


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Since I will be going through most of these documents for my research, I considered that compiling some selected documents may be helpful for other researchers.

E.A

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1. During the last few months, Stalin has effected a number of fundamental changes both in the structure and in the personal composition of the most important governmental institutions of the USSR. The meaning of these changes is not yet clear in detail, but there can no longer be any doubt as to the general line they have taken: an ever greater concentration of power in the hands of Stalin himself is taking place. During the war he was already, to all intents and purposes, a dictator with unlimited powers, but at that time this was considered as a temporary state of affairs. It has now been made permanent. The USSR has now entered upon a period of personal dictatorship in form as well as in practice.

2. The most important of the recent innovations are:
- (a) Measures which legally affirm Stalin's position as to the top "leader" (this title, borrowed from the Italo-German Fascist terminology, is now in universal use in official Soviet literature), who stands high above all other state functionaries, and in whose hands are concentrated the main threads of state, party, and military government.
  - (b) The transformation of almost all the members of the highest organization of the ruling party, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, men whose status was previously, formally at least, equal to Stalin's, into the latter's "substitutes" in various governmental functions, in other words, into Stalin's inferiors in the state hierarchy.
  - (c) The creation of a special body which has charge of all the country's military affairs - "The Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR" - which conducts all work connected with preparing the country for armed conflict with outside enemies. This ministry is headed by "Generalissimo" Stalin himself, who has chosen as his assistants the most brilliant military commanders of the war. The word "Defense" has been omitted from the name of the Ministry, and comments in the Soviet press make it clear that this omission is a deliberate one, and political in character; the tasks of the new ministry are not confined to preparing the country merely for defense.
  - (d) The complete alteration of the structure of the Organizational Bureau of the Communist Party, that most important body which directs all the inner work of the party and distributes the party forces (cadres); both in form and in fact Stalin is the head of this bureau.

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3. All these changes are the result of the complex processes of the country's development, and of the inner struggle within the Communist Party, which went on during the war years. Only an acquaintance with these interior processes will permit one to understand correctly the full meaning of the changes recently made by Stalin.
4. To understand present conditions in the USSR it is necessary first to see clearly the role played in the country by the Communist Party.
- (a) The whole population of the country is divided into two unequal parts: members of the Communist Party on the one hand, and non-members on the other hand. The first group at the moment numbers about six million, in other words, approximately six percent of the adult population of the country. All power in the USSR is concentrated in the hands of this six percent: they alone have the right to nominate candidates for election; they have the monopoly of all political and generally ideological propaganda; they alone may occupy leading positions in the government, the courts and the army, may direct industrial enterprises, and so on.
- (b) Non-party members, which means about 94% of the population, have no right and may occupy only subordinate positions. When occasionally a non-party member is elected to some post, this is done by the Communists themselves, who find it expedient to pretend that non-party members take part in running the country. Naturally, in such cases the Communists are careful to select persons who are wholly subservient to them. Non-party members who hold views different from those of the Communists have no chance whatever of influencing the government in any legal manner. They are not the subjects but the objects of power politics.
- (c) All power in the USSR belongs to the Communist Party; the structure of that party however has nothing in common with political parties as they exist in the democratic countries of the West. During the decades of its dictatorial rule in the USSR, the All-Russian Communist Party has been transformed from a free association of men who held the same views into a complex hierarchical organization of men who hold leading positions and of candidates for such positions. Uniting as it does only an insignificant minority of the population of the country over which it holds plenipotentiary powers, the All-Russian Communist Party has banished every vestige of democracy from its organization in order to preserve its dictatorship. At the present time its structure is built up from above, on purely totalitarian principles: severe centralization, iron discipline, and scrupulously observed hierarchical gradation.
- (d) All party policies are determined at the top, by a small group of leaders, and in actual fact by Stalin himself, with all the others acting in the capacity of advisers. The party tolerates no opposition to the decisions made by its heads. All its active members without exception swear by Stalin's every word. Yet an inner struggle within the party still goes on, but it uses channels other than those of political opposition.
5. Most important in the inner life of the party is the struggle which may be termed as the struggle between various social layers and strata within the country's new governing elite. In the ranks of the All-Russian Communist Party are united all those who occupy leading positions in the state governing mechanism. This mechanism is not only composed of a great many people, but is exceedingly complex as well, since all the branches of industry, culture, science, and public affairs in the USSR are governed by the state. Each of these branches has its own peculiarities and its special interests, which are inevitably reflected in the attitude of each separate group of "responsible workers" towards matters of general state policy. For this reason, during the very first years of its dictatorship, there appeared within the All-Russian Communist Party groupings built along occupational lines: "professionalists," or the leaders of the trade unions; "industrialists", or the men who stood at the head of various industrial enterprises; "military workers", or Communists who had specialized in the science of warfare, and so forth.

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6. The struggle between these groups was one of the pivots of the internecine party struggle within the last few decades Stalin settled it at last by his own methods: in the bloody purges of 1936-38 he liquidated all those who had taken a leading part in it, and established a party dictatorship within the party itself. All the members of the All-Russian Communist party may be divided into two basic groups: those who occupy important positions in some branch of the government on the one hand, and those who are engaged in organizing the proper functioning of the party itself on the other. At first the role of the latter had been merely auxiliary, but it gradually increased in importance, and after the trials of 1936-38 has overshadowed the other group. If the Communist Party as a whole is the master of the Russian State, the party machine has now become the master of the Communist Party. It is a dictatorship within a dictatorship.
7. The total result of these various processes of development was that, on the eve of the war, the mechanism of power in the USSR was built on the following scheme: governmental posts of any importance, in all branches, were packed by Communists, who were, however, merely carrying out the will of others; the real master of the State by now was the inner leadership of the Communist Party, which not only appointed all important government workers, but controlled them and gave them all necessary instructions.
8. The war produced material changes in this set-up. The country was fighting for its very existence, and events inevitably brought the army into the foreground. The specific gravity of the whole army staff increased correspondingly, together with the growth of its influence in the life both of the country and of the party.
9. On the eve of the war, the party machine had perhaps held more power over the army than over any other single group. The smashing of the staff collected by Tukhachevsky and his assistants had only recently taken place. The victims had been Communists versed in military science who, in order to render the army a more efficient instrument, had demanded for the Red Army a certain minimum of independence and freedom from political and police interference in its affairs on the part of party leaders. Some 50% to 70% of the upper army staff perished in that havoc, including all the best-trained younger men groomed for top positions. Only the "political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, Budenny and Kulik escaped. These were men who knew relatively little of military matters, but who were wholly subservient to party leadership. From 1937 on it was these men who became full masters of the Red Army, which they altered to suit themselves, with the aid of a special group of party officials, the so-called "political commissars", who were the direct representatives of the party machine. It was they who were in charge of preparing the country for war during the crucial years of 1937-40; it was they who held top command in the army during the first stages of the war, and they who were responsible for the defeats of 1941-42.
10. The situation was saved by officers of the middle ranks. They were all Communists, and many had done years of party work (at that time non-Communists were permitted only in the lowest officer ranks). How these men felt became clear by the fall of 1941: they were all unanimously in favor both of replacing the useless "political marshals" and of abolishing the office of political commissars. These demands were dictated by the war situation itself. These men did not constitute a political opposition to the government in general, though there was undoubtedly a certain amount of opposition to the party machine, which, in order to preserve its dominant position within the country, attempted to limit the initiative of officers in the field by placing them under the control of political commissars. \*
11. This opposition had no clear-cut form and no leaders; but it represented the attitude of the great mass of officers. The outstanding representatives of the latter had a few sharp personal brush-ups with the "political marshals" (as for example, the conflict between Zhukov and Voroshilov in September-October of 1941 on the problem of organizing the defense of Leningrad, or the even severer conflict

\* The office of political commissar was created in April 1918, during the Civil War, and abolished in 1924. It was reinstated in 1937, after the execution of Tukhachevsky. During the Finnish War it showed its worst side, and was therefore, abolished once more in August 1940. On July 16, 1941, it was revived for the third time.

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- of the same period between commanding officers in the Crimea and Mekhlis, a special emissary of the Political Bureau). Rumor spread the tales of such conflicts, and the general opinion in the army was that the "political marshals" and the commissars were responsible for the defeats which the army had suffered.
12. The Communist Party was finding itself in a really dangerous situation, since dislike of political commissars was wide-spread among the Red Army soldiers as well. Here the struggle took other forms: the number of political commissars killed by their own men in time of battle increased. The non-party men, which the great majority of the rank-and-file soldiers were, found their dislike of the commissars intensified by their hatred of Communists in general.
  13. In spite of the danger of the situation, the party machine did not give in without a struggle. The compromises which were gradually adopted follow a distinct pattern. The first sop was given to the younger candidates for the office of marshal; dismissals of the "political commissars" began as early as September 1941. Then came a general amelioration of the position of officers, the creation of new medals, and the restitution of other privileges of the officer class. The office of political commissar was abolished only after the second series of severe defeats (on October 10, 1942). As for the rank and file soldiers, the government met their demands only by altering the content of its political propaganda; it abandoned all mention of "world revolution", and began to appeal exclusively to national and patriotic sentiments. Political and police control over the soldiers remained in force as before, while the officers' powers over them were even increased; thus, all officers from battalion commanders up had the right to transfer any soldier to a penal regiment without trial.
  14. Clearly, the administration was willing to make compromises in order to reach an agreement with the army commanders, in other words, with the fighting officers, the overwhelming majority of whom were members of the Communist Party, but it granted nothing to the voiceless soldier masses. On the contrary, the administration expected active aid on the part of the officers in watching the army more closely than before.
  15. The second line along which the struggle within the Communist Party developed, was that of personal antagonism between various representatives of the Party's leading organs. History shows that such antagonisms increase in importance in inverse ratio to the amount of democracy in any given government. In absolute monarchies, for example, in which the policy of a country is determined by a single person, the hidden struggle for influence upon that person frequently decides the fate of the country as a whole. The USSR has come very close to being ruled by one man, which is why the personal antagonism between Stalin's closest assistants is of such great importance.
  16. It should be noted that, far from trying to wipe out such antagonisms, Stalin cleverly furthers and fosters them, and the various groupings which arise on such personal grounds. He has been systematically introducing into the leading positions in the party and government apparatus people whom he knows to be opposed and even hostile to each other. This is one of the peculiarities of his system of government, which he has borrowed from the ancient practice of the Oriental despots; personal enemies, like spiders placed in the same jar, watch each other jealously and report everything to their chief. True, the practical work of their departments may suffer because of this struggle, but on the other hand such a department can never become a center of opposition to the head ruler; as long as there is a personal conflict between heads of departments, they will need that ruler to arbitrate between them. We know from Stalin's Biography that he is extraordinarily clever in using this method, and that he frequently deliberately creates conflicts between his assistants.
  17. During the recent period (since the purges of 1936-38), the central figure in all such personal antagonisms which affect the fundamental institutions of the USSR has been (and still is) G. F. Malenkov, who at the present moment is one of the most influential men in Stalin's immediate entourage.

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18. Still comparatively young (he was born in 1901 or 1902), Malenkov first won distinction by doing political work in the Red Army during the Civil War, at a time when such work was indivisible from that of the Cheka. In 1925 he joined Stalin's private corps of secretaries, who were already conducting in great secrecy the collection of various materials which were to aid in Stalin's struggle for supreme power. Malenkov soon became one of the leading workers in this secretariat, and played an important back-stage role in organizing the purges of 1936-38. He remained officially merely a technical worker for the Central Committee of the Communist Party until 1939, but his hidden role had been of such importance that at the 18th Party Congress of March 1939 he was elected at once not only to the membership of the Party's Central Committee but also to that of its Organizational Bureau, one of those secretaries he became, while in March 1941 he was a candidate to the Political Bureau, the highest political organ of the Communist Party. During the war he was Stalin's substitute both in the People's Commissariat and in the Committee for Defense. From 1939 he has held under the Central Committee the position of head of the Department of Cadres, in other words, he is the man who appoints members of the Communist Party to the highest positions open both in the government and in the party itself. At the present moment he is the real head of that party machine which, as has been pointed out above, is the actual master both of the party and of the state as a whole.
19. Malenkov is neither a statesman nor a theoretician. He never writes, and seldom makes speeches. His strength lies in his knowing how to organize and direct the vast and complex machine which is in charge of the many million newly-trained men destined to hold responsible positions in the Communist Party and in the state. His staff in the Department of Cadres is organized in precise correspondence to the government itself; to each commissariat (now ministry) of the latter corresponds a section or sub-section of Malenkov's own organization. Such a section not only carries out all the appointments in its particular ministry, but also collects all possible information regarding the personnel's private and public life. This information is concentrated in the hands of Malenkov, whose organization keeps a running file of personal dossiers of all the responsible employees of the state and the party. Here repose all their secrets, which Malenkov often uses to keep the people concerned under his thumb. He is the real "boss" of this organization...
20. Politically, of course, Malenkov always follows Stalin's lead, and takes pains to show himself to be one of his most ardent disciples. But where running his machine is concerned he has long ago manifested a tendency to go further than Stalin, even in following the latter's own policies. Foremost among the problems which have arisen lately in that field is the problem of the so-called "Old Bolsheviks".
21. It must be noted that, when he was training the men who were to assist him in his rise to power, Stalin instilled in them a contemptuous attitude towards the "old men" (i.e., those members of the Communist Party who had belonged to it in its underground days), presenting them as people who were good enough for the destruction of the old regime, but were too "soft" for constructive work, for the administration of the state once the revolution had conquered, because they were frightened by the extent of the terror necessary for the purpose. Such work could be carried out successfully only by men who attained psychological maturity already under the dictatorship, and were trained in the state and party machine...
22. It was these considerations which formed a basis for the annihilation of the "Old Bolsheviks" during the purges of 1936-38. However, Stalin not only did not destroy at that time a certain number of these "Old Bolsheviks", some of whom were among his closest collaborators, but did not even remove them from leading positions in the state and party government (it is enough to mention that even now over two-thirds of the members of the Political Bureau are "old men"). Malenkov considers this a mistake, sees it as unforgivable weakness, and does not conceal the fact that he is in favor of "rejuvenating" party leadership still further.

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23. Stalin has been restraining Malenkov in this matter, but restraining him with the smile which comes to his lips when he listens to proposals which seem to him essentially right, but premature. To people who know him well and Malenkov is of their number -- the smile signifies encouragement: "wait a while, the time will come".
24. During the war years Stalin, occupied by matters of state, was forced to relinquish the actual guidance of the organizational work of the party secretariat to Malenkov, although of course he received regular reports from the latter and consequently approved of it in the main. Malenkov received great freedom, which he immediately put to use in pushing out the hateful "old men". The ones who engaged his foremost interest were those members of the Organizational and Political Bureaus of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party who played an important part in running the party machine and who consequently were Malenkov's immediate competitors. These were members of the Central Committee's secretariat Zhdanov and Andreev, members of the Political Bureau Voroshilov and Kaganovich, and Mekhliss, who was a member of the Organizational Bureau. The last-named was not actually an "Old Bolshevik," but was closely connected with Kaganovich and played a tremendous role in the Central Committee in his capacity as director of party work in the Red Army.
25. Thus the struggle which developed during the war in and about the central institutions of the All-Russian Communist Party has been following two lines; on the one hand, the struggle of communist officers against the party machine, on the other, the struggle in the core of the party itself between its younger leaders and the "Old Bolsheviks" who still remained on their posts. Malenkov became a central figure in this struggle because he stood at the point where the two lines crossed. As the head of the party machine, he not merely defended the latter from the pressure of the "military", but did his best to utilize the conditions created by this pressure to oust his enemies in the party machine.
26. This was all the easier since the main attacks of the officers were directed against the very men who were Malenkov's opponents. For this there is a very simple explanation. When the war began, the Political Bureau wanted to conduct it according to the old recipes for revolutionary wars. In accordance with this intention, not only were the "political marshals", Voroshilov, Budenny and Timoshenko, placed in charge of various fronts, but special commissars of the Political Bureau with extraordinary plenipotentiary powers were sent to all the armies. The more responsible of these assignments were given to those members of the Political and Organizational Bureaus whose work in the state and party machines was not considered indispensable. Malenkov was not among them; he was needed in the central organization more than ever, for the training and guidance of replacements. The "Old Men", being persons of greatest experience, were naturally appointed to the most dangerous sectors. At best, this took them away from leadership in the party machine, which was getting out of their control. But almost inevitably they had to bear the brunt of the conflict with the communist officers: it was psychologically easier for the latter to shift the whole blame for the activity of the political commissars on those concrete people with whom they came in immediate contact, than on the system as a whole. The young communist officers who were fighting against the interference of the political commissars in army matters were inclined to regard the creators of the system, who sat in Moscow, not as those who were most at fault for having brought about the situation, but rather as supreme arbiters, who alone could decide in their quarrel with the political commissars.
27. This was so advantageous to Stalin personally that there can hardly be any doubt that Malenkov's game had Stalin's complete approval behind it. The result was that towards the end of the war all of the five above-named men were almost completely removed from the positions of power which they had held in the core of the party machine. Of the five secretaries of the Central Committee who were active in May, 1941, two, Zhdanov and Andreev, had dropped out by the end of the war. Actually all the work of the Committee fell upon Malenkov and his closest collaborator and adherent, Shcherbakov; the fifth secretary was Stalin himself.

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28. Of great significance was the dismissal of Mekhliss from the post of head of the Political Guidance of the Army (a department of the Central Committee which has charge of all political work in the army, all appointments of political commissars, etc.) Mekhliss ruined his war career in the Crimea, where his activities as commissar extraordinary of the political Bureau were evaluated by all the war experts as unconscious sabotage. But his appointment to the Crimea in the late fall of 1941 was already subsequent to his dismissal from his post as head of Political Guidance. He was removed from that position at the demand of Shcherbakov and Malenkov, who insisted that a Jew must not be in charge of political work in the army, lest that should provide a basis for increased anti-semitical propaganda. In general, the removal of Jews from important political positions under this pretext was carried out systematically during the war. This practice was begun by Shcherbakov, who held the position both of secretary of the Central Committee and of chief secretary of the Moscow Committee: as early as 1941-42 he engineered the dismissal of Jews from all positions of responsibility in the Moscow section of the Communist Party. Later, when he was appointed head of Political Guidance in the place of Mekhliss, Shcherbakov pursued his policy of ousting the Jews in the Red Army as well.
29. To replace the "old men" who he had elbowed aside, Malenkov gathered about him a close-knit group of young men whom he had trained himself and who were devoted to him. Outstanding among these, apart from Shcherbakov, who has already been mentioned, were G. F. Aleksandrov, who in 1941 was appointed head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, and Nikolai Shatalin, Malenkov's substitute number one in the Department of Cadres. Also closely connected with Malenkov is N. A. Voznesensky, candidate for membership in the Political Bureau and chairman of the State Planning Commission. Towards the end of the war it was these five men who were practically in charge of the whole work of the party machine. (Shcherbakov died in April, 1945, shortly before the war ended).
30. It must be noted that to Malenkov's group belonged three out of the five "young" members of the Political Bureau (those who, according to Stalin's definition cited above, attained maturity already under dictatorship and therefore do not hesitate to use mass terroristic measures): Malenkov himself, Shcherbakov, and Voznesensky. Of the younger members, only Khrushchev and Borya were outside it.
31. However, Khrushchev, who is the general secretary of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, was practically in disgrace all through the war, not only because a general anti-Soviet attitude became apparent throughout the Ukraine (such a reaction took place practically wherever the Germans went), but because a similar attitude became very noticeable within the Communist Party of the Ukraine itself. Thus, for example, Khrushchev's substitute in the party secretariat, Burmistrenko, quite deliberately went over to the side of the Germans, and played an important part in organizing a pro-Hitlerite movement among the Ukrainians. It was largely for this reason that Khrushchev and his staff were not allowed to come to Moscow, but were settled in Saratov, where Khrushchev was obliged to carry out a ruthless check-up on the loyalty of all the Ukrainian Communists, a work which naturally had to be done under the control of Malenkov's special emissaries. All the publications of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party came under similar control, and during the war the "Pravda" two or three times published bitter criticisms of the editors of the newspaper, "Radianska Ukraina", the chief publication of the Central Committee of the Ukraine. Under these conditions it will be seen that although Khrushchev never formally lost his rights as a member of the Political Bureau, he was in no position to take an active part in the struggle which was going on in Moscow.
32. Quite different is the case of Borya, whose influence increased tremendously during the years of the war.\* The story was current in Moscow that Malenkov used considerable effort to establish closer relations with Borya. It is

\* The news of his having fallen into disfavor, which appeared in the American press, is altogether false: true, he gave up the post of Minister of the Interior, but only in order to take over, as Stalin's substitute, the direction of all problems of domestic policy (the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Justice, and others.) At the present time Borya is one of Stalin's most trusted assistants, and belongs moreover to the narrow circle of Stalin's personal friends, along with Mikoyan and Voroshilov.

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known, for instance, that he committed several infractions of his own wartime rule of spending holidays at work in his office (the remark, "There are no holidays at the front" is ascribed to him), in order to make trips to Pushkino to see Berya, whose summer cottage is next to that of Stalin. The cautious Berya was very cordial, but refused to commit himself. He has shown no inclination to join Malenkov's camp.

33. Malenkov has had no greater success in his relations with Bulganin, who since the spring of 1944 has been spoken of in Moscow as a rising star. It is known that after having worked on Rokashevsky's Staff, during the preparation and execution of the spring offensive of 1944, Bulganin, at Stalin's order, prepared a long memorandum on the defects in the organization of the armed forces, and that Stalin liked the memorandum so much that he immediately carried out a series of suggestions contained in it, and had Bulganin transferred to his own Committee for Defense, entrusting to him at first the preparation of all measures which directly concerned the organization of the armed forces. Several months later, when Bulganin was officially appointed Stalin's substitute in the Committee for Defense, Stalin also gave him the power to sign some of the Committee's orders, thus showing him a degree of confidence which previously Malenkov alone had enjoyed (Malenkov had been empowered to scribble Stalin's initials on documents which concerned appointments of party members in the army). From that time on, Malenkov began, with his usual somewhat rude clumsiness, to court Bulganin, but the latter has shown himself even more restrained than Berya had been.
34. Thus Malenkov's attempt to establish close relations with all the younger members of the ruling clique has failed. Only those of them who had worked together with him in the central party organizations have come firmly into his orbit.
35. Such were the inner relationships within the leading institutions of the All-Russian Communist Party when the war ended.\* The balance was a precarious one. It was clear that it was only temporary, especially where the two basic problems of the war years were concerned, namely, the relations between the party machine and the Communist officers, and the role played by the Malenkovites within the party machine itself. The changes made by Stalin in recent months represent an attempt to attain a new and more stable equilibrium. To understand fully their significance, they must be seen not only against the wartime conditions, but also the conditions which existed in the Kremlin high command immediately before the war, or, more precisely, before Stalin took over the chairmanship of the Council of the People's Commissars.
36. In examining these changes one feature should be noted, which becomes apparent as soon as one attempts to follow the personal destinies of the members of the high staff of the Communist Party whom Stalin assembled immediately after the purges of 1936-38. No matter how Stalin has shifted them about since 1939, not a single member of this staff (which includes all the members of and candidates for membership to the Political and Organizational Bureaus) has been dropped since that date. There were a great many personal conflicts during the war, in some of which Stalin himself was actively involved - for example, his skirmishes with Voroshilov in 1941-43; yet no matter how bitter such conflicts become, they did not lead to the ostracism of any one of the members of the top staff. Even Mekhliss, who was so violently attacked in 1941-1942, whose court-martial was demanded by the army officers, has now been fully restored to his former pre-eminent position within the party, and is a member of the Organizational Bureau. He is no longer, however, head of Political Guidance, since the latter post involves activity not within the party but in the field of relations between the party machine and the army.
37. Of course, only Stalin personally could have so definitely put an end to all the frictions of wartime, and even he could only have done so by means of great perseverance. For the first time in his history he had assumed the role of an arbiter whose aim it is to preserve the unity of the ruling group. There is only one possible interpretation of his conduct: Stalin is seriously concerned in keeping and unifying the leading party workers who remain grouped

\* Shcherbakov's death in April, 1945, made no change in the balance of power, since he was replaced as secretary of the Moscow and Central Committees by Georgii Popov, one of Malenkov's most loyal men.

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about him, and wishes to instill both in them and in all responsible party workers in general the assurance that inter-party relations have been stabilized, and that purges of the old type are no longer a possibility.

38. He has, of course, not given up his right to shift or even dismiss people at will, but his recent conduct is a promise that such reprisals could be caused by administrative considerations alone, and would not exceed certain definite limits. Very indicative from this point of view is the case of Alexei E. Badayev, former deputy of the Fourth State Douma. A devoted Stalinist - they have been personally acquainted since 1913 - Badayev after the trials of 1936-38 was appointed chairman of the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Republic and member of the presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR, was member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party, and occupied a number of other honorary positions. In 1942 Badayev committed a grievous fault: sent to Outer Mongolia to take part in some sort of festivities, Badayev not only acquired there a number of valuable "gifts", not only went in for drunken bouts and debauches (they don't pay attention to such everyday trifles in the USSR any more), but permitted himself to speak disparagingly in public of Stalin's diplomatic talents because of the latter's pact with Hitler. Such conduct on Badayev's part was characteristic of the man; he does not belong to the number of original thinkers, and if he pronounced such opinions (even when drunk) the inference must be that such opinions were commonplace among the ruling clique.
39. That, of course, could hardly serve Badayev as an excuse. He was at once recalled to Moscow, where the news of his adventures had been forwarded, to answer for his crimes. But the punishment meted out to him was amazingly mild: by party action, in other words, by Malenkov's orders, he was removed from his position Supreme Council, deprived of his title of President of the Russian Soviet Republic, and appointed director of the beer trust. This was, of course, done not only without a trial, but even without the permission of the Supreme Council, but what impressed the general public was not the infraction or the elementary laws of the constitution (advertised as "the most democratic in the world"), but the unusual mildness of the punishment; for such a crime a concentration camp, at the very least, was indicated, while here the party did not even bother to take away the valuable presents from outer Mongolia... Yet even this penalty was soon softened; recently Badayev was once more elected deputy of the Supreme Council of the USSR, which is clearly a step towards complete amnesty.
40. Such mildness can be properly interpreted only as an indication of the desire, referred to above, to create the impression that relations between the leaders of the party have been stabilized, and that the days of ruthless reprisals towards guilty party leaders are over. This policy is all the more characteristic because it is being pursued against the background of unusually cruel and unusually wide-spread mass reprisals directed against the non-communist population literally millions of whom are being sent to Siberia and to the north in general. These are actually the two sides of the same policy: within the ruling elite of the country, in the ranks of the Communist party and especially at its top, the administration is trying to create unity by means of a sort of amnesty, while merciless terror is being employed against the popular masses.
41. The highest exponent of supreme power in the USSR before the war was the political Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. Officially, according to the Party's statutes, the Political Bureau is in charge of the political work of the Communist Party. But since the latter, as has been pointed out above, is the master of the whole USSR, in actual practice the Political Bureau has not only been determining the country's general policies, but has served as the highest court for the decision of all practical questions of any importance as well. The official government - the Council of the People's Commissars - was composed of men appointed by the Political Bureau and was in fact only the executive organ which carried out the decisions of the Political Bureau. The relation between the Political Bureau and the Council may quite properly be compared to that between the owner of a private enterprise and the man whom he appoints as manager of that enterprise, with the only difference that this manager, liable to be cruelly punished for the least error, has no contract which might guarantee him a minimum of rights.

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42. Side by side with the Council of the People's Commissars, the executive unit of the Political Bureau in the government of the state, existed the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party which in practice was also an executive organ of the Political Bureau, but this time in the party machine. Formally the Organizational Bureau was not dependent on the Political Bureau, since it was elected at plenary sittings of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party for the purpose of "general guidance of the organizational work" of the party, but in actual practice it was completely subservient to the Political Bureau and directed its work along channels prescribed by the latter.
43. Thus the political Bureau was the highest body in the country's government, but a body which was not recognized in the country's official constitution, and which therefore had to act as a power behind the throne. This was characteristic of a basic contradiction in Soviet life: in actuality, all power was based on the recognition of the party's superiority over the state, but the party was not willing to give this principle official recognition. The resulting ambiguity may be illustrated by Stalin's personal position: until May 5, 1941, he occupied no post whatever in the government of the state, held no official ranks or titles, and was "only" Secretary General of the ruling party - yet actually he was the real "boss" of the country (at that time that was what the Russian communists called him among themselves), and one move of his finger sufficed not only to remove any given People's Commissar, but to send him to his death. In one way or another, this contradiction had to be resolved.
44. Shortly before Hitler's invasion of Russia, the situation underwent a change: Stalin emerged from the wings to the center of the stage and, on May 5, 1941, became chairman of the Council of the People's Commissars. During the war he was recognized as the sole dictator, but the war situation was a temporary one, and the government machine was not altered in accordance with Stalin's new role. This alteration is now taking place.
45. The present composition of the Political Bureau, confirmed by a plenum of the Central Committee in March 1946, is interesting primarily because it emphasizes Stalin's desire to stabilize the personal composition of the party's ruling clique: all the members of the Political Bureau who had been in office between 1939-45 have been re-elected, with the exception, of course, of the late Shcherbakov. The changes made within the Bureau are insignificant ones: two of the candidates - Berya and Malenkov - have been made active members; to replace them, two new candidates, Bulganin and Kosigin, have been elected. Since the death of another member of the Political Bureau, M. A. Kalinin, the Bureau is now composed of ten members: Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov, Khrushchev, Berya and Malenkov, and four candidates for membership: Shvernik, Voznesensky, Bulganin and Kosigin. But the distribution of work among these members of the Political Bureau is so different from what it was before the war that the question arises what the functions of the Political Bureau are going to be in the nearest future.
46. The most notable change has taken place in the state government, more precisely in the Council of the People's Commissars, now transformed into a Council of Ministers. The number of the latter has been materially increased: the constitution which was ratified in 1937 lists only 39 commissariats, while the list presented by Stalin to the Supreme Council on March 19, 1946 named 53, and several new ministries have been added since. Yet what this rapid increase in the number of ministries shows is precisely that the men who head them will play no political role. At the moment, there is a special minister not only for each branch of industry of any importance, but frequently for one industry branch in one specific section only. The ministers are becoming more and more similar to directors of large industrial trusts, except that they are backed by, and may call upon, the state's powers of oppression.
47. Side by side with these technician-ministers, Stalin has created a new category of ministers: substitutes of the chairman. These are eight in all, four of whom are entrusted with special functions - Molotov, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Kaganovich, and four others, Berya, Andreev, Kosigin and Voroshilov, who have no definite assignment. These eight men have only one thing in common: they are all members of, or candidates for membership in, the Political Bureau. Under these circumstances, the fact that they have all been appointed substitutes can mean only

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one thing: side by side with his technician-ministers Stalin is creating the office of politician-ministers. He is actually going to have two councils of ministers: the multiple general cabinet (which includes up to 70 ministers alone) in which no questions of political importance will ever be decided - and a small political cabinet, which will consist of ministers who are also members of the Political Bureau.

48. There can be no doubt that this small cabinet will take over both part of the questions which were previously referred to the Political Bureau, and political surveillance over the work of the technician-ministers. Such surveillance existed before as well; it was carried out in the past by members of the Political Bureau, almost every one of whom was entrusted with watching a number of commissariats, whose heads had to submit reports to them. Formerly, however, such surveillance was carried out extra-constitutionally, behind the wings of the state's legal procedure; now, while still carried out by members of the Political Bureau, it would be quite legal, since they now would be substitutes of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and would be carrying out his instructions.
49. Thus relations will be normalized to a far greater degree than before. Stalin is quite deliberately choosing this precise moment for alterations in nomenclature, abolishing the Soviet of People's Commissars, around which have formed associations with the frequent shifts of the revolutionary epoch, and returning to the old term, Council of Ministers, which is associated in the public mind with ideas of stability. Stalin not only realizes himself that he is making fundamental changes, he wants the whole world to realize it. But one of the results of this normalization must be an appreciable curtailment of the role of the Political Bureau. First of all there can be no doubt that a considerable number of the problems which formerly were decided by the Pol.Bu. will now be settled in the Council of Ministers, either by Stalin personally, or in a conference between him and his "substitutes".
50. Still more important is another point: Whereas before the members of the Political Bureau who were entrusted with the surveillance of the activity of various ministers previously held the status of equals, they will now be acting as Stalin's assistants, at his instructions and within the limits of the powers he may confer upon them. Stalin's extraordinary position has now received legal shape within the Political Bureau as well.
51. Of even greater importance is the second group of changes, which concern relations between the government and the army on the one hand, and between the Party and the army on the other. It has been pointed out above that during the war it was these relations which presented the greatest danger to the destinies of the "governing elite" of the Soviet state. During the war, the specific gravity of the officers increased in every respect. They now include dozens of marshals and several hundred generals, all of whom have rendered great service in battle and are covered with military glory. All of them are members of the Communist Party, but they are all rather backward in their knowledge of Communist doctrine; there was good reason for the order, issued to army organizations of the Communist Party as far back as 1943, not to insist upon acquaintance with the foundations of the party program when accepting new members or screening old ones. Whatever data is obtainable of the mental attitude of this particular class leads one to believe that there is no conscious opposition to the Soviet regime in their ranks, far less any organized opposition. But there is among them a great deal both of dissatisfaction with the general state of things and dislike of the party machine.
52. Those difficulties, so sharply defined at the beginning of the war, were not resolved during its course. Their solution was one of the basic tasks which faced Stalin when he began to carry out his "reforms".
53. A return to the past, to those days when the party ruled the army through "political marshals" of the type of Voroshilov, is impossible. These marshals failed in the role of generals, and the army, with the experiences of the war behind it, will never recognize their authority, even should Stalin make every effort to bring them back into army affairs. But it is clear that Stalin intends to make no such attempt, and, having restored both Voroshilov and Budenny to political leadership, appears to have no desire to restore them to leadership in the army. That is all over and done with. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Press, when it mentions Voroshilov, does not refer to him as "marshal".

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54. There is apparently no chance (at least in the nearest future) of another mass purge, of the type of 1936-38: the purges referred to were possible only because Stalin then felt that he was safe, for the time being, from a "great war", whereas right now, as all Soviet newspapers may testify, he is preparing for just such a war. Under these circumstances he may, of course, settle the hash of any given group of army officers, but will never undertake a widespread purge.
55. Such being the case, Stalin was forced to seek a solution to his problem in the only direction which remained open, that of an agreement with the new members of the army officer staff. The available information regarding the new Ministry of the Armed Forces of USSR and its first measures permits one to see along what lines Stalin expects such an agreement to develop.
56. This new ministry, at the head of which, with the title of Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR and at the same time that of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, is Stalin himself, has been constructed by him as a most powerful governmental center which is virtually isolated from the rest of the administrative mechanism. Formerly there were two military commissariats, that of Defense and that of the Navy, whose heads were members of the Soviet of People's Commissars and held the same status as all its other members. Like the rest, they were subject to the general control. At the present time the only link between the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the officers on the one hand, and the government on the other, is Stalin himself. Naturally, under these circumstances there is no possibility of any outside interference in military affairs.
57. This isolation will naturally increase, rather than decrease, the importance of the armed forces and of their new ministry in the general life of the country. As his substitutes, Stalin has named some of the best commanders produced by the war (as, for example, the Marshals Vasilevsky and Zhukov). The powers of the ministry are extraordinarily great. The fact that Stalin personally takes part in all its projects is sufficient guarantee that it will have unlimited credit at its disposal. In his speech of February 23, 1946, Stalin emphasized that the Red Army must "ceaselessly and swiftly" develop military affairs and improve the theoretical training of the officers. Of this one may be sure: though the country as a whole should starve, the new ministry will have enough means to form new armies containing millions of men. Under the circumstances there can be no doubt that the new ministry is about to become a new and important center of executive power in the country: if the Organizational Bureau is such a center in the party machine, and the Council of Ministers in the state mechanism, the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR in conference with his substitutes will certainly form another such center in the mechanism of the army.
58. The unlimited possibilities of military construction, which would enable the army officers to satisfy their professional ambitions by providing the opportunity for a swift and brilliant military career, are the bait with which Stalin hopes to lure over to his side the more ambitious among the officers.
59. Stalin is willing to go quite far to meet these army groups half-way; the new military code, recently published in the Soviet Press (and expounded in the New York Times on June 20, 1946) shows that Stalin intends to assist certain groups of Soviet officers in their desire to attain a stable and officialized privileged position. Thus, the code introduces officers' honor courts, an institution once highly developed in the armies of monarchies, where it used to be one of the most important factors for breeding an anti-popular, narrow caste attitude among the officer class. This measure is quite in keeping with others (the re-introduction of orderlies, the prohibition to officers to carry large packages in the street, etc.) which Stalin introduced in 1942-43. Mr. Stalin is consciously trying to build up the "red officers" into a specially privileged group within the new Soviet elite. This side of Stalin's "reforming" activities in the army is all the more important because it fits in with his general policy of stabilizing the new Soviet elite. While affirming the general privileged position in the country of the ruling class as a whole, Stalin is also marking out within this class a specially privileged order of persons and groups who are of particular importance to him in governing the country.

60. Reports of the new military code contain an indication of what Stalin expects to get from the new privileged officer class in return for its privileges: the code introduces far severer discipline in the army, and fixes increased penalties for the loss or damage to arms and military equipment for which single persons or detachments are responsible. The officers are expected to assist the government more effectively than before in holding the armed forces of the country in complete subjection.
61. The materials available at the present moment are insufficient to allow one to judge just how Stalin is going to resolve the second half of the army problem, namely, the relationship between the army and the party. All his recent statements, without exception, indicate that he is not in the least inclined to limit the role of the party as a gigantic mechanism for influencing the minds of the population. But there can already be no doubt that for the officers, who are being formed into a special privileged caste, some sort of adjustment will be made within the party, which will permit them both to remain party members and to hold courts of honor.
62. Measures which are now being carried out seem to indicate that party organizations in the army and navy have already been set free from the authority of the general party machine. This is attested to by the following facts: as his first substitute in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, Stalin has chosen Bulganin, who has been entrusted with "general business", which means primarily party political work in the army. Simultaneously Bulganin, who is a candidate for membership in the Political Bureau, has been also elected to the Organizational Bureau, where he has been placed at the head of that department of the central party machine which will direct party work in the army (this department was previously known as Political Guidance of the Red Army; it is not known exactly what it is called today). Thus Bulganin possesses full powers for the work he is doing, both along governmental and party lines. The extraordinary approval which Stalin has shown to Bulganin is guarantee enough that the latter will be completely independent of any other influence; no matter what policy he should pursue it will, essentially, be Stalin's policy, and will therefore necessarily be coordinated with Stalin's general effort to create a sharply delineated privileged caste of "red officers".
63. Stalin has carried out especially complex measures in reorganizing the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party - that department which directs the whole activity of the party machine. In March 1946 the Organizational Bureau was rebuilt completely, which involved not only radical changes in its staff, but an alteration of the very principles of its organization. It would be possible to bring out the full significance of these measures only by means of a detailed comparison of the biographical data of the new members of the Bureau and of their previous functions in the party machine. This would require a considerable digression. However, a basic outline of the meaning of these innovations may be indicated without such detailed analysis.
64. The Organizational Bureau, as prescribed by the last conference before the war (March, 1941) was actually a sub-section of the Political Bureau, to which organizational work was assigned: of its nine members, seven, in other words 77.8%, were members of and candidates for membership in the Political Bureau. Now the picture is quite different: while the total number of its members has been increased to 15, the number of members of the Political Bureau on its staff has been cut down to four, which represents only 26.7% of the total. Of equal importance is another point: in 1941 the majority (five) of its members were "old Bolsheviks", who had joined the Communist movement during its underground period; moreover, all five were members of the Political Bureau, in other words men of considerable importance. Of the fifteen members of the present-day Organizational Bureau only 2 (13.3%) belong to the category of "Old Men". All the rest are younger men, who joined the party during the period of revolution; moreover, the overwhelming majority of these - in fact, all but two: Bulganin and Mekhliss, both of whom have already been mentioned - belong to the category of party workers, and have been maneuvered into their present positions by Malenkov.

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65. The present-day composition of the Organizational Bureau would seem to indicate complete victory on the part of Malenkov, who has staffed it for the most part with his own candidates. Moreover, Malenkov himself has risen in party ranks: in the list of the members both of the Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat of the Central Committee his name follows immediately upon Stalin's, which means that he is in fact the first secretary of the party. Yet it is certain that Malenkov is not pleased by his victory: at the same time he has been relieved of all his duties in the government of the state. During the war he was Stalin's substitute both in the Council of the People's Commissars and in the Committee for Defense, he was almost a dictator in the field or production of military aircraft, and so on. Now he has been removed from all these positions, and transferred exclusively to work within the party. There can be no doubt that this was done under the pretext that there was a need on the part of all available forces to specialize and concentrate on party work; but neither can there be any doubt that this marks the end of Stalin's remarkable favoritism of Malenkov which began just before the war and lasted during its early years. Now Malenkov is no longer the man closest to Stalin, but merely one of his four or five closest collaborators.
66. Besides, even in the Organizational Bureau Malenkov's victory is not as far-reaching as might appear at first glance. One of the members both of the Organizational Bureau and of the Secretariat is Zhdanov, that same Zhdanov whom Malenkov had worked so hard during the war to oust from the Central Committee. True, Zhdanov has not been restored to his former position of head of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation, which he had occupied until late in 1941 or early in 1942 (that most important post is firmly held by Georgii F. Aleksandrov, one of Malenkov's closest assistants.) True, Zhdanov is only the second secretary of the Central Committee, which for him, who has served in the Secretariat since 1934, is a direct demotion. Nevertheless, he will be the second fully-empowered member of the Political Bureau to serve on the Organizational Bureau, another man who will be constantly taking part in the current work of the very center of the party machine, who will be informed of all its details and will have the right to know all its innermost secrets. From his experience of former years, Malenkov understands clearly the significance of Zhdanov's appointment: he will have at his side an enemy who is going to watch him, collect material about him, and report to Stalin on his activities. The function which in the past Malenkov himself has so often exercised in regard to others will not be exercised by Zhdanov in regard to Malenkov himself.
67. Another circumstance must be noted in this connection: Mekhliss, who seemed to have been ousted from the center of the party machine for good, has once again been made a member of the Organizational Bureau. This not only represents Stalin's departure from the campaign of "current anti-semitism" which was carried on in recent years by Malenkov and Shcherbakov, but means also that among Malenkov's closest collaborators there will be one more watchful enemy.
68. It will be seen that Malenkov's "victory" even within the party machine is not without important reservations. Actually, the chief, if not the only, victor in the struggle for power in the party machine which Malenkov has been waging all through the war is Stalin himself. It is his position which has been strengthened: in the new Organizational Bureau he is even more completely "boss" than he used to be in the old.
69. It is possible now to formulate conclusions. The two main lines of antagonism which were formed during the war in the government and party mechanisms have been utilized by Stalin to give shape and stability to his personal dictatorship. Instead of two organs of executive power, he now has three, each of which appears to have extensive powers. All contradictions between them, all frictions are now resolved by Stalin's personal authority. He alone correlates the activities of these three organizations.

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70. The political Bureau must certainly, both in form and in fact, lose a great part of its former importance. Of the fourteen men (members and candidates for membership) who now compose it, eight are Stalin's official assistants in the government of the state, one is his assistant in the Ministry of the Armed Forces, and two in the party machine. Only two of the members of the Political Bureau do not hold officially the position of Stalin's assistants. They are Shvernik, the new "president" of the USSR, and Khrushchev, the "viceroy" of the Political Bureau in the Ukraine.
71. The Political Bureau will not, of course, go out of existence, and in all probability there will be no formal changes made in its activities in the nearest future (Stalin is always extremely cautious in such matters.) But there can hardly be any doubt of the fact that its influence has entered upon a period of decline. It may be expected to progress further along that line, degenerating gradually into a conference between Stalin and his closest assistants in all the basic branches of the state government.
72. Under these conditions, an increasingly important role will undoubtedly be played by Stalin's personal secretariat, which will have to collect material relating both to the coordination of the three organs of executive power mentioned above, and to the preparation of central changes, both of a structural and personal character. There are already signs of such a growth. At the head of Stalin's personal secretariat at the present moment is Aleksandr Nikolaevich Poskrebishev (b. 1891) who is a member of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party. It is characteristic of Stalin to have engaged for this position not a representative of "the young", like Malenkov, but an "old man" and former underground worker, though with a rather brief record of such work. Stalin is insistently pushing him to the foreground: he has not only been elected to the Supreme Council of the Russian Soviet Republic, but has been placed at the head of the Council's Legislative Commission and made a member of the Constitutional Editing Committee.
73. It is clear that the new stage of development upon which the USSR entered in the moment when Stalin officially took the reins of government in his hands, is far from having reached its completion. It is impossible so far to predict the concrete forms which it may take in the future. But the direction of this new development is now clear: it is progressing towards the ever-greater strengthening of Stalin's personal regime. The preparation for war as a concrete possibility (and that this is being done may be seen from the highly instructive theoretical articles which determine the whole character of party propaganda) must further and hurry development in that very direction: in Stalin's opinion, in order to win a war, the country needs, first and foremost, complete unity of power which nothing and no one can disturb.

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
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1. Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organization of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin, so that it will be safer to assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called collective leadership, unless Western policies force the Soviets to streamline their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable from the point of view of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the death of Stalin.
2. There will not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been cleaned up and the Party and the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's favorites, there can be expected only a normal replacement of officials in the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Government.
3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920's when Stalin was ascending to power. There is now no organized opposition inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers, and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace.
4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux. The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between national-minded "Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who think in terms of the more orthodox international line is still going on.
5. No improvement in the food situation can be expected. The promises of Malenkov to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch

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as the Communist leaders were unable to keep this promise, particularly because of accelerated war preparations, they had to find a scapegoat, and thus Malenkov resigned.

6. Bulganin impressed those who had worked with him in the State Bank, including a famous expert on banking, with his high intelligence, mild manners, and capacity to learn in a very short time the most special and difficult problems.
7. It is difficult to anticipate any withdrawal from the Soviet foreign policy line unless there are concessions from the West with regard to the ratification of the Paris agreements. There is a possibility that a continuation of discord among the Soviet leaders may lead to a softening of the Soviet position and to a recognition by Molotov of his incompetence in the conduct of foreign relations. The Soviet leaders however, have recognized that the balance of power has changed in favor of the West. They are now endeavoring to change this balance as can be seen from the shift to accelerated war production, and the attempts to disrupt Western unity. The aggressiveness of the Chinese Communists may also be a part of this endeavor. A stiff position on the part of the West toward the USSR probably favors the continuation in power of the more stiff elements in the Soviet leadership.

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ORE 9

13 January 1948

Copy No. 73

## THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR

## SUMMARY

The selection of a successor to Stalin's present position in the Soviet hierarchy will be made with a view to its effect in insuring the stability of the present regime and the continuation of its policies. Because of the past experience of Soviet leaders, the psychology and traditions of the Russian people, and the nature of Soviet political machinery, a transfer of Stalin's power to a single individual would appear more suitable than the division of this power among several individuals. At present, the best qualified candidate for the succession is Molotov, whose close association with Stalin, devotion to present Soviet policies, and long experience in both Party and Government service give him a distinct advantage over other Politburo members. Elaborate precautions will be taken to insure that the transition of power to Molotov, upon Stalin's death or retirement does not seriously endanger the stability or policies of the regime. The immediate effects of such transition, therefore, probably will be insignificant. If, however, the USSR is confronted by a series of adversities, domestic and foreign, the absence of Stalin's prestige and personality might give rise to manifestations of personal rivalry among Politburo members which would result in the rapid disintegration of the Soviet regime.

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Note: This paper has the concurrence of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and of the Air Force. A statement of dissent by the Department of State is set forth in Enclosure "A."

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## THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR

Stalin's advancing years and intermittent reports of his failing health have several times within recent months given rise to considerable speculation as to the effects which his death might have on the Soviet regime. Such speculation has received renewed stimulus from the Soviet leader's failure to appear at the November 7th celebration in Moscow, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. While Stalin's absence on this occasion appears of small significance (he was likewise absent from the celebration for the previous two years), and while there is no reliable evidence of his present ill health, some interest attaches to the treatment accorded him by the Soviet propaganda machine during the recent festivities. In comparison with former years, his name was relatively inconspicuous on the myriad of officially prescribed posters and banners which blossom forth on the Moscow landscape each November. Although his political and military prowess were the object of several glowing tributes, the general tone of the propaganda tended to place him in a position of remoteness and reverence, similar to that previously accorded only to Lenin. It is possible, therefore, that a deliberate effort is being made gradually to condition the Soviet people for Stalin's retirement from active participation in Party and governmental affairs. The following discussion is concerned with the succession to power in the USSR upon Stalin's retirement, disability, or death, and with the effects of such succession on the policies and stability of the Soviet regime. ✓

There is no positive evidence that this problem has been the subject of discussion between Stalin and his hierarchy, although conjecture and rumor have been almost limitless. The approach to the subject, therefore, is necessarily analytical, the conclusions being reached through attempting on the basis of background experience, to analyze the thought processes of Stalin and members of the Politburo.

It is inconceivable that the question of succession would be brought up originally by any member of the Politburo except Stalin himself. Anyone doing so would make himself vulnerable to charges of "lack of faith" and "plotting." That Stalin would throw the problem to the Politburo for discussion and decision is also unlikely, since acrimonious debate and encouragement of power struggle would result. That Stalin has considered the possibility of his sudden or eventual elimination from the Soviet scene and formulated some plans for meeting the various contingencies must be accepted; whether his plans have been made known, and to whom, is a matter of conjecture.

The dominant criterion which must be met in making the choice of succession to Stalin's position is "How well does it guarantee the safety of the present regime and the continuation of its present policies?" All other considerations, such as the popularity, merit or seniority of the individual candidate must be secondary. That the choice will be made from without the Politburo is remote beyond possibility. Since it will be made from within the ranks of the Politburo members, there are two alternatives: (a) Stalin's tangible power will be divided among several members of the Politburo

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who now serve as his chief advisers and assistants, or, (b) the power will be transferred to a single individual.

Stalin must have considered the advisability and practicability of the first alternative, since the complexities of the Party-State mechanism would make a triumvirate more practicable than any available single individual. In such event the power would be divided among the three members of the Politburo who are best fitted to constitute the basic authority of the Soviet State through control, respectively, of government apparatus, Party policy, and internal security. Under such an arrangement, the logical candidate to inherit the direction of the government apparatus would be Molotov, long a devoted disciple of Stalin and a skilled administrator. His extensive experience in foreign affairs, combined with previous experience in government and Party administration, qualifies him for government leadership during a period in which foreign relations will be a prime factor in Soviet tactical policy. Andrei Zhdanov would logically be selected for full control of the Party policy; he is second only to Stalin as spokesman for the Party on ideological matters, and, as a member of the powerful Orgburo since 1934, has accumulated a wealth of experience and influence in organizational problems of the Party. Total control of the internal security of the USSR would be assumed by Lavrenti Beria. In the late thirties Beria was appointed Commissar of Internal Affairs, a position which gave him control of the complex Soviet security system, including the secret police, penal institutions, and forced labor camps. While his present official status is not entirely clear (he was relieved as Commissar of Internal Affairs in January 1946), he is believed to retain a large measure of control over the two security agencies (MVD and MGB), in addition to being primarily responsible for Soviet atomic development.

Stalin must have applied the criterion of safety to such a disposition of his power as that outlined above, a disposition which has both logic and practicability, and found that there are stronger considerations favoring a single heir. These considerations are:

- a. Soviet experience has shown that the structure of the USSR can best be administered by a single head—an infallible arbiter whose decisions on all questions are final.
- b. The fact that the present Soviet dictatorship has successfully withstood such strains as those created by the collectivization of agriculture, the purges, and World War II is a convincing argument for one-man control.
- c. The history of the Russian people, under both the Tsarist and Soviet regimes, preconditions them to accept the idea of a single, all-powerful ruler. There is a deep-seated concept in the Russian mind of a paternalistic ruler—a concept assiduously cultivated by the present regime.
- d. One successor, with full authority, would be more capable of dealing with personal jealousies, disagreements, and desires for personal power among leading members of the Politburo. A division of power among several leading contenders would probably satisfy none and would lead to an eventual struggle for power.

As the best available method of assuring the perpetuation and expansion of the Soviet system with a minimum risk to the stability of the regime, Stalin would choose the second of the two alternatives and bequeath his power to a single individual.

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The relative position of possible successors has in the past been subject to sudden change, and their present standings must be considered as ephemeral. Under present conditions the individual who now appears most capable of carrying on the Stalinist version of the Party doctrine with the least risk to the State is Vyacheslav Molotov. He has been associated with Stalin longer and more closely than any other member of the Politburo, and his personal loyalty has never been questioned. Molotov's position as the number-two figure in the official hierarchy seems to be clearly established in the popular Soviet mind as well as in international circles; he is referred to in the press as Stalin's closest adviser and most trusted assistant. In official photographs and at official functions he occupies a position of prominence second only to Stalin. His long and varied experience makes him the most logical single candidate, for, in addition to having occupied various key positions in both Party and government, he became an alternate member of the Politburo in 1921 and a full member in 1926. It is believed that he would be most acceptable to the powerful Police Ministries, because of his demonstrated antagonistic and accusing attitude in foreign relations which enables those Ministries to justify their actions as being necessary to insure the safety of the USSR.

Stalin realizes that Molotov has neither the personal characteristics nor the personal prestige to occupy the peculiar niche now filled by Stalin himself. Further, Stalin's appreciation of Molotov's capabilities probably includes the latter's shortcomings and therefore does not envisage Molotov as a new Stalin. Stalin would rather, for glorification of his own memory and for the safety of the Soviet regime, consolidate Molotov's position in relation to himself as Stalin is to Lenin—in other words, Molotov will be presented as the prophet of the demigod Stalin. Propaganda will include pictures showing the heads of Lenin, Stalin, and Molotov in such close proximity that to throw mud at the last would also splatter the two immortals. In all probability, Stalin will prepare both Molotov and the Politburo for the eventual transfer of power by gradually delegating increased control of State and Party to Molotov; an initial indication would be the appointment of Molotov to the position of a secretary of the Communist Party. This procedure would reduce the difficulties inherent in an abrupt transition and, at the same time, give Molotov the advantage of Stalin's guidance, prestige, and influence. Stalin would also be afforded an additional opportunity to estimate the chances of Molotov's success. The full transfer of power cannot, however, be accomplished before Stalin's death. No matter how much authority Molotov might enjoy, the very existence of Stalin, to whom the members of the Politburo owe their political success, would discourage any effective opposition to the master's will, even though the latter may be nominally retired to the position of elder statesman. Thus, Stalin will never be able to assess accurately the ability of Molotov to stand alone, while the latter will never, while Stalin lives, be certain that he, rather than the shadow of Stalin, controls the Soviet system.

There are three additional contingencies which Stalin must have considered and provided for:

- a. That he might disappear suddenly from the Soviet scene, in which case he probably has prepared a will addressed to the Soviet peoples and the Communist Party, enjoining them to accept Molotov as their new leader.

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b. That Molotov might predecease him, in which case he has probably chosen to prepare the succession for Zhdanov who, for the present at least, is the next most suitable candidate.

c. That the deaths of several members of the Politburo might occur simultaneously with his own; this contingency is probably taken care of in the will by naming the order of succession.

The effect of the transition of power on the Soviet regime and its policy also must be considered. While it is not anticipated that the basic aims of the Soviet system will undergo any change, there will probably be a change of tactical policy towards increased isolation from the Western powers—a tendency already apparent in Molotov's recent attitude. The effect on the Soviet regime will not be immediate since, if Molotov is installed prior to Stalin's death, the Politburo will presumably be conditioned to him as Stalin's heir. This factor, combined with the ideological unity of the Politburo, its loyalty to Stalin, and a probable realization that continuation in power depends on its unity, will militate against any immediate expression of disaffection. The ability of the Politburo to retain its unanimity for an extended period of time following Stalin's death is, however, open to question. Under Stalin, originality and initiative have been subordinated to obedience; the cohesive strength of Stalin's memory is bound to diminish, and Molotov's ability to subordinate personal jealousies and rivalries will be severely taxed. The temptation of the disappointed aspirants for power to reach down for support into those lower levels of the Party hierarchy which come under their individual control will be increased by what will be more violent dissension over tactical policy in meeting current problems. If this occurs, the resulting disunity in the Party would emasculate it as the political instrument heretofore capable of controlling the inherent weaknesses of the Soviet system. The extent and the speed of deterioration will depend on developments in the global situation and the extent of the failures of the USSR to deal with the attendant problems. But if the Politburo is confronted with a series of unfavorably resolved crises after the influence of Stalin has faded, a rapid disintegration of the Soviet system will result.

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## ENCLOSURE "A"

DISSENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

While recognizing that the absence of reliable information renders highly speculative any conclusions as to Stalin's successor, the Intelligence Organization of the Department of State concurs in the assumption that in the event of Stalin's death or retirement in the near future, Molotov will probably be chosen to head the nominal government shortly thereafter. It doubts, however, that Molotov will at that time succeed to Stalin's present leading positions in the Soviet State and in the Party. It also doubts that Stalin will voluntarily relinquish his power, although he may divest himself of one or another of his positions.

Although it may be argued that supreme power in the Soviet Union will tend eventually to be concentrated in the hands of one man after Stalin's withdrawal from the scene, such a concentration of power will probably not occur at once. Up to the time of Stalin's 68th birthday, no one man possessed the necessary power to succeed him nor were any indications of preparations visible for such a transfer. It appears psychologically improbable that Stalin would himself designate one individual as successor to the series of positions that symbolize his power. Furthermore, Molotov lacks some of the qualifications that such an individual might be expected to have.

It now appears probable that immediately after Stalin's early death or retirement, the present distribution of power among the top leaders will remain in force: Molotov will fill Stalin's position as Chairman of the Council of Ministers while Zhdanov will succeed Stalin as General Secretary of the Communist Party. The two other repositories of power—police and armed forces—will remain in the hands of Beria and Bulganin. This distribution of power is not fixed and may change abruptly. In the long run, after Stalin's demise, some one individual, possibly Zhdanov, might be able to concentrate supreme power in his own hands, but there may be several "palace revolutions" before the real successor to Stalin can consolidate his position.

It should be added that the relative strength of the top Soviet leaders is so fluid that any present prediction will probably require considerable future modification if Stalin remains alive and able to direct the policies of the Soviet Union for some years to come.

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TO: ALL FIELD STATIONS CONCERNED

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FROM: [REDACTED]

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SUBJECT: Attached Exchange Paper, entitled "Further Evidence on Stalin's Role in Current Party Indoctrination" (E-12)

1. The attached paper is the second and final in the series begun with "Stalin's Role in Current Party Indoctrination and Recruitment" (E-11).

2. It is suggested that, in transmitting the paper, it be pointed out to the recipient that we should like to receive reports on the local situation insofar as significant changes concerning the pattern presented can be observed.

3. Such changes should include:

- (a) disappearance of Stalin's writing from Party indoctrination;
- (b) emergence of new Party textbooks;
- (c) increasing use of Stalin's works.

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FURTHER EVIDENCE ON STALIN'S ROLE IN CURRENT

PARTY INDOCTRINATION

1. Since publication of the study entitled "Stalin's Role in Current Party Indoctrination and Recruitment," dated June, 1953, additional evidence has been sorted out with respect to the continuing treatment afforded Stalin in the international Communist movement. This evidence provides a supplement to the previous conclusion that Stalin's role as a master theoretician was still being acknowledged and cemented throughout the Communist world some months after his death. Since publication of the June study, there has been evidence of a change in the degree of treatment afforded Stalin as an individual leader, but there has appeared no open refutation of his basic theories or of Soviet policy formulated during his regime.

2. In general, the more current evidence pictures Stalin as one of the four apostles of Communism: Marx, Engels, Lenin, and now Stalin. Of these four, Lenin receives an especially high elevation placing him above the others. As the emphasis on Stalin as an individual leader has declined, emphasis on Lenin has increased. The most consistent theme in the current treatment afforded Stalin is his role as disciple and continuer of Lenin's teachings. Lenin is being freshly glorified as the father, the founder, the true leader of the Communist Party. Current direct references to Stalin or to his works are increasingly meager. This paucity of reference appears to result not only from the fresh emphasis on Lenin but also from the policy adopted by the new Soviet rulers to stress "collective leadership" and combat the "cult of the individual."

3. Collective leadership and the undesirability of the cult of the individual were particularly stressed in the July, 1953 Pravda article, "Fifty Years of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1903-1953" and in the lead article "Collective Way--Highest Principle of Leadership in Communist and Workers Parties," appearing in the Cominform Journal of 4 September 1953. The publication of the Pravda anniversary article at the end of July seemed to mark the moment when the position of Stalin as an individual leader was fixed. Referring to the post-Lenin period, this article stated, "The CP, under the leadership of the CC, headed by J. V. Stalin, the great continuer of V. I. Lenin's work, routed the traitors.... and took the firm course of building socialism." Also..."Generalizing the wealth of experience in building socialism.....J. V. Stalin creatively developed the Marxism-Leninism doctrine in application to new historical conditions and enriched revolutionary theory with new theses on many questions." Stalin was added to the collective of dead leaders: he shares a tomb with Lenin. His name appeared in conjunction with those of Marx-Engels-Lenin in the title of the highest CPSU school, the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute which is under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His teachings began to be referred to as "the wise teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" or "the doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." This "collectivity" implied a diminished status.

4. Stalin has not only been relegated to a position inferior to Lenin but the emphasis on collectivity has been made retroactive--accomplishments formerly attributed to Stalin personally are now credited



to Party leadership. The 15th anniversary of the publication of his "Short History of the CPSU" was virtually ignored by Soviet propaganda in comparison to treatment of past anniversaries. The first anniversary of the publication of his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" was likewise unobserved by Soviet radio and press. Upon the first anniversary of the 19th Congress of the CPSU, Stalin's role in that Congress went largely unnoticed in Soviet media. The Party is pictured consistently as the leading and guiding force in Soviet history and society. To date, even the current Soviet leaders receive a prominence only in connection with their official actions.

5. Despite the treatment of Stalin as an individual, however, there is no real evidence that the CPSU intends to deviate from Stalin's ideologies. Stalin's doctrines evidently remain a part of current Communist dogma. There is evidence to indicate that his works continue to underline Party indoctrination regardless of the decline in personal reference. It is obvious, however, that his policies and strategy will not be specifically credited to him. It seems possible that some of the writings attributed to him previously, such as his "Short History", may undergo certain revisions as the new Soviet leaders continue to minimize Stalin's personal role. There is no evidence as yet that policy revisions will be undertaken. It will be recalled that the previous study demonstrated that a thorough indoctrination in certain works by Stalin, particularly his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" was being systematically undertaken by Communist Parties everywhere. There has been no definitive evidence that this indoctrination has been rescinded or, as yet, replaced.

6. Little information has been noted of the various Stalin "recruitment" drives discussed in the previous study. This situation may result from the desire to minimize the use of Stalin's name as well as from failures to achieve noteworthy recruitments. The French L'Humanite still referred to the Stalin "Promotion" drive in early July. Also in early July a Party meeting in Brazil heard exhortations to go forward under the "Stalin Recruitment Plan." This plan is still being implemented. The Cominform Journal of 7 August 1953 referred to the Stalin recruitment campaign of the Italian Communist Party which claimed great successes. In Colombia, a Stalin Enrollment for new militants was reported to be underway in August.

7. On the whole, then, the major change noted to date in Stalin's role in current Party indoctrination has been one of increasing individual anonymity but with no discernible change in acceptance of his basic theories and strategy. The Yugoslav press, on the other hand, has maintained that the rewriting of Stalin's doctrine has already begun, particularly of his famous short history. Politika claimed that the Pravda anniversary article containing new theses of the history of the CPSU differs considerably from the old text of "A Short Course in the History of the CPSU". It stated that certain of the new theses actually charge Stalin with responsibility for the attempts to achieve absolute power, such as those of Beria. The removal of Stalin's name from the pedestal is obvious and the settling of accounts with Beria is directly connected with the condemnation of a system. Politika thinks that the squeezing out of

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Stalin's name from the pages of Soviet history will cause a flood of new questions among the Soviet people and among those who have been doing an insufficient amount of thinking so far. All of them know the "short course" and will also read the new theses. It will be very difficult to limit and regulate the opinion of each individual. Politika emphasized that the magic of Stalin's name, which concealed the controversies in the Soviet Union, is disappearing. Once the magic is gone, the truth will have to reveal itself. (Belgrade broadcast quoting a press review 6 August 1953; this item is representative of the treatment afforded Stalin's current role by the Yugoslav Communist media.)

8. That some confusion may exist with respect to the overt treatment of Stalin's works is indicated by the contrasting attitudes toward the "Short History" taken in East Germany by the Neues Deutschland and the Taegliche Rundschau on the same day. On 1 October, the Soviet-controlled Taegliche Rundschau published a eulogy of Stalin's "Short History" which contained the old time cliches of Stalin veneration. Also on 1 October, the SED-controlled Neues Deutschland cautioned against assuming that the "Short History" offered a prescription for all. In an article on the "Short History" and the theses of "Fifty Years of the CPSU", this newspaper pointed out that no textbook can take the place of the study of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, the decrees and reports of Party conferences and Central Committees. It declared that the "Short History" is one guide to study but it is not the entire study; it arranges a necessary understanding for the connection. This attitude

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seemed to echo the lead article in the Cominform Journal of 4 September wherein the world experience of the CPSU was offered for inspiration; mention of the "Short History" was omitted in this summation which spoke of the Rules of the CPSU, the decisions of the Congresses and meetings of the Central Committee, and the theses of "Fifty Years of the CPSU".

9. Concluding this series, it is suggested that continuing attention be paid to the actual use of Stalin's writings in the indoctrination program of Communist Parties within and outside the orbit. Although it is believed, on the basis of this current series, that Stalin's writings continue to be part and parcel of Communist indoctrination materials (in spite of the "new look" publicity treatment afforded him as an individual leader), the disappearance of his works from training and indoctrination curricula would be significant and report-worthy.

To venture an opinion, we believe it unlikely that such a trend will develop, simply because the Communist leadership can ill afford to admit or make a break in the continuity of the unfolding of the movement, and also because it still can make propagandistic hay with the proper use of "the great Stalin," particularly outside the USSR where the terroristic aspects of his regime were not experienced directly. Evidence to the contrary, we shall assume that in the period covered by this paper, Stalin's position was fixed (see above, paragraph 3) and that his writings continue to be included in Communist indoctrination.

December, 1953.

A. Satellites

(Note: As will be noted in the following evidence, by the middle of August it became increasingly difficult to find references to Stalin within available overt Satellite sources. Indeed, this appeared to be more difficult than within Soviet sources. This situation may have been prompted by Satellite uncertainty as to the correct treatment to give Stalin. A suggestion of some continuing confusion was again evident in October when some divergence was noted in the Satellite treatment of the anniversary of Stalin's "Short History".)

1. Evidence not available at the time of the previous study gives additional information on the East German treatment of Stalin's role in Party indoctrination. Neuer Weg for March contained an article by Ulbricht on the "legacy" of Stalin which, he said, is comprised of Stalin's "History of the CPSU", the Party Statute of the CPSU, the great scholarly work "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR", and the speech at the 19th Congress. Stalin's economic work was especially praised. On 7 August 1953, the Neue Welt carried an article on Stalin's economic work, calling it evidence of the unity of revolutionary practice and revolutionary theory. Die Neue Gesellschaft for May discussed Stalin's economic work from a technical viewpoint, relating Stalin's theories to the problems of workers.

2. An SED publishing house has put out volume IX of Stalin's works in German translation. The translation from Russian was prepared by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the CC of the SED. (Cominform Journal, 12 June 53; note the new name of the Institute).

3. In Poland, a Polish translation of Lenin's article on Marx has been published in connection with the 70th anniversary of Marx's death. Also published is the second bound edition of Stalin's biography translated from the revised Soviet edition. This also contains Stalin's speech to the 19th Congress, excerpts from Malenkov's report, and the message of the CC, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium. (Warsaw broadcast 16 June 1953).

4. In Albania the cycle of lectures on Stalin's economic work has been terminated. Conferences were attended by thousands—Party and mass organization cadres, as well as working people. Documents of the 19th Congress and the last work of Stalin have also been included in the programs of secondary and higher schools and in Party education. (Albanian broadcast 16 June 1953).

5. In Rumania, ideological work is being undertaken in Bucharest and the number of Party members studying Marxism-Leninism independently has grown. More than 500 tutors are delivering and holding seminars and consultations on Stalin's economic work and the materials of the 19th Congress. (Cominform Journal 19 June 1953).

6. The Slovakia Party in Czechoslovakia states that now is the period of the Soviet foreign policy of peace, international cooperation, development of trade relations with all countries—a policy based on the Lenin-Stalin thesis concerning the possibility of co-existence and peaceful competition of the two different systems. The Slovakia Party is successfully carrying out the Lenin-Stalin national policy; it is a Party of the

new Lenin-Stalin type. It is building a State where the brilliant teaching of Lenin-Stalin about equality and friendship of nations is being developed in full measure. (Cominform Journal 19 June 1953).

7. North Koreans, in discussing proletarian internationalism, say that all the world's progressive humanity consider it as their patriotic obligation to support the Soviet Union because this means that they support their own people in the fight for peace and protection of the national interests of their people. Lenin and Stalin further developed proletarian internationalism, intensifying the fight against nationalist oppression and cosmopolitanism. The 19th Congress laid down as one of its important tasks the promotion of proletarian internationalism and international friendship. (Pyongyang broadcast 15 June 1953).

8. Again in North Korea an academic meeting was held on 21 June in honor of the third anniversary of the publication of Stalin's work "Marxism and Problems of Philology." The meeting was sponsored by the Academy of Sciences and the Korean-Soviet Cultural Society. This work of Stalin arms all workers engaged in ideological and scientific studies. Thanks to Stalin's work, philology has been given exact Marxist definitions for basic problems. (Pyongyang broadcast 23 June 1953).

9. Polish youth are undertaking ideological and educational work. They are being acquainted with the life and teachings of Stalin, with the experiences and history of the CPSU, and with the fight of world youth for peace. (Warsaw broadcast 23 June 1953).

10. The current Party study year in Bulgaria included lecture centers organized for the first time in a number of big enterprises. Among those lectures which evoked particular interest were those devoted to the materials of the 19th Congress and to Stalin's book on economics. (Cominform Journal 26 June 1953).

11. A Chinese publishing house will issue in October the first volume of Stalin's works in a Chinese translation. The translation of Stalin's works was undertaken on the basis of decisions of the CC. (Cominform Journal 3 July 1953 and a Peking broadcast 3 July 1953).

12. In Albania a new edition of the "History of the CPSU(B), Short Course" appeared in 40,000 copies in the Albanian language. This book has been included in the curriculum of the Party's education network. (Cominform Journal 3 July 1953; note that there is no mention of Stalin as the author).

13. The Rumanian comment on the anniversary of the CPSU stated that the "CPSU, under the leadership of the genius, Lenin, and disciple and continuer of Lenin's cause, great Stalin, and their comrades" has achieved great victory. (Moscow broadcast on Rumania 31 July 1953).

14. In general, the Satellite comments on the anniversary of the CPSU followed the trend noted above, with particular emphasis being placed on Lenin. The Polish comment included references to the victorious banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. The Czech comment referred to the "immortal Lenin and his great disciple Stalin." The Hungarian comment mentioned the genius of Lenin and his great disciple and continuer, Stalin. It also spoke of "Lenin-Stalin counsel" and the



"victorious banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." The Bulgarian comment referred to the leadership of brilliant Lenin and the leadership of the disciple and continuer of Lenin's cause, the great Stalin. In all these comments, there was more discussion of Lenin than of Stalin, and the close similarity of words and emphasis clearly demonstrated that the Satellites had received the "line". (Factual data from Cominform Journal 31 July 1953).

15. The Moscow switch to "collective leadership" appeared most markedly toward the end of July and it was in this period that direct references to Stalin showed a sharp tapering off. This trend was echoed in China. A review of Peiping broadcasts since the Beria arrest revealed a greatly increased Chinese awareness of the Soviet emphasis on collective leadership. This was reflected in a noticeable decline in Peiping's praise of Mao's personal leadership. Yet in June and early July, Peiping's eulogies of Mao reached an all-time high. (Review of Peiping broadcasts July-August 1953).

16. The Polish Party is seeking to improve the ideological education of members. The Party must arm working people with the immortal teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (Cominform Journal 7 August 1953).

17. The SED resolution of the 15th Plenum of the CC states that the Party is relying on the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (Cominform Journal 7 August 1953).

18. The Bulgarian Party is beginning preparations for the new academic year. The curriculum of courses and seminars include key questions in the history of the CPSU, in the history of the Bulgarian CP, and study of works by Lenin and Stalin. Regarding the academic year which is ending, the study of Stalin's economic work stimulated Party cadres and non-Party intelligentsia to broaden and deepen their knowledge of political economy. (Gominform Journal 14 August 1953).

19. As an indication of the upsurge of Lenin, it is interesting to note that in Poland an edition of the 7th volume of Lenin's works has just appeared. It is a translation from the 4th Russian edition which was prepared for publication by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the CC of the CPSU. (Factual data from Warsaw broadcast 17 August 1953).

20. Likewise, the publishing house of the Bulgarian Party has published the first volume of the collected documents of the All-Union Communist Party Bolshevik, and the resolutions adopted at the conferences and plenary sessions of the CC in accordance with the 6th Supplementary Russian edition of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. (Sofia broadcast 19 August 1953; note that this Party publication would appear to concentrate primarily on Lenin, for the first volume contains material of the period between 1898 and 1925).

21. In China, cadres of the People's Governments of various administrative areas and cities are making preparations for the study of "the history of the All-Union Communist Party" as part of their ideological training program. (Nanking broadcast 21 August 1953).

22. The Bulgarian Party has published the brochure put out by the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute of the CPSU entitled "Fifty Years of the CPSU; 1902-1953." Some 40,000 copies have been published. (Sofia broadcast 21 August 1953; this "history" contains very little mention of Stalin's role of leadership).

23. The 23rd volume of the works of Lenin has just been issued in a Rumanian translation by the publishing house of political literature. (Agerpress, Bucharest 22 August 1953; this evidence is included as another representative example of the trend toward Lenin and the difficulty of finding references to Stalin's works).

24. Bulgaria has published the 29th and 30th volume of Lenin's works. (Sofia broadcast 27 August 1953; another example of Lenin).

25. In China, it is reported that all senior cadres of Kiangsu Provincial Government have been required to study the "Soviet Economic Problems of Socialism" written by Stalin. (Nanking broadcast 28 August 1953).

26. In East Germany, Stalin's "Short History" was eulogized and Stalin praised with the old time terms of veneration. (Factual data from Taegliche Rundschau, 1 October 1953).

27. In the Rumanian comment on the anniversary of the 19th Congress of the CPSU, reference is made to Stalin's economic work. The comment says that this work is a sure guide for the peoples of the Soviet Union who are building Communism and the peoples of the People's Democracies who are building socialism. (Bucharest broadcast 5 October 1953).

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28. The Hungarian comment on the anniversary of the 19th Congress of the CPSU referred to Stalin, "the great follower of Lenin," who delivered his last public speech at the Congress. This speech was received with great interest and enthusiasm not only in the USSR but in the entire world. (Szabad Nep, 5 October 1953).

29. There appeared to be considerable divergence in the Satellite treatment of the anniversary of Stalin's "Short History". The entire Albanian press devoted editorials to the anniversary and some Hungarian newspapers did the same. With the exception of Czechoslovakia, where some slight mention was made of the anniversary, no other indications were noticed. (Review of Satellite media, 2 October 1953).

30. On the anniversary of the 19th Congress of the CPSU, some of the Satellite radios gave the anniversary lengthy commentaries, although apparently only Hungary highlighted Stalin's role. Only Albania appeared to have formally marked the anniversary of Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." (Review of Satellite media during the week ending 7 October 1953).

31. In Czechoslovakia, the State publishing house of political literature has published 20,000 copies of J. V. Stalin's speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, explaining the tasks of the Communist and Workers Parties in the fight for peace, democracy, and socialism. (Prague broadcast 27 October 1953).

32. Reports of the party at the Soviet Embassy in Peking on 7 November 1953 showed a revival of the practice of emphasizing Mao's personal leadership. This emphasis had declined after the arrest of Beria, and Chinese

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treatment of Mao had tended to follow the Soviet lead in de-emphasizing personal leaders. At this party, however, the toasts to Malenkov did not reach the eulogies formerly directed at Stalin. (Factual data from Peking broadcast, 7 November 1953).

33. The publishing house of the Bulgarian CP has issued a Bulgarian edition of 25,000 copies of J. V. Stalin's "Problems of Leninism" and an edition of 50,000 copies of "A Short Biography of J. V. Stalin." (Sofia broadcast 17 November 1953).

34. In Poland, an exhibition of the works of the students of the Fine Arts Academy in Warsaw, under the title "Stalin—Friend of the Polish Nation," was held from November 7 to 14. Prizes were awarded to the best works in the exhibition. First prize in painting was given to a work called "Stalin at Kronstadt." In sculpture, the prize went for "Stalin at Tsaritsin." In graphic arts, first prize was awarded for a portrait of Stalin. (Warsaw broadcast 18 November 1953).

35. In their extensive praise of the Soviet 1936 Constitution on Constitution Day, none of the Satellites, except North Korea, referred to it as the "Stalin Constitution" as has been the case in past years. (Review of Satellite media, 5-6 December 1953).

36. In Albania, the 10th volume of the complete works of Stalin in the Albanian language was recently published. This was done in conformity with the decision of the Politburo of the CC of the Albanian Workers Party. (Tirana broadcast, 2 December 1953).

37. The Satellites mentioned Stalin's birthday (21 December 1953). In East Germany, the paper Tribuene, the weekly Der Freie Bauer, and several broadcasts commemorated Stalin's birthday. A ceremony took place at the Maxim Gorki Theater, Berlin. The Leipzig Central German Regional Service commemorated the event, and carried an item in which Malenkov was described as "the loyal pupil of Stalin."

38. Budapest radio commemorated Stalin's birthday briefly, and so did Sofia which referred to socialist competition being launched in honor of Stalin within the Stalin dam building collective. All children of primary school number 63 in Sofia which is named after Stalin heard lectures devoted to their patron. (Hungarian and Rumanian radio reports, 21 Dec. 1953). On 21 December 1953 a meeting was held by a Bulgarian Army detachment in honor of Stalin. (Sofia broadcast, 22 December 1953). The feature program "Stalin--Our Battle Banner" concluded with poems devoted to Stalin and the statement that "Stalin remains in the heart of the Soviet people" and "that his name is the banner of the Bulgarian people". (Sofia, 22 December 1953).

39. Stalin's birthday was celebrated in Peking. A forum on Stalin's teachings was held jointly by the Peking Sino-Soviet Friendship Association and the All-Union (USSR) Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In Shanghai, representatives of people's organizations and Sino-Soviet Friendship Association members attended a (similar) forum on 19 December 1953. (Peking broadcast, 22 December 1953).

