient not to entrust the settlement of the problem of Arab refugees and the problem of the rights of national minorities to the Palestinian Commission.

WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 81-86.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE USSR
AMBASSADOR IN ISRAEL P.I. ERSHOVA WITH HEAD
OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT OF THE
ISRAEL MFA SH. FRIEDMAN**

October 17, 1948

Secret

Today, at his request, he received Friedman, who came to the Mission to inform about three issues: the hostilities in the Negev, the new formulation of the question of Jerusalem and the messages received from Paris from Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok.

Regarding the situation in the Negev, Friedman said that on July 16, the day before the start of the second truce, Jewish troops seized the Karatiya point and interrupted Egyptian communications from west to east. At the very beginning of the second truce, Egyptian troops bypassed this point from the southwest, thereby depriving Israel of the opportunity to communicate with the Negev. There was no response from the Jews since they relied on the UN. Only a month later, on August 18, the chief of staff of the observers, General Landstrom, established the joint use of the Negev road intersection for the Egyptian and Jewish armies. Jewish transports could use this road from 6 o'clock in the morning to 12 o'clock. days, while the Egyptians from 14 to 20 hours. Israel time. This timetable was supposed to go into effect on August 21, but the Egyptians did not agree to it. On September 14, United Nations Mediator Bernadotte signed Act No. 12, which repeated the above-mentioned conditions for operating the intersection and introduced a ban on the use of aircraft for communications in the area.

On October 15, a transport was sent to the Negev, which came under fire from the Egyptians and was forced to return, and two vehicles were burned. The Egyptians used aviation (6 Spitfires). The Jews launched a retaliatory military action. The next day, General Riley ordered the cessation of hostilities. Immediately there was a response from the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the command of the Jewish army that the troops would not stop hostilities until the freedom of movement of Jewish transports in the Negev was ensured. Currently, major battles are taking place with the participation of tank and air formations. An Egyptian plane was shot down yesterday. The scale of the battles is evidenced by the fact that Tel Aviv hospitals are now overcrowded with wounded.

The **constant ceasefire violations by Egyptian forces** on the southern front, Friedman said, can be explained by the fact that the Egyptians want to take over part of the Negev, while using the favorable attitude of America, given that, according to Bernadotte's plan, they were not supposed to get anything in the Negev. It should be borne in mind that America will lose interest in Israel after the presidential elections.

Moving on to the second question, Friedman said that about two weeks ago, new American proposals for the future of Jerusalem had become known in Tel Aviv. According to this plan, Jerusalem should be divided into three parts, with the Jewish part of the city being placed under the tutelage of the State of Israel, the Arab part under the tutelage of an Arab state, most likely Transjordan. The holy sites (i.e., obviously the old city of Jerusalem) will be placed under international trusteeship with limited governing authority. In order to persuade Israel to agree to this project, American representatives say that this project is not much different from

the project of annexing part of the city to Israel, because it imposes only two minor restrictions: to send reports every two years to the UN Trusteeship Council and to answer questions from observers.

Further, Friedman reported on the telegrams received from Shertok, which contain conversations with representatives of various states. Belgian delegate Spaak believes that Israel itself should restrict freedom of immigration in order to put an end to talks about its allegedly aggressive intentions. This point of view of the Belgian delegate is in accordance with the general principles of British policy towards Israel.

The Swedes are deeply impressed by Bernadotte's assassination and consider it their moral duty to support the mediator's project. In general, their point of view is similar to the Belgian one.

The position of the Australian representative of Evvat and the Norwegian delegation is viewed by Shertok as favorable to Israel. When I asked about the details of this position, Friedman replied that the delegations of these countries object to the establishment of borders in Palestine at the current session of the General Assembly. In their opinion, a "good offices" commission should be created to determine the boundaries, which will present recommendations to the next session of the General Assembly. These delegations believe that Israel should be more flexible on the issue of the Negev.

Stopping in passing on the conversation **between Shertok and the Indian delegate Pandit Nehru**, Friedman said that the latter treats Israel favorably, but **India should reckon with the presence of 35 million Muslims in India.**

Shertok had a conversation in Paris with Soviet representatives Sobolev and Tsarapkin. According to

Fridman, Sobolev discovered a freedom of approach to the question of Palestine. Sobolev believes that the fate of the Arab territories of Palestine should be predetermined by a concrete clash between Transjordan and Egypt. He called the American proposals for Jerusalem interesting. In his opinion, the present session of the General Assembly should adopt resolutions on the recognition of the State of Israel, on the withdrawal of the invading troops, a resolution requiring direct peace negotiations between Jews and Arabs. A commission of "good offices," should be created, which will be given the right to decide the issue of borders.

During a conversation with Sobolev, Shertok said that the Israeli government is ready to negotiate an end to hostilities with all Arab states, but about the future of Palestine, Israel will only negotiate with the de facto Arab authorities in Palestine.

To my question about the positions of America and England, Friedman replied that it remains the same, i.e., **England supports Transjordan, and America supports Egypt**, but the form and size of this support is not known to him.

At the end of the conversation, Friedman dwelled on a number of questions of the internal situation. He said that elections to the Constituent Assembly will be held only in mid-December this year. A draft constitution and election regulations are currently being developed, but a law on citizenship will be adopted even earlier. The issuance of a compulsory loan is being prepared for persons who own a certain capital.

