

A DICTIONARY OF

Ethics



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СЛОВАРЬ ПО ЭТИКЕ

Под редакцией И.С. Кона и А.А. Гусейнова

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ABÉLARD, Pierre (1079-1142), French theologian and philosopher, representative of medieval free-thinking. He suggested that reason be applied to the interpretation of religious dogmas. Abélard believed that doubt is a way to the truth: reason has the right to reject any erroneous utterances in the works of church authorities and only in the event of insoluble contradictions can it choose those arguments of the author which it considers most cogent. In his work "Know Thyself or Ethics" Abélard, contrary to Saint *Augustine*, argues that not only can man sin of his own free will, but be virtuous as well. Conscience is a natural phenomenon present in all people and serves as a criterion of morality. An act of conscience is not sinful. Abélard upholds the value of human individ-

uality, man's right to independence and happiness, and censures the orthodox theology which is based on intolerance. His teaching was condemned by the councils of Soissons (1121) and of Sens (1140) and by Pope Innocent II, primarily for its anti-authoritarian thrust. Abélard's views on this matter in particular had much in common with popular heresies.

ABSOLUTISM, ethical [*L absolutus* unrestricted, unconditioned], methodological principle of interpreting the nature of morality which treats moral concepts as inherently perennial and invariable (laws of the Universe, a priori truths or divine commandments), independent of social conditions, of people's requirements and of laws of historical evolution of mankind. As distinct from *rela-*

tivism with its protest against canonization and dogmatization of the prevailing morals, absolutism could be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, its adherents often opposed the relative and conditional character of the prevailing morals, their unscrupulousness and subordination to political interests of the ruling groups; they put forward incontestable laws of morality, which should be observed by all, as a counterbalance to the degrading morals of the privileged classes. On the other hand, such a critique of the prevailing morality did not deny it in principle but only substantiated the idea of its inviolability and universality. Therefore, absolutists sometimes ended up with moral *dogmatism* and *rigorism*. Absolutist view of morality was first developed back in antiquity. *Socrates*, *Plato* and *Euclid* of *Megara* interpret good as an abstract, eternal idea opposite to all that is changeable and conditioned in the material world. Absolutist views on the nature of morality in general are also characteristic of the Christian doctrine, although

they were not always pursued with equal consistency. Some secular ethical doctrines of modern times also bear the ideas of absolutism. For example, the British philosopher *Shaftesbury* sought to prove that people's understanding of morality is of innate nature, invariable and cannot be substantiated by references to human interests and commonweal (*Moral sense, theories of*). *Kant*, as well as *Spencer* developed the principle of absolutism in their ethics. *Intuitionism*, an ethical theory which maintains that moral concepts of good and duty are invariable and absolute, that basic moral truths are discerned directly and need no proof, can serve as an example of a modern trend in moral philosophy which advances the ideas of absolutism. Marxist-Leninist ethics is based on a concrete historical approach to the nature of morality and associates it with social conditions and with people's interests and needs.

ACT, a moral *action*; an action regarded from the standpoint of unity of *motive* and conse-

quences, intentions and deeds, *ends and means*. One can judge of man's acts by the elements in its structure which include: motive, *intention*, *goal*, *deed*, consequences, the agent's appraisal of his own act and his attitude to its appraisal by other people. The role of various elements of an act, especially its motives and consequences, received different assessments in the history of ethics: either the motive is given primary importance (*Moral goodness, theory of*) or only the action itself is considered significant (*Deontological intuitionism*). Those who attributed major significance to the consequences of actions (*Consequential ethics*), believed that the achievement of adequate moral results must also be man's subjective goal (*Hedonism, Eudaemonism, Utilitarianism, Egoism, theories of*). As a rule, they were less interested in the role of a motive in moral actions. Integral conception of an act is more correct which treats it as an action in which the unity of value and operational aspects of man's activities is ensured by harmony of knowledge, convictions and

deeds. Components of the structure of moral act make up the content of moral *duty* fulfilled by man and all of them are taken into consideration in appraising an act (what is done and with what purpose, what is the agent's attitude to his action). In analyzing the significance of various aspects of an act it is important to take into account the role they play in moral relations and activities. E.g., as he fulfils his duty man is not always aware at the given moment of why he acts this way. This does not of course mean that he acts unconsciously. He has no need to motivate his act in every concrete case, to work out a decision, if moral acts have become a *habit*. The seemingly absent moments of an act can always be recreated and the whole activity of a given man analyzed (in case he himself wants to analyze the character of his actions which used to seem natural to him before). Comprehensive analysis and appraisal of an act is possible only if it is not considered in isolation, but in the context of man's *conduct* in general, his moral character as a whole. The

unity of motives and consequences is achieved, established and displayed not in an isolated act of conduct, but in a whole series of acts organized into a system, built into a line of conduct.

ACTION (moral). An act is usually regarded in ethics as a single action if it has led to a definite socially significant result (*Deed*) possessing a positive or negative moral *value* which can be subjected to moral *evaluation* and for the performance of which man can be considered responsible (*Responsibility*). Acts of a purely physiological nature cannot be considered as moral. Moral action is always a social act (rendering assistance, fulfilling promises, deceit, theft, treachery). Acts for which man cannot be held responsible cannot be considered as moral actions either, e.g. acts committed involuntarily (in a state of hypnosis, during infancy, in a state of diminished responsibility), under the influence of purely physical forces. Often, it is also considered that a person does not bear responsibility for acts

committed under coercion or the threat of death. In a moral action the following aspects are distinguished: the *goal*; use of the available means (*Ends and means*); volitional efforts and overcoming of obstacles to achieve the result implied by the very nature of the action; *consequences* to which the action has led as a result of its interaction with external circumstances. All these aspects must be taken into consideration in the moral evaluation of action.