**B. Western Communist Parties**

(Note: In the western world, a study of available material indicated a greatly reduced attention paid to Stalin but it was not apparent that the Western Communist Parties have as yet embraced the "Lenin emphasis" to the extent shown by the Satellites and the USSR. Western Communist Parties have undoubtedly felt some confusion regarding the proper treatment of Stalin and this probably accounts for the paucity of reference material).

1. Additional evidence on treatment afforded Stalin has been noted in France. Although a screening of L'Humanite for the period January to May 1953 revealed a systematic effort to publicize Stalin's works, coverage of the period May - 15 July turned up no evidence of a continuing drive in that direction. The name of Stalin figured prominently only in the Stalin "Promotion" membership drive.

2. In Belgium coverage of Le Drapeau Rouge for the period 16 April-15 July 1953 revealed a marked decrease in advertising of Stalin's works. A shift of emphasis in advertising was noted toward works by Engels and Lenin. The chief editor of the paper, however, continued to refer periodically to Stalin's works.

3. In the Netherlands only two references to works by Stalin were found in De Waarheid in the period 8 April - 16 July 1953. During March and early April, Stalin's works had been frequently advertised.

4. In June, 1953, Communists in Guatemala were found distributing literature which included Stalin's economic work and his speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU.

5. In June, 1953, it was reported that certain Party members in France had been especially appointed to edit the complete works of Stalin in 14 volumes.

6. The Communist Review in the UK in June, 1953, contained a long article on Stalin and quoted from his works, including his economic work. The article concluded that Stalin "takes his place in history, the greatest man of our time." This same edition contains a backpage notation that the first volume of Stalin's works is now available in English; this volume covers the period 1901-1907 and is scheduled for review in the next issue of the publication.

7. In Trieste the Communist Youth Federation, preparing for its attendance at the Bucharest youth festival in August, planned a "Stalin Fund." (June, 1953).

8. To the plenum of the CC of CP France in June, Thorez said that the camp of socialism is becoming stronger whereas the decadence of the capitalist world is becoming more evident. Thorez reminded his audience that Stalin, in his last work, advised Communists to see not only the outward phenomena but also the forces now operating imperceptibly which will determine the course of developments. (Cominform Journal 19 June 1953).

9. The Pernambuco State Committee of the Brazilian Party reported those tasks which the Party will undertake to improve itself and stated that it was taking into account the wise words of Stalin in turning to these tasks. (June, 1953).



10. French Party leader, Duclos, writing about the unity of the working class in France, stated that what is needed is a Party armed with the invincible teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. (Cominform Journal 26 June 1953).

11. The Austrian Party paper, commenting on events in East Germany and elsewhere, said that these merely reflect the transition between two states of socialist reconstruction. The new reorientation is a new course designed to satisfy requirements of the people. This is in strict accordance with the platform of the 19th Congress CPSU and with the theories laid down in Stalin's latest treatise on economics. (Volksstimme 9 July 1953).

12. Italian Party leader, Togliatti, writing on the Italian elections, referred to the peace initiative of the Soviet Union—the policy of peace and of easing the international tension pursued for many years by Stalin and further developed by the comrades now heading the Soviet Union. (Cominform Journal 10 July 1953).

13. In Finland the Party is organizing seminars to step up mass political work in factories. Curricula are arranged to enable agitators to master theories of Marxism-Leninism. The most successful of the seminars was in Helsinki where close attention was given theoretical questions, including Stalin's last work and the 19th Congress CPSU materials. (Cominform Journal, 24 July 1953).

14. The French Party, commenting on the anniversary of the CPSU, mentions Lenin as a leader of the CPSU and does not refer to Stalin at all. (Factual data from Cominform Journal, 31 July 1953).

15. No evidence was found in Iceland of an indoctrination program in Stalin's name being conducted by the Party this summer. Books listed for sale by the Communist youth organization did not mention any works by Stalin.

16. In a long article by Reimann, chairman of the KPD of West Germany, on the struggle of the Party for peace and unity of the country, one brief mention is made of Stalin. He states..."Lenin and Stalin teach us that we must explain the policy of the Party to the masses in our everyday explanatory work." (Cominform Journal, 23 October 1953).

17. Discussing the essence of Socialist economy, a CP publication in the UK states that a priceless contribution to the struggle of all workers was made in Stalin's distillation of the experience of this quarter century of socialist construction—his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." The article goes on to praise this book because of the path it shows to Communism. (World News and Views, dated 3 October 1953).

C. Middle and Far East, and Colonial Areas

(Note: After July, 1953, little pertinent evidence has been available from these areas. Stalin's role in Party indoctrination remains evident, however.)

1. A Bengali (India) Communist daily newspaper published in installments beginning 8 March 1953, a complete translation into Bengali of Stalin's economic work. Readers were told that this was an "immortal book" and were exhorted to save the newspaper issues. This same paper also carried a notice that Stalin's address to the 19th Congress CPSU was published in a special issue of the Calcutta monthly Soviyet Dosh. (Review of Swadhinata March, 1953).

2. Also in India, a Urdu-language Party daily carried advertisements that Stalin's economic work and his address to the 19th Congress CPSU, both translated into certain Indian languages, were available from the Tass representative in New Delhi. (Review of Naya Zamana, March 1953).

3. The Tudeh Party in Iran is reported to be emphasizing works by Stalin in its April program for the training of cadre classes. (April 1953).

4. Concerning the struggle of people in African colonial areas, a member of the French Party said that the enslavement and systematic robbery of the people of other countries, particularly the backward countries, is one of the chief means employed by the capitalists for amassing maximum profits. The French colonies provide vivid illustrations of this feature of the basic economic law of modern capitalism. This is

just what Stalin teaches in his "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR". (Cominform Journal, 3 July 1953).

5. The publishing house of the Greek CC has issued in Greek translation volume XI of Stalin's works. (Cominform Journal, 10 July 1953).

6. Among Japanese Communists, Stalin's economic work has aroused deep interest. Several editions of this work have been published. The CC has called upon members to study this work and has charged members working in the field of political economy the task of compiling a textbook on economic problems based on Stalin's theses. Stalin's work is recommended as a textbook in the Party's education program. Lectures, talks, classes, seminars, etc. are being held on this work; other works by Stalin will be published. (Cominform Journal, 10 July 1953).

7. Vietnam Party members are undertaking studies of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Malenkov's report to the 19th Congress CPSU, the works of Mae Tse-tung, and the writings of Ho Chi Minh are also being studied. (North Korean broadcast, 24 July 1953).

8. In early November, the Tudeh Youth Committee in Iran was reportedly advised to read and study the recently published biography of Stalin and that examinations would be given on this work.

D. USSR and General References

(Note: Although the following evidence will indicate the extent to which direct references to Stalin have declined, it will also indicate that Stalin's name still appears, most often in the context of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin and in general references to teachings of Communism. There is no evidence that Stalin's contributions to "Marxism-Leninism" do not continue to be embraced by the CPSU. Based on available evidence, Stalin's role as theoretician is still intact).

1. The Kiev Town Party Committee held a seminar for the secretaries of the primary Party organization at which lectures on Stalin's economic work were given. Also given were lectures on the international position of the Soviet Union as well as on Party organization and political work. (Kiev broadcast, 6 June 1953).

2. The Karaginskiy Rayon Party organization is broadening the knowledge of the Marxism-Leninism theories and raising the ideological and political level of the workers. During the 1952-53 school year, Communists and Komsomol members have taught at the rayon party school and thoroughly covered the materials of the 19th Congress and Stalin's economic work. (Petrovavlovsk broadcast, 10 June 1953).

3. In a lecture to Soviet armed forces, it is stated that a socialist society is governed by the fundamental economic law of Socialism discovered by Comrade Stalin, the essential features and requirements of which prescribe that the constantly mounting material and cultural needs of the entire community be satisfied to a maximum extent. (Volga broadcast, 12 June 1953).

4. In a long article on the academic studies of Marxism-Leninism being undertaken by Communists everywhere, the only direct reference to Stalin is in the statement that Communists are studying and propagating the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (Factual data from Cominform Journal, 19 June 1953).

5. In an article on the force of Marxism-Leninism, it is stated that Stalin continued Lenin's work, creatively developing the Marxism-Leninism theory in application to new historical conditions. (Pravda 2 July 1953).

6. Discussing how the Marxism-Leninism heritage shapes Party policy, it is stated that Stalin is the continuer of Lenin and in his works may be found an answer to the most vital questions of the contemporary struggle for peace, democracy, and socialism. (Moscow broadcast, 2 July 1953 of Pravda editorial).

7. In an article about the USSR as the mainstay of peace and security of peoples, the great driving force is said to be the CPSU, founded and tempered by Lenin and by the continuer of Lenin's cause, Stalin. (Cominform Journal, 3 July 1953).

8. A commentary from the Ukraine mentions Stalin as the continuer of Lenin's cause. In speaking of the greatness of the CPSU, the commentary states that the Communist path is enlightened by the great teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (Kiev broadcast, 3 July 1953).

9. A long article praising the CPSU refers to the doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin as the powerful ideological weapon of the Party. The

CPSU is guided by the great teachings of these men. Stalin is referred to as the continuer of Lenin's cause and one who strengthened the Party ideologically and organizationally. Reference is made to the Lenin-Stalin national policy. Stalin is quoted on knowledge of how to act collectively. Reference is made to Lenin-Stalin principles. Stalin's economic work is mentioned as an outstanding contribution toward the treasury of Marxism-Leninism. Stalin is referred to as the pupil and comrade in arms of Lenin. (Pravda, 4 July 1953).

10. A commentary states that a striking example of the creative attitude toward Marxism was given by Lenin and Stalin, who brilliantly developed the Marxist theory in its relation to new historical circumstances and raised it to unprecedented heights. Stalin's economic work is said to be of an outstanding importance for the development of Marxism-Leninism and for all the practical activities of the Party. (Moscow broadcast, 8 July 1953).

11. An article about the CP as the organizing and inspiring force of Soviet society states that it has traversed a glorious path under the leadership of Lenin, and under the leadership of the great Stalin, disciple and continuer of Lenin's cause. (Cominform Journal, 17 July 1953).

12. In an article on the unity of the CPSU, it is said that the CPSU grew into a mighty force under the leadership of Lenin and the leadership of Stalin, pupil and continuer of the cause of Lenin, and under the leadership of their colleagues. Reference is made to Lenin-Stalin consistency in exposing Beria. (Cominform Journal, 17 July 1953).

13. As evidence of a slackening of direct references to Stalin, a long article on Poland contains no mention of Stalin although the article discusses economic successes in State economic planning and also the anniversary of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army. Also, in a long article about Hungary, the only reference to Stalin is found in the phrase "the teaching and ideas elaborated by Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin". (Factual data from Cominform Journal, 24 July 1953).

14. During the week ending 5 August 1953, considerable propaganda was devoted to the 50th anniversary of the CPSU. A striking feature of the comment regarding the anniversary was the subsidiary role ascribed to Stalin in making Soviet history in comparison with the treatment of Lenin. The long anniversary article in Pravda for 28 July 1953 mentioned Stalin only 4 times, and attributed to the Party the supreme role in Soviet affairs during Stalin's lifetime. Stalin is, however, referred to as the continuator of Lenin's work and is quoted to support Lenin. Stalin is credited with creative contributions to Marxism and his name appears in the title of the CPSU theoretical Institute. Referring to the period after Lenin's death, the article stated...."The CP, under the leadership of the CC, headed by J. V. Stalin, the great continuer of V. I. Lenin's work, routed the traitors and capitulators, defended Leninism and took the firm course of building socialism." And....."Generalizing the wealth of experience in building socialism in the USSR and the experience of the modern liberation movement, J. V. Stalin creatively developed the Marxism-Leninism doctrine in application to new



historical conditions and enriched revolutionary theory with new theses on many questions." Although the reduced attention to Stalin was marked and his role in Soviet history greatly minimized, the Pravda "history" did not signalize any change in Party policy. Also during the week ending 5 August, another article on "collective leadership" appeared in Pravda. This article stressed the necessity of eradicating "from the Party's propaganda work incorrect un-Marxist treatment of the question of the role of the individual personality in history." (Soviet press during week ending 5 August 1953).

15. A short article, devoted to the 50th anniversary, appeared in the Cominform Journal and was based on the Pravda history of the CPSU. It, too, contained many more references to Lenin than to Stalin. Mention of Stalin was noticeably curtailed in the discussion of the post World War II years in CPSU history. (Factual data from Cominform Journal, 31 July 1953).

16. In a speech on the virtue of Party membership, Rzhanelov made only slight reference to Stalin, once quoting him on the greatness of Lenin and then referring to him only in the phrase, "the doctrines of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." (Moscow broadcast, 12 August 1953).

17. In the re-print of Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet, only one reference to Stalin was found.... "Lenin, the genius, our father and teacher, and by the continuer of his cause, the great Stalin." (Cominform Journal, 14 August 1953).

18. Again, in an article concerning the USSR as guardian of peace and security, the only reference to Stalin concerns the banner of Marxism-Leninism "which was raised aloft by Lenin, the genius, and by the continuer of his cause, the great Stalin." (Cominform Journal, 14 August 1953).

19. A long broadcast was made on the need for Party leaders to consult and listen to the masses. The experience of an individual is not sufficient for correct leadership. The Party leader must always supplement his experience with the experience of the Party rank and file, the experience of the Party aktiv, and the experience of the people. The founder of the Party, Lenin, and the continuer of Lenin's cause, great Stalin, always taught Party leaders to listen to the masses and to attract them to the Party. Stalin used to say that from experience one learns that out of 100 single-handed decisions, unchecked and untried collectively, about 90 are chance decisions. (Ukraine broadcast of Radyanska Ukraina editorial, 19 August 1953).

20. Discussing the creative force of Marxism-Leninism, reference is made to the great ideas and policies of the wise teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (Moscow broadcast, 25 August 1953).

21. At a plant in the Ukraine, the unveiling of a monument to Stalin took place. The Director of the plant delivered a speech saying that Stalin, together with the great Lenin, struggled to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. (Ukraine broadcast, 5 September 1953).

22. In a broadcast on heightening the level of teaching social sciences, it is stated that the first and foremost tasks of lecturers as well as those of Party committees and higher educational institutions are to organize widespread propaganda and to clarify to the students those most important political documents of the Resolutions of the 19th Party Congress; the decisions of the July plenary session of the CC of the CPSU; the theses of the Dept. of Propaganda and Agitation of the CC of the CPSU and the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institution in connection with the 50th anniversary of the CPSU; the speech of the head of the Soviet Government, Comrade G. M. Malenkov, at the fifth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR—documents which mark a new, powerful upsurge in all the ideological work of the Party. The tasks in teaching social science consist now in giving the students a correct picture of the role of the masses, to explain correctly the role of personality. (Georgian broadcast, 12 Sept. 1953).

23. Studies for the new Party school year will begin in October. One cannot be satisfied with the results of last year's schooling. In the practice of propaganda work, simplification and vulgarization of Marxism-Leninism have been tolerated concerning the role of the popular masses, the Party, and the individual in history. The instructions of the CC of the CPSU given in the decision connected with the publication of the "Short Course of the History of the CP (Bolshevik)" have been forgotten; these instructions pointed out that the history of the Party should be expounded not around separate individuals and their biographies, but on

the basis of the broad basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of historical facts. Party propaganda frequently has tended toward the cult of personality. In practice, propaganda work has manifested a happy-go-lucky attitude toward the study of such important Party documents as the decisions of the Party congresses, conferences, and plenary sessions of the CC which express the internal and external policy of the Party worked out over many years. The problem of Party propaganda consists in rooting out from the practice of our propaganda work any digression from Marxism-Leninism in the question of the role of the people—the creator of history—and the role of the CP as a leading and guiding force of the Soviet people in the struggle for Communism. Cadres must study hard in such a manner for the training of leadership. (Moscow broadcast, 26 September 1953 of a Pravda editorial).

24. In outlining the shortcomings in Party education, Pravda criticizes the reading of "pamphlets" instead of studying "original sources" such as decisions of Party congresses and plenary sessions of the CC. (Pravda, 26 September 1953; note similarity to above item).

25. The 15th anniversary of the Stalin "Short History" was virtually ignored by Soviet propaganda in comparison to treatment of past anniversaries. As of 2 October 1953, there had been only a brief commemorative article broadcast to Greece, Macedonia, Serbo-Croatia, and Slovenia. There had been no central internal Soviet broadcasts on the anniversary nor any indication from press reviews that there was comment in the central press. The Tass file to the provincial press similarly ignored the anniversary. Only two regional items were noted, both from Tashkent. (Review as of 2 October 1953).

26. In the Moscow broadcast to Greece on the anniversary of the "Short History", the book was praised and its advent called a great event. There was no mention, however, of Stalin as the author. The broadcast was devoted largely to the CP and the commentary included the statement.... "The CP, directed by the CC and led by J. V. Stalin, the great continuer of the work of V. I. Lenin, smashed traitors and appeasers." (Moscow broadcast, 1 October 1953).

27. The first anniversary of the publication of Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" went virtually unobserved by the Soviet radio and press as of 5 October 1953. (Review as of 5 October 1953).

28. Although decisions of the 19th Party Congress were mentioned in various broadcasts in connection with the anniversary, Soviet propaganda avoided commemorative mention of Stalin's role at that gathering. Stalin's Congress speech was referred to only once, in a regional broadcast from Yakutsk. (Review as of 7 October 1953).

29. On 5 December, Soviet broadcasting stations devoted most of their attention to the USSR Constitution Day. Great stress was laid on the national, economic and cultural advantages gained under the Soviet Constitution. Unlike previous years, however, when the Constitution had been called the "Stalin Constitution" and Stalin extensively hailed as the father of the Constitution, only one reference to Stalin was noted this year. This occurred in a Ukrainian broadcast in which he was cited as introducing the motion on the Constitution before the Soviets. (Factual data from a review of Soviet broadcasts, 5-6 December 1953).

30. No mention of Stalin's birthday was made in Soviet propaganda. This contrasts with moderate attention given to Lenin's birthday. Pravda's editorial on the announcement of peace prize winners does not mention Stalin personally as last years editorial did. (Factual data from a review of Soviet broadcasts, 14-20 December 1953).

31. On 22 December 1953, Moscow, Soviet European Service in Finnish carried the speech of a member of the Finnish Artist's delegation, "speaking outside Stalin's birthplace," and eulogizing Stalin. (Moscow broadcast, 22 December 1953).

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INDICATIONS THAT IN MID-JANUARY 1956 THE CPSU PRESIDUM  
REACHED THE DECISION TO ATTACK STALIN PUBLICLY

1. A review of Pravda and Kommunist and spot checks of Izvestia and the Cominform Journal between 1 October 1955 and the advent of the CPSU 20th Congress (14 February 1956) reveals that all public favorable mention of Stalin by Soviet Communists ceased as of 23 January. Prior to this date press treatment of Stalin still conformed to the old party line established in July 1953, whereby Stalin was pictured as the "great continuer of Lenin's cause". The halt in Soviet references to Stalin three weeks before the opening of the 20th CPSU Congress and approximately one month after Khrushchev and Bulganin returned from their Asian tour indicates the CPSU Presidium reached at this juncture a decision on the subsequent overt attack on Stalin.

2. The pattern of positive references to Stalin prior to 23 January 1956 is evident in the following quotations, which include those from speeches by leading Soviet Communists in November, December and January:

- a. Kaganovich, who addressed the Moscow Party's city organization at the 6 November celebration of the 38th anniversary of the October Revolution, and who spoke before an immense dual portrait of Lenin and Stalin, made four references to Stalin in his speech:

"...the teachers of the working class, Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin..."

"After his death, the Communist Party which had been built by Lenin continued, under the leadership of his faithful co-worker the great Stalin, to bring the Lenin plan into actuality."

"...the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin..."

"We shall continue to walk the path to complete victory under the banner of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

- b. Pospelov, who wrote a review of "The Decembrist Armed Insurrection of 1905" for the 21 December edition of Pravda, listed Stalin as one of "the powerful figures in the Party who took part in the organization and direction of the armed struggle" in 1905.

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c. Voroshilov, who spoke in Berlin on 8 January on the occasion of Wilhelm Pieck's 80th birthday, observed that the East Germans were "transforming into life the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

d. Furtseva, in a speech to the Twelfth Party Congress of the City of Moscow, as reported in the 18 January issue of Izvestia, mentioned Stalin once as follows:

"Strengthened by the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin, the Moscow City Party organization comes to the 20th Congress as a combat unit, tightly formed around the Central Committee, CPSU."

e. Kirichenko, in his 19 January address to the Ukrainian Party Congress, made two references to Stalin (one of which was carried in Pravda on 23 January):

"Communists of the Ukraine will continue to march towards the victory of the great cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

"Our Party has also paid great attention to the ever-victorious ideals of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin."

f. Pravda on 21 December commemorated the 76th anniversary of Stalin's birth with his large portrait on the front page, by devoting an article to him entitled "Life-Giving Power of the Ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin", by mentioning him in the lead editorial and in an article on the Decembrist Armed Insurrection of 1905. Although Stalin is pictured here largely as the "continuer of Lenin's cause", it is as Lenin's "true" student, who gave a "masterful" elucidation of Leninism, who made "bold deductions" and gave "all his energy" to the creative development of Marxist-Leninist theory. Also, in his own right, "Stalin, at the head of the Communist Party, directed the forces of the Soviet people in smashing the enemy during the Great Patriotic War, and led our people to a world-historic victory."

Note: This last reference strongly contrasts with the version during and after the Congress, where Stalin is accused of not having prepared adequately for the war. The strongest statement to date on the subject appeared in a 3 April 1956 Red Star



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article by Col. E. Chasnikov: "The cult of personality restricted individual branches of science leading to stagnation of theoretical thought and sometimes to crude perversions. This relates to military science, to problems of theory and history of military affairs as well."

- g. Kommunist, on 22 December, also devotes an article to Stalin on the 76th anniversary of his birth. The tone is set by the title: "Following the Path of the Great Lenin". Representative passages include:

"A notable role in building and strengthening the CPSU belongs to I. V. Stalin, true pupil and co-worker of V. I. Lenin, continuer of his deathless cause."

"Stalin believed unreservedly in the ideas of Lenin, fought tirelessly for their purity and linked them closely to the practical tasks of socialist construction."

"I. V. Stalin accomplished great work in the elucidation of Lenin's ideas."

"Developing the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the nationality question, Stalin revealed its nature under conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Stalin, in his own right, is credited in this article with having "revealed the nature of the socialist method of industrialization", having "developed the system of agricultural artels", having "unmasked numerous enemy attempts to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat, and with having clarified and analyzed many important questions in his works. Concerning his wartime role the article merely states that: "Stalin, at the behest of the Party, was named chairman of the USSR State Defense Committee and supreme commander of the Soviet Armed Forces."

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- h. A sampling of quotations from Pravda during this period include:

"I. V. Stalin followed the legacy of the great Lenin and was the continuer of his cause." (2 Oct)

"The basis for ideological unity in the countries of the socialist camp is grounded in the great teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." (2 Nov)

"We (Indonesians) bow our heads before the great Lenin and Stalin." (7 Nov)

"The world has never seen another theory which was able to exert such a powerful influence on the entire course of historical development, as the great teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin." (28 Nov)

"Stalin fervently dreamed of a meeting with Lenin since the early days of his revolutionary activity. When they first met Lenin greeted Stalin as an old acquaintance...." (26 Dec)

"The Communist Party and its Central Committee at the head of which was I. V. Stalin, continuer of the great work of Lenin, developed an excellent cadre of organizers from the ranks of the working class." (21 Jan)

3. That Stalin was virtually ignored after the Pravda, 23 January, quote from Kirichenko's address is borne out by the mere six references to his name in Pravda up to the advent of the 20th Congress. Of these six references, five were statements or actions of foreign Communists and the sixth was a notice that the 4th edition of Lenin's works contained a list of Marx-Engels-Stalin writings known to Lenin. The issue of Kommunist which went to press during this period makes not a single reference to Stalin.

4. The last mention of Stalin in lead editorials of the Cominform Journal was a reference to "the teaching of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" in the 27 January issue. Three references to Stalin appear elsewhere

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in the body of the journal up to the opening of the 20th Congress. These consist of allusions to "Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin" in statements by Togliatti and Duclos, along with a Chinese announcement on projected publications which include thirteen volumes of Stalin's works.

Issues of Izvestia between Stalin's birthday anniversary (21 December) and the opening of the 20th CPSU Congress (14 February) were checked, excepting for one copy which could not be located. It was discovered that Izvestia references to Stalin during this period paralleled those in Pravda both in quantity and treatment. The only reference to Stalin occurring after 23 January which did not likewise appear in Pravda was the statement: "The Kirgiz people read in their own language the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well as outstanding Russian and world literature."

5. Conclusions: The preceding findings do not confirm the allegation made by B. L. Nicolaevsky in his article on "A Major Triumph of Zhukov", New Leader, 2 April. Favorable references to Stalin located during the period covered do not indicate a sudden upsurge of pro-Stalinist exhortations, but show that the old (1953) Party line was still in automatic effect. This line permitted favorable references to Stalin in the context of "collective leadership" but did not authorize any criticism. However, the fact that Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Pospelov and Furtseva adhered to the old line in November, December and January suggests that the Presidium had at that time not made the decision to attack Stalin publicly. The fact that Pravda in December still gave credit to Stalin's wartime accomplishments adds further weight to the assumption. Izvestia of 21 December (Stalin's birthday) also continued to use the flowery cliché's of the old line ("...Stalin... dear to millions of workers in all corners of the world... His uniting struggle for freedom... Champion of peace... champion of the people's safety...") The three week hiatus prior to the Congress (particularly the absence of favorable references in Kommunist which appeared regularly in the past) indicates that the decision to publicize the attacks on Stalin was made in mid-January. Extensive further analysis of the pattern of positive references to Stalin prior to the Congress might indicate whether or not there was a pattern suggestive of disagreement between the Soviet leaders on the Stalin issue. The evidence examined so far is not conclusive on this point.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION FROM  
FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS

REPORT NO.

CD NO.

COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA

DATE OF Mar. 9-15, 1953  
INFORMATION

SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES

DATE DIST. 8 April 1953

HOW PUBLISHED

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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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SOURCE Monitored Broadcasts

CPW Report No. 65 -- COMMUNIST CHINA

(Mar. 9 - 15, 1953)

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ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	FBI											

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1. (1b) **STALIN MEMORIALS:** Peking reported (Mar. 9) that 600,000 people gathered for Stalin memorial services, which included a eulogy by Panyushkin. Theaters and mobile projection teams were to show Stalin films throughout China Mar. 10-16, and the People's Publishing House is to turn out large numbers of Stalin publications.

Peking in numeral code (Mar. 9) listed 40 Chinese organizations which sent condolence messages to USSR groups. Shanghai residents attending Stalin services totaled 800,000. Peking stated (Mar. 10) that all large cities conducted memorials, including Lhasa; both the Dalai and Panchen Lama sent condolences. Two thousand smaller communities and many special groups also held services.

Peking announced (Mar. 11) that people jammed local bookstores, while in Shanghai the Stalin biography was sold out. Peking (Mar. 13) reported East China military personnel studying Mao's and Malenkov's eulogies. Nanking reported (Mar. 10) that 231,500 cadres attended memorial services in 11 cities, with Soviet diplomats and experts present; 40 million people listened to commemorative broadcasts. Wuhan announced (Mar. 11) that a half million workers held memorial services at the Huai River project, while Mao's native Hunan village sent condolences to Stalin's native village.

On Mar. 9 Nanking, Chungking, Shanghai, and Sian dropped programs to relay Peking memorial broadcasts. Mukden reported (Mar. 11) that Soviet consular staff members and Russian experts held services. Tsinan stated (Mar. 11) that 3,000 people saw a local photo exhibit honoring Stalin. Hofei said (Mar. 11) that Anhwei Medical College students and teachers pledged at memorial services to work hard "in Stalin's memory." Sian asserted (Mar. 12) that members of Shensi's Geological Exploration Team No. 1,004 agreed to increase exploratory work "to demonstrate their love for Stalin."

Chungking said (Mar. 14) that local people were flocking to Stalin movies, and to libraries and bookstores to read about Stalin. Kunming stated (Mar. 13) that Yunnan Military District soldiers were studying Stalin's works, and "pledging greater vigilance in border areas."

2. (1b) **SINO-SOVIET SOLIDARITY:** Peking in numeral code (Mar. 9) quoted Lai Jo-yu as saying that the working class, which "ardently loved Comrade Stalin" and was building its future on the USSR pattern, would increase study of progressive Soviet experience "for the everlasting glory of Stalin." Sino-Soviet Friendship Association leader Wu Yu-chang declared that SSFA members must "guard the friendship of the Soviet and Chinese people like their own eyes."

Peking in numeral code (Mar. 10) said that women's leader Hsu Kuang-ping credited Stalin with correct solutions to questions of woman's status, and asserted: "We must learn more diligently the progressive experiences of Soviet women and strengthen the unity between women in China and the USSR." Youth leader Hu Yao-pang, describing the "Stalin era," declared: "Chinese youth are proud to be born in this blessed era," and had pledged to emulate the Lenin Komsomol.

Wuhan (Mar. 9) reported that various local groups holding memorial services urged closer Sino-Soviet relations, emulation of the Russians, and study of Soviet documents. Lin Piao and other military leaders pledged "solidarity with the USSR" and emulation of the Soviet military.

3. (1c) **DEBT TO STALIN:** Peking in numeral code (Mar. 9) transmitted eulogies by leading Chinese. Chang Lan cited Stalin's "continued interest in China" and "aid to China's growth." Huang Yen-peï praised Stalin for his "aid to China's liberation," and warned: "Warmongers are rejoicing over this calamity; however, people educated by Stalin must dry their tears, pull together, and perfect preparations to defeat the warmongers' intrigues."

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Li Chi-shen credited Stalin with "supporting China's liberation" and following in the footsteps of Lenin, who gave "guidance and assistance" to Sun Yat-sen. Chen Shu-tung said: "The victory of the Chinese people during the last 30 years must be credited to Chairman Stalin's solicitude, guidance, and assistance." Peking in numeral code (Mar. 12) quoted Li Chi-shen, who emphasized Sun's principles of "nationalism, internationalism, and Sino-Soviet friendship," Stalin's condolences in 1925 at the death of Sun, and Stalin's "enthusiastic support" of the Chinese Revolution.

Antung (Mar. 9) said that the local SSFA, Resist America-Aid Korea movement, and other organizations praised Stalin's aid to China, and pledged greater resistance to imperialist aggression. Wuhan (Mar. 9) quoted Chiao Tso Colliery, Honan, miners as praising Stalin's aid in industrializing China.

Kunming (Mar. 12) reported that model workers wrote letters thanking the USSR for sending experts to promote China's construction; a woman locomotive engineer thanked Stalin for liberation of the Northeast from Japan; and a jute farmer expressed thanks to Stalin for sending experts to teach better farming methods. Chungking said (Mar. 13) that Chengtu-Chungking Railway workers heard Soviet experts talk, then expressed thanks to Stalin for sending experts to build the railway.

4. (1c) SOVIET LEADERSHIP: Peking announced (Mar. 11) that the Communist Party had ordered cadres to drop study of all documents except those in memory of Stalin, in order to "realize the immeasurable contributions made by Comrade Stalin to World Communism."

Peking reported (Mar. 12) that leading Soviet scientists at a Moscow meeting had promised to "teach the Chinese." Young China would "demonstrate appreciation for Stalin" by learning from the USSR. Mukden said (Mar. 12) that Soviet experts played an important part in remodeling Ankang furnace no. 8, and that a Soviet expert saved 20 billion yuan by altering construction plans for the Kuanting reservoir on the Yungting River.

Peking in numeral code (Mar. 13) reported a Harbin meeting at which a Soviet adviser explained USSR technical high schools. Chinese school methods were criticized severely, and it was decided to "emulate the specialized classes" of USSR technical high schools. Peking announced in numeral code (Mar. 13) that the Ministry of Fuel had organized 200 cadres, engineers, and Soviet specialists into 12 teams to inspect collieries, petroleum plants, and power units.

Peking announced in numeral code (Mar. 14) that China's first shale oil distillation plant was being built at Fushun with the help of Soviet experts. Peking added (Mar. 15) that Soviet experts had renovated a second blast furnace at the Chichingshan steel mills.

Peking in numeral code (Mar. 15) quoted the JEN MIN JIH PAO in urging the people to "transform sorrow for Stalin" into a stronger RAAK drive, along the "path pointed out by Stalin" for the defense of world peace. Shanghai stated (Mar. 10) that local artillery school students promised emulation of Soviet methods in building a modern Chinese Army. Shanghai added (Mar. 14) that the local broadcasting station now was enrolling students for its Russian language course.

5. (2a) WAR BURDENS: Peking announced in numeral code (Mar. 12) that 180 railway technicians and workers had left for Korea, and added (Mar. 15) that 89 had left Chengchow. Chungking reported (Mar. 10) that a RAAK celebration had been held for 10 health workers departing for Korea, and added (Mar. 14) that the chief pharmacist of the Kweiyang Medical School was one of 10 medical workers going to Korea.

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6. (3a) BUREAUCRATIC WEAKNESSES: Antung reported (Mar. 11) that a TA KUNG PAO issue carried letters from the Liaotung Normal School attacking Department of Education and Culture cadres for mistakes in constructing school buildings, which were threatening to collapse.

Chungking announced (Mar. 12) that Southwest factory and mine cadres had been charged with failure, as only 17 out of 43 enterprises completed assignments in January and 14 out of 39 in February.

7. (3a) BASIC CONSTRUCTION: Peking in numeral code (Mar. 11) quoted a JEN MIN JIH PAO editorial in demanding improvement of the People's Supervisory Office to "wipe away obstacles in the pathway of national construction." Peking added (Mar. 13) that an inspection of the North China Designing Company showed "aimless construction, a mercenary attitude, and lack of knowledge of economic estimates." Mukden stated (Mar. 12) that the TUNGPEI JIH PAO had criticized basic construction cadres in Sungchiang for "talking about the importance of basic construction but doing nothing about it."

8. (3a) AGRICULTURAL REMOLDING: Peking in numeral code (Mar. 14) charged Hailung Hsien, Heliungchiang, Party cadres with failure to return equipment taken from farmers for mutual aid teams, and with promoting the indebtedness of farmers. Peking added (Mar. 15) that in Hopei some mutual aid teams existed in name only. Nanking reported (Mar. 10) that rural cadres were ordered to change their attitude and cooperate with farmers instead of merely issuing orders. Nanking said (Mar. 13) that a farm model who visited the USSR had told Kiangsu farmers of Stalin's leadership in collective farming and urged collectivization in China.

9. (4) AMERICAN DUPLICITY: Peking asserted in numeral code (Mar. 13) that exchanges between Juin and Reynaud and Clark revealed American plans to internationalize the Vietnam conflict, lower French prestige, and force France out of Indochina, a trap into which the French apparently were falling. Peking in numeral code (Mar. 10) quoted letters from Japan disclosing that Japanese youths were used as cannon fodder in Korea, while Yoshida collaborated with the Americans to ruin trade with China.

10 (4) BORDER MINORITIES: Chungking announced (Mar. 11) that comfort teams left in February for border areas, carrying a recorded talk by Ho Lung and letters urging preparations to "smash any adventurous attacks by the imperialists." Kunming said (Mar. 11) that a comfort delegation left for the border on Mar. 4.

Chungking declared (Mar. 11) that Sikang People's Liberation Army units pledged production increases in honor of Stalin's memory. Peking stated in numeral code (Mar. 12) that Sikang cadres had been ordered to be alert "in order to overcome feudalistic nationalism among minorities."

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

REPORT

CD NO.

50X1-HUM

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COUNTRY

USSR

DATE OF

INFORMATION

Mar 1953

SUBJECT

Political - Foreign policy, Communist Party,  
personalities

DATE DIST.


6 Apr 1953

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
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MALENKOV AND STALIN'S DEATH



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It is possible that the advent to power in the United States of the Republican Party and the Eisenhower Administration, and the active efforts, connected with this, to organize the armed forces of the US and the democratic countries have made the younger Kremlin rulers (Malenkov, Beriya, Bulganin, et al.) decide to attack the West before it has time to prepare itself for defense. Malenkov and Beriya know that the USSR, with China and the Satellites, has at present a military superiority over the US and the West which in armed conflict might give the Kremlin a decisive victory (enable it to seize Europe and Asia).

Stalin, cautious by nature, could scarcely agree with this point of view; he avoided the risk of a major war, for, as a true Marxist-Leninist, he was convinced that the existing world situation would sooner or later lead to an economic crisis in the capitalistic world, especially in the US, and finally to a triumph of Communism throughout the world. Stalin believed in the inevitability of the crisis and of the downfall of capitalism. He just developed Lenin's principles -- worked out methods to foster and intensify the crisis of capitalism without risking a major war with it. Stalin respected and feared US economic power.

Undoubtedly, Stalin knew of the inclination among the young members of the Politburo to take advantage of the present unprepared state of the West and to start a war before the organization of a European army and the restoration of the military power of West Germany and Japan. The young members of the Politburo do not have the same faith in the principles of Marxism-Leninism as did Stalin and the Lenin generation of Bolsheviks. Malenkov, Beriya, Bulganin, and the others believe that capitalism has within itself the power to change its forms

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and that the postwar period has shown that there is vitality in the West, that the expected economic crisis has not developed and will not develop. The young members of the Politburo have not made their careers in party ideological work and have not grown up amid the theoretical disputes of the Marxists or the disputes between Stalin and the opposition, composed of Bukharin, Trotsky, Zinov'yev, etc. They are calculating men, in a practical sense; men of action. They prefer direct action, and not Stalin's policy of slowly building up superiority, of gradual advance and seizure piece by piece of the capitalist world.

Feeling his age and the approach of death, Stalin decided to take precautionary measures against the hotheads in the Politburo. The 19th Party Congress was called in October, 1952; at this Stalin dissolved the Politburo consisting of 12 men and replaced it with the Presidium of 36 men. By this reorganization of the leadership at the 19th Party Congress Stalin decreased the importance of each member of the old Politburo and at the same time lessened the danger of an extreme concentration of power in Malenkov's hands. Moreover, Stalin introduced military figures into the Presidium. The presence of leading generals of the army in the party ruling circles would make Malenkov and Beriya be more cautious about risking a major war.

At the end of the Party Congress the ailing Stalin appeared before the delegates with a speech in which he said that conflict and war between the various capitalistic countries was inevitable /underscored as in original/, and that therefore the Soviet Union should follow a policy of biding its time, while intensifying the conflicts between these countries, exhausting them, and playing on the conflicts between them, i.e., should do as Stalin did with Germany and Japan and France, Britain and America in the last war.

Thus, the 19th Party Congress was used by Stalin against the possible strengthening of the individual power of Malenkov, and against the policy of the young members of the Politburo of beginning a war with the West, taking advantage of the latter's military unpreparedness.

But just as soon as Stalin died the world saw Malenkov do away with all the provisions of the 19th Party Congress, with all of Stalin's measures. The Presidium of the KPSU /KPSU?/, with its many members, was abolished, and the Politburo of ten men, obedient to Malenkov, was restored. The government was reorganized into a military cabinet, just as at the time of the last war. Marshal Zhukov, pushed aside and given lower positions by Stalin, was restored to a position of army leadership. Marshal Skolovsky was recently named chief of staff; even when he was in Germany he did not conceal his opinion that the West was militarily weaker than the USSR.

Thus the death of Stalin was of advantage to Malenkov. It was necessary to enable him to seize power and to carry out his policy of striking the West now, when it is just beginning to arm itself.

Malenkov was a pupil of Stalin in the period when the latter was seizing power, sweeping from his path all those who stood in his way: Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinov'yev, Rykov, Kamenev, Tukhachevskiy, and others. Malenkov was chief of Stalin's secretariat in that period and engaged in preparing the elimination of the opposition. Hence he has rich experience in this respect.

Trotsky wrote that Stalin, if he did not actually poison Lenin, at least helped to bring on his death, for the ailing Lenin began to fear Stalin, "the lover of highly spiced dishes," and before his death Lenin was taking steps to remove Stalin from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the party. History may have repeated itself: Stalin, fearing Malenkov, had taken steps to curb him, and the latter hastened Stalin's death, since he did not want to lose /the opportunity of/ this year, when the US and the West were still

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unprepared. The arrest of the Kremlin doctors now appears in a new light: they had been treating Stalin for a long time; their arrest by Malenkov frightened Stalin, and the new doctors, on the orders of Malenkov and Beriya, hastened Stalin's death. This, of course, is only a guess.

[The rest of] what has been set forth above is also a guess. Our propaganda must develop it and use it extensively for broadcasts to the other side of the Iron Curtain (by the radio of the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, Radio Free Europe, and other channels). Such propaganda should present Malenkov and Beriya as murderers, as politicians staking the lives and interests of their peoples on the card of war.

Our propaganda must use Stalin's death against Malenkov -- by means of the dead dictator it must strike at the living one. It is certain that the army and the people will believe such an explanation of the death of Stalin, all the more since Malenkov is known as the author and executor of the frightful Yezhov purge, and Beriya as the head of the hated NKVD-MGB-MVD. Also, everyone knows that as late as February Stalin received two Indian personalities and the latter said that he was in good health and spirits; this must be emphasized.

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3-9563

24 April 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR/CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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SUBJECT: Meeting of [redacted] Consultants

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1. Confirming our conversation of this noon, the next meeting of the [redacted] Consultants will be on Wednesday and Thursday, May 6 and 7. Most of our group

[redacted]

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2. On Wednesday we shall discuss the current Soviet "peace" tactics and probable reactions in the non-Communist world to these tactics. As background, the Consultants will have read the minutes of the last meeting, of which a copy is attached, [redacted]

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3. I hope very much that you can attend. We can make arrangements for transportation and for a room at the Inn.

[redacted]

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*Note for Record:*

*Gen Cabell did attend the meeting (the first days session, 6 May).*

*Km*

MORI/CDF Pages 2-11

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Security Information

*Consultants.*

5640  
MAR 26 1953

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
**OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

26 March 1953

STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. 336

25X1

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 18 AND 19 MARCH 1953 OF SE-39, "PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR" (10 March 1953)

CHAIRMAN OF CONSULTANTS' MEETING

25X1

[REDACTED]

Consultants to Board of National Estimates

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[REDACTED]

Board of National Estimates

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[REDACTED]

Staff Members of Office of National Estimates

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] CONSULTANTS' DISCUSSION ON 18-19 MARCH OF SE-39  
"PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEATH OF STALIN AND OF  
THE ELEVATION OF MALENKOV TO LEADERSHIP IN THE USSR"  
(10 March 1953)

I. SUMMARY

1. The discussion focussed on the question of transfer of power in the USSR and, specifically, on whether and with what degree of risk the enormous power concentrated in Stalin personally could be transferred to a successor or successors. The majority of the consultants leaned to the view that, in the process of solving the transfer of power problem, the Soviet system would probably be weakened. In this respect, the majority departed from the view which has generally obtained in O/NIE, that the transfer of power would probably be accomplished without weakening the continuity and effectiveness of the Soviet state.

2. Broadly speaking, two points of view emerged from the discussion:

- a. The majority, with the degree of confidence varying with individuals, argued largely on the basis of historical analogy that the transfer of power might shake the Soviet system. They viewed the structure of power in the USSR as intensely personal. They said that Malenkov lacks the majesty of Stalin and is surrounded by ambitious and fearful men who, if they could, would challenge what appears to be his pre-eminent position. These consultants also believed that a man such as Malenkov, reared in the shadow of Stalin, may have qualities and deficiencies which would make it difficult for him to succeed to Stalin's power. These consultants conceded, however, that despite the dangers which they saw menacing the Soviet system, the transfer of power may nevertheless be effected without damage to the system.
- b. The contrary view was based upon an analysis of Soviet society itself, and concluded that there was little or no prospect that the transfer of power would shake or

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disrupt the Soviet system. These consultants said that historical precedents were not relevant because there was no historical example of a system of controls such as Soviet power had developed. These controls, they said, penetrated all the institutions of power in the society so that even if a personal struggle occurred on the top level it would be transient and would not affect the stability of the whole system.

## II. THE PRINCIPAL ARGUMENTS

### A. The Majority Position

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3. [ ] began by stating flatly that any concept of solidarity or cooperative committee relationships among the men in the top ruling group was "utter nonsense." The relationships among these men had been marked throughout the Stalin era by extreme tension, the most delicate intrigue, and savagery. There were enormous possibility of violence implicit in this situation.

4. Moreover, there had been signs in recent months of a peak of tension which pointed to a power for struggle. It was possible that Malenkov was not Stalin's choice in the final weeks of his life; it was also possible that Stalin has been dead for some time and that a struggle has been going on in consequence of his death. The abolition of the Politburo at the 19th Congress was "an act of epoch-making significance," for which Stalin did not take personal responsibility. Molotov's attitude toward Malenkov in the funeral speeches was not the same as Beria's, which may mean that Molotov is at odds with the other two and that they cannot eliminate him now because he has support in the Party. The sudden prominence given the army, both before and after Stalin's death, suggests that Malenkov may be intriguing with the army for its support. The re-emergence of Zhukov fits this, for his earlier banishment was a personal act of Stalin. [ ] concluded that "whatever the apparatus of power is at this time, it is not unified."

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5. [ ] asked whether the doctors' plot, with its indirect attacks on Beria, had issued from a Stalin-Molotov combination against Malenkov and Beria. He speculated further that there might have been

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a policy difference between the two factions, Stalin-Molotov representing a "cautious" element and Malenkov-Beria a "forward" element.

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6. [ ] reply was that the alignment of personalities suggested was quite possible, although the policy issue which might lie behind it was obscure. He felt that a divergence of views had developed within the Soviet hierarchy early in 1952 over the response which the USSR should make to developments in the West, particularly US rearmament and the possibility of West German rearmament. One school believed that these developments were of such a magnitude that the USSR must decide at once either to fight or to negotiate, and that the latter course was preferable. The other school felt that developments in the West did not involve such a threat and that the USSR could afford to sit tight. [ ] saw two indications to support his belief that there had been a struggle along these lines. One was the distinct impression he had in Moscow last summer that a studied effort was being made in certain quarters to keep him away from Stalin and Molotov, which he supposed was related to the issue of whether the USSR should negotiate with the US. The other evidence was that he detected a pattern of wavering in Soviet policy on Germany. He thought that the March note reflected a temporary victory of the "negotiation" camp, whereas the later notes withdrew the bid which was implicit in the March note. The Stalin article appeared to settle the issue, at least temporarily, for it stated that developments in the West did not constitute a threat, that war was not inevitable, and therefore, by implication, that negotiations were not necessary. It placed Soviet policy in the posture: "No concessions and no negotiations."

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7. [ ] then summarized [ ] position as follows: (a) there was evidence of a struggle for some time among the possible heirs of Stalin, and there was also evidence that this struggle had not been resolved at Stalin's death; (b) there was involved in the struggle a difference of views on policy toward the West; (c) the present structure of power represented a compromise which, given the nature of the relations among Communist leaders, is most unlikely to be maintained.

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8. [ ] accepted this summary and then added a further observation. He said that much would depend on whether the West confronted the Soviet leaders with the necessity of making major policy decisions.

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If they were so confronted, a great strain would be placed on their present relationships. Differences among the top leaders would then be reflected in the Satellite and other Communist parties, the leaders of which would not respond to Malenkov's authority as they had to Stalin's, so that a tremendous strain would be placed on the unity of the entire Communist movement.

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9. [ ] asked whether a Western initiative would not unite the leadership, since historically that had been the effect of a foreign threat upon a divided leadership. [ ] replied that a Western (US) move should not involve any threat. He said that Germany was a potentially divisive issue among the Soviet leaders, and he believed that a new Western proposal on Germany would split them wide open.

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B. The Minority Position

10. In support of the view that the transfer of power was not likely to shake the Soviet system, [ ] offered a different version of what had been taking place in the USSR as well as a different picture of the nature of the Soviet power system. He believed that Stalin had given much thought to the succession problem and that he had placed Malenkov in a position to assume power with a minimum risk. The last real struggle for the succession had taken place between Malenkov and Zhdanov, and Malenkov had won. He had been intimately involved with the work of the Secretariat for at least 14 years. This was a key position, for it meant control of personnel from colonel up in the army, from the raion up in the Party, and from the managers of enterprises up in the bureaucracy. All personnel arrangements had been confirmed by the recent Congress.

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11. [ ] agreed with [ ] that the doctors' plot had been a blow at Beria, but the announcement of it meant that the struggle was already resolved, not that one was in progress. The replacement of Abakumov by Ignatiev, a key personnel shift in Beria's sector of responsibility, showed that Beria's sector had been reprimanded, but not Beria personally. The aspersions cast on the security organs in the announcement of the doctors' plot was a way of conveying to the

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Party that Beria had subordinated himself in the power struggle. [ ] said he thought it possible that the Malenkov-Beria relationship had been worked out last spring, and that the mention of prominent generals as targets of the doctors' plot was an attempt to convey that the leading figures in the armed forces were supporting Malenkov. [ ] did not regard the abolition of the Politburo and its replacement by an enlarged Presidium at the 19th Congress as significant. The Presidium contained the three elements which had always formed the top echelon of power: the leading personalities in the Politburo, the second string younger men in positions of great administrative responsibility, and the regional satraps. The important thing was that Stalin had wanted one dominant successor, and he had worked out the personal relationships so as to place Malenkov's hands on the levers of power.

12. This version drew a number of questions from those consultants who inclined toward the view outlined by [ ] In replying to these questions, [ ] further clarified his position:

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a. When asked to explain the perfunctory tributes paid to Stalin at his funeral and the apparently rapid deflation of the Stalin myth, [ ] replied that Malenkov was probably responding to a feeling in the party that the deification of Stalin had been overdone. [ ] noted in this connection that in the last year or so there had been "strange hiatuses" in the press treatment of Stalin. He speculated that Stalin might have become "fed up with" the Malenkov-Beria combination and had been engaged in a struggle to destroy them. He thought it significant that Beria popped up into prominence as soon as Stalin died.)

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b. When asked to explain whether Stalin's Bolshevik article had not undermined Malenkov's position, [ ] replied that he believed that the Bolshevik article

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represented Malenkov's line toward Europe, i.e., the West was no threat and the USSR had room for maneuver (Malenkov's speech to the Congress).  
25X1 [redacted] explained why the Bolshevik article had been published by speculating that Stalin had planned to give the article at the Congress as a speech, but that because of failing health he had been unable to deliver such a major address. His brief appearance was intended to sanctify the proceedings and to place a seal of approval upon Malenkov's report. (Here [redacted] and others introduced the hypothesis that Stalin may already have been dead at the time of Congress and had been represented by a double.)  
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13. [redacted] said he thought there were two principal flaws in interpretation. It made it difficult to explain, first the rebuke to Beria before Stalin's death and then his sudden build-up after Stalin's death, and second, the abolition of the Politburo and the erection of the Presidium at the Congress, followed by what amounted to the restoration of the former after Stalin's death.  
25X1 [redacted] added that he was sure there was no real power in the Presidium because it was too big. He pointed to the theses introduced by Krushchev at the Congress, which specified that the Secretariat, not the Presidium, would have control over personnel. This meant that the Presidium was a purely formal body and that Molotov prior to Stalin's death had not been in a position to exercise any influence over personnel.  
25X1

14. [redacted] asked whether it was possible to believe that a man who had struggled bitterly for power, as Stalin had done, would arrange a succession. The picture of an orderly transfer of power, simply out of a spirit of service to the cause, did not fit the history of revolutions. [redacted] replied that the factor of Stalin's failing health due to heart trouble over a long period should be taken into account, for Stalin had probably long realized that he might have to relinquish power at any time.  
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15. [ ] said that basically he agreed with [ ] thesis, but that he did not think that the [ ] interpretations were incompatible. He thought that Malenkov was undoubtedly Stalin's choice, but he considered it most unlikely that Stalin would have actually transferred power as an irrevocable trust. The doctors' plot and the reversal of Congress decisions after Stalin's death indicated that the succession had not been decided and that Malenkov had to and actually did seize power. Although Malenkov held power now, there was a possibility that others who felt threatened might combine against him. Personal power was vastly more important to these men than policy differences. Malenkov undoubtedly felt the need to associate other top figures with himself temporarily, but in time he would wish to rid himself of them. If Beria or Molotov showed the slightest sign of disloyalty, blood would flow. There was therefore a potentially explosive situation, although none of the others would make the slightest challenge to Malenkov unless they could do so in combination. [ ] interjected Lenin's remark that Russian history alternated between "wild violence and the most delicate deceipts." [ ] personal guess was that Malenkov's chances of consolidating his power were good, for Malenkov was in a better position than Stalin after Lenin's death due to the control system which had been developed.

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16. [ ] questioned whether a comparison with 1924 was valid, in view of the increased size of the Soviet empire, the complexity of the system and the pressures engendered by the effort to operate a planned economy under forced draft. Was it not possible that, in any such closely articulated structure, hesitations might be fatal, and therefore was it not true that personality was still decisive? [ ] replied that there had been a great administrative development since 1924 which made the system largely self-sustaining. It had weathered the shock of the great purges without a sign of breakdown. The control of key men from the Secretariat reduced the need for personal interventions.

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17. [ ] said he believed that modern totalitarianism inevitably degenerated into personal dictatorship. Stalin had become more and more like Hitler. For the general population a myth could be built around Malenkov, and he could be fitted into Stalin's role with relative ease. For the people at medium levels in the apparatus of power, it was a real question; they had probably been left in a trauma by Stalin's

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25X1 death and only gradually would they ask themselves whether his towering personality could be replaced. But at the very top level there was surely a terrific tension. We could not possibly predict whether they would resolve it in violence or by polite maneuver. The injection of complicated problems of empire -- relations with Mao and the Satellites -- made the new relationship far more difficult.

25X1 18. [ ] replied that the key question was whether any struggle at the top level could result in an institutional clash; that is, whether any top leader in resorting to violence could call upon the army or the secret police as a unit. He did not believe this was possible because of the interpenetrating nature of the controls in all the instruments of power. Malenkov had long operated this system based on the card indexes of the Secretariat. [ ] believed that he still controlled it and that therefore no institutional clash was likely.

25X1 19. [ ] said he thought the personal element in this control system ought not to be overlooked for it demanded continual juggling. He was convinced that Stalin maintained his power by an intentional preservation of instability and tension. In the last years of his life, he lacked the vigor to give the continuous attention which was required, and coagulation had developed in organizations of the state and the Party. If Malenkov had to compromise with institutional solidarities, he was lost.

25X1 20. [ ] said that even if it were conceded that Malenkov had succeeded to Stalin's power, the real question was whether he could operate the system with the same skill as had Stalin himself. On the question of Malenkov's capacities, there did not seem to be enough evidence to form a judgment.

### III. OTHER ISSUES

21. The consultants suggested modifications of SE-39 in several other respects:

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a. [ ] said he disliked the flat statement in paragraph 3 that the peoples of the USSR were "unlikely to participate actively" if a struggle for power should break out. He suggested that it be modified at least to read that "the peoples of the USSR are unlikely to initiate or to participate actively in the early stages of the struggle."

b. On the whole, there was an inclination among the consultants to believe, at least more than SE-39 conveyed, that Stalin's death might result in the weakening of Soviet controls in the Satellites and over Communist parties outside the Bloc. However, [ ] 25X1  
[ ] opposed the majority on this. There was a similar division of opinion on the question of whether Tito had prospects for increased influence in the Satellites and other Communist parties. [ ] 25X1  
in particular held that Tito's influence would increase.

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c. While there was no serious objection by any of the consultants to SE-39's statement on the probable effects of Stalin's death on Sino-Soviet relations, 25X1  
[ ] thought it important to stress other factors than appeared in the paper. He argued that if no great change in Sino-Soviet relations were to be expected, it was primarily because (a) the two states would be held together by their common interest in the Korean war, and (b) China would long be dependent on the USSR for industrial aid and the Russians would wish to exploit this dependence to maintain effective influence. While not disputing the general position nor the argument under (a), [ ] 25X1  
said he thought that Russia could not give much industrial aid to China and that in addition Russian penetration and influence in China were far less than was generally believed.

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MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES  
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION  
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

July 1956

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES  
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION  
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

General Discussion

The Central Committee Resolution dated 30 June and released on 2 July purports to be a Marxist explanation of how a Stalin could emerge from the Soviet system and why the current leaders did not remove him. In fact, the Resolution appears designed to keep critical discussion regarding Stalin under strict control both at home and abroad and to prevent such discussion from becoming an inquiry into characteristics of the Soviet system and the past actions of Soviet rulers.

Because of Moscow's sensitivity on these points, it produced a document which is distinguished for its defensive tone, lack of frankness, distortions, and contradictions. It is clear that the release on 4 June of Khrushchev's secret speech has set in motion a chain reaction of questioning and uncertainty in Western Communist Parties to which the 30 June Resolution is a response. In spite of the attempt to attribute the confusion in Communist ranks to "imperialist machinations," it is clear that doubt has been cast upon two basic elements of the relations between foreign Communist Parties and Moscow:

a. Kremlin Infallibility

The former god is cut down to size and is replaced by men of human stature. The foreign Communists have derived much strength from the infallibility myth. The way is now open for continual doubt.

b. Kremlin Credibility

Along with the end of the myth of infallibility, the Stalin denigration means that no Communist can ever again be sure that what he is told is the truth. The emphasis in the Resolution on how the "imperialists" seek to exploit the current situation cannot obscure the fact that the things the "imperialists" have been saying for years about the Soviet Union have turned out to be true. The words of those deemed to be enemies of the Soviet Union can never be rejected out of hand as before.



The basically unchanged and unchangeable nature of the dictatorial system which produced Stalin and developed under his evil genius has been once more underlined by Khrushchev at the reception for the East German leaders 16 July. Speaking "sharply," as he said, Khrushchev launched into an unexpected, bitter attack upon the West and its institutions. Western democracy, he charged, is a sham. The "monopolies" control the only effective press, and use this to "exploit the people." "They shear them like sheep." The "imperialists" who "like to speak of their election laws," have shown their disregard for free elections in the cases of Guatemala and Vietnam. The "free world" means "freedom for the capitalists to plunder the worker without interference from anyone." The discipline of the international Communist movement would guarantee its existence against the efforts of the enemy to "provoke" disunity in the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign.

Those non-Soviet Communists who may have thought that the ideals of Western democracy could somehow be made to fit into the Soviet Communist mold stand rudely corrected. The Stalinist formulas still stand.

By pledging to "help our brothers in class struggle" Khrushchev showed that Moscow would continue to dictate to the foreign CPs, and also that the line on Soviet "non-interference" in other countries is strictly sham.

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MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES  
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION  
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

Introduction \*

In order to facilitate and assist the prompt and effective exploitation of the 30 June Resolution of the CPSU and many other important statements, discussions and questions which have resulted from the de-Stalinization campaign launched by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Congress of the Party in February 1956, the attached material has been prepared.

It organizes an extensive selection of arguments, together with essential supporting evidence drawn almost entirely from Soviet sources, under a series of eight topics for ready reference.

The first seven of these topics represent in general the range of points on which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has demonstrated greatest sensitivity. The major Communist Parties of the Free World have also demonstrated their particular interest in, or concern over, each of these same points. The seven main topics are:

- I. The Soviet System as the Source of Stalinism
- II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the Soviet System
- III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify the Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy
- IV. The Question of Co-Responsibility for Stalin's Tyranny
- V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements
- VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism
- VII. Moscow Control of Foreign CPs Reasserted

\* Only this introduction is classified. The paper itself is unclassified.

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The eighth topic--"Omissions"--notes those points where Soviet Communist statements open up possibilities for discussion inasmuch as, for one reason or another, the Soviet leaders have not seen fit to deal with events of major interest to one or more nations throughout the world.

An Appendix is included, entitled "Criticisms and Questions Raised by Foreign Communists in the Course of the De-Stalinization Campaign." The Appendix is organized in sections generally corresponding to the sections in the body of the material, to permit easy correlation of Western Communist comments and questions with the relevant Soviet treatment of the same topic.

The material is only intended to serve on a selective basis as raw material upon which finished output can be based. Under each topic a general discussion sets forth the major issues involved and presents some background information. There then follows a listing of the relevant arguments, with supporting evidence. The use of either declarative, critical, or argumentative language and style in this text is not intended to imply that the treatment must take the same vein, nor is it intended to hamper or restrict the type of treatment to be used in output. It is designed to bring into the sharpest focus the substance of the argument, as an aid to those responsible for the final work.

It may be observed that several items of evidence are repeated in a number of different contexts. Since it is not considered likely that any substantial number of points will be incorporated into a single final product, this should not prove an obstacle to the use of the material.

While treatment obviously will be determined by each user on the basis of existing standards and instructions, it is suggested that in material directed primarily to Communist and pro-Communist audiences, the "raising of questions" is likely to be an effective approach. It is also suggested that at this juncture the treatment of the figure of Lenin in an aggressive and critical vein in material addressed to such audiences may prove counterproductive. Conversely, any use of the evidence in Section II, paragraph 8, and Section III, paragraphs 6 and 7, showing that Stalin and the present leaders have violated Lenin's dicta should avoid creating the impression that Lenin, who was a ruthless autocrat, was actually humane or democratic.

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES  
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION  
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

Topical Outline

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Appendix: Criticisms And Questions Raised By Foreign Communists During The Course Of The De-Stalinization Campaign

MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES  
REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION  
AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS

I. The Soviet System as the Source of Stalinism

In an effort to suppress further discussion of charges that the Soviet system itself naturally facilitates the rise of a Stalin and provides the means of and the justification for Stalinist crimes, the Soviet leadership has flatly stated that this is not the case. The denial is entirely dogmatic, unsupported by proof, belied by history and in particular, by the evidence contained in the secret Khrushchev speech, and does not begin to answer the questions raised outside the Soviet leadership. These questions have been raised, not only by non-Communists, but by some foreign Communist leaders and rank-and-file. The current leaders have given ample evidence that practices which facilitated the rise of Stalin in the first place still prevail in the system.

1. The Central Committee Resolution of 30 June is an autocratic statement designed to suppress discussion. This practice is identical with the practice employed by Stalin. The Resolution says only that it is "absolutely wrong" to "look for the source of this cult in the nature of the Soviet social order." The Resolution then attempts to evade the question of why it is "wrong" by entering into an irrelevant discussion of the nature of "Soviet democracy."

2. Lenin himself pointed out that the system, as early as December 1922, had enabled Stalin, in his role of Secretary General of the CP, to concentrate "enormous power in his hands." Lenin warned that such power could be misused. This power and the possibility of its misuse still exists. (The Lenin "Testament" was distributed to the delegates to the 20th CPSU Congress.) Khrushchev raised this problem in his secret speech, referring to the "great harm caused by ... the accumulation of immense and limitless power in the hands of one person ..."

3. In his secret speech, Khrushchev acknowledged that doctrine in the Soviet system was a powerful weapon in the hands of Stalin in raising himself to absolute power.

"Stalin originated the concept 'enemy of the people.' This term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological errors of a man or men engaged in a

controversy be proven; this term made possible the usage of the most cruel repression, violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone who in any way disagreed with Stalin."

"Stalin's report at the February-March Central Committee Plenum in 1937, 'Deficiencies of Party work and methods for the liquidation of the Trotskyites and other two-facers,' contained an attempt at theoretical justification of the mass terror policy under the pretext that as we march forward toward socialism class war must allegedly sharpen. Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this."

4. The present Soviet leaders continue to manipulate doctrine, just as Stalin did:

- a. In his secret speech, Khrushchev said that Stalin invented the thesis on the intensification of the class struggle as the building of "Socialism" progresses in order to give his repressive practices a "theoretical justification." The 30 June Resolution states that this formula is "only correct for certain stages of the transition," and that, being "given prominence" in 1937, it became "the basis for the grossest violations of Socialist law and mass repressions." By virtue of its power to make doctrine, the Soviet leadership has now found it expedient to denounce a Stalin doctrine as "erroneous" for a certain period, but to condone it for other times. Stalin's thesis, the Soviet leaders say, was quite valid in the forced industrialization and collectivization period (Stalin employed it correctly, in other words, against Bukharin and others in 1928 and later), but was wrong to advance it in 1937. A doctrine which was manipulated by Stalin for his own purposes, is again being manipulated in the interests of the de-Stalinization campaign of the present leaders.
- b. The CPSU manipulates Stalin's "capitalist encirclement" theory as it suits momentary purposes. At the 20th Congress, in order to further Soviet foreign policy aims, it was said that the theory was no longer valid. In the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and subsequent statements, the Soviet leaders seize once more upon

the essence of the "capitalist encirclement," in order to blame Poznan on the West and to reaffirm the principle of "vigilance" against "imperialist" machinations.

- c. At the 20th CPSU Congress a portion of Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR" was rejected out of hand as inconvenient to the current Soviet foreign policy.
- d. The 20th Congress also worked out the "different roads to Socialism" line to facilitate the united front drive. Subsequently, the CPSU has seen fit to put limits on this thesis to prevent the discussion of "independence" from getting out of hand.

5. The 30 June Resolution, in Stalinist fashion, falls back upon an authoritative interpretation of history to rationalize Stalin's rise to power, in order to evade the fact that Stalin arose from the system. In the process it falsifies history when the truth does not support the argument.

- a. "How could the personality cult of Stalin, with all its negative consequences, arise and acquire such currency under conditions of the Soviet socialist regime? When examining this question one must keep in mind both the objective and concrete conditions in which the building of socialism in the USSR took place and some subjective factors connected with the personal qualities of Stalin."
- b. The "objective factors" cited in this analysis were "the capitalist encirclement" and "the merciless struggle against the enemies of Leninism." The formula of "capitalist encirclement" involves falsification of history, even in authoritative Communist terms, at least during the critical period of 1925 to 1933, when it did not in fact exist. It is not a valid argument in any case, according to the Khrushchev speech, which points out Lenin's refusal to restrict democracy even in periods of major crisis.

"In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin found it necessary regularly to convoke congresses, party conferences, and plenary sessions ... where all the most important questions were discussed." (Khrushchev, secret speech)

The "merciless struggle" against the enemies of Leninism is used by the 30 June Resolution to justify restrictions of democracy and by inference the mass repressions of Stalin. In the secret speech it is used to justify only an ideological struggle, and its use by Stalin to justify mass repression is denounced:

"Worth noting is the fact that even in the progress of the furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, Bukharinites, Zinovievites and others--extreme repressive measures were not used against them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

6. The CPSU has recently reaffirmed that the principles of one-party rule and individual leadership, which made Stalin possible, continue to be fixed for the Soviet system.

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their leader and organizer throughout their entire struggle for Communism."

"Lenin wrote in the very first months of the organization of the Soviet state: 'It is necessary to learn to merge together the turbulent, mass-meeting-like democratism of the working masses... with iron leadership in work, with un-demurring submission to the will of the individual--the Soviet leader--in work.'" (Pravda editorial article, 6 July)

"Combating the cult of the individual one should remember that the petty bourgeois anarchist views denying the role of the leaders and organizers of the masses are alien to Marxism-Leninism. The rich experience of socialist construction teaches us that the principles of collective leadership, broad development of socialist democracy do not at all deny the role and responsibility of the individual leader for the matter entrusted to him.

"It is also well known that the Communist Party has always upheld the principle of one-man management at industrial enterprises and of one-man leadership in military matters."

7. While disposing of the particular cult of Stalin, the Soviet leadership has further revealed that it is wedded to the leader cult in practice. Throughout Khrushchev's secret speech, the 28 March Pravda editorial, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, and subsequent statements, Lenin is quoted as the ultimate authority for all questions. Khrushchev, in his secret speech, called for the establishment of "Lenin prizes" and construction of "a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich..." The cult of Lenin resumes more fully than ever:

Lenin

"The great Lenin, genial teacher and leader of the working class and all toilers, founder of the Communist Party, is the inspirer and organizer of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Creatively developing the Marxist teaching, training the Party and preparing it for leadership of the masses in the Socialist Revolution and the building of Socialism, Lenin..."

Stalin

"The entire work of transforming our country took place under the direct leadership of Comrade Stalin. Comrade Stalin kept perfecting the Soviet science of planning ... developed and raised the Marxist-Leninist theory to an unrivalled height ... Comrade Stalin is the mighty continuer of Lenin's cause..." (Mikoyan on Stalin's 70th birthday, Pravda, 21 December 1949)

8. The Soviet leaders continue toward the Soviet people the practices of concealment, evasion, and manipulation of the truth which contributed to the rise of Stalin and rationalized his crimes. The ability and the readiness of the regime to do this shows that it is inherent in the Soviet system.

a. Concealment of Stalin's Crimes

Khrushchev secret speech: "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party, especially not to the press."

30 June CC Resolution: "... the CPSU ... told the whole truth, no matter how bitter."

The facts are that the Khrushchev speech has not been published in the USSR. Stalin's personal responsibility for the use of torture, fabrication of cases, mass repressions, mass deportations of nationalities; involvement in Kirov's murder, the Leningrad case, the Doctors' Plot; mistreatment of Khrushchev, Bulganin, Andreyev, Molotov, etc.; his "plans to finish off the old

members of the Political Bureau"; his personal responsibility for dismissing warnings of Hitler's attack and for the failure of Soviet military operations in the early stages of the war; his despair in the early war period--all the details of the Khrushchev speech have not been published for the Soviet people. The 30 June Resolution and subsequent statements have suppressed, minimized or glossed over the charges against Stalin made in Khrushchev's secret speech.

b. Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule

Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin's wilfulness ... became fully evident after the Seventeenth Party Congress which took place in 1934." By implication, the bad period even antedates the Seventeenth Congress: "... Mass repressions against activists increased more and more after the Seventeenth Party Congress."

30 June CC Resolution: The period 1934-1937, during which great purges occurred, is glossed over; Stalin's thesis on intensification of the class struggle, which was "given prominence in 1937 ... was the basis for the grossest violations of Socialist law and mass repressions." Emphasis is shifted away from these earlier purges to the period "when 1938 the criminal band of the agent of international imperialism, Beria, was put at the head of the state security organs."

c. The Lie that the People or Even the Party as a Whole Rule in the USSR

30 June CC Resolution: "... For nearly 40 years the authority has been in the hands of the working class and peasantry."

Khrushchev secret speech: "Stalin headed the Party and the country for thirty years ... Stalin decided everything ... No one could say anything that was contrary to his opinion ... Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere ... Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great wilfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where one could not express one's own will."

d. Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the West

30 June CC Resolution: "For over a quarter of a century, the Soviet country was ... a besieged fortress situated in a capitalist encirclement ... Enemies sent into the USSR a large number of spies and diversionists... The threat of a new imperialist aggression against the USSR became particularly intense after the advent to power of Fascism in Germany in 1933... In the course of a fierce struggle against the whole world of imperialism our country had to submit to certain restrictions of democracy..."

Khrushchev secret speech: Ignores the "capitalist encirclement" bogeyman in describing the conditions under which Stalin exercised his tyranny and seeks to justify Stalin's misrule as in the interests of the Soviet people. Khrushchev makes a point of the fact that "Stalin ... used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the revolution was already victorious, when the Soviet state was strengthened [etc.]."

Since these two positions contradict each other, it is evident that the position of the Resolution is an attempt to divert attention from internal tensions to an external enemy.

e. Attempt to Shift the Blame onto the Soviet People

Khrushchev secret speech: Makes it clear that Stalin ruled by terror exercised through his control of the secret police. Stalin "was the chief prosecutor" in the purges. "Stalin not only agreed to, but on his own initiative, issued arrest orders." Stalin issued the order for the use of torture, etc.

30 June CC Resolution: "Any action against him ... would not have been understood by the people ... would not have received support from the people." "The people consciously assumed ... certain restrictions of democracy, justified by the logic of the struggle of our people for socialism under circumstances of capitalist encirclement."

f. Deception Concerning Foreign CP Criticisms

The 30 June CC Resolution, while acknowledging that "certain of our friends abroad are not quite clear on the question of the personality cult and its



consequences," attempts to shift the blame for "confusions" onto the "tricks and devices" of "imperialist quarters" and ignores the fact that many CPs have been thrown into turmoil by the revelations of the Khrushchev speech itself. The Resolution and later materials deceive the Soviet people about the turmoil produced by the Khrushchev speech, and suppress the foreign CP criticisms by selectively quoting from foreign CP statements to show their approval.

The Togliatti Nuovi Argomenti interview with its searching analysis has not been published in the USSR. Only a single suggestion--that the Soviet system might have "degenerated" under Stalin--has been cited by the Resolution, in order to be rejected cavalierly. The much more moderate article by Eugene Dennis was published instead, but with the deletion of the references to anti-Semitism under Stalin.

The Soviet leadership has followed the same practice of selectivity since the publication of the 30 June Resolution in an attempt to deceive the Soviet people into thinking that the Resolution has met with unqualified endorsement by the foreign CPs:

"The majority of representatives of the broad public in various countries," notes the French paper L'Humanite, "look upon the decision on the personality cult and its consequences as 'one of the fundamental documents in the history of the international workers' movement...'"

"The Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party has declared that under the influence of the historic decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress inner party democracy has become stabilized in Hungary; the democracy of state and public life has strengthened, and socialist law has become firmer."

"In Italy, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party says that executive bodies of the Italian Communist Party unconditionally approve the actions which have and are being taken by the leaders of the CPSU for the complete overcoming of the personality cult of Stalin, both in the Soviet Union and in the International Workers' Movement."

"The General Secretary of the National Committee of the United States Communist Party, E. Dennis, states: 'The decision provides a correct assessment of the malicious aims of those reactionary circles which would have liked to bury the colossal achievements of the 20th CPSU Congress under a mountain of suppositions concerning the revaluation of Stalin. The assessment of him is in accord with our views. It is that reactionary circles in the United States and other countries are seeking to distort Khrushchev's special report on Stalin in order to destroy solidarity of the International Working Class Movement.'" (TASS despatch to Soviet provincial press, 10 July)

Concerning the questions of foreign Communists which are not being satisfactorily answered by the Soviet leaders, and the criticisms from abroad which the leaders are concealing from the Soviet people, see Appendix.

## II. Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration of the Soviet System

While not denying that Stalin's actions were harmful to the Party and the USSR, the CPSU has minimized the harmful effects of his acts and denied, without bothering to support the denial in serious terms, that the nature of the Soviet Communist system was perverted by Stalin. From the Free World point of view, this question may seem of dubious importance, since it is impossible to separate Stalin from the system which gave him power and which in turn reflects his handiwork. It is also questionable whether the "perversion" of a fundamentally bad system is in fact possible. The question is, however, of critical concern to those who are firmly identified with or dedicated to the system. In the Khrushchev speech, the damage done by Stalin to both Party and state was extensively described in very specific terms, and was shown to have seriously affected the essentials of the system. This could and did lead naturally to observations and questions by foreign (i.e., non-Soviet) Communists concerning the possibility of some degeneration or distortion having occurred in the system. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution, in denying the charges and in cutting off further Communist discussion of the question, uses a limited and unrealistic definition of what constitutes the essence of the Socialist order, and a dogmatic "Stalinist" statement that such thinking is un-Marxist, contrary to truth, and heretically "idealistic." Thus it evades the major issue of the de-Stalinization process. The Resolution's denial is belied by Lenin's warning that Stalin could distort the system, a point which Khrushchev himself raised in his secret speech:

"Fearing for the future fate of the Party and the Soviet nation, V. I. Lenin made a completely correct characterization of Stalin..."

I. The effects of Stalin's actions on both the party and state were so fundamental and serious that they undoubtedly have modified the system.

- a. "The principle of collective leadership is elementary for the proletarian party, for the Lenin-type party ... in the course of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective leadership."  
(Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)
- b. "Isolation of the Soviet public and state organizations from the outer world" was acknowledged by Mikoyan as having been an error in Soviet policy, and he refers to "fear of all

that can happen from contact between Soviet people and foreigners," as an alleged source of this error. Khrushchev states in his speech that "Stalin demonstrated his suspiciousness not only in relation to individuals--but in relation to whole parties and nations." Twenty years of such isolation must have had a serious effect upon the system, as the inability and unwillingness of the present leaders to consider and understand the criticisms of foreign CP leaders show.\*

- c. "During the past 15 or 20 years there has been very little drawing upon the treasury of Lenin's ideas for the understanding and explaining of events." (Mikoyan, 20th CPSU Congress)

Since the scientific analysis of events is an indispensable aspect of the Soviet system, the non-Leninist interpretation of events for 20 years is bound to have had a serious effect upon the system, particularly since a whole generation of leaders has developed during this period.

- d. "The cult brought about ... sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit." (Khrushchev secret speech)

If Stalin's actions produced and gave authority to liars, deceivers, and sterile administrators, the actions of such individuals must in turn have had a serious effect upon the system, in which they occupied so many positions. Note the references in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution to "the mistakes in leadership in critical segments of the Soviet system which were countenanced by Stalin." The secret Khrushchev speech is more precise, and states that these characteristics were the products of Stalin's actions:

"Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged ... arbitrariness in others... We should not forget that due to the numerous arrests ... many workers began to work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared all that was new, feared their own shadows... This all produced the danger of bureaucratizing the whole apparatus."

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\* See 30 June Resolution comment: "Certain of our friends abroad have ... tolerated a wrong interpretation of certain of its the cult's aspects."

If the "whole apparatus" was bureaucratized, how can it be said that the system was not affected?

2. The Central Committee Resolution, in denying that Stalin's rule perverted the system, charges that those who believe that Stalin could have changed the socio-political order "enter into profound contradiction with the facts, with Marxism ... and give way to idealism."

In the light of the Resolution, should Khrushchev's secret speech and Mikoyan's speech, which clearly show the all-pervasive influence and limitless power of Stalin, now be condemned as un-Marxist and "idealistic"? It was primarily on the basis of the evidence and arguments in these two speeches, after all, that Communist Party leaders abroad raised the question of Stalin's effect upon the system. Are they also now to be condemned because they took these speeches seriously?

3. By emphasizing its "collectivity" the current leadership is evading the issue of continued concentration of unlimited power at the top. The small collective inherited all of Stalin's powers and is capable of abusing these powers just as despotically as Stalin. No meaningful changes have occurred.

- a. The Khrushchev speech states that Stalin abused the power given him and thereby increased his power to a point where he was an absolute ruler:

"Later, Stalin abusing his power more and more, began to fight eminent party and government leaders and to use terroristic methods against honest Soviet people. Attempts to oppose ... resulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. In such a situation, there is no need for any sanction, for what sort of sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev secret speech)

- b. It further stated that this absolute power made action against him impossible.

"Possessing unlimited power he [Stalin] indulged in great wilfulness. A situation was created in which one could not express his own will."  
(Khrushchev secret speech)

- c. In Pravda of 6 July, the Communist Party's continued possession of unlimited power is reaffirmed:

"As to our country the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people."

- d. And power in the Party remains concentrated in the hands of the collective leadership.

"Our Communist Party is the governing Party... The Central Committee ... is a collective leader of our Party... The Presidium of the Central Committee ... is a regularly acting collective body dealing with all the most important questions of the life of the Party and country." (Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress)

- e. But there is even doubt that the "collective" Presidium decides matters. The introduction of the idea of the "Leninist core" suggests an even greater concentration of power:

"The Leninist core of the Central Committee immediately after the death of Stalin set a course of resolute struggle..." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

4. The Khrushchev speech condemns the mass repressions of the Trotskyites and other oppositionists as unnecessary violence and abandonment of Lenin's principle of ideological struggle. The Central Committee Resolution, however, by restricting its criticism of mass repression to the period after 1937, tacitly endorses the earlier repressive acts and implicitly, therefore, the degeneration of the system under Stalin.

"Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases ... Stalin on the other hand used extreme methods and mass repressions at a time when the Revolution was already victorious, the Soviet state strengthened, when the exploiting classes were already liquidated ..."

5. The Khrushchev speech shows that what the 30 June Resolution later referred to as the "training of the whole people in a spirit of constant vigilance and readiness in the face of foreign enemies" actually led to the weakening of the Soviet Army at a critical time, and that mass repressions created mass suspiciousness and mistrust. Such training is still a characteristic of the system and both a source and a symptom of its degeneration.

- a. "For several years officers of all ranks, soldiers in the party and Komsomol cells were taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden enemies. It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military

discipline in the first war period." (Khrushchev secret speech)

- b. "Mass repressions ... created a situation of uncertainty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion and sowed distrust among Communists." (Khrushchev secret speech)
- c. "The capitalist encirclement has sent into our country no few spies and saboteurs.... We must therefore in every way arouse among the Soviet people the revolutionary vigilance and strengthen the state security organs." (Khrushchev, Report of the Central Committee to the 20th CPSU Congress)

Here Khrushchev shows that he is the direct heir of Stalin, who set forth this task to the 18th CPSU Congress in 1939: "Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, murderers and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people."

- d. "One must not show a careless attitude toward the new machinations of the imperialist agents, who are trying to penetrate into Socialist countries for the purpose of undermining the achievements of the workers." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

6. It is contradictory to give the system credit for major successes and at the same time deny its responsibility for failures and evils of an equally serious nature.

The Resolution states that counteraction against Stalin was taken during the war years by members of the Central Committee of the Party and outstanding Soviet war commanders, but ignores the major charge in the Khrushchev speech that the most serious injustices against the national minorities in the USSR took place during this same period. The most glaring illustrations of inconsistency follow:

- a. "There were definite periods, for instance during the war years, when the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted [and] the negative consequences of lawlessness and arbitrariness were substantially diminished." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

- b. "At the end of 1943 ... a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachai from the lands on which they lived. The same lot befell the whole population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic /also Chechen, Ingush, Balkars/. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

7. From a Marxist point of view, the 30 June Resolution is unscientific. Marxism contends that the political order of a country reflects and interacts with the economic system at the base, and more generally that individuals are the products of their environment. The Resolution simply says that the nature of a regime is determined by who owns the means of production and what class holds political authority. Since allegedly this has not changed since 1917, the Soviet system has not changed. The Resolution thus ignores the question of relation between economic and political institutions and says in effect that it doesn't really matter what happened since the Revolution. Further, if the system has not changed since 1917, it cannot prevent the rise of another Stalin, and also, the system itself must have generated its own degeneration. As Khrushchev put it,

"... the cult of the person of Stalin ... became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles, of Party democracy, of revolutionary legality." (Khrushchev secret speech. Emphasis supplied.)

8. Whereas the 30 June Central Committee Resolution stated that one-man rule could not possibly "change the nature of the Socialist state," it is a fact that Lenin prescribed some changes for the Soviet system, and that in neglecting to carry them out, Stalin changed the system, even as Lenin had envisaged it. Lenin specifically advocated that the central government

"... retain the union of the Socialist Soviet republics only in the sphere of military affairs and diplomacy, while in other matters each of the people's commissariats will be fully independent." (Lenin, "Concerning the National Question or 'Autonomization'")

This decentralization of key elements of power has never been carried out.



### III. Refusal of the Current Leadership to Modify the Stalinist Concept of Soviet Democracy

The CPSU appears to have been alarmed and embarrassed by evidence that the discussions of the cult of the individual reflected the Soviet people's hope for a relaxation and democratization of the Soviet state. At the same time, in many Communist Parties, there was evidence of a critical scrutinizing and questioning of the true workings of inner-party democracy in the light of the revelations concerning the operations of the CPSU under Stalin. Failing to understand or refusing to consider significant changes seriously, the CPSU has clearly indicated that the deceptive and peculiar Stalinist concept of Soviet democracy remains essentially unchanged.

The 30 June Central Committee Resolution depicts popular support of Stalin as a factor impeding the taking of action against him. The Khrushchev secret speech, on the other hand, paints a picture of the complete helplessness and subjugation of the entire nation--both people and Party--under Stalin's rule, and of personal pride and wilfulness as major motives of Stalin's actions. Examined against these two situations, the position of the Soviet people in the state is either that of slaves or helpless children to be led by the Party.

1. In an attempt to suppress foreign Communist and non-Communist discussion of the nature of Soviet "democracy" in Western terms, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution reverts to Stalinist definitions. Accordingly, Soviet "democracy" is reduced to such questions as the popularity of the regime, success of the Soviet state, civil liberties determined by those in power at their own discretion, and material benefits.

The system of Soviets is described as a system of "genuine popular authority":

"The essence of democracy is not in formal indications, but in whether political authority serves and reflects in action the will and interests of the majority of the people, the interests of the workers. The entire internal and foreign policy of the Soviet state proclaims the fact that our regime is truly democratic, a truly popular regime. The highest aim of the Soviet state's daily concern is the raising in every respect of the people's living standards, the securing of a peaceful existence for its people." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

2. The Khrushchev secret speech denies the possibility that the Soviet system under Stalin's absolute rule could reflect the desires and best interests of the people, since Stalin isolated himself from the people and was not aware of the real state of affairs.

"Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated..."

"Stalin never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and collective workers..."

"Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situation at the front. This was natural because during the whole patriotic war he never visited any section of the front..."

And "Stalin decided everything." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The Soviet leadership has recently reaffirmed that the Soviet people are irrevocably subordinated to authoritarian one-party dictatorship, "iron discipline," individual leadership, and unrelenting control of the press. Alternative voices are still denied them, in spite of the now proven fact that the Party could not protect the people, the Soviet state, or itself against a Stalin.

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people-- their leader and organizer throughout their entire struggle for Communism."

"A new homogeneous society has been created in the Soviet Union. It is void of any hostile classes, of any social groups whose interests fail to coincide. Therefore, there is no social ground in the Soviet society for the origination and existence of other than the Communist Party." (Pravda, editorial article, 6 July)

4. Even the necessity of "undemurring submission to the will of the individual" is being propagated currently. (Pravda, quoting Lenin, 8 July)

"The rich experience of socialist construction teaches us that the principles of collective leadership ... do not at all deny the role of the individual leader for the matter entrusted to him."

(Pravda, 28 April 1956)

5. Lenin is cited as the authority against freedom of the press: "'Freedom of the press ... in a world in which there exist capitalists, is freedom to buy the press, to buy those who write in it, to bribe and to fabricate public opinion in favor of the bourgeoisie' ... In our Soviet country there is and there can be no freedom to buy or to bribe the press." (Pravda editorial article, 8 July) The argument that freedom would make it possible for hostile class interests to make use of a Soviet publication is contradictory to the argument employed to explain why there is no need for more than one party in the USSR:

"At the present time, as a result of the victory of Socialism, a new homogeneous society has been created in the Soviet Union. It is void of any hostile classes, of any hostile groups whose interests fail to coincide. There is no social ground in the Soviet society for the origination and existence of other than the Communist Party." (Pravda editorial article, 6 July. Emphasis supplied.)

6. While the present leadership cites Lenin as authority for its restriction of democratic freedoms, the current definition of Soviet democracy fails to meet even Lenin's definition of democracy in at least one major respect. Even the Communist Party itself fails to meet this test.

"Everyone will probably agree that 'broad democratic principles' presupposes two following conditions: first, full publicity, and second, election to all functions. It would be absurd to speak of democracy without publicity; that is, publicity which extends beyond the circle of membership of the organization... No one would ever call an organization that is hidden from everyone but its members by a veil of secrecy, a democratic organization." (Lenin, "What is to be Done?")

"We cannot let this matter get beyond the party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason we are considering it here at a closed Congress session." (Khrushchev secret speech)

7. The Soviet leaders today also continue to violate Lenin's dictum that even in the peculiarly Soviet type of "democracy" the people "must have the right to know and check even the smallest step in ... [the] work ... [of] their responsible leaders."

a. This statement was quoted in the Pravda editorial article of 28 March, "Why is the cult

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of the individual alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism?"

- b. The Khrushchev speech of 25 February, being secret and enjoining secrecy, violates this principle, as do many other events. (For example, the facts and pleadings of the cases of Beria, Bagirov, et al., have never been published.)
- c. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution that opposition to Stalin would "not have been understood by the people" shows that the regime has never considered it necessary to let the people know the truth. The Soviet people are considered incapable of comprehending the truth (since their ideas are the creations of official propaganda) and are only told those things that suit the particular needs of those in power (Stalin or the "collective").

8. The thesis concerning Stalin's popularity, as stated in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, shows that the current Soviet leadership believes the people to have been either fools or dupes: fools, if in the light of what was happening in the Soviet Union, they still loved Stalin; dupes, if what was happening was kept from them by a controlled propaganda machine.

#### IV. The Question of Co-Responsibility for Stalin's Tyranny

In the course of the de-Stalinization campaign the CPSU leadership--or at least a major element of it--has sought to avoid discussion of the question of its co-responsibility for Stalin's errors and crimes. The secret speech, however, intentionally or unintentionally, raised this question when it clearly implicated many of the leaders in the authentication and execution of Stalin's policies, showed that they knew about his illegal methods of action, and described how they sympathized with some who did oppose Stalin. The secret speech also shows that in many instances Stalin had the active support of the leaders, and that even as late as the World War II period, they urged him to resume active leadership after he had largely withdrawn as a consequence of the initial Soviet defeats. In an effort to conceal their culpability, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution and later material refrain generally from mentioning these facts. They seek to shift responsibility to the Soviet people, and "objective" circumstances, and also to shut off foreign Communist discussion of the issue.

1. Khrushchev, in seeking to explain why the members of the Politburo did "not assert themselves" against Stalin, admits co-responsibility: "The members of the Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at different times."

- a. "Initially, many of them backed Stalin because he was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic, his strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and party work." (Khrushchev secret speech)
- b. This was in spite of the fact that Lenin had warned the Party against Stalin and urged his removal from the post of Secretary General. (Lenin's "Testament") In other words, the Party leaders disregarded Lenin's advice and put themselves into Stalin's hands, "hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Vladimir Ilyich and would be able to overcome the defects which caused Lenin serious anxiety." (Khrushchev secret speech)

2. By 1934, according to Khrushchev, Stalin "had so elevated himself above the Party and above the nation that he ceased to consider either the Central Committee or the Party." The CPSU has completely failed to explain how this arrogation of one-man power by Stalin occurred, at the time when the Party was still capable of restricting his powers.

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3. Thereafter, Stalin made use of police power to terrorize the Party and the people.

"Stalin acted ... by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position, was doomed to removal from the leading collective and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation." (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. It is evident that the other leaders, in order to remain in power, submitted to Stalin's will and in this respect, bear responsibility with him for the crimes. The statement in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution--that it was not "a question of personal courage"--is amply demonstrated in the Khrushchev speech to have been false. The other leaders, in order to gain and protect their positions, became the "many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit," which Khrushchev said had been produced under Stalin.

5. The Soviet statements have neglected to account for the fact that Stalin's thesis on the intensification of the class struggle--which both Khrushchev and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution said was a major weapon in Stalin's terror policy--was accepted by the Central Committee in 1937 despite Khrushchev's claim that many opposed it.

6. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution produces, for the first time, an allegation that there was "counter-action against the negative manifestations which were connected with the personality cult..." The "counter-action" was credited to a "Leninist core of leaders." The Resolution states that "there were certain periods, for instance during the war years, when the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted."

- a. There is no explanation of why the "core" was able to act at "certain" times, but not at others; nor of how it was able to survive against the certain "vengeance" which Khrushchev said awaited anyone who opposed Stalin.
- b. It is not explained why the "core" failed to act at what would appear, from Khrushchev's secret speech, to have been a golden opportunity to take power away from Stalin, namely, when the Central Committee Plenum was called in October 1941. Stalin refused to meet with the Central Committee members, but if the "core" had been resolute, the Plenum could have been convened without Stalin.

- c. The existence of a "Leninist core" brings into question the role of those "members of the Political Bureau" who recalled Stalin to active leadership from the state of inactivity into which Khrushchev stated he had withdrawn. Were they members of the "core"? If so, what has the "core" done to punish them for bringing Stalin back?

7. Khrushchev has claimed that the other leaders were ignorant of many of the facts of Stalin's crimes until after the removal of Beria. Even if the impossibility of the other leaders having worn blinders throughout the entire Stalin period is not taken into account, the claim is not valid.

- a. In his speech, Khrushchev admits that he, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich knew in 1931 that Beria's reputation was bad (i.e., long before Beria got power).
- b. The leaders knew that many top functionaries were being purged; they also knew what measures the Party statutes prescribed and that these statutes were being violated.
- c. Khrushchev, along with many others, knew of Stalin's coded telegram of 20 January 1939 (to Secretaries of Oblast and Krai Committees, etc.) endorsing the use of torture.
- d. Ignatiev must have had access to MVD records in 1952, before Beria's ouster. (Ignatiev, incidentally, attended the 20th Congress and is now Party Secretary in Bashkir.)
- e. The "Committee of Information," established in 1947 under the Council of Ministers, had access to all data on the activities of the Soviet intelligence organs, which Stalin personally exploited to liquidate his opponents. Molotov was chairman of the committee in the beginning. The committee existed until 1951. V. A. Zorin, Andrei Vyshinsky, and Yakub Malik were also concerned with the committee.

8. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that "immediately after the death of Stalin, the Leninist core of the Central Committee set a course of resolute struggle against the personality cult and its grave consequences."

- a. Khrushchev was hailing Stalin as "the great continuer of Lenin's cause" in April 1954. (Speech to the Supreme Soviet)

b. Even as late as December 1955, Stalin's birthday was the occasion for adulatory statements about his merits.

9. The co-responsibility of the entire CPSU leadership during the period of Stalin's rule is clear in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, which states:

"All these difficulties on the path of building socialism were overcome by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee which consistently carried out Lenin's general line."

If the Central Committee chooses to claim credit for the achievements of the USSR, it stamps Khrushchev's statements that Stalin ruled alone as a lie. Similarly, if "Lenin's general line" was being carried out, how account for the Stalinist evil? Was that a result of "Lenin's general line"?

## V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements

The current regime, while placing the blame upon Stalin for excesses and evils, denies that he is entitled to exclusive credit for the major successes of the Soviet state during the past 40 years. As a consequence, the question of who deserves the credit arises.

While the Khrushchev secret speech was in general non-partisan in giving credit for successes to the Party, the government, technical and intellectual leading workers, and the Soviet people, it was quite explicit in giving credit for the successful prosecution of the war to the generals, and in the same context carried implied criticism of the actions of the Party in connection with preparedness and the efficiency of the Armed Forces just prior to World War II. Later material, particularly the Pravda editorial of 6 July, is less balanced, and claims the greatest share of credit for the Party for all the socialist successes. In the 30 June Central Committee Resolution a so-called "Leninist core" of the leadership lays claim to major credit for itself.

Although, according to the secret speech, the restoration of the Party to its rightful role was an avowed aim of the de-Stalinization campaign, the speech's revelations of the extent to which the Party had been ignored and deprived of power under Stalin evoked from Communists everywhere embarrassing questions of what essential role the Party played in the Soviet system. This appears to have inspired the observed shift in treatment of the Party's claim to credit for the past successes of the Soviet state.

1. The Khrushchev speech gives major credit for the successful conduct of the war to the Soviet generals.

"We paid with great losses until our generals, upon whose shoulders rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver operations, which immediately brought serious changes at the Front favorable to us." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"And where are the military on whose shoulders rested the burden of the war? ... With Stalin in, no room was left for them." (Khrushchev secret speech)

2. The Khrushchev speech criticizes the role of the Party in connection with the Soviet Army's preparedness for war.

"For several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the Party and Komsomol cells were taught to 'unmask' their superiors as hidden enemies. It is natural that this caused a negative influence on the state of military discipline in the first war period." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"Before the war ... all our political-educational work was characterized by its bragging tone; when the enemy violates the holy Soviet soil ... we will battle the enemy on his soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves. But these positive statements were not based in all areas on concrete facts." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The Resolution claims credit for the "Leninist core" of the CPSU leadership which is inconsistent with the statements in the Khrushchev speech.

a. "During the war years, the individual acts of Stalin were sharply restricted... It is known that precisely during this period members of the Central Committee and also outstanding Soviet commanders took over certain sectors of activity ... made independent decisions, and through their organizational, political, economic, and military work ... insured the victory of the Soviet people in the war." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

b. "It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe disaster ... Stalin thought this was the end... After this Stalin ... ceased to do anything whatsoever. He returned to active leadership only when some members of the Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary to take certain steps immediately to improve the situation at the Front." (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. The CPSU claims that credit for all the successes of the Soviet state belongs to the Communist Party.

"Our socialist state owes all its successes to the leadership of the Communist Party." (Pravda, 6 July)

5. The Party seeks to assume credit for all the actions of its members in the Soviet government and the Soviet economy.

"Whenever the country was in danger ... the Communists were the first to rush ahead... During the years of the Great Fatherland War ... the Party directed its best forces to the military fronts and to decisive sectors in the rear."

"Our Party is boldly leading us along this path strengthening Soviet state, upsurge of agriculture, etc., for it unites in its ranks the most progressive, the most conscious ... section of the Soviet people."

"By its tremendous efforts ... the Party has accumulated a rich experience of leadership in all spheres of the state--economic and cultural construction... Nearly four decades have passed ... and each day ... was filled with the tireless activity of the Party in directing the country, in the socialist transformation of its economy and culture, in defense of what has been achieved ... and in strengthening and development of the principles of the international solidarity of the workers." (Pravda, 6 July)

6. The falseness of the last quotation given above from Pravda, 6 July, can be abundantly demonstrated by comparison with the many statements given elsewhere\* concerning the Party's lack of initiative and authority and the helplessness of the Party leadership during Stalin's years.

7. Although the CPSU claims that its great strength is shown by its campaign against the cult--

"The fact that we present in all its ramifications the basic problem of overcoming the cult--is an evidence of the great moral and political strength of our Party." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"The fact that the Party itself openly and boldly posed the question of liquidating the personality cult--is the best proof of the force and viability of the Soviet Socialist regime." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

--it immediately destroys the argument and shows its true weakness by admitting that action against Stalin was not possible until his death.

"The 20th Congress and the entire policy of the Central Committee after the death of Stalin bear vivid testimony..."

"Why did these people not take a stand against Stalin and remove him from leadership? This could not be done in the circumstances ... such a stand would have been considered a blow against the unity of the party and the whole state, extremely dangerous in the presence of capitalist encirclement." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

"After Stalin's death the Central Committee began ... a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that it is ... foreign to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism to elevate one person ..."

"Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? ... Attempts to oppose resulted in the opponent falling victim to repression." (Khrushchev secret speech)

## VI. "Guarantees" Against Recurrence of Stalinism

Safeguards adequate to ensure that another Stalin cannot arise do not, in spite of the CPSU Resolution, exist at present in the Soviet system.

After the Khrushchev speech called for study and analysis to determine what measures beyond those already taken would be necessary to ensure that another Stalin could not arise, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution abruptly stated that all the necessary measures have already been taken, and that adequate guarantees against a repetition of Stalin's actions now exist. A review of the measures and guarantees referred to does not demonstrate that the critical elements of the Party and state system which led to Stalin's rise\* have, in fact, been brought under adequate control. In particular there is no provision for popular checks on the leadership or for freedom of expression and dissemination of information.

The fundamental dilemma over this question of guarantees in the Soviet system is shown clearly by the Khrushchev speech to lie in the possibility that deeds such as Stalin's can be committed in the belief that they are done in the interest of the Communist cause itself.

1. Restoration of collective leadership is claimed as a guarantee against the rise of another Stalin, but this statement is meaningless since there are no guarantees that collective leadership itself will continue, or that the collective itself will not become despotic.

Although Khrushchev said--"Lenin worked out the principles of party direction ... stressing that the guiding principle of party leadership is its collegiality. Lenin never imposed by force his views upon his co-workers." (Khrushchev secret speech)--there is no guarantee that a member of the collective leadership, if he so chooses cannot impose his views upon his co-workers, nor any way in which an attempt to do so could be observed by the ranks of the party and the citizens.

2. As a guarantee of collective leadership, Lenin, in his "Testament," placed his faith in the selection for the position of Secretary General, of an individual who has certain personal characteristics. But as the case of Stalin demonstrates,

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\* See Section I



the collective leadership cannot--even after a warning such as that given by Lenin--be trusted to select someone who will not turn into another Stalin.

"The delegates [to the 13th Congress] declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin, hoping that he would heed the critical remarks of Lenin." (Khrushchev secret speech)

3. The power of the Party in the Soviet state is still unlimited. No system of checks and balances operates within the Party to restrict the unlimited use of power by the collective leadership or by any individual acting in its name, as Stalin did (e.g., division of powers, limits on terms of office, alternative candidates for leadership, to be chosen democratically).

"As to our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the one and only ruler of thoughts, the one to express the ideas and hopes of the people--their leader and organizer." (Pravda, 6 July)

"Lenin called the Central Committee of the Party a collective of leaders and the guardian and interpreter of party principles...Lenin pointed out: 'Our Central Committee constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative group...'" (Khrushchev secret speech)

4. Khrushchev demanded further critical study and the taking of any additional steps needed to prevent the rise of another Stalin, and defined such study as a specific task. Although this is stated as a task in the secret speech, this work does not appear among the tasks listed in the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, and there is no indication such study is in progress.

"We have to consider seriously and **analyze correctly** this matter in order that we may preclude the possibility of a repetition, in any form whatever, of what took place during the life of Stalin." (Khrushchev secret speech)

5. Adherence to Socialist law is claimed as a guarantee against the rise of another Stalin, but no guarantee is given that the collective leadership or anyone acting in its name as Stalin did, must and will adhere to the law.

"In such a situation there was no need for any sanction, since what sort of sanction could there be when Stalin decided everything?" (Khrushchev secret speech)

6. The decentralization measures carried out in the Soviet state are claimed to be guarantees against the rise of another Stalin. But the amount of decentralization which has actually resulted from these measures is insignificant. In any event, the measures do not restrict centralized control of the three primary instruments of power identified by Lenin as the organs of authority and repression under the dictatorship of the proletariat--the Army, the Police and the Communist Party.

7. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution states that it was not possible for the leadership to take action against Stalin, because the people credited him with the Party's successes, and did not know of his errors. But there is no guarantee that such a situation cannot recur since the practice through which the people were misled--i.e., Party monopoly control of all information channels, and of all information concerning the activities of its leadership which reaches the people--continues to operate.

a. "It should not be forgotten that the Soviet people knew Stalin as a person who always acted in defense of the USSR, and struggled for the cause of socialism." (30 June Central Committee Resolution)

b. "We cannot let this matter get out of the Party especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy; we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes." (Khrushchev secret speech)

"We do not want to commit suicide, and that is why we will not do it." (Lenin, on granting freedom of the press, quoted in Pravda, 8 July)

8. Since an authoritative interpretation of "objective conditions" by the leadership of the Communist Party is all that is required to sanction as necessary the reestablishment of Stalinist practices and restrictions, the 30 June Central Committee Resolution's statements -- "the most difficult period in the development and establishment of socialism is behind us" and "on the possibility of preventing wars during the present era"--are the sole guarantees that the Stalin experience will not be repeated. It has already been shown that errors can be

made in such statements, and that the statements can be manipulated as the requirements of the leadership dictate.

9. The fundamental fact that guarantees cannot be dependable in the Soviet system is brought sharply into focus by Khrushchev in the following statement:

"Stalin was convinced that this [his now condemned actions] was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working class. He saw this from the position of ... the interest of the victory of socialism and Communism. We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot ... In this lies the whole tragedy!"  
(Khrushchev secret speech)

## VII. Moscow Control Of Foreign CPs Reasserted

Moved by CPSU pronouncements, some Communist Parties apparently miscalculated the extent to which criticism of the CPSU, the Soviet system, and the taking of independent action was permissible in the course of the de-Stalinization campaign, and have been sharply snapped back into line by the 30 June Central Committee Resolution.

Foreign Communist comment and criticism, based on the 30th Congress speeches and the Congress Resolution on the cult of the individual and on the "different roads to Socialism," initially involved penetrating questions concerning problems embarrassing to the Soviet leadership.\* The release of the Khrushchev speech (passed by the CPSU itself to top satellite Party figures, given semi-official authentication by Moscow correspondents of foreign Communist Parties, and released by the State Department to the world press) provoked an intensification of such questioning, as well as criticism of the current attitudes of the CPSU toward other Communist Parties. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution, which was apparently directed primarily to the foreign Communist parties, and later CPSU statements imposed narrow limits on discussion, reprimanded Parties which had violated those limits, and reminded them of the essentially unchanged dominance of the CPSU. Criticism still emanates from Communist Parties, destroying the thesis of the 30 June Resolution that the cause of confusion and dissension in the "socialist" world is the activity of anti-Communist enemies and of the capitalist proponents of the cold war. A measure of the perplexities of the foreign Communist Parties and of their dependence upon Moscow is provided by the rash of trips by foreign Communist leaders to Moscow and the mission of Suslov and company to the 14th Congress of CP France.

1. The Soviet leaders themselves were responsible for letting foreign Communists think that they could begin to act with greater freedom from Moscow--that they could criticize and question the CPSU, and that they could begin to act with greater independence from the Moscow line.

a. The CPSU opened up the question of "national Communism" in connection with the rapprochement with Tito and the discussion of the "different roads to Socialism" which the rapprochement entailed:

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\* See Sections I - VI.

"...while maintaining the unity of the main and most important matters and common path, the transition to Socialism in various countries will not be quite alike and ... each nation will make its own contribution to one form of democracy or another, to one form of the dictatorship of the proletariat or another, to one phase of the Socialist transformation or another, and to the various sides of social life." (Suslov, 20th CPSU Congress)

- b. The criticisms of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress "shocked" the foreign Communists and encouraged them to join in the criticism. The de-Stalinization campaign was launched in the open speeches at the Congress, especially in Mikoyan's statements that "in the course of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective leadership" and his criticisms of Stalin's "Short History of the CPSU" and "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR." These public CPSU statements provoked a mild flurry in the foreign CPs. Some of the details of the secret Khrushchev speech got into the Western Press in mid-March, and provoked a somewhat stronger reaction within some Western CPs--a reaction which measurably increased when West European Communist newsmen in Moscow reported that the secret speech in fact had been given, and told some of the details of the speech. Meanwhile, some satellite leaders (notably, Ulbricht and Rakosi) were discussing Stalin in sharp terms. All these developments, for which the CPSU itself was responsible, stimulated foreign Communists into further questioning and criticism--a process which naturally reached a climax when the secret speech itself was released to the press.

2. The CPSU has since sought to throttle the foreign Communist criticism touched off by the revelations about Stalin. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution clearly had this as its purpose.

- a. It misleadingly claims that the foreign CPs have unqualifiedly endorsed the de-Stalinization campaign: "Condemnation by our Party of the personality cult of J. V. Stalin and of its consequences, brought approval and wide response in all brotherly Communist and workers' parties."
- b. It ignores the embarrassing questions raised by the foreign Communists.

- c. It belittles the confusions by stating condescendingly "that certain of our friends abroad are not quite clear on the question of the personality cult and its consequences and sometimes give incorrect interpretations of certain points connected with the personality cult."
- d. It condemns such criticisms as "absolutely wrong." They are "not in accord with reality and contradict the facts."
- e. It shuts off debate by stating that the Stalin issue is "a case of a past stage in the life of the Soviet country."
- f. It claims that only the "enemies of Communism" are responsible for the confusion in the international Communist movement: "Launching a slanderous campaign, the ideologists of the bourgeoisie are again ... attempting to cast a shadow on the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism, undermine the trust of the working people ... to sow confusion into the ranks of the international Communist and workers' movement."
- g. It seeks to turn aside embarrassing basic questions touching upon the Soviet system by "explaining" Stalin's despotism as a result of "objective factors" (the machinations of the capitalists) and the "struggle against the enemies of Leninism."

3. More recently, the Soviet leaders have bluntly reminded the non-Soviet Communist Parties that the discussion period is ended and that they must resume their role as unquestioning agents of Moscow.

"If the workers' parties did not maintain unity of action and opinion on the most important questions, this would play into the hands of the enemies of Communism and would harm the Party and the cause of Socialism." (Moscow broadcast to Europe, 12 July)

4. The CPSU has flatly rejected the idea of "national Communism" for individual CPs:

"One should not forget that in certain places there still are opportunist elements on whom the enemies of the working people are undoubtedly banking. One should also remember that among the insufficiently

politically mature and exceedingly credulous people there might be those who would fall for the noisy words about 'national Communism' and for the contention that international connections of Communist Parties have allegedly become 'superfluous,' and so on." (Pravda editorial article, TASS, 15 July)

5. Not only has Moscow spoken against "national Communism," but it has even turned down the thesis put forward by Togliatti that non-Communist parties can build socialism.\* The CP must be in charge:

"In other countries proceeding along the road to socialism, other workers' parties may be given the opportunity of taking part in the administration--on the condition that the leading role is assured for the revolutionary Marxist party, which expresses the interests of the working class in the most consistent manner i.e., the CP." (Pravda, editorial article, 6 July)

6. The 30 June Central Committee Resolution makes it clear that all the decisions are binding on the non-Soviet CPs, that the de-Stalinization campaign is designed to further the interests of international Communism and that they must buckle down to business without further dallying over the Stalin issue.

- a. The 20th Congress decisions have "opened up new prospects" for international Communism. The "important fundamental theses on peaceful coexistence" and the different "forms of transition of countries to Socialism" are "promoting" the "further consolidation of the positions of the world system of Socialism."
- b. The CPSU, the Resolution states, "believed that even if the stand taken against the cult of Stalin caused some temporary difficulties, then in the long run, from the point of view of the vital interests and ultimate aims of the working class, this would have a great positive result."
- c. The foreign Communists should realize that the Stalin era is "a past stage," that the CPSU has "been with exceptional persistence and determination liquidating the consequences of the personality cult," and they should not be taken in by

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\* "...There are countries where we wish to start socialism although the Communists are not the leading party." (Togliatti, "Nuovi Argomenti" Interview, L'Unita, 17 June)

the "tricks and devices" of the "ideologist of capitalism ... to distract the attention of the working people from the advanced and inspiring ideas posed before mankind by the Socialist world."

7. It is notable that the CPSU, in rudely clamping down on the foreign CPs, has shown substantially less concern for their problems and background than it has for the Yugoslav Communists. According to the declaration of the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (released 30 June)--

"...proceeding from the fact that either side holds alien any tendency to force its views with regard to the ways and forms of socialist development, both sides have agreed that the aforesaid cooperation should be based on complete voluntariness and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely exchange of views on the contentious issues between our parties." (TASS, Moscow, 20 June)



## VIII. Omissions

Both the Khrushchev secret speech and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution, in varying degrees, refer to certain fundamental areas of policy in which Stalin is said to have committed crimes or been in error. The following list notes a number of actions in each of these areas which merit consideration they were not given.

### 1. Mass Repressions (1934-1937)

While there is no charge in either document that the repressive activities in connection with collectivization merit condemnation, the Khrushchev speech condemns as "unnecessary" the repressive measures taken during the great purges against proven oppositionists (Trotskyites, etc.). This condemnation is omitted from the 30 June Resolution, which agrees with the Khrushchev speech only on the crimes involved in the use of mass repression against loyal Party members during the same period. Presumably as of 30 June the Central Committee had decided that the mass repression of the opposition was after all necessary, as Stalin had said.

### 2. Deportations

The secret speech condemns a number of cases of mass deportations which "were not justified by military necessity," but does not include those of the Baltic states, eastern Poland, or the Volga Germans. The resolution ignores this matter entirely.

### 3. Collectivization

Both the secret speech and the 30 June Central Committee Resolution endorse the program of forced collectivization, which entailed the greatest single case of the use of violence and mass repression in the history of the Soviet Union. Although this fact is not discussed, the treatment of the collectivization period justifies continued highlighting of the inherent inhumanity and brutality of the system.

### 4. Anti-Semitism

The Soviet documents steer clear of the anti-Semitic implications of the campaign against cosmopolitanism in the early postwar period and the doctor's plot just before Stalin's death. They ignore the questions of foreign Communists about the murder of Jewish cultural leaders and the destruction of Jewish cultural institutions. Soviet sensitivity on this score was indicated by the fact that Pravda's reprint of U.S. Communist leader Dennis'

article deleted a phrase about the "snuffing out ... of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures" and added a footnote on the doctor's plot which implied that not only the Jews but other nationalities were involved.

## 5. Foreign Policy

In the field of Soviet foreign policy, "peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened because one-man decisions could and often did cause great complications."

"The willfulness of Stalin showed itself ... in the international affairs of the Soviet Union." (Khrushchev secret speech)

However, the only matter specifically mentioned is the case of Yugoslavia. By placing the blame on Stalin the present Soviet leaders could, as they have in other matters, evade responsibility for many acts which still obstruct the lessening of international tensions. The question naturally arises whether by failing to repudiate such acts the Soviet leadership does not risk being considered as giving tacit approval to them. What were these wrong decisions? Did they include the postwar actions in occupied northern Iran, the Berlin blockade, the refusal to permit the European satellite states to participate in the Marshall plan, the Korean war, the virulent anti-American propaganda campaign of 1947-1951? Does the Yugoslav case carry with it the implication that similar wrong policies were pursued--successfully--in dealing with other European satellites? What of their actions toward the United Nations during the Korean War?

In connection with Yugoslavia it should be noted that the Soviet leaders when they visited Belgrade sought to put the blame entirely on Beria rather than Stalin.

A P P E N D I X

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS  
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

The material herein has been organized to correspond generally with the organization followed in the body of the paper. The preponderance of American and Italian materials is explained by the fact that Communists in these countries have raised the most penetrating questions. Extensive use has been made of quotations from Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, which has been in close alliance with CP Italy.

APPENDIX

CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS  
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

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CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS  
IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN

General

1. The Shock of the Khrushchev Revelations About Stalin

"There is little that one can say to take the deadly edge off of the secret Khrushchev speech, and I, for one, have no desire to enter the argument as to the manner of its presentation. I am puzzled but not deeply concerned as to why Mr. Khrushchev made the report public in the fashion he did; my concern is not with the manner of the document, but with its content.

"It is a strange and awful document, perhaps without parallel in history; and one must face the fact that it itemizes the record of barbarism and paranoid bloodlust that will be a lasting and shameful memory to civilized man." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"We especially, because we are Communists, understand and share the profound grief and shock of the Soviet people. The crimes and brutalities that sullied the latter period of Stalin's leadership are unforgivable." (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

"All Communists, in common with all Democratic and progressive people, are deeply shocked by the injustices and crimes which during the period under review violated the essential principles of socialist democracy and legality and dishonored the noble cause of Communism." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

"... The text of Khrushchev's speech will both frighten and shock those who read it." (Norway, Friheten, 8 June)

2. Inadequacy of Soviet Explanation Until the Publication of the 30 June Central Committee Resolution

"The K. report lacks any kind of Marxist analysis of Soviet society and historical reconstruction of the moment in which under the influence of determinate objective or subjective relations all power was transferred into the hands of Stalin." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"... As long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain within the realm of the 'personality cult.' First, all that was good was attributed to the superhuman, positive qualities of one man; now all that is evil is attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"The explanations given up to now of Stalin's errors, their origin, and the conditions under which they developed, are not satisfactory. A thorough Marxist analysis to determine all the circumstances under which Stalin was able to exercise his personal power is indispensable." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)

"We agree with the observations of Comrade Togliatti and the French CP that it will be necessary to make a profound Marxist analysis of the causes of the degeneration in the functioning of Soviet democracy and Party democracy; that it is not enough to attribute these developments solely to the character of one individual, and that a more adequate estimate of the role of Stalin, both in its positive and negative aspects, will be necessary." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

### 3. Reservations Concerning the Adequacy of the Soviet Explanation of the 30 June Resolution

"Many Marxists will feel satisfied with the answers which the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many will feel that the final answers still need to be found and that the discussion must continue." (New York Daily Worker editorial, 3 July)

"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, perhaps the best thing to do now is to read carefully what I have written. In my opinion, and I have said so openly, the line followed by the Soviet Comrades in the construction of a Communist society was undoubtedly right; but within the general framework of this acknowledgement, there may be differing opinions on the value and importance of the errors committed under Stalin's leadership, the violations of legality, the restrictions on democracy, and so on, over the economic and political development of the Soviet Union."



"I repeat that such differing opinions are possible and a frank discussion on the matter cannot but prove useful for the development of our movement..." (Palmiro Togliatti, Paese Sera, 3 July)

"From the resolution of the Central Committee emerges the principle of the necessity of 'War Communism' which Stalin exploited for his dictatorial ends.

"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of passing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to that of the Party, and from the latter to that of Stalin, are not described in the documents; nor is there any treatment of how and why Stalin succeeded in carrying out his plans. ...Why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding himself with relative ease of all his adversaries, in depriving the directing organs of the Party of authority, in substituting himself for justice and government from local soviets all the way up to the Supreme Soviets? Why did the Party, the Soviets, the proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed, and why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?

"The document of the Central Committee does not answer all this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was such that he could exploit a fundamental error which prevailed in the Bolshevik Party after the death of Lenin." (Editorial, Avanti, 3 July)

## I. Foreign Communist Questions and Criticisms Touching Upon the Basis of the Soviet System

### 1. General

"The no longer secret report of Khrushchev, which made Stalin a sort of modern Ivan the Terrible, goes beyond an attack on the man and hits the system, the ideological problems connected with the notion of dictatorship of the proletariat and its application in the USSR, hits the Leninist notion of the working party as well as the Stalinist notion, and attacks the structure of the state born of the October Revolution." (Pietro Nenni, Avanti, 17 June)

"In blaming everything on Stalin the true problems are evaded, which are why and how Soviet society could and did reach certain forms alien to the democratic way and to the legality which it had set for itself even to the point of degeneration." (Palmiro Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"Why did these things happen? Were they inevitable? Are they inherent in socialism, in Communist philosophy?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

2. Questioning Soviet Sincerity in the De-Stalinization Campaign

"It is stated, that things have changed, but the truth is that the only thing that has changed is the men in the Kremlin... The truth of yesterday is not the truth of today. In this way many truths become doubtful and the responsibilities become collective." (Umberto Terracini, as reported in New York Times, 30 March)

"If there was so much self-serving intention substituted for fact all along, not, as far as we know, opposed by the present leaders, how do we know that they are telling the truth now?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 29 March)

"Why are we asked to take Khrushchev's word for all this? Where is the proof? They are saying that Lenin left a will in which he warned against Stalin. Trotsky also said the same. So Khrushchev and Trotsky agree? Is Trotsky, too, about to be vindicated? Is the great Andrei Vishinsky who conducted the trials of the Trotskyites another stinker? Was it all just a notion of Stalin's? How is the 'cult of the individual' built up without the consent of the other members of the Central Committee? Why has the discussion of the Stalin question suddenly ceased in the Worker?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 13 May)

3. Criticisms of the Soviet Leadership for the Handling of the Khrushchev Report on Stalin

"We do not hesitate to state that we don't like the way Khrushchev's speech was made public. The leaders of the Soviet Union probably had their reasons for letting the contents come out piece-meal and in round-about way. In our opinion they made a mistake and should have published the speech immediately and made it available throughout the world." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)

"...The Politburo regrets that because of the conditions under which Comrade Khrushchev's report was presented and divulged, the bourgeois press was in a position to publish facts of which the French Communists had been unaware. Such a situation is not favorable to normal discussion of these problems within the Party. It facilitates, on the contrary, speculation and maneuvers on the part of the enemies of Communism." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 19 June)

"At the private session of the 24th National Congress of our Party on April 1, a resolution was passed and conveyed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, regretting that a public statement on this question had not been made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which could have enabled the members of all Communist Parties and the staunch friends of the Soviet Union to have understood fully the seriousness of the issues and helped them to a better understanding of everything that is involved. Our Party has not received any official version of the report of Comrade Khrushchev." (Statement of the Political Committee of the British Communist Party, London Daily Worker, 22 June)

"... The Politburo of the Austrian Communist Party's Central Committee sometime ago requested the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party to place this document at the disposal of our Party. We Austrian Communists voiced the belief that questions of such big international importance must be treated in a manner which takes into account the conditions under which the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries are waging their struggles." (Volksstimme, 26 June)

"I do not know whether this re-examination will include the problem, which has been raised in a number of cell and section discussions, of the manner in which our Party was informed of these criticisms, and in particular of the report made by Comrade Khrushchev. We recognize that the method was bad, but on the other hand we ask you to recognize that our responsibility is not involved in any way. For obvious reasons of courtesy towards our Soviet Comrades, we could not have acted otherwise than as we did. A certain amount of critical dissatisfaction also has been expressed in our Party concerning aspects and concerning the form of the report." (Palmiro Togliatti, Report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, 24 June, L'Unita, 26 June)

4. Togliatti Raises the Question of One-Party Rule in the USSR

While attempting to defend the Soviet system of one-party rule, Togliatti definitely advanced the question of the one-party system as a source of the Stalinist evils.

"We are reminded, first of all, that Lenin, in his last speeches and writings, stressed the danger of bureaucracy which threatened the new society. It seems to us that undoubtedly Stalin's errors were tied in with an excessive increase in the bureaucratic

apparatus in Soviet economic and political life, and perhaps, above all, in Party life. And here it is extremely difficult to distinguish between cause and effect. The one gradually became the expression of the other ...

.....

"Following the early period during which Stalin performed services for the Soviet state the sound forces of the Party rallied and united around him. Now it can be observed that these forces rallied around Stalin and, guided by him, accepted such modifications in the function of the Party and of its directing organisms, i.e., the new functioning of the apparatus controlled from above, as the result of which either they could not offer opposition when the evils began to appear, or else at the outset they did not fully understand that they were evils.

"Perhaps we are not in error in asserting that the damaging restrictions placed on the democratic regime, and the gradual emergence of bureaucratic organizational forms stemmed from the Party...

"In the exaltation of ... achievements there prevailed, particularly in the then current propaganda but also in the general political line, a tendency to exaggerate, to consider all problems already solved and objective contradictions, difficulties, and differences, which are always inherent in the development of a society, as having been overcome... In this period one had the feeling in the Soviet Union that the leaders, even if they were aware of the conditions, failed to present correctly these problems to the Party and the people.

.....

"Stalin was at the same time the expression and the maker of a situation, because he had shown himself the most expert organizer and leader of a bureaucratic-type apparatus at the time when this got the better of the democratic forms of life, as well as because he provided a doctrinal justification of what was in reality an erroneous line and on which later was based his personal power, to the point of taking on degenerate forms." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

5. British and American Communist Questioning of Democratic Centralism as a Source of Stalinism

"From what is asserted to have happened in the CPSU it would seem that democracy has been absent for 20 years or so. How was it possible for such a state of affairs to arise in such a Party? Is it that the Party system of 'Democratic Centralism' is at fault? Does it carry the danger of too much centralism? Is Democratic Centralism useful and necessary only for certain stages and conditions?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 29 March)

"Was the brutal suppression of civil liberties in the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, etc., an abuse of democratic centralism, or was this suppression an inevitable outgrowth of democratic centralism--a system of party organization born in the bitter illegality of Tsarism and hardened under the martial law conditions of civil war and intervention?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 28 May)

6. Stalin's Manipulation of Doctrine

"... Stalin ... usurped not only the power belonging to the people and the part to be played by the Party, but also the position of final authority in all fields..." (Cyrankiewicz Speech, Warsaw Broadcast, 27 March)

"... The theory of the sharpening of the class struggle was invented by Stalin ... Stalin's morbid suspiciousness and his growing despotism, allowing not even the least objection, found expression in this theory. With the aid of this theory he wanted to justify the application of drastic measures of repression not only with regard to enemies and political adversaries, but also with regard to persons representing different views." (Jerzy Morawski, Trybuna Ludu, 27 March)

"... The theory of 'class struggle under Socialism'... seems to be a major question about which new thought is needed.

"At the time of the struggle to 'liquidate the Kulaks,' Stalin laid it down that in the period of working class power the class struggle would keep on intensifying and, in particular, that the weaker the capitalist forces became and the stronger socialism became the more would the struggle intensify..."

"He was evidently right in saying that the class struggle had to be stepped up in the USSR at that particular time /i.e., 1928/. But was what he said true as a universal principle? Evidently not ..." (Maurice Cornforth, London Daily Worker, 23 March. Cornforth is a leading British Communist theoretician.)

"Stalin gave a pseudo-scientific formulation to this fearful confusion /i.e., connected with the "capitalist encirclement" and the internal "class enemy" through his erroneous thesis of the inherent increase in enemies and in the sharpening of the class struggle with the progress of building socialism. This made permanent and aggravated the confusion itself and was the origin of unheard-of violations of Socialist legality which have been denounced publicly today." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

## 7. Criticisms of Soviet Evasions and Deceptions

### a. Suppression of the Khrushchev Speech on Stalin\*

"I think it is extremely important to the whole world Socialist movement that the CPSU publish to the world its detailed report on the cult of the individual and state specifically what crimes were committed. It is not we who interfere by demanding details, but the Soviet Communist Party ... Let them give us the whole dose at once, or else let them give an official and convincing explanation of why they are holding back." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 17 May)

### b. Suppression of Lenin's "Testament"

"The first part of the /Khrushchev/ report is devoted to the re-evocation of an old polemic--of the antagonism, so to speak, between Lenin and Stalin: an antagonism well known in all its details outside the USSR, but which the official historians of the Soviet Union had passed over for 30 years, as if the testament of Lenin had not even existed." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

### c. Refutation of Khrushchev's Line that Opposition to Stalin was Impossible Because of His Control of the Organs of Coercion

"... I rule out the explanation that a change was impossible solely because of the presence of a military

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\* See also paragraph 3, above.

police, terror apparatus which controlled the situation with its means. The same apparatus consisted of, and was led by, men who in a serious moment of stress, for example such as Hitler's attack, would have likewise been subject to elemental reactions if a crisis had developed. To me it seems much better to recognize that Stalin, in spite of the errors which he was committing, continued to command the solidarity of the overwhelming majority of the nation, and above all had the support of his leading cadres and also of the masses." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

d. Soviet Tampering with the "Bad" Period of Stalin's Rule

"... It is still not clear, to us, if the current denunciations of the violation of legality and application of the illegitimate and morally repugnant prosecuting methods extend to the entire period of the trials, or only to a given period from 1935 on..." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

e. Soviet Evasions and Deceptions Concerning Stalin's Anti-Semitic Policies

"We are deeply disturbed by facts revealed in information coming from Poland that organs and media of Jewish culture were summarily dissolved and a number of their leaders executed. This is contrary to the Soviet Union's historic contributions to the Jewish question. Khrushchev's failures to deal with these outrages, and the continuing silence of Soviet leaders, requires an explanation." (Statement of CPUSA, New York Daily Worker, 25 June)

"We also express our concern that in the long list of crimes mentioned in the Khrushchev speech, there was silence on those committed against Jewish culture and Jewish cultural leaders. We do not consider the speech to be the last word on just how Stalin's terror control came into existence and maintained itself for 20 years and of the role of the other Communist leaders." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 6 June)

"If, as she says Mrs. Furtseva, alternate member of the Presidium/CPSU, Jewish culture has been developing freely, where are the Yiddish books, the Yiddish theatre, the Yiddish schools?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 27 June)

"When Pravda reprinted the Dennis article it left out the attack on 'snuffing out the lives of more than a score of Jewish cultural figures.' If the charge was untrue, all Pravda had to do was to deny it. Moreover, an explanation is long overdue from the Soviet leaders about the physical annihilation of the top Soviet Jewish writers and poets in the late 40s." (Joseph Clark column, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

f. Continued Soviet Evasions and Deceptions

"There is a ready tendency to slide over the many and varied problems presented by the current revaluations by burying thought with fresh armfuls of cliches and hackneyed phrases. Alongside such stalwarts as 'developing crisis' and 'Wall Street imperialists' we now have: 'cult of the individual' and 'Beria gang,' all of which gets as meaningful as soap commercials when used as a substitute for thought." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 24 April)

"... Mr. Khrushchev led men of good will to understand that the document itself would be a warning of the monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial government. I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly at the end of the document for a pledge that the last execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of habeas corpus, of public appeal to higher courts, of final judgment by one's peers rather than by professional judges.

. . . . .

"Instead, I learned that three more executions had been announced from the Soviet Union, and my stomach turned over with the blood-letting, with the madness of vengeance and countervengeance, of suspicion and countersuspicion.. I don't think I am alone in this feeling. I think millions of human beings share my disgust at this idiotic behavior--wicked, uncivilized, but above all, idiotic." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)



II. Foreign Communist Reflections on Stalin's Rule as a Source of Degeneration

"The least arbitrary of the generalizations is the one which sees in Stalin's errors a progressive encroachment by personal power on the collective entities of a democratic origin and nature and, as a result of this, the pile-up of phenomena of bureaucracy, of violation of legality, of stagnation and, also, partially, of degeneration of different points of the social organism." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"It was evident from that time on i.e., from the time of the purges of 1936-1938 that Soviet public life had undergone in the previous ten years a double process of degeneration: on the one hand, of the Party and state machine toward forms of bureaucratization and terrorism, and on the other hand, of the internal opposition toward forms of conspiracy and palace revolution." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"The distortions arising from the cult of the individual, from the infringement of the Leninist norms of Party life, went deep into life. They went deep into the life of our country as well. Stubborn, petrified bureaucracy, suppression of criticism, disregard for the needs and views of the people--these are only some of the evils which could become rampant in the atmosphere of the cult of the individual and of the infringement of the principles of Party democracy. It is only too often that we can still meet the harmful consequences of this atmosphere--commandeering, intimidation, disregard for collective will. In this atmosphere servility and obsequiousness developed, as well as an automatic attitude of obedience to all 'orders from above,' an attitude of concealing truth, lack of independent thinking and initiative." (Jerzy Morawski, Trybuna Ludu, 27 March)

III. Questioning and Criticism of Soviet "Democracy"

"... It seems irrefutable to us, at any rate, that the bureaucratization of the Party, of the state organisms, of the labor unions, and, above all, of the peripheral organisms which are the most important, must have checked and compressed the democratic functioning of the state and the creative drive of the entire society with real, evident damage resulting therefrom.

.....

"... What must be studied thoroughly and clarified are the problems pertaining to the interrelation of political democracy and economic democracy, of internal democracy and the leadership function of the party with the democratic operation of the state, and how a mistake made in one of these fields may have repercussions on the entire system." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"... The collective direction of the Politburo or of the Central Committee would certainly be preferable to the direction of one man, but if in the collective direction of the Politburo or of the Central Committee there is progress compared to personal direction, enlightened or tyrannical as it may be, there is nevertheless no guarantee of democratic life. Now the whole problem of Soviet society, the whole problem of the People's Democracies which have followed in the footsteps of Soviet society, is reduced to the necessity for internal democratization, for the circulation of ideas; in a word, for political liberty, a necessity which has lain beneath the surface of Soviet society for many years. It is substantially a question of eliminating in the state, in the laws, and above all in customs all the surviving incrustations of War Communism, of creating means and instruments for the formation of the free political initiative of the citizen, without there hanging over his head the accusation of being an enemy of the people, a deviationist, a saboteur every time he tries to give weight, in dealings with public authority, to his own personal and independent evaluation of the path to be followed.

.....  
"After a century has passed, the concept of dictatorship of the proletariat must be thought out again and reconsidered in relation to a society where the influence and weight of the proletariat and of the workers in general have become a determinant in public life and where, in countries democratically and socially more advanced, the state reflects the continuous evolution of class positions." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"In my opinion, the Soviet leadership is wrong in claiming their government is a full-fledged socialist state; socialism without democracy is simply not socialism ... The Marxist leadership failed completely--never seemed really interested--in imbuing the country, not to speak of themselves, with an understanding of and respect for civil rights and what is known generally as the Rights of Man." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 31 May)

#### IV. Co-Responsibility of Other Soviet Leaders for Stalin's Tyranny

##### 1. For Permitting Stalin to Seize Total Power

"If, after the collective leadership left by Lenin, Stalin acquired so much power in his own hands, then all in the leadership who acquiesced in such concentration of power are fully responsible for what followed. If after the concentration of power in Stalin's hands those in the leadership with him supported his now criticized policies knowing they were wrong they are despicable scoundrels who should not be entrusted with the responsibility of fanning a breeze in a hot room. ...The Khrushchev report ... reminds me of nothing so much as a man sitting in judgment on himself." (Letter to the Editor, New York Daily Worker, 14 June)

"These critics who asked why the present leaders did not take action against Stalin during his lifetime would have been on stronger ground had they asked why the Central Committee chose Stalin as general secretary in spite of Lenin's warning." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 17 July)

"Who guided the Bolsheviks in view of the fact that their Congresses, their Central Committee, their Politburo, the Soviets, little by little, had allowed themselves to be stripped of their prerogatives of control and their right of initiative over 20 years? ... We do not even know how the Soviet ruling group has arrived at its conclusions, whether it is in agreement or divided, and if so on what, and why." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"Where were the present leaders during the period when they say that collective leadership was lacking? What about their own mistakes in that period of capitalist encirclement?" (Alan Max column, New York Daily Worker, 13 March)

"But why did Stalin succeed in getting rid with comparative ease of all his adversaries, in making leading party organs powerless and in substituting himself for justice, Government, the Supreme Court and even the local Soviets? Why did not the party, the Soviets and the proletariat resist before Stalin triumphed and why were those who did isolated and defeated?" (Nenni, Avanti, 3 July) (Following the issuance of the 30 June Central Committee Resolution.)

## 2. For Contributing to Stalin's Monopoly of Power

"And the mistake of his Stalin's collaborators was in not seeing this in time, in having allowed him to go on thus until correction was no longer possible without damage to all concerned. As can well be imagined, to this can be joined the question of co-responsibility for these mistakes of the entire political leadership group, including the comrades who today have provided the impetus both for the correction of the evil which had been done and its after effects. The present Soviet leaders knew Stalin much better than we and therefore we must believe them today when they describe him in this manner. We can only think, among ourselves, that since this was the case, aside from the already discussed possibility of a timely change, at least they could have been more cautious in their public and solemn praise of this man's qualities to which we were conditioned. True, today, they offer criticism and this is to be lauded, but with such criticism they lose without doubt a little of their own prestige." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"The Communist Party is the guardian of the rights of the working people. How did it happen that this guardianship failed to be exercised and the crimes stopped long before the death of Stalin? Clearly, responsibility for this failure falls on the shoulders of the leadership of the CPSU as a whole. They endorsed Stalin's wrong theory that the class struggle must be intensified after socialism was built." (Statement adopted by the National Committee of the Canadian Labor-Progressive Party, i.e., CP Canada, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"Those leaders who today rise like great new giants and hurl denunciatory rocks at the body of the dead Stalin must have been very willing to let that same Stalin make the decisions then. They did not dare assume the responsibility in those fateful critical days. Otherwise Stalin could not have attained such frightful, overwhelming personal power. But they were the eager and willing water, as it were, that, inevitably, made the Stalin plant grow." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 29 March)

## 3. For Acquiescing to Stalin's Murders

"If one considers that the power of Stalin was not at that time what it became later, with the war, it is evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev involve responsibilities which were not Stalin's alone

but those of the whole directing apparatus. Terror, in conditions of time and place not justified by necessity, was the price paid for the suppression of all democratic life inside the party and the state. . .

. . . . .

" . . . At last, the final sally, which was intended to be a justification for K. and the other members of the Politburo: 'Stalin obviously had a plan to eliminate the old members of the Politburo.' At this point K. answers the questions that must have been in the air: 'Where were the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee? Why did they not assert themselves against the cult of the individual in time? And why is this being done only now?' The answer is: 'The members of the Politburo saw these problems in a different way at different times.'

"This answer may be valid in a strictly personal sense, but it is not valid for the Politburo. There is no doubt that the facts cited by Khrushchev, and on which world opinion now awaits proper documentation, must have placed the members of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation. But they had been placed in posts of responsibility precisely for this purpose, precisely to face difficult situations." (Nenni, Avanti, 24 June)

"Where was Khrushchev when all those 'crimes' were being committed?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 1 April)

"Is it not obvious that to repeat 'the Beria gang' was responsible for the executions is merely to circumvent one of the central points in the discussion. . .? That question is: where were the rest of the Soviet leadership? Could they have permitted the execution of such outstanding Soviet citizens without being involved in discussion or the decision? It is certainly not possible, since these executions were part of a major ideological campaign against cosmopolitanism." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 26 April)

"How fearless were Khrushchev and the others when many of the best Communists in the Soviet Union were being murdered? Or were they part of the terror apparatus? Did they have a secret trial and murder of Beria because they needed a scapegoat, and because a public trial would have implicated them as part of the terror? Was Beria an 'imperialist agent' or was that a phony trial too? Why must Dennis gloss over the fact, recognized by millions

of people, that Khrushchev, speaking for the present Soviet leadership, at no time had one word of self-criticism for himself personally or for the group?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"If Beria and his gang were responsible for the break with Yugoslavia why was he not brought to open trial? If the executions in Hungary were frameups is it correct to put all the blame on a police chief rather than the Party leadership?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 11 April)

4. The Question of Opposition to Stalin

". . . What alternative policies to Stalin's were suggested by others and rejected? What resistance was made in top official circles to Stalin's trend toward super-centralization and denial of collective leadership?" (William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker, 16 March)

"It has also not yet been made clear as to whether or not or to what degree, the Party and its leaders were able, at least partially, to check the undemocratic course of Stalin and to hold the USSR on the fundamentally correct political line which it followed over the years." (William Z. Foster column, New York Daily Worker, 4 April)

"In the discussion on the XXth Congress currently being centered around the special Khrushchev report, questions frequently arise about the present Soviet leadership. Did some of them try to bring about changes before the last three years? Could the past evils have been checked earlier? How big and serious are the changes now under way?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

5. Failure of Soviet Leaders to Admit their own Mistakes

"It is inconceivable that after such major mistakes were revealed, that there is not a resolution or a speech at the Congress, nor even a whiff of self-criticism by the leadership of its own errors. I think we ought to tell the Soviet comrades that it was these mistaken and wrong policies which led to the crimes." (Steve Nelson article, New York Daily Worker, 24 June)

"If a leading Marxist in the Soviet Union could give that type of personalized report [i.e., Khrushchev's secret report on Stalin] and have it acceptable to the leading

Marxists of a Socialist nation, I suggest that they are not through with their errors and that perhaps others may have to do the job of explaining and analyzing what they have left undone." (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 14 June)

#### V. The Question of Credit for Soviet Achievements

". . . as long as we confine ourselves, in substance, to denouncing the personal faults of Stalin as the cause of everything we remain within the realm of the 'personality cult.' First, all that was good was attributed to his equally exceptional and even astonishing faults. In the one case, as well as in the other, we are outside the criterion of judgment intrinsic in Marxism." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

"It was wrong, while Stalin was still living, to shower him with dithyrambic praise and to give him the exclusive credit for all the successes in the Soviet Union which were due to a correct general policy in the construction of Socialism. This attitude contributed to the development of the cult of the individual and negatively influenced the international labor movement. Today, it is wrong to blame Stalin alone for every negative act of the CPSU." (Statement of the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party, L'Humanité, 19 June)

#### VI. The Question of Guarantees Against Recurrence of Stalinism

". . . One general problem, common to the entire movement, has arisen from the criticisms of Stalin--the problem of the perils of bureaucratic degeneration, of stifling democratic life, of the confusion between the constructive revolutionary force and the destruction of revolutionary legality, of separation of the economic and political leadership from the life, criticism, and creative activity of the masses. We shall welcome a contest among the Communist parties in power to find the best way to avoid this peril once and for all. It will be up to us to work out our own method and life in order that we, too, may be protected against the evils of stagnation and bureaucratization, in order that we may learn to solve together the problems of freedom for the working masses and of social

justice, and hence gain for ourselves ever increasing prestige and membership among the masses." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

With respect to the pledges at the end of the secret Khrushchev report on Stalin (rooting out the cult, restoring Leninist principles, etc.) Pietro Nenni observes:

"Fine declarations which, when Stalin was alive, were made a hundred times by Stalin and other Soviet leaders." (Avanti, 24 June).

". . . Mr. Khrushchev led men of good will to understand that the document itself would be a warning of the monstrous dangers inherent in secret and dictatorial government. I, for one, looked hopefully but vainly at the end of the document for a pledge that the last execution had taken place on Soviet soil. I looked for a pledge of civil rights, for the sacred right of habeas corpus, of public appeal to higher courts, of final judgment by one's peers rather than by professional judges." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"Was Mr. Khrushchev's secret report meant to be secret? Was it delivered in good faith? Things are changing tremendously for the best in the Soviet Union, without doubt, but why then still employ capital punishment? Collective leadership exists in the Soviet Union, but why is so much being done, written and published in the name of Khrushchev? Why not permit recently freed leaders to lead in the new formation of Soviet government and Party?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 28 June)

## VII. Foreign Communist Subservience To Moscow

### 1. British and American Communists Admit Uncritical Adherence to Moscow Line

"Where I failed miserably and where I swear by all that is holy that I will not fail again, was in not exercising the same judgment toward the Soviet Union. This would not have lessened my belief in socialism; it would have increased it, and it would have increased and strengthened the belief of others as well. For I saw only a land that had won socialism, and I failed to see that to win socialism and to abandon the holy right of man to his own conscience, his own dignity, his right to say what he pleases when he pleases, to speak



clearly and boldly for the truth as he sees the truth--and fearing no man, whether right or wrong--is no victory at all.

"It is some small comfort to say that I did not know the facts in the Khrushchev report; but I cannot rest on that. I knew that the death penalty existed in the Soviet Union, and I knew in my own heart that capital punishment is an abomination and a disgrace to mankind. I knew there were prisons, and I believed that civilized society would make a short shift of prisons, and yet I failed to charge the Soviet Union with this. I accepted the fact that Jewish culture had been wiped out in Russia; and I know that this is a fate no culture should ever meet; yet this too I did not challenge. I knew that Jews were forbidden to leave Russia for Israel, and yet I did not raise my voice to protest this restriction, even though I could make no sense or reason out of it. I knew that writers and artists and scientists were intimidated, but I accepted this as a necessity of socialism, even as I accepted all else that I have enumerated as a necessity of socialism." (Howard Fast, New York Daily Worker, 12 June)

"How was it possible for so many Communists in the 'West,' and so many non-Communist statesmen and political leaders to accept the idea that treason and treachery had assumed such fantastic proportions in the Soviet Union as were claimed in the series of purges and trials that took place in the 1930's and subsequently?" (Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 18 June)

"Making due allowance for the distortions and caricatures of Soviet policy that appear in the capitalist press, why did the Daily Worker editors feel called upon to go along with each successive position [of the USSR] without ever having the humility to admit that they may have been wrong in their previous position?" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 22 March)

"... If Marxists in the U.S. come to disagree over a particular issue with Marxists in the Soviet Union, it is we who are in error and must give way. The Soviet position, as if by definition, is 'the Marxist' position. What kind of critical thinking is that? . . . I would rather be right, than Marxist!" (Letter to the editor, New York Daily Worker, 3 May)

"If the Soviet-Yugoslav friction was occasioned at least in part by the unwarranted attempt of one Communist Party to dominate another, on whom did the obligation of objective

criticism rest more squarely than on a party detached by distance and immediate interest from the smoke of that battle [i.e., the CPUSA?]" (Letter from Ring Lardner Jr., New York Daily Worker, 18 March)

[Relative to the Statement of the Executive Committee of the CP Great Britain:] "The statement pleads 'false information' and 'good faith' as an excuse for our own uncritical and inaccurate propoganda about the Soviet Union, extending over a period of 20 years. Surely 'good faith' is not sufficient in the leadership of a party of scientific Socialism? This is not self-criticism, it is self-justification. The statement emphasizes that all abuses in the Soviet Union took place against the background of 'total human advance.' Can one consider a period which opened with the suicide of Mayakovsky and ended with the suicide of Fadayev, which saw the murder of Gorky and the silencing in various ways of many Jewish writers (and perhaps others)--can this period be considered to be one of total human advance?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 4 June)

"Did we really have to wait for Mikoyan to tell us that for '20 years the cult of personality flourished' before we were aware of it or before we could admit it? Our attitude in the past has indescribably been one which can best be described as 'uncritical acceptance.' What the Soviet Union did, we endorsed. Future prospects are inspiring but let us not assume that because the Soviet Union has done something it must be good." (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 6 March)

"But do we learn? For many years people, both Communists and non-Communists, have had doubts about what is now termed 'the cult of the individual.' As Marxists should we accept everything that happens in the Soviet Union uncritically as the best of all possible worlds?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 6 March)

"This sudden rush of criticism amazes me--where was it all hidden before? All the 'discussions' I've attended in the last 15 years and never a dissenting voice did I hear--why?" (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 29 March)

"But support for the general political line of the CPSU does not mean the abandonment of our own right to criticize and of our own need to work out policy on the basis of the need of interests and experiences of the British people. In the last few years work in various

fields of culture has been dominated by Soviet discussions which were not necessarily relevant to our own needs. . . . I am not concerned with the correcting of Stalin's formulations. . . . I suggest that the Communist Party cultural work is badly in need of overhauling, on the basis of freest discussion." (Letter to the editor, London Daily Worker, 12 March)

2. Togliatti Charges that the CPSU Excluded Criticism.

"Later, our parties spoke less and less of the questions which our Soviet comrades faced in the building of a socialist society because, among other things, our Soviet comrades did not present them to us any longer as problems, as they had before, but almost as stages of a progress already well under way, the course of which did not give rise to any new serious themes." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

3. Togliatti Proposes "Polycentrism"

"I do not believe it will be possible for all this to lead to a diminution of the mutual trust and solidarity among the various parties of the Communist movement. However, undoubtedly, not only the need but also the desire for increasingly greater autonomy in judgments will come out of this; and this cannot help but benefit our movement. The internal political structure of the world Communist movement has changed today. What the CPSU has done remains, as I said, as the first great model of building a socialist society for which the way was opened by a deep, decisive revolutionary breach. Today, the front of socialist construction in countries where the Communists are the leading party has been so broadened (amounting to a third of the human race) that even for this part the Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be obligatory. In every country governed by the Communists, the objective and subjective conditions, traditions, the organizational forms of the movement can and must assert their influence in different ways. In the rest of the world there are countries where we wish to start socialism although the Communists are not the leading party. In still other countries, the march toward socialism is an objective for which there is a concentration of efforts coming from various movements, which, however, have not yet reached either an agreement or a reciprocal understanding. The whole system becomes polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different." (Togliatti, Nuovi Argomenti, 16 June)

". . . There is established what I called in the interview . . . a polycentric system, corresponding to the new situation, to the alteration in the world make-up and in the very structure of the workers' movements, and to this system correspond also new types of relations among the Communist parties themselves. The solution which today probably most nearly corresponds to this new situation, may be that of the full autonomy of the individual Communist parties and of bilateral relations between them to establish complete, mutual understanding and complete, mutual trust, conditions necessary for collaboration and to give unity to the Communist movement itself and to the entire progressive movement of the working class." (Togliatti, Report to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, 24 June, L'Unita, 26 June)

4. Reaction to the 30 June Central Committee Resolution

a. Togliatti

"I have not yet read the full text of the CPSU Central Committee final resolution on the origin and consequences of the personality cult. Judging by what I know of the resolution, it seems to me that that document provides a contribution of extreme importance for the clarification of the questions aroused among the international workers and Communist world by the criticism of Stalin's work made by the XXth CPSU Congress.

"As for my attitude at my well-known interview, perhaps the best thing to do now is to read carefully what I have written. In my opinion, and I have said so openly, the line followed by the Soviet comrades in the construction of a Communist society was undoubtedly right; but within the general framework of this acknowledgement, there may be differing opinions on the value and importance of the errors committed under Stalin's leadership, the violations of legality, the restrictions on democracy, and so on, over the economic and political development of the Soviet Union.

"I repeat that such differing opinions are possible and a frank discussion on the matter cannot but prove useful for the development of our movement, because it corresponds to a higher degree of maturity and of mutual understanding and confidence.

"This is all the more true since such differences of opinion do not diminish, but, in fact, as far as myself and the leading organs of the Italian Communist Party are concerned, perhaps they enhance our unreserved approval of action taken by the CPSU leaders to overcome completely the consequences to which the cult of Stalin's person has led in the USSR and in the international workers' movement." (Paese Sera, 3 July)

b. Nenni

"The document of the Central Committee of the CPSU on overcoming the cult of the individual and its consequences, explains several things in the famous secret report of Khrushchev which up to now remained obscure or unknown. It illustrates with the greatest Marxist coherence the causes of the formation of the cult and of the personal dictatorship of Stalin, but it still does not answer the fundamental questions which the Khrushchev report has raised so dramatically with its revelations of the illegalities and the atrocities of Stalin.

"The summary that we have of the resolution of the Central Committee confirms, for example, with the greatest clarity the secret report of how Stalin's personal dictatorship evolved, how difficult it was to combat Stalin during the last twenty years, because his guilt was unknown to almost all of the Soviet people while all the successes of the USSR were attributed to his personal merit.

"We know better why the abnormal situation of the last twenty years developed. Thus we know that certain circumstances contributed to the personal dictatorship of Stalin, among which, as the document of the Central Committee states, was the capitalist encirclement of the USSR, which Stalin used to justify a temporary restriction of democracy which he later rendered permanent. From the resolution of the Central Committee emerges the principle of the necessity of "War Communism" which Stalin exploited for his dictatorial ends.

"But all this is still not sufficient. The phases of passing from the dictatorship of the proletariat to that of the Party, and from the latter to that of Stalin, are not described in the document; nor is there any treatment of how and why Stalin succeeded in carrying out his plans. The practical impossibility of overthrowing Stalin or seriously resisting him after

he had gained control of the Party, his seizure of absolute power, the substituting of himself for the Party and for the constitutional organs of the state, which the Khrushchev report describes, is comprehensible. But why was Stalin able to succeed in ridding himself with relative ease of all his adversaries, in depriving the directing organs of the Party of authority, in substituting himself for justice and government from local soviets all the way up to the Supreme Soviet? Why did the Party, the soviets, the proletariat not resist before Stalin triumphed, and why were those who did resist isolated and defeated?

"The document of the Central Committee does not answer all this; it does not explain why Stalin's power was such that he could exploit a fundamental error which prevailed in the Bolshevik Party after the death of Lenin. Having suppressed the other parties--and thereby democracy based on the plurality of parties--democracy within the party was also suppressed. Having eliminated the other parties, from the Mensheviks to the Socialist Revolutionaries, from competition with the Bolshevik Party, having eliminated the internal factions of the Bolshevik Party, utilizing the rivalry of his followers and oftentimes that of his adversaries whom he succeeded in pitting one against the other, it was easy for Stalin, who in the course of this operation had accumulated immense personal power, also to eliminate democracy from within his own faction, remaining the only legal force in the Party and in the state." (Unsigned editorial, Avanti, 3 July)

c. CPUSA

"In the latest chapter in this discussion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has now given its reply to some of these questions. Many Marxists will feel satisfied with the answers which the Soviet Communist Party now presents. Many will feel that the final answers still need to be found and that the discussion must continue.

"The Daily Worker will have more to say on the Soviet Communist Party's statement in the future and we will keep our readers informed, as the discussion goes on, of the views of Marxists here and throughout the world.

"A deeper probing of the errors in the Soviet Union can only result in speeding the profound changes already getting under way in that country. It can be of

invaluable help to the Communist movements elsewhere, and to the cause of co-existence and world peace." (Editorial, New York Daily Worker, 3 July)

"The Soviet Communist Party's resolution is a most welcome development in the friendly interchange of opinion among Marxists of the world. It correctly turns attention to the profound significance of its XXth Congress, with its historic decisions paving the way for new socialist advances and its far-reaching conclusions on the non-inevitability of war and the possibility for peaceful paths of Socialism in democratic countries.

"The resolution correctly estimates the sinister aims of those reactionary circles who would bury the tremendous achievements of the XXth Congress under an avalanche of speculation about the re-evaluation of Stalin. It coincides with our estimate that reactionary circles here and elsewhere are trying to distort and utilize Khrushchev's special report on Stalin to disrupt the solidarity of the international working class movement.

.....

"In my opinion the resolution of the CPSU goes a long way in explaining--while clearly not justifying--what has become known as the growth of the cult of the individual and the unforgivable violations of socialist legality and principles that took place in the latter period of Stalin's leadership. The substance of this matter will be discussed shortly by our National Committee which will then collectively express its views." (Statement by Eugene Dennis, New York Daily Worker, 4 July)

"It is this attempt to exploit the present discussion in order to attack the fundamentals of socialism and to glorify monopoly capitalism, which the Soviet resolution of the Soviet Communist Party warns against. This warning needs to be heeded by everyone participating in the discussion. However, in my opinion, it would be unfortunate if this warning were interpreted as meaning that the only safe way to discuss is to have no discussion at all. I am afraid that the wording and tone of the Soviet Communist Party resolution opens it up to the interpretation. I say this in spite of the fact that the Central Committee statement, in my opinion, marks an advance in the discussion in that it presents a historical background to the 'cult of the individual.'

"The fact is, however, that the profound questions raised by Palmiro Togliatti and others with regard to the limitations of socialist democracy in the USSR, have no relation to such anti-socialist sentiments as expressed by the New York Times and it does not help the discussion to suggest they do. In my judgment the Soviet statement does not fully answer the questions raised by Togliatti. Nor does it dispose of the matter by quoting from various Communist sources as if in opposition to Togliatti." (Alan Max, New York Daily Worker, 9 July)

"The resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a most valuable and important contribution to analyzing the origins, effects and lessons of the mistakes made by the CPSU under Stalin's leadership. We welcome it.

"In responding to the discussion and views of other Marxist parties of the world, including our own, the resolution reflects the developing relationship of independent and friendly criticism which today marks the fraternal solidarity of Communist parties.

.....

"The resolution of the CPSU is a timely and major contribution to a further strengthening of such international solidarity. It assists all Marxist and working class organizations in their struggle to promote peaceful relations among states, irrespective of social systems--the common desire of all mankind.

.....

"We believe that the resolution of the CPSU provides a convincing answer to the Big Business enemies of Socialism who claim that the gross mistakes made under Stalin's leadership are inherent in Socialism. Not only does the socialist character of the system remain in the Soviet Union, despite the mistakes and injustices under Stalin's leadership, but during the past three years important steps have been taken to correct the mistakes of the past, to further democratize Soviet life and institutions, and to establish guarantees that such harmful injustices will never occur again. We greet these steps and are convinced that the Soviet Union, under the leadership of the CPSU, is moving ahead to a new period of unprecedented Socialist progress.



"In connection with the questions analyzed in the CPSU resolution, we believe certain aspects of the origins and effects of past violations of socialist law and principle need, and will receive, further study and discussion. Among these are: the question of bureaucratic distortions in a Socialist society, as well as the happenings in the sphere of Jewish cultural institutions and their leadership. Our own Party will, in the period ahead, continue to examine these questions with the aim of deepening its understanding of the profound lessons which must be drawn from the disclosures made by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." (Statement of National Committee, 19 July, New York Daily Worker, 26 July)

d. Canada

"The Tribune greets this resolution. It adds greatly to understanding. It puts the whole terrible 'Stalin affair' in better perspective.

.....

"We believe however, that there remain some still unanswered questions: such as the demand for more light on the excesses against certain nationalities or against Jewish cultural life and the Jewish writers. These are not mentioned. All that is said is that Stalin was 'guilty of many lawless deeds.'

"Nor does it answer the criticism of the way in which the Khrushchev report on Stalin was handled. The Tribune has declared it should have been made available to the press as soon as it was delivered and not allowed to 'leak' out through the U.S. State Department.

"While it offers further clarification, it does not acknowledge that the present leaders of the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted the erroneous theory originated by Stalin, from which so many crimes ensued, that the class struggle must be intensified following the victory of socialism. The 'theory' is attributed solely to Stalin and not the Central Committee or the party Congress that also accepted it.

"On balance, however, we find it a forthright declaration which we believe will do much to clear the air, help to end confusion, restore confidence and bring about the ideological unity of Marxist parties everywhere so necessary for the advance of the peoples to peace, to

national liberation, and each in their own way to socialism." (Editorial from the Canadian Tribune, reprinted in New York Daily Worker, 13 July)

e. France

"The Central Committee warmly approves the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU which shows how the cult of Stalin's person was overcome in the USSR." (Statement of the Central Committee, French Communist Party, L'Humanite, 7 July)

f. Great Britain

"We warmly welcome the resolution of June 30 ..."  
(Statement of the Executive Committee of the British Communist Party, 14 July, London Daily Worker, 16 July)

g. Austria

"The resolution ... is welcomed with the greatest satisfaction by the Communist Parties, because it contributes essentially to the clarification of questions in connection with the personality cult." (Johann Koplénig speech to CC/KPOe, Volksstimme, 15 July)

h. West Germany

While adopting a position in accord with that of the 30 June CPSU Resolution, a statement issued by the Secretariat of the KPD included a reference to "symptoms of degeneration" under Stalin, a statement that "the uncovering of the causes which led to the mistakes committed is a task which still has to be solved," and an admission that leading Party cadres had been "fully informed on the entire course of the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU." (That is, the KPD leadership had a copy of the secret Khrushchev speech prior to its publication in the press.) (Duesseldorf, Freies Volk, 2 July)

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NSC BRIEFING

22 March 1956

SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH

- I. Clearest view of recent events in USSR comes from hard look at known facts, and recent history.
  - A. Fact that, during three years since his death (5 Mar '53) Stalin's position has been undergoing gradual and calculated alterations.
    1. Pattern consisted of playing Lenin up, Stalin down: campaign was rolling by Jan '54 (Lenin's 30th anniversary), when Stalin was described as "continuator of Lenin's cause", rather than independent genius of equal stature.
    2. By time of second anniversary Stalin's death (5 Mar '55), day went by almost unmarked.
  - B. Thus, Stalin myth already well-whittled even before Feb '56 Party Congress. Nonetheless, this occasion-- first meeting of Party rank-and-file since Stalin's death--was first when really major, although oblique, blows were publicly struck at remnant of myth.
    1. ~~Without actually naming names~~, Khrushchev *referred* made smiling comment on "restoration of the norms of Party life elaborated by Lenin, which have previously been often violated."

2. Mikoyan, ~~plugging "principle of collective leadership," also slipped in anonymous knifer~~  
"...we must emphasize this old truth because in the course of about 20 years, we in fact had no collective leadership."
- C. Not until 10 March, however, (French Embassy reception) did Amb. Bohlen first catch wind of then two-week old event which underlies present excitement.
1. At reception, two different sources (one the London Daily Worker correspondent, the other unidentified by Bohlen) told him of secret closed session of 20th Party Congress, (other sources state night of 24 Feb. until 4 A.M.) where Khrushchev had spoken "for two to three hours," giving "chapter and verse" on Stalin's "crimes." According these sources:
    2. Khrushchev, who burst into tears three times during speech, charged that Stalin decimated party, executed many of outstanding leaders without cause, and (following purge of Tukhachevsky) "murdered" the 5,000 best officers in armed forces.