Friedman also said that recently, measures are being taken to eliminate the separate headquarters of Palmach, 2, whose formations number up to 5 thousand people and form three

brigades, which until now had their own separate headquarters. Now there is a need to resolve this issue, since parts of Palmach enjoyed a well-known privileged position in the Jewish army based on the fact that these formations bore the brunt of the fighting in the first stage of the war. The total number of the Israeli army is currently 60-70 thousand people. Although in Israel there is universal conscription for men from 18 to 40 years old, and for childless women from 18 to 26 years old, nevertheless, the order of contingents remains in force, since the general mobilization of draft-age people in areas such as the Negev and Galilee would lead to the complete deprivation of the labor force of the settlements located in these areas of new colonization.

I asked what new I heard from Meyerson. Friedman said that Trade Attaché Bezherano has developed a vigorous activity and is negotiating the purchase of oil and other materials. Defense Attaché Colonel Ratner sent a message that the Soviet military circles are interested in the structure of the Israeli army, martial law, etc. Friedman asked the General Staff to send maps and other materials to Moscow. The Israeli mission encountered economic difficulties: the furniture had to be purchased from Sweden, the premises provided turned out to be so small that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had to refuse to send some employees who were supposed to be additionally included in the Mission's staff.

Before leaving, Fridman conveyed Ms. Shertok's request for permission to send one boy to the USSR for surgery at the clinic of prof. Filatov, since he alone can cure his eye disease associated with brain inflammation. I said that it was necessary to first ask prof. Filatov - is he able to provide this assistance.

The conversation lasted 30 minutes, attache Semioshkin was present.

Envoy of the USSR in Israel P. Ershov of the RF

AVP. F. 089. Op. 1.P.1.D. 3. L. 17-20.

**TELEPHONOGRAM OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.M. MOLOTOV TO THE
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CC VKP (B), CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V.
STALIN**

October 19, 1948

Secret

On October 14, the representatives of China and Great Britain in the Security Council submitted a joint draft resolution in connection with the latest events in Palestine. In this draft, after mentioning the murder of Bernadotte and the fact that the Government of Israel has not yet submitted a progress report on the murder, it is proposed that the Palestinian governments and authorities allow free access to the armistice monitoring personnel in all places where they need to be by virtue of their duties, and have taken all measures to ensure the safety of the monitoring personnel and representatives of the mediator. Vyshinsky, in his telegram No. 388, proposes not to object to this draft and to vote in favor. According to Vyshinsky's community, Jews only complain that there are more UN observers (54 people) in the territory they control than in Arab territory (32 people). In this regard, Vyshinsky proposes to add an addition to the resolution, in which to point out the desirability of an equal distribution of UN observers on the territory of both sides.

Considering that at one time we did not object to the creation of the Armistice Commission and insisted on the participation of Soviet representatives as observers, I believe that one can agree with Vyshinsky's proposal. Please approve.

V. Molotov

On the document of the Paper: "Comrade Stalin agrees.

P [oskrebyshv]. "

AVP RF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 15, d. 161, l. 6.

NOTE OF THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE USSR VMMOLOTOV TO THE GENERAL
SECRETARY. CC VKP (b), CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN

October 20, 1948

Secret

In the First Committee of the General Assembly, discussion begins on Bernadotte's proposals on Palestine, which boil down to the following:

1. Bernadotte proposes replacing the existing temporary truce between the parties with an official peace or such a truce, which is accompanied by the **complete withdrawal and demobilization of the armed forces** or the creation of a demilitarized zone between them under UN supervision.

I consider Bernadotte's proposal unacceptable since it bypasses the issue of the withdrawal of foreign troops (Transjordan and Egypt) and proposes the demobilization of troops on the territory of the Jewish and Arab parts of Palestine.

Vyshinsky proposes to oppose this proposal of Bernadotte with our proposal, stipulated by the directives, for the immediate withdrawal from the territories of the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine **of all foreign troops and foreign military personnel.**

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky and give him additional instructions - to support the proposal to establish an official peace between the Arab and Jewish states, the creation of which is envisaged by the decision of the General Assembly on November 29.

2. Bernadotte proposes the transfer of Nerev to the Arabs, and the Western Galilee to the Jews and the transfer of the fate of the Arab part of Palestine to the Arab states. At the same time, the arguments in favor of the merger of the Arab part of Palestine with Transjordan must be taken into account.

Vyshinsky considers it necessary to object to these proposals, since they revise the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, giving away four-fifths of the entire territory of Israel (Nerev) Transjordan, i.e., under the control of England, and insist on the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

3. Bernadotte proposes that the UN **give assurances that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories** will be respected and changed **only with the consent of the parties concerned**.

Vyshinsky believes that one cannot object to this proposal of Bernadotte, but **only if the boundaries** established by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 **will not be changed**.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

4. Bernadotte proposes to declare the port of Haifa, including refineries and oil pipeline terminations, a free port and Lydda airport a free airport, with unhindered access to both ports of the Arab countries concerned.

Vyshinsky reports that the **Jews are inclined to agree on the issue of Haifa** with the interested Arab states on the basis of reciprocity.

I propose to instruct Vyshinsky that if Jews and Arabs agree to agree on mutual concessions to Haifa and Lidda, **one should not object to this.**

5. Bernadotte proposes that the city of Jerusalem, within the boundaries defined by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947 with **unhindered access to the city** by land, air, and railways.