ACTIVITIES (moral), ethical category by means of which the moral aspect is singled out in all the diversity of man's social practice and the specifically moral motives out of all other types of *inducement* (material *interests*, *habits*, *inclinations*): the desire to do *good*, obedience of the sense of *duty*, pursuit of certain *ideals*. Ethics studies precisely this, moral aspect of human activities which on the whole are examined by various sciences. In contrast to *conduct* embracing the totality of man's actions, moral activities in ethics include only those actions which are consciously sub-

ordinated to definite moral goals. Moral concepts are capable of orienting people in social reality and guide their activities only when they reflect the real historical process. Only when the pursuits of people correspond to objective social necessity can they resolve historical tasks, being guided by moral goals. At the same time, there is no doubt as to the independent significance of moral motives in human activities.

ALCOHOLISM [Arab *al* the, *koh'l* powder for staining eyelids], social pathology, variety of *deviant behaviour*. Alcoholism is regarded by science as a disease caused by the systematic abuse of alcoholic beverages, dependence on them and mental and physiological disorders developing on this basis. From ancient times, consumption of alcoholic beverages was habitual in all cultures on ceremonial, sacrificial and other socially integrating occasions as a stimulant or anaesthetic. Alcohol was administered in strictly limited quantities and it was regulated by *customs* and *traditions*. However, there was also

pathological excessive drinking which engendered alcoholism as a social phenomenon. Immoderate drinking was widespread among peoples with weak tribal and social ties, strong faith in the magic and witchcraft, and unstable economic structure, while the desire of a person for a socio-cultural dependence on the community was suppressed and the freedom of moral choice and individual responsibility was proclaimed. All this determined the compensatory vital function of alcohol in the traditional society: the suppression of anxiety, fear, misgivings and lack of confidence in oneself and the future. The 20th-century society is characterized by the rise of individualistic tendencies in all spheres of life and an unprecedented growth of the all-pervading competition. In these circumstances, man feels a need for alcoholic beverages not only as a remedy for social stresses and as a means of relaxation but also as a peculiar mechanism of social integration into a cultural society. However, in the absence of the generally accepted norms of

drinking, the mass-scale consumption of alcoholic beverages leads to alcoholism as a social disease, a disease that affects society at large. Aware of the peril posed by alcoholism, many states undertake to combat it. Since the consumption of alcohol is part and parcel of cultural traditions and historically established forms of personal relations, while raising the culture of intercourse in general, account should be taken of such its form as feast. Immoderate consumption of alcoholic beverages which deserves social censure.

ALIENATION, a process of transformation of the results and products of man's activities into something that exists independently of man and dominating him; distortion of the nature of human activity so that it loses its creative dimension and man becomes depersonalized because social relations take on a form of relations between things. The concept of alienation goes back to German and French Enlightenment which criticized the anti-humanistic character of society in which

social and cultural progress turns against man. This criticism, however, did not go beyond moral denunciation of the inhumanity of existing society (*Moralizing*), nor did it reveal the true social cause of alienation. Marx proved that in an antagonistic class society alienation stems from the social division of labour and is manifested in the predominance of private property in the means of production and exploitation of man by man. Human relations come into being spontaneously, in an uncontrollable way; joint social activities, their results and social links are external and alien with respect to each individual and different social groups. The social world created by man is hostile to, and dominates, its creator, with man having to adapt himself to it (*Man and society*). The products of human labour are opposed to the working man as capital and a social force dominating him and forcing him to work (alienated labour). In ethics, alienation is seen in that the content of the requirements imposed upon people contradicts their vital practical interests and re-

quirements and is reflected by consciousness in the following antitheses: "proper—essential", "goodness—usefulness", "duty—inclination", "virtue—happiness", etc. This is reflected in the distorted concepts dealing with the nature of morality (*Fetishism, Absolutism, Authoritarianism*) and engenders *hypocrisy* and *nihilism*. As a result, in contrast to the hypocrisy of the official ideology and social morality, individuals develop their own "private" ethics (*Duty, Conscience, Irrationalism, Existentialism*). By exposing the root causes of alienation, Marxism showed practical ways to its elimination. These are the revolutionary transformation of society, the elimination of private property, the bridging of the gap between the ruling classes and groups and ordinary citizens, the involvement of the working people in the distribution of the products of their labour and in running state affairs. However, the problem of alienation turned out to be more complicated than the founders of Marxism could surmise. In the course of building socialism, there

cropped up new contradictions and emerged deformations which led to a sharp deterioration of social morals, alienation of the people from political power and other social institutions. Democratization, greater social activity of the masses and legal guarantees for human rights are vital conditions for overcoming these contradictions.

ALL-ROUND INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONALITY. The problem of the integrated, harmonious development of man follows from the understanding of the contradictory nature of society's progress based on the division of labour. As a result of this division, a person performs only part of what makes up human material activity, thus becoming an instrument of work and a distorted one-sided personality, and the level of his abilities sharply lag behind the level of social culture. The integrated development of man consists in such an assimilation of the wealth of social culture, whereby every person becomes an independent and creative

personality. Social division of labour—as distinct from specialization which is the concentration of the efforts of various people in a special occupation—constituted a partitioning of labour itself, i.e., of labour as a means by which the entire world of material and spiritual culture is produced and reproduced, a division of the very labour activities into partial functions and the assignment of one of these functions to each person. Such is the division of the material and the spiritual, of manual and intellectual work, practical and theoretical, executive and managerial activities leading, in the end, to their absolute opposition, which found its expression in the division of society into antagonistic classes. The division of industrial and agricultural labour, the isolation of science, art and ideology into reciprocally opposed spheres means the transformation of many aspects of human life and human abilities into the property of society alone. In a system with such a distorted division of labour, in a system of class relations, man himself becomes the creator of an en-