3. Said that, at one time, when any important Communist summoned to Stalin's presence, he first took farewell of his family. Said torture was used to extract confessions: those who confessed were promised "dachas," but in fact received "dachas underground."
  4. Said Stalin had disregarded repeated warnings, including some from Churchill, of imminent Nazi attack and, as result, USSR had barely escaped catastrophic defeat.
  5. Said all these "facts" justified attitude of present leadership toward Stalin and that statues and other signs glorification Stalin to be progressively eliminated.
- D. Bohlen commented that, while tale obviously losing nothing in its telling, highly probable some such "secret" speech actually made.
- E. Bohlen also stated Party officials throughout USSR rumored to be in receipt substance of "secret" speech, but that nothing had appeared in Soviet press by 12 Mar., and Soviet censors not <sup>them</sup> passing foreign journalists' stories on subject. <sup>^</sup> (was they are)

II. Within few days of Bohlen report, world press was having heyday with "secret speech" story--and now we leave realm of established fact.

A. Typical press treatment was 15 March Reuters version which had Khrushchev accusing Stalin of: *Bultra - 20 Mar*

1. '36 removal (followed by execution) of NKVD head Yagoda, his replacement by Yezhov, and after '37 "purges," liquidation of Yezhov himself.
2. Liquidation, a decade later, of N. Voznesensky, Politburo economist, whose disappearance surprised his own Politburo colleagues.
3. Insults and threats to Mme. Lenin (Krupskaya) including declaration that if widow kept up public criticism of him, he would issue declaration she had never been Lenin's wife, put "someone else" in her place.
4. At start of June '40 / German attacks, Stalin attributed them to "indiscipline" on part of certain Hitler units, ordered Soviet troops not to return fire. Later, when Germans reached outskirts of Moscow, Stalin--who had been directing operations "from a school globe, without really knowing what a proper map was"--cravenly fled the city, lamenting "we have lost everything that Lenin created."

5. In postwar atmosphere of "fear and terror" under Stalin, Bulganin feared prison, Voroshilov was suspected as UK agent, Molotov was put under house-arrest.

6. Khrushchev added that Stalin had been a violent nationalist, anti-Semitic (and engineer of "Doctors' Plot"), and responsible for torture even of children during "purges", and that this revelation of the true Stalin could be "spread to the people either suddenly or gradually, and I think it would be more correct to do it gradually." Asked from floor, "how did you stand it? Why didn't you kill him?", Khrushchev replied: "What could we do? There was a reign of terror. You just had to look at him wrongly, and the next day you lost your head."

III. Next mixture of fact and press embroidery to arise was over early March disorders in Georgia.

A. Known facts are these, from 15 March Embassy Moscow report: A Scandanavian diplomatic dependent, recently returned to Moscow from trip, had eyewitnessed "noisy demonstrations" in front Tiflis Gov't. building 7 Mar. Later, while traveled by train

from Sochi to Moscow, she was recipient of remarks by "agitated" Soviet lady fellow-passenger.

1. Passenger related that "extremely brutal" police had fired "breast-high" on out-of-hand 3 Mar. Tiflis student demonstration, and that her son, among demonstrators, escaped injury only by throwing self on ground before machine-gunning began.

B. We also know as fact that 3rd anniversary of Stalin's death (5 Mar '56) had gone unremarked throughout USSR, but that on 9 Mar. the Georgian Party paper, "Dawn of the East," front-paged big picture of Stalin and Lenin, plus editorial calling hometown boy "the outstanding pupil of great Lenin."

C. Also have fact of admission by ex-premier Malenkov, visiting in London, that, although British press reports exaggerated, "there had been demonstrations" in Tiflis.

IV. World press had second heyday on Georgia story.

A. Reuters reported (from Vienna, 17 Mar.) that "hundreds of thousands of angered demonstrators in Stalin's native Georgia" on 8 Mar. had demanded dismissal of USSR's present leaders "for making accusations against late Premier," and that police refused to intervene, troops ordered not to fire.



- V. No question but that press accounts of Georgia disturbances both exaggerated and demonstrably inaccurate. However, returning to hard facts, we do know that variety of people in USSR have reacted strongly to Khrushchev's "secret" speech. Among facts are:
- A. TASS report (18 March) of "explanatory" speeches by Mikoyan and fellow-Presidium member Pervukhin to mass rallies of workers at two of Moscow's largest factories.
  - B. Embassy Moscow report (20 Mar) that current "party line" on Stalin being given full treatment at series meetings party "activists," and general outline Khrushchev "secret" speech widely known among non-party circles Moscow.
  - C. Typical reaction one such non-party source (Moscow scenario writer) reported as shock, together with feeling that, while he had been no lover Stalin's policies, "something great I believed in has died." Scenarist further commented: "it took courage for our leaders to admit they were afraid."
  - D. Embassy also reports that, as late as 20 Mar, Soviet domestic press still not criticizing Stalin by name, and domestic reprints of foreign Communist attacks on Stalin (Rakosi, Ulbricht and Togliatti)

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continue to delete direct references and merely note that speakers condemned "personality cult."

VI. Interesting evidence Soviet uncertainty over this hot issue is fact that censors have passed both 19 Mar. AFP statement that "secret" Khrushchev speech actually was made, and 17 Mar. NY Times dispatch from Murmansk which underlined shock, puzzlement and dismay of arctic man-in-street over Moscow's "reassessment Stalin." *New stories -*

- A. Declaring flatly "party workers are explaining things," Times story quotes Murmansk resident as saying "it is no easy thing to make corrections in the policy of personal cultism that has prevailed for so long and under which so many of our youth grow up."
- B. Times story also quotes young Komsomol as saying in response to some of new statements on Stalin: "ridiculous! Stalin was wonderful. Stalin and Lenin, they are two of the same. When you say Lenin, you can also say Stalin."
- C. Meanwhile, apparently indifferent to internal reaction, leadership is continuing debunking campaign. Have these further facts:

1. Tretyakov Gallery (Soviet "national museum")--which once overwhelmed with Stalin pictures and statues--now contains only one small bust of former dictator.
2. Stalin statues also disappearing from other sections Moscow.
3. Rewrite of Party History already in progress.

8 February 1957

THE COURSE OF DE-STALINIZATION  
IN SOVIET DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA THROUGH JUNE 1956

I. Introduction

The Problem for Soviet Propaganda

Stalin! Always we hear in our souls his dear name. And here in the Kremlin, his presence touches us at every step. We walk on stones which he may have trod only quite recently. Let us fall on our knees and kiss those holy footprints.

from THE RUSSIAN LAND, published  
by the Komsomol in 1946.

Thousands of workers representing generations of Soviet people are marching past; their life flows under the sign of love and gratitude to Stalin, Stalin--the beginning and end of our life.

from Radio Moscow's account of  
the celebration of the 35th October  
Revolution anniversary, 7 November  
1952.

The public defamation of Stalin launched at the XX Soviet Party Congress in February 1956, setting off a chain of repercussions that continue to threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc, confronted Soviet propagandists with a challenge of extraordinary magnitude. The propaganda apparatus, which since 1929 had been using its full resources to promote the adulation of Stalin, had now to direct its efforts toward minimizing the dangers and reducing the liabilities inherent in the process of destroying the infallible idol it had itself helped to create.

For 25 years, the peoples of the Soviet world and members of foreign Communist parties had been taught to bow to Stalin as "the greatest genius of mankind" and to accept all his dictates without question. By the time of Stalin's death, his image had been firmly established in the propaganda as that of an all-wise, all-knowing genius whose knowledge was supreme in almost every conceivable field, from politics, history, philosophy and science to folk-singing and stockbreeding. He was hailed as the inspirer of all the successes of the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, including the winning of World War II.

Three years after his death, Soviet propagandists were called upon by Stalin's heirs to tear down this overpowering image. That they have not been altogether successful is manifest in the recent events in the Satellites and is attested by signs of "re-Stalinization" in the Soviet world.

Cautious Deflation of Stalin's Image After His Death

Following Stalin's death, a decision to deflate his image to some degree was reflected in the propaganda's deemphasis of the Stalin cult and greater attention to Lenin. But there was no evident propaganda preparation for the open attack on Stalin at the XX Congress, no indication in the propaganda that a step-by-step process of denigrating

Stalin had been carefully mapped out in advance. Stalin remained a positive though less obtrusive symbol in the propaganda almost until the eve of the Congress.

The course of de-Stalinization in the months following the Congress was manifest in the propaganda in a cautious elaboration and expansion of the charges made against Stalin in Khrushchev's secret speech. The full text of that speech remained unavailable to the Soviet public. Its very existence was not acknowledged in Soviet media until four months after the Congress, when PRAVDA made passing reference to it in the Soviet press's first response to mounting criticism of the Soviet leadership among foreign Communist Parties! Even the sterilized version of Stalin's misrule presented in the propaganda was handled with extreme caution. Continuous efforts were made to counter resistance to the new line and to check efforts to exceed it. Any attempts to carry criticism of Stalin into areas touching on the correctness of Soviet policies and the legitimacy of the present leadership were quickly countered in the propaganda.

#### De-Stalinization Primarily a Domestic Affair at First

The Soviet leadership appears initially to have looked upon de-Stalinization mainly as an internal Soviet affair. Two foreign delegates to the XX Congress, Maurice Thorez and Chu Teh, were apparently not fully aware of the depth or firmness of the attack on Stalin, and during the open sessions of the Congress both made brief references to Stalin as still enthroned beside Lenin.\* Foreign Communist delegations to the Congress were excluded from the closed session at which Khrushchev delivered his attack on Stalin, and various foreign Communists later complained that they were only able to learn of the contents of the secret speech after the U.S. State Department released a version of it.

The propaganda accompanying the attack on Stalin also indicated that denigration of the dictator was viewed as basically a domestic concern: It made repeated appeals for developing the creative initiative of the masses; it promised strict adherence to "socialist legality" by the regime; and it heralded a policy providing greater physical and material security for all segments of the Soviet population, in order to offset the stagnating effects of the heritage of Stalinist police rule and to reinvigorate Soviet society by a new stress on material and psychological incentives. It reflected, in other words, an apparent desire by the Party leadership to find a more effective means of urging the productive forces of Soviet society on to greater activity than had been possible under the Stalinist pattern of rule. But the signs of a retreat toward Stalinism in 1957 mirror the apparent inability or disinclination of Stalin's heirs to carry through a full and decisive break with the past.

This review of the course of de-Stalinization propaganda in the Soviet Union is confined to the campaign as it developed up to the end of June 1956, when the process was still basically a domestic affair for the Soviet leadership. Up to the end of June the propaganda attempted to break the news of Stalin's symbolic death gently to the Soviet population. But by the end of June the international impact of de-Stalinization on the world Communist movement began to rebound; the Soviet

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\* Thorez was later chided by members of the French Party for this "mistake."

- 3 -

leadership lost control of de-Stalinization as a carefully directed process, and Soviet propaganda was forced sometimes to react rather than act. A primarily domestic propaganda problem of making an unpalatable fact acceptable had broadened into a Bloc-wide problem.

## II. Deemphasis of the Stalin Cult After Stalin's Death

During the first week after Stalin's death in March 1953, Soviet media had a final fling at unrestrained Stalin-worship. Never before had the Soviet propaganda apparatus given so much attention to a single event. Radio Moscow devoted all its broadcasts to reports of the funeral, world-wide mourning, and messages of condolence interspersed with music. Regional transmitters abandoned most of their local schedules to relay these programs. By 12 March the lamentation began to subside, and within a week a deliberate effort to deemphasize Stalin became apparent.

The process of deemphasis took the form mainly of restraint in the use of Stalin's name: Stalin was less frequently named in connection with his previously heavily publicized contributions to Communism; quotations from his works were now regularly used anonymously; he was not credited with opening the way for the indulgent measures taken after his death, such as the amnesty and price reductions.

### Stalin Loses Co-Equal Status with Lenin

The toning down of the Stalin image in the propaganda was in line with a new formula for Stalin's historical position set forth in the Central Committee's theses on Party history, published on 27 July 1953 to mark the 50th anniversary of the Party's Second Congress. The theses established Lenin as the uniquely great Soviet leader and Stalin as the continuer of his cause. Anticipating the line taken at the XX Congress, the theses attributed the supreme role during Stalin's long reign to the Party as a whole and its Central Committee in particular rather than to the dictator. However, Stalin continued to be treated respectfully, and his name appeared in the propaganda more frequently than that of any living Soviet leader.

### Collective Leadership Displaces Personality Cult

The theme of "collective leadership" as the guiding spirit of the rule of Stalin's successors emerged in the propaganda along with the deemphasis of Stalin. Acclaim for that theme served as reassurance against anarchy or a war of succession among Stalin's heirs and was clearly not intended as an implicit criticism of Stalinist rule; the collective leadership theme had been used in the same way after Lenin's death, without in any sense reflecting on Lenin's methods of leadership. A PRAVDA article in April 1953 by editor Slepov of the paper's "Party Life" department, pointing to the superiority of the collective leadership method over "rule by administrative measures," took pains not to present the argument in such a way as to reflect on Stalin and in fact invoked Stalin's authority to support the contention. The propaganda said nothing about "restoring" Leninist norms, the device that was to be used at the XX Congress to point to past violations of Party principles under Stalin's rule.

Criticism of the "cult of the personality"--the phrase which during and after the XX Congress became the euphemism for Stalin's misrule--

appeared in propaganda after the dictator's death and before the XX Congress, but with no anti-Stalin overtones. The device of quoting Stalin himself to criticize the "cult," like the device used in the propaganda on post-Stalin collective rule, was used in Party organs. For example, KOMMUNIST's 27 May 1953 editorial, reviewing the Party's struggle against the cult of personality and explaining its harmful effect on initiative in the Party and among the masses, took its text from Lenin's and Stalin's condemnations of the cult and quoted from a letter in which Stalin objected to "the principle of devotion to persons." As late as September 1955, KOMMUNIST again invoked Stalin's name along with Lenin's in an editorial attacking the cult of personality. The use of this device in the propaganda fostered the implication that Stalin had at least not been personally responsible for manifestations of the cult during his lifetime, the key point on which the XX Congress was to effect a reversal.

#### Opportunistic Use of the Stalin Symbol

Favorable references to Stalin appeared in various leaders' speeches throughout much of the period between Stalin's death and the XX Congress. In late 1954 and early 1955, Stalin's name played a key symbolic role in the dispute over priority for heavy industry. Malenkov, in launching the consumer goods program in August 1953, had not associated Stalin with any of his proposals; now his opponents found ammunition in Stalin's injunctions for the preferential development of heavy industry. This opportunistic Stalin revival became manifest in mass propaganda as the Malenkov-Khrushchev struggle reached its climax.

The Stalin symbol was also used at the culmination of Malenkov's defeat, when Khrushchev nominated Bulganin as the new Premier and called him "one of the closest comrades-in-arms of the continuer of Lenin's cause, Iosef Vissarionovich Stalin." And Bulganin in his maiden speech replied that his Government would "follow the instructions of the great Lenin and the continuer of his cause, I. V. Stalin," for the development of heavy industry.

Stalin's 76th birth anniversary in December 1955 received extensive press treatment and radio coverage, surpassing even the radio publicity for his 75th birthday which had been so heavily exploited in support of the Khrushchev forces in the heavy industry controversy. Propagandists even counted Stalin's injunctions to the Party to maintain close ties with the masses and encourage their creativity among his "wise teachings"--the principles he was to be accused two months later of having violated. KOMMUNIST, in eulogizing Stalin, at the same time stressed collectivity as the vital principle of Party leadership; it even cited Stalin's injunctions as consistent with Leninist flexibility and as particularly relevant to current policy.

#### Subtle Hints Foreshadow Open Attack

The Party and its leadership continued to be portrayed as the heirs and loyal executors of Lenin's will, preserved and transmitted through the hands of Stalin, up to the end of January 1956. Stalin continued to be mentioned routinely in propaganda. There was no overt indication of what was in store for the dictator's name and reputation at the XX Congress.

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A public hint that a new line on Stalin had been taken appeared shortly before the convocation of the Party meeting on 4 February 1956, when the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers greeted Stalin's oldest crony Voroshilov on his 75th birthday as Lenin's "faithful pupil" without reference to his comradeship with Stalin, a standard component of such decennial birthday tributes to Soviet leaders. And on 9 February KOMMUNIST was signed to the press without a single use of Stalin's name. PRAVDA and the rest of the Soviet press hailed only Lenin in greeting the opening of the XX Congress.

### III. The XX Congress: From Demi-God to Scapegoat

Khrushchev's opening words at the XX Congress launched the public denigration of Stalin. In a memorial to "most prominent figures of the Communist movement" lost in the period since the previous Congress in 1952, he lumped Stalin casually with Communism's lesser lights, Czechoslovakia's Gottwald and Japan's Tokuda. However, most of the public assaults on Stalin at the Congress were indirect. Only two Soviet speakers ventured to use Stalin's name in the meeting's open sessions: Khrushchev, after slighting the memorial to the late leader, named him again quite respectfully in noting that his death had not caused confusion in Communist ranks as the enemies of socialism had hoped. Mikoyan, the only speaker to heap scorn on Stalin by name, attacked what had been represented as Communism's authoritative blueprint for the future--Stalin's ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM. Otherwise, speakers refrained from naming Stalin in hailing the restoration of "Leninist norms of Party life" such as collective leadership, intra-Party democracy and "socialist legality." They attacked the impersonal "cult of personality," deplored unidentified distortions of history and corrected anonymous erroneous predictions of capitalist stagnation. They looked to Lenin's inspiration to set such errors straight but did not directly impute the errors to Stalin.

Whether planned or the result of the dynamics of pressures upon or within the Soviet top leadership, Khrushchev's sensational indictment of Stalin at the closed final session of the Congress contrasted sharply with the vague criticisms of "mistakes" presented for public Soviet consumption in the speeches delivered at the open sessions. Although the attack on Stalin was gradually expanded and elaborated in Soviet propaganda as de-Stalinization proceeded in the months after the Congress, the public record of the indictment of the dictator available to the ordinary Soviet citizen remains a weak reflection of the contents of the secret speech.

#### Oral Agitation Precedes Frontal Attacks in Press and Radio

Before the first frontal attack on Stalin appeared in the Soviet press and radio, a month after the Congress ended, rumors spread in the USSR about oral disclosure of the contents of Khrushchev's secret speech. U.S. press correspondents report that the contents of the speech, either in full or in the form of a Central Committee circular, were rumored to have been read at closed meetings of lower Party organizations. It was reportedly also rumored that large segments of the public were informed of the attack on Stalin's misrule at open meetings at factories, enterprises and institutions. The only indication in the Soviet press and radio that such meetings were taking place were contained in brief reports--traditional following a Party Congress--that Party leaders,



secretaries and lecturers were addressing meetings throughout the Soviet Union "on the decisions of the XX Congress." However, a Moscow correspondent for the London DAILY WORKER reported that about 30 million people attended meetings at which the contents of the secret speech were reported.

Although rumors spread through Moscow immediately after the Congress that Khrushchev had attacked Stalin for his mistakes and crimes, Soviet censors did not allow foreign correspondents to report on the subject until after the middle of March. Direct criticisms of Stalin in speeches and articles by foreign Communists, beginning with an article by East German Party Secretary Ulbricht in the first week of March, were excised from reports on those pronouncements in the Soviet press and radio.

#### Georgians Protest Stalin Defamation

Despite the extreme caution with which the denigration of Stalin was launched, vigorous resistance to the new anti-Stalin policy among nationalistic Georgians--to whom Stalin was first of all a Georgian--touched off pro-Stalin demonstrations in Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. While in the rest of the Soviet Union Stalin's 5 March death anniversary was pointedly ignored, the date was observed in the Georgian press and radio four days late as an obvious concession to pro-Stalin sentiment in Stalin's homeland.

Apparently in the face of volatile pro-Stalin sentiment in Georgia, the campaign against the Stalin cult took a milder and more cautious course there than in the rest of the Soviet Union for a number of months following the Congress. The local press and radio generally avoided independent comment on the harmful results of the Stalin cult. Deference to local sensitivities by Georgian authorities was revealed when the local press and radio reported the appearance of Stalin posters on government buildings and among marchers on Lenin Day and May Day.

It was not until August 1956 that the Georgian Party leadership apparently considered it safe to initiate a concerted propaganda campaign against the Stalin symbol. While the Party leadership revealed a willingness to permit some concessions to powerful resistance to the new line on Stalin, the course of the anti-Stalin campaign in Georgia showed that such concessions were intended as only temporary and tactical.

#### Removal of Stalin Symbols

While Soviet propaganda held back any open attack on Stalin in the month after the Congress, a quiet process of removing Stalin symbols began. Pictures, statues and busts of Stalin began to disappear from view in such Moscow institutions as the Tretyakov Gallery, the Lenin Museum and the Military museum. A large display of presents given Stalin on his 70th birthday in 1949 was reduced in size and relabeled in such a way as to hide the fact that the gifts were Stalin's. The SHORT COURSE HISTORY OF THE CPSU and Stalin's biography began to disappear from Soviet bookstores. The Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute became the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Moscow's Stalin Automobile Works became the Moscow Automobile Works and was again renamed in June after I. A. Likhachev, a former manager of the enterprise who died on 24 June. The Soviet radio began broadcasting the national anthem without the lyrics, which contain reference to Stalin.

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Although this process began ambitiously, it slowed down after April and has since given no indication that it is intended to erase all visible Stalin symbols.

At the same time, history curricula in the Soviet school system began to be revised, teaching of the history of World War II was discontinued until revised texts were available, and in April the cancelling of final history examinations for students completing secondary schools was announced. One week before PRAVDA's first post-Congress open attack on Stalin, leading Soviet historian Pankratova revealed in a radio interview in Leningrad that a vast long-term process of revising Soviet history was already under way.

#### PRAVDA Initiates Direct Assault on Stalin in Press and Radio

A month's press and radio silence on Stalin's obvious connection with attacks on the "cult of personality" was broken by PRAVDA on 28 March. An editorial article on that date was the opening gun for a series of elaborations of the attack on Stalin, with the general charges being outlined by the major propaganda organs like PRAVDA and specific charges being detailed by more specialized organs like RED STAR, QUESTIONS OF HISTORY and LITERARY GAZETTE.

The 28 March PRAVDA offered a diluted version of some of the main lines of attack developed by Khrushchev in his secret speech: It declared that the Stalin cult in the course of time "assumed ever more monstrous forms and did serious harm to the cause," which led to the "distortion of Party principles and Party democracy, violation of revolutionary law and unjustified repressions." PRAVDA, however, made it clear that Stalin's reputation was not to be completely destroyed. It said that the Party pays "due tribute to the services of J. V. Stalin," and it acknowledged the "great services" of Stalin as "one of the strongest Marxists." It called in effect for a go-slow approach in the campaign against the Stalin cult.

#### PRAVDA Places Limits on Censure of Stalin

On 5 April PRAVDA attacked "rotten elements" in the Party and named a number of minor Party functionaries and members who made "anti-Party" statements and questioned the correctness of Party policy under the guise of condemning the Stalin cult. This editorial--given wide publicity in the Soviet Union--was the first overt sign that the leadership was finding it necessary to move against pressures to exceed the new line on Stalin and enter the proscribed realm of criticism of the Party itself.

Echoes of the PRAVDA attack on "rotten elements" were heard in the regional press and radio during April. PARTY LIFE twice in that month--the second time more emphatically than the first--attacked Party members who had ventured to criticize Party policies and even had dared to call for basic policy changes, parroting "slanders" spread by bourgeois propaganda. The philosophical journal VOPROSI FILOSOFII advanced the argument that the principle of "peaceful coexistence" does not mean ideological coexistence for Western ideas in the USSR, an argument frequently repeated since then in Soviet and Bloc propaganda. The journal added that "Leninist blows" must be struck at any manifestations of bourgeois ideology in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the propaganda reflected the Party's concern that the campaign against the "cult of

personality" could generate widespread disrespect of the authority of leaders in general. Shepilov, in his Lenin Day speech in late April, put special stress on the "great importance" of the leader despite the attack on the cult.

#### Scope of Bloc-Wide Attacks on Stalin Suppressed

Two days after PRAVDA warned about the perils of straying from the official line on the Stalin cult, the press and radio widely publicized PRAVDA's abridged reprint of a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial article giving the Chinese Communist Politburo's views on Stalin. This was the first inkling provided to the Soviet public by overt propaganda that Communist parties abroad were also attacking the Stalin cult.

However, the propaganda continued to withhold from the Soviet public the knowledge that criticism of the Stalin cult had been up to then more detailed and incisive in the Satellite countries of Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Chinese editorial article presented in the barest outline two additional charges against Stalin which had not yet appeared in Soviet media--that Stalin had not been vigilant on the eve of the Nazi attack on the USSR in 1941 and that he had pursued an incorrect policy toward Yugoslavia.

#### Details of Stalin Cult Provided--and Debated--by Specialized Journals

Mass propaganda treatment of the cult remained generalized after the 28 March and 7 April PRAVDA editorial articles on the Stalin cult. A host of Party, professional and specialized publications (SOVIET STATE AND LAW, PROBLEMS OF HISTORY, KOMMUNIST, PARTY LIFE, RED STAR, BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET, and many others) took up the task of more detailed elaboration of the Stalin charges, developed the attack on various Stalinist practices, and rehabilitated victims of the Stalin era. The specifics of the campaign as a whole were thus being mainly directed to special audiences and could only become generally known by a gradual 'filtering-through' process.

Late in April KOMMUNIST took up the allegation that Stalin had pursued incorrect farm policies and had little first-hand knowledge of countryside conditions. Like all the rest of the charges against Stalin to appear in overt Soviet media, this was a weak echo of Khrushchev's accusations in his secret report.

At the end of April the MILITARY HERALD provided the first details in the press of the charge that Stalin had failed to properly prepare the USSR for the German attack in World War II. On 9 May, however, RED STAR took issue with that charge and indicated that MILITARY HERALD had come too close to an indictment of the Party itself on the question--though in fact the MILITARY HERALD's position closely followed that presented by Khrushchev in his secret speech. QUESTIONS OF HISTORY soon came out in support of the MILITARY HERALD's position, and the dispute was officially ended in MILITARY HERALD's favor by KOMMUNIST, the Party's most authoritative organ. The implementation of de-Stalinization emerged as not simply a problem of carrying out full, clear-cut propaganda directives, but as a problem involving areas of ambiguity and even disagreement.

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The Rewrite of Stalinist History

During April QUESTIONS OF HISTORY, coming out almost a month late, refuted the thesis that Stalin had single-handedly led the Soviet Union to victory in World War II, pointed to Stalin's insufficient attention to Lenin's strictures on anti-Semitism, and charged him with deviations from Leninist principles in nationalities policy.

At the same time, the authoritative history organ contributed to the process of clearing the names of leading purge victims of the thirties, a process effected by press organs rather than by formal announcements of rehabilitation. The rehabilitation procedure was kept as unobtrusive and unsensational as possible: The 22 April PRAVDA, for example, printed a previously unpublished letter from Lenin to Rykov, one of the major purge victims, thus subtly rehabilitating Rykov by presenting his name in a not unfavorable light.

In May QUESTIONS OF HISTORY pointed critically to Stalin's March-April 1917 alliance with Kamenev--shot as a counterrevolutionary in 1936--against Molotov in supporting the Provisional government. Stalin's "centrist" position in this period, soon to be overruled by Lenin, had for obvious reasons never been alluded to in official Soviet histories during Stalin's reign. The same issue of the historical journal punctured the myths of Stalinist historiography that the late leader had headed the Caucasus branch of the Russian Workers' Social Democratic Party from 1903 to 1905, that he had organized an underground printing plant in Baku, and that he had led the Baku oil workers' strike in 1904. The journal also continued the rehabilitation process by calling for a reissue of the writings of such former Politburo members as Voznesensky, Kossior, Postyshev, Rudzutak and Chubar, all executed on Stalin's orders.

The concurrent process of rewriting Stalinist history to conform to the new propaganda line was highlighted in June when the publication of Volume 40 of THE GREAT SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA was indefinitely delayed, presumably because the job of rewriting Stalin's biography which would appear in this volume had not been completed. Several succeeding volumes have been issued, but Volume 40 is still to appear. Especially in view of the more positive evaluation of Stalin being formulated in the USSR in early 1957, the writing of the new biography appears to be a particularly challenging task.

De-Stalinization of Law and the Arts

During April the BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET listed new decrees abolishing Stalin's special investigatory and court organs designed to facilitate the execution of purges and at the same time setting up special organs to check on the activities of security agencies. In May the same publication announced the revocation of the Stalinist labor laws calling for severe penalties for workers who leave their jobs without permission.

The journal SOVIET STATE AND LAW also contributed in May to the revisions in the legal field. The high point in this process was the journal's attack on the late Andrei Vishinsky, state prosecutor during the purge trials, for his doctrine of proving guilt on the basis of confessions alone. KOMMUNIST gave the criticism high official sanction by repeating it and conceding that the doctrine had at times led to false convictions.

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In April the organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, LITERARY GAZETTE, spoke of the "dreadful sickness" that the Stalin cult had produced in literature and the arts. It struck out at the Stalin prize-winning motion pictures "The Vow" and "The Fall of Berlin," in which the image of Stalin predominated.

#### Public Disclosure of the Lenin Testament

One of the most carefully guarded documents of Soviet history concealed from public view in the USSR during the Stalin era, the "Lenin testament," was one of a number of incriminating documents used as exhibits in the indictment of Stalin at the XX Congress secret session. It was circumspectly introduced into the propaganda in mid-May. The testament, in which Lenin called for the removal of Stalin from the post of General Secretary, was first publicized only in part and without identification in the youth paper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, in the form of a "guide" for youth on the Stalin cult. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA said it was publishing the "guide," which quoted without attribution some of the Lenin testament's most uncomplimentary remarks about Stalin, in response to numerous inquiries from youth regarding the attack on the Stalin cult. It was not until over a month later that the testament was published in full by KOMMUNIST along with an editorial asserting that "Stalin committed serious errors in leadership over agriculture, military affairs and in the area of foreign policy." Along with the testament, KOMMUNIST also presented for the first time a number of other Lenin documents distributed at the secret session of the XX Congress. The Lenin documents were given added broad distribution in the form of a pamphlet, of which a million copies were published. On 2 July, the day those pamphlets appeared, another pamphlet came out with the text of the Central Committee's 30 June resolution "On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences."

#### Central Committee Resolution Offers "Clear-cut" Answers About the Cult

The 30 June resolution, widely publicized by the Soviet press and radio, signalled a shift in the focus of mass propaganda with respect to Stalinism. It called for a halt to Western Communist assaults on Khrushchev's explanation of the sources and meaning of the Stalin cult, and it made it clear that any challenges of the legitimacy of the present leadership on the basis of attacks on the cult would not be tolerated.

The resolution came close on the heels of PRAVDA's 27 June reprint of an article by U.S. Communist Eugene Dennis that had appeared in the New York DAILY WORKER. The PRAVDA reprint had constituted Soviet propaganda's first response to foreign Communist criticism of the Khrushchev secret speech and first public acknowledgment that the speech existed. The mildest of the foreign Communist criticisms and the most complimentary to the Soviet leadership, Dennis' article was used to pave the way for the 30 June resolution.

The mounting foreign Communist criticism, resulting from the widespread dissemination of the Khrushchev secret speech abroad, had forced Soviet propaganda to go on the defensive. The resolution and a follow-up PRAVDA editorial article heralded an end to the effort in domestic mass propaganda, cautious as that effort had been, to convince the Soviet people of the harmfulness of Stalinist rule. In the propaganda, the Party's achievements, unblemished record and infallibility had not been seriously compromised by the Stalin cult and were to be the proper

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focus of attention henceforth. The role of the Communist Party as the "only master of the minds and thoughts, the spokesman, leader and organizer of the people in their entire struggle for Communism" was forcefully reasserted. In a hackneyed defense of the one-party system, PRAVDA indicated that to entertain the idea of a two-party system in the USSR was rank heresy.

PRAVDA indicated that the 30 June resolution had provided "clear-cut" answers to questions on the Stalin cult from which no substantiated deviations would be allowable. By releasing the Lenin documents, the Soviet leadership had invoked an unimpeachable authority for its use against Stalin without compromising itself. The possibility of release of Khrushchev's secret speech, which delved into the present leaders' relations with Stalin, seemed sharply reduced; the likelihood that the text may be introduced into the propaganda seems even more remote now. The expurgated fragments of the speech fed to the Soviet people in small but cumulative doses over a period of some four months still represents the extent to which the present leadership deems it wise to go in registering the case against Stalin in the full view of the whole Soviet population.

Since most of the text of the secret speech became public knowledge outside the Soviet Bloc in early June 1956, Khrushchev's explanation that the speech would be withheld from the public to prevent giving "ammunition to the enemy" obviously can no longer be the rationale for not publishing it in the Soviet Union. The cautious, piecemeal approach to informing the Soviet people of the case against Stalin, allowing only the Party faithful to learn the full story in detail, reflects what seems to be an underlying distrust and fear of the Soviet masses, based on the concept that the greater the knowledge, the greater the danger.

SECRET  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1957

- II -

New Information on Khrushchev's

Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU

Congress

11 March 1957

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

~~SECRET~~  
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

SUBJECT: New Information on Khrushchev's Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU Congress

1. The following information was received from a highly sensitive source:
  - a. Circumstances of Khrushchev's secret speech on Stalin.

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[REDACTED] who claims to have received his information from Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, recently offered the following explanation of developments at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), held in Moscow in February 1956. When the Congress convened, the Soviet leaders had no intention of admitting that Stalin had been responsible for numerous crimes. They realized that there was considerable dissension throughout the Soviet Union as a result of Stalin's policies. However, they hoped that over a period of time discontent would gradually disappear. During the Congress, several altercations arose among the delegates, many of whom accused one another of being responsible for the murder or the disappearance of the Soviet officials who had been purged during Stalin's regime. The delegates insisted that the leaders of the CPSU provide a complete explanation of what had transpired under Stalin's rule. The situation became so tense that the Congress was temporarily adjourned, and the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU met in an all-night session to decide what action should be taken. A majority finally decided that a report of Stalin's crimes should be made to the delegates. Khrushchev predicted that such a report would give rise to numerous difficulties. He was selected to deliver the report, because a number of his subordinates had been the victims of Stalin's atrocities. It was, therefore, believed that the delegates would feel that he was sympathetic to their complaints.

- b. Existence of a second speech on Stalin's foreign policy.

In addition to this report on Stalin's crimes, which was later made public, Khrushchev delivered another secret report to high-ranking officials of the CPSU, the USSR Foreign Ministry, and the Soviet intelligence agencies. The second report, which dealt with the errors in Soviet foreign policy, has not yet been made public.



NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

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2. Concerning the decision to make the special report on Stalin. The information in 1. a. above checks with reports received from other [REDACTED] sources on the circumstances of the secret Khrushchev speech on Stalin on the night of 24-25 February 1956.

- a. It was reliably reported that General Secretary Gollan of CP Great Britain was told by Soviet leader Ponomarev during the period late May-early July that the decision to make the Khrushchev attack was not taken until the Congress was already in session; that the release of Stalin purgees prior to the Congress had stimulated pressure for further investigations; that during the Congress, the delegates had expressed dissatisfaction with the adequacy of the open-session speeches by Khrushchev and Mikoyan; and therefore, the Central Committee had made an "emergency decision" that Khrushchev should make a special report on Stalin.
- b. The leading Secretary of the Belgian CP, Ernest Burnelle, following his visit to Moscow, reported to Party members that the open criticisms of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress had caused so much surprise and emotion it was then decided to give the secret report on Stalin. According to Burnelle, the Khrushchev speech had not been drafted prior to the Congress, and was an improvised presentation of data designed to show that the open criticisms of Stalin were well-founded.
- c. In addition, Dutch Party leader Paul De Groot has stated that, in his opinion, the open attack had been launched by Mikoyan without Khrushchev's consent, or that Khrushchev was consulted, but did not realize the consequences. According to De Groot, the Mikoyan speech caused such a stir that the delegates forced Khrushchev to deliver his closed-session attack on Stalin. Whether De Groot deduced this on his own or was so advised by the Soviets is not known.

3. Ambassador Bohlen has reconstructed the circumstances in a similar manner:

- a. The general decision to launch a frontal attack on Stalin was made well in advance of the 20th Congress.
- b. But the Khrushchev special report itself may not have been planned in advance.

NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

"It may well be," Bohlen observed, "that although the Party leadership thought that the generalized criticism of Stalin by Khrushchev in his report to the Central Committee, and the somewhat sharper attacks by Mikoyan and Pankratova, would be sufficient to lay the foundation for the necessary revision of Soviet writings, the delegates to the Party Congress were not satisfied with these explanations and that further justification for the dethronement of Stalin was considered necessary."

4. Other circumstantial indicators that the Khrushchev speech was hastily drafted, possibly while the 20th Congress was in session, as the non-Soviet CPs have been told, include the following:

- a. The first part of the speech is painstakingly documented; the latter portion is less so.
- b. Khrushchev, in the speech, said: "Not long ago, only several days before the present congress, we . . . interrogated the investigative judge Rodos. . ." (Underlining supplied.)
- c. As the foreign CPs complained, the speech was notably devoid of an adequate "Marxist analysis" of the reasons for Stalin's rise and reign. This "explanation" was not produced until 30 June. A well thought-out attack would have at least made an effort to give it a decent foundation. The numerous holes in the Khrushchev story, which Communists and non-Communists outside the Bloc have pointed out, also mark it as a hastily prepared document.

5. The existence of a second secret Khrushchev report is plausible. The information set out in paragraph 1, b, concerning a second secret report by Khrushchev on Stalin's "errors" in foreign policy is plausible. Most observers noted the relative lack of treatment of Soviet foreign policy in the version of the report which has been publicized.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECRET [redacted]

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COUNTRY	USSR	REPORT NO.	[redacted]	25X1A
SUBJECT	Foreign Policy Implications of Stalin's Death and the Doctors' Plot	DATE DISTR.	18 June 1953	
		NO. OF PAGES	2	25X1

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[redacted]

REQUIREMENT  
REFERENCES

[redacted]

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.  
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.  
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

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1. The new regime that was set up after Stalin's death has been formed by two strong men, G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beriya, who have been bound by a long friendship and complicity. This regime has come into power by a real coup d'etat and has destroyed the Stalin structure of government and the Communist Party organization which had been selected at the 19th Party Congress, according to the dictatorial wishes of Stalin. It is doubtful that Malenkov's real position was as strong as was indicated by the fact that he had been proclaimed the heir to Stalin by the international press and even by Stalin himself. It is highly probable that Stalin, irritated by and suspicious of the clamor for an heir apparent, had selected Malenkov merely to quiet the clamor and to wait for further developments when other provisions could be made. In any case, if the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had been favorable to Malenkov and Beriya, there would have been no need to reduce it to approximately a third (36 in the original, now cut to 14) in such a drastic and sudden manner. It was probably done because Malenkov and Beriya felt that the Presidium could not be trusted. The same argument can be applied to the reduction of federal ministries by about 50 percent.
2. It has been rumored that, in his last few days, Stalin had been extremely nervous, almost as though he felt death to be near. He may have had an intuition that the noted doctors were incorrectly treating him deliberately on specific orders, and after their arrest, he forced them, with appropriate methods, to confess to being "Zionist agents and spies". He then capitalized on the event to accuse the United States of being connected with the plot and adopted the Tsarist trick of employing anti-Semitism to gain the sympathy of the people. It is certain that the seeking of Arab support was secondary.
3. In the light of recent events, however, the possibility cannot be excluded that Stalin may have designed the doctors' arrests as a step against Malenkov and

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SECRET [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 25X1

- 2 -

Beriya. In fact, in January, the dictator replaced V.K. Abakumov with N.G. Ignatyev as Minister of State Security.<sup>1</sup> Abakumov was a Beriya man, while Ignatyev must have enjoyed the personal confidence of Stalin. As soon as Malenkov and Beriya took power, Ignatyev was removed from his post to become a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party. His appointment was confirmed on 14 March 1953, on the eve of the meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This "promotion" may have been designed to allay the suspicions of Ignatyev's police friends and adherents and to eliminate any possible trouble from them. The public announcement of his new position came on 21 March, and, as is already known, he has now been released.<sup>2</sup>

4. Another possibility is that the release of the doctors and their whole case can be used as an excuse for a purge of the security forces by Beriya, so that the police can be rendered an absolutely secure instrument. Logically, such a purge would precede any other, since it will be the police who will be used to purge the Party and the administration. Such are the traditions of the country and the legacy of the dead Stalin.<sup>3</sup> For centuries, Russia has been governed by force, and the revolutions that have occurred here, as elsewhere, have always been against weak sovereigns or leaders, never against real autocrats.
5. The real power today is the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and not the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party.
6. In connection with foreign policy:
  - a. The "friendly" air in Moscow is most apparent in little gestures.
  - b. A lessening of the obdurate attitude on Korea is logical, since the new regime fears that Stalin's death may induce Washington to carry out the plans of the new Republican administration. No other "Koreas" are likely while the consolidation of the new government is taking place, and this will probably take some time. Moreover, the Soviet people want peace.
  - c. The German question is the most complex. Indications are that the Soviets consider two alternatives: a united but neutral Germany, or two Germanys which will counterbalance each other. The latter solution is preferable to them. Nor can it be excluded completely that the Soviets will insist that either solution be guaranteed by a Locarno-type pact among the four big powers.
  - d. The Austrian question seems to be a corollary of the German question, and it is doubtful that it can be resolved by itself.

25X1A 1. [REDACTED] Comment. The time of Abakumov's replacement by Ignatyev is not known. Abakumov had not been seen since the beginning of 1952, and the first indication that Ignatyev had been appointed in his place came in January 1953, when Ignatyev was nominated by the workers of the MGB to the Moscow City Council.

25X1A 2. [REDACTED] Comment. Ignatyev's release was announced on 7 April 1953.

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] Comment. In the Soviet Union's major purges during the 1930's, the purging of the security forces followed that of the Party and the administration.

SECRET [REDACTED]

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**JOSEPH VISSARIONOVICH STALIN**

*Our Great Leader and Teacher*

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PRESS  
PEKING 1961

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CPYRGHT

### INTRODUCTION

On the twenty-first of December, 1961, members of communist and workers' parties throughout the world celebrate the eighty-second anniversary of the birth of Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, an outstanding figure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet state and a great Marxist-Leninist. Stalin, who was boundlessly loyal to the cause of the proletarian revolution, was an implacable enemy of imperialism. He made great contributions in defending his socialist motherland, in developing the international communist movement, in helping the liberation of the oppressed nations, and in the struggle to safeguard world peace.

It is true that Stalin made mistakes; he was not a "demigod", nor did he pretend to be. But has any leading Marxist ever written that we could never commit mistakes or that it is absolutely impossible for a given communist to commit mistakes? Isn't it precisely because we Marxists-Leninists deny the existence of a "demigod" who never makes big or little mistakes that we communists use criticism and self-criticism in our inner-Party life? Moreover, how could it be conceivable that a socialist state which was the first in the world to put the dictatorship of the proletariat into practice, which did not have the benefit of any precedent, should make no mistakes of one kind or another?

In accordance with Lenin's teachings, Stalin put forward the policy and tasks for the industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, shattered the attacks launched jointly by the Trotskyites and the right opportunist Bukharinites against the Party's general line. In these struggles he defended and creatively applied and developed Marxism-Leninism. For every socialist country, the working class all over the world, and all oppressed nations, Stalin's creative contribution to the theory of Marxism-Leninism is of ineffaceable influence.

The following pages present a selection of statements which testify to the correctness and great value of Comrade Stalin's contribution to Marxism-Leninism.

**STALIN, THE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE**  
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The Party and our people have boundless love for their glorious saviour — the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and the great Stalin. Stalin is with us and where Stalin is there is victory.

From "Speech by E. Hoxha to the Second Albanian Labor Party Congress" (published in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*; April 4, 1952).

Comrades, when one speaks of the services of our Party, of its achievements, one cannot help speaking of the great organizer of the gigantic victories we have achieved. I refer to Comrade Stalin. I must say that he is a truly accomplished, a truly perfect successor and continuator of the cause. It is not easy to grasp the figure of Stalin in all its gigantic proportions. There has been no major undertaking, slogan or trend of policy of any importance of which Comrade Stalin was not the author. All the principal work is done in accordance with the instructions, on the initiative, and under the guidance of Comrade Stalin. All that goes to direct the construction of socialism emanates from this man, and all that we have achieved in the

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period of the First Five-Year Plan has been due to his directions. The mighty will and organization genius of this man ensure our Party timely accomplishment of the big historical turns involved in the victorious construction of socialism.

From S. M. Kirov, *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Moscow (1939).

All members of the Central Committee must work to realize the decisions of this plenum, and this demands from all of us limitless gratitude and love toward the great Stalin, our teacher and leader. We will put forth all our efforts to justify his confidence.

From V. Chervenkov, *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Sofia (February 4, 1950).

It was Stalin who as early as 1913, in his work *Marxism and the Problem of Nationalities and Colonization*, laid the foundation stone for solution of the peace problems.

From J. Plojhar, *Lidova Demokracie*, Prague (December 21, 1952).

Hail the greatest genius of mankind, teacher and leader, who leads us victoriously to communism, our own Stalin!

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov to the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party" (1939).



It is extremely difficult to apprehend Stalin's gigantic contribution to Marxist thought, for there is no field of science which has not been enriched by his genius. It is impossible not to call Stalin the greatest philosopher of our times, the great expert on national and colonial problems, a magnificent strategist.

From *Rzeczpospolita*, Warsaw (December 23, 1949).

In France and Italy, in Malaya and Burma, in Spain and Indonesia, in Argentine and in oppressed Africa, working class revolutionaries, patriots and partisans fight with the name of Stalin on their lips for their freedom and independence. The name of Stalin, the liberator, resounds as a call to fight for peace, freedom and the happiness of the peoples.

From G. Gheorghiu-Dej, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (December 21, 1949).

Long live the wise leader of the Party and the people, the inspirer and organizer of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (published in *Pravda*, October 13, 1952).

**CPYRGHT STALIN, THE TEACHER**

All of the works on the Chinese revolution written by Comrade Stalin — the mighty teacher of the international communist movement — are of the utmost value to the Chinese revolution by virtue of their ability to arm the minds of the Chinese Communists during this lengthy period. The victory of the Chinese revolution is a victory of Marxism-Leninism, or the victory of Comrade Stalin's theories of the Chinese revolution. In this respect, we have been repeatedly told by Comrade Mao Tse-tung that, in order to augment incessantly our strength both in war and in work, it behooves the Chinese Communists to make a good study of the theories on the Chinese revolution evolved by Lenin and Stalin, and in particular the theories of Comrade Stalin.

From "In Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of Comrade Stalin's Great Work *The Problem of the Chinese Revolution*" by Chen Po-ta (published in *People's Daily*, April 21, 1952).

Comrade Mao Tse-tung is Stalin's outstanding student and comrade-in-arms. He was able to become Stalin's outstanding student and to become the leader of China's

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victorious revolution because his methods of work and his methodology are those of Stalin. He applied Stalin's methods to the study of Stalin.

From *Stalin and the Chinese Revolution*  
by Chen Po-ta (December 19, 1949).

The teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin constitute a homogeneous scientific doctrine, the greatest achievement of the human mind. . . . The Stalin Constitution is a Constitution of the most genuine, complete and consistent democracy. Comrade Stalin continued the work begun by Lenin, and developed the doctrine of the State into a homogeneous system.

From "Speech by W. Ulbricht to a Rally of  
the Socialist Unity Party" (May 5, 1953).

Stalin's work on linguistics inspired educators and enabled them to clarify, on the basis of Stalin's guidance, basic questions and principles of the science of education.

From *Kozneveles*, Budapest (June 1952).

The teaching of Stalin embraces all the universal principles of nature in its smallest details. He solves all the practical problems of understanding natural science. Stalinist science has become a planned science.

From *Elet es Tudomány*, Budapest  
(December 24, 1952).

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Comrade Stalin's splendid guidance on questions concerning the Chinese revolution was of tremendous invaluable significance for the victory which the Chinese people won in the revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of China.

From "Greetings to the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" by Liu Shao-chi (October 1952).

What better means of influencing pupils can the teacher find than, for example, the following characteristic of the spiritual figure of Stalin given in the *Short Biography*? Everyone knew the irresistible shattering power of Stalin's logic, the crystal clearness of his intellect, his iron will, devotion to the Party, his modesty, artlessness, his solicitude for people and mercilessness to enemies of the people.

From "Marxist-Leninist Education of Soviet Teachers" (published in *Uchitelskaya Gazeta*, 1947).

Stalin's work and the lesson of his life are, and always will be, a guiding light for the Chinese people. Acting in the Stalin spirit, we will proceed to build happiness for ourselves and render all possible help to our friends.

From "Stalin Worked for Peace, Progress and People's Freedom" by Soong Ching Ling (published in *China Reconstructs*, March, 1953).

**STALIN, THE VIGILANT DEFENDER  
OF MARXISM-LENINISM**  
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Every Bolshevik, every worker, every citizen of our Soviet country must clearly realize that the successful and victorious destruction of fascist agents—all those contemptible Trotskyites, Bukharinites and bourgeois nationalists—is owed first of all, personally to our leader, our great Stalin.

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov to the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party" (1939).

Comrade Stalin not only masters to perfection the entire scientific inheritance of Marx-Engels-Lenin, not only safeguards the Marxist-Leninist theory in the severe struggle against the opportunists of all classes, not only is a genial prophet of the scientific inheritance of his teachers, but enriches Marxism-Leninism with a number of great discoveries and further develops the Marxist-Leninist theory.

From A. Mikoyan, *Rabotnichesko Delo*  
Sofia (January 7, 1950).

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As a result of Stalin's leadership of the Soviet armed forces the Soviet people have preserved the independence of their fatherland and all the people of the world were saved from fascist cruelties.

From *The Great Soviet Encyclopaedia*  
(Approved for publication June 19, 1951).

Comrades! The Soviet Union under the genius leadership of our wise leader and military commander Generalissimo Stalin not only defended its freedom and independence, but made the decisive contributions to the struggle of all the united nations against the German-fascist usurpers, and saved the nations and civilizations of Europe and the whole world from fascist enslavement.

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov at the Republican Conference of Leaders of Agriculture in the Ukraine" (January 19, 1946).

Stalin was a devoted Marxist-Leninist, a devoted and steadfast revolutionary . . . he also did much that was useful for our country, for our Party, for all the international workers' movement. Our Party, the Soviet people will remember Stalin.

From "For a Close Tie of Literature and Art with the Life of the People" by N. S. Khrushchov (published in *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1958).

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. . . Stalin was a wise commander who made all important decisions and who alone led the nation to victory over fascism.

From W. Ulbricht, *Neues Deutschland*  
(March 19, 1956).

We have recently been accused in the West of being "Stalinists", "followers of Stalin". In reply to this we have already declared more than once that to our minds the term "Stalinist", like Stalin himself, is inseparable from the great title of Communist. When one speaks of the cause of the revolution, the defence of the class interests of the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle against our class enemies, Stalin courageously and unyieldingly defended the cause of Marxism-Leninism. . . . May God grant that every communist will be able to fight as Stalin fought.

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov at a reception in the Embassy of the Chinese People's Republic" (published in *Pravda*, January 19, 1957).

The Party fought and will continue to fight against all those who slander Stalin.

From "Speech by N. S. Khrushchov at the Jubilee Session of the USSR Soviet Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution" (November 6, 1957).

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"Only by adopting an objective and analytical attitude can we correctly appraise Stalin and all those comrades who made similar mistakes under his influence, and only so can we correctly deal with their mistakes. Since these mistakes were made by communists in the course of their work, what is involved is a question of right versus wrong within communists ranks, not an issue of ourselves versus the enemy in the class struggle. We should therefore adopt a comradely attitude towards these people and not treat them as enemies. We should defend what is correct in their work while criticizing their mistakes, and not blankly denounce everything they did. Their mistakes have a social and historical background and can be attributed especially to their ideology and understanding. In just the same way, such mistakes may also occur in the work of other comrades. That is why, having recognized the mistakes and undertaken their correction, it is necessary that we regard them as a grave lesson, as an asset that can be used for heightening the political consciousness of all communists, thus preventing the recurrence of such mistakes and advancing the cause of communism. If, on the contrary, one takes a completely negative attitude towards those comrades who made mistakes, treats them with hostility and discriminates against them by labelling them this or that kind of element, it will not help them to learn the lesson they should learn. Moreover, since this means confusing the two entirely different types of contradiction — that of right versus wrong within our own ranks and that of ourselves versus the enemy — it will only help the enemy in his attacks on the communist ranks and in his attempts at disintegrating the communist position."

From "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (published in "People's Daily", December 29, 1956).



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STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Some forms of Stalinism\* have regained ground in the USSR since early 1965. Such gains are noticeable in the cultural, political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in the distinctly less unfavorable press treatment of Stalin and his era. Evidence of a trend towards reviving Stalinism, as well as of opposition against this trend, is discussed below and is given in greater detail in the attached survey.

Whereas the consistency of the evidence is convincing that there has been a step back towards Stalinism by the power establishment, it is difficult to measure the extent of such a reversion. Similarly, there is evidence of determined resistance to Stalinism by a broad range of intellectuals but its strength cannot be easily measured. Nor can popular reactions be gauged. But it is not the purpose [REDACTED] to strike the balance between the forces for and against Stalinism. Rather, it is to provide the background of an issue that now plagues the leaders of the USSR\*\*, and is expected to continue to cast a long shadow over the future of the Soviet society.

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\*We call STALINISM the degenerated form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" wherein the power of the class, or of the party, is replaced by one-man rule and wherein the other dignitaries of party and government, even in the top echelon, are reduced to mere yes-men and tools of the dictator. The decision-making processes that result from the whims of one-man rule are incompatible with the original teachings of Marx and Lenin and are devastating not simply in the expenditure of human life but, even more important for the whole society, politically and historically.

\*\*Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has made a meaningful statement of policy concerning Stalinism; however, as will be pointed out, there is clear evidence that Brezhnev at least has considered Stalinism to be a major problem.

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[REDACTED] Cont.)

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Khrushchev's downfall was presumably largely due to the fact that he endangered the status of the privileged new class (Djilas!) -- not physically but in terms of political power; and, at the same time, he failed to satisfy the needs of a modern industrial society and the aspirations of the young generation. The current struggle between De-Khrushchevization and Re-Stalinization reflects these insoluble contradictions in Soviet society today: the beneficiaries of Stalinism refuse to abandon their privileged position; and vicious Chicom criticism makes it even more difficult to abandon the dictatorship even in words (the Chicoms have intensely criticized the passage in the new CPSU program promising "rule of the entire people").

Literary affairs have provided the fiercest and most overt battleground of Stalinism. The first sign of a reversal of the Khrushchev regime's literary climate was seen in the report of a writers' congress in early March 1965. [redacted] The most forceful reflection of Stalinism is the Sinyavsky-Daniel case [redacted] which pointed up -- but did not equate with -- a host of reminders of Stalin's worst excesses. The role of the KGB in this trial connotes its continued importance in the CPSU bureaucracy and recalls the security police past of some of today's leaders. While reactionary Soviet critics have been increasingly aggressive, they have not shown that they now dominate. The battle over Stalinism may well attain serious proportions at the USSR Writers' Congress which was postponed from June until probably late fall of this year -- possibly at behest of these reactionaries.

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In the political sphere the most open manifestation of Stalinism appeared in the widely reported efforts by Brezhnev to gain acceptance at the 23rd Party Congress of a "balanced" historical view of Stalin's 30-year reign. [redacted]

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[redacted] When this move was resisted, Brezhnev toned down his treatment of Stalin. Subsequently, however, Brezhnev has appeared to be practicing Stalin-style politics, as demonstrated by his heavy-handed strategy at the special May Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

CPSU politics have generally shifted from Khrushchev's relatively open, live atmosphere to the present inscrutable dullness. Reading between the lines of the CPSU press, some analysts are speculating that intra-Party relationships may be subject to re-examination and change subsequent to the 2-3 August meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Trends are believed to represent a turn backwards toward Stalinism, and to help to consolidate the strength of Brezhnev and/or Kosygin, both of whom rose to their first positions of prominence during the purges of the 1930's. A possible long-term beneficiary would be Politburo member A.N. Shelepin, one of Stalin's last appointees (as chief of the Komsomol in 1952).

In the Soviet economy's much-needed and long-overdue reform, conservatives whose orientation reflects their training in economic administration during Stalin's time are obviously dragging their feet. The

conservatives, who also qualify as bureaucrats, evidently believe that a serious economic reform, including meaningful price revision and direct commercial relationships between managers of supplying and manufacturing organizations, as well as retail outlets, would reduce their role in running the economy from Moscow.

The new leaders' economic policies have shown a trend which is reminiscent of Stalin's era. The early indications of an effort to supply more consumer goods [redacted] and cut down on military outlays have been reversed. The grandiose irrigation and drainage program being pushed especially hard by Brezhnev -- and of questionable economic justification, bears a striking resemblance to Stalin's Great Projects for the Building of Communism.

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Soviet military leaders have apparently succeeded in getting satisfactory budgetary and supplementary allocations and in having won support for the programs they consider necessary, an achievement which is in line with Stalin's persistent goal of fostering the development of the armed forces. The opinions of some top leaders on recent non-military issues reflect the group's conservatism -- which probably reflects their age, averaging over 60, and the fact that they survived Stalin's purges.

A survey of the press indicates that de-Stalinization has come to a crashing halt. Only twice since March 1965 have Stalin's policies been attacked in the press. And allusions to Stalin have virtually disappeared from press rehabilitations of Stalin's victims, which are also less evident in the central press even though they continue in expurgated form in the provincial press. So far the regime has not been able to rehabilitate Stalin and/or his era in any straightforward manner.

Objections to the present regime's suspected return to Stalinism have been registered from all over the world. Free World criticism focused on the Stalinist aspects of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. Sixteen non-Bloc CP's also criticized the Sinyavsky-Daniel case and the PC of Italy went so far as to declare in its newspaper just before the 23rd Party Congress that it could not accept a re-evaluation of Stalin's role if the Congress should make such a decision. Novotny is also widely reported in the Western press to have objected to Brezhnev's intention to refurbish Stalin's image at the Congress. Furthermore, writers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland voiced disapproval of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case.

In the USSR itself, extraordinary opposition to the Soviets' handling of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case welled up around the time of the trial. Of the greatest significance is the reported letter of mid-February to the Kremlin from 25 leaders in a broad range of professional fields. The letter warns against the rehabilitation of Stalin, and asserts that Western CP's would view Stalin's rehabilitation as "capitulation to the Chinese." This and other internal protests were credited

by Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian as apparently representing a "last resort" to head off a "formal decision" (implicitly on re-Stalinization) by the conservatives in the CPSU. In spite of subsequent heavy assaults by conservative elements, a few liberal writers have continued in late spring and early summer to register opinions which can be understood to represent opposition to Stalinism.

It is difficult to speculate how the current uncertainty over the eventual place of Stalin and Stalinism in Soviet society will be resolved. In this conflict, the reactionary side apparently has the preponderant power and control: political, military, economic. The liberal side has no real power or organization, but probably has the support of many intellectuals, the most significant of which are undoubtedly the scientists. Where the muted masses -- and particularly the youth -- stand on the question of Stalinism, is not known. But however the sides line up, and whatever may be their mode of conflict, the issue of Stalinism, like several other unresolved questions in the USSR, is overripe and must be settled soon.

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Where speakers and writers, looking at Stalinism historically, shrug off the present as being a vast improvement over Stalinism as practiced by its creator, we use Free World standards to judge Soviet society and to deny respectability to any aspects of Stalinism. For example, some excuse the outrages of the Sinayavsky-Daniel case by suggesting that under Stalin the authors would have had no trial (rather than a patently unjust one violating even the weakly written laws for the protection of Soviet citizens), and would have been summarily executed (rather than being sentenced to long imprisonment at hard labor). They may shrug off reversals of policies promising improved supplies of consumer goods by pointing out that under Stalin thoughts of increased well-being were simply unreasonable. They may excuse Brezhnev's apparent move to garner more power for himself as a pale reflection of Stalin's maneuvers.

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## CURRENT SOVIET AFFAIRS

### *Culture*

#### Socialist Realism Begins a New Offensive

For the third time since state awards have existed in the USSR, Soviet literature has been given the cold shoulder. The first occasion was in 1958, at the height of the bitter struggle waged by the Party against the literary revolt known as the "thaw." That writers were being deliberately punished for their "free-thinking" tendencies was clear from the observation made at the time, that "a prize is at one and the same time a form of encouragement and a form of criticism."<sup>1</sup> The second occasion was last year, when creative literature was again ignored and only the sector of journalism was honored by the award of a prize to S. Smirnov for his documentary series on the defense of the fortress of Brest-Litovsk.<sup>2</sup> The reasons for this were doubtless the fact that the previous year had seen the publication of a number of works that had provoked the Party leaders' disapproval and the growing conflict between writers of the progressive and dogmatic schools. Now punishment for disobedience has been meted out again. This is even less surprising in view of the fact that this year's candidates for literary prizes included writers at whom the Party leaders look very much askance—namely, Voznesensky, Martynov and especially Yury German.

The resolution of the Twenty-Third Party Congress devoted its tenth and penultimate paragraph to problems of literature and art:

The Congress attaches great importance to developing the literature and art of socialist realism. The Party expects of creative workers new and important works that shall impress us by the depth and truthfulness of their reflection of life, by the strength of their ideological *elan* [and] their high artistic skill, actively assist in molding the spiritual physiognomy of the builder of Communism [and] educate in Soviet people lofty moral qualities, devotion to Communist ideals [and] a feeling of civic duty, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism.<sup>3</sup>

These lines contain little that is new, but nevertheless it would be a mistake to imagine that literature and the arts really occupy tenth place in order of importance. The congress was, of course, officially devoted to economic problems, but other departments of the country's life were also touched upon, including the one with which we are concerned here. The importance of the arts under a Communist system hardly needs stressing: as the most important means of ideologically influencing the masses, their morganatic marriage with the prosaic problems of economics becomes inevitable.

In his report on behalf of the Central Committee, Brezhnev devoted considerable space to literature and art, drawing attention to causes of dissatisfaction:

<sup>1</sup> *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, April 24, 1958.

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, April 22, 1965.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, April 9, 1966.

Unfortunately, such journeymen of the arts are to be found who, instead of helping the people, choose to specialize in denigrating our regime and slandering our heroic people. Of course, these are only isolated cases, which by no means express the feelings and thoughts of our creative intelligentsia, which is indissolubly linked with the people and the Party. These renegades scoff at what is most holy for every Soviet man—the interests of the socialist homeland. It goes without saying that the Soviet people cannot ignore the shameful activities of such people. It treats them as they deserve.<sup>4</sup>

This should not be taken merely as an approving comment upon the recent trial of the writers Sinyavsky and Daniel, but rather as a warning to the considerable body of Soviet writers who have independent opinions and who are championing freedom of expression. Altogether, it constitutes a principle of the Party's policy with regard to literature and art. This is confirmed by the response which Brezhnev's words found during the subsequent course of the congress. The response came from leading Party officials. A. A. Yepishev, head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, when dealing with the ideological struggle, dwelt principally on evidence of a dissatisfactory state of affairs in literature. He called for stricter control of writers:

The slightest relaxation of attention to ideological work, a lowering of demands in respect of arming cadres with revolutionary theory and the ideological content of works of literature may lead to annoying *contretemps*. This is evidently why on occasion "works" appear which bear traces of apoliticalness, lack of ideological principles, and, in some cases, quite simply anti-Soviet tendencies.<sup>5</sup>

Yepishev involuntarily implied that the "freethinkers" are far from few in number:

Those lacking ideological integrity and guilty of petty-bourgeois dissoluteness reveal themselves in the fact that some under the banner of freedom of creation, others under the pretext of fighting consequences of the personality cult, yet others under the cloak of "championing" historical truth and authenticity, in fact are coquetting before the mirror of history and are trying to detract from the heroic history and struggle of our Party, the nation and its army, the glorious fighting and revolutionary traditions of older generations, denigrate Soviet reality [and] minimize the greatness of our victory over fascism in the last war.<sup>6</sup>

Not surprisingly in view of his position, Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary S. Pavlov dealt with this question in some detail. He too accused writers who refuse to comply with the Party's demands. Remarking that successes were understandably sometimes accompanied by failures, he added: "We cannot, however, justify the artist who, unable (or unwilling) to get a clear idea of the dialectics of life, takes refuge in a small and musty world of self-analysis, defamation [and] modernist philistinism."<sup>7</sup> The significance of the parenthetical "or unwilling" needs no stressing.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, March 30, 1966.

<sup>5</sup> *Izvestia*, April 5, 1966.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, April 4, 1966.



First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee V. Konotop declared:

Certain works of literature published recently, particularly in the columns of such journals as *Novy mir* and *Yunost*, and also, unfortunately, certain films and stage productions sometimes give a distorted idea of our Soviet life, isolated shortcomings and difficulties are presented with relish, skepticism and apoliticalness are cultivated and responsible officials are deliberately contrasted with the collectives. In publishing ideologically harmful works, responsible officials of journals and publishing houses are voluntarily or involuntarily departing from the Leninist principles that literature should show Party spirit [*partinost*] and be rooted in the people [*narodnost*].<sup>8</sup>

The speech made by First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee N. Yegorychev was even sharper in tone, being peppered with expressions such as "a one-sided reflection of the past and present," "a conciliatory attitude toward alien views and feelings," "elements of nihilism and skepticism," "ideological saboteurs," "narrow-minded peevishness," etc. He particularly drew attention to one group of artists and writers, of whom he said: "Unfortunately, there are also people who think not so much about their duty to the people as about what will be said about them abroad."<sup>9</sup> Yegorychev attributed this to a spirit of "political devil-may-care," and urged the need to "apply the Party line militantly and consistently in creative collectives."

Significant of the Party leaders' desire to suppress the champions of artistic freedom, or at least to belittle them in the public eye, is the fact that A. Tvardovsky, candidate member of the Party Central Committee, editor of *Novy mir* and a well-known poet, was not elected a delegate to the congress, whereas other writers of much less importance, such as Sergei Baruzdin, Mikhail Dudin, Sergei Mikhalkov, Mikhail Alekseyev and A. Koptelov, did attend. The "dogmatic" school, on the other hand, was well represented, including V. Kochetov, N. Gribachev, G. Markov, N. Rylenkov and V. Kozhevnikov. (At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, it was Tvardovsky who delivered the main speech on behalf of the writers.)

It is of interest to see what writers had to say at the recent congress. The Party leaders were followed by G. Markov, Secretary of the Board of the Union of Writers of the USSR, who began with the dubious assertion that Soviet literature was as old as the Soviet regime. (For some time after the Revolution, the leading writers were men to whom one could hardly apply the epithet "Soviet.") Markov proceeded to bang the drum for socialist realism, which, he said, "provokes especial indignation among our enemies." The main point of his speech was a condemnation of writers' "free-thinking" tendencies:

In recent years, we have seen the appearance of works [of literature] in which deep artistic analysis of the complex problems of today gave way to superficial descriptions, one-sided views or literary mannerisms, which on closer inspection proved to be nothing but an imitation of the fashionable models of bourgeois litera-

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, March 31, 1966.

ture. In every case, the result was the same: the overall picture of our life was distorted, reality was artificially confined by the artist to the circumstances of a single fact or event, mostly isolated from the general current, and came into conflict with the truth . . . of our age.<sup>10</sup>

In his contribution, Sholokhov even outdid the "dogmatics" in his condemnation of progressive writers. Apart from his attacks on those whose works have been published abroad, his attitude to persons (and collectives) championing writers who have been condemned and "subjected to repression" is of interest:

I am not ashamed of those who have slandered their homeland and dragged in the mud everything that is most sacred to us. They are amoral. I am ashamed of those who tried and are trying to defend them, whatever their motives for doing so may be.

I am doubly ashamed of those who offer their services and apply for condemned renegades to be entrusted to them on bail.<sup>11</sup>

The following passage is also remarkable:

All the time I keep thinking of one thing. If these young rascals with their black records had been living in the memorable period of the twenties, when sentences were passed on the basis, not of strictly delimited articles of the criminal code, but of a "revolutionary sense of justice," these werewolves would have received a far more severe punishment.<sup>12</sup>

These attacks, taken in conjunction with Sholokhov's extremely unconvincing, even helpless, analysis of the work of Soviet writers, offers further evidence in support of the view that the award of last year's Nobel Prize for Literature was misguided.

From these excerpts, it is fairly clear that although the congress was primarily devoted to economic questions, literature and art occupied an important place in the proceedings, and that here most attention was devoted to the conflict between progressive writers and the supporters of Party conservatism. It becomes more difficult to grasp the full scale of this conflict since many literary contributions are either not published at all or publication is held up for long periods with the result that they lose some of their force and topicality. Despite the severity of the censorship, however, some things get through. We may take as an example the novel by the Belorussian writer V. Bykov, *The Dead Feel No Pain*, which was published in the first two issues for this year of *Novy mir*. This gives a vivid portrait of the typical Stalinist, the fanatical and heartless Communist, in the characters of Captain Sakhno and the state prosecutor of a military tribunal, Major Gorbatyuk. Although no coward, Sakhno always manages to be out of danger. For him, all considerations of humanity fade before the law. Without hesitation, he shoots wounded men when his unit is forced to retreat and imposes the death sentence for negligible offenses. He decides the fate of a German prisoner with the words, "Strangle him!"

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, April 4, 1966.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, April 2, 1966.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

Another example of the recent tendency in Soviet literature to portray the Stalinist not as a blind executor of orders but as embodying all the qualities which were responsible for the lawlessness of the Stalin era may be found in V. Popov's novel recently published in *Moskva*. One of the characters is a certain Karygin, who became an oblast Party committee secretary in 1937:

At thirty, [he is] an oblast committee secretary, invested with the power to punish or pardon, to decide all questions, both economic and political . . . But the main thing is that whatever he does he gets off scot-free; he has unlimited possibilities for suppressing discontent and criticism. If they attack you at a meeting, you can label [the critic] a slanderer who is undermining the authority of the oblast committee secretary and consequently the authority of the Party which gave him this post . . .<sup>13</sup>

Such literature on the Stalin era was condemned by speakers at the congress, particularly Yepishev. The Party leaders had clearly decided to stick to the orthodox ideological line with regard to literature and to tolerate departures from Communist dogma only in the economic sphere. In general, ideological principles are considered to be of greater importance than the country's economic structure and the Party's organizational activities. If this had not been so, the Communist system would have collapsed after the introduction of NEP. At that time, the Party temporarily sacrificed its basic economic principles while holding fast to its ideological line. Thus, whatever temporary concessions it may make, the Party can on no account allow its own members to take the ideology lightly. Party members, for example, were in no wise concerned by the legal recognition of religious bodies during World War II. Since ideological positions are all-important, it follows that art, as the sole means of implanting this ideology in the masses, must be firmly confined to a subsidiary role. The teachings of the founding fathers of Communism, Marx and Engels, and the heritage of the practical revolutionary Lenin are studied, if at all, only by the theoreticians, not by the masses, which can only be reached by emotional means, and now that the romantic appeal of the Revolution has faded and a critical approach is spreading the Party leaders are obliged to take whatever measures seem necessary in order to preserve the appeal of art. Thus, the freedom of action that has been granted to science and technology remains forbidden fruit as far as literature and the arts are concerned.

This attitude of the Party is reflected in the representation of writers' organizations in the higher Party organs. Only two writers, Sholokhov and Korneichuk, have retained their positions as full members of the Central Committee, and of the three who were formerly candidate members—Tvardovsky, Surkov and Gribachev—only the last has survived in this position.

According to long-established tradition, writers' congresses and similar meetings are held soon after a Party congress, while the latter's resolutions are still fresh in people's minds. The next congress of the Union of Writers of the

<sup>13</sup> *Moskva*, 1966, No. 1, p. 53.

USSR is to take place this year. Preparations for this event are already under way, and are dominated by the line adopted at the recent Party congress. During the second half of April, the board of the Writers' Union of the RSFSR held a plenary session at which the Party's demands were presented by the "non-Party dogmatic" N. Sobolev, who said:

At this [the Twenty-Third Party] Congress, questions of literature fortunately received very close attention, which was friendly but at times also severe. The most important conclusion, as may also be seen from the speeches at our plenary session, is yet another firm assertion of the Leninist principle of the Party spirit of literature, departures from which, as the opinions of congress delegates showed, lead to regrettable and sometimes dangerous results.<sup>14</sup>

In his address, M. Alekseyev gave an account of the state of affairs in the main *genres* of literature and emphasized the viability of socialist realism. He declared:

The tasks imposed on the Party and the people at the Twenty-Third Congress... oblige writers to put their entire literary household into a state of complete military preparedness and to mobilize all types of weapons, all *genres* of literature.<sup>15</sup>

A similar tone was adopted by a number of other writers, chiefly of the dogmatic school:

Today's urgent need is for the creation of full-blooded artistic characters in which the best features of our contemporaries—worker, kolkhoznik, intellectual, soldier—are accumulated.<sup>16</sup>

The first meeting of this kind to take place in the Union republics after the Party congress was the fifth congress of the Tadzhik Writers' Union, devoted to the stabilization of the subsidiary role of literature. Much attention was given to young writers who displayed "a retreat into the intimate world of personal experience, sometimes an incomprehensible *Weltschmerz*."<sup>17</sup>

In this way, the Party leaders hope to put an end to the "unsatisfactory state of affairs" which provoked so much comment at the Party congress. Neither the congress nor the meetings that followed, however, appeared to recognize the one serious obstacle in their path, namely, the process of spiritual emancipation, which is constantly gaining momentum.

A. Gayer

<sup>14</sup> *Literaturnaya Rossiya*, April 29, 1966, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup> *Literaturnaya gazeta*, April 26, 1966.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, April 28, 1966.

Stalinism\*: Past and Present

Stalin's reign of 30 years left deep imprints on Soviet society: his influence and the self-serving interests of the CPSU bureaucracy have resisted subsequent efforts to eradicate the effects of his policies and personality. These efforts, usually termed de-Stalinization\*\*, have been sporadic. Right after Stalin's death the Malenkov regime adopted policies which differed radically from Stalin's. Khrushchev, in bidding for and rising to power in 1954 and 1955, urged and then reinstated some of Stalin's policies (e.g., the clear-cut primacy of heavy industry). During most of his 9 ½ year reign however, Khrushchev's policies led the USSR away from Stalinism -- a development dramatized by his denigration of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and his removal of Stalin's body from its resting place next to Lenin's in the Kremlin mausoleum during the 22nd Party Congress in 1961.

When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power in October 1964 they at first paid less attention to Stalinism than to Khrushchev's "subjectivism." Beginning around the first of March 1965, however, evidence has pointed to a shift away from de-Stalinization and towards policies which smack of a Stalinist flavor.

In the realm of literature, the most forceful reminder of Stalinism is seen in the Sinyavsky-Daniel Case. The sudden move of the KGB to arrest the authors in September 1965, their 5-months' detention incommunicado before the trial, the patently rigged trial in February 1966, the harsh sentences of 7 years at hard labor for Sinyavsky and 5 years at hard labor for Daniel, and the tenuousness of the charges -- producing anti-Soviet propaganda -- all conjured up a grim image of Stalin's ways.

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\*To some, Stalinism is equated with unprincipled political methods, mass starvation of peasants, blood baths, ruthless dictatorship, police repressions, concentration camps, and thought control. Observers of contemporary Soviet society, when speaking of Stalinism, usually refer to such subjects as cultural and political orthodoxy, the degree of centralized planning and operation of the economy, and priority to the military in allocations of scarce goods.

\*\*Khrushchev deemed elimination of the deadening effects of Stalin's methods and psychological climate necessary for the institution of progressive changes in the Soviet society. According to Robert Conquest, such de-Stalinization could mean the beginning of the end of Soviet communism.

(Cont.)

Virtually unheralded, however, were the earliest manifestations of a reversal of the Khrushchev regime's generally more permissive policies in this realm. The first sign of such a reversal was seen in early March 1965, in a published report of the RSFSR Writers' Congress at which the so-called conservatives\* upset the prevailing dominance of the liberals. During the rest of 1965 the forces of liberalism and reaction clashed with increasing intensity. The liberals evidently resisted with such stubbornness that the CPSU was obliged to take the extreme measure of cracking down hard on Sinyavsky and Daniel, who were popular and respected members of the unanimously anti-Stalinist liberal group.

Following the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial the orthodox critics have become increasingly aggressive in their assaults on liberal writers, especially in the pages of the RSFSR Writers' Union journal, Oktyabr' (October) and the Red Army newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star). On the other hand Novy Mir (New World), the monthly known for its publication of liberal views and novels which conflict with the guidelines of socialist realism, has fallen 2 months late and appears to be marking time by publishing little which the reactionary critics can seize upon. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Writers' Congress has been postponed until November 1966, and the oft-postponed USSR Writers' Congress (already 2 years overdue) was once again pushed back, this time from June until probably late fall 1966.

Evidently, the reactionaries are aiming to get the corpus of Soviet writers to recognize what Ivan Kuz'nichev\*\* termed "the failures of ... modern creative works" and the "disastrous ... one-sided, tendentious character" of the (anti-Stalinist) themes which are concerned with the concentration camp and justice, as well as the undesirability of works depicting the lack of military preparedness in the period preceding Hitler's invasion of the USSR. In this way, the reactionaries would hope to get authors to conform to a new version of socialist realism and to condemn the prized product of liberal writers during the past decade.

In political matters the most flagrant manifestation of Stalinism was seen in the widely reported efforts by Brezhnev to gain acceptance at the 23rd Party Congress of a "balanced" historical view of Stalin's 30-year reign. This move was resisted (see discussion below) and finally shelved.

In practice, however, Stalin-style politics are increasingly evident. For example, at the May 1966 Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU Brezhnev was the only Soviet leader of major standing to speak on the major subject of the plenum, the proposed grandiose and very costly program of irrigation and drainage. Kosygin, though present and presumably still responsible for the over-all management of the economy, was silent.

\*A better term would be reactionaries, or the orthodox supporters of the Party line which calls for adherence to "socialist realism." See attachment entitled "Current Soviet Affairs" by the Institute for the Study of the USSR, for a discussion of socialist realism.

\*\*In Oktyabr', June 1966.

Furthermore, Kosygin was indirectly attacked when Brezhnev charged industrial ministers (who are responsible to Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers) with failure to support the irrigation and drainage program.

Party politics in general have shown a discernible trend from the relatively open, live atmosphere under Khrushchev to the present inscrutable dullness. The 23rd Party Congress was, on the surface at least, lacking in significant developments, although much speculation has been spurred by the restoration by the Congress of Stalin's old title of General Secretary and its award to Brezhnev. Hints of undercurrents of political uncertainty came out in speeches at the Party Congress, and subsequent articles in the CP press (Pravda 20 June and 20 July; Partiinaya Zhizn') suggest that intra-Party relationships are due for reexamination and change.