Vyshinsky proposes to include the part of the New City of Jerusalem inhabited by Jews into the Jewish state, and the part inhabited by Arabs into the Arab state and agree with the proposal of the Jews to limit the establishment of an international regime under the leadership of the UN only over the territory of the Old City. **Unlike Vyshinsky's proposal, I propose to give him the following instructions: to insist on the implementation** of the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, i.e., to establish a regime over Jerusalem in which administrative power is **exercised by the Trusteeship Council.** Under this condition, one can agree to Bernadotte's proposal **to provide local autonomy for the Jewish and Arab parts of the population of Jerusalem.**

If in the process of discussing this issue a solution is outlined that **is acceptable to both Jews and Arabs,** we consider it possible **to discuss such a proposal in the future.**

6. Bernadotte proposes to **grant Arab refugees the right to return to the territory of the Jewish state and compensation for the lost property.**

Vyshinsky proposes **to provide the Jews with the opportunity to agree on this issue** with the Arabs during peace negotiations.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

7. Bernadotte proposes **to establish a Palestinian Conciliation Commission**, responsible to the UN and acting on the instructions of the latter.

Vyshinsky proposes **not to object** to the creation of such a commission, provided that it has purely advisory and consultative functions.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky on the condition that at least one of our friendly Eastern European states joins the conciliation commission. **If the United States and Britain are to be included** in the commission, **it is necessary** to seek the inclusion of the **USSR in the commission as well**.

8. In addition, Vyshinsky reports that the Jews intend to come up with a proposal to provide them with a "corridor" to connect Jerusalem with the main coastal part of the Jewish state.

Vyshinsky proposes not to object to this proposal of the Jews **if other delegations speak in its favor** and there are chances of its adoption.

I propose to agree with Vyshinsky.

I ask you to approve the above proposals.

V. Molotov

On the paper document: "Comrade Stalin agrees. V.M[olotov].20. X. "

AVP RF, f. 06, op. 10, p. 15, d. 161, l. 1-4.

LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
ISRAEL P. IERSHOV TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN

October 20, 1948

Secret

Israel has a League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, which was created in 1946 on the basis of the previously existing "Vi" League of assistance to the Soviet Union. The League's program notes **that its main goal is to strengthen friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Palestine.** The league is headed by a central committee composed of party representation. This circumstance complicates the work of the League since party disagreements of a different nature are transferred to it. There are constant disputes about who will lead the planned event, who will make a report at any solemn meeting, etc. This principle made it possible for the right-wing elements, i.e., the Mapai Party, to win a dominant position in the League.

Some members of the United Workers' Party, such as the general secretary of the Tarnopoler League, fell under the influence of the **Mapai representatives** and, in fact, pursue their policy, **a policy of sheer demagoguery.**

The League has a number of branches in the main cities and some rural areas of the country. There are **also disagreements between the Central Committee of the League,** on the one hand, and the local committees of Tel Aviv and Haifa, on the other, for the same reasons.

The work of the League was limited all the time to demonstrative events (meetings, rallies). However, at present the League is planning to hold a number of specific measures:

it is planned to convene a Congress of the League, at which **the central committee is to be re-elected**, the new charter of the League is to be approved, and so on. It is planned to publish some collections, organize an exhibition about the Soviet Union, etc.

With the arrival of the Soviet mission to Israel, among the majority the population of the country has seen **a great increase in sympathy for the USSR**. This gives us ample opportunities for our propaganda, for organizing all kinds of cultural events, despite the well-known **opposition from the reactionary elements**.

However, given the given composition of the League's leadership, it is difficult to imagine that good work can be done in this area. Therefore, **we need to define our attitude towards the League** and its future work. First, we can take the path of changing the composition of its leadership. This, naturally, will require a certain amount of pressure from us, indirect or direct, in the re-election of the Central Committee of the League. Secondly, it is possible to create a new "Society for Cultural Relations between Israel and the USSR", but it cannot be ruled out that the Israeli parties will not declare a boycott of this society, as a result of which we will not be able to turn it into a mass organization.

I ask for your instructions.

Appendix: Information on the League of Friendly Relations with the USSR, drawn up by the second secretary of the mission, comrade Fedorin. USSR envoy to Israel P. Ershov

On the paper document: "Comrade Bakulin. Understand and give suggestions. V. Zorin".

AVP RF, f. 089, op. 1, p. 2, d.21, l. 7-8.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE Ukrainian
SSR D.Z. MANUILSKY WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF ISRAEL M. SHERTOK**

October 22, 1948

Secret

During the conversation, Shertok outlined the position of the Government of the State of Israel on the Palestinian issue, which is on the agenda of the current General Assembly, and Shertok's statements coincided with what he had previously said to Comrade. Malik.

I note only some new points that indicate that Shertok is coordinating his position with representatives of the US Department of State:

1. In response to my comment that after the presidential elections in the United States, the position of the State of Israel may be less favorable for defending the position of the Government of Israel, Shertok said that the elections will not change the attitude of the State Department towards the State of Israel, that the postponement of the discussion of the Palestinian issue, which is supported by the US , is explained by the fact that in the United States there is practically no government now.
2. The government of the State of Israel can already speak on the Palestinian issue - the speech is in Shertok's pocket, but, according to Shertok, about 30 states have not yet determined their position and therefore there is no need to rush to raise the Palestinian issue.
3. Schertok relayed the contents of a conversation he had in Paris with two prominent State Department officials on the

Jerusalem issue. The latter suggested to him that the trusteeship of the Trusteeship Council should be established over Old Jerusalem, that the State of Israel should appoint its representative "guardian" over the Jewish part of New Jerusalem, and the Arab State of Palestine appointed its "guardian," over the Arab part of New Jerusalem.