tire hierarchy of alienated forces standing above him (*Alienation*). The necessity of his actions appears to him as forced on him from without, with which he has no choice but to comply. He is used by society only as a work force. All the basic forms of behaviour in society and even man's consciousness are prescribed as a function "programmed" beforehand. The ruling class morality serves as one of the regulators for his performance of these social functions, and as an expression of forced social standards. Under such conditions, man is compelled to view moral duty as something which is in principle alien to his inner aspirations. Such a status of man characterizes the entire history of antagonistic class society. Socialism eliminates the antagonism of classes. In the process of socialist development, the social division of labour which disfigures the individual, as well as the division of physical and mental, the managerial and executive work are gradually being overcome. This is achieved not by a mechanical combination of "partial" func-

tions engendered by social division and alienation of labour, but by removing such division. It is eliminated by the development of the activity inherent in a communist formation, activity which is not simply diverse but also integral and which becomes the primary need of each person. In the very process of work, man masters all those functions (administrative-supervisory, distributive, managerial, and protective) which previously stood above him (and thus renders their departmental division obsolete). He includes in his personal activity the decision-making in respect to all these tasks as something auxiliary, and becomes a versatile and creative agent, which means the integrated development of the individual. Everything dictated by the needs of society as a whole becomes the necessary substance of the activity of each person and his own need. Thus, the unity of the goals of the individual and society is achieved: the individual identifies his immediate goals with those of society; society does not set forth any goals contradicting the interests of

the full development of all the inner forces and spiritual growth of the individual. The moral essence of resolving a particular problem follows from man and society ceasing to regard each other as a means of achieving one's own goals. In place of diametrically opposite needs and selfish attitudes to moral duty, self-consciousness appears in the immediate relations between people, whereby responsibility for all the affairs of society becomes a determining motive of action. Marxism understands man's integrity as his inner receptivity to the results of the historical-cultural process.

ALTRUISM [F *altruisme*, from It *altrui* for others, somebody else], a moral *principle* prescribing compassion for other people, selfless service to them and readiness for self-sacrifice for their *benefit* and happiness. In moral theory, the concept of altruism was introduced by August *Comte* who used it as a foundation for his ethical system. He linked the moral improvement of society with the inculcation of social altruism in

people which should counteract *egoism*. Similar ideas had also been expounded before him: in early Christianity (*Christian ethics*), in the Middle Ages by Francis of Assisi and in modern times by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, Adam Smith, Rousseau, Herder, Goethe and others. As a moral imperative, altruism emerges as a reaction to the isolation of human interests which is conditioned by the *alienation* (engendered by private property) and when the motives of self-interest and money-grubbing move to the forefront in social life. The appeal of altruism to a selfish and alienated individual is reflected in the *golden rule* of morality and in the Christian commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself". The golden rule accentuates the idea of *equality* in morality, and in the commandment of *love* it stresses the idea of *respect*, *benevolence* and the attitude to others as an end in itself (*Categorical imperative*). As an imperative of equality and *humanity* altruism is one of the normative foundations of *morality* and *humanism*. At the

same time, altruism implies self-denial, for in conditions of the reciprocal alienation of interests the care for one's neighbour is possible only at the expense of one's own personal interests. Marxism points to the inconsistency of the humanistic essence of altruism as a moral principle stemming from the internal interconnection of altruism and egoism, and orientates itself towards a humanistic perspective when their opposition will be eventually overcome (*Collectivism*). *Benevolence* and *philanthropy* are specific behavioural forms of altruism being realized in practice.

AMBITION, a social feeling manifesting itself as a *motive* for actions performed by man to achieve public honours, influence in some sphere of social life. In many respects it is similar to *vanity*; in his ambitious aspirations man takes into account social interests only insofar as they conform to his own purposes. But unlike vanity ambition does not so much crave for recognition on the part of others, as strives to gain a high

social position, influence, and to merit official recognition, honours and rewards ensuing therefrom. In the event such inducement becomes a distinctive feature of a person's behaviour, ambition acquires the significance of a positive *moral quality*.

AMORALISM [Gk *a-* without, L *moralis* custom], a characteristic of the views, the line of conduct and the way of life of an individual, as well as the policy pursued by a political group or a party, a corrupted clan or corporation, which are based on nihilistic attitude to social and moral norms and, primarily, to the common moral views of mankind. The forms of its manifestation are diverse: *cynicism*, *misanthropy*, unscrupulousness in pursuing one's egoistic interests (*Egoism*). Recognition of any immoral means of achieving seemingly moral ends should also be considered immoral (*Jesuitism*, *Machiavellianism*, *Ends and means*), in particular, fanatical cruelty (*Fanaticism*) and demagoguery. Amoralism can ultimately turn into extreme *nihilism* of a man of individualistic outlook whose

protest against the hypocrisy of the ruling morality takes on a form of anarchical riot. Amoralism of this kind which has nothing to do with the revolutionary overthrow of obsolete morality, in fact leads to the justification of immorality. The principle of amoralism was repeatedly given theoretical substantiation in the history of ethics (*Voluntarism*, *Scepticism*, *Relativism*). Elements of amoralism can be found in ethical teachings of the Cynics and some late Sophists of ancient Greece. *Nietzsche*, Ludwig Klages, the ideologists of fascism Giovanni Gentile and Alfred Rosenberg acted as advocates of amoralism in modern ethics. Amoralism in behaviour, frame of mind or in theory becomes widespread during periods of crises and decline of a particular society.