All of these manifestations -- a bid to restore the respectability of Stalin's name and era, the apparent effort of Brezhnev to assume the sole leadership of a new and important program, and the shrouded movement of Party affairs -- are in line with trends towards a Stalinist political climate. Such trends can be expected to help consolidate the positions of Brezhnev and/or Kosygin, both of whom rose to their first positions of prominence during the purges of the 1930's. A possible long-term beneficiary of a trend back towards Stalinism would be Politburo member A.N. Shelepin, one of Stalin's last appointees (as chief of the Komsomol in 1952). On the other hand, such trends would present obstacles to the ambitions of the younger members of the CP who have no unbreakable ties with Stalinism.

The Soviet economy may be considered immune from the threat of a return to Stalin's crude and rigid system which was designed to generate maximum industrial growth at the expense of the material well-being of the consumer (worker), with little regard to efficiency. Nevertheless, the habit patterns of the bulk of the administrators trained in Stalin's time will undoubtedly continue to influence the development of the Soviet economy. One indication of this is the apparent foot-dragging by conservatives in the matter of the long overdue and badly needed economic reform.\* The conservatives are undoubtedly aware that the institution of meaningful price revision and subsequent direct contacts between suppliers, manufacturers and retail outlets will eventually deprive many party and government officials of their bureaucratic roles in planning and operating the economy from

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\*Surprisingly, the veteran Chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Wages, A.P. Volkov, continues in that post which is of crucial importance in the elaboration of price reforms. In the fall of 1965 Volkov expressed a strong bias against the value of systems as instruments for the solution of economic problems.

Moscow. Under economic reform, executive talent will become far more important than political influence. The trend of economic policies under the new leaders has been reminiscent of Stalin. Kosygin, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in December 1964, set forth a goal of providing more consumer goods. Issued at the same time, the 1965 budget called for military expenditures to be sharply reduced from the planned 1964 level. In contrast, the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan clearly short-changes the consumer; and the current indications are that military and space expenditures will increase. Furthermore, the grandiose irrigation and drainage program recently being pushed by Brezhnev (although it incorporates several features supported by Khrushchev) bears a distinct resemblance to Stalin's Great Projects. Two of those 5 projects were suspended shortly after Stalin's death, the implicit explanation being that they were unjustifiable at a time (as at present) when the economy was overextended.

Soviet military leaders have succeeded in fostering the development of the armed forces, a persistent Stalinist goal since the mid-1930's. Defense outlays were budgeted to decline by .5 million rubles in 1965 and to increase by .63 billion rubles (to 13.43 billion) in 1966, and Soviet military leaders have expressed satisfaction with the steps being taken to provide for the country's defense.

In recent discussions not directly related to military matters, high Soviet officers have generally expressed highly conservative attitudes. This probably reflects the fact that the great majority of the top-ranked military leaders are over 60, and thus benefited (or at least were not destroyed) by Stalin's purges.

Roughly paralleling the above reflections of a trend towards Stalinism in Soviet society are indications from the press that de-Stalinization has come to a crashing halt. Whereas Stalin's policies were frequently attacked (and used as a guise for criticisms that would otherwise have been unprintable) during the latter part of the Khrushchev era, there have been noted only 2 criticisms of Stalin's policies since March 1965.\* And whereas during the Khrushchev era Stalin was named in published accounts of the rehabilitation of his victims,\*\* Stalin's name and even allusions to Stalin

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\*These criticisms, in July and November 1965, both pertained to Stalin's pre-1935 policy of insisting on hostility to right Social Democrats in Germany [an attitude now impeding the popular front strategy].

\*\*For example, in Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya (Soviet Historical Encyclopedia) Vol. 3, 11 Feb 1963, former State Planning Commission chief N.A. Voznesensky was rehabilitated as follows: "unjustifiably condemned on the bases of the provocationary 'Leningrad case,' fabricated by L. Beriya with the participation of G. Malenkov and the sanction of Stalin."



have been dropped. On 30 January 1966 in Pravda an article by Soviet historians criticized the use of the euphemism for the Stalin era: "the period of the cult of the personality." Subsequently, not only the expression but even the word "cult" has virtually dropped from use in the Soviet press. Stalin's victims have continued to be rehabilitated; but most of the recent rehabilitations have appeared in the provincial press only and have been toned down to such mild expressions as: "victim of false accusations"; or "illegally repressed"; or "in March 1938 his life was tragically broken off."

Straightforward attempts to rehabilitate Stalin have been few and short-lived. Brezhnev created a furor in his speech commemorating V-E Day in May 1965 by mentioning Stalin's name in positive terms. As noted above, Brezhnev is widely reported to have wanted to gain acceptance of Stalin's reign at the 23rd Party Congress in March 1966. Instead Brezhnev (probably for reasons pointed out below) limited his speech on this subject to some favorable remarks about Stalin, justifying his military policies. Later, on the anniversary of Hitler's invasion of the USSR, Defense Minister Malinovsky mentioned Stalin in a positive context. The meager response and follow-through on the above-noted trial balloons (if indeed such they were) is undoubtedly attributable to the enormous success of Khrushchev's long, hard-hitting campaign denigrating Stalin.

Objections to the present regime's signs of a return to Stalinism have been registered from all over the world. Free World criticism has centered on the Stalinist aspects of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. Reportedly, the Soviet leaders were greatly surprised by the intensity, duration, and scope of these criticisms.

Non-Bloc Communist Parties (16 at last count) also focused their criticism on the Sinyavsky-Daniel case, partly because of Stalinism but mostly because of the damaging reflection the case made on their own popular image at home. The CP of Italy, evidently after having gotten word of Brezhnev's intention to refurbish Stalin's image at the 23rd Party Congress, published beforehand in L'Unita the strong declaration that:

"If the Congress, in re-evaluating Stalin's role, were to minimize the judgments made by the Twentieth Congress [in 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his "secret speech"], we couldn't accept its decision."

From the Communist-governed countries of Eastern Europe have come several reports of protest. Writers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland voiced disapproval of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case. For example, an article in the Hungarian literary weekly Elet es Irodalom favorably assessed Sinyavsky's works and stated that he had a right to criticize things that were "wrong and deserved to be criticized." Czechoslovak CP boss Novotny evidently received the same information as the Italians concerning Brezhnev's intentions to refurbish Stalin's image at the 23rd Party Congress, for he is widely reported in the Western press to have expressed his disapproval of such a move by the Soviets.

In the USSR itself, extraordinary opposition to the Soviets' handling of the Sinyavsky-Daniel case welled up about the time of the trial. One petition to the Soviet government, signed in mid-March by 40 prominent Moscow writers including Yevtushenko and Solzhenitsyn, cited the harshness of the penalties, the dubiousness of the legal procedures, and the consequent reversal of literary liberalization since Stalin's death. Another petition is reported to have been sent from Leningrad writers. Of greatest significance inside the USSR is the reported letter of mid-February to the Kremlin from 25 leaders in a far broader range of fields (included are Peter Kapitsa and 4 other top atomic scientists, the prima ballerina Maya Plisetskaya, former ambassador to Great Britain Ivan Maysky, other prominent writers, and the leading film director Mihail Romm). The letter warns against the rehabilitation of Stalin, which could lead to "a new split in the ranks of the Communists, and this time between us and the CP's of the West." The latter, the protest continued, would view Stalin's rehabilitation as "capitulation to the Chinese." The commentary at that time of the Manchester Guardian's Soviet expert, Victor Zorza, was that the protests by the Soviet writers and other intellectuals apparently represented a "last resort" to head off a "formal decision" (implicitly on re-Stalinization) by the conservatives in the CPSU.

Evidence of continuing internal opposition to Stalinism is scant and difficult to evaluate. Individual literary figures still venture implied criticism of Stalinist practices. For example V. Pertsov, a critic on the editorial board of Voprosy Literaturny (Problems of Literature), at a meeting in May of the board of the usually liberal Moscow Writers' Organization, lamented that the works of a number of writers have not been adequately published. Pertsov mentioned the names of several liberal writers, including Anna Akhmatova, who had suffered from Stalinism. His representations, however, were reportedly received coldly and with shock. Another incident is the publication on 22 July 1966 in Literaturnaya Rossiya (Literary Russia) of the author K. Simonov's story of his assignment in the late 1940's to induce Ivan Bunin, the Nobel Prize winning Russian emigré author, to return to his native land. Bunin, according to this account, was repelled by the news of the repressive acts of Stalin's cultural hatchet man, Andrei Zhdanov, and instead of accepting the invitation to the USSR Bunin stepped up his attacks on Stalin's cultural terrorism. Another sign of opposition is seen in Novy Mir's continuing publication, albeit in a less bold manner, even though its liberal editor, A. Tvardovsky, has survived a rumored threat of being ousted. These incidents, as well as the mere fact that the reactionaries have been keeping up a drumfire of assaults on liberal writers and ideas is testimony of the continuing existence of internal opposition to Stalinism.

The current balance of Stalinism is difficult to strike, however, because of the diffused and inadequate information on pertinent developments. It is obvious, nevertheless, that Stalinism rests somewhere between low and high tide. The surge of anti-Stalinism has been halted; but the flow back towards Stalinism has met significant head-on resistance and is buffeted by cross currents. The present regime has made no commitment to a course of action regarding Stalin as a person or Stalinism as a method of government. It is difficult to see, however, how the Soviet "command society" can long endure uncertainty on this key issue.

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November 1968

NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

"... the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repression against honorable Soviet people, and other activities in the period of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the bier with his body in the mausoleum of V.I. Lenin."

N.S. Khrushchev at Twenty-second Party Congress,  
October 1961

\* \* \* \* \*

Double or triple the guard  
beside his grave,  
So that he will not rise again,  
and with him -- the past...  
We carried him away --  
threw him out of the mausoleum,  
But how shall we remove Stalin  
from within Stalin's heirs?...  
True, there are those who hurl abuse  
at Stalin from the platform,  
Who secretly at night  
ponder their former glory...  
They were the former pillars:  
with no liking for empty slave camps,  
Or halls jammed with people  
where poets recite their verses...  
As long as the heirs of Stalin  
remain on this earth,  
I shall feel Stalin is still there  
in the mausoleum.

From "Stalin's Heirs," by Yevgeny Yevtushenko.

The term "Stalinism" has come to signify many things -- the arbitrary rule of a nation by a despot, the rigid control of a nation's economy, the collectivization of agriculture, the massive displacements of minority groups, the purge trials, forced labor camps, manic secretiveness, a massive secret police system, and, pervading everything, a reign of terror. The word can legitimately be stretched to fit the entire gamut of developments in the Soviet Union from the late 20's until Stalin's death in 1953, during most of which time Stalin literally was responsible for every major action.

Stalin made a mockery of legality and justice. He stifled the entire intelligentsia of the country, insisting that all artistic work conform to the principles of "socialist realism." Internationally, he demanded, and obtained, total, blind obedience from Communist parties throughout the world. His conduct of diplomatic relations was marked by a mania for espionage and subversion which was in turn only a reflection of a basic paranoia. All these features nurtured in the Soviet leadership, perhaps as a permanent ineradicable legacy, a frame of mind we can call Stalinism -- an orthodoxy ever inclined to preserve those features of the past that proved successful (whatever its failures) in preserving the Party's unchallenged strangle hold on political power, a frame of mind that shies away from experimentation with new forms.

The total cost of Stalinism can never be reckoned. In terms of human lives, Soviet scientist Andrei D. Sakharov estimates that 10 to 15 million people perished from hardship, torture and execution. Robert Conquest, in his recent, definitive book, The Great Terror, estimates that Stalin's death toll may be as high as 20 million.

Stalin's death in 1953, after 29 years of rule, left his successor, Georgi Malenkov faced with the necessity of consolidating his hold on the reins of power and the need to set a new direction for the nation's economic and political life which would be devoid of the worst of Stalin's excesses. Gradually, a decompression process began. Beria, head of the secret police, was defeated in his bid for power and executed. The secret police forces were purged. Huge numbers of prisoners were released from Stalin's labor camps (leaving millions in the camps, however). The Malenkov leadership gradually developed an economic program designed to sharply increase the availability of food, clothing and housing. This program came to be known as the "New Course."

Early in 1955 Khrushchev came to power, deposing Malenkov and one year later made the "secret speech" that radically changed the entire political life of the nation. In this lengthy speech to the 20th Congress of the CPSU, February 1956, Khrushchev vehemently attacked the entire "cult of Stalin's personality" -- his person, his mistakes, and his misdeeds, particularly the wholesale Party purges. Then, having exposed some of Stalin's greater crimes (although Khrushchev came far from telling the entire truth, which would have implicated the whole Soviet leadership, himself included, in the crimes), Khrushchev was committed "rectifying the errors" of Stalin's time.

Under Khrushchev, de-Stalinization had its ups and downs. Its rapid growth early in 1956 was almost entirely reversed by the end of the year as a consequence of the riots in Poland and the Revolution which exploded in Hungary. Nevertheless, insofar as the person of Stalin was concerned there was no letup and Stalin became an unperson almost overnight. Although Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign was more an attack on his political foes than an effort to right the wrongs which still persisted in the Soviet Union, many first steps were taken under Khrushchev to remove the stain left by Stalin. One of Khrushchev's most dramatic steps

was the large-scale of freeing hundreds of thousands of political prisoners. Those disposed of earlier could only be rehabilitated posthumously: in 1936-39, according to Sakharov, more than 1,200,000 Communist Party members, or half of the total membership, were arrested, and of those only 50,000 regained freedom.

Other steps toward de-Stalinization were carried out in each major sector of Soviet society. In the cultural sphere, significant books and articles began to appear in the liberal press, particularly in the monthly Novy Mir (New World). These included Vladimir Dudintsev's novel Not by Bread Alone (1956), a number of Ilya Ehrenburg's thought-provoking essays (1957 through 1964), and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's politically momentous novel about Stalin's camps, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (1962).

In the economy, Khrushchev attempted to decentralize management in order to break the bureaucracy's strangle hold on initiative. He abolished most of the old-line industrial ministries in 1957, and transferred many of their functions to regional economic councils. He also broke with Stalin's self-defeating chauvinism when he strongly encouraged Soviet engineers to study foreign techniques, especially American, and apply them in their own work.

In military policy, Khrushchev downgraded conventional arms in favor of missiles and nuclear weapons. (This policy also enabled Khrushchev to release military men from service at a time when the USSR was suffering labor shortages.)

Khrushchev ordered that the laws of the USSR be exhaustively studied, set up a commission to draft a new constitution to take the place of the unimplemented Stalin Constitution of 1936, and extended feelers to the outside world. Not only did Khrushchev and his leading associates travel widely throughout the world, but so did relatively large numbers of technical and cultural representatives of the USSR. Exchange programs were encouraged. Tourists became almost commonplace in major Soviet cities. Moreover, jamming of foreign radio broadcasts was almost completely halted.

In the political sphere Khrushchev scored some notable successes. He removed from the party's top ruling body most of the dead dictator's oldest accomplices; he exposed himself and his views to millions of Soviet citizens in his travels throughout the country (notably to farm areas); his frequent speeches were published; Central Committee meetings were publicized and the populace began to feel that their opinions were being considered by the country's leadership. Khrushchev was unsuccessful, however, in his move in November 1962 to divide the bulk of Communist Party functionaries into two groups, those concerned with industry and those concerned with agriculture, a move which antagonized and alarmed Party officials who had become set in the bureaucratic ways of Stalinism.

The changes of the de-Stalinization period, however, were superficial for Khrushchev, himself, remained a dictator and made use of the same

machinery built by Stalin. (The secret police was curbed primarily by agreement among the leadership that no one single leader should ever again be able to use the weapon to terrorize the Party as Stalin had done. The police remained just as vigilant, and potentially just as arbitrary and brutal, toward the ordinary citizen.) And unceasing resistance to de-Stalinization by entrenched officials was effective in restricting the actual scope of changes. Moreover, Khrushchev, who had himself served Stalin and was not free of the Stalinist taint, did not consistently press for changes. Thus, many aspects of de-Stalinization are remembered more as proposals, partly formed ideas, or attitudes than as accomplished acts. Nevertheless, the USSR of October 1964, when Khrushchev was overthrown, was a far different country from the USSR of March 1953, when Stalin died.

Khrushchev's ouster resulted in part from the Stalinists' resistance to change. After all, the key party, government and military leaders of 1964 were almost all appointed and advanced by Stalin in the 15 years between the Great Purges and his death. They had shown the aptitude and ability to survive the Stalinist system, and many feared that they would lose status in any other system. There were undoubtedly other reasons for ousting Khrushchev: he impulsively launched substantial programs without thoroughly airing them with his fellow Presidium members; he spoke intemperately and crudely, embarrassing many Soviet leaders; he posed a threat to the security of top military leaders; Soviet foreign relations had been a series of failures, such as the disastrous Cuban missile affair, the ever-worsening conflict with Communist Chinese leaders, and the weakening solidarity of the world Communist movement. Of immediate alarm to his opponents, he had made tentative plans to seek a detente with Bonn.

The new Kremlin leaders had united in opposing Khrushchev. There is little evidence, however, that they have subsequently been able to agree consistently on much else. Neither party boss Leonid Brezhnev, nor any of the other leaders has been able to establish his clear-cut primacy. One result of this situation has been top-level indecision in the USSR, an unusual circumstance for a Party boasting a monolithic structure.

In this circumstance, it is hardly surprising that the developments of the four years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have been marked by increasing reversions to Stalinist mentality and practices. This pattern became evident soon after the new regime took over, and has been accentuated as the years have gone by. Criticism of Stalin's person and his mistakes virtually stopped within five months after Brezhnev and Kosygin displaced Khrushchev. Rehabilitations of Stalin's victims dwindled and, contrary to earlier practice, no longer mentioned Stalin's guilt or the euphemistic "period of the cult of the individual" when they exonerated "victims of false accusations" who had been "illegally repressed" or whose lives had been "tragically broken off."

The measure of the political climate in Moscow is perhaps most frequently taken from the state of affairs among the intelligentsia; this is



due to a number of factors, among them the relative volubility of this group, its access to westerners, and its quick reflection in the press, theater, and artistic styles. Therefore the infamous trial of the two Soviet writers Sinyavsky and Daniel in February 1966 was correctly viewed at the time as the harbinger of much more stringent controls over society. The pressure on Soviet citizens to toe the line gradually built up thereafter. Fewer and fewer truly creative works were published in the press, art shows of anything not conforming to the worst "socialist realism" were halted, travel to and cultural exchanges with foreign countries were gradually curtailed, Soviet tourists ceased traveling, etc.

By April 1968, not only had the de-Stalinization campaign come to a complete end, but a new period -- which can perhaps best be described as "Neo-Stalinism" -- began. The occasion was the plenum meeting of the Central Committee on 9-10 April at the end of which a communique was issued which warned of a "sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism." The committee also warned against contact with foreigners -- even foreign Communists -- since any of them might be agents of capitalist subversion. This typically Stalinist xenophobia did not pass unnoticed. Brezhnev personally addressed the meeting, but his speech has never been released. Following the plenum meeting, Brezhnev -- who seemed to have taken charge of the new campaign against "foreign ideological subversion" -- and other top party leaders traveled throughout the country addressing party groups. It was evident from the speeches and statements during that period that the Soviet leadership was deeply concerned over widespread dissent within the Soviet Union and throughout the Soviet bloc. In the face of this mounting problem, however, their reaction, significantly, was to retreat into the cocoon of the safe, Stalinist practices of the past, however discredited, rather than to move ahead with new, progressive solutions to their problems.

A leading Swiss journalist has described Neo-Stalinism in the following terms:

"Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and methods of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after 1953 and to make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy. The neo-Stalinist turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party Congress and a rejection of developments since then, including reform communism, recognition of the "individual road," and West-East coexistence. The opinion seems to prevail in present-day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies did not produce the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexistence only undermined the Soviet power base, while in Stalin's time there was "quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet government inspired fear and respect in the outside world."\*

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\*"Czechoslovak Reforms Squashed by Soviet Neo-Stalinism," by Kux, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 25 September 1968. The complete text of this outstanding article is attached.

The nature of the neo-Stalinist reaction which has set in is to be found in both major and minor incidents. Obviously the overwhelming evidence was given in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. As Kux points out, this was actually a step not to correct a deviation, a counter-revolution that had already broken out, but rather a step to eliminate the possibility that something might happen. This act was based on the same reasoning employed by Stalin when he purged potential enemies of the Party -- before they had become such.

Among the major events in the re-emergence of Stalinism has been the lengthy series of political trials, some well known, but others totally unknown. The first and most sensational was the trial of Daniel and Sinyavsky in February 1966. Another, involving Alexander Ginzberg and three of his friends, took place in January 1968. The most recent case is that of Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Yuli Daniel and three others, which is mentioned below. However the publicity attending these trials should not be allowed to obscure the fact that literally dozens of other political trials have been held in what has been a growing wave of deliberate terrorism during the past three years. Occasional glimpses of the nature and extent of these trials are afforded by documents smuggled to the free world, as was the case in the Chornovil papers -- a series of documents by an imprisoned Ukrainian lawyer which have revealed a major wave of repression which swept across the Ukraine, beginning in 1965.

Pavel Litvinov, Mme. Daniel and their colleagues, most of whom had joined in earlier protests against the denial of freedom, demonstrated on 25 August in Red Square for a free and independent Czechoslovakia, for Czech-Soviet friendship, and against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. They were beaten (one had four front teeth knocked out and looked so bad he was not included among those later tried semi-publicly) and locked up by plainclothesmen said to be KGB personnel. At the trial the courtroom was packed with spectators loudly hostile to the accused, while only a small number of close relatives of the accused were allowed in. The accused were peremptorily found guilty of disturbing public order, and even their closing statements were interrupted and disputed by the judge. Their sentences were up to three years at hard labor (for the poet Vadim Delone) and 5 years exile to an as yet unannounced location for Litvinov and Mme. Daniel. The manner in which this trial was conducted indicates that its basic purpose was to serve notice on Soviet citizens that no form of overt protest will be permitted. The semi-secrecy of the trial was designed to limit, to the extent possible, foreign repercussions.

One measure of the extent of re-Stalinization was provided by Mme. Daniel who described the reticence of those who hold divergent views but do not express them. She appeared to be criticizing those who play important roles in Soviet society and have made names for themselves, but fail to use the weight this gives them to state their dissent.

Dozens of less dramatic incidents may be cited exemplify the turn toward Stalinism, among them:

-- Soviet historiographers are sharply split in attempting to describe and explain events which occurred during Stalin's reign, such as the collectivization of agriculture. Typically, a book published in 1966 which denounced Stalin's mistakes in the collectivization was violently criticized in Questions of CPSU History No. 6 (June 1968). The attack implicitly absolves Stalin of all blame and even goes so far as to assert that collectivization "developed on a sound basis with observance of the principle of voluntariness."

-- In much the same sense, a recent book by General Shtemenko, The General Staff During the War, whitewashes the Soviet war record and in the process refurbishes Stalin's reputation as a wartime leader. It maintains that his military prowess and personal courage were exemplary and it attempts to minimize the culpability of Stalin and his coterie for the disasters that befell the Red Army in 1941.

-- The Red Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda recently attacked the popular Taganka Theater and Theater magazine for their modernist view of the arts and recommended that the Taganka Theater produce more works by Mikhail Sholokhov, Alexander Fadeyev, Alexander Korneichuk and other pillars of Stalinist thought.

-- The invasion of Czechoslovakia was accompanied by a resumption of the jamming of BBC and Voice of America broadcasts, which had ceased five years earlier.

-- Sovetskaya Rossiya, of 4 October, devoted three columns to attacking Russian drama critic V. Kadrin for a book in which he had been "too favorable toward the contemporary theater, while dismissing works of the Stalin period.... There is no room for such views in Soviet art," the paper said.

-- The president of the Soviet Academy of Art, Nikolai V. Tomskey, wrote an article for Pravda, published 24 September, in which he severely criticized nonconformist artists who do not create in the school of "socialist realism." Even more significantly, he attacked persons who are members of exhibition committees who determine what is to be shown and who thus have life and death control over all Soviet art.

-- Work is underway on a new epic film about World War II in which Stalin is depicted as a "kindly, wise and trusted leader." This is the first major film portrayal of Stalin since "The Fall of Berlin," a hero-worship spectacular made shortly before Stalin's death in 1953.

Other examples will be found in the attached materials. While these examples appear to be relatively minor froth on the surface, they are in truth only surface manifestations of very major conflicts going on behind the locked doors of the Kremlin.

\* \* \* \* \*

And where do the ordinary Soviet citizens stand on these issues? Again, one can only judge from the few instances of dissidence that come into view, such as the protests by a limited number of intellectuals in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia. It is hard to imagine that the peasant or the worker welcomes any return to Stalinism -- it was they who paid by far the highest toll for his despotism. One cannot help but think of the roughly parallel case of Czechoslovakia which only a short time ago was considered to be the most Stalinist of the satellites. However, when a real possibility of change came, the people unanimously stepped forward to hail the leaders who promised a total renunciation of the past.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

22 October 1968

# Neo-Stalinism gains in Soviet Union

By Paul Wohl

Written for The Christian Science Monitor

A new political style now appears to hold sway in the Soviet Union — neo-Stalinism.

Behind it is a hard-line philosophy concerned with the greatness of the Soviet state and with the mission of its ruling party.

Neo-Stalinism has a modern, efficiency-conscious, flexible approach to policy formation and considers many of Stalin's methods archaic. But, by restoring Stalin to his historic role as a great leader and architect of the Soviet communism, neo-Stalinism pays tribute to the continuity of the Soviet state and sets up a barrier against criticism of the Communist Party.

The neo-Stalinists are believed to be dominant in the politbureau. Their spokesman is second party secretary Mikhail A. Suslov, he is seconded by trade-union chief Alexandr N. Shelpin, the politbureau's youngest member.

The politbureau's so-called Jkranian faction (Pyotr Y. Shelest, Nikolai V. Podgorny, Dmitri S. Polyansky) also is neo-Stalinist inclined. General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev is close to this group.

## New line spelled out

The latest move of the neo-Stalinists on the domestic scene was the exoneration of Stalin of what was believed to have been his greatest blunder: his trust in Hitler and his neglect of Soviet defenses on the eve of the war.

The new line was spelled out in No. 12 of *Kommunist*, the leading political and theoretical journal of the party's central committee. There the history of the years from 1938 to 1941 was authoritatively rewritten by two historians of the neo-Stalinist school, V. Khvostov and A. Grilev. Dr. Vladimir M. Khvostov is the director of the institute of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of the Academy of Sciences.

The thesis of the two authors is that the Soviets were not taken by surprise in June, 1941, that they never trusted the Nazis, and that they had used the time gained through the Stalin-Hitler pact for intensive war preparations. Consequently, the authors conclude, although numerically inferior to the Nazis, the Soviets entered the war under more favorable conditions than would have been the case at an earlier date.

Soviet war preparations, the authors recall, started at an early date. In 1930-1931 the war industry turned out 860 planes and 740 tanks. The corresponding figures in 1938 were 5,469 planes and 2,270 tanks.

## Role of protector

Between 1939 and 1941 the Soviet war industry produced 17,000 planes and 7,600 tanks.

The Kremlin was ready to fight before Hitler attacked.

At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, we are told, Moscow twice offered to go to war for Czechoslovakia—even if France would not fulfill her treaty obligations toward Prague. The first time, the authors say, was on April 26 in a speech by then President Mikhail I. Kalinin; the second was at the time of Munich when apparently Stalin informed Czechoslovak President Edward Beneš through the Czech Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald of the Soviet Union's readiness to fight on Czechoslovakia's side.

The authors omit to mention that at the time of Munich Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had no common border; and that the 40 divisions and three tank corps which Moscow allegedly held in readiness would have had to cross Romanian territory in order to reach a remote and mountainous part of Czechoslovakia.

Western historians question the seriousness of Moscow's offer to fight. But the story of the offer has been revived of late in order to place the Soviet Union in the role of the providential protector of Czechoslovakia.

In elaborating this episode, the authors tend a bouquet to Stalin and accuse Mr. Beneš of having betrayed his people by refusing to fight.

## Nonaggression pact explained

British and French offers to negotiate with the Soviet Union about a common defense against Hitler are pictured as deceptive. The alleged purpose of the offers was to involve the Soviet Union prematurely in a war with the Nazis without offering adequate guarantee of Western aid.

Only after reports of secret deals between London and Berlin had reached Moscow was the Soviet-Nazi Nonaggression Pact of August, 1939, concluded. Stalin, the authors assert, had no illusions about the pact:

"The Soviet Government never believed in the loyalty of the Nazis concerning the fulfillment of their [treaty] obligations," they write.

The entry of Soviet forces into Poland the following September is described as a "liberating move."

The period from then until June, 1941, is described as a time of "intensive Soviet war preparations to ward off imperialist aggression." Allocations for military needs were increased from 25.6 percent of the total budget in 1939 to 43.4 percent in 1941. In the first six months of 1941 the output of armaments rose by 15 percent.

The Army was overhauled, antiaircraft

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defenses reorganized. In June, 1941, the military schools had five times as many students as in 1937.

Quoting from the archives of the defense department the authors claim that large-scale mobilization started in the beginning of 1941. Part of the forces stationed in Siberia, in the Far East, and in the Urals were then transferred to the western border, and nearly 800,000 reservists called up.

According to the authors, the Soviets were well informed of Hitler's intentions—they did not need Churchill's warning—but they tried to the very end to delay the attack through diplomatic maneuvers in order to gain time.

### Two mistakes admitted

Only two Soviet mistakes are admitted: the assumption that the armies could be placed on war footing within a few hours and belated transmission of the Kremlin's telephoned order to fight.

In this context the authors mention, in

passing, the "negative effects of the cult of personality and of unfounded repressions of the military and political cadres of the armed forces."

Although the odds were staked against them, the Soviets did not give in. "The party [meaning Stalin] took energetic measures to weld together the efforts of the front and of the rear to defeat the enemy. A State Defence Committee was formed under the chairmanship of I. V. Stalin."

This new reading of history is diametrically opposed to the carefully documented findings of Prof. Alexander M. Nekrich in his book "June 21, 1941." At the height of the Khrushchev era this book pinned the blame for the lack of preparations squarely on Stalin.

After Mr. Khrushchev's fall from power the neo-Stalinists counterattacked. In 1967 Professor Nekrich was expelled from the party, but for awhile his views still continued to gain recognition.

THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS

## Izvestia Stands Foursquare for Socialist Realism in Art

Rejoinder: LIGHT AND SHADOWS. (By B. Shcherbakov, artist. *Izvestia*, Sept. 20, p. 4. Complete text:) The Art Publishing House has issued V. Antonova's "The State Tretyakov Gallery" in a large edition in the "Cities and Museums of the World" series. The book provides information about the famous art gallery, its history and social significance. It tells how the collection grew during Soviet years as works of Soviet art were added. The book is richly illustrated. All this promises the reader an interesting acquaintance with the genuine masterpieces of this national treasure-house. But as he gets deeper into the book, a sense of puzzlement and disillusionment grows in connection with the treatment of the work of individual artists and the tendentious selection of the illustrations.

One would expect the gallery's most important works of art to be chosen for illustrations. But the book does not contain reproductions of works of Soviet art that have become classics, such as Ioganson's "At an Old Urals Factory" and "Interrogation of Communists," the Kukryniksy canvas "The End," Nesterov's "Portrait of Academician I. G. Pavlov," the paintings of Grekov and Brodsky or sculptures by Mukhina, Shadr, Kononov, Vuchetich and Tomsky. On the other hand, insignificant works, remote from realism, are reproduced. The writer tries to give a vivid presentation of works of the modernist trend. For example, Kandinsky's canvas "Vagueness" is reproduced in color, whereas many splendid works of classical Russian art and Soviet art appear in black and white.

The principle by which the works of prominent artists were chosen also seems strange. Out of the whole rich heritage of M. V. Nesterov, why was his pastebcard "The Birth of Christ," painted in 1891, reproduced, but not a single work of the Soviet period of his activity? The selection of works of the wonderful artist Konchalovsky also causes chagrin. Our contemporaries know very well that most of his paintings were produced in Soviet times. But his work is represented among the illustrations by the far from best still life "Dry Paint," produced in 1913!

It is utterly incomprehensible why such masterpieces by Valentin Serov as "Girl With Peaches" or "Portrait of Mika Morozov" were ignored, whereas his copies of ikons were presented.

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One of the important distinctive features of Soviet art is its multinational character. Yet the book reproduces paintings only of Russian Republic artists. An exception has been made only for the Azerbaidzhanian Salakhov. Where are the artists of other republics—Saryan, Nikoladze, Azgur, Mikenas, Shovkunenko, Salkalns, Tansykbayev, Dzhaparidze, Yablon-skaya, and many others?

It is hard to agree with the interpretation of individual movements in art. It is widely known, for instance, that Kazimir Malevich rejected the representational principle in art and was a follower of abstractionism. But the writer of the book says, not without sympathy, that Malevich "sought to convey in art empty space, endlessness, trajectories inhabited by visible but weightless substance" and emphasized Malevich's great popularity among adherents of abstract art.

The legitimate question arises: What guided the publishing house in issuing such a book?

**Our Thoughts and Disputes: LIFE IS THE SOURCE OF CREATIVITY.** (By U.S.S.R. People's Artist Yu. Vuchetich. *Izvestia*, Sept. 21, p. 2. Complete text:) One morning I gathered a bouquet of peonies in the garden. The white flowers with the soft pink spots gave off the most subtle fragrance. I placed the bouquet in a vase before the mirror. It was an early morning in summer. The sun penetrated the room through the green crowns of tall trees. The sunlight seemed to take on the fresh colors of the outdoors. The peonies, reflected twice, in the mirror and in the sunlit window pane, suddenly glowed with such color that I forgot everything as I stood looking at them.

At that moment one of my artist friends came to visit me. I showed him the peonies and he, like myself, froze in delight.

We stood in worshipful silence before this beauty. Finally I asked him to take canvas and paint this bouquet in the whole gamut of colors created by the light and the reflections in mirror and window pane.

But my friend was silent and hung his head. What was wrong? Had I offended him somehow? Then he said:

"I can't. I can't convey all this beauty. I have forgotten how. If I were to try, the peonies would fade while I searched for the right combination of colors."

I believed him. A fine painter, talented, yet he had lost the ability. What had happened?

Let us not hide the fact that the demands on the artist's mastery have declined; we have begun to regard hack work with tolerance.

But this is not all.

Some artists' searches have drowned in floods of short-lived "fashionable" trends, have dissolved in them and acquired an overall grey and inexpressive tone. Shallowness of theme swallowed up other artists; it broke down, mixed up and confused the criteria we set for art. Man with his individual diversity and beauty began to disappear from their paintings, and even the background, the "architectural structure" and so on, entered the paintings only as an external indication of the times. For the image of man, left undisclosed, did not show the signs of the times, not to mention expressive social class signs.

The impatient desire of some to "criticize," "to expose," began to spread. Artistry became secondary to satire on canvas.

A noisy pseudo-artistic milieu reveled in portrayals of everyday scenes; genre superficiality was presented as a discovery, as the birth of the art of "the little man." The insignificant personality was counterposed to the purposeful, heroic personality. And for this purpose they invented conflicts between "the little man" and "the huge, cold world," in which individuality allegedly is suppressed by the collective.

In a related art, the art of the cinema, neorealism, a much talked of trend, one that evidently had some progressive significance in the conditions of Italy, became popular in this period. To spy upon "real life" with the eye of the movie camera and record the picture with photographic preciseness became the goal of such cinematographers. Not to mention those who, with amazing persistence, kept dragging us into

applicable to such a concept as realism. Incidentally, why "neorealism"? Why is it new? Had the old realism of L. Tolstoy and Balzac exhausted itself? Or, for example, had the realism of Repin and Surikov somehow sinned against art? And was the conflict of "the little man" with society new to art? Let us be more precise: with capitalist society! No, there was nothing new in this conflict. The Italians in the cinema were following a long and well explored path, the path of showing what bourgeois society and the crazy world of fear and desperation does to man and his feelings and aspirations. But some people were overjoyed at this "discovery" of the neorealists and in our country too dashed off in search of the conflict of the "common man," the "little man," with society. With which society? With the society of this same person who was described as "common" and "little." There never were "common" and "little" people, only people; each person constitutes a huge world of feelings and thoughts, for "man is the greatest of the marvels he has created."

For some reason at our artists' meetings we began to talk little of the heroic nature of Soviet man, of creating his image in art. It is by no means a matter of mechanically borrowing the Italian "neorealists'" method. If it were only that! Philistinism overwhelmed some artists, and ugliness in all its unexpected varieties took the place of the beauty of the world around us.

But the best artists of socialist art did indeed create masterpieces that amazed the world with the majesty of the accomplishments and wealth of spirit of the new man.

Their work opened up a new era in the artistic development of mankind, they portrayed deeply and truthfully the birth, development and victory of the socialist social system. In images of enormous ideological and emotional power, images that educated the broad masses, Soviet artists affirmed the communist ideal. I shall not mention the names of the best of our artists—there are many of them.

Soviet artists created a highly artistic gallery, vast in scope, of typical images of Soviet people, a chronicle of their heroic deeds. And when we speak now of those who are falling into hack work and shallowness of theme or unthinkingly chasing after each latest zigzag of the silly Western art fashions, we have in mind, of course, only a few carriers of unhealthy trends in our artistic milieu.

Genuinely progressive art, capable of retaining its significance for centuries, was always lofty in mastery and deeply human in content, filled with thoughts and aspirations of mankind and concern for man.

Great writers and artists have always understood that art never left man's side, always corresponded to his needs and his ideal, always helped him in pursuit of this ideal—was born with man and developed along with his historical life.

Who of us does not remember "Chapayev," the famous film made by the Vasilyevs? These directors created an image of a hero that even our ill-wishers applauded. Or in art: "Lenin the Leader," "Lenin on the Platform" "At an Old Urals Factory," "Transportation Being Set in Order," "Interrogation of Communists," "The Sentry," "Worker and Collective Farm Woman"—there is enough in these canvases to show the face of our artistic culture, which is counterposed to modern decadent bourgeois art.

But let us return to the discussion of so-called "new" trends, whatever names they bear. Do we see in them the humanistic ideals of the era, its heroic content? Has time been merciful toward the "inspired" discoveries in the style of the "new trends" that were at first greeted with extraordinary fuss, with tremendous pretensions and with chagrin at nonrecognition? What has remained of them in the memory of the people?

With amazing wastefulness and with the bitterness of petty nihilists, people who called themselves artists trampled on beauty and rejected even what ancient Hellas had left them as a heritage. They even hastened to replace the beauty of man's body, its plasticity and perfection, with angular features, putting outrageous images on shameless display and thereby opening the gates to bad taste. Some lost themselves in the flood of short-lived trends or simply became confused by the diversity of the world around them. The very colors on these



trophied disproportions that even artists of the stone age were ashamed of.

In the age of thermonuclear reactions, supersonic speeds and the conquest of outer space, some artists suddenly turned out to be on the periphery of society's life.

It seems to me that this is because, in the pursuit of supposed innovation and cheap success, they somehow forgot about the chief function of art: to look into the soul of its contemporary, the fighter and builder of the new life; to look deep, as deep as our times demand.

In a half century man has matured by a century, yet we still cannot portray this suitably. How will we render account to posterity? It is generally recognized that the flourishing of the personality is judged not from formless lumps but from lofty artistic images that disclose the concepts of beauty and harmony.

Who is he, the hero of our Soviet times? The worker, whose hands create the material benefits of socialist society! The collective farmer, growing the grain for our daily bread! The Soviet soldier, who cleansed the world of fascism! The scientist splitting the atomic nucleus, the surgeon operating on the human heart! Apparently no one would object to calling them heroes. But how are they to be portrayed? After all, they are utterly incompatible with shallowness of theme. What is more, the heroic is difficult! For worthy portrayal of our contemporary one needs far-from-exhausted potentialities of art, one needs all the richness and diversity of color. But not only this. One must also be able to rise to the level of the hero, to penetrate his spirit, to be able to read and reflect his huge and complicated inner world. "Neo" does not help here. No comma shapes, not even a comma of wild color superimposed on a chaotic intersection of lines and spots, can substitute for the image of our contemporary; it cannot substitute for the depth of his thought, his courage and, finally, his beauty!

Raphael's "Sistine Madonna" has been attracting pilgrims for several centuries. This painting has only (only!) beauty. The beauty of maternal love, maternal tenderness, eternal femininity, disclosed with an amazing palette and virtuosity in handling this palette.

Leonardo da Vinci loved to tell his pupils the story of the razor. A ray of light once struck the razor, and the latter saw its reflection in a mirror. It was delighted with how it looked and complained at having to shave men's coarse beards. The razor was offended that its brilliant blade had to be sharpened on a rough whetstone, strapped and honed. It decided to hide. Time passed, and eventually the razor managed to see its reflection again. But the blade no longer shone, it was eroded with coarse rust and had become as rough-edged as a saw.

It was no accident that this story sprang from the artist's imagination. As long as art serves a lofty idea and its noble purpose of helping people to make our life beautiful, it does not lose its shine and it glistens as the sun. This is exactly how the art of socialist realism is.

Oct. 6, 1968 THE WASHINGTON POST

## Soviets Intensify Crackdown On Own Cultural 'Heretics'

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, Oct. 5—Soviet Communist critics, seeking to restore the "monolithic" political and cultural unity of the early 1950s, have been lashing out at heretics in Russia itself as well as in Czechoslovakia and the world Communist movement.

The "vigilance" campaign begun in April and temporarily slowed during the summer

holidays, has resumed with vigor. In addition to China, Yugoslavia and long-favored targets in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet press is probing deeper in exposing unacceptable "deviations."

Today's Pravda contained a long attack on Ernest Fischer, the Austrian Communist theoretician and Marxist philosopher.

"Among the ranks of Communist Party members anywhere," Pravda said, "a person

who stood so close to the crudest inventions of imperialist propaganda concerning the 'occupation' of Czechoslovakia."

For Krasnaya Zvezda, the army paper, the targets were the lively Taganka Theater and Theater magazine.

"Art and politics, the truth of life and Communist Party-mindedness—these aspects of socialist esthetics are indissolubly bound together," the paper declared. It recommended that the Taganka Theater produce more works

by Mikhail Sholokhov, Alexander Fadeyev, Alexander Korneichuk and other stalwarts of the Stalin period.

The foreign affairs weekly *Za Rubezhom* takes after the Czechoslovak press, in addition to Yugoslav and Western publications. The Soviet weekly attacks the satirical magazine *Rogac and Dikobraz*, the Bratislava dailies *Pravda* and *Smena*, the Kosice daily *Vychodoslovenske Noviny*, the Moravian paper *Nova Svobodna*, as well as Czechoslovak theaters and publishing houses.

Friday's *Sovietskaya Rossiya* devoted three columns to a Russian drama critic, V. Kad-

rin, for a book "The Dignity of Art." Kadrin had been too favorable toward the *Savremennik* (contemporary) theater and other cultural phenomena, while dismissing works of the Stalin period.

"There is no room for such views in Soviet art," the newspaper said—urging greater attention to Vsevolod Kochetov, Anatoly Sofronov, Korneichuk and other Stalinist and neo-Stalinist authors.

For the party theoretical monthly *Kommunist*, the targets were two philosophers, Y. A. Milner-Irinin and P. M. Egides, whose contributions to a recent symposium on ethics

were found to be permeated with "anarchist idealism" and Kantian views. *Kommunist* was extremely critical of the Department of Ethics at Tbilisi University, which sponsored the symposium and "permitted the publication of theoretically erroneous materials."

A long quotation from Milner-Irinin provides a hint of the views underlying all these objectionable heresies.

"Ethics," he writes, "is far from being the science of what is, has been and will be . . . It is the only science which concerns what, in the moral consciousness of mankind, should be."

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, Oct. 18, 1968

# Yugoslav Reds Fear Soviet Period of Neo-Stalinism

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

BELGRADE, Oct. 17—Yugoslav Communists fear the Soviet Union has entered what may be a long period of neo-Stalinism which will permit neither Czechoslovak reformers nor other independent-minded forces in Eastern Europe much room for maneuver.

Despite Moscow's promise eventually to remove most of its occupation army from Czechoslovakia, qualified sources here believe the Soviet aim is to reduce that country to the status of East Germany, Poland and Bulgaria—without even the degree of cultural freedom and economic reform achieved by Hungary in recent years.

The Soviet aim, it is said here, is to make Czechoslovakia an object lesson for other Communist parties and peoples in Eastern Europe who might contemplate embarking on political or economic experimentation without full Kremlin clearance. The lesson, directed primarily now at independence-minded Rumania and internally moderate Hungary, is that states which rebel can expect harsher treatment than those which remain 100 per cent loyal to Moscow.

With the signing yesterday in Prague of a treaty legitimizing the "temporary" stationing of Soviet troops, the Kremlin has already achieved one of its initial goals in Czechoslovakia. The next step is to obtain a statement from Czechoslovak authorities that there was a danger of "counterrevolution" in August which justified the Soviet intervention.

Observers here believe that continuous Soviet pressure on Prague will produce such a statement in a matter of weeks or, at most, a few months.

These formalities are needed by Moscow in order to bring back into line the West European Communist parties which condemned the invasion. The Kremlin still hopes to stage a world summit conference of loyal parties to consolidate pro-Soviet ranks. Some 65 parties had originally agreed to hold such a conference in Moscow on Nov. 25, but Western Communist protests over the occupation of Czechoslovakia forced a postponement.

While pressing Prague for justification of the invasion, the Soviet Party has also

key Western parties whose ranks are split over the Czechoslovak events.

In the French, Italian and Finnish parties, an estimated 20 to 30 per cent of the leadership disagreed originally with their parties' condemnation of the invasion. The Soviet Party has made clear its readiness to split these parties if need be, and is reported also to have withheld funds on which these parties are in large measure dependent.

The Italian Party, in a Central Committee plenary meeting this week, is discussing for the first time whether it should make the break for genuine independence of Moscow. The outcome of the discussion is uncertain, but compromise and delay are in the Italian tradition.

However the Italians decide, it is now considered likely that the next international Communist preparatory meeting, to be held in Budapest on Nov. 17, will agree in principle to a conference early next year, without setting a precise date.

Such a conference would deal with "common tasks in the struggle against imperialism" and would not discuss Czechoslovakia. It

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Chinese and Yugoslav heretics, reaffirm the hard Soviet line on the German and Mideast questions, and proclaim collectively the Kremlin thesis that "sharpening" of the struggle against the West requires strengthening of supranational control both in the East European bloc and in the International Communist movement.

By the time such a conference is held next spring, the Soviet Union expects to have the Czechoslovak Party well in hand. Already, such collaborators as Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak—ostracized for weeks by the Czechoslovak progressives—are sitting in on meetings of the Czechoslovak leadership. Old Stalinists like Anton Kapek and Karel Mestek have organized a hard-line pressure group on the outside.

At the same time, the process of undermining the unity of the original reformers is expected to continue, as occupied Czechoslovakia tends to be abandoned by the outside world and especially by the foreign Communist parties.

Czechoslovakia's popular National Assembly President, Josef Smrkovsky, is high on the Soviet purge list and his resignation or dismissal is considered merely a matter of time. Party leader Alexander Dubcek has been placed in an impossible position. If he resigns,

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

13 June 1968

## Soviet trend?

# Stalin again praised

By Paul Wohl

Written for *The Christian Science Monitor*

Once again, Stalin is being honored in the Soviet Union, albeit cautiously.

Although no one talks of the Stalin cult of personality any longer there are indications that it is being revived.

An otherwise undistinguished young poet, Feliks Chuyev, who published a poem glorifying Stalin and publicly demanded: "Put Stalin back on his pedestal," received a medal for distinguished work on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the revolution. He is also said to have been expelled from the mission to travel abroad.

Moscow is spared the trouble of contriving his dismissal. If he stays and executes Moscow's harsh terms, he loses popularity among the Czechs and Slovaks—and can then more easily be discarded later, as one source here puts it, "like a squeezed lemon."

Despite the surface unity displayed in Prague thus far, differences in view have already emerged among the reformers, and there are fears that with continued Soviet pressure Prime Minister Oldrich Cernik and possibly President Ludvik Svoboda may yet be induced to collaborate with a new Soviet-controlled Party leadership of the Indra-Bilak type.

As for differences within the Soviet leadership concerning Czechoslovakia, sources here maintain that these were not disagreements over principle but only over timing and tactic. Premier Kosygin, ideologist Mikhail Suslov, trade union chief Alexander Shelepin, Deputy Premier Dmitry Polyansky and Party Secretary Boris Ponomarev argued against the invasion of Aug. 20. None of them did so, however, out of sympathy for the Czechoslovak experiment or belief in the independence of small nations. (Yugoslav leaders are now recalling for the first time in years the fate of the Baltic republics incorporated by Russia in 1940).

Instead, the reputed Kremlin doves either cited the difficult repercussions which might be expected in the West and in the Communist movement—or argued that further attempts should be made to halt the Czechoslovak democratization by political pressures "short of war" before turning to the last resort of the Red Army.

Yugoslav observers believe the present Soviet Central Committee to be dominated by long-entrenched Stalinist and neo-Stalinist bureaucrats governed largely by fear for their own positions.

These stalwarts of the Party apparatus, the army and the political police fear that even the slightest attempt at internal democratization, economic reform or relaxation of tensions with the West would open a Pandora's box and jeopardize their entire system.

Under such conditions, little hope is seen here of meaningful East-West dialogue in the near future. Contrary to some Western diplomatic assessments, qualified Yugoslavs believe that Russia is not at all interested in an early settlement of the Middle East problem, but would prefer to keep the pot boiling for five or six years—time enough to establish a solid Soviet military and economic presence in the Mediterranean Sea.

Grigory Svirsky, a well-known novelist, was excluded from the Communist Party because of a speech he made before a Moscow writers meeting on Jan. 16, in which he attacked censorship and complained, "Everything that seeks to overcome the fatal consequences of the cult of personality is burned out with a red-hot iron. One sometimes is not even allowed to mention that the cult of personality existed."

### Party expulsion hinted

The critic and essayist Lev Kopelev, who in December, in the Austrian Communist journal *Tagebuch* attacked those Soviet writers who glorify Stalin, also is said to have been expelled from the

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party.

The rehabilitation of Stalin has spread to military writings. In February, even *Kommunist*, magazine of the Central Committee, gave credit to Stalin for having "taken part in organizing the struggle against white guardists" and for having had a big stake in winning World War II.

Far more serious than such indications of the party leadership's attempt to restore Stalin to a distinguished place in history is the reaction of much of the people at large.

When Defense Minister Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, in a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Red Army on Feb. 23, mentioned Stalin's role as chairman of the State Defense Committee, he was interrupted by loud applause. When reminiscing about the war, many older people often raise toasts to Stalin, not only in the late dictator's native Georgia but all over the Soviet Union.

### Secret police glorified

Hand in hand with a renewed Stalin cult goes the glorification of the state security services, formerly called the secret police. A theater play by Sergei Mikhalkov, which was favorably reviewed by *Pravda* and *Red Star*, the daily of the armed forces, referred to secret police agents or Chekists as "those admirable people, courageous, intrepid, heroic, true knights without fear and reproach."

No wonder that the Soviets are disturbed about Czechoslovakian periodicals implicating Stalin's friend, former Soviet President Mikoyan, in the Czech trials of the early fifties and the honoring of Stalin's victims.

Mr. Svirsky, in his speech before the Moscow writers, singled out a novel by V. Zakhrutin among the works rehabilitating Stalin. It appeared last year in the conservative journal *Oktyabr*.

"Do not tackle [the] Stalin [problem]," says Mr. Zakhrutin's positive hero. "We know why Stalin got stuck in your throat. . . . Because he defended the ideas of Lenin and cut short all attempts to betray him."

### 'Loyal and dedicated'

"Who knows, perhaps prison, exile, the solitude of the taiga (Siberian forest), the cold and hunger which he endured, hardened his soul, made his brusque and rude, but he was loyal and dedicated to Lenin like a soldier. With all his strength and will power he defended Lenin's teachings against the rabble of the opposition and watched over the purity and discipline of the party."

Another example of Stalin idolatry are the verses of the well-known writer Sergei Smirnov, in the journal *Moskva* of last October. "It was Stalin who, in the years of trial, did not leave his command post. And we, legitimately, honored in him our own strength. . . ."

All this, complained Mr. Svirsky, goes on "with the approval of Glavlit [the censorship office]. . . . Anyone who praises Stalin is encouraged. . . . Critics of the survival of the [Stalinist] past are told 'One must not stir up the past, one must not open up old wounds etc.'"

### CZECHOSLOVAK REFORMS SQUASHED BY SOVIET NEO-STALINISM

[Article by Kx; Zurich, *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, German, 25 September 1968, pp 1, 2]

The intervention in Czechoslovakia has clearly brought out a fundamental reorientation in the Soviet "general line." Against the background of the invasion of Prague, we can now detect the most profound changes in Soviet policies since Stalin's death. Czechoslovakia wanted to catch up with the "de-Stalinization" ushered in by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 at a very late date because it had missed this opportunity in 1956; on the other hand, the exact opposite development in the Soviet Union has brought a return to the formerly criticized totalitarian methods of rule and Stalin's ideological dogmas. The irreconcilability of these two development tendencies -- away from "Stalinism" in Prague, back to "Stalinism" in Moscow -- constituted the basis for the tensions between the Czechoslovak and the Soviet leaderships and inescapably led to an attempt to resolve the situation by force. There was quite obviously much more at stake here for the Soviet leadership than the new forward-strategy of the Warsaw Pact and quarantine measures against the revisionist source of infection, that is to say, the fundamental decision on the future "general line" of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2

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of world communism, and a qualitative change in the European balance of power, but it also signified the first phase of an upheaval in Soviet policy with as yet unforeseeable consequences.

#### Counter-Reform Movement

Since Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964, there has been a silent "de-Khrushchevization movement" parallel to the beginning of a "re-Stalinization." These tendencies of course were not expressed in any fundamental and comprehensively political and theoretical manner, such as the dramatic turn away from the Stalin era in Khrushchev's secret speech and in the resolutions of the 20th Party Congress, something which was done under the aegis of neo-Leninism. The changes since 1964 were sneaked in through the back door in that a veil of complete oblivion was spread over Khrushchev and his era, while a more positive evaluation of the Stalin era was undertaken and while the list of sins of 1956 was increasingly ignored. This creeping re-Stalinization burst into open neo-Stalinism after the 9 and 10 April 1968 CC Plenum, when hitherto rejected theories of Stalin were once again upgraded. This involved not only a better evaluation of the Stalin era, a rehabilitation of Stalin and other problems of coping with the past, but it also involved the development of new ideological perspectives and of the future political line.

Neo-Stalinism is an attempt to restore the guidelines and methods of Stalinist rule which were condemned or modified after 1953 and to make them once again the foundation of Soviet policy. The neo-Stalinist turn signifies a return beyond the 20th Party Congress and a rejection of developments since then, along with reform communism, recognition of the "individual road" and West-East coexistence. The opinion seems to prevail in present-day Soviet leadership that post-Stalinist policies did not produce the hoped-for successes and that reforms and coexistence only undermined the Soviet power base, while at Stalin's time there was "quiet and order" in the satellite empire and the Soviet government inspired fear and respect in the outside world.

This attitude so far has not produced any actual restoration of Stalin's "old regime" with permanent purges, secret police terror, and slave labor camps. In addition to the jingoistic and anti-Semitic relics which have been swept forward again, neo-Stalinism -- like most counter-reform movements -- also contains modernistic and dynamic features. By falling back on tried methods, the Moscow neo-Stalinists want to extricate the country from the stagnations of reforms, from the decay of the economy and society, and from the corruption of constant compromises; they want to alter the status quo and they want once again to restore "order" at home and power and hegemony abroad. For this purpose, they have upgraded the decisive ideological, political, and military dogmas from Stalin's textbook more in spirit than in the letter and they have combined these dogmas into a new "general line" which is by no means identical with Stalin's line. His methods and teachings are today being applied more roughly, more brutally, and more uninhibited than the sly and coolly calculating Stalin himself used to do or the way he would have done it now in similar situations. The neo-Stalinist renegades obviously are also lacking in stature and capability so that they cannot step into Stalin's shoes without creating a danger to themselves and to the rest of the world.

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The most visible outward sign of this Stalinist reaction is the increased secrecy and concealment of Soviet policy, such as it was customary prior to 1953. There is no more Giuseppe Boffa to recount the internal secrets of the Kremlin and the CIA likewise does not so far seem to have succeeded in getting its hands on the texts of Brezhnev's secret speeches to the April and July Plenums. Once again one must read between the lines, one must sift through ideological tracts, and one must listen for indirect signals.

Just how severe the current about-face is and just how radical the revocation of the 20th Party Congress really is can be seen from a contribution in the Party journal Komunist, No 12, on the outbreak of World War II. In the past, Hitler's attack on Russia and Stalin's behavior in 1941 were a debated key topic of "de-Stalinization" and only recently did Soviet historian Nekrich in his heavily attacked book The 22nd of June 1941 document and criticize the mistakes on the basis of sources. This historical dispute has always constituted a concealment of present-day clashes. The interpretation of Stalin's failure in 1941, which so far has been accepted even in official histories, has now been turned upside down in Komunist by key Party historian V. Khvostov and his associate A. Grilav.

They now assert that the Party and the Soviet leadership (they mention Stalin by name only twice) from the very beginning did not trust in the pact with Hitler and used the time between 1939 and 1941 as a breather, for the expansion of Soviet armament. Stalin supposedly was right when he avoided the danger of a two-front war in Europe and in the Far East through his pact with Hitler. The Soviet Union supposedly strictly carried out this agreement and tried to stop the attack with diplomatic means until the very last. The Soviet leadership allegedly was informed on Hitler's attack preparations -- something that has so far been doubted and challenged by Soviet historians, military men, and writers -- and did take the necessary precautions. The blame for the outbreak of World War II is placed entirely on the Western governments. With the conclusion that the Soviet leadership 30 years ago foresaw the "imperialist attack" and took the correct countermeasures, the authors are now concentrating on current matters through a revision of the image of Stalin. By the way, this essay draws a parallel between the antecedents of World War II and present-day developments. Although the article went to print on 12 August, it reads as if it were an announcement and justification of the capture of Prague.

#### Preventive Purge

More frightening than the threadbare justification of Soviet intervention in Prague is the reappearance of the Stalinist concept of preventive punishment used in this connection. It was not a "counter-revolution" that had already broken out -- as it was alleged in Hungary in 1956 -- but rather the danger of a threatening "counterrevolution," in other words, a possible and not a real deviation, that was to be liquidated. This is exactly the same argumentation that was used for Stalin's purges which were directed against all possible and potential "enemies of the Party." The thought scheme of total suspicion, which determined the charges and the explanation of the sentences handed down during the Moscow trials, returned with dangerous threat in the a

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tured as "right-wing revisionist traitors" and accomplices of Mao and of the Western imperialists.

With the allegation of a counterrevolutionary danger in Czechoslovakia, there has now been wiped out as inapplicable a thesis set up by Khrushchev according to which the East Bloc countries have already progressed so far on the road to communism that a relapse into capitalism has become impossible. This ideological justification of a "Communist commonwealth" of Communist countries with equal rights, moving along "their own road," has now been replaced with the old Comintern formula of Stalin according to which all parties must take the CPSU as a model and prove their loyalty to the line by giving Moscow unconditional support. This demand is already being waved in front of all parties that dare criticize the capture of Prague. Not even in theory does Moscow want any more "sister nations" and equal partners in world communism; instead, it wants powerless tools and satellites, as in Stalin's time.

#### Revival of Class Struggle

This new "Stalinism without Stalin" is in the process of replacing the reformist theory of "the Party and the state of the entire people" in the 1961 Party Program with the outdated thesis of the "class struggle in socialist society," as this has already been done by Party Secretary Demichev in Komunist (No 10, 10 July). Stalin and Molotov were blamed for this class struggle theory on the occasion of the rehabilitation of their victims in 1956. The reappearance of this thesis as to the continuing class struggle is a signal for a domestic-policy hardening and challenges all of the past reform endeavors. Here we also find one of the decisive causes of the Czechoslovak crisis: while the Czechoslovak CP with its action program and statute draft was tying in with Khrushchev's 1961 and 1962 Party reforms and while it wanted to develop these reforms radically, the CPSU revoked these reforms and is now once again trying to reintroduce the old-style strict Party order. In this connection, the dispute between the Soviet reformers and the neo-Stalinists was continued via the polemic with Prague.

Although neo-Stalinist theory and practice have not yet been canonized by a Party Congress and although it is still disputed among the leadership and in the Party, it nevertheless increasingly influences the Soviet scene and promises little that is good for the future. The reimposed formulas of "class struggle" and "counterrevolution" alone would rather seem to point to convulsions and tensions, certainly not to a restoration of "calm and order." Another thing that sounds ominous is the repeated hint at a ban on the formation of fractions and on a return to Party discipline, something which Stalin used to keep bringing up during the power struggles and purges.

This theoretical and practical development of neo-Stalinism is undoubtedly backed up by forces that want to push their power aspirations through. The last consequence of neo-Stalinism would actually be a return to one-man rule. The present "collective leadership" under Brezhnev and Kosygin did grow up under Stalin and was molded by the Stalin era, but it is on the other hand closely tied in with the Khrushchev era and the reform endeavors. The real protagonists of neo-Stalinism would appear to be found in the "Ukrainian Mafia," the "young Turks," and the ambitious military leaders who do not necess-

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arily constitute a compact fraction and who need not necessarily pursue identical objectives. But in the history of the Bolshevik Party a sudden upheaval, such as it now seems to emerge with the neo-Stalinist about-face, was always connected with personnel changes at the top.

#### Confrontation Instead of Coexistence

Anyone who today continually reads the Soviet press and theoretical treatises on foreign policy will feel as if he were back in the Cold War during the late 40's. Corresponding to the revived thesis of the continuing class struggles within the Communist countries we now have the assumption of growing international tensions between the two camps. This fatal dialectic has already been used against the Czechoslovak "counterrevolution," when an alleged cooperation between "class enemies" in Czechoslovakia and foreign "imperialists" was construed. Since the Resolutions of the April Plenum demanded increased defense against "subversive imperialist propaganda," we find that a "continuing contrast between the socialist and the imperialist camp" is being emphasized increasingly clearly in the Soviet Union. Very quietly and hardly noticed, there has been a return to the theory of the "two camps" which was set up by Zhdanov, in 1947 and the image of "imperialist encirclement" was recalled through the tie-in between the Vietnam War, the Israeli campaign, "West German revenge-mongering" and the allegedly "aggressive NATO plans."

The Stalinist conflict theory has been expanded and aggravated inasmuch as there is now not only talk of a threat of force from the outside; in addition, the real threat is considered to reside in the internal softening which has been promoted by peaceful means, in other words, in the form of Johnson's "bridge building" and Bonn's Eastern policy. Conjuring up a "foreign enemy" to justify internal suppression is now turning into a much more offensive effort, in combination with expressions of the arrogance of power and the expansion drive. The neo-Stalinists in the Kremlin seem to have less inhibitions and a greater readiness to take risks than their re-awakened model Stalin.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# Intelligence Report

*Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
27 August 1969

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy

Summary

Since the spring of 1965, the Soviet leaders, proceeding gingerly and obliquely, have rehabilitated Stalin's historical image. Official guidelines have defined Stalin's successes in industry, agriculture, culture, ideology, and war. The cult of personality and the purges are still disapproved, but only in footnotes to the historical record. Historians, memorialists, and literary men propagating this positive image have largely replaced critics of Stalin who flourished in the public forums under Khrushchev.

Stalin's rehabilitation has been accompanied in the political sphere by reversion to practices reminiscent of his rule. The regime has sought to refashion the party as an elite ruling body that stands above other interests and imposes its will upon them according to the orthodox precepts of Marxism-Leninism. The government administration has been recentralized, and the police have become more active. On the propaganda level, the regime has sounded in heavy tones the twin themes of vigilance toward the West and of Soviet patriotism. By a slow but steady twisting of arms, culture has been made to conform to the official strictures, forcing reformers to turn increasingly to

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such unofficial means of protest as petitions and demonstrations. The Soviet leaders have nevertheless not reverted to two extremes of Stalin's rule, one-man dictatorship and mass terror. For this reason, their policy deserves the label "neo-Stalinist" rather than "Stalinist."

The regime's desire for legitimacy probably underlines the drive to rehabilitate Stalin, and its own collective nature seems to have encouraged conservative policies. These two tendencies have become mutually reinforcing. The reformers' major weapon to force change, criticism of policies as "Stalinist," has been denied them. Meanwhile, the conservatives have been busy invoking Stalin and his record to ensure "more of the same." Although the Soviet leaders have not been unanimous on all issues, they have stood more united than divided behind both the rehabilitation and the conservative trend. Brezhnev's hand has been especially evident, and he has undoubtedly gained the most from these developments.

The ascendancy of neo-Stalinism does not necessarily portend the eventual emergence of full-fledged Stalinism. The present leaders seem to realize the danger this would bring upon themselves and the damage it would cause the country. Reaction will probably continue, however, at least until the next change of men at the top. The near future will probably see a consolidation of present achievements, that is, fleshing out a favorable portrait of Stalin and a more extensive and thorough application of Stalinist principles to current policy.

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### I. Image Refurbished

1. Nikita Khrushchev, by his own blows and those he inspired others to deliver, had by the end of his rule succeeded in thoroughly blackening Stalin's historical image. Stalin still lived in political and cultural dialogue in the Soviet Union, but only as the embodiment of wrong by which to measure right. Mention of any positive role that he had played had ceased by 1964.

2. Under the present regime, Stalin's battered image has undergone a regeneration in the public forum. Political leaders, official representatives, writers, and memorialists have all had a hand in the process. Derogatory statements about Stalin have become rare and restricted, while praise of most of his career is now recurrent. Although Stalin's image has not regained all of the idealized and mystical glow that it once had, it has officially shed most of its scars and has attained respectability.

#### First Efforts Bring Protest

3. The twentieth anniversary of the end of the war celebrated on 8 May 1965 provided the occasion for the first neutral, if not favorable, public utterances on Stalin's behalf. During the month preceding the anniversary, articles appeared in the central press, most of them signed by military leaders, discussing the economic and military preparations made before the war, Stalin's leadership of the war effort, and his participation in planning military strategy. These articles alleged that some writers had been overly critical in their treatment of Stalin. Leonid Brezhnev seemed to countenance this new look at Stalin in his anniversary speech on 8 May, when he referred to Stalin as the chairman of the wartime State Committee for Defense, the first reference to Stalin by a member of the new leadership.

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4. Positive and negative comments about Stalin alternated in the press, but Brezhnev's remark was followed by other signs of high-level approval of the former Soviet leader. On 29 June 1965 the Georgian party First Secretary, Vasily Mzhavanadze, dignified a dictum of Stalin's by referring to it as "Leninist" in a speech to the Georgian Central Committee. Sergey Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee's Science and Education Department and probably a protégé of Brezhnev, argued in Pravda on 8 October that, because the cult of personality did not arise from the nature of Communism, works that concentrated on this aspect of the Stalin years were in error. Attention, he noted, must be given to the achievements of those years, including industrialization based on the primacy of heavy industry, collectivization of agriculture, the cultural revolution, the Constitution of victorious socialism, the defeat of Trotskyism and right-wing opportunism, and the conduct of the war. On 30 January 1966, three historians declared in Pravda that the term "period of the cult of personality" was "un-Marxist," that in no period did the negative aspects of Stalin's rule predominate.

5. These efforts to enhance Stalin's image agitated intellectual circles in Moscow. During the V-E Day preparations in April 1965, rumors circulated that Central Committee Secretary Petr Demichev, who oversees ideology, had called for a more balanced treatment of Stalin. It was also rumored that Brezhnev and Politburo member Mikhail Suslov had disagreed on the subject, with Suslov allegedly contending that he, Suslov, was too deeply committed to de-Stalinization. [redacted] the subject was a major issue of contention within the leadership before the Central Committee plenum in September 1965. By early 1966 the story was abroad that a full rehabilitation of Stalin would be attempted at the 23rd Party Congress in March. Shortly before the Congress opened, twenty-five leading intellectuals addressed an appeal to Brezhnev warning of the dire effects Stalin's rehabilitation would have in the Soviet Union and the world Communist movement.

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6. At the Congress, Brezhnev did not mention Stalin, a sign perhaps of indecision among the leaders. Nikolay Podgorny stood out as the one speaker who praised the party's achievements in "the elimination of the harmful dregs in connection with the personality cult." Podgorny's position within the leadership, however, had been weakened in late 1965 when he was made chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He replaced Anastas Mikoyan, a champion of de-Stalinization under Khrushchev, who left the leadership entirely. The eclipse of Mikoyan and Podgorny probably helped to open the way to the subsequent progress of rehabilitation.

### New Look Becomes Official

7. Instead of a formal declaration, the Soviet leadership has resorted to diguised and piecemeal measures to make the rehabilitation official. Brezhnev again mentioned Stalin, making a passing reference to him as a Georgian revolutionary, in a speech he delivered in Tbilisi in Georgia on 1 November 1966. Stalin also received favorable mention in a speech by the Armenian party first secretary and in a book by the Georgian party second secretary during early 1967.

8. A number of documents have elaborated on the guidelines for historians laid down by Trapeznikov and, in effect, have made them official. These documents include the Theses of the Central Committee for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Revolution, an article on historiography in the Central Committee's theoretical journal Kommunist No. 3, 1969, and a biography of Stalin in a volume of memoirs about Lenin compiled by the Central Committee's Institute of Marxism-Leninism. The burden of these articles is that the mistakes of Stalin were minimal and should be swept under the carpet of glorious deeds accomplished by him and the party. Because the party corrected violations of collective leadership, party life, and "socialist legality" in 1956, the subject is now closed. Moreover, the articles continue, Stalin's struggle against so-called Trotskyites, right opportunists, and bourgeois nationalists was correct, thus clouding the issue of the purges and the later

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rehabilitation of their victims. Stalin's inspirational leadership of the war effort overshadows any mistakes made in preparation for war, and also to Stalin's credit are collectivization, industrialization, the victory of socialism in the USSR, and the formation of the world socialist system. His works are now recommended to historians as source material. The article on historiography was signed by, among others, V. Golikov, thought to be a personal aide to Brezhnev. It closes with a ringing quote from Brezhnev on the need for unflinching loyalty to Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

9. Demichev indicated his approval of this effort to brighten Soviet history when, in Kommunist No. 10, 1968, he complained of the nihilistic moods engendered among youth by "the blackening of the historical past." The only discordant note on the issue from the leadership was sounded by Suslov on 25 March 1969 at a meeting celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Comintern, when he criticized Stalin's attitude in the early 1930s toward Social Democrats.

#### Reinterpretation Spreads

10. The official reinterpretation of Stalin has been imposed on the history written by academics and memorialists. The professional historians did not submit without a fight, however, which came to center on A. M. Nekrich's book entitled June 22, 1941, published by the Academy of Sciences in 1965. At a conference of historians in 1966 organized to censure the book, the critics were held off by the strength of those who supported Nekrich in his view that Stalin was to blame for the USSR's initial military defeats in WW II. It was not until the summer of 1967 that Nekrich's opponents prevailed. He was expelled from the party, and in August the journal Problems of History of the CPSU published the first vicious attack on his book. Meanwhile, Stalin's reputation as a wartime leader was being advanced without opposition in memoirs by his military collaborators, including Marshals Grechko, Konev, Meretskov, Rokossovsky, and Zhukov, General Shtemenko, Colonel General Yakovlev, and Admiral Kuznetsov. Lest the message of these memoirs be lost on anyone, Kommunist No. 2, 1969, carried a review of five of them, concluding that they show Stalin, "for all the complexity of his character, as an outstanding military leader."

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11. Closely tied to the historical image of Stalin is the matter of rehabilitating his victims. Khrushchev had taken the process to a point just short of exonerating Nikolay Bukharin, a leading advocate of a non-Stalinist program of Soviet development. Under Khrushchev's successors, the publication of memorial biographies of purgees has dwindled, and it has become the general practice to delete all mention of the circumstances of death or to note only that a certain life was "tragically interrupted." The Golikov article in Kommunist No. 3 of this year went still further and specifically rescinded one rehabilitation by name.

12. By 1968 Stalin's activities in the economic field began to receive fuller treatment. The newly published memoirs of former Armaments Minister B. L. Vannikov and of the aircraft designer A. S. Yakovlev portrayed Stalin as the competent director of industries vital to the war. Ironically, different extracts of Vannikov's memoirs had been published in 1962 with the aim of giving the opposite impression. Former Finance Minister A. G. Zverev, in a portion of his memoirs printed in early 1969, concluded that, although Stalin was not without faults, "yet I tend to evaluate his direction of financial activity very highly." The reminiscences of others of Stalin's deputies in economic affairs are reportedly being prepared for publication. Socialist Industry in July 1969 carried the recollections of hero worker Ivan Gudov, who invoked the memory of the Stakhanovite movement of production heroes and the popular adulation that surrounded Stalin. Gudov recalled his awe, at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, at Stalin's cool assessment of the prospering Soviet economy and its problems and his ability to focus attention on vital questions such as production of automatic machine tools.

13. A number of conservative journals spearheaded Stalin's comeback in the literary world. In the patriotic atmosphere of the 1967 anniversary, Moskva No. 10 carried a poem by Sergey Smirnov that became notorious for its passages of servile homage to Stalin. Two poems by Feliks Chuyev in Oktyabr

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No. 1, 1968, called for a restoration of Stalin's honor. Oktyabr took the next logical step in June by carrying A. Grebenshchikov's call for the republication of earlier novels, poems, and plays that glorified Stalin. He especially saw the need to revive the three historical novels written by Valentin Kostylev about Ivan the Terrible, a convenient historical model for Stalin. These efforts met considerable opposition in Literaturnaya Gazeta, organ of the USSR Writers Union, and the liberal journal Novy Mir. Two establishment writers, Aleksandr Chakovsky, chief editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, and Mikhail Sholokov, winner of the Nobel Prize for the novel Quiet Flows the Don, attempted to treat Stalin in major works of literature. In so doing, however, they did not go as far as the historians in covering up Stalin's misdeeds. In his historical novel Blockade published in late 1968, Chakovsky balanced Stalin's days of panic at the beginning of the war and the harm caused by his egotism against his accomplishments in mobilizing the country to achieve ultimate victory. Similarly, in the extracts of Sholokov's novel They Fought for the Fatherland, which appeared in Pravda in March 1969, any criticism of Stalin implicit in the treatment of the purges and prison camps was softened by directing the blame principally at Stalin's deputies for state security and by the hero's constant faith in the party.

#### The Balance and the Leadership

14. The Soviet dictum, being stringently enforced, that the positive is always more "real" than the negative ensures that the "balance" in interpretation weighs heavily in Stalin's favor. In effecting this transformation Brezhnev especially has shown his hand, and Demichev has occasionally appeared to act the role of spokesman. Disagreement within the leadership is indicated by the silence that most Soviet leaders have maintained and by the cautious and contradictory course that the rehabilitation has followed. Clear directions from the top have been absent. No doubt the leaders have felt opposing pressures from different interests within the Soviet Union and the Communist movement and have found it difficult to arrive at a "balance." The report that Suslov objected to the rehabilitation is supported

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only by the fact that he is the one member of the Politburo to have publicly criticized Stalin since the beginning of the process. By individually either encouraging or acquiescing in Stalin's rehabilitation, the current leaders must collectively stand as its authors.

### II. Reversion of Policy

15. The shift toward Stalinist policies accelerated only after a period of many liberal tendencies in late 1964 and 1965 and after Podgorny and Mikoyan's positions had weakened. Since then the party and government have imposed a considerable and cumulative restriction on intellectual life and personal freedoms, have created a more rigid and orthodox ideological framework, and have returned to full centralization of the bureaucracy and a more active police power. The regime has, however, avoided two extreme elements of Stalin's rule, the personality cult of the leader and the use of mass terror. The aloofness and collectivity of the leadership obscure individual personalities and responsibilities. Tyranny may bear heavily on individual citizens but scarcely touches the masses because, however arbitrarily, only specific crimes are prosecuted and punishment is applied by process of law. Therefore, the current regime may more properly be called "neo-Stalinist" than "Stalinist."

### The Party's Leading Role

16. The present leaders have worked against what they see as errors in the regimes of both Stalin and Khrushchev in party affairs. In place of the dictatorship of one man above the party, they have sought to reassert the dictatorship of the party itself. They have maintained a separation of the principal party and government offices, the General Secretary of the party and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and have preserved a genuine balance of power in the Politburo. The expression of party leadership by committee, however, has proved to be less dynamic and decisive than a one-man dictatorship. The leaders have tried to keep the interests of the party distinct from those of other groups in

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society so as to conserve the integrity of the party as an elite body above all others. They have, therefore, pulled back from the party of specialists that was forming under Khrushchev to a more restricted and professional party in the Leninist tradition. The result has been a re-emphasis of many of the principles of political control and ideology for which the era of Stalin is known.

17. Khrushchev's division of the party into agricultural and industrial sections was abolished, and the Twenty-third Party Congress in March 1966 took other measures to fit the party for its changed role. Khrushchev's formula, enshrined in the 1961 program, that the party was "of the whole people" was tacitly abandoned. It reverted, as under Stalin, to being the party of the "vanguard of the people"-- the working class. Corresponding emphasis was laid on restricting membership, particularly in favor of workers. Amendments to the party statutes made it harder, especially for the young, to join the party and easier for lower party organs to expel members. The Twenty-third Party Congress also revoked Khrushchev's rule calling for the change-over of secretaries of party cells every two years. In the theoretical field, the regime has stressed the importance of Marxism-Leninism and, demonstrating its seriousness, has introduced full-time ideological refresher courses for party officials at the district level.

18. In the later Khrushchev years and immediately following his ouster, there was considerable public discussion concerning the withdrawal of the party from day-to-day administrative tasks. This policy was never put in practice however; on the contrary, the maintenance of a leading role for the party in all sectors of society has been given increasing emphasis. Early moves to improve the flow of information and communication inside the party and between the party and the people have also foundered. The Twenty-third Party Congress adopted a resolution to hold party conferences between Congresses in order to provide a wider forum than the Central Committee plenum. No such conference has yet been held. Politburo members have widely publicized the decisions of some of the plenums, but

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the effect has been weakened by the Stalinist bent for secrecy. The last central committee plenum for which a stenographic report was published was in March 1965, and the last at which some of the debate was published in the press was in September 1965. Since then only two of the main speeches have been published in full: those by Brezhnev on agriculture in May 1966 and in October 1968. Thus, the party's hand has not been lifted from society's back while the source of its direction has become more distant, dogmatic, and obscure.

### Administration is Centralized

19. The current regime has reversed nearly all the measures that Khrushchev had designed to decentralize the machinery of administration. In September 1965 a central ministerial system replaced the regional councils of the national economy established in 1957. Since then the number of ministries has been gradually increasing. In August 1966 two union-republic ministries (central ministries supervising ministries in the republics) were established for the Preservation of Public Order and for Education.

20. The concentration of power in Moscow, along with other developments, has largely doomed the economic reforms of September 1965, which were supposed to free the hands of enterprise managers and to encourage rational decision making through use of economic indicators and incentives. The preservation of central planning, direction, supply distribution, and centralized determination of norms and prices has left little leeway for the enterprise manager. To the distress of republic and local officials, the return to the ministerial system has been accompanied by a decline in the attention given by planners to regional considerations. Finally, although the government still relies in practice on economic incentives to spur production, the party has been led by its ideological turn to place renewed stress on ideological incentives.