4. Shertok believes that this session of the General Assembly should not define the boundaries of the Jewish State of Israel and that therefore the Government of the State of Israel will have to agree to the establishment of a conciliation commission with limited powers. As for the composition of such a commission, according to Shertok, in addition to the United States, Great Britain and France, Jews are interested in a representative of the USSR or one of the Slavic states, such as Czechoslovakia.

5. According to Shertok, refineries owned by **private companies in Haifa with capital invested by the US, France and the UK should remain in the hands of these companies.**

6. Shertok gave a positive assessment to the King of Transjordan, Abdullah, stating that the latter is burdened by the intervention of the British and allegedly would like to **rely on the Jewish state (i.e., the United States) in order to get more freedom of maneuver.**

7. Shertok also stated that although Bernadotte himself was a man of the British, however, in the last period of his life he tried to act in such a way as to establish contact with both governments, but he had two advisers, whose names Shertok did not name, who kept a strictly English orientation and interfered with Bernadotte takes a mediating position.

D Manuilsky, WUA RF. F. 07. Op. 21c. P. 49.D. 39. L. 89-91.

TELEGRAM OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL D. BENGURION TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR I.V. STALIN

November 5, 1948

I am happy to send, on behalf of the State of Israel and on my own behalf, the best congratulations on the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution, which ensured national equality for the peoples of the USSR, provided work and existence for all working people, paved the way for the social and cultural progress of the urban and rural masses, created a powerful Red Army, which fulfilled an immense task in the war against the Nazi-fascist danger.

Our people will never forget the assistance rendered by the USSR to the Jews - victims of Nazism, nor the loyal support of Israel and its struggle for the freedom and independence of their historical homeland. I wish the peoples of your country, who are carrying out post-war reconstruction, economic and cultural progress, peace, and general harmony.

Ben Gurion

Chairman of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel

AVP RF, f. 48z, op. 7a, p. 4, d. 4, 11.7

**NOTE OF THE HEAD OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE
USSR MFA I.I. BAKULIN TO DEPUTY MINISTER OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN**

November 24, 1948

Secret

November 11 this year In a conversation with me, the envoy of the State of Israel in Moscow, Golda Meyerson, and the military attaché of the Ratner mission, conveyed the request of the government of the State of Israel to the Soviet government to provide assistance to the State of Israel with heavy weapons and other equipment necessary for the Israeli army. Defense Attaché Colonel Ratner said that the Israeli army needs primarily artillery, tanks and aircraft, and that the Israeli government's request for weapons specifies the types of heavy weapons and other equipment. I replied that I would bring the request of the Government of Israel to the attention of the leadership of the Ministry.

In view of the fact that Meyerson and the military attaché Ratner may again return to this question and ask about the answer to the transmitted request of the Government of Israel, I would consider it possible, in the event of such an appeal, to answer them that the Soviet government, which is attentive to the fate of the State of Israel and protects its right to an independent and independent existence, nevertheless, does not want to contradict the decision of the Security Council to end hostilities in Palestine and to prohibit UN members from supplying arms to the armies of the countries fighting in Palestine.

We have already given the same answer to a similar question through Comrade Gromyko, in New York, to Israel's representative to the UN. I ask for your directions

I. Bakulin

WUA RF. F. 089. Op. 1. P.1. D.5.Sheet 17.

Published: Soviet-Israeli relations: Collection of documents. Volume 1: 1941-1953. Book 1: 1941 - May 1949. M., 2000. Doc. No. 201.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky with PRIME MINISTER OF
LEBANON R. SALKH**

December 2, 1948

Secret

Received at his request the Prime Minister of Lebanon, Riad Bey Solh, who heads the Lebanese delegation to the General Assembly.

Solkh said he had no special questions for me, but wanted to take advantage of my stay in Paris to see me.

Having mentioned the Soviet Union's defense in 1946 of the interests of Lebanon and Syria in the Security Council on the issue of the withdrawal of troops, Solkh moved on to the question of Palestine. He said that he could not, of course, influence the position of the Soviet delegation on this issue, but he would like to emphasize that an independent Jewish state cannot exist in Palestine, since the Jews are a small national minority there and, in addition, the Jewish state will actually colonial territory and stronghold for the United States and England in the area.

Our position on the Palestinian issue is determined by our foreign policy, one of the most important principles of which is the right of nations to self-determination.

I replied that **we regret that there are hostilities between Arabs and Jews in Palestine**, and we believe that **if there were no foreign troops and there would be no intervention of some great powers**, then the Jews and Arabs could more easily reach an agreement ... I added that we hope that such an agreement will still be reached and peace will be

established in Palestine. As for the state of Israel, it already exists and has the right to defend its interests.

Solkh said that the Arab countries are pursuing an independent policy on the Palestinian issue and oppose Britain and the United States on this issue. He mentioned that Syria and Lebanon would vote against the British draft resolution. In conclusion, he said that Lebanon is pursuing an independent policy and considers all those who support the independence of Arab countries as its friends.