ANTISTHENES of Athens (c. 435-375 B.C.), Greek philosopher, a pupil of *Socrates*, founder of the Cynic school. Working on ethical problems, Antisthenes developed the Socratic idea that happiness and virtue are inherent in man and

depend exclusively on his will and mind. Antisthenes identified happiness with virtue and believed that it consisted in man's inner freedom, complete independence of everything external, primarily of society. He advocated autonomy for the individual, i.e., freedom from social and religious laws. According to him, this freedom can be achieved by means of restricting one's requirements, and returning to the simplicity of man's natural state unaffected by civilization. This is why Antisthenes rejected sensuous pleasures, material benefits, wealth and luxury and recognized only satisfaction of man's basic natural needs. He criticized civilization which gave rise to inequality and social distinctions, rejected public and political activities, pointed out the unnatural character of distinctions between slaves and their owners. Antisthenes's ethical views reflected the ideology of the impoverished strata of Athenian society. His preaching of return to the natural state of man was taken up by Diogenes whose own way of living constituted complete rejection of any

standards of culture and civilization, showing that nothing can prevent an individual from being autonomous.

APATHY [Gk *a-* without, *pathos* suffering], one of the main concepts in the ethics of *Stoicism*, denoting spiritual imperturbability, a state of peace, in which emotions and passions do not interfere with the work of the mind. Apathy, from the standpoint of Stoics, encourages meditation, excluding passion which influences judgments and introduces subjective factors into thinking making it biased. This reveals traces of Oriental religious and philosophical influences, in particular, the teaching of nirvana as absolute tranquility which is the highest state of the human soul. The Stoics' doctrine of apathy is much more extreme than the theories of *Aristotle's* followers, who insisted only on moderation of passions. The Stoic principle of renouncing earthly passions and play of emotions, their demand of *asceticism* and self-contemplation were later employed by Christian morality.

APPROBATIVE THEORIES

[*L approbatio* approval, sanction], theories of morality which determine the origin, basis and meaning of moral concepts proceeding from the fact that they are sanctioned, i.e., approved by some *authority*. Such interpretation of morality is a theoretical expression of moral *authoritarianism*. Approbative theories of three kinds can be distinguished depending on what is regarded as an authority: theological, according to which the will of God is the only law-maker in morality, and good is that which conforms with this will; psychological, according to which good is that which is approved by moral sense (*Moral sense, theories of*); social-approbative, introduced at the turn of the century by French sociologists Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl subjected to criticism the traditional viewpoint that moral concepts are of an objective nature, for the purpose of denouncing *dogmatism* in morality, which they ascribed to almost all the ethical teachings of the past. They pointed out the

connection between moral concepts and society which advances them, the social nature of morality. At the same time, Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl failed to reveal the sources of morality having reduced the essence of moral concepts (*good, evil, etc.*) to moral *sanction* on the part of society (those deeds are good which society approves and those it condemns are evil). They thus confined themselves to the assertion of the most superficial fact that moral ideas are a form of social or collective consciousness. Although Durkheim and Lévy-Bruhl admitted that collective ideas were connected with material living conditions of society, they nevertheless saw the ultimate basis of morality in those ideas themselves and this led them to a subjectivist interpretation of the nature of morality. Subjectivist trend in interpretation of morality was later developed by many non-Marxist sociologists and by neopositivists in ethics.

APPROVAL (moral), see *Sanction*.

AQUINAS, see *Thomas Aquinas*.

ARISTIPPUS from Cyrene (c. 435-c. 355 B.C.), Greek philosopher, the founder and consistent proponent of *hedonism* in ethics, disciple of *Socrates*. He was also influenced by the Sophists. A founder of the Cyrenaic (or hedonist) school of philosophy. The subject-matter of Aristippus's studies is man's predestination and achievement of the highest good. According to Aristippus, sensations are the only source of knowledge and they can be reduced to the feeling of pleasure and suffering. These feelings are the criteria of good and evil, truth and falsehood; all living beings strive for the former and try to avoid the latter. Guided by Socrates's idea of the highest good as the combination of virtue and *happiness*, Aristippus attaches particular importance to the latter. He defines happiness as prolonged pleasure and declares it the criterion of good and the only purpose of action. But man should not become a slave to pleasure, he must keep within

limits, have common sense and see its spiritual aspect. Aristippus's works did not come down to us. His views are known from fragments of Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus and Xenophanes.

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.), Greek philosopher and encyclopaedic scientist, great thinker of antiquity. Aristotle founded his own school (the Lyceum). He rejected his teacher *Plato's* Theory of Forms—the doctrine of ideas as ephemeral forms of things, created the teaching of objective idealism which covered all fields of knowledge of those days and came very close to materialism in understanding natural phenomena. Aristotle wrote three special works on ethics, the main one is "*Nicomachean Ethics*". Aristotle considered objective expediency to be the basis of moral activities and moral virtues. The highest good is the *goal* people strive to achieve for its own sake and is specified by politics, the most important guiding science. The highest good is neither material wealth nor

pleasure, nor even *virtue* alone, it is determined by man's predestination realized in reasonable activities and in harmony between the deed and a corresponding virtue. Existence aimed at achieving the highest good can only be an active one, virtues which are not materialized in action give no pleasure. The highest good presupposes, besides the highest goal, a certain number of lower goals subordinate to it. For achieving one's goal one possesses a virtue which is above all the ability to find one's bearings in choosing the golden mean between the excessive and the deficient. This golden mean cannot be found within the confines of evil; only the best should be selected from the good. Aristotle divided virtues into ethical, or virtues of character (e.g. generosity) and dianoethical, or intellectual (e.g. wisdom). The latter can be developed by means of instruction and training. Virtues are neither fits of passion nor inborn faculties—they are acquired qualities. As it is difficult to find the golden mean between excess and deficiency, moral perfection is a rare,