21. Another of Khrushchev's schemes to achieve Communism was to remove some administrative functions from direct control of the state. The measures he

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introduced were primarily in the legal sphere. They included the abolition of the Ministry of Justice, whose functions largely devolved to the courts, and the institution of "comrades courts" and civilian aides to the militia. Khrushchev also placed the organization of physical education and sports in the hands of public bodies. So far his successors have not reversed these changes except for replacing sports under state control. They have, however, discarded the rationale for carrying decentralization forward by arguing in theoretical articles that the state apparatus must retain its full powers until the point where Communism is achieved.

22. The police organs have enjoyed some increase in their authority. In November 1968 measures were introduced to raise the quality of the militia and improve its public image. These measures were accompanied by a return to the title Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) that had become notorious in the times of Stalin and Beria. The secret police (KGB) benefited from a decree of December 1965 increasing their powers of criminal investigation, by the appointment of a candidate member of the Politburo as KGB chairman in May 1967, and by the appointment of two KGB officers to the Supreme Court in October 1967.

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### Vigilance and Patriotism

23. The regime has been particularly sensitive to the weakness of its ideological base when confronted with foreign example. At the Central Committee plenum in April 1968 Brezhnev prescribed a posture of vigilance toward the West, downgrading the concept of "peaceful coexistence" in favor of a more intense ideological struggle between the two world social systems. The result, best described as a "siege mentality," is similar to the attitude fostered by Stalin's theory of capitalist encirclement. Sharp campaigns against alleged Western propaganda and penetration have been unleashed, and "class criteria" are being used to discredit foreign influences and ideological revisions. The authorities have restored selective radio jamming and have

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discouraged contact of Soviet citizens with foreigners. The ultimate expression of this attitude, of course, was the use of troops in Czechoslovakia to crush that country's reform movement.

24. Another sign that the regime may doubt the inspirational effect of its message of Marxism-Leninism and "proletarian internationalism" is its simultaneous efforts to revive the intense patriotism of the war years. The authorities have organized a continuous parade of celebrations and publicity around the recurring anniversaries of revolutionary and wartime events. A complex of measures known as the "military-patriotic upbringing of youth" includes tours to battlefields, military classes in secondary schools, and more universal military service. Enveloping all is the effort to use the 100th Anniversary of Lenin's birth in 1970 to invoke him and his authority in almost supernatural terms.

### Culture Succumbs

25. The atmosphere of neo-Stalinist indoctrination and regimentation has weighed perhaps most heavily and painfully on the cultural life of the Soviet Union. The new leadership of 1964 held out the promise of an end to the direct and arbitrary interference in the arts that Khrushchev had practiced and that was itself redolent of Stalinism. The editor of *Pravda*, Aleksey Rumyantsev, took advantage of the situation to publish in September 1965 an unusually liberal interpretation of the policy. He argued the need for intellectuals to expose shortcomings in Soviet life and said that talk about party guidance must not be used to cover up injunction in intellectual life. That same month, however, the regime demonstrated that its attitude toward intellectuals had toughened drastically. Rumyantsev was fired and two writers, Andrey Sinyavsky and Yuly Daniel, who had been smuggling their satirical works abroad under pseudonyms, were arrested. Their trial on charges of engaging in "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation" and their seven- and five-year sentences to prison camps in February 1966 ended any illusions among the liberal intelligentsia that the regime now tolerated free expression.

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26. Since then the regime has succeeded in imposing, if not its positive injunctions, certainly its negative ones, on the intellectual world. Obvious tools in the process have been the writers' and artists' unions, and their internal party organizations. Censorship has had its deadening effect. It kept the works of Drabkin, Bek, and Solzhenitsyn out of the pages of Novy Mir even after their publication had been announced. Works giving less than flattering treatment to Soviet history or contemporary conditions or displaying a sympathy for ethnic or religious traditions were systematically denounced by defenders of "socialist realism." Calls came from officials for more heroic works about Lenin, revolutionary and war subjects, and the modern Soviet worker. In 1967, some of the more daring theaters sought to evade these strictures by staging modernized versions of classics, such as Chekhov's Three Sisters and Ostrovsky's A Remunerative Position, to comment on contemporary life. Only after considerable efforts were the authorities, including part of the Moscow party organization, able finally to tame the unorthodox journal Teatr and to ban the most controversial plays in the fall of 1968.

27. Conservatives in the cultural establishment have found this atmosphere propitious for engaging in particularly vicious attempts to discredit their rivals associated with liberal literary journals. The journal Yunost, after months of hounding by conservatives and rumors of changes, in July 1969 lost three prominent liberals, Yevgeny Yevtushenko, Vasily Aksenov, and Viktor Rozov, from its editorial board. The one independently minded replacement, Anatoly Kuznetsov, soon defected to the West. The conservatives are now concentrating their fire on the last and still defiant refuge of the liberals, Novy Mir. In their heat they have raised again the charge of "cosmopolitanism," a label Stalin used against intellectuals and Jews in purges after the war.

28. Among the social sciences, history has suffered most under the new dispensation. A new Military History Institute was created under the Ministry of Defense in 1966 for the purpose of "exposing bourgeois falsifiers" and "propagandizing the heroic



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feats" of the Soviet armed forces. The Institute of History, apparently because of the recalcitrance of many of its members, lost its director in August 1967 and a year later was split into two Institutes, one for USSR History and one for General History. A Central Committee decree on the social sciences in August 1967 resulted in many changes in the organization of research and the system of institutions. The effectiveness of the measures, however, has been hampered by their contradictory aims: to improve knowledge of foreign countries and to counter bourgeois and revisionist ideas. The development of sociology still languishes for want of official approval. Hopes for radical economic discussion raised by the economic reform were dashed by conservatives who began to warn against "market socialism" and "anarcho-syndicalism" and to point to reforms in Eastern Europe. The natural sciences have been freer from interference. Lysenkoism was discredited after Khrushchev's fall, although its spokesmen have recently been finding their way into print again.

### Protests and Persecution

29. As a result of this deadening policy, reformers who previously had tried to work within the system now find themselves outside it. Their literary arguments in the public press have been replaced by a protest movement concentrating on dramatizing constitutional rights by petitions to Soviet officials and international bodies and by occasional public demonstrations. The movement has attracted the support of famous figures in the arts and sciences, as well as hundreds of virtual unknowns, professional people, party members, and workers in various cities around the country. The protestors have broadcast their fears that the illegal repression of dissent threatens the country with a new era of Stalinist terror. Russian-centered activity has been paralleled by similar activity among national groups such as the Ukrainians and the Tatars and among religious organizations, and some attempts have been made to link all these causes in a broader struggle for justice.

30. The authorities have responded to this challenge with a variety of measures which, while

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often harsh, have fallen short of the massive and brutal solutions of Stalin. The principal activists were sent to prison or into exile after a series of trials in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities. Others have been committed to mental hospitals. Probably over a hundred of those who lent their names to petitions have suffered loss of party membership, professional status, employment, or schooling. The regime has seemed particularly concerned to end the public nature of the protests and the attention they receive abroad. Although authorities had apparently achieved some success in muffling the voices of protest after March 1968, open dissent during the International Communist Conference in June 1969 proved that the measures being used had not solved the problem.

### III. The Uses of Stalin

31. Stalin as a person and the system he represents loom so large in Soviet history that they remain the principal guidelines by which subsequent policies and modes of government are defined in the popular and official minds. This situation is reinforced by the fact that in political discussions Soviet practice so restricts direct debate over current policy that the use of other terms, especially historical, is required. As a result, official approval or disapproval of Stalin has been and is likely to continue to be an important signal of the direction of policy, toward reaction or reform.

#### The Conservative Impulse

32. The regime has found it desirable to repair Stalin's image probably for reasons of its own legitimacy and of public morale and order. The party has been at pains since it demoted Khrushchev to establish that it holds a continuous and dominant place in all periods of Soviet history as the advancer of socialist development according to the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. The horrendous crimes that Khrushchev charged to Stalin implied either the party's complicity or its abdication of authority. The party's leaders have in self-defense now sought to minimize those crimes, if not forget them.

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At the personal level, many officials had been in league with Stalin in carrying out his policies and were potentially compromised by exposure of their character and by the course of the rehabilitation of their victims. For the millions of Soviet people who had learned to revere him as a personal leader and an infallible authority, the denunciation of Stalin had been a shocking and disillusioning experience. His reinstatement presumably has assuaged the feelings of a large portion of the population.

33. The nature of the current collective leadership has also encouraged the reversion to Stalinist practices. The interests that are strongest in Soviet society, including, besides the party, the police forces, the military, heavy industry, and various bureaucracies, are those that prospered under Stalin and his system of rule. Government by committee has shown itself to be responsive to these major interests. In fact, the consultation and compromise required for a committee system to work suggest that it will be a conservative rule.

34. Once started, the reactionary drift proved to have a dynamism of its own. Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin created a psychological climate allowing the existence of at least some measure of criticism and dissent. The new regime's attempts to turn back the clock met with stiff resistance, which then required harsher measures to overcome. The influence of foreign example on this resistance further demanded, in the authorities' view, a xenophobic stance and finally contributed to the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

#### Stalin as a Weapon

35. If independent reasons have led the conservatives in power both to restore Stalin's image and to resort to neo-Stalinist practices, they have also found the two policies to be mutually reinforcing. Under Khrushchev, progressives regularly discussed in party and historical journals specific "mistakes" of Stalin in economic, military, agricultural, and foreign policy. Usually these articles

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had implications for contemporary Soviet policies, and at a minimum undercut conservative objections to change. The term "Stalinist" itself became a loaded epithet that liberals could use to discredit conservative opponents. These were vital weapons for reformers who otherwise had limited means for countering entrenched interests. Their effectiveness was admitted by D. I. Chesnokov, deputy director of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, who complained in Problems of Philosophy No. 12, 1968 that "the bugaboo of 'Stalinism' is used to frighten unstable people, and to spread the idea that any firmness, any revolutionary policy, any implacability in ideology, any consistency in the defense of Marxism, is somehow 'Stalinism'."

36. The conservatives, too, can use Stalin for their own ends. If Stalin's constitution of 1936 is said to have served the nation so well, then there is little reason to update it. Consequently, nothing has come of the leadership's original promises of a new constitution that would emphasize a break with the past. The party's praise of the industrialization of the country through central planning and "socialist competition" puts a damper on the use of economic levers and incentives to spur development. Endorsement of Stalin's cultural policy and the "cultural revolution" serves efforts to regiment the artistic world, whose radicals, in their eagerness for new horizons, have called the Stalin era a wasteland.

37. Moreover, the proclaimed correctness of Stalin's struggles against "right and left revisionism" provides useful authority for combatting anyone who questions the relevance of Moscow's line today. At the Comintern anniversary meeting last March, Suslov scored Stalin for misdirecting the Communists' struggle against Social Democrats between 1928 and 1935, rather than against the rising tide of fascism in Italy and Germany. He said the error was akin to dogmatism and must not be repeated. In essence, he was discussing the propriety of political cooperation between Communist parties and non-Communist reform elements--cooperation which can only be achieved at the cost of "bending" Communist principles. The points that he made run counter to

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Brezhnev's efforts to lead the Communist movement back to uncompromising hostility to everything non-Communist and to tighten control from the "center." That this continued to be Brezhnev's position is evident in Golikov's attack in Kommunist on the theme that Lenin had not always been unconditionally hostile to all except pure Bolsheviks. The problem of reconciling Communist principles and tactical compromise remains at the base of Moscow's difficulties with Eastern and Western European parties, figures in the difficulties with China, and has implications for Soviet attitudes toward the West.

38. Brezhnev's activity on behalf of Stalin's reputation has been matched by his embrace of Stalinist policies. Certainly, as Stalin's particular heir as General Secretary, he has had most to gain by reversion. As leader of the party, he has been the architect of its restoration to a more professional and worker-oriented elite. He has led the revival of Marxism-Leninism to an all-embracing and unyielding state dogma. He has shown himself to be solicitous of the military's material desires as well as their historical pride. That such policies have prevailed indicates that the majority of the Politburo has been with Brezhnev. On particular questions, however, there have obviously been differences among individuals. For example, Kosygin, who promoted the restoration of the central economic ministries, is probably chagrined that traditional ideological strictures hamper the adoption of certain new measures of economic rationality. Whether Suslov's objection to one aspect of foreign policy extends to other portions of the Stalinist heritage is unknown. In general, however, the neo-Stalinist program of the leadership has largely pre-empted an important area of challenge for its ambitious members. Individuals such as Aleksandr Shelepin, for example, are not themselves strong enough to mount a challenge from a liberal platform and yet they find most conservative positions already well occupied.

### Stalin's Legacy

39. The ascendancy of neo-Stalinism does not necessarily portend the eventual emergence of full-fledged Stalinism. The present leaders know that

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the ways of Stalin ultimately endanger no one so much as themselves. Their desire to avoid the extremes of Stalinism is evident in their rebuke of the cult of Stalin and the purges, and in their shunning of one-man rule and unlimited police power. They also show some appreciation of the havoc that Stalinism would raise in the country's domestic and foreign affairs. Although the atmosphere today is more conducive to a full return to Stalinism than in the recent past, such a development would probably come only at a time of crisis and with a change in top leadership.

40. There is no indication, however, that modification of the current reaction is in prospect. Not only are the heirs of Stalin in power, but the spirit of Stalin has a grip on the country. Were events to bring new leaders to the fore, leaders who were ready to break with the past, that grip would again have to be loosened. Barring a change at the top, the near future will probably see a consolidation of the stage presently achieved, that is, a fleshing out of Stalin's favorable portrait and a more extensive and thorough application of Stalinist principles to current policy. Especially in the arts, the freeze threatens to harden. In this sense, Stalin's legacy will continue to weigh heavy on Soviet society.

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Executive Registry  
67-4370

13 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT : Forthcoming Book: The Young Stalin  
by Edward Ellis Smith

1. This memorandum is for information only and is in response to your request for an evaluation of a forthcoming book entitled The Young Stalin by Edward Ellis Smith (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1967).

2. Galley proofs of The Young Stalin have been reviewed by [redacted] of the DDI/Special Research Staff; his review is attached. On balance, [redacted] finds this book to contain a very substantial research effort. Unfortunately, it appears that Mr. Smith's conclusions are frequently awkward and are not always borne out by the facts he presents. A great part of the book is devoted to the role of Stalin as a probable Okhrana agent. Much of the research for The Young Stalin was done in Okhrana files recently opened to scholars at the Hoover Library at Stanford University as well as other Russian materials in its collections.

Walter Pforzheimer  
Curator  
Historical Intelligence Collection

Attachment  
Review

Distribution:  
Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att.

- 1 - DDI
- 1 - Asst. to Dir. (Goodwin) w/att.
- 1 - DDP w/att.
- 1 - D/Sec ( [redacted] att.
- 1 - CI Staff ( [redacted] att.
- 1 - DDI/SR ( [redacted] w/att.

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The Young Stalin

by Edward Ellis Smith

This book is built around the thesis that Stalin was an Okhrana agent throughout his prerevolutionary career, and all the evidence presented--the product of a very substantial research effort--is shaped to fit this view. The results are sometimes persuasive but frequently awkward and incredible, even to a reader who was originally predisposed toward the author's thesis.

For Mr. Smith tries too hard. All too often, when evidence is either lacking or completely ambiguous, he constructs a highly speculative and improbable hypothesis which he later alludes to as established fact. (Smith's depiction of Stalin's supposed conspiratorial relationship in 1913 with the Bolshevik leader and known Okhrana agent Ramon Malinovsky --at a time when by Smith's own showing Stalin was in very bad odor with the Okhrana--is an example of such a hypothesis.) More than once he sets forth an impressive generalization which he himself subsequently undermines, apparently unwittingly: thus, he attaches tremendous sinister significance to the fact that Stalin "alone" escaped arrest in the Okhrana raids in Tiflis in March 1901 (p. 59), and three pages later alludes in passing to a more important Georgian revolutionary (Ketskhoveri) who had similarly escaped. This over-enthusiastic approach to the facts is particularly unfortunate because it creates unnecessary distrust in the reader and weakens confidence in ~~many~~ conclusions which may nevertheless be correct.

Smith does best in the first third of his narrative: although he does not prove his thesis, there seems nothing inherently impossible and much that is reasonable in his suggestion that Dzhugashvili may have been tapped by the Okhrana as a low-level agent shortly after his expulsion from the Tiflis seminary in 1899; that he systematically informed on comrades in party organizations in Tiflis, Baku and Batum over the next few years; that he acquired a highly unsavory reputation among the Social Democrats of each city in turn; that he was finally arrested for cover purposes in 1902 when revolutionary suspicions about him were about to boil over; and that the Okhrana furnished the otherwise invisible means of support for the family he acquired after 1904.

It is after this that Smith begins increasingly to strain the evidence. He insists that the Okhrana was behind Stalin's masterminding of the particularly bloody and ill-fated Yerevan Square robbery in Tiflis in June 1907,

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although he is not consistent enough even to examine the question of whether the Okhrana endorsed all the other Caucasus "expropriations" Stalin is believed to have planned for the Bolsheviks in 1906 and 1907. These operations were congenial work for Stalin, and it was through them that Stalin first acquired importance in Lenin's eyes--surely sufficient motivation in itself for Stalin's actions.

From this point on, Smith's persistence in seeking to explain Stalin's behavior in terms of supposed Okhrana operations becomes ludicrous when viewed in the light of what both the Okhrana and Stalin actually did. The Okhrana arrested Stalin five times between March 1908 and the February Revolution, and left him at large a total of 3 months in 1908, 6 months in 1909, 3 months in 1910, 2 months in 1911, 6 months in 1912, 2 months in 1913, and not at all in 1914, 1915, or 1916. In September 1911, Stalin had barely been in St. Petersburg two days before he was picked up again and sent back to his term in exile. All this would seem to go well beyond any conceivable requirements of cover. For Stalin's part, when he was helping to run Pravda in St. Petersburg late in 1912 he took a temporarily conciliatory line toward the Mensheviks which, as Smith admits, was precisely the opposite of what was wanted by both the Okhrana and Lenin.

Smith recognizes that Stalin was not at all under Okhrana control by 1912, yet stubbornly insists (p. 202) that he must have continued to have a regular contact in the Department of Police in St. Petersburg to whom he supposedly could plan to denounce Roman Malinovsky for disloyalty to the Okhrana. One of the weakest aspects of the book is the author's failure to consider carefully when such links must have disappeared, and at what point Stalin must have decided to opt for the Bolsheviks rather than the police. The evidence provided in the book itself suggests strongly that this occurred much earlier than Smith is willing to admit, and that if Stalin had once had a foot in the Okhrana camp it was probably withdrawn by 1907 or 1908.

  
DDI/Special Research Staff

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# Intelligence Report

**THE STALIN ISSUE AND  
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE**



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**5 July 1968  
RSS No. 0030**

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**THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE**Preface

Since the ouster of Khrushchev in the fall of 1964 the domestic political scene in the Soviet Union has witnessed a struggle for power within the leadership. Two of the key figures in this struggle, Brezhnev and Shelepin, have attempted to gain the support of the old-guard party apparatchiks by espousing orthodox policies; of the two Shelepin has been the more aggressive and Brezhnev in general the more cautious, but thus far Brezhnev has clearly gained the upper hand in the competition. Accompanying the struggle has been a gradual but continuing reversion toward the ideological orthodoxy, rigid controls, and repression which characterized the Stalin years. One aspect of this move toward orthodoxy has been the resurrection of Stalin's reputation and the cleansing of his tarnished image, developments which many Soviet citizens fear may mark a return to "Stalinism."

The reign of Stalin covered some 30 years, more than half the history of the Soviet Union. It was a period of intense industrialization, of forced mass collectivization, and of the great sacrifices of World War II. It was also a period of terror and repression during which millions of Soviet citizens died in the purges. Although the term "Stalinism" has a number of connotations, to Soviet citizens in general and to the intellectuals in particular, the term conjures up memories of total police control, repression, terror, purge trials, and labor camps. It is in that context that the term is used in this paper.

The scope of the paper is limited to the general use by the leadership of the Stalin issue in the struggle

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for power and the practical implications of a rehabilitation of Stalin for intellectual freedom in the Soviet Union. The paper does not deal with specific policy implications often involved in the use of the issue--such as military expenditures, agriculture, nationalities problems. Neither does it deal with other policy questions dividing the leadership.

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Chief, DDI Special Research Staff

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## THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE

Since the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964 a gradual restoration of Stalin's political respectability within the Soviet Union has coincided with a return to more orthodox policies and increasingly repressive methods of dealing with non-conformists. The issue of Stalin's rehabilitation has been used by various leaders, most notably Brezhnev and Shelepin, in their attempts to attain the top position in the Party hierarchy. The aim of each has been to gain the support of the party apparatchiks, both high and medium level, many of whom were dismayed and felt threatened by Khrushchev's reformist tendencies. Thus, each has tried to demonstrate that he and he alone is the legitimate leader of the party faithful. In order to do so, each has supported orthodox views and each has attempted to reach around the reformer Khrushchev to Stalin in an effort to establish a direct line of legitimacy from Lenin.

Thus far, Brezhnev has prevailed over Shelepin in the ongoing struggle for power; in order to do so he adopted the neo-Stalinist position first assumed by the Shelepin faction. Brezhnev has also managed to stave off attempts by moderates within the leadership, represented by Podgorniy and Kosygin, to push their own policy views; in the process he has apparently gained a measure of support from them, possibly by convincing them that the alternative to him was even less desirable--e.g., Shelepin. However, while Brezhnev has emerged as the strongest of the Soviet leaders, his position is still limited by the nature of the leadership; for a majority of the Soviet leaders has a vested interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring too much power.

### The Issue And What It Means

The Stalin issue evokes a great emotional response among those who suffered during the Stalin years and fear a return to the harsh repressive methods of those years.

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At the same time the issue has great political significance. To Communists, history is not a matter of academic concern; rather it is a vital element in political life. Communist ideology is based upon the inevitability of a certain historical progression, and the continued justification of the system as it exists is based upon the perpetuation of that concept of history. Thus, all policies must at least have the appearance of conforming to the ideology, and for this reason each successive Soviet regime has felt the need to rewrite Soviet history in order to support its own policies.

The classification of Stalin touches upon the very nature and legitimacy of the world's foremost Communist system. It was impossible to denounce Stalin without placing in question the myth of the party's infallibility and undermining its ideological authority; this is precisely what happened in the Soviet Union following Khrushchev's 1956 denunciation of the Stalin period and its cult of personality. The continuing but gradual rehabilitation of Stalin is part of an attempt to return the party and the system to a position of ideological legitimacy. The damage done to the party's credibility by the denunciation of Stalin took its toll in the morale of the party apparatchiks. Thus the rehabilitation of Stalin also represents an attempt to reassure these old-guard--and by nature conservative--cadres that the party retains its legitimacy and authority.

Khrushchev's attack on Stalin represented an attack on orthodoxy and inflexibility; it was the beginning of a drive for change. In general, those who support continued de-Stalinization are those who also favor change, reform, and liberalization. They tend toward pragmatism and prefer to adapt theory to the needs of the country rather than vice-versa. Their inclination toward reform in general creates an atmosphere conducive to more open discussion and, as a result, more freedom. A positive characterization of Stalin, on the other hand, suggests a more rigid, dogmatic approach to politics and economics. Those who view the Stalin era in a favorable light have generally argued the case for doctrinal continuity and have emphasized the ideological role of the party. Their approach

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necessitates tight control and close supervision of the pragmatists and the intellectuals, and a corresponding lessening of personal freedom.

Alignment within the hierarchy on the Stalin issue, as well as on other policies, is quite complex, and the assignment of classifications to individuals and groups is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. It nonetheless serves the purpose of identifying and highlighting shades of difference in approach and in points of view. There are several groupings within the leadership which might well wish the rehabilitation of Stalin--but for different reasons and to different degrees. The old-line apparatchiks who tend to be dogmatic would, in all likelihood, welcome a return to an atmosphere of tight control and rigid, unquestioned views; this is the atmosphere in which they rose to the top and in which they would feel more comfortable. Individuals who seem to fit this description, best represented by Suslov, will be referred to as orthodox.

Another, seemingly more coordinated, group of individuals took the early lead in actively pushing an end to criticism of Stalin's cult of personality and in urging tighter controls on the content of published material. For this reason they are referred to as a neo-Stalinist faction. Their main purpose seems to have been to capitalize on the views of the orthodox apparatchiks in order to gain support in their drive for power. This faction is composed primarily of young members of the hierarchy, many of whom came up through the Komsomol and have been closely aligned with Shelepin. The neo-Stalinists have demonstrated an ability to be quite pragmatic, unlike the orthodox grouping, and even to shift positions in order to attain their main goal, the acquisition of the instruments of power.

On the other side of the political spectrum, the moderates or pragmatists see a need for change and reform in the Soviet Union and tend away from rigid, orthodox positions. Kosygin and probably Podgorny (at least at one time) belong in this category. They would be inclined to oppose a rehabilitation of Stalin. Even more to the

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reform side of the spectrum are the liberals. The member of the hierarchy who came closest to representing this position, Mikoyan, was dropped from the Presidium in March 1966. The main strength of the liberals is found among the intellectuals--for example, the chief editor of the liberal journal Noviy Mir, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy. The intellectuals want more freedom to write, to speak, and to dissent. They have actively opposed the restoration of Stalin's image.

Shifts in policy concerning various aspects of the Stalin issue are reflected first in the intellectual community. Reversion to a favorable view of Stalin has required historians and writers to adhere to the new line. The re-Stalinizers have demanded that criticism of Stalin cease and, in the past three years, they have had considerable success in efforts to untarnish Stalin's historical image. The re-Stalinizers also demand that written material be judged according to the principles of socialist realism--which means that, when writing on the Soviet Union, criticism is out of order and only the achievements and promises of Communism may be discussed. In order to restore Stalin's political respectability, therefore, it has been necessary to reimpose prescribed, rigid formulas, and to clamp down on non-conformists.

Increasing pressure on intellectuals to conform has, in fact, accompanied the gradual rehabilitation of Stalin. In the three years since Khrushchev's ouster, the regime's warnings, threats, and outright repression have intensified. Frustrated in their efforts to continue their moves toward greater freedom and frightened by what they considered to be a move back toward Stalinist methods, the intellectuals have responded with demonstrations, petitions, and letters of protest. These, in turn, have resulted in even stronger measures by the regime--including expulsion from the party, arrests, commitments to mental institutions, and incarceration in labor camps. The result has been a spiraling cycle of action and reaction resulting in increasingly harsh measures.

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### Alignment of Forces

The regime's moves toward harsher policies have generated considerable public opposition, and have been accompanied by--indeed are a part of--an ongoing struggle for power within the hierarchy. In the first few months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new Soviet leaders were preoccupied with establishing their positions and organizing their forces. Both Shelepin, a neo-Stalinist, and Podgorny, a moderate, seemed to be in fairly powerful positions, with Brezhnev seemingly occupying a middle ground. The existence of this somewhat diffused political situation was reflected in the lack of a clear policy on culture, resulting in considerable freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were numerous and criticism of Stalin widespread.

If any faction seemed to have a slight edge at the time it was the moderates. Apparent Presidium-level supporters for a moderate policy included Podgorny, Kosygin, and Mikoyan, while those who clearly seemed to favor a hard line were Shelepin, Shelest, and Suslov. With the Presidium divided in this manner, a balancing group, conservative by inclination and headed by Brezhnev, possessed considerable power to swing votes in favor of one group or another. Polyanskiy and Kirilenko probably belonged to this group.

### Infighting Begins

Brezhnev apparently saw his biggest threat as coming from the moderates. In February 1965 an attack was launched against Khar'kov Oblast, Podgorny's former bailiwick; the author of the article was Shcherbitskiy, the First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, Brezhnev's old power base. In the same month members of the neo-Stalinist faction (Pavlov and Yegorychev) attacked those who criticize the period of the cult of personality. Thus, the struggle for power had begun, with the moderates coming under attack from both the neo-Stalinists and Brezhnev.

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By the early spring of 1965 the backers of a rehabilitation of Stalin had a well-coordinated campaign underway to restore Stalin's World War II image. Although Brezhnev's statements at the time were not so harsh as those of such neo-Stalinists as Moscow City Chief Yegorychev and Komsomol First Secretary Pavlov, he must have supported the proposal to restore Stalin's reputation and have swung a decision in favor of it. He probably had various reasons for doing so. In order to justify Khrushchev's ouster it was useful to demonstrate that Khrushchev had strayed from the true party line; thus, if virtually the whole period of party rule was not to be in disrepute, the respectability of the Stalin era (and of Stalin himself) must be restored. Secondly, Brezhnev too was fighting for the leadership and must have felt that he needed the support of the orthodox apparatchiks.

The decision to rehabilitate Stalin was implemented first with respect to Stalin's image as a wartime leader. Various military leaders made increasingly favorable comments concerning Stalin as a wartime leader. The military has been in the forefront on the Stalin issue no matter which line the party has adopted--always using the issue to defend the prerogatives of the military. When de-Stalinization was the line, the military criticized Stalin for not listening to the professionals. Now, they began to praise him because he did listen. Another indication of the trend was the partial suspension in the spring of 1965 of the program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims. This partial rehabilitation of Stalin was given official sanction in May 1965, when Brezhnev became the first member of the hierarchy to mention Stalin's name in public; at this time he referred to Stalin as the wartime head of the State Defense Committee.

In the summer and early fall of 1965 the liberals fought back against the onslaughts of both the neo-Stalinists and Brezhnev. Publication of rehabilitations of Stalin's victims was resumed and a number of liberal articles appeared. In early September a liberal defense of the intellectuals, signed by Pravda editor Rumyantsev,

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a possible associate of Podgorny, appeared in Pravda. This counterattack by the liberals was, however, short-lived. Rumyantsev was fired in mid-September and replaced by Zimyanin, a Belorussian closely associated with Belorussian leaders Mazurov and Masherov, both of whom were to express neo-Stalinist opinions subsequently. Also in September the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy were arrested for having published works abroad; this marked a victory for a hard-line approach.

### Shelepin's Bid Fails But Hard-Line Prevails

Shelepin's drive for power, begun in February 1965, intensified throughout the summer and early fall; but it had been decisively defeated by the December central committee plenum. The Party-State Control Committee which he headed was abolished, and he was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, the moderates also received a set-back at the plenum, indicating that the strength to strike at Shelepin had not been mobilized by them, although they might well have supported it. Podgorny replaced Mikoyan as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, a position with far less political power than his position on the party Secretariat, which he lost. Furthermore, Mikoyan's removal indicated that this strong supporter of a moderate position was on his way out. Thus, the net gainer at this time was Brezhnev, who probably had gained the support of Suslov by supporting orthodox views.

Brezhnev's support for re-Stalinizing and the need for conformity had been revealed in the publication in October 1965 of an article by an apparent protege of his, Trapeznikov, instructing propagandists that the period of the cult should not be viewed negatively and indicating that this applied not only to the question of wartime leadership but to other aspects of the period, such as collectivization and industrialization. A Pravda article the following January instructed historians to stop describing the Stalin era as the period of the cult of personality,

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as this time in history had been characterized by many positive achievements. Consequences of this move toward orthodoxy include the arrests in September 1965, and trial the following February, of the writers, Daniel and Sinyavskiy, for unauthorized publication of their works in the West.

### The 23rd Congress

On the eve of the 23rd Congress, which opened in late March 1966, there were numerous reports that Stalin would be formally rehabilitated. A number of hard-line articles and speeches given during this period supported the rumors, as did the apparently well-coordinated program to improve Stalin's historical reputation. The rumors were also supported by the resurrection of a number of Stalinist terms--such as cosmopolitanism, sharpening of the class struggle (used in reference to the 1930's), and enemies of the people. The prospect of a rehabilitation of Stalin drew strong negative reactions from several foreign Communist countries and frightened reactions from Soviet intellectuals, who sent Brezhnev a letter urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.

Perhaps in response to these reactions the Soviet leaders stepped back from a full-scale formal rehabilitation, and when the congress opened only the vestiges of such a program remained--the restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary. While the return of these Stalinist terms was purely symbolic, it nonetheless demonstrated the mood of the Soviet leadership and suggested the direction in which it wished to go. Brezhnev's acquisition of the title General Secretary set him apart from his colleagues, distinguished him from Khrushchev, and identified him with Stalin, the only other Soviet leader ever to hold this title.

Brezhnev's success was further reflected in the fact that both the moderates and Shelepin again suffered set-backs at the congress. Mikoyan was dropped from the Politburo; Shelepin, apparently at this time, was assigned

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responsibility for light industry, a clear step down for him. Brezhnev and the orthodox element in the party gained, however. Pelshe, the Latvian First Secretary and reportedly a Suslov associate, became a full member of the Politburo, and Kunayev, a Brezhnev protege, became a candidate member. The continued strength of Shelepin's views was suggested by the appointment as a candidate Politburo member of Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, who, while not a protege of Shelepin, supported many of the same views.

Brezhnev's speech at the congress was mild compared with some of those which followed, indicating that in spite of the adoption of an increasingly hard-line stand, pressure by the neo-Stalinist faction for even harsher methods continued. Some of these speakers called for administrative action against non-conformist writers, and such liberal journals as Noviy Mir and Yunost' received strong criticism. After the congress these threats were halted for a period, perhaps because of the sharp protests, both foreign and domestic on the eve of the congress, or possibly as a result of Shelepin's defeat.

#### Liberal Initiative

Perhaps encouraged by the failure of the congress to formally rehabilitate Stalin and the reassurances given to them that Stalinist times would not return, the liberals proceeded to write and publish a number of articles in the late spring and early summer of 1966. In particular, there was a temporary upsurge in the program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims, and a number of articles criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization appeared. This initiative was quickly squashed however, and articles casting Stalin in a favorable light soon predominated once again.

In spite of the prevalence of a conservative influence, the liberals continued to voice opposition throughout 1966. In February and in the summer, two

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meetings were held, one to discuss a book by A. Nekrich criticizing prewar preparations, and the second to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU. At each of these meetings those in charge lost control and attacks were launched by participants on Stalin and the personality cult. A number of petitions also were circulated; for example, in December a group of intellectuals protested the passage of a decree extending an article of the RSFSR criminal code to include any form of "slander" of Soviet society; the intellectuals feared that this would open the way for further repression of the intellectuals. Also in December Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article demanding a truthful examination of the past. Orthodoxy still dominated, but resistance to the pressure to conform continued.

#### Leadership Tension Continues

Friction within the leadership was reflected in a debate which was waged in the press during the summer and early fall of 1966. The issue was that of collective leadership versus individual responsibility and all factions participated. The neo-Stalinists opened the debate with several articles stressing the importance of collective leadership and warning of the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule. They received support from an unlikely direction--the liberals who used the cult of personality and the resulting violations of legality to illustrate the evils of one-man rule. Both of these factions clearly had a vested interest in retaining collective leadership and in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring too much power.

Brezhnev and his backers responded to the concerted attacks with several articles emphasizing the need for responsibility and discipline, stressing the importance of individual leadership, and quoting Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be permitted to hide beneath references to collectivity. Brezhnev also responded by mentioning favorably that most notable of individual leaders--Stalin; in a November speech in Tbilisi, he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary."

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A rigid, orthodox policy clearly prevailed in early 1967. The rehabilitation program was halted and refurbishing of Stalin's image continued. Dissident intellectuals were arrested, particularly in the Ukraine and Leningrad, where party leaders Shelest and Tolstikov supported the neo-Stalinist line. Other examples of the ascendancy of orthodoxy were the harassment of Noviy Mir and the replacement of two key members of its editorial board, and the expulsion of the historian Nekrich from the party in July for his criticism of Stalin's handling of the prewar situation.

### Shelepin's Defeat

With the moderates on the defensive, Brezhnev and his followers next turned their big guns on Shelepin. In May 1967, Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was removed as head of the KGB and the following month the most outspoken neo-Stalinist, Yegorychev, was removed as Moscow City First Secretary. Shortly before his dismissal, Yegorychev had reportedly attacked the leadership at a Central Committee plenum for its handling of the Middle East crisis. Shelepin was apparently held responsible for Yegorychev's attack and his power was curtailed; in July he became head of the Soviet Union's trade union organization and then in September he was removed from the secretariat.

In the face of Brezhnev's organizational victories, Shelepin's backers began to issue more warnings in the press against high-handed leadership methods. As they had in 1966, they again stressed collective leadership, but they came down most strongly on the right of party members to criticize their superiors, citing the dangers involved in having a leader who cannot take criticism. Two of these articles used the cult of personality (one directly and one indirectly) to illustrate the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule--meaning Brezhnev's. The adoption in both 1966 and 1967 of an anti-Stalin line of argument by Shelepin's neo-Stalinist

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supporters was an indication of their desperation. Finding themselves in a vulnerable position, they used arguments best suited to help prevent both the acquisition of further power by Brezhnev and their own subjection to more political defeats. Some individuals not in sympathy with Yegorychev's views might also have feared the precedent set by Yegorychev's abrupt dismissal.

The defeats suffered by Shelepin and the neo-Stalinist faction in the spring of 1967 briefly encouraged the liberal intellectuals. At the end of June several articles critical of censorship and urging its abolition were published, but almost immediately they were repudiated and the hard-line reaffirmed by articles in the central press. The arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals continued; clearly the defeat of Shelepin did not entail a corresponding defeat for hard-line policies.

#### Postlude and Prospects

During the first few months of 1968, the atmosphere of threat and repression grew still more menacing. Intellectuals were prosecuted for "anti-Soviet" activities; liberal articles and anti-Stalin references disappeared from publication.

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Brezhnev continued to gain strength and to hack away at Shelepin's position during the first half of the year. In April, First Secretary Katushev of Gorkiy Oblast, who had supported Brezhnev on several occasions previously, became a Party Secretary and, in May, Shelepin's protege Pavlov was relieved of his position as Komsomol Chief. Late in March Brezhnev delivered his most militant cultural statement to date. Emphasizing the importance of ideology, he described the "sharp ideological struggle" being waged and charged that bourgeois imperialists were trying to influence Soviet citizens. He attacked Soviet renegades and hypocrites who fall into the imperialist net and warned that they would not go unpunished. He again announced that what he termed ideologically "weak works" would be given a strict appraisal. Less than two weeks later a central committee plenum adopted a resolution calling for a further tightening of ideological controls. While it seems clear that Brezhnev's speech and the resolution were at least partially in reaction to the revolutionary liberalizing events taking place in Czechoslovakia in early 1968, both were consistent with the trend which had existed in Soviet policy over the previous three-and-a-half years.

While the current atmosphere is less restrictive than that of the Stalin years, when terror and repression were the order of the day, it is much more stifling than that which existed during Khrushchev's tenure. The situation varied under Khrushchev; when he was relatively strong there was a corresponding relaxation of ideological controls, and when he was on the defensive (for example in late 1962 and early 1963) there was a tightening in cultural policy and less freedom of expression. Nonetheless, the current clamp-down far exceeds in severity any clamp-down which occurred during the Khrushchev years.

At the present time there seems little likelihood of a return to a more liberal policy. Over the past three-and-a-half years there have been few personnel changes at the highest levels of the party, but those that have occurred have tended to strengthen the hard-line forces apparently dominated by Brezhnev. As long as the leadership balance remains essentially intact the prevailing policy is likely to remain orthodox and, if anything,

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become more repressive.

On the other hand there would also appear to be a limit to the extent of regression to Stalinist tactics as long as the current leadership structure remains. In 1956 when Khrushchev in his "secret speech" condemned Stalin's crimes he implicitly pledged that such methods would not again be employed, thus limiting the potential for control by an individual and laying the groundwork for the sanctifying of collective leadership. While the rehabilitation of Stalin and the crackdown on the intellectuals have raised the spectre of a complete return to Stalinist terror tactics, such a reversion virtually presupposes the ability of one individual to impose his will and authority. Barring a crisis situation in which one man might have to make the decisions, the diversity still existing within the Politburo would seem to work against such a possibility.

Each member of the hierarchy, whether moderate or orthodox, has an interest in preventing any other individual from acquiring too much power. Thus, although Brezhnev is quite clearly first among equals, and is more secure than ever before, his power is far from unlimited. For example, while he has undermined Shelepin's position considerably, he has not yet been able to oust him from the Politburo, and a number of Shelepin's supporters remain in important positions. Each member of the hierarchy has a vested interest in seeing that Brezhnev's ability to exert his will remains limited.

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Central Intelligence Agency

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Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

20 December 1985

Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics

Summary

After thirty years, the assessment of Joseph Stalin's historical role remains a controversial and highly charged political issue. The Soviet leadership attempts to manipulate the Stalin myth to promote regime legitimacy--steering clear of any endorsement of the "negative" aspects of his rule--while elites use the Stalin symbol to promote or oppose policies associated with his name. Like his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev has adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin issue. He has publicly praised Stalin's wartime role and the highly centralized and disciplined Stalinist economic system, but he has resisted any larger rehabilitation of the dictator. Some straws in the wind suggest that Gorbachev may favor a limited relaxation of Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intra-party policy discussions while continuing to tighten the screws on overt dissidents.

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Despite the passage of more than 30 years, treatment of Joseph Stalin and his policies remains a highly charged political issue. The images conjured up by references to Stalin are both internally contradictory and inconsistent in their impact on various elements of the Soviet populace. This presents both a problem and an opportunity for the regime. Soviet domestic propaganda attempts to exploit broad public nostalgia for such "positive" aspects of Stalin's rule as national unity and social order, economic progress and efficiency, and strong leadership-- as a means of shoring up regime legitimacy at home and marshaling support for the USSR's international role--while avoiding endorsement of the "negative" aspects of his leadership that frighten important segments of the public. [redacted]

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At the same time, the Stalin symbol is employed in intra-elite politics to promote or oppose various policies associated with his name. As with the general public, however, elite political sensitivities about Stalin are so powerful that use of his image as a political weapon can backfire unless great care is exercised. Indiscriminate praise of Stalin would antagonize key elites, such as the military and the more liberal elements of the intelligentsia, who suffered greatly during the purge years. A blanket condemnation of him, however, would alienate those rightwing intellectual and managerial elites who see Stalin as a symbol of the established order and who might fear that renewing the attack on him would undermine regime legitimacy. [redacted]

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#### Evolution of Treatment of Stalin

From his death until 1979. The dominant desire of most of the Soviet elite and general population in the years immediately following Stalin's death was for a relaxation of Stalinist internal controls. Khrushchev attempted to exploit this yearning for political ends by moving toward a limited "destalinization." He associated himself with the exposure of Stalin's abuses of power, ended political terror, rehabilitated many purge victims, and permitted a "thaw" in cultural and intellectual life. Equally as important, Khrushchev capitalized on the Stalin issue to purge the KGB and to move against rivals within the leadership closely identified with Stalin. [redacted]

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Khrushchev's condemnation of the worst abuses of Stalin alarmed many other leaders, who were concerned that going too far toward destalinization might prove politically destabilizing and who feared being implicated in Stalin's crimes. Immediately after Khrushchev's removal in October 1964, the official denigration of Stalin was halted, and a period of uneasy official silence about the dictator settled in. During this period Soviet leaders occasionally commented favorably on Stalin's wartime role or disparaged his violations of "Soviet legality." Generally, however, references to Stalin were avoided and no clear-cut "line" on the Stalin issue emerged. [redacted]

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Stalin as Issue and Symbol

To the various elements of the elite and the population, Stalin evokes different images. These include:

- national unity and power. Military might and international prestige, Russian domination over Eastern Europe and over minorities at home, victory in World War II (but also failure to prepare adequately for the war).
- economic progress. Rapid industrialization, full employment, upward social mobility.
- economic centralization and efficiency. A tightly organized command economy, strong central control over planning and management, opposition to economic reform.
- strong leadership and lack of elite security. Personal dictatorship, a cult of Stalin's person, complete subordination of the military officer corps, random purges of the party apparatus.
- brutality and repression of the population. Unrestrained KGB use of terror, forced collectivization, lack of worker job security, strict ideological controls on cultural and intellectual life, tight restrictions on non-Russian nationalities and religious believers.
- social order and cohesion. Discipline across the board, harsh penalties for crime and deviation, a shared vision of social goals, puritanical norms for family and private life. [REDACTED]

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Since 1979. By the late 1970s several developments impelled many citizens and lower-level elites to move toward a more positive appraisal of Stalin:

- o Economic growth rates declined and class lines hardened, causing many Soviets to recall with nostalgia the "good old days" under Stalin, when rapid industrialization created vast opportunities for upward social mobility.
- o The memory of Stalin's repressions ebbed, official ideology grew stale, and popular cynicism about regime propaganda increased.
- o Society became less orderly and disciplined, and social pathologies such as crime and corruption grew.
- o Many citizens unfavorably contrasted the drift of policy under Brezhnev with the tough leadership associated with Stalin.

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since the late 1970s has indicated that many Soviet citizens from various walks of life have become increasingly attracted to the Stalin symbol.

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Soviet youth are especially inclined to see Stalin as a positive and heroic figure. A recent USIA poll of Westerners who have had extensive contact with Soviet elites suggested that about 85 percent of senior Soviet officials and 67 percent of middle-level officials felt that the Soviet people need a strong leader, although many of them preferred a leader more tolerant and "sophisticated" than Stalin was.

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As a consequence of these phenomena, in 1979, on the 100th anniversary of Stalin's birth, the regime articulated an official policy on the public portrayal of Stalin's historical role designed to exploit the Stalin "myth"--and, in particular, the World War II years--to legitimize the system and strengthen patriotism. The new party line portrayed the dictator as a "complicated" leader who deserves credit for his contributions--particularly his wartime leadership of the country--but whose "errors and blunders" and "gross violations" of law cannot be ignored. A 1979 article in the authoritative party journal Kommunist took the same tack, calling Stalin "neither an angel nor a demon," and this view of Stalin became standard.

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By maintaining that each aspect of Stalin's activity must be considered discretely in its own particular historical context, the regime ruled out an overall evaluation of Stalin and attempted to ward off inferences that Stalin's personal "excesses" were in any way endemic to the Soviet system or that other Soviet leaders could be linked to his deeds--notions which have been anathema to the regime since Khrushchev first exposed

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Stalin's crimes in 1956. In actual practice, however, the official line--by providing for both positive and negative portrayals--has encouraged a continued veiled debate about Stalin in the Soviet media. [redacted]

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Current Debate Over Stalin. Brezhnev's death and the ensuing leadership review of internal policy in a succession environment have given impetus to the debate within the Soviet elite over how to deal with the Stalin issue. Some Soviet commentators have pushed harder to extend the selective rehabilitation of Stalin as war leader to more sensitive areas of his rule, while others have voiced criticism of his policies. [redacted]

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Stalin's wartime role remains a controversial issue. Over the past year and a half, propagandists have unleashed a flood of new films and printed materials in celebration of the 40th anniversary of victory over Nazi Germany. Much of this propaganda provides extensive and positive treatment of Stalin's leadership. [redacted]

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But recent media references to Stalin have not been uniformly positive. In two major World War II documentaries--a film on Marshal Zhukov's life released in December 1984 and a March 1985 television film--Stalin was shown ignoring or rejecting the advice of military leaders to prepare for war. A previously unpublished section of the memoirs of former Politburo member and close Stalin associate Anastas Mikoyan that appeared in a recent issue of an important historical journal also presents a negative picture of Stalin. He is depicted as rejecting warnings of other leaders on the eve of the war and failing to give strong leadership after the Nazi attack. A selection from Zhukov's reminiscences published in Izvestiya in May 1985 and a tribute to former Defense Minister Ustinov in a March 1985 issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya portrayed Stalin as highhanded and unfair in his treatment of subordinates. [redacted]

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Aside from continued ambivalence about Stalin's behavior as a wartime leader, there have been new signs of controversy over his general reputation. Some elites have pushed for a broader rehabilitation of Stalin:

- o An authority on Lenin described Stalin in a November 1984 Sovetskaya Rossiya article as a vital supporter of Lenin in 1917 and one of a new "finely honed type of professional revolutionary."
- o A May 1985 Sovetskaya Rossiya literary review article tried to exonerate Stalin from persecution of peasants during collectivization and to present him as the voice of moderation and mercy during the "tragic events" of 1933.

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- [redacted]
- o In 1983 a novel by Ivan Stadnyuk, which portrayed Stalin as a basically sympathetic figure and was attacked in the media in 1974 for historical inaccuracies, was pulled out of obscurity and awarded the State Prize for Literature. The Komsomol's literary journal Molodaya Gvardiya recently serialized another Stadnyuk novel, which praises Stalin not only as a wartime strategist but also as a compassionate person.
  - o A historical World War II novel by the conservative editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, Aleksandr Chakovsky, serialized in 1983-84, showed Stalin as a wise and firm diplomat who outshone Roosevelt. [redacted]

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At the same time, critical media references to Stalin continue to appear:

- o A January 1984 Izvestiya article stated that Stalin's erroneous nationalities policy was "refuted" by Lenin during his last days. Last year articles by two Central Committee officials in the journal Voprosy Filosofii repudiated Stalin's theory that the class struggle intensifies as socialism develops--which he used to justify repression of ethnic and social groups.
- o The reformist economist Yevgeniy Ambartsumov in a 1984 Molodoy Kommunist article criticized Stalin's adherence to only the repressive aspects of Lenin's teachings.
- o Literaturnaya Gazeta in April 1985 and Izvestiya in May 1985 implicitly condemned Stalin's purges.
- o The prominent poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko--whose poem published in Pravda in 1962 was one of the most famous public attacks on Stalin in the Khrushchev period--has again publicly derided him. A new Yevtushenko poem in the 9 September Pravda indirectly maligned Stalin (without naming him) by mocking Trofim Lysenko--the pseudo-geneticist who was a favorite of Stalin. The poem also criticized Stalin's refusal to allow the USSR to enter the computer age and his repression of Bulgakov's innovative novel Master and Margarita. [redacted]

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The proliferation of both positive and negative references to Stalin suggest heightened debate over whether to move toward greater reform or greater repression in various areas--including economic, cultural and nationalities policies. [redacted]

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### Gorbachev's Position

Like his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev appears to have adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin issue. A self-described friend from their student days at Moscow State University law school--the emigre former Czech Communist Party

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secretary Zdenek Mlynar--has written that in 1952 Gorbachev confided his distaste for Stalin's arrests of political opponents. Also, there are some indications that he has resisted the efforts of leaders who want to go further in rehabilitating Stalin. On the other hand, he clearly sees a political value in evoking Stalin's name to gain support for some of the policies he is promoting. [redacted]

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In his 8 May 1985 speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, Gorbachev referred to Stalin as head of the State Defense Committee which, together with the Central Committee, guided the party's "gigantic" war effort. Gorbachev praised the "efficiency" of Stalin's centralized war economy, which was guaranteed by the "immutable authority" of the state plan, "discipline and strict responsibility," "initiative" of workers and scientists, and the "organizing abilities" of industrial managers. This statement could be read as Gorbachev's own prescription for economic success and as an appeal for support for his discipline and order campaigns. Gorbachev probably was also sensitive to the need to allay fears that he would institute radical liberalizing changes and to rally support among the military and conservative elements in the bureaucracy and population. Gorbachev balanced these positive remarks, however, by listing "miscalculations on our side" as one of the factors that contributed to the early wartime defeats. [redacted]

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The remarks offered by Gorbachev on this occasion appear to have been carefully calibrated to present a modulated picture of Stalin as a complex figure worthy of both praise and blame for specifically identified actions. This approach is consistent with Gorbachev's insistence that official spokesmen must discuss problems more openly so as to enhance the credibility of regime propaganda. Thus, in his speech to the December 1984 party ideological conference, Gorbachev recommended a more realistic portrayal of Soviet history, stating that although the USSR has achieved "great victories," it has experienced "errors, failures, and mistakes" as well. A Pravda editorial of 17 January 1985 elaborated this theme, arguing that history must be examined in all its complexity and not "rewritten or erased." Matter-of-fact media references to some other controversial Soviet historical figures, such as Khrushchev, have increased over the past year or two. [redacted]

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[redacted] suggests that Gorbachev is not in favor of any general rehabilitation of Stalin. He reportedly opposed a proposal made in the spring of 1985 to change the name of Volgograd--site of the USSR's greatest wartime victory--back to Stalingrad before the World War II anniversary celebrations.

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[redacted] then Politburo member Grigory Romanov strongly supported renaming Volgograd and his clash with Gorbachev over this issue became part of an ongoing political battle between the two men, leading to a "very serious" situation prior to Romanov's ouster from the Politburo. [redacted]

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Despite Gorbachev's efforts to tighten discipline and strengthen social order, there are straws in the wind suggesting that he might be inclined to move in the direction of limited relaxation of strictures in some areas of Soviet life:

- o Yevtushenko, in a bold mid-December speech to the Russian Republic Writers Union leaked to western journalists, insisted that Soviet writers must confront politically sensitive topics that have long been taboo. He called for honest accounts of Stalin's purges and the collectivization of agriculture, and frank treatment of current corruption among privileged Soviet officials. The failure of the Soviet press to report his most critical remarks in its account of the speech suggests that he was testing the limits of official toleration of criticism. But Pravda's publication in September of his poem critical of Stalin's repression of writers and the regime's willingness to let him address the Writers Congress suggest that his general position on this question has the support of some Soviet leaders.

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- o The new draft of the CPSU Program published in October includes a negative reference to the "personality cult"-- a codeword for Stalin's abuse of power. [redacted]

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It is possible that Gorbachev--although probably an admirer of Stalin's centralized economic organization and tight management of society--is also more inclined than some leaders to permit expanded internal party discussion of policy options. Yevtushenko's speech, the publication of his anti-Stalinist poem, and the appearance of a few other literary works by relatively liberal writers, suggest that Gorbachev may be seeking ways of making cultural life more appealing to Soviet intellectuals, even as he tightens the screws on overt dissidents. [redacted]

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### Prospects

The Stalin issue will remain a political "hot potato" and a bellwether of regime priorities as Gorbachev fleshes out his programs in the coming months. The regime may find it easier to

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deal with the issue of Stalin's crimes in a few years, after Stalin's few remaining lieutenants have left the scene.<sup>1</sup> But the party formula of selective rehabilitation harbors fundamental contradictions. The regime's desire to create a more neutral and believable historical record conflicts with its determination to convey the impression that Stalin was an aberration in an otherwise flawless system. The attempt to exploit the Stalin symbol as a source of legitimacy conflicts with the goal of avoiding association of the leadership with the negative aspects of his rule. Moreover, if Gorbachev moves very far to expand the parameters of permissible discussion of the Stalin period, it could prove difficult to control the process. As happened during the cultural "thaw" under Khrushchev, a limited relaxation of strictures encourages pressure from intellectuals for further liberalization. This, in turn, tends to generate counterpressures within the elite that could reverse the process. These dilemmas will not be easily resolved. [redacted]




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<sup>1</sup> Vyacheslav Molotov--Stalin's foreign minister and premier--was readmitted to the party in March 1984, on his 94th birthday, after a gap of over 20 years. [redacted]

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# Intelligence Report

ANNEX:

THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE




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**THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE**

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The Annex is divided into three chronological sections with three further sub-divisions in each. The first sub-division deals with the use of the Stalin issue in the Soviet leadership struggle. The second considers the practical effects on intellectual freedom resulting from a policy of greater restrictions and central controls. The third sub-division traces the treatment of the Stalin issue in Soviet communications media.

The Annex is not a coordinated document.

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## POINT COUNTERPOINT

From Khrushchev's Fall to Shelepin's Set-Back  
(October 1964-December 1965)

## LEADERSHIP

The Sides Are Formed

After the ouster of Khrushchev, the Soviet leaders were preoccupied with the task of rewarding those who had cooperated in overthrowing Khrushchev and reversing some of Khrushchev's more unpopular measures. The man who seemed to benefit the most from the early appointments was Aleksandr Shelepin, former Komsomol and KGB Chief.\* He was promoted to full membership in the CPSU Presidium in November and several of his associates and proteges received promotions within the party apparatus.\*\* Shelepin also appeared to benefit from changes made in the leadership of the press and propaganda organs.\*\*\*

Podgorny's position also seemed to be fairly strong at this time. Aleksey Rumyantsev, who had been secretary for propaganda and agitation in Khar'kov Oblast', probably when Podgorny was there, became chief editor of Pravda.

---

\*At this time Shelepin was a Party Secretary, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Chairman of the Party State Control Committee.

\*\*Petr Demichev, a former First Secretary of Moscow City, became a candidate member of the Presidium. He is reportedly a good friend of Shelepin and owes his position to him. Vladimir Semichastnyy, KGB Chief and a Shelepin protege, was promoted from candidate to full membership on the central committee.

\*\*\*Vladimir Stepakov, who had come up in Moscow City under Demichev, became editor of Izvestiya and Nikolay Mesyatsev, who had served under Shelepin in the Komsomol, became Chairman of the State Committee for Radio and Television. Another subordinate of Shelepin's in the Komsomol, Mikhail Khaldeyev, became Chief of the RSFSR Propaganda and Agitation Section in January 1965.

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Podgorny gave the main report at the November party plenum, and at the November anniversary celebrations, the toast to the party was given by Podgorny rather than Brezhnev, who followed with a toast to the military. More importantly, moderate trends with which Podgorny was subsequently to associate himself seemed to prevail throughout this period. The 1965 budget included a reduction in the overt military budget and concessions to the consumer, both of which Podgorny favored.

Condemnation of Khrushchev began almost immediately after his ouster; this was necessary if the new leaders were to justify their own action in getting rid of him. However, these attacks were frequently accompanied by support of collective leadership and occasionally accompanied by condemnation of the cult of personality as well.\*

The approach to the Stalin issue by members of the hierarchy remained essentially as before. On 6 November an article by Latvian First Secretary Arvid Pelshe, who has been associated with Suslov, appeared in Pravda; in it he discussed the cult:

The ideology and practice of the personality cult, alien to Marxism-Leninism, has done considerable harm to our party and the Soviet state. The personality cult reduced the role of the masses and of the party, minimized collective leadership, undermined intra-party democracy, and suppressed the activity, initiative, and independent action of the party members . . . .

---

\*For example, a November Kommunist Belorussii editorial stated that where the cult of personality takes root, collectivity of leadership is impossible. And a January 1965 article in Kommunist Sovetskoye Latvii, probably controlled by Pelshe, attacked the cult of Stalin's personality in harsh terms and stated that it had done serious damage to party and state leadership, adding, however, that this could not and did not change the nature of the socialist system.

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The 20th CPSU Congress put an end to this. It was thus a turning point in the party's history . . . The Congress recommended to the Party Central Committee 'not to relax the struggle against the remnants of the personality cult' . . . .

Similarly, in December, First Secretary of Kazakhstan, Kunayev,\* a Brezhnev protege, spoke at a commemorative meeting for Saken Seyfullin, a writer who had died in the purges. On 6 December, a strong attack on Stalin was carried in a Pravda article, which also strongly praised the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses.

In February 1965 the journal Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life), scoffed at the suggestion that criticism of the cult would cease:

Some people abroad have begun to speculate and even assert that after the October plenum of the Central Committee the CPSU will give up criticizing the cult of Stalin's personality and revise its general line, elaborated at the 20th and 22nd Party Congresses. Vain hopes! . . . The process begun at the 20th Party Congress is an irreversible process. There is no return to the old ways, and there will be none. It is not a matter merely of somebody not wanting this return, but of the objective conditions of life of Soviet society and of the Communist Party at the present stage.

That some party figures felt the need to reassure the party and public that there would be no return to the past may well have reflected the fact that there was indeed pressure being exerted to do just that.

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\*D. A. Kunayev was reappointed First Secretary in December 1964. He had held this post from 1960 to 1962 and had then been named Chairman of the republic's Council of Ministers.

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Shelepin's Drive For Power

The expression of the neo-Stalinist views that Stalin should not be criticized and that intellectuals should be made to conform began somewhat sporadically, but seemed clearly to come from a Shelepin-oriented group. The first, and for a number of months, the only, favorable reference to Stalin appeared on 6 November in Komsomolskaya Pravda, the organ of the Young Communist League (Komsomol); the Komsomol had been headed previously by Shelepin and Semichastnyy, and since 1959 its chairman had been their protege, Sergey Pavlov. In this article Stalin was referred to as one of Lenin's "comrades-in-arms."

In February Kommunist published an article by Moscow City First Secretary Nikolay Yegorychev,\* who has been one of the most violent spokesmen for the neo-Stalinists. This may well have been the opening salvo in Shelepin's attack on Brezhnev's position. Yegorychev advanced a number of themes which were subsequently to be stressed by the neo-Stalinists. After paying lip service to the important measures taken to root out the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality, he concentrated his attacks on the sins of the Khrushchev era. He stated that "events of recent years" had caused doubts among ideologically unstable youths, and he criticized those who take what he called a one-sided view of the past and stress only shortcomings.

In connection with this, we must lodge a complaint against those of our creative intelligentsia who sometimes are too attracted by describing the willfulness of the period of the cult of personality and the moral experience and physical deprivation of innocently condemned people.

He coupled this criticism with a call for more patriotic and ideological training. This represented precisely the sort of statement which Partiynaya Zhizn', in the same month, had indicated was impossible.

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\*Yegorychev rose to his position through the Moscow Komsomol and party apparatuses; he succeeded Demichev as first secretary there.

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Yegorychev continued to press his point at the Second Congress of RSFSR Writers early in March. He attacked a number of articles which had appeared in liberal journals, as well as Solzhenitsyn's One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, a sensational novel published during the Khrushchev period which graphically described life in a Stalin labor camp. He condemned those who permit criticism of shortcomings to degenerate into blackening the "glorious history" of party and people. He called on writers to instill in youth pride in the great achievements of their history, and said that

The instilling of such views is hardly facilitated by the excessive enthusiasm of part of our creative intelligentsia for depicting the cruelties and willfulness of the period of the cult of personality . . . .

Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege who also spoke at this congress, scored pessimistic works which, he said, as a rule are "connected with the cult theme. The opening statement to the congress by Party Secretary and Presidium member Andrey Kirilenko\* had been somewhat less harsh than these speeches; while he had stressed the party's demands on writers, he had not criticized writers for dwelling on the cult nor had he condemned criticism of shortcomings.

From 24 through 26 March an agricultural plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held. The main order of business was the agricultural report delivered by Brezhnev and the adoption of his proposed five-year program designed to bolster the agricultural sector of the economy. A number of personnel changes were also made at the plenum. Demichev, probably a Shelepin supporter, became party secretary responsible for ideological matters. Kirill Mazurov\*\* was named a full member of the Presidium and was succeeded as Belorussian First Secretary by Petr Masherov,\*\*\* who also

---

\*Kirilenko served in the Ukraine under Brezhnev, but at times has seemed closer to Podgorny in his policy views.

\*\*Mazurov was First Secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol during the late 1940's--when Shelepin was all-union Komsomol secretary for cadres.

\*\*\*Masherov rose through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party organizations after Mazurov.

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
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became a candidate member of the Presidium. Both Mazurov and Masherov had served in the Belorussian Komsomol and may well have become aligned with Shelepin. Masherov's subsequent statements would indicate his clear support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinists; Mazurov's views have not been made as clear.

During 1965 there were indications of increasing dissension within the leadership. Evidently, the Stalin issue was a major, if not the major, source of conflict.



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16 April at a meeting of central committee ideological specialists, Demichev, in his new role as ideological spokesman, reportedly proposed changes in policy toward the intellectuals and called for "more balanced treatment" of Stalin.

In May Brezhnev became the first member of the new leadership to mention Stalin's name in public. The occasion



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was the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II. In his speech Brezhnev stated that as was well known the war had begun under unfavorable conditions for the Soviet Union and that great efforts had been made to strengthen the country:

The State Defense Committee was formed with the Secretary General of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Josif Visarionovich Stalin, at its head to exercise leadership over all action in the matter of organizing the repulse of the enemy.

Brezhnev went on to pay tribute to the armed forces and the intellectuals for their wartime performance, but did not mention either of Shelepin's organizations, the KGB or the Komsomol. Thus, while supporting the neo-Stalinist position on the Stalin issue, Brezhnev was clearly shying away from any support, implied or explicit, of Shelepin. Brezhnev had thus made clear his support for a policy of at least partial rehabilitation of Stalin. His reasons for doing so probably include the fact that as party first secretary he had the most to gain from such a rehabilitation. If he could establish that much of Stalin's power position was both legitimate and desirable, he could hope to acquire at least some of this power.

Rumors concerning impending changes in the leadership began in the summer of 1965 and ended somewhat abruptly in September. The common thread [redacted] was that Shelepin would replace Brezhnev, [redacted]. There were a number of variations and subsidiary themes [redacted]. Suslov was the most prominent member of the leadership, but did not want the top position. [redacted] Mikoyan would retire, that Brezhnev would take his place, and that Shelepin would take Brezhnev's position. Some claimed that Kosygin would also be relieved.

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One of the issues causing disagreement among the leaders at this time was that of politics versus economics. Support for the dogmatic position which views the party as a political and ideological body was indicated by Suslov,

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Shelest, and, most strongly, by Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze, who, in June, invoked Stalin's words to support his position. After expressing his hostility to the influx into the party of a large number of people with production expertise, he stated:

Proceeding from the Leninist principle of building our party, I.V. Stalin, acutely and figuratively, said at one time, 'Our party is a fortress the doors of which open only to the tested.'

Indications of controversy within the leadership also came in the form of several strong statements on the need for collective leadership. Such a defense appeared in Pravda on 15 April and an even stronger one appeared in the Uzbek paper Pravda Vostoka on 20 April. The latter article praised the 22nd Party Congress, which had strongly condemned the cult of personality, and attacked the cult as well as the methods of personal dictatorship, suggesting that its target was a neo-Stalinist individual or faction. Thus it would appear that the First Secretary in Uzbekistan, Rashidov, was at this time giving some support to a moderate faction which felt itself losing ground, probably to Brezhnev.

During the spring and summer Podgorny seemed to be losing strength, while Shelepin was acquiring it. In April party secretary Titov, a Podgorny associate, was sent to Kazakhstan as second secretary; he was removed from the secretariat the following September. In May Shelepin supporter Stepakov was promoted from chief editor of Izvestiya to head of the central committee's Propaganda and Agitation Department.\* That same month all Moscow-resident Presidium members with the exception of Podgorny received medals for their wartime contributions. And in May and June a large number of articles extolling the virtues of the KGB appeared in the press.

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\*The Izvestiya post was to remain vacant until October, an indication that the leaders could not agree on the appointment.

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In July the central committee reprimanded Kharkov Oblast, with which Podgorny had been associated, for serious shortcomings in the work of party admissions. An 11 August Pravda editorial reported this and also criticized the oblast for emphasizing numerical over qualitative growth. This marked the climax of a campaign of criticism of Podgorny's oblast which had begun in February with an article by Brezhnev protege Shcherbitskiy. This suggests that Brezhnev was pushing the campaign, probably with the concurrence of neo-Stalinist and orthodox elements.

In August and September, on the eve of the economic plenum, forceful articles appeared from both the neo-Stalinist and liberal camps. On 29 August Pravda published an article by Komsomol Chief Pavlov, a Shelepin protege, who again attacked those who look at history through the "prism of the negative results of the personality cult." He urged that the great achievements of the 1930's be stressed.

Pavlov's theme was picked up by a secretary of the traditionally hard-line Leningrad city party committee, Yu. Lavrikov, in a 9 September speech. He too condemned a "one-sided" approach to the complexities of the cult. And, on 15 September, First Secretary of Leningrad Oblast V. Tolstikov came down strongly on the side of orthodoxy with an article criticizing the lack of positive heroes and ideology in literature and art. The Azerbaydzhan first secretary, V. Akhundov, also stressed a hard line in his speech in September to a plenum of the republic's creative unions. Interestingly, KGB Chief Semichastnyy, a Shelepin protege, had served briefly as Second Secretary under Akhundov in the late 1950's, an indication that Akhundov might be in league with the neo-Stalinists.

On 9 September the liberals launched a counterattack with the publication of Rumyantsev's second liberal defense of the intellectuals in Pravda.\* In this article he criticized the call for positive heroes as the sole criterion of a work and said that shortcomings should not be ignored. Sometime before 21 September, when the official

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\*See page 18 for further discussion of this article.

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announcement was made, Rumyantsev was relieved as Pravda's editor and succeeded by M. Zimyanin;\*\* this was a real blow to the moderates, and represented a major defeat for Podgorny. Rumyantsev's identification several months later in a fairly responsible position\*\* indicated, however, that Podgorny still retained considerable strength.

Shelepin may have made his major push for power in September. About this time several articles were published defending the Party-State Control Committee--which he headed--suggesting either that the organization was under attack, that Shelepin was trying to strengthen this organization, or both. This committee had been established in 1962. Its function was to find and punish party and government officials guilty of misconduct. The existence of such an extra-party organization had been controversial and Shelepin's position as head of the committee gave him a fairly powerful base from which to operate. Sovetskaya Belorussiya, the Belorussian paper, in a 13 August editorial, described party state control as an "inherent, integral part of party organizational work." This was an indication of the support being given Shelepin by the Belorussian party and its leader Masherov. Also, in mid-September the writers Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuriy Daniel were arrested by the KGB for publishing works in the West under pseudonyms. The timing of these arrests may have represented an attempt by the neo-Stalinists to seize the initiative on the eve of the September plenum. But the Presidium must have agreed to the action, indicating that Brezhnev approved and had taken a number of key votes with him.

[redacted] opposition before the September plenum to proposals to reform the economic structure through de-centralization and an emphasis

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\*Zimyanin rose to prominence through the Belorussian Komsomol and Party; he also served as deputy minister of foreign affairs.

\*\*Rumyantsev's identification in November as Acting Academician Secretary of the Department of Economics indicated that he still had support.

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on profits, came from Shelepin and Suslov, who feared the increased freedom for plant managers would weaken central control of the economy. The reform adopted at the September party plenum represented a compromise with the economic reformers, backed by Kosygin, achieving only a portion of their goal. [redacted] while reform was a significant issue, the major political issue before the plenum was the proposal to partially rehabilitate Stalin. There were those, [redacted] who favored political as well as historical rehabilitation. It was decided, however, to leave the rehabilitation at the level of the 20th anniversary of the end of the war--public reference to Stalin's existence as an historical figure when obviously called for. Thus, on both issues--the economy and Stalin--a compromise position seems to have prevailed. At the Supreme Soviet session which followed the plenum, Brezhnev was named a member of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium, a largely honorific post, but still indicative of his growing strength. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming Shelepin's senior in the government. Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin mentioned Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee in his speech, a fairly obvious omission.

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### Brezhnev Undermines Shelepin

Brezhnev's support for the neo-Stalinist position both on re-Stalinizing and cultural policy was revealed shortly after the plenum. A protege of his, Sergey Trapeznikov who in June had been appointed Chief of the central committee's Section for Scientific and Educational Institutions, wrote an article which appeared in Pravda on 8 October, in which he strongly asserted the supremacy of theory over practice. Trapeznikov said that no party is guaranteed against tactical errors, but that the main question is the depth of these mistakes and the timely correction of them. He condemned one-sided approaches to industrialization, collectivization, and, of course, the war. Thus, several specific policies were added to the subject of Stalin's wartime leadership as being no longer suitable topics for criticism. The official, and clearly

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Brezhnev-supported, line on the cult of the personality was made clear:

. . . Certainly the cult of personality brought significant harm to the cause of socialist construction in certain spheres of the life of society. However, neither the cult of personality itself nor its consequences flowed in any way from the socialist system and did not change and could not change its character. Therefore, it cannot be recognized as either theoretically or factually correct when in some of our scientific or artistic publications life is portrayed only from the viewpoint of the manifestations of the cult of personality and they thereby cloud the heroic struggles of the Soviet people who are building socialism . . . .

This article by Trapeznikov was followed on 20 October with an instructional letter, sent out by Trapeznikov's department to schools, calling for changes in the treatment of the Stalin and Khrushchev periods in history courses. It called for increased emphasis on the role of the central leadership in mobilizing economic resources for defense during the war and for restoration after it. The letter also stressed the need to reveal the harm of subjectivism. These two Trapeznikov statements clearly demonstrated that a policy had been adopted, that Brezhnev had endorsed that policy, and that the line was orthodox.

Thus, the major protagonists in the struggle taking place within the leadership at this time both seemed to be supporters of the neo-Stalinist line. That Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, was involved was clearly revealed in the ongoing dispute over the future of the Party-State Control Committee. On 8 and 12 October respectively Izvestiya and Pravda asserted that the role of the committee would rise under the new ministry system set up at

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the September plenum. On the 15th Krasnaya Zvezda supported the role of the control groups in the armed forces and demanded that persecution of them stop. However, Partiynaya Zhizn followed the line taken by Kosygin and Brezhnev at the September plenum, and completely ignored the role of party-state control organs, referring to party organs as the checking bodies. And Soviet State and Law criticized party-state control groups quite strongly. This sharp divergence over an organization closely connected with a Presidium member, Shelepin, clearly revealed the intensity of the struggle.

Shelepin's neo-Stalinists continued to push their position. Demichev addressed members of the RSFSR Writers Union in Moscow and reportedly called for an end to "camp" literature (i.e., literature concerning Stalin's crimes) and for an emphasis on the "heroic" aspects of Soviet history. In early September he had reportedly apologized to the writers for excessive attacks on them; now he was pushing the attack again. On 28 November a Pravda article by RSFSR Agitprop Chief Khaldeyev, a Shelepin associate, also emphasized a hard-line approach. He criticized a one-sided approach in literature and called for improvement in the ideological and political indoctrination of youth. He particularly called upon the Komsomol to do more in this area. Deputy Chief of the central committee's cultural section, G. Kunitsyn, in November's Kommunist, threatened nonconformist artists with expulsion from creative unions.

A central committee plenum was held from 4 to 6 December and was followed by a two-day session of the Supreme Soviet. A number of high-level personnel changes were made, thus vindicating to some extent the flood of rumors of the previous summer. Mikoyan, who had undoubtedly opposed any rehabilitation of Stalin and would continue to push the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims, "resigned" as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and was succeeded by Podgorny. Podgorny probably simultaneously left his position on the CPSU Secretariat, although this could not be announced until the next central committee meeting--the congress in March 1966. This action marked a real set-back for the moderates. However, it was matched by a blow to Shelepin. The Party-State Control Committee

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was abolished and Shelepin lost his position as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. In his speech to the plenum Brezhnev said that there had been shortcomings in the work of the committee, a clear slap at Shelepin. A protege of Brezhnev's, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, was named a candidate member of the Presidium. Thus, Brezhnev seemed to have emerged the victor from this particular skirmish. He had administered a decisive rebuff to the moderates and had also managed to stave off Shelepin's challenge, dealing him a severe defeat in the process.

## INTELLECTUALS

### Press For More Freedom

The unsettled nature of the leadership and the lack of an agreed position during the first few months after Khrushchev's ouster was reflected in relatively more freedom for the intellectuals. Liberal articles were published and attacks on conservative views were commonplace. Literaturnaya Gazeta's 12 November criticism of a conservative novel, for example, recalled the harsh methods of the Stalin years. The book being reviewed had called for a militant struggle for party-mindedness in art; the review stated that the struggle for socialist realism had been complicated by the 'subjective approach of Stalin' and by attempts at administrative solutions to complicated problems.\*

On 13 December 1964, A. Bocharov in Izvestiya made a plea for a liberal artistic policy, stating that criticism should persuade and educate, not suppress. His closing statement was quite pointed:

In order to be authoritative, a critic must be guided by the highest interests of the people and not by group predilections, not by the 'literary policy' of the moment, which too often resembles literary confusion.

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\*The application of the term subjective to Stalin is unusual, for at this time the term was being applied primarily to Khrushchev.

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An article by Noviy Mir's chief editor, Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, commemorating the journal's 40th anniversary appeared in the January issue of that journal. Tvardovskiy defended the need to present the whole truth, arguing that there is no such thing as truth of life versus truth of fact--that there is only truth.\* He continued his attack on orthodox cultural viewpoints by stating that each work cannot present the whole picture--that only literature as a whole can do that--and that no hero is able to represent all things. He stated that at one time (i.e., under Stalin) the exaltation of the hero had taken the place of reality.

Tvardovskiy was answered on 9 January by a Pravda editorial which argued that the artist must present life in full historical perspective and criticized works which concentrate on the negative aspects of life. These contradictory views, as expressed by the most liberal journal published in the Soviet Union and the party paper, recur repeatedly in the dialogue between liberal intellectuals and the conservatives.

In February Pravda published two contrasting articles on cultural policy. The paper's editor Rumyantsev, an apparent Podgornyy supporter, was the author of the first, which appeared on 21 February and was moderate. Rumyantsev made the necessary bows toward the need for party spirit in all forms of creative work, but he concentrated his energies on support for the "highest humanist ideal," the free all-around development of every individual in conformity with the general interest. Rumyantsev then connected a strong defense of collective leadership with the concept of the freedom to create, thus reflecting the knowledge

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\*This particular issue bears a somewhat frightening resemblance to the basic question in the purge trials in the late 1930's--did it matter in fact whether or not the accused person had conspired against Stalin; or was it enough that he had the potential to do so? The facts in other words are irrelevant. The argument for the truth of life is that any fact which does not support the official view is out of tune with the truth of life, is therefore wrong, and should not be expressed. It is an attempt to suppress by the use of jargon any honest and objective attempt to describe and assess history and life.

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and fear of the intellectuals that the emergence to dominance of a single man, be he Stalin, Khrushchev, or Brezhnev, greatly increases the chances of arbitrary interference.

Neither the right of leadership in and of itself nor the post occupied gives grounds for intervening in the course of life; only competence in one or another sphere of knowledge and practice entails this right.

The second Pravda article appeared on 26 February and was written by Yu. Barabash, who was not further identified. Barabash strongly defended socialist realism and the "positive hero." He presented the basic arguments for the truth of life, stating that the good artist even if he depicts ugly and alien phenomena does so in the context of an affirmation of what is wonderful. Writers fail, he stated, when they do not rise above superficial, empirical observations to the great generalizations. Barabash ended his article with a statement concerning the world-wide struggle for the minds of men, stating that the question of the goals of art concerns the place of the artist in the struggle of ideologies. This somewhat vague linking of the issues of creative freedom and alien ideology was to become a basic tenet of the neo-Stalinists attacks, and is very reminiscent of Stalin's attacks on intellectuals, accusing them of internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The publication of these two, conflicting articles in Pravda suggests that at this point the official position on culture was still being sharply disputed, reflecting the unsettled nature of the leadership struggle. Podgorny may have backed the first, moderate article; the quick appearance of an orthodox article revealed that the backers of a hard line would not be defeated easily.

#### The Neo-Stalinists Push; The Moderates Counter

The pressure of the neo-Stalinists in the leadership began to be reflected in cultural trends in the spring of 1965. On 27 April an article appeared in Literaturnaya Gazeta which called for the restoration to respectability

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of the literature of the Stalin period, and the repudiation of subjectivism (i.e., Khrushchevianism) in the study of the history of Soviet literature. The article stated that although the cult of personality had inflicted losses on the development of Soviet literature, it never cut short its progressive movement. An article in that same paper two days later appealed to writers to seek historical truth "in all its entirety."

For this it must be kept in mind that genuine penetration into the truth of life of those years is the thorough investigation of many objective factors and not merely the depiction of Stalin's errors and miscalculations.