I said to this that there was no need for us to prove that the USSR by its entire policy confirms that it most consistently defends the independence of small countries against imperialist policies.

Solkh replied that Lebanon always views the Soviet Union as its friend, despite some differences of views on the Palestinian issue.

The conversation lasted 15 minutes. Comrade Ratiani was present.

A. Vyshinsky

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 7.P.7, D. 4.L. 5-6.

**RECORDING OF THE CONVERSATION OF THE
DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE
USSR V.A. ZORINA WITH F. ZEYNEDDIN**

December 29, 1948

Secret

Today at 3 pm I received the Syrian envoy at his request. Zeyneddin, in connection with his departure to Damascus, set forth the orders of his government.

The principles of freedom and self-determination of nations, supported by the Soviet Union, are of vital interest to Syria as a small power, the envoy said. There are only 12 other countries in the UN that are second in size to Syria. It is the small countries that bear the heavy burden of fighting for their freedom and independence, but the Syrian people are eager to fight for their independence and freedom. Syria also supports the Indonesian people in their struggle for independence. Since the Soviet Union stands for the above principles and strives to preserve international peace, there is a solid basis for cooperation between Syria and the Soviet Union.

The envoy further emphasized the desire of his government to promote friendly cooperation with the Soviet Union and asked about my opinion on this matter. I replied that what he said would be brought to the attention of the Soviet Government, and added that without knowledge of the specific problems of cooperation it would be difficult to say anything on this issue.

Zeyneddin, after stipulating that all problems and issues should be resolved in a spirit of mutual understanding, as well as through consultation with each other and attempts to

reach a unanimous opinion, told me that he had 4 specific issues on which his government would like to reach mutual understanding and cooperation with Soviet Government:

1. The issue of the evacuation of foreign troops from Syria.
2. The Palestinian question.
3. Tripoli.
4. Development of trade between Syria and the Soviet Union.

Dwelling further on the first question, Zeyneddin made the remark that, speaking about Syria, he also speaks about the interests of the entire Arab nation as a whole. Speaking about the evacuation of foreign troops, he said that he meant Alexandretta and the Alexandretta area, since there are no foreign troops in the rest of Syria. Syria has never recognized the occupation of this area and hopes to find support in this matter.

Moving on to the Palestinian question, he said that the point of view of the Soviet Union with respect to Palestine is known, since it has been detailed at the UN. However, he considers it unfair that Arabs seeking to liberate Palestine are called aggressors, because Arabs are being driven out by Jews from territory rightfully belonging to Arabs. The Messenger believes that it is wrong to apply the expression "persecuted," to Jews. In support of his thesis, he pointed to the Jews from Eastern European countries who were moving to Palestine, and stated that they could not be called "persecuted," since they live in truly democratic countries and enjoy equal rights with all other citizens. If we take Jews from the countries of Western Europe and America, then it must be remembered that large monopolies are concentrated in the hands of a handful of Jews in these countries, and rather these Jews

“persecute” the rest of the population, rather than are “persecuted”.

In both cases, Zeyneddin continued, the resettlement of Jews is carried out for political reasons, in order to spread their influence. He also stated that there were rumors that the Soviet Union was allegedly helping the Palestinian Jews, but that he did not believe it and rejected this rumor in front of his government. However, - noted Zeyneddin, - he cannot say this in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe.

Abdallah, in his opinion, is, apparently, a puppet in the hands of the British, in fact, he is now pursuing the policy of the Americans. The UN Conciliation Commission, in his opinion, is only a tool for eliminating differences between imperialist groups, which have already been almost eliminated.

Zionism, according to Zeyneddin, is the bearer of the ideas of imperialism. Zeyneddin believes that there is a lack of understanding on the Tripoli issue. In his opinion, neither Italy nor any other country should in any form govern this territory. It must be self-governing. Italy itself is not a country independent of foreign influence, and these influences, in turn, would spread from Europe to colonial territory. "The promises of the British are worth nothing," Zeyneddin remarked with a grin, "for they were given by the British," "As for trade, then of course, - said Zeineddin, - this issue is within the competence of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Syrian Ministry of Economy, but the Foreign Ministries of both countries must open the door for these negotiations,". Zeyneddin did not put forward anything specific in this area.

In conclusion, stating that he foresaw my answer in advance, Zeineddin inquired whether it could be hoped that the Soviet Government would consider these issues in a spirit of

cooperation and mutual understanding. I said that I would bring the questions raised to the notice of the Soviet Government, which could, naturally, consider them in the light of its policy.

The conversation lasted one hour. Comrade Matveeva was present.

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Zorin

AVP RF. F. 021. Op. 9.P. 1. L. 5-7.

**FROM THE INFORMATION LETTER OF THE MISSION
OF THE USSR IN LEBANON TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR V.A. ZORIN**

April 14, 1949

Secret

During the month of March, the general political situation in the Middle East was characterized by a kind of lull, under the cover of which active preparations were made for violent events that resulted in a coup d'etat in Syria at the end of March.

The main issues during this period include the following:

1. The Palestinian question

After signing on February 24 this year. The Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement was followed by the Transjordan-Israeli and the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations continued and the signing of the Lebanese-Israeli agreement on March 23 and the Transjordan-Israeli agreement on April 3 this year. In addition, after a very long and sharp hesitation, the Syrian government in the twenties of March finally decided to negotiate with Israel, which began on April 5 after the accomplished coup d'état in Syria.