praiseworthy and excellent achievement. Since virtues become apparent in the means of achieving a goal, it is in man's power, according to Aristotle, to be virtuous, vicious or temperate. Yet striving after true purpose is not a matter of personal choice; man must be born with this striving. He who is a born expert in it is a noble man. Actions and acquired qualities of the soul, according to Aristotle, are not equally dependent on man's will; actions, from beginning to end, are in man's power, while acquired qualities of the soul are opted for only in the beginning and then man does not notice how his character is gradually taking shape. So far as Aristotle's ethical conception is closely connected with his "Politics" which studies social relations, he introduced in "Ethics" the problem of value which he regards as a special case of the problem of justice. Aristotle's analysis of justice is a circumstantial investigation of one of the most important questions of political economy. Despite the fact that Aristotle, as Marx noted, demonstrated historically narrow-

minded class thinking in his analysis, nevertheless, he discovered in the value of a commodity the ratio of equality which cannot be immediately traced. The real purpose of human life, according to Aristotle, is pleasure engendered by activity as such. Aristotle considered contemplation of truth the most attractive kind of activity. In contrast to the activity of practical virtues (military, political) always aimed at achieving a certain purpose and desirable not for its own sake, contemplative activity of reason is notable for its significance and value for its own sake, does not strive to achieve any external good and contains a pleasure of its own which intensifies the energy. This is the kind of life man should strive for. Aristotle's moral ideal as an abstract reflection of the ideas of the antique slave-owning society, proclaims self-contained contemplation of truth aloof from the anxieties and emotions of practical activities to be the highest virtue; leisure (ensured by the slaves' labour and by prosperity achieved on the basis of this labour) to be the precon-

dition for philosophical activities; God existing outside the world and above the world—to be the most perfect and self-sufficient contemplation. Divine pattern of mental contemplative activity is a complicated outcome of separation of mental and physical labour, theoretical quests and practical activities, of independence and vicissitudes of social struggles typical of the Greek polis of the second half of the 4th century B.C. The standard of the golden mean typical of Aristotle's ethics revealed social features of the bearer of this standard—the citizen of the polis on the eve of its fall and conquest by the Macedonian monarchy.

ARROGANCE, negative *moral quality* characterized by disrespectfully contemptuous, haughty attitude to other people (to individuals, certain social strata and people generally) because of the overestimation of one's own merits and egotism. The opposite qualities of arrogance are *modesty* and *respect* of people. The underlying social basis of arrogance is the socio-economic inequality

in an antagonistic class society which permits some to enjoy privileges in property status, rights, accessibility to culture and to claim the role of an elite in society, dooming others to an oppressed status and material and spiritual poverty. In a class society there are widely current philosophical and ethical teachings which theoretically justify arrogance towards the "herd" (e.g. the theory of *Nietzsche* dividing mankind into a majority of slaves and individual supermen; the concept of *Bergson* which counterposes the creative morality of the elect, the heroes, to the dogmatic morals of the crowd). In socialist society, arrogance is usually associated with distinctions in the material and cultural level of people and the manifestation of individualistic psychology (lack of modesty, *conceit*, *vanity*). Socialist morality censures scornful attitude to people as a whole as well as to individuals. Although people's abilities and forms of activity vary, these distinctions do not affect their *dignity*. Each member of a socialist society who honestly fulfils his duties, enjoys the right to be re-

spected, regardless of his specific occupation or social status.

ASCETICISM [Gk *askeo* exercise], a moral *principle* prescribing self-denial, abstention from worldly pleasure and comforts, restraining of sensuality for the sake of achieving some kind of social purpose or moral self-preservation. In the non-mythical form ascetic, i.e., physical and psychological, rules aim at keeping man from shameful weaknesses (gourmandise, laziness, voluptuousness), strengthening the will, preserving sober-mindedness and acquiring a clear consciousness. However, their formal performance not subjugated to man's obligations to other people (*Altruism*, *Beneficence*) do not bear moral meaning. In religious consciousness and doctrine, asceticism is imbued with absolute significance: it is associated with renunciation of earthly benefits and the mortification of the flesh in the name of God. Asceticism was usually contrasted to *hedonism* and *Epicureanism* in pre-Marxist moral teachings. First efforts to impart to it theoretical substantia-

tion were made in religious dogmas and certain philosophical schools of the ancient East, in Pythagorean religious teaching, Stoicism and later in Christianity. In a class society this principle is imbued with an ideological content and is expressed, in particular, in propagating among the people the necessity to reject comforts which the ruling classes enjoys. For instance, the institution of monkhood which envisaged the asceticism of the clergy (fasting, celibacy, self-torment) created the halo of sanctity around them and propagated the idea of abstinence among the working people. Revolutionary bourgeois ideologists subjected religious asceticism to criticism (*Humanism*), but their rehabilitation of human needs was inwardly contradictory. Bourgeois society, proclaiming man's right to pleasure, and making private property the universal criterion of human relations, distorts the very nature of man's needs confining them to the one-sided sense of possession. Asceticism was at times preached by the ideologists of the oppressed classes in protest

against the luxury of the propertied classes and as a way to mobilize forces in the struggle for a just society (peasant and early proletarian movements). Various theories of equalitarian communism also contain elements of asceticism, propagating the reduction of material requirements of all members of society to a minimum. Today, the ideology of certain sections of capitalist society (lower urban strata, groups of immigrants, students, etc.) that participate in democratic movements includes some principles of asceticism as far as they are counterposed to the existing bourgeois morality, to consumerism and the ideals of hedonism. At the same time, anarcho-asceticism is developing as a special form of moral *nihilism*. Such asceticism attracting some elements of the privileged sections of society, acts as an overthrower of culture and morality. Supporters of asceticism of this kind regard extremist acts of immoralism as the principal means of shattering the mechanisms of society's functioning. In certain cases under socialist conditions, asce-

ticism can become a form of re-animation of petty-bourgeois morality manifest in equalitarian ideas and propaganda of preserving poverty and backwardness as levers of revolutionary enthusiasm, in trampling of cultural and moral values. The idea of asceticism is alien to scientific socialism so far as it intends to create highly developed social production to fully satisfy people's requirements, though a temporary necessity to restrain people's requirements is likely to arise in the course of building socialism, under certain conditions. Usually it is connected with overcoming extreme economic and political difficulties. Still the requirement of self-restriction cannot serve as a universal principle of socialist morality, which proceeds from the principle, "Everything for the sake of man, everything for the benefit of man". Socialist morality also rejects the other extreme—that of making the pursuit of enjoyment one's *purpose of life*, the advocacy of dissipation and luxury.