Arrests and demonstrations apparently began at least as early as April. In that month the two young intellectuals, A. Amalrik and A. Zverev, were reportedly arrested; one was sentenced to two and a half years in exile for parasitism--the other apparently was released. There is also a report that in April leaders of the central executive committee of SMOG\* planned a demonstration. This was held on 14 April and resulted in several arrests and several university expulsions.

The hard-line view taken by the Leningrad organization, particularly its oblast' first secretary, Tolstikov, was reflected in a 30 June Leningradskaya Pravda article which reported that a meeting of party members from the Leningrad writers organization had acknowledged that "justifiable criticism" had been leveled at Leningrad writers by a plenum of the city party committee.

However, the liberal intellectuals were far from cowed. In July the theatrical journal Teatr published an article by A. Anikst, criticizing the theater of the Stalin era and praising the theater of the early 1960's. The

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\*A loose, illegal organization of young dissidents taking its name from the first letters of the Russian words for word, thought, form, and profundity.

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liberal journal Yunost' in July took a similar line on films and defended the portrayal of diversified types of heroes. And, on 1 August, Pravda published an article by Tvardovskiy defending against an attack on his poem "Terkin in the Other World" made in a 30 July letter to Pravda. Tvardovskiy stated that "anyone who reads the poem without prejudice" would see that it presents a satirical picture of those aspects of reality--stagnation, bureaucracy, formalism--that hamper Soviet progress.

In September there were several important articles representing the liberal point of view. Noviy Mir published an editorial which again denied the validity of counter-posing small and large truth, arguing that truth is truth. And on 9 September Pravda carried the previously mentioned liberal editorial by its chief editor Rumyantsev, in which he made a liberal defense of the arts. He stated that positive heroes are certainly important but should not be the only criterion of the artistic value of a work. He argued that socialist realism should not be oversimplified and that criticizing faults is not alien to socialist realism; on the contrary, ignoring shortcomings may lead to nihilism. He also supported the Noviy Mir position that no writer, let alone in one work, can do that which is possible only to literature as a whole. Rumyantsev criticized those who try to set the intelligentsia against party spirit, stating that this amounts to a demagogic attack on culture. He supported party guidance of the arts, but explained why some people question this guidance:

One can see in such questions the legitimate alarm caused by recollections of the fact that not so long ago words about party guidance sometimes masked crude rule by decree in the sphere of artistic life, and categorical, dilettantist judgments about certain artists and their works.

Furthermore, Rumyantsev's concept of party guidance differed somewhat from the conservative view; he emphasized that the party should defend the artist's right to select his own theme and style.

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On 19 September Pravda, in another editorial, presented a conservative version of Rumyantsev's article, suggesting that the decision to fire Rumyantsev had already been made, and another article on the 24th was even more conservative. Radio Moscow, however, continued to carry Rumyantsev's editorial in broadcasts for two weeks. A certain inability to decide just what the official line was at this time was displayed by Izvestiya which published two contradictory articles in a three-day period. On 23 September F. Kuznetsov made a plea that works be judged by their artistic merit, not their ideological content. Three days later V. Shcherbina stated that these two concepts are inseparable.

[redacted] in October the 70th birthday of the poet Yesenin was marked and the poet Yevtushenko read an unpublished poem "Letter to Yesenin" which was clearly an attack on Komsomol chief Pavlov:

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When a rosy-cheeked Komsomol chief  
Bangs his fist at us poets  
And wants to knead our souls like wax  
And wants to fashion them in his own image,  
His words, Yesenin, do not terrify us,  
Although it is hard to be happy . . .  
You were more party-oriented than all the scoundrels  
Who tried to teach you to think like the party.

In a November Kommunist article a man named V. Ivanov attacked the "so-called theory of deheroization," and refuted the Noviy Mir editorials on "the truth of life versus the truth of fact." He quoted Lenin to the effect that facts in totality are definitely conclusive, but taken out of context and totality are fragmentary and arbitrary.

The arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in mid-September frightened the intellectual community, and on 5 December a demonstration was held in Moscow to protest these arrests; a number of persons were arrested, some of whom were subsequently tried. Also in December the first of what was to be a series of written protests was sent by Sinyavskiy's wife to Brezhnev, the USSR Procurator General, and various

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Soviet newspapers. In it she recalled the trials of 1937 and termed her husband's arrest an example of lawlessness.

Thus, throughout 1965, while the liberals and moderates managed to score occasional points, the clear trend was toward an increasingly more orthodox line. By the end of the year Noviy Mir stood virtually alone in its defense of the liberal position. In its November editorial it again quoted Lenin to support its view that ideological persuasion is only effective when accepted voluntarily, a plea that there be no clamp down on the intellectuals.

## STALIN THEMES

### Criticism of Stalin Continues

The unsettled nature of the struggle for power in the Soviet Union opened the way for a push by the intellectuals to attain greater freedom. It also permitted the continuation of harsh criticism of Stalin as a leader and continued rehabilitation of those who suffered and died in the purges.

The liberal journal Noviy Mir published a number of articles in the months after Khrushchev's fall which were highly critical of Stalin's handling of the pre-war situation. Ivan Mayskiy,\* in memoirs published in that journal in December, attacked Stalin for failing to heed warnings about an impending attack and for failing to strengthen defenses. The writer Ilya Erenburg, in a January article, attacked Stalin's extermination of army commanders before the war. These have been the main criticisms of Stalin's pre-war leadership.

Voprosy Istorii KPSS, the organ of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, published a number of anti-Stalin articles during this period; in November it carried several such articles. One deprecated Stalin's revolutionary theories and charged that he had in fact conspired with Kamenev and Zinovyev against Lenin in 1917 on the question of whether

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\*Mayskiy was Ambassador to London before the war. In March 1966 he was to be one of the signers of an appeal to Brezhnev not to rehabilitate Stalin.

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the time was ripe for armed revolution. Another criticized Stalin's theory of disproportionate rates of development, claiming this had, in fact, caused a decline in production.\* A third article attacked Stalin for issuing contradictory directives, for indulging in wishful planning, and for making decisions alone. In February Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried an article attacking the cult of personality, stating that it had delayed the modernization of Soviet armed forces; the article charged that the most dangerous consequence of the cult was the destruction on the eve of the war of many talented military leaders.

Various other anti-Stalin articles were also published in the months following the coup. In December Kommunist carried an article concerning the signers of a peace treaty with Germany in 1917. Lenin favored the treaty, but Stalin, according to the article, vacillated and committed the unpardonable error of siding with Trotskiy in the dispute. After Lenin sharply criticized Stalin, he reportedly admitted his mistake and supported Lenin.

The rehabilitation program continued uninterrupted in the first months after Khrushchev's fall, with Pravda carrying particularly strongly-worded articles. In November an inkling of things to come appeared, however. The 75th birthday of purged Ukrainian leader S. Kosior was marked by praise from most papers. However, Pravda Ukrainy pointed out that Kosior had erred in joining the "left communists" on the issue of signing the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This paper would prove to be one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist organs, probably reflecting the position of Ukrainian party leader Shelest.

Volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, which was presumably an official publication, was signed to the press in March 1965, although it did not appear

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\*The question of disproportionate rates of development between heavy and light industry continues to be explosive. The dogmatists think heavy industry should develop at a faster rate; the liberals argue that the gap between the two rates should close.

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until the following October. The tone on a number of issues was clearly anti-Stalin, indicating that as of March the official line on the Stalin question had not been changed. An article on collectivization by V. Danilov praised the policy itself, but criticized Stalin's role:

Starting in the fall of 1929 the tendency toward excessive forcing of collectivization, which reflected the position of I.V. Stalin, sharply increased. This policy was based on a scornful attitude toward the opinions of the peasant, ignoring his attachment to his individual farm, ignoring the instructions of Engels and Lenin, the party decisions on the impermissibility and harmfulness of haste and force in cooperatizing small farms . . . . The theoretical justification of the forcing of collectivization was Stalin's article published on 7 November 1929 in Pravda entitled 'The Year of the Great Breakthrough,' which asserted that the basic masses of the peasantry had already joined the kolkhozes and that 'the deciding victory' had already been attained.

Danilov stated that in early 1930 directives were issued for a retreat, but that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success," in blaming local officials for the chaos, had caused even greater mistakes.

The volume also used very strong language in discussing Stalin's crimes:

Stalin began to misuse power and crudely violate the Party Statute and Soviet laws . . . . The cult of personality engendered careerism and servility, suspicion and distrust, and in the field of theory it engendered dogmatism and alienation of theory from practice. Having established his own personal control over organs of the NKVD, Stalin dealt summarily with officials whom he did not like. In 1937 . . . Stalin advanced the harmful and theoretically mistaken thesis that as socialism becomes

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stronger and the Soviet state moves further ahead, the class struggle in the country will become sharper and sharper. This thesis served as justification for mass illegal repressions against prominent leaders of the party and state, members and candidate members of the central committee, important military leaders, and many other people who were guilty of nothing . . . . The repressions began at first against ideological opponents, the majority of which were represented as agents of imperialism and foreign intelligence, and then the very same false accusations were made against other Communists who had never taken part in any opposition . . . .

The language used in this article is very reminiscent of Khrushchev's secret speech denunciation of Stalin. As stated above, the fact that this was signed to the press in March indicated that no decision to totally restore Stalin to a position of respectability had yet been made.

#### Drive to Restore Stalin's Image Begins

Meanwhile, the neo-Stalinist drive for power which began in February 1965 was quickly reflected in articles relating to the Stalin issue. A sharp reduction in rehabilitations of Stalin's victims began in February and the first indications of an organized effort to restore Stalin to respectability appeared about the same time; this first concerted effort was concentrated on Stalin's wartime image.

Soviet military figures have generally been in the forefront of the shifting lines on the Stalin issue, but always pushing the same point. Their main interest is increased control of military matters by the military. When the party line was anti-Stalinist, the military argued that Stalin had been an incompetent wartime leader because he had failed to listen to the professionals. Now, with

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the start of re-Stalinizing, military figures were to argue that Stalin had been an effective wartime leader precisely because he had listened to his military advisors. A February article in Krasnaya Zvezda by Marshal Bagramyan credited Stalin with participation in successful military planning--after he had listened to military advice.

In April 1965, according to a Reuters report, Soviet historians were ordered to stop picturing Stalin only as a "muddle-headed military failure" during the war. In the future, it said, history books would show him neither as a military genius nor as a complete imbecile in matters of strategy. This order was reflected in a reported interview of several Soviet historians with journalists in April. The spokesman for the group stated that Stalin had made a mistake in thinking that Hitler would not attack and in not taking more precautions. However, he warned that Stalin's merits should not be ignored and quoted Stalin himself to prove that he had consulted others and had admitted his own mistakes.

Articles commemorating the 20th anniversary of victory over the Germans in World War II began appearing in April; these reflected the new "balanced" approach to Stalin and the war. A first step was simply to identify Stalin in his wartime positions without further comment, a technique used by Brezhnev in his 8 May speech. A second approach was to ignore the deplorable state of Soviet defenses at the start of the war, dismissing all discussion of miscalculations, purges, and defeats as subjective and one-sided. Still a third method was to blatantly lie about the state of Soviet defenses on the eve of the war. For example, a 30 April Pravda article defended military-industrial preparations for the war. The author, Vasiliy Ryabikov, then First Deputy Chairman of USSR Sovnarkhoz and later First Deputy Chairman of USSR Gosplan, had a special axe to grind as he had become Deputy Peoples Commissar for Armaments in 1939; however, the publication of the article in Pravda indicated that his argument had high-level support. In this article Ryabikov dated the drive to prepare for the war from 1939, and claimed that the

powerful industry established in the Soviet Union before the war ensured the Soviet army's uninterrupted supply of everything necessary for the rout of the enemy.

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The vehicle used most widely to convey a favorable portrait of Stalin was the memoirs of military figures who simply reported their wartime contacts with Stalin, presenting him as a reasonable, if fallible, leader. Marshal Konev, a former First Deputy Minister of Defense, performed this function in a series of interviews and articles published during the spring of 1965. In one article Konev described his success in persuading Stalin to change his mind on a military plan, and in another he credited him with participating in the forming of plans to capture Berlin. In his memoirs in Noviy Mir in May, he stated that Stalin was a wise leader who was "particularly alert to the political and economic overtones of his military decisions." And in a press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 28 April, Konev expressed the new "balanced" formulation of Stalin's wartime role:

Stalin played a certain positive role in the cause of insuring victory over the enemy, but in the first period of the war and before its beginning, there were miscalculations and shortcomings in Stalin's activities and these have already been mentioned.

A similar approach was taken by Marshal Bagramyan in a 17 April article in Literaturnaya Gazeta, as well as by Marshal Sokolovskiy in a May interview with a L'Unita correspondent. Bagramyan did criticize the purge of military figures on the eve of the war and stated that there had been strategic miscalculations before the war. However, he stated that measures had been taken to prepare the country. Sokolovskiy went further than this, stating that the "main" reason for early defeats was that the young Soviet state had not had time to build the necessary military-technical base, and that for this reason Stalin had tried to delay the war.

On 8 and 9 May various celebrations were held in honor of the 20th anniversary of the victory in World War II, and numerous speeches were given. The most important of these was one by Brezhnev, in which he identified

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Stalin in his wartime role; he also glossed over the errors made in the early stages of the war:

It is well known that the first stage of the war took place in conditions that were unfavorable to us, and advantageous to the enemy. On the side of the fascists who committed this insidious and treacherous attack was the factor of surprise . . . .

He thus ignored the numerous warnings of impending attack, and made no reference to failure to prepare defenses.

The start of re-Stalinizing was reflected in various articles on other Stalin-related issues, although there was not the same uniformity as in the articles relating to his wartime role. An April article in a Turkmen journal discussed the rise of the cult of personality and the 20th congress in a "balanced" manner. The article stated that the cult had been the result of exceptional conditions, and that various factors, including imperialist encirclement, had demanded strict centralized leadership and certain limitations on democracy. The article went on to state that Stalin's personal shortcomings had, however, caused the cult of personality to emerge. While the article stated that the 20th congress had criticized the cult, it emphasized that the June 1956 central committee decree on the cult had analyzed the cult profoundly and had rebuffed attempts to use criticism of the cult to undermine the socialist system. The call to use the June 1956 decree as a guideline for statements on the Stalin issue would be made with increasing frequency in the months ahead. This decree had marked a sharp modification of Khrushchev's February 1956 denunciation of Stalin. The decree had praised Stalin as a Marxist-Leninist and leader, but said that he had had certain negative character traits which had lent themselves to the development of the cult. The decree's sharpest criticism was reserved for enemies who tried to use the issue to sow confusion and undermine socialism. Thus, the attempts to restore this decree as the basic guideline on the Stalin issue was a clear step toward re-Stalinizing.

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During the summer and early fall of 1965 there were a number of instances in which Stalin was mentioned without comment. A July Voprosy Istorii KPSS article included Stalin in a list of persons who had played an important role in the struggle against the Trotskiyites. The film The Aurora Salvo which was released in October 1965 contained one scene of Stalin--smoking a pipe and voting in favor of Lenin's call for armed action. On 12 September Pravda carried an excerpt from a book on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in which Stalin is simply included in a list of those who voted "correctly" (i.e., for the treaty.)

Whereas volume 7 of the Soviet Historical Encyclopedia, signed to the press in March 1965, had dealt harshly with Stalin on the subject of the repressions, volume 8, signed to the press in October 1965, represented a more "balanced" approach, similar to the line of the June 1956 decree. This volume emphasized that iron discipline and some restrictions on democracy had been necessary under the complex conditions of the times, but that these had always been considered temporary. The article praised Stalin for fighting deviation, organizing the building of socialism, and protecting Lenin's attitudes on the possibility of building socialism in one country. It then went on to criticize the cult and the use of administrative methods. The article closed by stating that the party had liquidated the violations of socialist legality.

#### Anti-Stalinists Continue to Resist

During this period articles attacking Stalinist positions continued to appear, indicating that those who wished to prevent a rehabilitation of Stalin had not been subdued. On 15 April Kommunist Ukrainy published an article on the contributions of the Ukrainians to the defeat of the Germans, and included Khrushchev in a list of those who had held responsible posts. The moderate position taken by this paper suggests that it was under the influence of Podgorny, rather than the more orthodox Shelest. The journal Voprosy Istorii KPSS, while acceding to the

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apparent directive to identify Stalin in his wartime positions, also blamed early military reverses on various factors, tracing many of these to violations of collectivity under Stalin's cult of personality.

From February through April 1965, the journal Noviy Mir published the memoirs of Soviet writer Il'ya Erenburg. Erenburg was highly critical of Stalin and the cult; he attacked Stalin as a military leader.

. . . Litvinov and Mayskiy told me that the pact with Hitler had been necessary--Stalin had succeeded thereby in frustrating the plans of the Western allies . . . But Stalin did not use the two-year respite to strengthen defenses--military men and diplomats alike have told me this. I have written that Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious and saw in his closest collaborators potential "enemies of the people," but for some reason he trusted Ribbentrop's signature. The Hitlerites' attack caught us by surprise. At first Stalin lost his head. He did not dare to announce the attack himself; he charged Molotov with doing so . . . .

Erenburg also denounced at some length the purges. He discussed the "deification of Stalin and Stalin's responsibility for all that occurred, ridiculing the attempt to shift blame elsewhere.

A group of writers was invited to the central committee where one of the secretaries explained to us the reasons for Beria's arrest . . . . The comrade who spoke with us said: 'Unfortunately, in the last years of his life Comrade Stalin was strongly influenced by Beria.' When I later thought about these words, I recalled the year 1937. Would someone then say that at that time Yezhov had influenced Stalin? It was obvious to everyone that such insignificant people could not have prompted Stalin's political course.

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Another voice of moderation came from the journal Soviet State and Law in an article by Deputy Procurator General Zhogin, attacking Vyshinskiy and Stalin. Zhogin charged that Vyshinskiy had cooperated with the NKVD, had suppressed attempts to enforce legality at the purge trials, and had engineered the purges of those who protested. He said that all of this was the fruit of the cult of personality and that Vyshinskiy had carried out Stalin's orders. Vyshinskiy's words had served as "theoretical justification of tyranny and coercion and of the mass persecution of entirely innocent people." Zhogin called for the exposure of these distortions in order to strengthen socialist legality.

In May there was a sudden upsurge of rehabilitations in the press which lasted through June. Voprosy Istorii KPSS resumed its publication of rehabilitation items with no apparent change in formulation. Izvestiya and Sovetskaya Rossiya carried rehabilitation items as did Krasnaya Zvezda. Kommunist Estonii published a strongly worded article on the suffering of the Estonian party in the purges.

Noviy Mir persisted in its resistance to re-Stalinizing trends. In September it published an article by V. Kaverin in which he discussed a number of writers who had had difficulties in the 1930's. He stated that the 20th party congress had put an end to arbitrariness, and, in discussing the trials of the 1930's, said that it had turned out that those convicted had been right and the accusers had been devoid of any moral values. And in October, Noviy Mir published an article reviewing the book The Last Two Weeks by A. Rozen.\* The author of the review, A. Kondratovich, sharply criticized a TASS statement which had been issued a week before the outbreak of World War II, denying the possibility of war. He said that it would have been one thing if it had come from a man who was excessively trustful, "but we all know that Stalin was distinguished by completely different qualities." He then attacked those who argue for the "truth of life" as opposed to the "truth of fact:"

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\*This book was published in February 1965 and criticized the handling of the two weeks before the war.

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Sometimes the attempt is made to link the 1941 defeats to a petty "truth of fact" which it is said is a far cry from what "truly occurred;" those writers who examined that threatening summer of 1941 in an attempt to understand how it happened, have been called "narrow-minded writers." But in those months we lost hundreds of thousands, if not millions of people, and we surrendered to the enemy, even if only for a time, a huge territory, and to call this petty, non-essential "truth of fact" is really a blasphemy. To "dissuade" writers from the "1941" theme means at the very least to show a lack of interest in historical truth . . . Much of what A. Rozen writes about looks unbelievable. During the reading one often asks the question how could such things happen? But even this astonishment is a blessing; that means we have come a long way from those times . . . .

#### Re-Stalinizing Dominates

The strength of the conservative position was reflected in the fall of 1965 in the reduction in the number of rehabilitations appearing in the central press,\* and the modification of the language used in those that did appear. For example, on 3 September Pravda carried

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\*The provincial papers continued to publish some rehabilitations, particularly the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Armenian papers.

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an article about V. Knosin, former Comintern Secretary, but failed to mention his death in the purges, simply giving 1937 as the last date in his career. In general, this was the new format to be followed in the months ahead.\*

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In September, October, and November, the memoirs of Admiral N. Kuznetsov were published; these carried on the process of presenting a "balanced" view of Stalin. While somewhat critical of Stalin's behavior on the eve of the war, Kuznetsov's emphasis was on Stalin's positive achievements. He indicated that Stalin had been a competent and reasonable leader and he denied the "malicious" story that Stalin had planned strategy on a globe (Khrushchev's story) and said that he could vouch for numerous cases where Stalin was engrossed in pinpoint detail and "knew everything right up to the position of each regiment." He stated that more and more during the war Stalin had listened to his front commanders, and he added that every man made mistakes and that wartime errors should not always be blamed on an "incorrect evaluation of the situation by Stalin."

In December a fairly clear step toward rehabilitation of Stalin as a revolutionary was taken in the pages of Pravda Ukrainy. The article concerned the 1917 Sixth Party Congress and the question of whether or not Lenin should

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\*There were of course exceptions to this. On 17 November, the 76th birthday of Kosior, Radio Moscow stated that "in 1938 Kosior was defamed and arrested. S.V. Kosior perished . . . as a victim of arbitrariness."

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appear before the court of the Provisional Government. This article glided gently over Stalin's position, stating that

in the past few years contradictory data have been presented on the position of individual delegates concerning the problem of V.I. Lenin's appearance before the court . . . Some delegates considered it possible for the leader of the party to appear before the authorities under certain conditions. I.V. Stalin made the solution of this problem contingent upon guarantees for Lenin's safety. Since there were no guarantees he was against an appearance before the court at the given moment. . . .

The appearance of this positive appraisal of Stalin's revolutionary role in the Ukrainian paper suggests once again the neo-Stalinist position of Ukrainian leader Shelest.

#### SUMMARY

For the first several months after Khrushchev's ouster, the new leaders were busy undoing some of Khrushchev's policies and making personnel appointments. Shelepin, leader of a neo-Stalinist faction, emerged with considerable strength after the November plenum, and successfully installed many of his proteges in the party and state apparatuses, particularly in the cultural and information media. He also maintained his previous strength in the KGB and Komsomol.

Podgorny, a moderate, also appeared to have gained some strength after the ouster, and for several months a moderate policy prevailed, more in keeping with Podgorny's views than Shelepin's. This line was reflected in the publication of numerous liberal articles on cultural matters and by the continued criticism of Stalin and rehabilitation of his victims. If anything, more freedom

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to write existed in the first few months after the coup than had previously been the case, possibly reflecting the fact that the leadership situation was in a state of flux and that no agreed upon position existed.

In February 1965 the paper Partiynaya Zhizn' (Party Life) published an article stating that there would be no return to the pre-1956 view of Stalin. While this article was reassuring on the surface, it indicated that there were those who feared such a revival and therefore probably also those who supported it. Support for re-Stalinizing was revealed almost immediately. Kommunist, in February, published an article by Moscow city chief Yegorychev which raised for the first time a number of neo-Stalinist themes--including the idea that many people had gone overboard in criticizing events of the period of the cult of personality. This line was picked up by various individuals and journals quite quickly; in February Voprosy Istorii KPSS, which had been publishing a number of anti-Stalin articles, suddenly stopped its program of rehabilitating Stalin's victims.

A party decision must have been made early in 1965 on the question of mentioning Stalin in his wartime positions. The uniform nature of the campaign and the public approval given it by Brezhnev in May, as well as the importance of the issue, indicated that this decision had been made at the highest level. Given the split between moderates and hard-liners existing in the presidium at this time, it seems clear that Brezhnev must have supported the rehabilitation, along with the neo-Stalinist and orthodox members of the presidium. Rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader was the most logical place to start a total rehabilitation; for the issue was a war from which the Soviet Union emerged victorious and in which Stalin, at least as a unifying symbol, played an important part.

However, Brezhnev must have been aware that a total rehabilitation of Stalin would be a real shock and he was prepared only to move gradually. This was indicated by several equivocal statements made by him as well as by the fact that persons closely associated with him, such

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as the First Secretary of Kazakhstan Kunayev, were not pushing the neo-Stalinist line. Thus, while the decision to restore Stalin's wartime image was being carried out fairly consistently during this period, uniform rehabilitation of Stalin in other areas did not occur. Both praise and criticism of his general role continued to be expressed.

The neo-Stalinists used various other issues in their assault on the liberals in the spring of 1965. In April articles were published urging the restoration of Stalin-era literature to respectability and strongly asserting the argument supporting "truth of life." Also in April arrests of dissident intellectuals began, although on a relatively small scale compared with what would come later. In June the Leningrad newspaper indicated that the intellectuals in that area had been criticized by the city party committee, revealing the hard-line posture being taken by that party organization. In the spring the rehabilitation of Stalin's victims was also halted for several months.

During the summer the liberals enjoyed a brief but not unchallenged resurgence as reflected in the resumption of the rehabilitation program and the publication of various liberal articles; these articles were subjected to sharp criticism, however. In September the liberals apparently attempted to defend their position with the publication of a very bold article by Pravda editor Romyantsev, who may well have been speaking for Podgorny. This liberal push was quickly repulsed. Romyantsev was fired and at almost the same time Daniel and Sinyavskiy were arrested, marking a real clamp-down on the liberal intellectuals.

Signs that the neo-Stalinists were pushing hard at this time could be seen in the various defenses made of Shelepin's Party-State Control Committee. Defense of the committee came from the Belorussian paper, suggesting that Shelepin had the support of that republic's organization headed by Mazurov and Masherov. The new Pravda editor Zimyanin, who had replaced Romyantsev, had risen in Belorussia, and Pravda from now on would support a fairly consistent hard-line, another indication of the Belorussian

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orientation. Pravda expressed its support for party-state control (i.e., Shelepin) in December--after that committee had been abolished.

Shelepin received a rebuff at the September central committee plenum; neither Kosygin nor Brezhnev mentioned party-state control, an obvious omission. Polyanskiy was named a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, thereby becoming senior to Shelepin in that organization. And a compromise economic reform program, reportedly opposed by Shelepin, was passed.

The appearance in the beginning of October of a dogmatic article by Sergey Trapeznikov, Brezhnev's protege who had been appointed chairman of the department of Scientific and Educational Institutions the previous June, revealed Brezhnev's support for the hard-line, re-Stalinizing policy. This article exempted from criticism various new aspects of Stalin's policies--collectivization, primacy of heavy industry, politics over economics; in addition, Trapeznikov criticized "some" rehabilitations. Brezhnev's pre-emption of a major portion of the neo-Stalinist platform served to weaken Shelepin's basis for arguing that he (Shelepin) deserved to be the party's leader.

At the December party plenum, the Party-State Control Committee was abolished and Shelepin was removed from his position as deputy chairman of the council of ministers. At the same time the moderates were weakened by Podgornyy's appointment as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which also meant that he had lost his more powerful position on the party secretariat. Furthermore, he replaced Mikoyan, suggesting that this moderate was finished as a political force.

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NOVEMBER 1964

MARCH 1965

CPSU PRESIDIUM

CPSU PRESIDIUM

Full Members

Full Members

BREZHNEV  
KIRILENKO  
KOSYGIN  
PODGORNYI  
POLYANSKIY  
MIKOYAN  
SHELEPIN  
SHELEST  
SHVERNIK  
SUSLOV  
VORONOV

BREZHNEV  
KIRILENKO  
KOSYGIN  
MAZUROV<sup>2</sup>  
MIKOYAN  
PODGORNYI  
POLYANSKIY  
SHELEPIN  
SHELEST  
SHVERNIK  
SUSLOV  
VORONOV

Candidate Members

Candidate Members

DEMICHEV  
GRISHIN  
MAZUROV  
MZHAVANADZE  
RASHIDOV  
YEFREMOV

DEMICHEV  
GRISHIN  
MZHAVANADZE  
RASHIDOV  
USTINOV<sup>2</sup>  
YEFREMOV

CPSU SECRETARIAT

CPSU SECRETARIAT

ANDROPOV  
BREZHNEV  
DEMICHEV  
IL'ICHEV<sup>1</sup>  
PODGORNYI  
PONOMAREV  
RUDAKOV  
SHELEPIN  
SUSLOV  
TITOV

ANDROPOV  
BREZHNEV  
DEMICHEV  
PODGORNYI  
PONOMAREV  
RUDAKOV  
SHELEPIN  
SUSLOV  
TITOV<sup>3</sup>  
USTINOV<sup>2</sup>

1. Dropped in March 1965.
2. Elected in March 1965.
3. Dropped in September 1965.

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CREEPING CONSERVATISM

The 23rd Congress--Before and After  
December 1965--November 1966

LEADERSHIP

Build-Up To The Congress

Following the December plenum an orthodox, hard-line approach to cultural matters as well as to the Stalin issue seemed to prevail in the leadership. At the same time, however, the neo-Stalinist members of the Shelepin faction expressed less extreme views than had previously been the case, suggesting that they were reacting cautiously to Shelepin's set-back in December. For example, in a 25 December speech Demichev retreated somewhat; although he called for approval of all that is new and truly communist and criticized lack of principles and ideals, he closed by stating

The party has a cautious and careful regard for the intelligentsia, trusting it, being concerned for the future of talent, and the directing of it so that it is socially useful, and about the healthy, normal development of it. 'Talent is a rare thing,' said Lenin, 'it must be methodically and cautiously encouraged . . . .'

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The fact that Shelepin's set-back in December had not meant a corresponding set-back for neo-Stalinist views was quickly demonstrated, however. On 30 January Pravda published an article by three historians which urged that the use of the term "period of the cult of personality" be discontinued, and called for more positive portrayals of the Stalin era. They argued that emphasis should be put on the enormous successes of the period and that the cost in human suffering should be minimized. They attacked those who pay tribute to "unprincipled opportunism," apparently a reference to Khrushchev's use of de-Stalinization. Also in January the Moldavian paper Sovetskaya Moldaviya published an article by a member of the council of the House of Political Education of the Moldavian Central Committee, analyzing the cult and its exposure. The article instructed propagandists to refer to the June 1956 decree; it attacked those who turn criticism of the cult into a campaign and told propagandists to emphasize that the party had dealt with all that had conflicted with the lines of the 20th Congress. Both of these articles reflect the carrying out of the instructions issued by Trapeznikov in October 1965 and mark a further step in the road to re-Stalinization.

The clearest expression of the prevailing orthodox approach was the trial in February of the writers Daniel and Sinyavskiy, an action which must have been approved by the Presidium. According to the writer Valentin Katayev, Kosygin had opposed the trial and "the whole damned thing" but had been outvoted. It seems likely that Mikoyan would have opposed it and probable that Podgornyy, too, would not have supported it. It seems clear that Brezhnev, in league with the neo-Stalinists and other orthodox members of the hierarchy, supported the action. The two men received five and seven years respectively for their "crime" of publishing so-called anti-Soviet works under pseudonyms in the West.

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On 15 February the Polish party organ Trybuna Ludu published a strongly worded editorial in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 20th CPSU Congress. This editorial could be read as a warning to the Soviet Union, linking as it did the coming 23rd Congress with the heritage of the 20th, which it said had become "a common gain for the entire Communist movement." In contrast, the anniversary received only muted attention in the Soviet press.

On the eve of the 23rd congress, a number of republic and regional party meetings were held, at which party leaders expressed for the most part hard-line sentiments. The most strident voice came, not surprisingly, from Mzhavanadze's bailiwick, Georgia, where party secretary Sturua spoke of the "costs" of de-Stalinizing, saying it had brought nihilism and cosmopolitanism (an old Stalinist term with anti-Semitic connotations), as well as attempts by some authors to bring back Trotskiyism and other deviations. He condemned the term period of the cult of personality, claiming that it belittled a period of heroic victories and enormous successes. And, finally, he attacked those who undervalue ideological work and write about shortcomings. He stated that this does not help the building of communism. And he closed with a call for party coordination of ideological work.\*

\*The Italians reacted quickly to Sturua's speech. On 27 March Unita warned that if the 23rd congress re-evaluated Stalin and minimized the negative judgment of the 20th congress, "we cannot accept it."

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At the Belorussian congress first secretary Masherov stated that de-Stalinization had brought into disrepute "an entire historical era" in the country's life. He also criticized those who distort certain events of the war and emasculate the class content of history. First Secretary Bodyul, in Moldavia, implied that the uncrowning of Stalin had led to a distortion of the historic achievements of the party in its struggle for socialism. In Latvia Pelshe emphasized the importance of party education and criticized those writers and artists who are disposed to fault finding and exaggerating existing shortcomings and difficulties. In the Ukraine Shelest used Sholokhov's formulation that when the heart of each artist belonged to the party, he would be free to write as his heart dictates. And, at the Leningrad Oblast' Party conference, Tolstikov presented his neo-Stalinist solution to the problem of non-conforming intellectuals:

Under present conditions, we are faced with having to strengthen the party's influence on the creative intelligentsia, and to help it, by its creative works to strengthen Communist ideals.

At the end of March several warnings were sounded about the proposed rehabilitation of Stalin. One came from the journal Voprosy Filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) which warned that reversion to one-man rule was still a possibility:

In the conditions of the application of socialism there exists the possibility that while taking part in collective work, definite personalities may pursue aims which are their own or which are aims of a faction. Moved by ambition, they have personal aims and cause harm to the common cause, particularly if those personalities have leading positions.

The article then proposed that reforms be adopted to "prevent the repetition of past mistakes."

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The second, and most spectacular, warning came from 25 Soviet intellectuals. These individuals sent an urgent appeal and warning against the rehabilitation to Brezhnev.\* The letter stated that the authors saw nothing to indicate that condemnation of the personality cult had been mistaken-- on the contrary, they said, many horrifying facts remained to be revealed. They said that any attempt at rehabilitation would cause great dissension within Soviet society, and would be interpreted by the world as capitulation to the Chinese.

### The Congress Opens

The 23rd Congress opened on 29 March and proved to be much less interesting than the build-up to it. The reported rehabilitation of Stalin amounted only to the restoration of the terms "Politburo" and "General Secretary;" these were perhaps the symbolic vestiges of an abandoned plan. Whether the proposed rehabilitation was abandoned because of opposition in Eastern Europe, internal protest, or power shifts in the Presidium is not clear; it seems most likely that the leaders were startled by the vehemence of the reaction, both at home and abroad, and decided that it would be wise to move cautiously.

In his speech to the congress, Brezhnev mentioned neither Stalin nor Khrushchev by name, but he did refer to the miscalculations, undue haste, and subjectivism of recent years (a clear slap at Khrushchev). He called for party-mindedness and a class approach, although he rejected arbitrary influence (an apparent rejection of the more neo-Stalinist recommendations of Tolstikov). Brezhnev's speech was less extreme in tone than many of the pre-congress speeches had been, perhaps a reflection of the leadership's decision to pull back; nonetheless, the tone of his speech was orthodox:

The party will always support art and literature which confirm beliefs in our ideals and will wage an uncompromising struggle against all manifestations of ideology which is alien to us.

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\*See Appendix Item A and page 49 for further discussion.

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Socialist art is deeply optimistic and cheerful . . . . This, of course, does not mean that one must write only about what is good. As everyone knows, we have many difficulties and shortcomings and the truthful criticism of them in works of art is useful and necessary; it helps the Soviet people to eliminate the shortcomings. Unfortunately, one also encounters those hacks in art who, instead of assistance to the people, choose as their specialty the blackening of our system and the slander of our heroic people. Of course, we have only a few such people. They do not to any extent reflect the feelings and mind of our creative intelligentsia who are linked inseparably with the people and with the party . . . .

After Brezhnev spoke, a number of speeches were given which were more hard-line than his. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, warned against relaxing ideological work, and stated that some "bearers of petty bourgeois licentiousness" under the pretence of struggling against the consequences of the cult of personality and others under the guise of advocating historical truth, run down the heroic history and struggle of party and people, and try to blacken Soviet reality and minimize the grandeur of our triumphs over fascism.

The series of neo-Stalinist reports was begun by Yegorychev, that stalwart supporter of the Soviet Union's heroic past, who started by reassuring those who had been frightened by the spectre of Stalinism:

The personality cult, the violation of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality--all that has hindered our movement forward--has been decisively rejected by our party, and there will never be a return to this past!

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He then proceeded, however, to attack once again those who write off the heroic history of the Soviet people, and to condemn insufficiently party-minded approaches to history and individuals. He closed by stating that the sensational instances when direct ideological saboteurs penetrate the ranks of the workers of art can be explained only by political carelessness. Yegorychev's attack seemed to include a large portion of the intelligentsia in its scope. The liberals had demonstrated their apprehension about this sort of approach in a January Noviy Mir article which criticized Stalin's statement at the 18th party congress that the main bulk of the intelligentsia had opposed the revolution, and therefore had to be broken and dispersed.

Moldavian First Secretary Bodyul, a Brezhnev man, called for stricter literary controls. He urged that a decisive rebuff be given to the falsifiers of history and to those who slander the Soviet people. He described the nature of freedom in the Soviet Union, stating that artists are free to create but

in the same degree the party and state organs enjoy the right of free choice of what to print . . . . In our opinion, the weak side of leadership of this sector of ideological work is insufficient party demandingness toward selection and publication of works of literature, art, and cinema.

Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop was more explicit and more harsh in his recommendation than Bodyul had been:

Each person is free to write and to speak everything which pleases him, without the slightest restrictions. But every free union (including the party) is also free to dismiss those members who use the party for preaching anti-party opinions.

Thus the threat had been raised of expulsion from party and creative unions; expulsion from the latter would mean the end of the right to publish. Other hard-line speeches

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were given on this occasion by Masherov, Mzhavanadze, Pelshe, and Rostov party chief, M. Solomentsev.

On the other side of the fence, the more moderate Podgorny stated that the party had done much to strengthen law and order and to eliminate harmful elements connected with the cult of personality. He said that economic and cultural issues present new questions, requiring legislation. In his speech Podgorny also appealed for greater democracy in the party. In general those leaders who support a moderate approach have been silent on the Stalin issue and related subjects such as cultural freedom. In this particular speech Podgorny dealt only briefly with the topic but his treatment was clearly moderate, as he implied that these issues should be dealt with through legislation--not administrative fiat.

At the congress Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Pelshe was added; formerly First Secretary of Latvia, Pelshe is reportedly close to Suslov. Pelshe also took over Shvernik's function as chairman of the party's Control Commission. These actions marked another setback for the moderates on the Politburo.\* Kunayev, a Brezhnev follower, and the Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, an apparent Shelepin supporter and probably Mazurov's protege, became candidate members of the Politburo.

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\*Before the congress, in February, the moderates had suffered another setback when A. Kochinyan replaced Ya. Zarobyan as First Secretary in Armenia. A subsequent speech by Kochinyan revealed that Zarobyan had been demoted for opening party membership to the masses and recruiting technicians rather than political workers, as well as for poor ideological leadership. Zarobyan had come from Khar'kov Oblast', Podgorny's bailiwick, as had N. Sobol, dismissed in March from his position as Ukrainian Second Secretary. Both of these actions therefore represented a defeat for Podgorny, and the Armenian shake-up may also have marked a defeat for Mikoyan, an Armenian who probably had had considerable influence in personnel appointments in that republic over the years.

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In other personnel actions during this period, Shelepin's associate Khaldeyev was shifted from his position as RSFSR Agitprop Chief to become the new editor of Partiynaya Zhizn and G. Yenyutin, a long-time Brezhnev associate was named Chairman of the RSFSR People's Control Commissions. After the congress, there were a number of indications that Shelepin had been assigned responsibility for light industry matters, and from a meeting he attended the following September, it appeared that Demichev had assumed Shelepin's responsibility for supervising the Soviet security apparatus. From these actions it would appear that the moderates had received a further setback as had Shelepin, but Shelepin still had considerable strength judging from his ability to keep his supporters in high-level posts.

#### Post-Congress Orthodoxy

Following the congress a number of speeches given by party leaders indicated that the orthodox re-Stalinizing line continued to prevail. At a Leningrad Oblast' meeting early in April, Tolstikov delivered an only thinly veiled warning:

The congress devoted attention also to the negative phenomena in the development of literature and art. We also have been having cases of lowered demandingness toward the results of creative work here in Leningrad. Such lack of demandingness appears especially often in evaluating the creative work of the young writers and this has a negative effect on their creative growth. Our creative organs should think seriously about these facts.

And Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev, who had previously been quite moderate, gave a dogmatic speech in May at a congress of Kazakh writers. He called on writers to be in the forefront of the ideological struggle and to combat the challenge of bourgeois propaganda, and he affirmed party leadership of the arts. He did make several concessions to the

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moderate view, stating that writers could depict negative aspects of life--but from a Communist position--and that demands should not be made on writers to write on specific subjects.

Demichev, in his May election speech, condemned ideologically harmful works and linked them to foreign propaganda which seeks to subvert Soviet society. This line by now had become almost standard and is reminiscent of the Stalinist concept of a sharpening class struggle. There can be no dissent within the structure as envisioned; therefore, any dissonance must be attributed to an aggressive, alien ideology. In the logical continuum of this line, Demichev condemned bridge building between East and West. Subsequent extension of the line would lead to the charge that dissident writers were in fact agents of the West and should be tried for treasonous activity.

On 16 May Yepishev, head of the armed forces' political administration, gave a dogmatic speech at a conference on the indoctrination of youth. He reportedly called on writers to show the greatness of the times instead of questioning heroic legends. He praised the literature of the Stalin era, and said that Stalin's reasons for sending people to death or prison camps should be understood. He then criticized both Noviy Mir and Yunost' for publishing articles describing setbacks during the war and for paying tribute to abstract humanism and pacifism.

Differences within the leadership on the Stalin issue were reflected in the publication of contradictory articles by the two highest-ranking military figures in the Soviet Union in June 1966. Defense Minister Malinovskiy wrote an article in Izvestiya on 23 June in which he mentioned neither the purge of military leaders before the war nor mistakes on the part of Stalin. He attributed the initial defeats to the enormous size of the attacking forces which he said had been built up with the help of Western imperialists. He emphasized the pre-war buildup by the Soviet regime which, he said, saw the danger long before the war, and he praised the party for strengthening

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the moral-political unity of the country.\*

In an article in the June issue of the Military Historical Journal Marshal Andrey Grechko, First Deputy Minister of Defense, bucked the prevailing line and returned to the historiography of the Khrushchev era. He criticized Stalin and charged ineptitude by "the highest military and political leadership" on the eve of the war. He accused the regime of underestimating the immediacy of the Nazi threats, and stated that Stalin and his closest advisors--men at the head of the Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff (Timoshenko and Zhukov) "grossly miscalculated" the strategic situation. He further asserted that decisions on major defense problems were made by one man while responsible military leaders "often enough supported and encouraged these erroneous views." The use of this issue by Grechko may have demonstrated his dissatisfaction with what he considered the lack of consideration being given strategic military problems, and the willingness of some military men, for example Malinovskiy, to go along with it. Grechko was to change his emphasis on the Stalin issue considerably before being named Defense Minister the following year.

#### A Shift In Positions

A debate on the subject of collectivity of leadership versus individual responsibility was carried on in the press during the summer and fall of 1966. On 20 July a Pravda article by F. Petrenko reaffirmed the principle of collective leadership and warned against the imposition of individual power. On 8 August a Pravda editorial appeared to respond to this by citing the need both to strengthen party democracy and at the same time to develop a sense

\*A Rude Pravo version of this article had apparently been tailored to take into account bloc sensitivities. In this version, Malinovskiy referred to a series of grave mistakes committed during the early stages of the war, asserted that the USSR had a very limited time in which to prepare, and cited shortages of planes, tanks, and artillery at the start of the war.

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of responsibility and discipline. The editorial quoted Lenin to the effect that "irresponsibility taking shelter under references to collectiveness of work, is a most dangerous evil."

An article by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev in Partiynaya Zhizn' on 1 October supported the Pravda editorial. Kunayev stressed the primacy of individual leadership, and he too used the Lenin quotation. However, Georgian Second Secretary P. Rodionov, in a Voprosy Istorii KPSS article reasserted Petrenko's view and emphasized that individual leaders must subordinate themselves to the collective. In this debate the neo-Stalinists, represented by Petrenko and Rodionov, demonstrated their fear that Brezhnev was acquiring too much power. They resorted to the same argument used previously by the moderates--that there are dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule and that the collectivity of leadership must be preserved. The neo-Stalinists were answered by the Brezhnev forces in the Pravda editorial and Kunayev's article. The argument used by them was that while collectivity is fine, it must not be used to cover up irresponsibility, and that there must be individual responsibility and discipline.

In August and September Izvestiya published two articles which strongly attacked Stalin and the personality cult. The first article stated that Stalin had departed from the norms of party life and had destroyed collectivity of leadership. The second was even stronger in its denunciation of Stalin; it accused him of overestimating his own services and crudely violating collectivity. It charged that his thesis that the class struggle was growing more and more aggravated had led to crude violations of socialist legality. These articles seem to have come from the moderate side as they condemn the Stalinist theory of intensifying class struggle, a term which was being resurrected by the neo-Stalinists. The Izvestiya articles do, however, agree with the neo-Stalinist defenses of collective leadership mentioned above, and for good reason. The moderates had been on the defensive for a long time and they, too, feared Brezhnev's increasing strength. Thus, the neo-Stalinists and the liberals had a common interest in stopping Brezhnev.

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An indication that Shelepin's faction had cause to be concerned about the strength of its position was the identification of Shelepin in August as secretary in charge of consumer goods, a real come-down for him. In September Shelepin lost another foothold in the security forces. A new Ministry for the Protection of Public Order was established with N. Shchelokov, a long-time Brezhnev associate, appointed to head it. The logical appointee had been V. Tikunov, a Shelepin associate, who had been serving as chief of the RSFSR militia.

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In November Brezhnev indicated his support for a general rehabilitation of Stalin; in a speech in Tbilisi, he again mentioned Stalin's name, this time including him among a group of "ardent revolutionaries" who had led the struggle for the revolution in Georgia. Thus, while the neo-Stalinists were siding with the moderates on the question of collective leadership, Brezhnev took the Stalin issue an additional step. By further restoring Stalin he could also restore the concept of one-man rule to respectability and thereby legitimize his own drive for increased power.

## INTELLECTUALS

### Pre-Congress Clamp-Down

The general shift to an increasingly hard-line policy was reflected in a clamp-down on the intellectuals in the first few months of 1966. In addition to the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and their sentencing to five and seven years at hard labor respectively for the publication of "anti-Soviet" works in the West, there were a number of other arrests and trials. In early January, diplomatic sources reported that a Soviet student had been sentenced to seven years in prison as the alleged leader of

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approximately 250 Leningrad students who had secretly published the magazine Kolokol (The Bell), the magazine of "free thought." Eight others reportedly received sentences ranging from two to five years. The group reportedly claimed that it was not anti-Communist, but was opposed to Communism as practiced in the Soviet Union, and was against what they considered the remnants of Stalinism. Once again Leningrad was acting as the leader in implementing a hard-line policy. In February the young poet Vladimir Batshev was sentenced to five years exile in Siberia. Accused of being a parasite, he was condemned for participation in the 5 December demonstration protesting the arrests of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and for carrying on literary activities without being a member of the Union of Writers. Also in February the writer Valeriy Tarsis was deprived of his Soviet citizenship while traveling abroad.

The Soviet intellectuals reacted to the increasing pressure with fear and courage. Just before the 23rd congress convened on 29 March, 60 members of the USSR Union of Writers sent a letter to the presidiums of the congress, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.\* They asked permission to stand surety for Daniel and Sinyavskiy. While criticizing the publication of works abroad without authorization, the signers stated that the trial of the two writers had set a dangerous precedent and threatened the progress of Soviet culture. They called for more freedom, not its condemnation.

Also on the eve of the congress, a group of 25 intellectuals sent a signed letter to Brezhnev, arguing against any rehabilitation of Stalin at the congress.\*\* They mentioned tendencies in speeches and articles directed at such a rehabilitation and stated that this caused them deep apprehension. They said they had seen nothing which would warrant thinking the original condemnation of the personality cult was wrong; on the contrary, they maintained

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\*See Appendix Item B.

\*\*See Appendix Item A.

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that many of the most horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes had not yet been made public. They said that there were many dangers involved in any rehabilitation of Stalin, including serious dissensions in Soviet society.

. . . Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles . . . . No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

The letter went on to describe another danger--that a rehabilitation would pose a threat of a new split in the world communist movement--between the Soviet Union and the Communists in the West who would see this as a surrender to the Chinese. The letter closed by saying that such a decision by the Central Committee could not be regarded as routine--that it would have historic importance for the destiny of the county.

In its March editorial Noviy Mir again defended truth in literature and used Pravda's 26 February article on the coming 23rd Congress to support its position. It said that Pravda, which had in fact given limited attention to the 20th Congress, had praised that congress for overcoming the personality cult and for restoring Leninist norms of party and state life, the observance of collectivity

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of leadership and intra-party democracy. Noviy Mir asserted, optimistically, that the party was constantly strengthening these things and was doing everything to avoid a repetition of the violations of legality connected with the cult. In obvious disfavor, Noviy Mir's editor-in-chief, Tvardovskiy was the only candidate or full member of the central committee not elected a delegate to the congress.

### The Congress and After

As noted above, the 23rd Congress did not formally rehabilitate Stalin and, in fact, skirted the issue almost entirely. However, most of the speeches which dealt with culture were hard-line. This was true not only of the leaders who spoke, but also of those members of the intelligentsia itself who spoke. Mikhail Sholokhov gave one of the most vicious speeches of all, stating that if Daniel and Sinyavskiy had been caught in the 1920's they would have received harsher judgment and that if anything the sentences they received were too mild. One exception to the general trend was a speech given by USSR Cultural Minister Yekaterina Furtseva. While admitting that there were shortcomings in the arts, she named no names and called for friendly guidance. She said that the October 1964 plenum had gotten rid of the last vestiges of administrativeness in the arts and that in the new atmosphere intellectuals could work calmly and assuredly.

The sycophants and hacks immediately picked up the basically tough line projected at the congress. Both Pravda, in an article by Literaturnaya Gazeta editor Chakovskiy, and Literaturnaya Rossiya, in an editorial, attacked foreign propagandists for trying to frighten the creative intelligentsia with the "spectre of Stalinism." According to the latter paper

Our ideological opponents are trying again to put an equal sign between the basic principles of Soviet literature of socialist realism and its party spirit and closeness to the people, and the shortcomings connected with the cult of personality . . . .

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The editorial also described as slanderous, claims that Sholokhov's views on Daniel and Sinyavskiy were not shared by other writers.

In April the literary journal Yunost' (Youth) published a very self-critical editorial. [redacted] the Komsomol was trying to take over the journal and the editorial represented the attempt to forestall this. Yunost' had been sharply criticized at the congress. The editorial recited conservative views on such topics as positive heroes and the ideological content of writing, but closed with a defiant statement:

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Nobody and nothing hinders or can hinder all the young and truly talented in the Soviet Union from growing and developing. It is not for nothing that the young in Soviet literature blossomed particularly well in recent years.

Thus the editorial closed by implying that there had been an upsurge in Soviet literature during the Khrushchev years and that the writers were aware of this and would not tolerate repressive measures aimed at cutting off this growth.

In April, at a plenum of the Board of the RSFSR Writers Union, a secretary of the union, M. Alekseyev, defended the literature of the Stalin years and condemned the "devastating term 'cult literature.'" He stated that some people had gone too far in condemning the cult:

. . . Because of certain reasons, a good little bit of confusion was brought into the understanding of history and the present day during the last 10-12 years. The word 'great' related not to the whole history of the Soviet state but only to the decade which began approximately in 1953. It was suggested that this period should define the concept of the present day while events which happened earlier were not history. . . . Since in a certain part of this history there developed an ugly phenomenon, which was unnatural for our society and which at the 20th Party Congress was named the 'cult of personality', our ideological opponents did not fail to use this to blacken our revolution

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and to cast aspersions on Soviet real life as a whole. As regards Soviet literature, despite the obvious facts which we cited above, it was simply declared non-existent.

Alekseyev praised several of Konstantin Simonov's war novels, but stated that he could not accept everything in them, specifically the idea that some heroes operated during the war with doubts which they could not possibly have had until after the 20th Party Congress. In other words Alekseyev was claiming that nobody knew of Stalin's crimes until they were revealed by Khrushchev in 1956.

Various articles published in the spring demonstrated the prevalence of a conservative trend. For example, in its lead editorial in May, Voprosy Istorii KPSS criticized false portrayals of the cult period, and cited the influence of subjectivism and voluntaristic mistakes. It said that there were still instances where "under the guise of criticism of the cult of personality, the work of our party and people in the construction of socialism was belittled." On 7 May a Pravda article conceded that the period of the cult of personality had been linked with serious perversions and mistakes in the work of state security, but claimed that this did not change the socialist nature of Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence.

Pressure also continued to be exerted on the intellectuals. In May the writer Igor Galamchok was given a suspended sentence for having refused to testify at the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial. In July 1965, 40 Ukrainian intellectuals had reportedly been arrested for nationalistic activities. Open trials for some of these were held in January and February 1966, but because of protest demonstrations open trials were discontinued. In April a closed trial was held, but three intellectuals managed to attend. Two of them, Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Drach, later started a campaign to obtain signatures for a petition, pleading for the release of those tried. This was the beginning of a series of arrests and trials in the Ukraine which would increase in number and intensity in the next few years.

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A Frightened Response

Clearly frightened by the prevailing trend, and possibly encouraged by what they may have considered to be the success of their previous letter pleading that Stalin not be rehabilitated, liberal intellectuals continued to protest. Lidiya Chukovskaya addressed a letter to Mikhail Sholokhov, which was subsequently smuggled to the West, condemning him for his congress speech. A number of other letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trial were also written during this period and smuggled out. In one of these, written by A. Yakobson, the statement appears that the works of the two men were not anti-Soviet, but were "against Stalinism, its survivals and all attempts to revive it in our society."

Several articles appeared during the summer which revealed continued intransigence on the part of even published writers. In the Armenian paper Kommunist, Bagish Ovsepyan wrote an article in which he reported glowingly on the 23rd congress, saying it had guaranteed once again that there would be no return to lawlessness and that it was a worthy successor to the 20th and 22nd congresses. His description bore little resemblance to the real thing. In an Izvestiya article on 21 July, Konstantin Simonov stated that it was worth repeating that had it not been for the purges, the USSR would have faced Hitler with many more commanders. On 22 July Literaturnaya Rossiya carried another Simonov article which contained implicit criticism of Zhdanov. On 30 July Tvardovskiy wrote a letter to Literaturnaya Gazeta in which he rejected criticism of the staging of his play "Terkin in the Other World" at the Satire Theater which had been closed at the end of June. The editors of the paper accompanied Tvardovskiy's letter with the statement that his evaluation was one-sided. The play was performed once more--in mid-August, but thereafter disappeared from the theater's repertoire.

In August Noviy Mir published an article which was to cause considerable controversy in the months ahead. The article was by V. Lakshin, an editor of the journal, and

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was entitled, "Writer, Reader, Critic." In it Lakshin praised works by Solzhenitsyn and Semin which had previously been criticized, and again presented Noviy Mir's case for truth in literature. This article was subsequently attacked by both Literaturnaya Gazeta and Literaturnaya Rossiya; both Lakshin and the journal itself were criticized. This was the start of an intense campaign against Noviy Mir which would continue into the following year.

## STALIN THEMES

### Re-Stalinizing Is Pushed

The prevalence of an orthodox line during and after the December 1965 plenum was reflected in the appearance in early 1966 of numerous articles glossing over Stalin's errors and crimes. The focus of attention had shifted, however, from Stalin's wartime role to more general policies and achievements of the Stalin years, with the policy of collectivization receiving the most attention. This indicated that Trapeznikov's October 1965 instructions were being followed.

Sel'skaya Zhizn', in a 29 December 1965 article attacked those who assert that conditions were not right for collectivization in the 1930's and who concentrate on the negative features of collectivization, ignoring all that was progressive. The article admitted that errors had been committed early in the process of collectivization, but minimized their seriousness; it spread the responsibility among local, oblast, and central organs, and failed to criticize Stalin at all. In fact, the article praised as "courageous fighters for the triumph of Lenin's cause" those who stood "at the source of the construction of the kolkhozes;" this can certainly be read as indirect praise of Stalin.

This theme was further advanced by F. Vaganov in a February Kommunist article, and by S. Kaplan in Pravda

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Ukrainy on 14 February. Kaplan even used a Stalinist argument to explain early difficulties in collectivization. He said that the policy had been accompanied by a sharpening of the class struggle in a country encircled by capitalist states. He did mildly criticize Stalin's "inclination" to be hasty and "overly decretory" but clearly minimized the importance of this factor.

Evidence that the January article in Pravda, in which the three historians urged that the term "period of the personality cult" be renounced, was being taken seriously can be seen in two articles which appeared in early 1966. In late February Sel'skaya Zhizn stated that criticism of collectivization could not be justified by references to the subjectivist term "period of the personality cult." Similarly, a 12 March Pravda Ukrainy article criticized the use of this term, stating that its use had led to the detraction of Soviet achievements.

Another indication of the prevalence of a conservative line was the halt in the rehabilitation program. From January through April Voprosy Istorii KPSS again suspended its rehabilitations and on the eve of the congress the section of the journal which had included such articles was eliminated. In December the U.S. Embassy in Moscow reported a trend in Soviet writing to concede that the Stalin cult had been regrettable, but had been an aberration unrelated to the system's basic structure. The embassy cited several poems emphasizing the need to stress the positive, including one stating that youths who have heard about special camps, the Kirov murder, and so forth, should balance such a "momentary bit of offal" against the stride of the century.

A somewhat ominous indicator of the trend was Oktyabr's publication in March of an article referring to Boris Kedrov as a son and brother of "enemies of the people." Kedrov's father had been one of the first rehabilitations after Stalin's death, and Stalin's term "enemies of the people" had been specifically condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

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Exceptions to Rule; Nekrich Book Debate

There were exceptions to the generally hard-line emphasis in early 1966, but for the most part these came from the most intransigent and liberal journals. Noviy Mir, for example, continued to publish anti-Stalinist items. In January it carried a review of A. Nekrich's book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and by now was very controversial. The book had been highly critical of Stalin for his handling of the prewar situation, and the review also charged Stalin with grave errors, and stated that those who arrested and persecuted Marshal Tukhachevskiy and his comrades must have known that they were innocent.

In February 1966 a meeting was held to discuss the Nekrich book and to determine the propriety of the book's condemnation of Stalin.\* Participants in the conference included people from the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences, the foreign ministry and the armed forces. G. Deborin, later identified as head of the editorial board at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, opened the meeting by criticizing the book for what he considered a number of incorrect evaluations and facts. He argued that Soviet unpreparedness at the start of the war was not primarily due to Stalin's stubbornness, but was the result of various factors including misinformation. He attacked Nekrich's implication that Stalin, Voroshilov, Budenny, Blyukher, and others had known of the innocence of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, but had condemned them nonetheless. Throughout this talk, there were numerous shouts from the floor, and when Deborin attempted to pay tribute to the honor and conscience of Budenny and Voroshilov, he was shouted off the rostrum.

A number of people then spoke and disputed Deborin's statements, putting the blame for military unpreparedness

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\*This account is based on notes taken by a participant at the meeting and eventually made available to the U.S. Embassy. A similar transcript was published by Posev.

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on Stalin:

Stalin bears the main responsibility for the tragedy. He created the situation in the country. Stalin's biggest crime was usurpation of power and destruction of our best military and Party cadres . . . . Now there are still people who say that Stalin must not be spoken of badly. They say he was not alone . . . . Stalin assumed the boldness of independently leading the country and his guilt is tremendous. It is necessary to speak of this so that it not be repeated.

This speaker then went on to discuss the trial of the Tukhachevskiy-Yakir group, stating that the "fraud was prepared by the Gestapo, but the idea came from Stalin."

Another speaker provided an example of the kind of statement probably most feared by the hierarchy; he criticized those around Stalin, who had not stopped him.

Each is guilty, but the degree of guilt varies. One is guilty in that he decided not to say what he was thinking. The further and the higher, the greater the responsibility. At each level rejection of truth for the sake of personal well-being is a crime, and the higher the level, the more serious the crime. The main culprit is Stalin.

At the end of this meeting there was an exchange between Deborin and a man named Snegov, who said that Stalin should have been shot, not exonerated. Snegov charged that Stalin had helped Hitler in every way, especially in the invasion of Poland, because he had shot all the Polish Communists in the Soviet Union and had declared the Polish Communist Party illegal; he then stated that Stalin had betrayed all communists in all countries. At that point Deborin accused Snegov of saying things that "come from a

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camp hostile to us," and he asked Snegov to what camp he belonged. Snegov's reply was, "I am from Kolyma."\* Snegov closed by stating that

you can't frighten us with camps.  
We will not be intimidated. The time  
is different, and the past will not  
return . . . .

Snegov's optimism was not supported by subsequent events. In July 1967, Nekrich, the author of the book under discussion, was to be expelled from the party as an example to those who do not conform with the party line.

There were several other instances of intransigence on the part of the liberals in early 1966. In February Noviy Mir carried an article by V. Kardin which was to have repercussions for months to come. Kardin stated that since the 20th congress there had been a strong desire to "drink from the river named fact," but that historians and memoirrealists faced numerous obstacles--including the opposition of those who disagree with the restoration of historical truth. The other major liberal journal Yunost', in January, published for the first time in the Soviet Union, the text of a letter of Lenin's which was written in March 1923 and in which he upbraided Stalin for the latter's rude treatment of Nadezhda Krupskaya, and demanded either an apology from Stalin or the "severance of relations between us." The existence and contents of this letter as well as the quarrel itself had been described in an article in Pravda in 1964, but the text itself had never been published before.

There were several other anti-Stalinist articles before the congress. In March, for example, Voprosy Istorii KPSS published an article by A. Solov'yev which was very critical of Stalin's 1922 position on the nationalities issue (which had amounted to forced incorporation). Solov'yev stated that this concept had "conflicted with the ideas of equality and independence of fraternal Soviet republics."

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\*One of the forced labor camps under Stalin.

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He described Lenin's opposition to this proposal, and stated that Lenin had favored strengthening both the union of republics and the sovereignty of each republic, and had warned of the dangers of extreme centralism.

Post-Congress: Pro-Stalin Line Dominates

The conservative impression given by the congress was picked up and reinforced in various articles and speeches in the spring of 1966. At the Writers Union Congress in April, union secretary Alekseyev scoffed at those who refer to the battle of Stalingrad as the battle of Volgograd, stating that there was no such battle. Similarly, he scoffed at those who try to ignore the fact that Stalin was the supreme commander during the whole war. And Kalashnik, deputy to Yepishev at the armed forces political administration, criticized those who sometimes place the blame for the failures and difficulties at the start of the war on one figure--Stalin. While he admitted that the lawlessness and some errors played a certain negative role, he emphasized other factors such as the military and economic superiority of fascism which at that time had the benefit of the resources of almost the entire continent, and the fact that many Soviet troops had to be maintained in the East in case Japan entered the war.

On 9 May an article by Deborin, who had participated in the attack on Nekrich's book in February, appeared in Pravda. In this review of a history of Soviet foreign policy from 1917-1945, Deborin stated that despite the desire of the Soviet Union to conclude a collective security pact with Britain and France in 1939, the Soviet Union "was forced to accept the German proposal for signing a non-aggression pact." He blamed this situation on the British and Americans who, he said, preferred to make a deal with the fascists.

In addition to articles glossing over wartime difficulties, articles restoring Stalin's image in other areas also appeared. In May Oktyabr' attacked Zalygin's Na Irtyshe for portraying collectivization one-sidedly and for exaggerating the influence of the cult of personality on this

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great historical event. In June Izvestiya included Stalin on a list of those who played a major role in speeding up industrialization. In July an article in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn' presented a favorable picture of Stalin at the Potsdam negotiations in July 1945.

In July Oktyabr' carried several very hard-line articles. In one of these Stokov, in typical fashion, launched an attack on that great Khrushchevian sin--subjectivism--and described how that insidious quality manifests itself:

. . . . Subjectivism may appear in the modernization of history and then a man, let us say from the 1940's, begins to think like a 'prophet', anticipating the party in condemning the cult of personality . . . . Subjectivism can incidentally 'reappraise' crucial historical events--and then it turns out that kolkhoz construction from the very beginning even to this day was a 'fatal mistake.' Yielding to the widespread fashion--to portray mainly our failures in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War--subjectivism will dismally concentrate on the 'horrors' of our 'defeats,' even when a gradiose attack by the Soviet armies is under way, and ardently will expose the commanders as 'fools' and the sinister 'osobisty' (KGB).

In the same issue, A. Dymshits attacked the concept of abstract humanism,\* stating that it is impossible to approach in terms of abstract humanism such policies as war communism and collectivization, because it must not be forgotten that despite hard times progress was always being made.

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\*Also a favorite target of the Chinese.

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On 21 July Kazakhstanskaya Pravda attempted to shift blame for the excesses in collectivization to local officials, stating that the central committee had cautioned local organization against artificially forcing the rate of collectivization. This article, coming from the republic headed by Brezhnev-supporter Kunayev suggested that he probably sanctioned this approach and, therefore, felt that Brezhnev approved. A 17 August Pravda article also criticized those who argue that collectivization had to be imposed from above. It said that while the party did not wait for the development of a material-technical base, this base had been developed simultaneously.

#### Liberals Fight Back

Coincident with a brief upsurge in other areas of the cultural community, probably a combination of fear at the prevailing hard-line and relief because Stalin had not been formally rehabilitated, a number of anti-Stalin articles were published in the spring and summer of 1966. First of all there was a sharp upsurge in the rehabilitation program in May. Most interesting were two articles in Izvestiya, which had not carried rehabilitation articles since May 1965.\* One article stated that the historian V. Nevskiy was arrested in February 1935 on false charges and two years later was dead; the other was about the Uzbek leader, F. Khodzhayev\*\* and mentioned only his "tragic" death in 1938. Other articles appeared in Literaturnaya Rossiya and Kommunist Estonii on purge victims, and the Military History Journal carried an article which stated that the personality cult had harmed strategic theory because of the unjust reprisals against many who were best trained in military theory, including Tukhachevskiy.

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\*Pravda had halted its rehabilitation articles after Rumyantsev was replaced in September 1965.

\*\*Khodzhayev was executed in 1938 after his confession at the last of the big show trials. Only two other people who were involved in any of the three big trials, A. Ikramov and N. Krestinskiy, have been rehabilitated.

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For the first time since December 1965 Voprosy Istorii KPSS carried items on purge victims, although it now used a very conservative format. It mentioned Nevskiy and Kirov, but mentioned neither the purge of the former nor the assassination of the latter. Furthermore, the May issue carried an article which indirectly provided justification for the purges, by stating that the struggle with the "enemies of Leninism" had been instrumental in preventing differences within the party during the war. The article also criticized subjective errors which led to the deprecation of the party and people under the guise of criticizing the cult of personality.

After May the rehabilitations again dropped off, although the provincial press continued to be stubborn.\* Those articles which did appear carefully skirted any mention of the purges. For example, an article noting the death of R. Katanyan and signed by Anastas Mikoyan gave Katanyan's career until 1938 with no further elaboration. On 24 August Izvestiya discussed the events of 1935 and 1936, and mentioned Stalin only once--when he was held responsible for "violations of socialist legality" which did not alter the nature of the system. On 21 July Izvestiya had carried an article by Konstantin Simonov in which he cited the grave harm done the military by the purges. Throughout this period Izvestiya was consistently more moderate on the Stalin and cultural issues than was Pravda, perhaps a reflection of the government-party rivalry--i.e., Kosygin's relative moderation compared to Brezhnev's orthodox views.

\*Bakinskiy Rabochiy on 7 June carried an article on a former First Secretary of Azerbaydzhan, stating that his life was "tragically cut short" in 1938. A 14 July article in Kommunist Tadzhikistan carried the same wording on Rakhinbayev. In August Kommunist Armenia published an article on Marshal Gay, calling him one of the outstanding Armenian officers "ruined by slander during the years of the personality cult." The same issue published an item on the poet Vartanyan, closing with

. . . in 1937 the storm cloud, which was hanging over many persons also touched even the Communist poet Azasi Vartanyan.

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In July 1966 the Outline History of the Moscow Party Organization was signed to the press. While the history placed the blame for excesses in collectivization on local officials and praised Stalin's 1930 article "Dizzy With Success" for having stressed the impermissibility of using force to carry out collectivization it came down surprisingly hard on the crimes of Stalin. It criticized the

crude violations of Leninist norms and principles of party life and socialist legality, the willfulness and misuse of power, and the mass repressions against completely innocent Soviet people, engendered by the cult of Stalin's personality.

According to the history, Stalin deserved authority, but after the 17th congress he had begun to violate Leninist norms, and at the February-March 1937 plenum advanced the mistaken thesis that as socialism strengthens the class struggle intensifies:

This was said at a time when the exploiting classes were already liquidated . . . . This assertion served as a theoretical basis for illegal repressions against honest Soviet people. Enormous harm was caused to the party and the whole people by the political adventurists Yezhov and Beria, who subjected many honest officials to unjustified repressions.

This particular history also treated Khrushchev fairly kindly, quoting from a 1963 speech by him in which he stated that there would have been even worse repressions if everyone had agreed--implying that he and others had stood up to Stalin. The history stated that in general party organs were improved in Moscow after a December 1949 plenum; it was at that plenum that Khrushchev became first secretary of the oblast. It is not at all clear who was responsible for the publication of this history. Moscow city and oblast' leaders Yegorychev and Konotop were at this time pushing a much harder line than that suggested in the history. For example, while presenting a "balanced"

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view in some respects, the history cited shortcomings in the party in the 1940's, stating that there was not the proper struggle against dogmatism.

Noviy Mir continued to resist the re-Stalinizing pressure, as did several other journals. In August, for example, Noviy Mir published an article criticizing the 1938 decision of Stalin and Vyshinskiy to declare subsidiary activities of kolhkozoes illegal. This particular issue is still very much alive in the Soviet Union now, with the pragmatists supporting such activities. Several articles critical of Stalin's handling of collectivization were published in the spring and summer. The Ukrainian Historical Journal published two on the subject, one in April and one in July. The articles denied that Stalin's article "Dizzy With Success" had ended excesses in the countryside, attributing this instead to the work of Ukrainian party organizations. One of the articles stated that excessive haste and violations of the principle of voluntariness were among the biggest errors in the beginning of collectivization.

#### Revolt Of The Old Bolsheviks

In the summer of 1966 a meeting was held at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism to discuss the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which covered the period from March 1917-March 1918. The meeting was chaired by Pospelov, chairman of the institute and chief editor of the volume, and was attended by a group of Old Bolsheviks. Pospelov, in opening the meeting, described the difficulties in compiling the volume, stating that it had been necessary to overcome the "subjective layers which had been written in the previous ten years."

Following Pospelov's remarks a number of Old Bolsheviks rose to criticize the history and denounce Stalin. Several speakers attacked the praise given Stalin's official history, The Short Course, in the volume. One speaker claimed that he had spoken with Brezhnev protege Trapeznikov, head of the scientific and educational institution about this in April 1966, and that Trapeznikov had

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said he did not agree with the editorial board on this and that he would give corresponding instructions. The speaker stated that he would like to know why this had not been done.

Several speakers then rose to challenge Stalin's performance as a revolutionary. Numerous specific charges were made, including the statement that Stalin had been no better than Trotskiy. One speaker stated that Stalin and Voroshilov had wiped out many loyal military specialists, and another said that Stalin had fabricated charges against Lenin's closest workers. A man named Snegov, possibly the same man who had participated in the debate on the Nekrich book,\* launched perhaps the strongest attack:

It is said that one man cannot change as much as an entire army. Stalin proved that more could be destroyed by one man than by a whole army. He destroyed millions of people . . . . Affectionate mothers are defending the child Stalin is every way possible . . . . The thing boils down to the fact that some counted on having the 23rd Congress rehabilitate Stalin. That didn't happen and it won't happen! . . . . The 23rd Congress confirmed once again the lines of the 20th and 22nd Congresses. There is no return to the times of Stalin.

An old Bolshevik named Zorin attacked the methods of the meeting, charging that the previous day some young historians had not been permitted in the room. He charged that documents were hidden, and said that it must be revealed how Leninist norms had been perverted by Stalin:

Your conception is the conception of the Chinese leaders. You stand together with the bourgeois falsifiers. The history of the Party must not justify the perversions. You wrote that Trotskiy tried to replace Leninism with Trotskiyism, but you remain quiet about Stalin's having replaced Leninism with Stalinism. Now will the young people believe you; can they believe lies?

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\*See page 58 for further discussion.

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At the end of the meeting there were various comments from those who had helped frame the history. Bugayev, the head of the commission, said that in writing the history it was necessary to be guided by the decisions of the central committee on 30 June 1956. At this there were shouts that the 22nd Congress had declared Stalin a criminal and that this congress had not been abrogated. When Pospelov spoke and tried to maintain that Stalin's role had been mostly positive during this period, he was interrupted by shouts that he stop falsifying history.\* Publication of this volume of the history was very slow; it finally appeared in October 1967 and its publication was accompanied by a Pravda article, whose re-Stalinizing tone indicated that the efforts of the Old Bolsheviks had failed.

#### Leadership Shift Reflected in Stalin Issue

In September and October, Pravda Ukrainy, which for several years had published neo-Stalinist articles, carried a two-part article by G. Kikalov which evaluated the Stalin cult more critically than it had in the past. While he made the usual calls for emphasis on positive achievements and ignored the question of excesses in collectivization and the purges, Kikalov said that sometimes "arbitrary administrativeness was condoned," principles of free exchange of opinion were violated, and objective truth suffered as a result. He said that while it was only natural that people respected Stalin, who had properly fought the Trotskiyites and rightists, Stalin had begun to manifest some negative traits; he began to think of himself as infallible, made theoretical errors, and ignored collective leadership. It would appear that publication of this article in this neo-Stalinist journal was part of the campaign being started at this time by the Shelepin

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\*The original account of this meeting was carried in the underground journal Feniks 66, whose publisher Yuriy Galanskov was sentenced to 5 years in a labor camp in January 1968. The shortened version of the meeting was carried in the April issue of Survey, a London-based quarterly journal of Soviet and East European studies.

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faction. Their target was Brezhnev, who they feared was gaining too much strength and their weapon was the Stalin issue--pointing out the consequences that can flow from the concentration of power in the hands of one man. In general, neo-Stalinist attacks on Stalin concentrate on the abuses of collective leadership through the accumulation of power in the hands of a single man, whereas moderate anti-Stalin attacks include charges of repression and criticism of the purges.

On 1 November Brezhnev made his adoption of the re-Stalinizing policy complete when he referred to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary. This line was echoed rapidly by various publications. On 6 November an Izvestiya chronicle of Lenin's activities in November 1917 listed Stalin among those consulted by Lenin during the critical days of armed uprising in Moscow. The November issue of Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta credited Stalin as well as Lenin with authoring the regime's November 1917 declaration of the rights of nationalities. And Komsomolskaya Pravda on 6 November, published excerpts from Theodore Dreiser's 1928 book Dreiser Looks at Russia, in which he treated Stalin as a dedicated national leader and as a revolutionary figure concerned with the fate of humanity and the individual.

#### SUMMARY

Indications that a further step toward the neo-Stalinist position had been taken at the December 1965 plenum were substantiated in early 1966. A January Pravda article instructed historians to stop referring to the term period of the cult of personality and to take a positive view of the Stalin era. A similar article appeared shortly thereafter in a Moldavian paper, instructing propagandists of the correct view to take on the cult. The trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy in February, as well as the arrests of several other young intellectuals, indicated the start of an actively repressive policy toward dissident intellectuals.

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The decision to proceed with the trial of Daniel and Sinyavskiy and to impose harsh sentences must have been made by the Presidium, as the implications of this decision were important enough to warrant high-level consideration. Of the twelve members of the Presidium, at least seven must have supported the measure. Kosygin reportedly opposed it, Mikoyan presumably opposed it, and Podgornyy, in this subsequent statement at the congress that cultural matters should be dealt with through legislation, indicated that he would have opposed it. Suslov, Shelepin, Mazurov, and Shelest almost certainly supported the decision. Brezhnev must therefore have given his support and have taken with him the votes of at least two of the following--Kirilenko, Polyanskiy, Voronov, and Shvernik.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] At several pre-congress regional party meetings, high-level spokesmen indicated their support of a hard-line. Among those who expressed neo-Stalinist viewpoints were Masherov of Belorussia, Shelest of the Ukraine, and the First Secretary of Moldavia, Bodyul, who at one time may have served under Brezhnev in Moldavia. Leningrad chief Tolstikov urged that party influence on the creative intellectuals be strengthened. The most strident tones came from Georgia, where party secretary Sturua used the term cosmopolitanism, which under Stalin had been an anti-Semitic charge used to justify repression of the intellectuals; Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze also gave a hard-line speech.

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In addition, many articles which were written during this period, particularly on the subject of collectivization, reflected a coordinated policy of rehabilitating Stalin and his policies. Particularly ominous were the Stalinist terms which were resurrected. In addition to Sturua's use of the term cosmopolitanism, a February article on collectivization referred favorably to Stalin's long-discredited theory of the sharpening

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of the class struggle in the 1930's. And in February, the neo-Stalinist journal Oktyabr' referred to two rehabilitated purge victims as enemies of the people. This term had been condemned by Khrushchev in his secret speech.

When it opened in late March 1966, the 23rd Congress proved to be somewhat anticlimactic. Stalin was not rehabilitated and the only remaining vestige of a rehabilitation plan was the symbolic restoration of the terms Politburo and General Secretary. It seems likely that the decision not to proceed with public and formal rehabilitation was based on the violent reactions to the proposal, both at home and abroad. Various communist parties had indicated disagreement and the rumors had brought a frightened response from Soviet intellectuals, a group of whom bravely sent a letter of protest to Brezhnev urging that Stalin not be rehabilitated.

✓ Brezhnev emerged from the 23rd congress as clearly the first among equals; his acquisition of the title General Secretary had clearly strengthened his position. Although this was primarily a symbolic victory, it nonetheless served to set him apart from his colleagues and establish him as Stalin's legitimate heir. The fact that Brezhnev was the beneficiary of the policy of re-Stalinizing supports the view that he had supported the policy. However, a number of speakers at the congress, including Yegorychev and Moscow Oblast' First Secretary Konotop, gave much tougher speeches than that given by Brezhnev. Thus it would seem that in spite of Brezhnev's support of much of the neo-Stalinist position, pressure for even more repressive measures was being exerted by members of the neo-Stalinist faction.

Personnel changes made at the congress indicated that the moderates were continuing to lose ground. Mikoyan and Shvernik were dropped from the Politburo and Suslov associate Pelshe, the First Secretary of Latvia, was added. In addition Brezhnev-protége Kunayev, the First Secretary of Kazakhstan, and neo-Stalinist Masherov,

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the First Secretary of Belorussia, became candidate members of the Politburo. However, Shelepin was apparently assigned responsibility for light industry at the congress--a clear set-back for him also. Thus, the net gainer was Brezhnev.