A very lively Anglo-American struggle was waged around these negotiations all the time, into which both sides involved their agents and extremely nationalist reactionary elements of the Arab countries. The fact is that, in spite of the most unbridled chauvinist propaganda, the broad masses of the Arab countries began to understand and feel the grave consequences of the Palestinian adventure started by the ruling clique, so they began to put pressure on their governments and force them to end the Palestinian question.

However, an agreement between the Arab countries and Israel would deprive the British and Americans of the opportunity to carry out their plans in the Middle East.

In view of this, Great Britain has thrown out a new trick. It allowed the King of Transjordan, Abdullah, to conclude a truce with Israel, since his refusal would have shown the British game too openly and would have made it somewhat difficult for him to develop the Arab part of Palestine, but forced Iraq to take an implacable position, leaving Iraqi troops in Palestine.

In parallel with the bilateral negotiations between individual Arab countries and Israel and the signing of these ceasefire agreements in the Middle East, the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine which, after visiting Jerusalem and bypassing the capitals of Arab states, began to hold meetings with representatives of the Arab countries on the settlement of the Palestinian question.

At these meetings, the following main issues were discussed:

About the fate of Arab refugees from Palestine, who, according to some sources, number over 800 thousand people. Moreover, about half of this number refers to those areas that, according to the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947, should go to the Arab state, but in the process of armed struggle in Palestine were captured by Jews.

On the Statute of Jerusalem and On the Possibilities of Establishing Peace in Palestine.

According to the materials available to us, the main difficulty in the work of the commission was and still is the question of refugees, although it is not the main issue, for with the establishment of peace in Palestine, the situation of refugees

would have been determined without any particular difficulties.

Representatives of all Arab countries strongly insist on the unconditional return of all refugees without exception to their former places of residence with full return or compensation for their property.

The State of Israel, referring to the changed conditions as a result of the hostilities in Palestine, refuses to accept all Arab refugees and agrees to accept only a known small part of them.

Thus, those who like to muddy the waters have turned the issue of refugees upside down in such a way that under the current circumstances it is really difficult to find a solution, especially since, according to individual statements of Arab politicians, Arab countries insist on the return of all Arab refugees, not because there is nowhere to place them in the rest of Arab countries or in the Arab part of Palestine, but because they want to have a kind of fifth column on the territory of the Jewish state, which in case of resumption of hostilities in the future will be able to provide serious support to the Arab offensive.

On the issue of the statute of Jerusalem, the Arab countries do not yet have a unanimous opinion. Some states, such as Syria, agree to grant Jerusalem an international statute, while Transjordan has indicated its intention to share Jerusalem with Israel.

Regarding a general solution to the Palestinian question in some Arab countries, even in the highest ruling circles, sentiments are beginning to appear about the adoption of the UN General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947 as a basis.

The commission stopped its work on April 3, having not found an acceptable solution to any of these issues, having achieved only the consent of the Arab countries, except for Iraq, to begin negotiations by the end of April in one of the European countries in Switzerland or Austria through the mediation of the commission with representatives of Israel.

2. Arab League

The December-January defeat of Egypt in Palestine finally revealed that the contradictions existing between the Arab countries and the dependence of some of them on Great Britain are much stronger than the capabilities of the Arab League, which actually ceased to exist. However, after the truce negotiations began with Israel and passions gradually subsided, the Arab ruling circles took a number of measures in order to find ways to prevent the official open collapse of the Arab League and to maintain its formal existence. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the month of March was approaching, during which, according to the charter of the Arab League, the next session of the League Council should take place. Consequently, the disruption of the convening of the session of the Council in March would mean not only the actual, but also the formal collapse of the League.

Perhaps, under other circumstances, this would have been easily reconciled, but in view of the fact that all the attempts of the British to put together the Small Eastern Bloc or to implement the project of Greater Syria and the Blessed Crescent did not give noticeable results, and the unambiguous American campaign unfolding at that time to put together the Mediterranean Entente temptation from the ruling elite of some of the Arab countries, the collapse of the Arab League could seriously weaken the British position in

the Middle East. In view of this, it was very important for the British, at least for a while, to preserve the Arab League, which in many difficult turns made it possible to keep the Arab countries under British influence. To save the League, the British resorted to the services of their Lebanese agent Kamil Chamoun, who at the end of February and during the first half of March traveled to the Arab capitals: Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, and Amman, in which he obtained the consent of the Arab governments to a formal convocation on March 17 in Cairo regular 10th session of the Council of the Arab League.

The artificial nature of this session is evident from the fact that the delegates were third-rate representatives of the Arab governments, who, after several sessions of the Council, quietly interrupted their work, did not touch upon any pressing issues. But nevertheless, they fulfilled their task, preserving the formal existence of the Arab League.

3. Blocs

To strengthen its influence in the Middle East, to preserve its positions in the Arab countries, Great Britain has been striving for a very long time and persistently to carry out either the formation of Greater Syria, or the Union of the Fertile Crescent, or to achieve the conclusion of bilateral treaties of alliance and joint defense. But, when none of these intentions could be realized due to serious disagreements between the main inspirers of these blocs - Great Britain and the United States - and also because of the obvious objections, protests and even indignation of the Arab peoples against these blocs, then the British, apparently, decided temporarily abandon their projects and start giving power in the already existing Arab countries to their protégés and obedient lackeys such as Abdallah in Transjordan and Nuri Said Pasha in Iraq.