ATARAXIA [Gk: calmness], a category of ancient Greek ethics defining the state of tranquility, free from emotional disturbance and anxiety. Classical thinkers believed a wise man should strive for ataraxia which promotes unprejudiced meditations. They had various ideas of how ataraxia could be achieved. Materialists (*Democritus, Epicurus* and *Lucretius*) saw it in the cognition of the Universe, overcoming fear and prejudices, achieving tranquility and inner harmony, while according to the ethics of the adherents of *scepticism* (*Pyrrho*) ataraxia could be achieved by abstention from making judgments on what is good and evil, true and false, by reconciliation with reality (*Apathy*). Happiness, *Pyrrho* held, lies in imperturbability and absence of suffering. Although the psychology of social man includes an element of tranquility, ataraxia elevated to the level of an ethical principle runs counter to an active social position.

ATTITUDE TO NATURE, a sphere of man's social activity, which is based on ethical values

(*Bioethics*). One's attitude to nature is dictated by the prevailing pattern of production and based on social ties between men. In subjective terms, one's attitude to nature provides a projection, as it were, of the criteria and values prevailing in interpersonal relations. Three major historical types and, correspondingly, three value-related models of attitude to nature may be identified. In the initial stage of development in which life was sustained largely by hunting and gathering, man's attitude to nature was largely one of adaptation. Primitive man's dependence on available natural resources was reflected in his conception of the world and a superstitious fear of nature. Nature was viewed as a supreme being and an object to be held in awe and religiously worshipped. As the forces of production grew and particularly with the transition to machine production, man gradually learnt to make natural forces serve him, to adapt them to his own needs and to transform natural substances as he saw fit. Private ownership of the developing forces of pro-

duction, however, led to exploitation of natural resources degenerating into wanton pillage of them. In this context, natural environment appears as merely an external object to be exploited. Utilitarian, commercial psychology deprives nature of any vestige of ethical value, reducing it to an instrument for deriving economic profit. Today we are witnessing a rise in the struggle of the world democratic public for environmental protection. New forms of attitude to nature are appearing in the course of this struggle (*Ecological ethics*). Considerable changes in cultural and value orientation are needed, along with new technological solutions and social and economic transformations, to overcome difficulties in the interaction of society and nature resulting from the growing scale and intensity of man's economic activities during the scientific and technological revolution. The wealth of man's sensual nature also reflects the diversity of natural relations, and, thus, preservation of the environment in its integrity, concern for the vegetable and animal

kingdoms are of direct humanistic importance associated with universal human interests, including those of future generations. Solution of global ecological problems depends, moreover, on social and moral factors. This is how ecology leads to ethics. Ethics historically dealt above all with man's obligations towards society, other people and himself. His obligations towards nature remained outside its scope. At the same time, there were theories which attached universal cosmic importance to morality. The present ecological situation in the West suggests the need to overcome traditional humanistic bounds of morality and to regenerate the so-called universal ethics which does not differentiate man from other living beings as regards their value. Ideas of universal ethics elaborated in the past, as a rule, by people of culture (Henry Thoreau, *Tolstoy*, *Gandhi*, *Schweitzer*, et al.), existed rather in the form of ideals and socio-psychological moods, than as a comprehensive ethical conception, and were often a converted form of the critique of

class society. In reality, ethics also embraces the ecological aspect. Still, it is not nature itself which is the object of moral assessment, but man's attitude to nature that is in fact social attitude. Only a fundamentally humanistic thrust in ethics creates the moral climate which makes it possible to overcome ecological difficulties impeding social progress and undermining a responsible attitude to nature. The recognition of the responsibility of man for environmental protection is a fact of socialist social awareness. However, it is also an important task of the public in the struggle against narrow economic pragmatism, departmental interests, the fetishism of the plan, national narrow-mindedness and other forms of group egoism.

ATTITUDE TO WOMEN, one of the most important moral attitudes. The attitude of a man to a woman "reveals to what extent the natural behaviour of man became humane ... to what extent he himself in his individual being is at the same time a social being" (*Marx*). This attitude, as well as the real rela-

tions between sexes, is a historical phenomenon determined by the mode of production and the social system. In most societies, the differentiation of labour by sexes was simultaneously a sex stratification, i.e., an hierarchical system placing male activities above those of females. In continuing humanistic traditions, socialism has always actively supported the idea of the emancipation of women and their equality with men. However, in reality, due to material and other difficulties, the social equality of men and women is formal to a certain extent: women have gained access to many traditionally male occupations and social activities. However, since the burden of the family has not decreased emancipation has become a double load. Besides, the essence of social equality was interpreted so literally, in disregard of anthropological and cultural differences, that women began to be engaged in activities which were unusual for them or even detrimental to their health. The attitude to woman in socialist society should be based on the follow-

ing principles: (1) woman is not an object of guardianship and power of man but is an equal participant in social and personal activities, a partner of man; (2) this partnership covers all spheres of social, labour, political, cultural, family and everyday life where women should enjoy equal opportunities with men. This, however, does not imply a psychological and social identity of the sexes. Since the woman possessed certain vital peculiarities associated with motherhood and the rearing of children, it gives her the moral right for special care and attention on the part of society as a whole and the male population in particular.