In the months immediately after the congress, a conservative line prevailed, but the more extreme neo-Stalinist statements virtually ceased. Furthermore, while the intellectuals continued to write letters protesting the Daniel-Sinyavskiy trials and the generally orthodox line, they must have felt a certain amount of relief at the failure of the congress to rehabilitate Stalin. In addition, they might have felt that the retreat by the leadership on this issue had been brought about by their protests, a belief which might have encouraged them to draft further protests. Thus, still frightened by the prevailing conservative line, but hopeful that things might change, the liberals apparently decided to press ahead. In May there was a resurgence of rehabilitations and during the spring and summer a number of articles were published criticizing Stalin for his role in collectivization.

This liberal push was soon halted, however; the rehabilitations ended by summer and articles critical of Stalin were quickly outnumbered by articles exonerating him. As the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow approached, Stalin's military image was further improved, and prewar miscalculations and errors were increasingly rationalized. One exception to this was a June article by Marshal Grechko, reportedly a Brezhnev man, in which he attacked Stalin and charged the prewar leadership, both political and military, with ineptitude. The purpose of this article may have been to stress the need for more emphasis on contemporary military defenses; he may well have been annoyed by the adoption at the May plenum of an enormous agricultural program. Grechko's point may have been that the military should not be slighted and his method was to show the disastrous

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results of ignoring military needs.

Friction in the leadership continued throughout the summer. This was most interestingly demonstrated in a debate which took place in the press during the summer and fall. Several articles were written by neo-Stalinists, stressing the importance of collective leadership and warning against the dangers inherent in the imposition of one-man rule. An article in the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy criticized Stalin's tendency to think of himself as infallible and to ignore collective leadership. These articles revealed the concern felt by the Shelepin faction over their leader's decline and Brezhnev's growing strength.

The apprehension of the neo-Stalinists was shared by the liberals who also had a vested interest in preventing Brezhnev from acquiring further power. During the summer two articles in Izvestiya also defended collective leadership strongly. Izvestiya, the government paper, had been consistently moderate during the period, possibly reflecting Kosygin's views. These articles defending collective leadership, which used the Stalin issue, suggested that Kosygin and the moderates were also very uneasy about Brezhnev's growing strength.

These attacks by both moderates and neo-Stalinists on Brezhnev's position, were answered fairly quickly. A Pravda editorial and an article by Brezhnev protege Kunayev both emphasized the need for responsibility and discipline, and quoted Lenin to the effect that irresponsibility must not be allowed to hide under references to collectivity; Kunayev also stressed the primacy of individual leadership. Furthermore, on 1 November, Brezhnev pushed even further the issue of Stalin. By referring to Stalin as an "ardent revolutionary", he reinforced his own claim to be Stalin's heir and by implication defended the concept of one-man rule.

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DECEMBER 1965

APRIL 1966

CPSU PRESIDIUUMCPSU POLITBUROFull MembersFull Members

BREZHNEV  
KIRILENKO  
KOSYGIN  
MAZUROV  
MIKOYAN<sup>1</sup>  
PODGORNYI  
POLYANSKIY  
SHELEPIN  
SHELEST  
SHVERNIK<sup>1</sup>  
SUSLOV  
VORONOV

BREZHNEV  
KIRILENKO  
KOSYGIN  
MAZUROV  
PELSHE<sup>4</sup>  
PODGORNYI  
POLYANSKIY  
SHELEPIN  
SHELEST  
SUSLOV  
VORONOV

Candidate MembersCandidate Members

DEMICHEV  
GRISHIN  
MZHAVANADZE  
RASHIDOV  
SHCHERBITSKIY<sup>2</sup>  
USTINOV  
YEFREMOV<sup>1</sup>

DEMICHEV  
GRISHIN  
KUNAYEV<sup>4</sup>  
MASHEROV<sup>4</sup>  
MZHAVANADZE  
RASHIDOV  
SHCHERBITSKIY  
USTINOV

CPSU SECRETARIATCPSU SECRETARIAT

ANDROPOV  
BREZHNEV  
DEMICHEV  
KAPITONOV<sup>2</sup>  
KULAKOV<sup>3</sup>  
PODGORNYI<sup>1</sup>  
PONOMAREV  
RUDAKOV  
SHELEPIN  
SUSLOV  
USTINOV

ANDROPOV  
BREZHNEV  
DEMICHEV  
KAPITONOV  
KULAKOV  
PONOMAREV  
RUDAKOV<sup>5</sup>  
SHELEPIN  
SUSLOV  
USTINOV

1. Dropped in April 1966.

3. Elected September 1965.

2. Elected in December 1965.

4. Elected in April 1966.

5. Died in July 1966.

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NEO-STALINIST LINE ADOPTED

The 50th Anniversary Year

November 1966-December 1967

LEADERSHIP

Hard Line Dominates; Dissension Continues

Following Brezhnev's indication in early November that he favored further restoration of Stalin's name, a number of leaders rushed to follow suit. Azerbaydzhan First Secretary Akhundov, Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan, and, of course, Georgian First Secretary Mzhavanadze all mentioned Stalin favorably in February 1967. In the last two months of 1966 both Shelest and Yegorychev once again expressed their typically neo-Stalinist views, indicating that this neo-Stalinist faction continued to push. In a speech at the Fifth Ukrainian Writers Congress, Shelest called for more vigilance and militance toward the enemy. He stated that if the enemy praised you, you must have made a political mistake. According to Pravda Ukrainy, Shelest recalled the 1965 central committee decree criticizing Khar'kov Oblast' (Podgornyy's old domain) and indicated that there were still shortcomings there, a clear slap at Podgornyy. On 6 December Yegorychev spoke on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Moscow; he had only praise for Stalin's role.

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During this period there continued to be articles on the subject of collective leadership and criticism within the party. The most significant of these was a March article by Petrenko in Voprosy Istorii KPSS. Petrenko argued that collective leadership and a scientific approach help prevent but cannot exclude serious mistakes and that Lenin had considered honest acknowledgement and correction of mistakes as a sign of the seriousness of the party, its moral strength, and its ability to implement revolutionary reorganizations. For example:

The frank, bold statement on the serious mistakes and distortions, committed as a result of the personality cult of Stalin, which was made by our party at its own initiative can serve as an example of resolute criticism and self-criticism.

The 20th Party Congress resolutely subjected these mistakes to fundamental criticism. The party began step by step to correct them . . . .

Petrenko stated that every party member has the right to criticize any other Communist no matter what position he holds, and that persons guilty of suppressing criticism should be punished--even expelled from the party. Petrenko seemed clearly to be indicating his strong support for current criticism of party members, at any level, implying that this was directed at high-ranking people--possibly Brezhnev.

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However, Petrenko's concept of criticism was limited. He quoted Lenin to the effect that "if freedom of criticism means freedom to defend capitalism, then we will crush it." And he stated that it was necessary to take a critical look at the past, but that this look should not be negative:

. . . For instance, many historians and writers are now striving to interpret in a critical manner the time during which the harmful consequences of the personality cult of Stalin had a negative influence on the development of Soviet society. This is a necessary step in the further development of historical science and artistic creativity. The task is not easy, but is of the highest degree of importance. Incompatible with its implementation, however, are the attempts to distort our past in a one-sided manner, in a distorted mirror, as just a solid chain of mistakes and shortcomings.

Thus Petrenko's article, while using the Stalin issue to illustrate the need for criticism, was conservative in emphasis, suggesting that it came from the neo-Stalinist faction which must have considered itself on the defensive at this time.

### Leaders Speak

On 23 February First Deputy Defense Minister Grechko, in an Izvestiya article, completely exonerated the party leadership of blame for failing to prepare for World War II. Less than a year before, in June 1966, he had been quite critical of prewar preparations. Now he stated that

In connection with the growing threat of an armed attack the party and government adopted the necessary measures to further strengthen the Soviet Army. In the period between 1 January 1939 and 1 June 1941 the numerical strength of the armed forces increased almost 2.5 times. The formation of mechanized corps, aviation divisions, and new artillery and anti-tank units began in 1940-1941, but unfortunately by the outbreak of the war they had not yet been fully supplied with new material equipment.

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In April Grechko became USSR Minister of Defense, reportedly with Brezhnev's backing, and in a 9 May article in Pravda he completely explained away the initial setbacks of the war:

. . . Encouraged by the reactionary circles of the Western powers, Hitler at the time of the attack on the Soviet Union had enslaved most European countries and had forced their manpower and industrial resources to serve his predatory plans. As a result, fascist Germany invaded the territory of our country with an enormous already mobilized and powerful army. Not a single state could have resisted such pressure. Only a state born by the Great October and only a people who had liberated themselves from the fetters of capitalism were strong enough to engage in a singlehanded struggle against such a formidable enemy and achieve a brilliant victory.

In the spring several members of the hierarchy referred in speeches to the state of culture in the Soviet Union. In his March election speech, Brezhnev cited shortcomings in creative work and stated that criticism of these shortcomings was directed solely at the fruitful development of culture and that this was a concern which the party manifests unflinching and constantly. While still more moderate than statements by neo-Stalinists such as Shelest and Yegorychev, this was Brezhnev's strongest statement up to this time on the subject of party control of the arts.

In late April two somewhat different attitudes toward cultural matters were expressed by Kirilenko and Yegorychev. Kirilenko in the past had expressed both moderate and pro-Brezhnev sentiments. In November 1966 he had given a speech in which he strongly praised Brezhnev for his wartime activities. Now, on 22 April, he stated simply that Soviet literature and art were flowering. Two days later, in Pravda, Yegorychev warned against negative attitudes and called for the strengthening of ideological work. He stated that one cannot for a minute forget that

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communism is being built in circumstances of a sharp struggle of two ideologies, and that malicious attacks on the revolution and falsification of historical events had intensified. He stated that Soviet history must be evaluated correctly and he casually dismissed the crimes of the Stalin era:

Of course, now everything is clear, as they say, looking back. Apparently some things could have been done better perhaps and with less expenditure of forces . . . . At one time in our country so much was said about errors and mistakes that some people . . . could get the impression that all we have done is make mistakes . . . . We must have a more exacting attitude than ever before toward everything that is put out in publications, that is presented in exhibits, that is put out on screens and on stages of theaters and is secured in concert halls. The role of Communist creative organs grows especially in this.

Thus, whereas Kirilenko had indicated that all was well, Yegorychev was full of accusations and warnings that the party would exert even more pressure upon the intellectuals. This difference between these two speeches suggests that while Brezhnev and his followers supported re-Stalinizing and a generally orthodox position, they were being pushed to proceed still more rapidly toward more repressive measures. This pressure still being exerted by the neo-Stalinists was apparently part of their ongoing effort to gain the initiative in their struggle for the leadership.

↓ The Fourth All-Union Writers Congress finally opened in May, having been postponed several times previously. The party's message to the congress demanded of literature well-developed ideological criteria, emphasized party control of the arts, and warned against western influence. Podgorny was the highest-ranking speaker at the congress and the tone of his speech was orthodox, although he did not call for further party control of the arts or do any threatening. He discussed the fierce

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struggle taking place between the two social systems and said that ideological enemies try to disarm the Soviet people. He said that loyalty to the truth of life and the indelible principles of party-mindedness enable writers to write vivid history of the great deeds of the Soviet people. On the other hand, he had only praise for Soviet writers, and said that there was every reason to expect that the writers union would continue to champion party-mindedness and people-mindedness. Thus, he seemed to be saying that any control necessary should be exercised by the writers union, a clear difference from Yegorychev's threat that the party should do more.

In a speech on 12 June Mzhavanadze called for the purification of party ranks and used a Stalin quotation to support his point. Whether or not he was calling for a purge of impure party members is not certain, but such a call is implied, making this a very threatening speech:

First, I would like to draw your attention to the need for a most decisive struggle for the purity of party ranks . . . . The penetration of the party by unworthy members has not yet been overcome . . . . I will cite in this connection the words of I.V. Stalin, who said that there was nothing higher than the title of a member of the party, the founder and leader of which was Comrade Lenin. He also said, "It is not given to everyone to be a party member . . ." This means that the door of the party must not be open to all but only to worthy people, entirely dedicated to the cause of the party.

In June 1967 the theses of the central committee for the 50th anniversary were published. They contained some criticism of the cult of Stalin, although they presented the 50 years of Soviet rule as a period of unbroken progress. To the extent that they reintroduced some criticism of the cult, however, they differed from the January central committee decree on preparations for the anniversary. That decree had projected an overwhelmingly favorable image of the entire course of Soviet history.

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There was no mention of Stalin or criticism of his reign-- not even a reference to difficulties at the start of the war. Thus the return of some criticism was a definite shift.\*

### Shelepin's Defeat and Reaction To It

In the spring and early summer of 1967 Shelepin suffered a series of defeats in the form of personnel shifts. Goryunov, the head of TASS and a Shelepin man, was replaced in April. In the same month Grechko became Minister of Defense, replacing Malinovskiy, who had died two weeks earlier.

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In May Shelepin's protege Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief by Andropov.\*\* While the KGB had had several failures right before this shift-- including the defection of Stalin's daughter--it seems clear that the firing of Semichastnyy was primarily a blow at Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction. Also in May, Pospelov was relieved as Chairman of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, a position he had held since 1949. While Pospelov's allegations are not clear, the timing of his removal and the fact that his journal had published Petrenko's March article which was apparently anti-Brezhnev, suggests that he was considered sympathetic to Shelepin.

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A crisis in the leadership occurred following the Middle East debacle in early June. At the end of that month a party plenum was held and Brezhnev apparently reported on the situation. A number of regional leaders (all republic first secretaries except Masherov who had previously indicated his neo-Stalinist tendencies) rose

\*See page 98 for further discussion.

\*\*In June Andropov was taken off the Secretariat, but became a candidate member of the Politburo, the highest position held by a KGB chief since Beriya's death.

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to support Brezhnev. However, Yegorychev, in his speech, reportedly attacked the regime's handling of the situation, possibly arguing that the Soviet Union should have taken a stronger position. Yegorychev's apparent support of a harder foreign policy provides an example of the correlation between these policies and the Stalin issue. Yegorychev, one of the most outspoken members of the neo-Stalinist faction, was also supporting a very hard foreign policy.

Several days after his attack, the Moscow city committee relieved Yegorychev of his positions and appointed Viktor Grishin, who had previously headed the Soviet trade union organization. The following month Shelepin replaced Grishin as head of Soviet trade unions, indicating a further decline in his fortunes and strongly suggesting that he was being punished along with Yegorychev\* for the latter's move at the congress. At the September plenum Shelepin was released from his position on the secretariat; however, he retained his position on the Politburo.

Following Yegorychev's removal and Shelepin's demotion, a group of articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members to criticize. These seemed clearly to be reactions to the firing of Yegorychev and indicated the degree of support for Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction within the party apparatus. They may also have represented the fear of various second-level officials that they might meet Yegorychev's fate. For example, the first article was by Georgiy Popov, Yegorychev's counterpart in Leningrad City. The Leningrad party organization had long been hard-line; now it was clearly siding with Yegorychev and, by implication, Shelepin. Popov emphasized the right to criticize and the dangers inherent in the tendency of some leaders to suppress criticism from below and to attempt one-man leadership.

The second article was by Petrenko, who had previously written several articles defending collective leadership and the right to criticize. The article was published in Partiynaya Zhizn' in September and was particularly interesting as Petrenko again raised the personality cult spectre, even though he seemed to be defending Yegorychev, a neo-Stalinist. Petrenko stated

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\*Yegorychev was subsequently named Deputy Minister of Tractor-Agricultural Machine Building.

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that the party theses issued in June had resolutely condemned the cult of Stalin's personality which had expressed itself in the raising up of the role of one person which, he said, is alien to Marxism-Leninism and a deviation from the principle of collective leadership. He went on to defend collective leadership, and to say that the party secretary must not misuse his position. In praising criticism he stated that "cases where certain officials [/Brezhnev?] incorrectly take criticism from below [/Yegorychev?] are far from having been eliminated."

The third article in this series also appeared in Partiynaya Zhizn' in the same month; this too is significant as Khaldeyev, a close Shelepin associate, had been appointed chief editor of that journal in the spring of 1966. In this article Masherov, the Belorussian First Secretary and apparently a member of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction, quoted from Brezhnev's speech at the 23rd Congress in support of criticism and self-criticism. According to Masherov, each party member should have an opportunity to express his judgments, expose shortcomings, and work to eliminate these shortcomings. He said that an important place in the development of criticism is occupied by central committee plenums [/such as the June plenum at which Yegorychev expressed his criticism?] and that a correct response to criticism is necessary. Critics must be listened to and their criticism must be followed by the correction of errors. Masherov went on to say that critics too have a responsibility and should not be impatient, and should not engage in criticism for the sake of criticism or in order to achieve some personal egotistical goals. However, Masherov left little doubt of where his allegiance lay. He stated that the desire of a leader to guard himself from criticism could lead to violations of Leninist norms and he closed with a case study. He cited a bureau head [/Brezhnev?] who was justifiably criticized for shortcomings. But the bureau head was offended and took revenge by accusing the critic [/Yegorychev?] of irresponsibility and having him transferred to a lower paying job.

A fourth article dealing with this subject appeared on 19 September in Sovetskaya Rossiya; this was written by Gorkiy First Secretary Katushev, who has been close to

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Brezhnev,\* and its tone was quite different from that of the other three. Katushev did not emphasize collective leadership nor did he stress the right to criticize; rather he concentrated on the need to convince through argumentation and reasonable plemics. He stated that sometimes opponents act without restraint and hurl accusations at each other, a situation which results in even greater divergence of viewpoints. He stated that in order to convince someone it is necessary to use logic and reason--that no organizational measures or administrative threats can force him to change his mind. While these words might have been directed at Brezhnev, Katushev's closing statements supported the view that the main target was Yegorychev and the neo-Stalinists. Katushev stated that freedom of discussion is permitted only until a decision is adopted, and that then that decision must be carried out. He stated that sometimes a complication arises when a man who agreed to a decision and voted for it, subsequently does not implement it--a possible reference to Yegorychev's criticism of Middle East policy after the fact. Katushev closed by stating that conviction and exactingness must be joined, and he quoted Lenin to the effect that after the attempt to convince fails, then force may be used.

It is ironic that in the first three of these articles, written in defense of Yegorychev (and by implication Shelepin as well) by his neo-Stalinist allies, liberal arguments were used. Support of a Stalinist position carries with it implied approval of the right of the leader to get rid of his opponents, and the need of the Shelepin group was the opposite--to emphasize the rights of those not in control to attack with impunity. As a result, a somewhat bizarre situation arose in which supporters of Yegorychev, one of the most fanatic re-Stalinizers, were forced to resort to arguments for collective leadership, the right of criticism, and even outright condemnation of the cult of personality, in an effort to safeguard their

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\*Katushev's appointment as Gorkiy First Secretary had been personally supervised by Brezhnev in December 1965; Katushev had indicated strong support for Brezhnev at the 23rd Congress and Brezhnev personally defended Gorkiy Oblast' in January 1967 after it had been criticized in Pravda in 1966.

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
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
own survival. In defense of Brezhnev, Katushev responded with an article stating in effect that the right to argue is limited to the period before a decision is made, but that then there must be unity and compliance.

Year End Atmosphere Repressive




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The 50th anniversary of Soviet rule was celebrated in November and was unsensational. As suggested by the January decree on preparations for the anniversary and the



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theses issued in June, the entire period of Soviet history was treated overwhelmingly favorably. Even the cult, which had been condemned in the theses, was not mentioned, Brezhnev gave the major speech on this occasion. He did not mention Stalin by name, but was favorable by implication. He praised the 18th Congress of 1939 and stated that the party had foreseen the possibility of a military clash with the forces of imperialism at this time and had prepared the country and the people for defense. He admitted that there had been miscalculations, but explained these away on the basis of the pioneering role of the Soviet regime.

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**INTELLECTUALS****Pressure Increases; Protests Continue**

Following Brezhnev's favorable mention of Stalin in November 1966, pressure on intellectuals to conform was to increase. However, liberal intellectuals continued to make their feelings and apprehensions known. On 27 December Literaturnaya Gazeta published a fascinating article by A. Yanov, which contained a strong liberal appeal for a truthful examination of the past. Yanov called for a clear interpretation of past and present, and stated that problems need investigation--not indignation. He argued that an examination of the past is a prerequisite to obtaining freedom from the consequences of those mistakes:

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'A nation which has forgotten its past runs the risk of experiencing it again,' said some philosopher.

Yanov then attacked an Oktyabr' article by K. Bukovskiy.

K. Bukovskiy writes: 'Regardless of what we were--blind or "hypnotized"--and regardless of the origin of the "hypnosis"--in those years we not only did not lie, but we had no doubts about anything.' And that is all! Black on white. But wait a minute, esteemed Konstantin Ivanovich, how about the investigation of the mechanism of that gigantic illusion, that unprecedented historical mystification, and that "hypnosis" which you yourself were talking about,-- has it been completed, exhausted, signed and filed away in the archives? So what gives you the right to offer your personal opinion and your personal experiences as the final result of the investigation as a categorical imperative? How do you know that 'we' did not doubt?

In December Soviet intellectuals again expressed their apprehension at orthodox trends, this time in a letter which warned against confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of a decree published in September 1966, extending Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code to cover literary protests.\* The letter was signed by nine academicians, various members of the intellectual community, and a number of Old Bolsheviks. It stated that the signers considered the adoption of the decree unjustified and that the decree raised the danger of "violations of socialist legality" and the "creation of an atmosphere of suspicion and denunciation" (i.e., a return to Stalinist methods).

The concern expressed both by Yanov, who was in effect stating that the refusal to continue to probe the crimes of the Stalin era could well foreshadow a return to Stalinist methods, and of the intellectuals, who were protesting what they considered to be the sign of such

\*See Appendix Items C for text of decree and D for text of protest.

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a return, was valid. The year 1967 opened with a harsh clamp-down on the dissident intellectuals. In mid-January Yuriy Galanskov, editor of Feniks (Phoenix) 1966, a secret typewritten literary-publicist journal,\* was arrested, as were three of his co-workers. On 22 January a demonstration held to protest these arrests resulted in the arrests of more people, including art critic Igor Golomshtok, who had defended Sinyavskiy at his trial, and Viktor Khaustov, who was subsequently sentenced to four years in a labor camp. Khaustov was the first person convicted and sentenced under the new section of Article 190 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Others arrested at this time were tried in August 1967.\*\*

On 24 January it was reported from Moscow that Aleksandr Ginsburg had been arrested for compiling the Belaya Kniga (White Book), a collection of documents on the Daniel Sinyavskiy case. Ginsburg had sent a copy to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1966. Ginsburg and Galanskov were tried in January 1968.\*\*\* In March, according to Posev,\*\*\*\* a number of young people were arrested in Leningrad on charges of having organized a circle connected with emigre groups under the cover of a philosophical circle. Posev reported that a trial was being prepared for some of these people, and that as a result of preliminary investigations, 11 of the 25 had been sent to psychiatric hospitals or released under surveillance.

The general tightening of policy was also revealed in the closing down of two art exhibits in January. One

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\*Among the items published in Feniks was the previously mentioned "Discussion of the Third Volume of the History of the CPSU."

\*\*See page 93 for further discussion of the trial.

\*\*\*See page 94 for further discussion of this trial.

\*\*\*\*An anti-Soviet emigre publishing organization in West Germany.

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was an unofficial, unsanctioned exhibit of unorthodox art and the second was a display of Chagal paintings.\* On 23 January the Fifth Plenum of the USSR Union of Artists was held and dogmatic speeches were given by the union's acting head, F. Belashova, and by USSR Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva. Furtseva had been quite moderate in previous speeches and stood out for her moderate statement at the 23rd congress. Her shift at this time suggests that she had been given clear instructions about prevailing policy.

#### Campaign Against Noviy Mir

During the first few months of 1967 there was considerable evidence that the liberal journal Noviy Mir was in trouble. The first indication came in a 27 January Pravda editorial--its first major editorial on culture in over a year. In a personnel change in January Kunitsyn, a consistent hard-liner and formerly deputy chief of the central committee's cultural section, became editor of Pravda's Department of Art and Literature; he may have been responsible for this editorial which criticized both Noviy Mir and Oktyabr', but was much more harsh in its comments on the former.

On 1 February Literaturnaya Gazeta published an article which followed the line of Pravda's editorial. This journal had reportedly been taken over by a dogmatic group in December, although Chakovskiy remained as chief editor; in January the paper began a new format. In this article Noviy Mir was sharply criticized. The journal was also attacked at a session of the Board of the Union of Writers during this period. At the meeting various speakers pointed out the "substantial ideological and artistic errors, over-simplification, and shortcomings in the journal's activities."

An 8 March article by Tvardovskiy in Literaturnaya Gazeta revealed, however, that he would not give in easily.

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\*In February three of the artists who had participated in the exhibit were called to a meeting of their combine and "condemned."

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He stated that "We are attentive and will be attentive in the future to criticism," but only if this criticism

proceeds from the lofty concepts of the literature of a socialist society, worthy of the great traditions of Russian realism bequeathed by the classics.

His omission of the adjective "socialist" modifying "realism" indicated his continued opposition to the official line. In March, while in Italy attending a writers meeting, Tvardovskiy stated that the concept of realism did not need to be explained by adjectives.

Publication of Noviy Mir was held up during the early part of 1967. During January there were reports that the central committee was trying to force changes in the editorial board by removing A. Dementyev and B. Zaks, two assistant editors upon whom Tvardovskiy reportedly relied heavily. The party central apparatus was said to be reluctant to have a scandal but determined to weaken Tvardovskiy. In March, when the first issue of the journal finally appeared, Dementyev and Zaks had been removed from the board and three new members had been added. The two removed were definitely liberals; the leanings of the new three was less clear.

In May Yunost' published two poems by Tvardovskiy, both applicable to freedom and the attacks made against him. The first read

I myself inquire and find  
All my own mistakes.  
I shall remember them  
Without a given libretto.  
There is no sense--I am a grown man--  
In laughable self-defense.  
But please, don't hang on my soul.  
Don't breath down my neck.

In the second, more allegorical poem, Tvardovskiy described his birth--under the fir trees in the forest--saying it is

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the legend that any baby born there will not be touched by the wolves [read censors].

Alas, ignoring that special birthright  
Which the forest grants,  
With what gusto,  
With how much fury  
The wolves do eat me.  
All kinds of them eat,  
But I still come from under the fir tree:  
They have not eaten me up.

In spite of Tvardovskiy's appeals and claims that he had not been "eaten up," he had clearly been weakened during the early part of 1967.

#### Liberal Efforts Rebuffed

In January 1967 the Ukrainian Komsomol's literary, socio-political journal, Dnipro, published an article by its editor-in-chief Yuriy Mushketik. He described the literary upsurge following the 1917 revolution, and said that it was followed by

watchfulness, silence and decline, empty proclaiming, searching for deviations and isms, along with singlemindedness and vulgarization. There were fewer and fewer theoretical and debating articles. Prose was petty and poetry was shrieking. The lively spurt caused by the wave of general popular patriotism after the war, and again the clogging up of the literary channel. And finally, the dethroning of the cult of personality, the revival of certain earlier violated principles of Soviet and party life and the further development of democracy, which opened a wide road for the development of Soviet literature . . . .

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Dnipro was quickly rebuffed for publishing such an article. On 25 February Molodoy Ukrainy attacked the journal and said that it had been criticized by the Ukrainian Komsomol central committee.

Another example of a republic journal being censured is that of Zvezda Vostoka, the organ of the Uzbek Union of Writers. In its first four issues of 1967 the journal published a number of works by semi-controversial authors. In one of these Konstantin Simonov reviewed For Whom the Bell Tolls, and alluded to the purges. The fifth and sixth issues of the journal did not carry any such works in spite of promises that it would do so, and in August, the editor V. Kostyria, was reportedly dismissed.

In April and May, in the weeks preceding the Fourth Writers Congress, the efforts by the liberals to stage a comeback were overshadowed by the orthodox articles being published. On 19 April an editorial in Literaturnaya Gazeta made a strong demand for unity and central control over the arts. It used as its reference the 35th anniversary of the party resolution which banned all independent literary organizations and forced writers into a single, tightly-controlled writers union. Similarly, Pravda published two threatening articles on the eve of the congress. One implied that those who did not respond properly to criticism might well lose their jobs, and the other, one of whose authors was Kunitsyn, called for more aggressive criticism of incorrect concepts. This article proposed the establishment of an institution of "readers' opinions" to help those involved in publishing works to deepen the educational influence of literature and art; in other words they proposed the establishment of still another control organization to weed out "incorrect concepts."

Originally scheduled for the spring of 1966, the Fourth Writers Congress had been postponed twice before it finally opened in late May 1967.

the congress had been put off because of dissidence and "hundreds" of writers had been arrested in Leningrad and Kiev in the weeks before the congress. An orthodox line dominated at the congress and the most interesting

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episode occurred behind the scenes. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn circulated a letter to the delegates strongly condemning censorship in the Soviet Union and describing his own persecution at the hands of the authorities.\* In addition, 79 intellectuals circulated a petition calling for discussion of Solzhenitsyn's letter.

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In June 1967 Grani\*\* published a letter sent by an anonymous person in Moscow, stating that even Solzhenitsyn himself had given up hope of being published.

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Solzhenitsyn's letter was followed in the early summer of 1967 by a number of protests, concerning censorship. The intellectuals had undoubtedly been frightened by increasing threats of tightened control as well as by the actual clamp-down on liberal journals and dissident intellectuals. It seems likely that they were encouraged to mount their attack when they did because of the defeat of Shelepin's neo-Stalinist faction in the spring and early summer.

On 19 June a scheduled trip to New York by the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy was suddenly cancelled. Voznesenskiy, obviously angry, sent a letter to Pravda in which he described the "atmosphere of blackmail, confusion, and provocation" in which he had been living. A copy of this letter was sent to the West and printed in the New York Times.\*\*\* On 2 July Voznesenskiy appeared at the Taganka Theater and read a poem attacking censorship; two days later he was reportedly called before a special meeting of the Board of the Union of Writers and put under pressure to withdraw the comments in his letter and poem. He refused to do so even though he was censured and threatened with expulsion from the union.\*\*\*\*

\*See Appendix Item E.

\*\*The quarterly journal of Posev.

\*\*\*See Appendix Item F.

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On 30 June Komsomolskaya Pravda carried an article by Pravda correspondent Burlatskiy and a former secretary of the Komsomol Karpinskiy. These two men attacked censorship in the theater and strongly implied their support of freedom to criticize. They attacked those who avoid discussing certain phenomena because it might put the system in an unfavorable light, stating that these people sacrifice real political interests--the improvement of Soviet society--for the sake of improperly understood propaganda interests. They argued that art is obligated to intrude into life and touch all its aspects. They said that Lenin's formula for guiding creative work

definitely excludes a secret and narrow departmental approach which is never guaranteed against a subjective bias . . . .

Publication of this liberal article in the organ of the Komsomol, an organization headed by Shelepin protege Sergey Pavlov indicates that the neo-Stalinist faction had allied itself with the liberals on the issue of censorship, as well as on the subject of the right to criticize. The publication of this article coincided with the publication of three articles defending collective leadership and freedom to criticize which were published following Yegorychev's dismissal and Shelepin's setback.

This particular article was decisively rebuffed only a week after its publication. On 8 July Komsomolskaya Pravda itself, in an editorial, rejected the article, calling it erroneous and stating that it contradicted party principles.

The Komsomol Central Committee having examined the article . . . has found that the publication of the article was a crude ideological mistake on the part of the Komsomolskaya Pravda editorial board.

The editorial then quoted Brezhnev's comments on party guidance of the arts, made at the 23rd Congress. Thus, this attempt to challenge Brezhnev, made in the form of

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a liberal article but apparently sanctioned by the neo-Stalinists, was rejected immediately, undoubtedly at the bidding of high-level officials.

### Year Ends With Harsh Policy

In the fall of 1967 the ominous tendencies continued. On 30 August Vladimir Bukovskiy and two others arrested in January for protesting the arrests of Galanskov and his co-workers went on trial. Bukovskiy, who said he had organized the demonstration was sentenced to three years and the two others to one year each. Bukovskiy did not plead guilty at his trial, although the Soviet press indicated that he had; on the contrary he made a spirited plea in his own behalf and attacked the manner in which the whole trial had been conducted. The text of his plea was attached to a letter sent by Pavel Litvinov to four Soviet newspapers, as well as to the French and Italian party papers. In his letter Litvinov, the grandson of Maxim Litvinov and a physicist, described a warning he had received from the KGB not to become involved in any reporting on the Bukovskiy trial.\* Litvinov defied this order and has subsequently participated in the drafting of several protests.

[redacted] On 22 September the head of Moscow City party's cultural section, Solovyeva, called for more control by theater party organizations over theater repertories:

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There are cases when it is necessary for all the members of the party bureau to convince one director or another that he must review his selection of plays or his outline and at times even replace a performer.

In October a joint plenum of the boards of cultural unions and organizations of the USSR and RSFSR was held, and a very dogmatic line dominated. Ye. Belashova stated that the artist must take a side in the struggle for ideologies and that "even silence can be treason."

\*See Appendix Item G.

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The 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution came and went in November and there was no indication that the prevailing repressive line would lift. In fact, if there was any shift in policy line in the months after the anniversary, it was toward a still more orthodox line. In October and November Oktyabr' published a novel by Kochetov in which Stalin was viewed as a very positive, though fairly minor, figure and the use of terror received implied approval.

Even more threatening than orthodox articles, however, were the continuing arrests and trials of intellectuals. In mid-December there was a report that four people were being tried in Leningrad on the serious charge of having participated in an armed terrorist network trying to overthrow the Soviet state. This trial had reportedly grown out of the arrest in early 1967 of 25 intellectuals connected with the philosophy department at the University of Leningrad. Many rumors circulated in Moscow, including the report that similar groups had been discovered in the Ukraine and another that the case was so serious that the central committee had met to consider it. Other reported trials included one involving six youths in Moscow charged with distributing anti-Soviet leaflets and one involving a student charged with writing an allegedly anti-Soviet film script.

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In January 1968 the four individuals arrested the previous January--Ginsburg, Galanskov, Dobrovolskiy, and Lashkova, went on trial. In connection with this particular case, several petitions were reportedly circulated. The first was said to be signed by about 100 members of the intellectual community and was sent to the Procurator General; it requested assurances that the trial would be

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public. The second petition was reportedly signed by 44 intellectuals and charged that the long imprisonment of the four persons without trial was in violation of the criminal code of the Soviet Union. In addition, Litvinov and the wife of the imprisoned author, Yuriy Daniel denounced the trial in a letter which was published in the West.\* In what they termed an appeal to world opinion, they condemned the manner in which the trial had been held and demanded a new trial. Litvinov was subsequently fired from his position as a physics instructor. Two other petitions were reportedly circulated with respect to this trial; one was an appeal by 30 intellectuals and the other a petition of 12 who wished to appear as defense witnesses. In December there were reports of another petition, this one signed by 180 Moscow intellectuals who urged that a law be adopted which would implement the constitution's pledge of freedom of the press. All of these pleas were to no avail; the trial of the four was not public and heavy sentences were imposed. Ginzburg and Galanskov received seven and five year sentences respectively; Dobrovolskiy, who turned state's evidence, received a two-year sentence, and Lashkova, who had merely typed for the group, received a one-year sentence.

Thus, during the early part of 1968 there was considerable evidence that a very harsh policy prevailed--the harshest policy since the death of Stalin--and that repression of intellectuals who dared to voice opinions which deviated from the party line would continue. Official sanction was put on this policy with the central committee resolution passed at the April 1968 plenum; this resolution called for a further tightening of ideological pressure.

## STALIN THEMES

### Stalin Era Whitewashed

The continued shift toward more and more orthodox views, revealed in the arrests of dissident intellectuals in early 1967, was also reflected in the new extremes reached in extolling the Stalin era. In November and December, on the eve of the anniversary of the Battle of Moscow, numerous articles and speeches were published

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praising Stalin for his leadership at this time of crisis. In a January article in Molodaya Gvardiya, N. Mikhaylov, possibly the chairman of the State Committee for Publishing and a Shelepin protege, described Komsomol unity during the war and attributed this to Stalin's inspiring leadership. Mikhaylov stated that Stalin must have known of Hitler's designs, for with his experience and hatred of fascism he would not have treated reports of the planned attack carelessly. But he also knew what Hitler's strength was, so he tried up until the last minute to ward off the approaching war and buy time for preparations. He stated that Stalin withstood all pressures because he had great ideological conviction, implicit faith in the party, and recognition of the party's authority.

A 16 January broadcast over Moscow Domestic Service on the years from 1933 to 1941 ignored any errors or problems of the period, and concentrated on praising industrial and agricultural growth. It paid tribute to the 1936 constitution as well as to the 1937 elections which saw a "remarkable victory" for the block of party and non-party candidates. It praised the 18th party congress of 1939 for its approval of the war prevention policy of the party--and it totally ignored the purges.

In March Kommunist Moldaviya urged that the positive achievements of collectivization be stressed and attacked a West German author (a euphemism for Soviet writers who make the same point) who

attempts to impose on the reader the current but absolutely groundless thesis prevalent in bourgeois historiography concerning the forcible nature of collectivization . . . .

And on 7 May Pravda published an article which glossed over the disagreement between Stalin and Lenin on the subject of nationalities in 1917:

. . . On the basis of the report by I.V. Stalin, the conference adopted a resolution signed by V. I. Lenin, on the nationalities

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question. The Bolshevik Party came forth decisively in favor of meeting the demands of the working people of all oppressed nations, recognizing their right to self-determination, including separation and formation of an independent state.

On 30 May Krasnaya Zvezda criticized various World War II memoirs, and charged that personal memoirs should not contradict the "truth of history." It attacked those who criticize General Headquarters for its conduct of the war, stating that

The best evidence of the fact that the General Headquarters and its working organ, the General Staff, skillfully directed the operations of the Soviet troops is the victorious outcome of the war. The General Headquarters included prominent commanders and party and state leaders. The Supreme Commander, I.V. Stalin, displayed great firmness; his leadership of the military operations was on the whole correct, and his merits in this field were numerous.

In this early part of 1967, there was a virtual suspension of any references to the purges and rehabilitations of purge victims. Even the provincial papers halted publication of such articles with very few exceptions. Interestingly, those references which did appear seemed to involve the military. For example, in February the Armenian paper Kommunist published a series of articles on Marshal Gay and there was also apparently a commemorative meeting held for Gay in which Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan participated. On 26 March Krasnaya Zvezda carried an article by Marshal Vasilyevskiy in which he referred to Tukhachevskiy as an outstanding theorist and leader. Both Tukhachevskiy and Gay had been proponents of modernization of Soviet forces before their purges, and it is possible that these particular rehabilitations were being pushed by those who wished more emphasis to be put on modernization of Soviet armed forces.

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In June 1967 the central committee issued its theses on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the revolution. On the subject of war preparations, the theses gave official sanction to the complete ignoring of prewar miscalculations and errors. The theses stated that the Soviet Union had done all it could to establish a system of collective security in Europe, but that these efforts were rebuffed by the men of Munich who preferred an alliance with Hitler. In this very complex situation the Soviet Union had been forced to sign a nonaggression pact with Hitler, thereby gaining time to prepare. Even though the party and government took steps to strengthen defenses it was impossible to prevent war. The theses also praised the 20th party congress resolution which it said had condemned the Stalin personality cult; the cult, according to the theses, had expressed itself in the glorification of the role of one man, departures from the Leninist principle of collective leadership, unwarranted repression, and other violations of socialist legality. This reference is very low key, as the resolution passed by the 20th Congress was relatively mild; the strong anti-Stalin element at the congress was Khrushchev's "secret speech."

#### Wartime Errors Erased

On 21 July the new First Deputy Minister of Defense, Yakubovskiy, wrote an article for Krasnaya Zvezda which successfully passed over whatever errors there might have been in prewar preparations. He praised measures taken to train military personnel and did not even make an oblique reference to the purges. He then explained why the Soviet Union had suffered some defeats in the early stages of the war:

It was not possible, however, to fully implement the planned program of preparing the armed forces for the war. Specifically, the rearmament of the ground forces with new military technical equipment and the formation of mechanized groups of units remained unfinished. This explains the

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difficulties encountered by our troops  
in the first period of the Great  
Fatherland War . . . .

In mid-July it was reported that Nekrich, author of the controversial book 22 June 1941, which had been published in 1965 and discussed at a stormy meeting early in 1966, had been expelled from the party. Thus, Nekrich became the scapegoat for past "errors" in analysis of prewar preparedness and Stalin's wartime role, and an example to those who might wish to write in a similar vein. It was also reported that the editor who had approved the publication of Nekrich's book had been fired. In September Voprosy Istorii KPSS followed this with an attack on Nekrich by Deborin, who had also participated in the February 1966 meeting held to criticize Nekrich's book.\* Deborin claimed that the book had been written in the spirit of bourgeois historiography. He then proceeded to defend war preparations and the leadership of the party during the war; he asserted that the Soviet Union had signed the Ribbentrop Pact only when it was clear that an anti-Nazi alliance was impossible. Deborin denied that preparations for an attack had not been made and that the Soviet leadership had underestimated the danger of war.

On 24 August a Krasnaya Zvezda article by Major General Zhilin called for a new official wartime history to correct the "subjective" view of Stalin's leadership. He stated that bourgeois falsifiers must be refuted--that they try to discredit the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the prewar years and conceal the fact that this policy was directed at providing collective security in Europe and restraining aggressive forces. He called for criticism of subjective statements made by some memoirists who mistakenly evaluate the readiness of the Soviet Union to repulse aggression in the late 1930's and wrongly evaluate events at the start of the war.

An 8 December article in Krasnaya Zvezda completed the transition to a positive view of Stalin as prewar and wartime leader:

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\*See pages 57-59.

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Historical experience obviously confirms the correctness of the military policy of the party at all stages of socialist construction and the decisive significance of the prewar five-year plans for the defense potential of the country. This experience rejects the formerly existing anti-historic views on alleged miscalculations of the Communist Party and Soviet government in the creation of military-economic potential. In any case, in such a short time the military-industrial base of the USSR simply could not reach the volume of the military-industrial base of fascist Germany, which as early as 1933 began to actively reorganize its economy for war purposes and later completed its military-economic potential by making use of the heavy industry of the European states it had occupied.

The treacherous attack on the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, which had previously mobilized its first-class equipped war machinery, as well as a certain incompleteness in the measures taken by our country to prepare itself to repel an aggression, allowed the Hitlerite army, despite the heroic resistance of the Soviet troops, to rapidly penetrate into the USSR . . . .

Thus all that remains of previous criticisms of the handling of the prewar situation, is the statement that there was a certain incompleteness in the measures taken to repel aggression.

#### Collectivization Smoothed Over

In August several articles were published on the period of collectivization. The first was by Brezhnev-protege Trapeznikov and appeared in Pravda on 4 August.

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Trapeznikov acknowledged that there were complications and difficulties in collectivization, which were the result of the fact that this policy was carried out among a culturally backward and widely dispersed peasant population. He stated that this had been one of the "most brilliant periods" in Soviet history and that collectivization had been an historical necessity. However, he said that there had been no way of knowing exactly what stages had to be gone through, how fast to go, and exactly what economic forms the new type of enterprise would take.

It must be said that a considerable mess and confusions prevailed in this respect. There were elements in the party which, engaging in hare-brained schemes for the selection of forms of collective economy, tried at first to create various types of gigantic units--agro-industrial combines--in order to propagate communes, or to design agro-cities without consideration for the objective conditions and the practical experience of the masses.

The agro-gorod concept described by Trapeznikov had been supported by Khrushchev; thus Trapeznikov had absolved Stalin and the party of any guilt and had shifted blame for confusion in agriculture to Khrushchev, implicating at the same time those who also had supported such policies--Podgornyy, Polyanskiy in 1959 and, more recently the Belorussians.

A 26 August article in Pravda Ukrainy by A. Yevdokimov continued the line found in Trapeznikov's article, and criticized the ideologists of anti-communism for treating collectivization as though it had been implemented contrary to Leninist principles. He then discussed the complexity of the development of socialist agriculture and some of the problems encountered. In particular, he stated that the defense of the country during the war had placed demands on heavy industry, thus retarding the strength of the material-technical base of agriculture. There was no mention of Stalin, and no indication that incorrect orders from the center had created difficulties in collectivization.

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### Stalin's Revolutionary Role Praised

On 8 August several articles were published commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Sixth Party Congress. A Pravda article by first deputy editor Zarodov stated that the report to the central committee, delivered by Stalin and Sverdlov, had presented a bright, vigorous picture of the development of the revolution. An article published in Belorussia also mentioned Stalin's report and noted that he was elected a member of the central committee. The article listed several delegates who had wavered on the subject of Lenin's court appearance, but Stalin was not included on the list. According to this article, Stalin did make one error, but the error is minimized. At a time when Lenin was saying that the situation was fully defined and power was in the hands of the counter-revolutionary military, Stalin stated that "it was still not clear in whose hands the power is." The article makes it clear that the situation had, in fact, only been defined for about a month. An October article in Pravda discussed the October 1917 adoption of a resolution on armed uprising, and listed Stalin among those who had supported Lenin.

In October the third volume of the History of the CPSU, which had caused such a furor in the summer of 1966, was finally published. It was accompanied on 26 October by a Pravda editorial which blasted previous one-sidedness and serious errors which had been made in the characterization of the early struggle of the party; these errors had involved viewing these struggles in terms of the blunders made by people involved in them. While the editorial did not mention Stalin by name he was obviously the person now being exonerated.

On 22 October the Georgian paper Zarya Vostoka published an article on the uprisings in Georgia in the early 1920's. In discussing Ordzhonikidze's handling of the uprising, the article referred constantly to telegrams sent to Lenin and Stalin; the two names are always mentioned together. Then, according to the article, in September 1920 Stalin was sent to study and clean up the situation in Georgia. After establishing Communist power

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in that state, the article stated, the party's Orgburo adopted a decree at Stalin's suggestion calling for the immediate dispatch of cadres to Georgia.

### Liberal Efforts--Feeble and Hopeless

Several feeble efforts were made by the moderates to combat the steadily increasing orthodox pressure, but these efforts were doomed to failure. The rehabilitation program was virtually ended, but there were several commemorative meetings held. In August such a meeting was held for Yan Rudzutak, who had died in the purges in 1938; Mikoyan spoke at this meeting as did various Latvian veterans of the revolution.\* In September a similar meeting was held for another of Stalin's victims, Postyshev; press coverage of both these meetings was, however, minimal.

In October a war film based on a scenario by Konstantin Simonov opened in Moscow. Among the subjects discussed in the movie were the lack of preparedness for the war, Stalin's refusal to believe that the Germans would attack, and the catastrophic effect of the purges on the Soviet high command. [redacted] this film had encountered fierce opposition before it was finally released; however, the fact that it was released indicated that there was still some support for a moderate position in high places.

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Another interesting deviation from the general trend was the passage in September of a decree exonerating the Tatars of the charge of collaborating with the fascists. The decree stated that the accusation made in 1944 had been without foundation and had groundlessly attributed this crime to the whole Tatar population. This decree

\*In December Mikoyan again demonstrated his sympathy for the liberals when he attended a performance of the controversial play "Bolsheviki" at the Sovremennik Theater and made a demonstrative show of approval. This play delivered the message that the start of Red Terror during the Civil War had been a dangerous step.

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was passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of which Podgorny is chairman. However, in spite of this rehabilitation there was apparently little change in the situation of the Tatars. A petition sent to the West in early 1968 included the charge that although the Tatars had been officially rehabilitated, they still could not return to their homeland.

On 30 December one of the most interesting turn arounds of this period occurred. Pravda Ukrainy, which had been one of the most outspoken of the neo-Stalinist journals, published a rehabilitation. On the 70th birthday of V. Primakov, a former member of the Military Council in Leningrad, the paper stated that he had been slandered in 1935, removed from his job, and a year later was dead. The use by this paper of a rehabilitation might be a further indication of the fear of the neo-Stalinists in the wake of the Yegorychev purge, that they were now in danger of being repressed by Brezhnev.

#### SUMMARY

A rigid, orthodox line dominated the first six months of 1967, in spite of reports of dissension within the leadership. While there may well have been dissension, a conservative-orthodox faction, led by Brezhnev and perhaps strongly influenced by Suslov, was strong enough to enforce its line. This line was demonstrated in the arrests of a number of intellectuals early in January and by large-scale arrests in the Ukraine and Leningrad on the eve of the Fourth Writers Congress. The leaders in these two areas, Shelest and Tolstikov, had been among the most outspoken proponents of the neo-Stalinist line; the suppression of intellectuals in their regions demonstrates the direct relationship between an expressed orthodox viewpoint and direct administrative action.

The few liberal articles which were published during this period were met with fairly swift punishment, reflecting the orthodox solution of dealing with non-conformists through administrative action. The most

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notable example of this was the harrassment of Noviy Mir which culminated in the replacement of two key members of that journal's editorial board. Another instance was the expulsion of Nekrich from the party for having written a book in 1965 critical of the handling of prewar preparations. His expulsion was a clear warning to others who might be tempted to indulge in historical objectivity.

The orthodox line was also reflected in the continued halt in the rehabilitation program; the only exception was the publication of several articles on purged military leaders Gay and Tukhachevskiy. Both of these men had been supporters of modernization of the Soviet armed forces in the 1930's, and these articles might have been backed by contemporary supporters of increased emphasis on a modernized military establishment. Articles which appeared during this period concerning Stalin's wartime role and his actions as a revolutionary and leader seemed to exonerate him completely of any mistakes.

Signs of dissension within the leadership continued. Several more articles were published defending the need for collective leadership. One of these, by Petrenko, defended collective leadership and also called for the right of criticism and self-criticism within the party. The tone of Petrenko's article was quite hard-line, however, suggesting that he was speaking for the neo-Stalinists rather than the liberals. He used the cult of personality to illustrate the evils of one-man leadership-- the first time the neo-Stalinists had resorted to this device.

Having effectively beaten down the moderates, Brezhnev was now ready to launch a major campaign against Shelepin, and during the spring and summer of 1967, the latter's strength was gradually whittled away. In April his protege Goryunov was relieved as head of TASS, and in May Semichastnyy was replaced as KGB chief. Following the Middle East crisis and his apparent challenge to the leadership on its handling of that situation, Yegorychev, the most outspoken member of the neo-Stalinist faction, was fired as Moscow City boss. As a final blow, Shelepin

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was appointed head of the Soviet trade union organization and removed from the party secretariat.

In the wake of these major setbacks for the neo-Stalinist faction, several articles appeared defending collective leadership and the right of party members (i.e., Yegorychev) to express criticism of their superiors (i.e., Brezhnev) even at the highest party levels. These articles seemed clearly aimed at Brezhnev, and came in at least two instances from members of the neo-Stalinist camp. The adoption by this faction of an anti-Stalin line suggested real desperation on their part; their use of this line was clearly defensive--an attempt to stave off further setbacks. Another apparent shift was the publication of a rehabilitation by the neo-Stalinist journal Pravda Ukrainy in late December. Having previously backed the halt in the rehabilitation program as part of a general re-Stalinizing, they now apparently feared that they themselves were in danger of being purged and therefore were now identifying with the purge victims rather than with Stalin.

That Shelepin's defeat and that of various of his neo-Stalinist backers did not signify a corresponding defeat for their point of view was revealed almost immediately. Encouraged by Shelepin's defeat, the liberal intellectuals published several articles at the end of June in which they criticized censorship and seemed to urge its abolition. These articles were quickly suppressed. The continuation of a harsh policy was also reflected in the continuation of the arrests and trials of dissident intellectuals and in the favorable treatment Stalin and his policies continued to receive. Thus, it was clear that an orthodox line, favored by Brezhnev, still dominated.

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APPENDIX A: TEXT OF APPEAL AGAINST STALIN'S REHABILITATION  
March 1966

Respected Leonid Ilich!

Tendencies have appeared lately in some public speeches and articles in our press which are in fact directed at a partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. We do not know how firmly these tendencies are grounded, but they manifest themselves ever more frequently as the XXIII Party Congress draws nearer. However, even if it is only a matter of a partial revision of the decisions of the XX and XXII Party Congresses, this causes deep apprehension. We think it our duty to inform you about our opinion in this matter.

Until now we have not been aware of a single fact, of a single argument which would permit us to think that a condemnation of the personality cult was wrong in any of its respects. On the contrary, it is difficult to doubt that a large part of striking, of truly horrifying facts about Stalin's crimes has not yet been made public. These facts would confirm the absolute correctness of the decisions of both Party Congresses.

There is something else as well. We believe that any attempt to whitewash Stalin conceals a danger of serious dissensions within Soviet society. Stalin is responsible not only for the destruction of countless innocent people, for our unpreparedness for the war, for a departure from the Leninist norms of party and state life. His crimes and unjust deeds also distorted the idea of Communism to such an extent that our people will never forgive him for this. Our people will not understand and will not accept even a partial departure from the decisions on the personality cult. No one will be able to obliterate these decisions from its consciousness and memory. Any attempt to do so will lead only to confusion and disarray in the broadest circles. We are convinced, for instance, that this would cause great unrest among the intelligentsia and would seriously complicate the moods of our youth. Like the whole of the Soviet

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public we are worried about the young people. No explanations or articles will make people believe in Stalin again; on the contrary, they will simply create disorder and anger. To undertake anything like this is dangerous, taking into account the complex economic and political situation of our country.

We also see another danger as equally serious. The question of Stalin's rehabilitation concerns not only home, but also international politics. Any step towards his rehabilitation would undoubtedly pose a threat of a new split in the ranks of the world Communist movement, this time between ourselves and the Communists of the West. They would assess this step as a surrender to the Chinese, to which they would never agree. This is a factor of exceptional importance which we cannot write off. In the time when we are threatened, on the one hand, by ever more active American imperialists and West German revanchists and, on the other, by the leaders of the Communist Party of China, it would be extremely unwise to risk a rift or even complications with the fraternal parties in the West.

So as not to claim your attention for too long we limit ourselves to mentioning only the most substantial arguments against any rehabilitation of Stalin, first and foremost concerning the danger of the two-way split. We do not even speak about the great complications which any departure from the decisions of the XX Party Congress would bring upon the international contacts of our cultural community--among other things upon its struggle for peace and international cooperation. All that has been achieved so far would be endangered.

We could not but write you about our thoughts. It is quite clear that a decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on this question cannot be regarded as a routine one, taken in the general course of work. In either case it will have historic importance for the destinies of our country. We hope that this will be taken into account.

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APPENDIX B: TEXT OF SOVIET WRITERS' PETITION TO KREMLIN  
November 1966

To the Presidium of the 23d Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

To the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

Comrades:

We, the undersigned group of Moscow writers, request you to grant us permission to stand surety for the recently sentenced writers Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel. We believe that this would be an act of both wisdom and humanity.

Although we do not approve the means by which these writers published their work abroad, we cannot accept the view that their motives were in any way anti-Soviet, which alone could have justified the severity of the sentence. The prosecution failed to prove the existence of such a motive.

At the same time, the condemnation of writers for the writing of satirical works creates an extremely dangerous precedent and threatens to hold up the progress of Soviet culture. Neither learning nor art can exist if neither paradoxical ideas can be expressed nor hyperbolic images be used as an artistic device. In our complex situation today, we need more freedom for artistic experiment and certainly not its condemnation. From this standpoint, the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel has already caused us more harm than did any of their mistakes

Sinyavsky and Daniel are gifted men who should be given the chance to make up for their lack of political prudence and tact. If they were released on our surety and remained in touch with Soviet society, they would soon

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realize their mistakes and redeem them by the artistic and ideological value of the new literary works they would create.

We beg you, therefore, to release Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel on our surety.

This would be an act dictated by the interests of our country, the interests of the world and those of the world Communist movement.

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APPENDIX C: TEXT OF A DECREE ISSUED BY THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE RSFSR [RUSSIAN SOVIET FEDERATED SOCIALIST REPUBLIC] ON 16 SEPTEMBER, ENTITLED "ON THE ENTRY OF A SUPPLEMENT TO THE PENAL CODE OF THE RSFSR", 16 September 1966

Chapter IX "Crimes Against the Administrative Order" in the Penal Code of the RSFSR is hereby supplemented by Articles 190 [sub-section 1], 190 [sub-section 2], and 190 [sub-section 3] which contain the following provisions:

Article 190--1. Spreading scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and social order: systematic dissemination, in verbal form, of scientifically slanderous fabrications which discredit the Soviet system of government and the Soviet social order, as well as preparation of writings or printed products of the same content and their dissemination in any form shall be punished with deprivation of freedom up to 3 years or with corrective labor terms up to one year or with a fine up to 100 rubles.

Article 190--2. Defamation of the coat of arms of the state or of the national flag: defamation of the government coat of arms or the flag of the USSR, the RSFSR, or any of the other Union Republics shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 2 years, corrective labor service up to one year, or a fine of up to 50 rubles.

Article 190--3. Staging group actions which violate public order or active participation in such actions: the staging of group actions or active participation in such actions, which violate public order in a serious manner or which are accompanied by open failure to comply with the legal requests of agents [representatives] of the government, or which interfere with the activities of the transportation system, of government and community [social] agencies or enterprises, shall be punished with imprisonment of up to 3 years or corrective labor service up to one year or a fine of up to 100 rubles.

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**APPENDIX D: PETITION AGAINST EXTENSION OF ARTICLE 190  
January 1967**

Copies to the Political Bureau of the CPSU;  
to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR;  
to the Attorney General of the USSR.

Comrade Deputies:

We, a group of Soviet citizens, consider it to be our duty to express our attitude toward the 16 September 1966 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR "On the Entry of a Supplement to the Penal Code of the RSFSR."

In our opinion, the additions to Articles 190--1 and 190--3, of the Penal Code of the RSFSR, have no foundation in the political reality of our land. The passage of such laws, at this time, seems to us to be an unjustified act which conjures up the danger of false judicial verdicts, the violation of socialist justice, and the creation of an atmosphere of suspicions and denunciations. Article 190--1 facilitates subjective evaluations and arbitrary interpretations of statements as scientific slander against the Soviet system of government and social order.

We are convinced that Article 190--1 and 190--3 are in conflict with the Leninist principles of socialist democracy. If the Plenum of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR should confirm these Articles, they might become an obstacle on the road to the implementation of the freedoms guaranteed in the USSR constitution.

The signers include the following: Academician Asturov, biologist; academician Zeldovich, physicist; academician Knunyants, chemist; academician Leontovich, physicist, Lenin Prize winner; academician Sakharov, physicist; academician Skazkin, historian; academician Tamm, physicist; academician Engelhardt, biochemist; author

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Kaverin; author Nekrasov; author Dombrovskiy; author Voynovich; composer Shostakovich; movie director Romm.

This letter was also signed by a group of old Bolsheviks and others, giving us a total of 21 signatures, some of the signatures being illegible. The document was received by the Supreme Soviet between 1 and 10 January 1967.

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**APPENDIX E: TEXT OF SOLZHENITSYN LETTER PROTESTING  
CENSORSHIP, May 16, 1967**

To the presidium and the delegates of the congress, to members of the Union of Soviet Writers, to the editors of literary newspapers and magazines:

I.

The oppression, no longer tolerable, that our literature has been enduring from censorship for decades and that the Union of Writers cannot accept any further.

This censorship under the obscuring label of Glavlit [Soviet censorship agency], not provided for by the Constitution and therefore illegal and nowhere publicly labeled as such, is imposing a yoke on our literature and gives people who are unversed in literature arbitrary control over writers.

A survival of the Middle Ages, censorship manages in Methuselah-like fashion to drag out its existence almost to the 21st century. Of fleeting significance, it attempts to appropriate unto itself the role of unflinching time of separating the good books from the bad.

Our writers are not supposed to have the right, they are not endowed with the right, to express their anticipatory judgments about the moral life of man and society, or to explain in their own way the social problems or the historical experience that has been so deeply felt in our country.

Works that might have expressed the mature thinking of the people, that might have timely and salutary influence on the realm of the spirit or on the development of a social conscience are prohibited or distorted by censorship on the basis of considerations that are petty, egotistic and, from the national point of view, shortsighted.

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Outstanding manuscripts by young authors, as yet entirely unknown, are nowadays rejected by editors solely on the ground that they "will not pass."

Many union members and even delegates at this congress know how they themselves bowed to the pressure of censorship and made concessions in the structure and concept of their books, changing chapters, pages, paragraphs, sentences, giving them innocuous titles, only to see them finally in print, even if it meant distorting them irremediably.

We have one decisive factor here, the death of a troublesome writer, after which, sooner or later, he is returned to us, with an annotation "explaining his errors." For a long time, the name of Pasternak could not be pronounced out loud, but then he died, and his books appeared and his verses are even quoted at ceremonies.

Pushkin's words are really coming true: "They are capable of loving only the dead."

But tardy publication of books and "authorization" of names do not make up for either the social or the artistic losses suffered by our people from these monstrous delays, from the oppression of artistic conscience. (In fact there were writers in the 1920s, Pilnyak, Platonov and Mandelshtam, who called attention at a very early stage to the beginnings of the cult and the particular traits of Stalin's character; however, they were destroyed and silenced instead of being listened to.)

Literature cannot develop between the categories "permitted" and "not permitted"--"this you can and this you can't." Literature that is not the air of its contemporary society, that dares not pass on to society its pains and fears, that does not warn in time against the threatening moral and social dangers, such literature does not deserve the name of literature; it is only a facade. Such literature loses the confidence of its own people, and its published works are used as waste paper instead of being read.

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Our literature has lost the leading role it played at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and the brilliance of experimentation that distinguished it in the 1920s. To the entire world the literary life of our country now appears as something infinitely poorer, flatter and lower than it actually is, then it would appear if it were not restricted, hemmed in.

The losers are both our country, in world public opinion, and world literature itself. If the world had access to all the uninhibited fruits of our literature, if it were enriched by our own spiritual experience, the whole artistic evolution of the world would move along in a different way, acquiring a new stability and attaining even a new artistic threshold.

I propose that the congress adopt a resolution that would demand and insure the abolition of all censorship, overt or hidden, of all fictional writing and release publishing houses from the obligation of obtaining authorization for the publication of every printed page.

II.

The duties of the union toward its members:

These duties are not clearly formulated in the statutes of the Union of Soviet Writers (under "Protection of copyright" and "Measures for the protection of other rights of writers"), and it is sad to find that for a third of a century the union has defended neither the "other rights nor even the copyright of persecuted writers.

Many writers were subjected during their lifetime to abuse and slander in the press and from rostrums without being given the physical possibility of replying. Moreover they have been exposed to violence and personal persecution (Bulgakov, Akhmatova, Tsvetayeva, Pasternak, Zoshchenko, Platonov, Aleksandr Grin, Vasily Grossman).

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The Union of Writers not only did not make available its own publications for reply and justification, not only did not come out in defense of these writers, but through its leadership was always first among the persecutors.

Names that adorned our poetry of the 20th century found themselves on lists of those excluded from the union or not even admitted to the union in the first place.

The leadership of the union cowardly abandoned to their distress those for whom persecution ended in exile, camps and death (Pavel, Vasilyev, Mandelshtam, Artem Vesely, Pilnyak, Babel, Tabidze, Zapolotsky and others).

The list must be cut off at "and others." We learned after the 20th congress of the party [on de-Stalinization in 1956] that there were more than 600 writers whom the union had obediently handed over to their fate in prisons and camps.

However, the roll is even longer, and its curled-up end cannot be read and will never be read by our eyes. It contains the names of young prose writers and poets whom we may have known only accidentally through personal meetings, whose talents were crushed in camps before being able to blossom, whose writings never got further than the offices of the state security service in the days of Yagoda, Yezhov, Beria and Abakumov [heads of the secret police under Stalin].

There is no historical necessity for the newly elected leadership of the union to share with preceding leaderships responsibility for the past.

I propose that paragraph 22 of the union statutes clearly formulate all the guarantees for the defense of union members who are subjected to slander and unjust persecutions so that past illegalities will not be repeated.

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## III.

If the congress will not remain indifferent to what I have said, I also ask that it consider the interdictions and persecutions to which I myself have been subjected.

1. My novel "In the First Circle" was taken away from me by the state security people, and this has prevented it from being submitted to publishers. Instead, in my lifetime, against my will and even without my knowledge, this novel has been "published" in an unnatural "closed" edition for reading by a selected unidentified circle. My novel has become available to literary officials, but is being concealed from most writers. I have been unable to insure open discussion of the novel within writers associations and to prevent misuse and plagiarism.

2. Together with the novel, my literary archives dating back 15 and 20 years, things that were not intended for publication, were taken away from me. Now tendentious excerpts from these files have also been covertly "published" and are being circulated within the same circles. The play "Feast of the Victors," which I wrote down from memory in camp, where I figured under four serial numbers (at a time when, condemned to die by starvation, we were forgotten by society and no one outside the camps came out against repressions), this play, now left far behind, is being ascribed to me as my very latest work.

3. For three years now an irresponsible campaign of slander is being conducted against me, who fought all through the war as a battery commander and received military decorations. It is being said that I served time as a criminal, or surrendered to the enemy (I was never a prisoner of war), that I "betrayed" my country, "served the Germans". That is the interpretation now being put on the 11 years I spent in camps and exile for having criticized Stalin. This slander is being spread in secret instructions and meetings by people holding official positions. I vainly tried to stop the slander by appealing to the board of the Writers Union of the R.S.F.R. [Russian Republic], and to the press. The board did not even

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react, and not a single paper printed my reply to the slanderers. On the contrary, slander against me from rostrums has intensified and become more vicious within the last year, making use of distorted material from my confiscated files, and I have no way of replying.

4. My story "The Cancer Ward," the first part of which was approved for publication by the prose department of the Moscow writers organization, cannot be published either by chapters, rejected by five magazines, or in its entirety, rejected by Novy Mir, Zvezda and Prostor [literary journals].

5. The play "The Reindeer and the Little Hut," accepted in 1962 by the Theater Sovremennik [in Moscow], has thus far not received permission to be performed.

6. The screen play, "The Tanks Know the Truth," the stage play "The Light That Is in You," short stories, "The Right Hand," the series "Small Bits," cannot find either a producer or a publisher.

7. My stories published in Novy Mir have never been reprinted in book form, having been rejected everywhere--by the Soviet Writer Publishers, the State Literature Publishing House, the Ogonyok Library. They thus remain inaccessible to the general reading public.

8. I have also been prevented from having any other contacts with readers, public readings of my works --in November, 1966, 9 out of 11 scheduled meetings were canceled at the last moment--or readings over the radio. Even the simple act of giving a manuscript away for "reading and copying" has now become a criminal act, and the ancient Russian scribes were permitted to do.

My work has thus been finally smothered, gagged and slandered.

In view of such a gross infringement on my copyright and "other" rights, will the fourth congress defend me, yes or no? It seems to me that the choice is also not without importance for the literary future of several delegates.

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I am, of course, confident that I will fulfill my duty as a writer under all circumstances, from the grave even more successfully and more unchallenged than in my lifetime. No one can bar the road to the truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to accept even death. But, maybe, many lessons will finally teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime. At no time has this ennobled our history.

A.I. Solzhenitsyn  
May 16, 1967.

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APPENDIX F: TEXT OF VOZNESENSKIY LETTER, TO PRAVDA,  
22 June 1966

For nearly a week now I have been living in an atmosphere of blackmail, confusion and provocation.

On June 16 I received an official notification from the Union of Writers that my trip to New York to give a reading at the Arts Festival there June 21 (this was the only poetry reading at the festival and it had been allotted to a Soviet poet) was "inadvisable."

I warned the leadership of the Union of Writers of the consequences of cancellation: the evening had been advertised for six months ahead, posters had been put up and tickets sold, and it would have been too late to arrange an alternative program. Despite my conviction that the union's decision was extremely unwise, I immediately, after talking with them, sent a cable to the United States saying I could not come.

But what does a poetry evening matter? That's not the main point. Let's also forget that at first (until June 16) everybody was in favor of it, but that then they suddenly changed their minds. What is intolerable is the lying and total lack of scruples that went with all this.

Here I have been working, taking part in functions organized by the Union of Writers, going to the theater, receiving foreign writers at the request of the Novosti agency, only to learn that for three days now the Union of Writers has been telling journalists that I am seriously ill. Of course, the leaders of the Union of Writers must know what they are talking about, but why haven't they at least informed me that I am sick? It's difficult to imagine anything more idiotic. It's an insult to elementary human dignity.

I am a Soviet writer, a human being made of flesh and blood, not a puppet to be pulled on string.

Why is it that I suddenly have to learn from foreign broadcasts that "the government of the U.S.S.R. has

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allowed Voznesenskiy to go to the festival. The ban has been lifted and he has received his visas. It now is only a matter of his getting a ticket . . ."

But at this very same moment the union tells me: "Your trip is off. In reply to questions we are saying you are ill." In other words they tell one lie to me and another to the world at large. What sort of position does that put me in? What am I supposed to tell people? Why, during all this, has nobody in the leadership of the Union of Writers bothered to call me and explain what was going on, or at least, tell me what the official reasons for my non-departure were? Why do they pull the wool over everybody's eyes by saying (variously) that I'm ill, that I've left it too late to get a ticket, or (now that everybody knows that it's too late for me to get to the poetry reading) that I am just about to leave? Why compromise a Soviet poet in the eyes of thousands of lovers of Soviet poetry? Why lead people to think that the reading might take place after all? Why involve the organizers of the evening in further expense? And why, in general, create all this fuss about my trip at such a crucial time as this in world affairs!

It is not a question of me personally, but of the fate of Soviet literature, its honor and prestige in the outside world. How much longer will we go on dragging ourselves through the mud? How much longer will the Union of Writers go on using methods like these?

Clearly the leadership of the union does not regard writers as human beings. This lying, prevarication and knocking people's heads together, is standard practice. This is what they do to many of my comrades. Letters to us often do not reach us, and sometimes replies are sent in our name. What boors, what chameleons they are! We are surrounded by lies, lies, lies, bad manners and lies.

I am ashamed to be a member of the same union as these people.

That is why I am writing to your newspaper, which is called "Truth" (Pravda).

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APPENDIX G: EXCERPTS FROM LITVINOV LETTER TO VARIOUS PAPERS

I regard it as my duty to make public the following:

On September 26, 1967, I was summoned by the Committee of State Security (K.G.B.) to appear before Gostev, an official of the K.G.B. Another officer of the K.G.B., who did not give his name, was present during our conversation.

After this talk was over, I wrote it down immediately and as fully as I could remember. I vouch for the accuracy of the substance of what was said between the representative of the K.G.B. and me.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, [we] have knowledge that you together with a group of other people intend to reproduce and distribute the minutes of the recent criminal trial of Bukovsky and others. We warn you that if you do that, you will be held criminally responsible.

I: Irrespective of my intentions, I cannot understand what the criminal responsibility for such an action might be.

Gostev: The court will decide that, and we wish only to warn you that if such a record should be spread through Moscow or other cities or appears abroad, you will be held responsible for this.

I: I know the laws well and I cannot imagine what particular law would be transgressed by the composition of such a document.

Gostev: There is such an article, 190-1. Take the criminal code and read it.

I: I know this article very well and can recite it from memory. It deals with slanderous fabrications which would discredit the Soviet social system and regime. What

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kind of slander could there be in recording the hearing of a case before a Soviet court?

Gostev; Well, your notes will be a biased distortion of facts and a slander of the court's actions, and that would be proved by the agency competent to handle such cases.

I: How can you possibly know this? Instead of starting a new case, you yourself should publish the record of this criminal trial and in this way kill the rumors circulating in Moscow.

Gostev: And why do we need to publish it? It is an ordinary criminal case of disturbance of the peace.

I: If so, it is all the more important to give information about it, to let all the people see that it is really an ordinary case.

Gostev: Vechernyaya Moskva (a Moscow newspaper) of September 4, 1967, gives all the information about the case. All that has to be known about that trial is in there.

I: In the first place, there is too little information: The reader who had heard nothing previously about this case simply would not understand what it is all about. In the second place, it is false and slanderous. Rather, the editor of Vechernyaya Moskva or the person who gave such information should be charged with slander.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, the news report is absolutely correct. Remember that.

I: It says there that Bukovsky pleaded guilty. Yet I who was interested in this case, know perfectly well that he did not plead guilty.

Gostev: What does it matter whether he pleaded guilty or not? The court found him guilty. Consequently, he is guilty.

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I am not talking now about the court's decision; nor did the newspaper have it in mind. And confession of guilt by the defendant represents a completely independent judicial concept. In general, it would be a good idea to tell more about Bukovsky; for example, how he was arrested while reciting poetry on Mayakovsky Square, brought to the police station and beaten up.

Gostev: This is not true. It could not be.

I: His mother said so.

Gostev: Who cares what she said?

I: She did not tell it to me--I do not know her--but to the court, and nobody interrupted her or accused her of slander.

Gostev: She should rather have told you how she was summoned and warned about the conduct of her son. We can summon your parents, too. And in general, Pavel Mikhailovich, have in mind: Vechernyaya Moskva has printed all that the Soviet people should know about this case and this information is completely true and we warn you that if not only you, but your friends or anybody makes this record, you specifically will be held responsible for it. You understand very well that such a record can be used by our ideological enemies, especially on the eve of the 50th anniversary of Soviet power.

I: But I do not know of any law that would prohibit the dissemination of a non-secret document only because it might be misused by somebody. Much critical material from Soviet newspapers might also be misused by somebody.

Gostev: It should be clear to you what we are talking about. We are only warning you, and the court will prove the guilt.

I: It will prove it, I have no doubt. The trial of Bukovsky makes that clear. And how about my friend Aleksandr Ginzburg? Is he imprisoned for the same kind of actions that you are warning me about?

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Gostev: Well, you will learn what he did when he is put on trial. He will be acquitted if he is innocent. Could you possibly think that now, in the 50th year of Soviet power, a Soviet court would make a wrong decision?

I: Then why was Bukovsky's trial closed to the public?

Gostev: It was not.

I: Yet it was impossible to get in.

Gostev: Those who had to get in got in. There were representatives of the public and all seats in the hall were taken. We did not intend to rent a club (auditorium) because of this case.

I: In other words, the public nature of legal proceedings was violated.

Gostev: Pavel Mikhailovich, we have no intention of arguing with you. We simply warn you. Just imagine if people would learn that the grandson of the great diplomat Litvinov (Maxim M. Litvinov, former Foreign Minister) is busy with such doings, this would be a blot on his memory.

I: Well, I do not think he would blame me. Can I go?

Gostev: Please, The best thing for you to do now would be to go home and destroy all that you've collected.

I know that a similar kind of conversation was conducted with Aleksandr Ginzburg two months before his arrest.

I am asking you to publish this letter so that in case of my arrest the public would be informed about the circumstances which preceded it.

P. M. LITVINOV.  
Assistant in the Faculty  
of Physics in Moscow,  
Institute of Precision  
Chemical Technology

October 3, 1967  
Moscow, 8 Alexei Tolstoy  
Street, Apartment 78.

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APPENDIX H: TEXT OF LITVINOV-DANIEL APPEAL, 12 January  
1967

## To World Public Opinion:

The judicial trial of [Yuri] Galanskov, [Aleksandr] Ginzburg, [Aleksei] Dobrovolsky and [Vera] Lashkova, which is taking place at present in the Moscow City Court, is being carried out in violation of the most important principles of Soviet law. The judge and the prosecutor, with the participation of a special kind of audience have turned the trial into a wild mockery of three of the accused --Galanskov, Ginzburg and Lashkova--and of the witnesses--unthinkable in the 20th century.

The case took on the character of the well-known "witch trials" on its second day, when Galanskov and Ginzburg--despite a year of preliminary incarceration, in spite of pressure from the court--refused to accept the groundless accusations made against them by Dobrovolsky and sought to prove their own innocence. Evidence by witnesses in favor of Galanskov and Ginzburg infuriated the court even more.

The judge and the prosecutor throughout the trial have been helping Dobrovolsky to introduce false evidence against Galanskov and Ginzburg. The defense lawyers are constantly forbidden to ask questions, and the witnesses are not being allowed to give evidence that unmasks the provocative role of Dobrovolsky in this case.

Judge [Lev M.] Mironov has not once stopped the prosecutor. But he is allowing people who represent the defense to say only that which fits in with the program already prepared by the K.G.B. (state secret police) investigation. Whenever any participant in the trial departs from the rehearsed spectacle, the judge cries, "Your question is out of order," "This has no relation to the case," "I will not allow you to speak." These exclamations have been directed at the accused (apart from Dobrovolsky), to their lawyers and to the witnesses.

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The witnesses leave the court after their examination, or rather they are pushed out of the court, in a depressed state almost in hysterics.

Witness Yelena Basilova was not allowed to make a statement to the court--she wanted to record how the K.G.B. had prosecuted her mentally sick husband, whose evidence given during the investigation when he was in a certifiable state, plays an important role in the prosecution case. Basilova was driven out of the court while the judge shouted and the audience howled, drowning her words.

P. Grigorenko (former Maj. Gen. Pyotr Grigorenko of the Soviet Army) submitted a request asking that he be examined as a witness because he could explain the origin of the money found on Dobrovolsky. Galanskov gave him this money. Grigorenko's request was turned down on the pretext that he is allegedly mentally ill. This is not true.

Witnesses Aida Topeshkina was not allowed to make a statement to the court in which she wanted to give facts showing the falsity of Dobrovolsky's evidence. Topeshkina, an expectant mother, was physically ejected from the courtroom, while the audience howled at her.

The "commandant of the court," K.G.B. Colonel Tsirkunenکو, did not allow witness L. Katz back into the court after a recess, and told her, "if you have given other evidence, you could have stayed."

None of the witnesses have been allowed to stay in the court after giving evidence, although they are obliged to stay under Soviet law. Appeals by the witnesses on the basis of Article 283 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [the relevant article] went unheeded, and the judge said sharply to witness V. Vinogradova, "You can just leave the court under Article 283."

The courtroom is filled with specially-selected people--officials of the K.G.B. and volunteer militia--who give the appearance of an open public trial. These

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people make a noise, laugh, and insult the accused and the witnesses. Judge Mironov had made no attempt to prevent these violations of order. Not one of the blatant offenders has been ejected from the hall.

In this tense atmosphere there can be no pretense that the trial is objective, that there is any justice or legality about it. The sentence was decided from the very start.

We appeal to world public opinion, and in the first place to the Soviet public opinion. We appeal to everyone in whom conscience is alive and who has sufficient courage:

Demand public condemnation of this shameful trial and the punishment of those guilty of perpetrating it!

Demand the release of the accused from arrest!

Demand a new trial with the observance of all legal norms and with the presence of international observers!

Citizens of our country! This trial is a stain on the honor of our state and on the conscience of everyone of us. You yourselves elected this court and these judges--demand that they be deprived of the posts which they have abused. Today it is not only the fate of the three accused which is in danger--their trial is no better than the celebrated trials of the nineteen-thirties, which involved us in so much shame and so much blood that we have still not recovered from them.

We pass this appeal to the Western progressive press, and ask for it to be published and broadcast by radio as soon as possible. We are not sending this request to Soviet newspapers because that is hopeless.

(signed)

LARISA BOGORAZ-DANIEL  
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Flat 3

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