The main attention of the British was directed to Syria, in which Lawrence's associate Colonel Sterling, who remained in Syria as a "correspondent," has significantly strengthened his activities. During February and March, prominent British intelligence officers John Trudbeck and Getwood, Air Force Commander in the Middle East, Air Marshal William Dixon visited Syria, and Chief of General Staff General Dixon arrived at the British military base on the Suez Canal in Fayyad. In addition, the commander of the Transjordanian army, the notorious Glabb Pasha, allegedly also met with the commander of the Syrian army, Colonel Husni al-Zaim, who carried out a coup d'etat in Syria shortly thereafter.

Thus, a certain lull in open political activity in the Middle East that was observed in March in fact meant a change in the methods of action of the British and a deeply conspiratorial preparation of a new strike, this time delivered to Syria. [...]

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 8.P. 10. D. 1.L. 7-12, 15.

**LETTER FROM THE AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN
LEBANON D.S. MALT TO THE HEAD OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF
THE USSR MFA I.I. BAKULINA**

June 28, 1949

Secret

At the same time, I am sending you the materials and newspaper reports we have about the arrival at the end of May in the Near and Middle East of the British Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Sir William Strang and the US Department of State Eastern Affairs Adviser Samuel Cooper.

As can be seen from the attached materials, the trip of Strang and Cooper quite clearly reflects all the growing Anglo-American contradictions in the Near and Middle East, caused by the desire of each of these imperialist powers to strengthen their positions and influence in these countries to the detriment of each other.

A common reason for Strang's trip is the failure of British events in the countries of the Near and Middle East, and especially in the Arab countries, as well as the systematic and increasing displacement of the British by American expansion into these countries.

The immediate reason for Strang's trip to the Arab countries is the sharp rupture of Syria by Husni Zaim with the Hashemites and her transition to the anti-Hashemite camp¹. Therefore, the British made a last attempt to weaken the very adverse consequences of this transition, as well as to prepare more thoroughly for the upcoming meeting of British

diplomatic representatives in the Near and Middle East at the end of July.

In addition, it seemed to the British that Israel's admission to the United Nations at the second part of the third session of the UN General Assembly is a very convenient pretext for involving the Arab countries in the system of concluding bilateral agreements on alliance and joint defense with Great Britain.

The purpose of Cooper's surprise visit to the countries of the Middle East is the desire of Americans to prevent a possible threat to American interests in these countries, which could be created by Strang's presence in these countries, as well as an attempt to negotiate with Arab countries on a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees outside the United Nations. and to obtain the consent of the governments of the states of the Middle and Near East to agree to the extension of the Marshall Plan to these countries either directly or through Truman's proposed "aid" to the backward regions.

Based on the preliminary data we have, both of these missions did not produce the expected results, as, among other things, Cooper contributed significantly to the failure of the Strang mission. He himself could not achieve much, as the current Arab leaders are afraid to make far-reaching commitments to the United States in view of the existing general precarious situation in the Middle East, as well as in view of the manifestation of clear signs of an impending global economic crisis.

Appendix to the text on pages 26.

Messenger D Malt

WUA RF. F. 0106. Op. 8.P. 10. D. 1.L. 31-32.

**ABSTRACTS ON THE SPEECH BY THE USSR
DELEGATION AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN
GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF
ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINIAN REFUGEES**

July 15, 1949

Secret

1. The question of Palestinian refugees is an inseparable part of the Palestinian problem as a whole. A radical solution to this issue, like the entire problem, now depends on the early implementation of the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947 regarding the creation of an independent Arab state on the territory of the Arab part of Palestine, which makes it possible to return a significant part of the refugees to their homes and peaceful creative work. ...

2. **The problem of Palestinian refugees is the result of the policy of certain monopoly circles in Britain and the United States**, interested in delaying a general settlement of the question of Palestine and seeking to revise the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947. This selfish policy, which has nothing to do with the interests of the Arab and Jewish peoples, was and remains the main reason for the complication of the entire problem of Palestine, the ensuing military adventure, and the disasters it caused for the Arab peoples.

3. **The same monopoly circles**, whose efforts actually gave rise to the problem of Palestinian refugees, are now trying to take advantage of the suffering of the victims of their own policies, continuing to resist the general peace settlement in Palestine and replacing it with palliative, ostentatious measures that can only partially alleviate the plight. refugees,

but not eliminate it and not completely resolve the whole problem.

4. The United Nations can no longer accept the delay in a radical solution to the refugee issue and its replacement with palliative temporary voluntary assistance. It must focus its efforts on achieving a solution to the issue that would enable the Palestine refugees to use their labor effectively and thus create a secure and sufficient means of subsistence.

5. The only way for such a radical solution to the refugee problem is the earliest implementation of the General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947 on the establishment of an independent Arab state on the territory of the Arab part of Palestine and an immediate general peace settlement through direct negotiations between all interested Arab states and the State of Israel. The conclusion of peace and the mutual guarantee of the rights of the Jewish and Arab national minorities will make it possible to return refugees to normal, creative work, which will provide them with the necessary means of subsistence.

WUA RF. F. 0118. Op. 2.P. 3. D. 13.L. 142-143.