AUGUSTINE, Saint (Augustinus Sanctus Aurelius, 354-430), Christian theologian, a prominent patristic, the author of several hundred works; the most important of which are: "De Trinitate" (The Trinity) and "De Civitate Dei" (The City of God). His views constituted one of the main sources of early scholasticism and doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.

Augustine asserted the theological conception of history, laying emphasis on the contrast between the initial principles of distinguishing the earthly from the heavenly: "...Two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self." The teaching of predestination, of divine grace, of the essence of the highest good and the supreme evil (the first one in the eternal life and the second—in the eternal death, both beyond the limits of earthly existence) determine the main principles of the ethics of Augustine: God is the source and criterion of morality which is opposite to earthly sensuality, God is the embodiment of all good, the original *sin* is the source of evil, the mark of Cain on the human race. The individual's activity manifested in his free will has been of an exceptionally negative significance since the time of the Fall. Thus, a true Christian exterminates willfulness in himself, he is the slave of God, he is a nobody, the dust on God's feet. According to Au-

gustine, Christian virtues constitute the consistent negation of pagan ones (vices in the disguise): the individual's passivity instead of activity, humbleness instead of courage, belief in God Almighty instead of wisdom, blind love for God instead of justice, and the hope of heavenly salvation. Thus, Augustine demands extreme *asceticism* and repudiation of one's individuality, implicit submission to God's testaments proclaimed by His servants. In his "Confessions", which contains a striking account of his early life and conversion, Augustine revealed the futility of human efforts, the inability of man to free himself from sin until he submits wholly to Providence and becomes an instrument of divine will. Only he who turns to God can cherish the hope of salvation, that is why heretics must be forced back to the Church for their own sake. Augustine's treatises, with their *fanaticism* and *authoritarianism*, served as a source of the theory and practice of the Inquisition. Augustine's ideas are still widely used by theologians.

AURELIUS, Marcus (121-180), Roman Emperor, Stoic philosopher and writer (*Stoicism*). His only work, "Meditations", is a collection of aphorisms and reflections on morality, which he considers as inseparable from religion. According to him, man's moral behaviour is guided by his reason, which is part and parcel of universal divine reason. The latter ensures a harmonious and just order in the Universe, in which man must find his place in accordance with his innate rational guiding principle. Nothing that usually causes pleasure or suffering (wealth and poverty, glory and disgrace, life and death) can be evaluated in terms of good and evil, since they can fall to the lot of both worthy and unworthy people. He who rejects pleasure-seeking, raises himself above passions and regards everything around him as a manifestation of the universal cosmic law, acts in a really reasonable and, consequently, moral way. Any attempt to change the existing state of things in the world should be censured as an attempt to do injustice to nature

and society. Although he speaks much of man's social duties, of the necessity for devotion to the common cause ("That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good for the bee"), his ethics is still very individualistic. He believed that one can achieve moral perfection only through self-absorption and cognition of the nature of the absolute, through realizing the transiency of human existence and the inevitability of death. Marcus Aurelius's ethical doctrine, calling for obedience and patience, exercised considerable influence on *Christian ethics*.

AUTHORITARIANISM [L *autoritas* power, influence], a form of *dogmatism* in morality which manifests itself in the method of substantiating moral rules. Authoritarian interpretation of morality considers reference to an authoritative person (*Authority*) who issues moral precepts to be the best substantiation of these very precepts. Authoritarianism is most typical of religious doctrines of morality, which declare God's will to be the prime criterion

and basis for morality. Thus, *Neo-Protestantism* considers the absolute will of God to be the only source of moral principles which is never to be subjected to rational analysis. The essence of authoritarianism actually lies in that it envisages blind implementation of moral precepts proclaimed from above without understanding their social significance. Marxist ethics holds that moral precepts do not have any subjective source (someone's will or order), but are objectively based. Moral precepts act as an obliging force to the extent to which they correspond to objective needs of people and to the laws of their social existence. This is one of the points of distinction between morality and legality, where the norm is made valid by official state legislation (*Morality and law*).

AUTHORITY [L *autoritas* power, influence], distinguishing features of a person, group or organization due to which they have won *trust* and, owing to this, can influence the views and behaviour of other people in a particular field of activity

or social life in general. Authority is one of the factors contributing to sustaining social *discipline* and preserving continuity in social development. The attitude to authority can assume an extreme form of *authoritarianism*. Particularly characteristic in this case are the ideology of the cult of a leader and the ideology of *nihilism*. A genuine moral authority can be won only through undeviating service to the interests of the people and it cannot be decreed from above. Such authority is totally at odds with the personality cult, i.e., the faith in the infallibility of an authoritative person and blind submission to his will. Authority should be based on a sober assessment of the activities of persons and organizations.

AUTONOMOUS ETHICS [Gk *autos* self, *nomos* law], a kind of ethical theory deducing morality from its own laws and attributing self-sufficing meaning to its principles. In contrast to it, heteronomous ethics (Gk *heteros* another) bases morality on any authority outside itself. *Hedonism*, *eudaemonism* and

utilitarianism are the varieties of heteronomous ethics, according to which morality is deduced from the concepts of pleasure, *happiness* and benefit. The idea of autonomous ethics was already present in the views of British moralists of the 17th and 18th centuries (*Shaftesbury, Hutcheson*, et al.) who postulated the existence of a special moral sense independent of both social experience and man's material requirements; thus, morality was interpreted as something primordial. *Kant* gave a detailed substantiation of the autonomy of morality. Opposing the prevailing ethical tradition and entering into direct polemics with French materialists who deduced morality from human nature, he attributed an a priori status to morality: man's existence must be an implementation of primordial self-evident moral principles. *Kant* also attaches moralistic significance to his conclusions, as he believed that behaviour is moral only if it is motivated exclusively by respect for moral law (*Categorical imperative*) and is free from extra-moral motives — selfishness,

pursuit of happiness, socially prestigious aims, etc. The idea of autonomous ethics in one or another form is adopted by various modern ethical schools (*intuitionism, Neo-Protestantism, existentialism*, etc.). The very dilemma of autonomy and heteronomy of morality is superficial from the point of view of Marxism. The source of morality lies beyond its limits and in this sense morality is heteronomous. At the same time, morality is autonomous, it has its own specifics, its own logic of development, and is not deduced directly from objective economic factors.