**DRAFT PROPOSAL OF THE USSR DELEGATION AT
THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL STATUTE OF JERUSALEM AND THE
PROTECTION OF HOLY PLACES**

July 15, 1949

Sov. secretly

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its resolution of November 29, 1947, decided that the city of Jerusalem, whose boundaries are established in accordance with the provisions of this resolution, should be established as a separate entity enjoying a special international regime and be under the United Nations Office;

Whereas the General Assembly has entrusted the Trusteeship Council with the responsibility of establishing a permanent international regime for Jerusalem and has entrusted the Trusteeship Council with administering the City of Jerusalem on behalf of the United Nations;

Whereas the Trusteeship Council has already done significant work in shaping the international regime of Jerusalem and is the most appropriate organ of the United Nations for this purpose, as well as for administering the city on behalf of the United Nations;

The session of the United Nations General Assembly
DECIDES:

1. Instruct the Trusteeship Council to complete and approve, during the fourth session of the General Assembly, the permanent international statute of Jerusalem and to retain the right to administer Jerusalem on behalf of the United Nations.

2. Instruct the Trusteeship Council to provide for the protection of holy sites in the International Statute of Jerusalem, as an integral part of the International Statute of Jerusalem, and also provide for the protection of holy sites in Palestine outside the established borders of Jerusalem.

3. Provide in the International Statute of Jerusalem:

a) The integrity of the city as an independent unit with the simultaneous provision of local autonomy for the Jewish and Arab population of Jerusalem within the framework of the international statute.

6) Broad democratic freedoms for the city's population, including freedom of religion and worship, freedom of access to holy places, freedom of conscience, language, education, speech, press, organizations, meetings, petitions, etc.

c) Free democratic elections to the Legislative Council of the city, consisting of 40 people, of whom 18 are elected by Jews, 18 by Arabs, and the remaining 4 members are freely elected from other ethnic groups of the city's population.

d) Free democratic elections to local autonomous bodies, their subordination to decisions of the General Legislative Council and orders of the governor arising from the rights assigned to him under the international statute of Jerusalem.

e) The procedure for appealing against decisions of the governor, decisions of the local court.

4. Invite the Trusteeship Council to appoint, within five months, a suitable governor to exercise administrative authority in accordance with the international statute of Jerusalem.

5. Make it the responsibility of the governor to immediately report to the Security Council on all threats or acts of aggression against Jerusalem in order to take appropriate measures to ensure the peace and security of Jerusalem.

6. Request the Security Council to urgently consider and decide on the immediate and complete withdrawal of all armed forces from Jerusalem in order to carry out the complete demilitarization of the city and thereby enable the implementation of the international statute in the spirit of the General Assembly decision of 29 November 1947.

WUA RF. F. 0118. Op. 2.P. 3. D. 13.L. 132-134.

FROM THE REFERENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE MIDDLE AND MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES OF THE USSR MFA THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

September 3, 1949

Secret

Conclusions:

1. Over the past two years, the Palestinian problem has not left the UN agenda. This is due to the fact that in Palestine the interests of the British and American imperialists, who seek to strengthen their positions in this country, are crossed, and the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 confused the imperialist plans and significantly hampered their implementation. These reasons can explain the desire of the British and American imperialists to revise the decision of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 and to dictate their solution to the problem.

2. The interest in the Palestinian problem of both British and American imperialism and all kinds of intrigues, behind-the-scenes negotiations and pressure exerted on Arabs and Jews caused a difficult political situation and a delay in the solution of the Palestinian problem. Proceeding from their interest, the British and American imperialists are hindering the peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question and are seeking to use the tense situation in the country as one of the means of pressure on the Arabs and Jews in order to secure an advantageous position.

3. The Arab aggression in Palestine provoked by British imperialism revealed the military weakness of the Arab states, exacerbated the contradictions in the Arab camp and further undermined the political prestige of England. Along with this,

the Arab aggression in Palestine has raised a number of new and very serious problems: the question of the state borders of the State of Israel and the Arab part of Palestine, the question of Arab refugees and their improvement, the question of peace between the State of Israel and the Arab countries.

4. Despite all the efforts of the British and American imperialists, they failed to prevent the emergence and strengthening of the state of Israel, which has become a reality and is now recognized by 57 states, and also accepted at the 111th session of the General Assembly as a member of the UN. At present, the British and Americans are negotiating mutual concessions at the expense of the Arab part of Palestine. In this regard, the United States does not raise the issue of the formation of an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine, and England is taking all measures to ensure that this part of Palestine is annexed to Transjordan, and is trying to persuade Israel to transfer the southern part of the Negev to the Arabs of Transjordan and receive in return, all of Galilee.

5. The most important task of the UN in solving the Palestinian problem should be: the creation of an independent Arab state in the Arab part of Palestine, which will make it possible to return a significant part of the refugees to their homes and peaceful creative work; the conclusion of peace between the Arab countries, on the one hand, and the state of Israel, on the other; resolution of all controversial issues through direct peace negotiations between Arabs and Jews; the establishment of the international statute of Jerusalem and the protection of the "saints," places. Such a solution to the Palestinian question will meet the interests of the cause of

peace and the true aspirations of the Arab and Jewish peoples.

Bakulin

Zaitsev

Gnedykh

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1953. Book 2: May 1949 - 1953. M., 2000. Doc. No. 261.

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