AUTONOMY [Gk *autos* self, *nomos* law], ability of an individual as a moral subject to exercise self-determination on the basis of one's own internal laws. The need for autonomy was already realized in the antiquity by *Democritus* and *Socrates* who said of himself: "I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason, whatever the reason may be which upon reflection appears to me to be the best." Autonomy was declared

a general principle of conduct by Martin Luther who opposed the *authoritarianism* of the Roman Catholic Church. It is reflected in his statement: "I can do no other." The problem of autonomy was elaborated in ethical terms by Anthony *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson* and was theoretically and consistently treated by *Kant* (*Autonomous ethics*). Shaftesbury and Hutcheson saw the veracity of moral judgements and actions in their independence of the influence of *authority*, of hedonistic, utilitarian and religious motives. But Kant associated autonomy not only with freedom from external influences but also with the universality of the moral choice (*Categorical imperative*). Autonomy is above self-centred arbitrariness since it is based on moral self-restraint conditioned by timidity, care for other people (*Altruism*) and the yearning for improvement. While preserving human dignity and responsibility, moral autonomy makes it possible for man to be free of arbitrary social precepts, the dictates of power and not to lose self-control in confronting

the elements, sickness or the threat of death (*Moral freedom*).

AVICENNA, see *Ibn-Sina*.

AXIOLOGICAL INTUITIONISM, see *Intuitionism*.

AXIOLOGY (ethical) [Gk *axia* value, *logos* teaching], the theory studying philosophical aspects of moral *values*. Axiology appeared in the second half of the 19th century as a special philosophical discipline studying the nature of economic, aesthetic, moral, historical and other values. The term itself was introduced by the French philosopher Paul Lapie in the early 20th century, although various questions dealing with the nature of values have been repeatedly discussed during the whole history of philosophy. Axiology, as the branch of ethics which studies the problems of *good* and *evil*, is sometimes distinguished from *deontology*—the theory of duty. The basic problems of moral axiology are: what is good, is it an inherent property of man's certain acts or is it simply ascribed

to man by moral consciousness? In what way do people discern good or evil in actions (evaluate them)? What is the origin and the nature of the concept of good in moral consciousness? Various ways of interpreting the nature and the origin of moral values are known in the history of ethical teachings: naturalistic, objective-idealistic and subjective-idealistic. The source of moral good was seen either in human nature, in man's natural pursuit of pleasure or happiness (*Naturalism, Hedonism, Eudaemonism*), or in God's will or reason (*Neo-Protestantism, Neo-Thomism*),

or in laws and properties of the Universe, and sometimes in feelings and emotional reactions (*Neopositivism, Moral sense, theories of*). Historical materialism treats moral and other values as neither natural nor supernatural properties, but specific social phenomena. Nature in itself, outside the context of man's activities, possesses no value at all, neither good nor evil. Society qualifies an act as good or evil only in connection with man's social practice. Such an assessment reflects prevailing social relations.

B

BARTH, Karl (1886-1968), Swiss theologian, the founder of the neo-orthodox school (*Neo-Protestantism*). The influence of his theology continues in Western Europe and America among both the theologian community and secular scholastic philosophers. Barth's teaching continues the tradition of *Luther* and *Calvin*, and partly of *Kierkegaard*. In contrast to *liberal Christianity*, Barth's theology advances the idea of the supremacy and transcendence of God compared with the earthly existence of man: God is absolute, man is sinful and confined in his capacities. These ideas have been reflected in Barth's ethical concepts: the New Testament commandments are not positive precepts but mere models of absolute virtue which man can never reach, and which only reveal his imperfec-

tion and make him critical of himself. According to Barth, man has never been good and will never be, and for that reason his true morality may be manifested only in his equally denouncing whatever happens to him and whatever he does himself. In many aspects Barth was critical of capitalism. In his own time, he firmly opposed German fascism and after World War II he repeatedly refused to denounce communist ideas. He believed that the Church should not side with any of the warring factions, parties or systems. In this, he differs drastically from other modern theologians, for example, such representatives of Neo-Protestantism as Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr who directly contrast the conceptions of neo-orthodoxy with socialist and communist ideas.

BELINSKY, Vissarion Grigoryevich (1811-1848), Russian revolutionary democrat, philosopher, literary critic and journalist. Brought up in the traditions of the Russian liberation movement, the progressive ideas of Russian and Western literature and philosophy, and always remaining a true humanist, Belinsky passed through a serious evolution—from the ideas of enlightenment to revolutionary democratism, from idealism to materialism. In the 1830's, under the influence of German classical philosophy, especially that of *Hegel*, Belinsky examined the sphere of morality, the conflict between good and evil as a manifestation of the "eternal idea". The latter, as he believed, is also embodied in human will but does not deny its freedom. Therefore, an individual himself may choose his path in life: the path of good, i.e. of subordination of one's personal motives to the supreme will, the interests of Motherland and mankind, or the path of evil, i.e., that of egoism and concern only for one's own self. In this period of his life, Belinsky gave priority to

the rational a priori analysis over the empirical examination of the truth. The universal nature of the law of morality which requires that man's actions should always accord with his sense of duty, rests upon the principle of necessity and universality of reason. The problems of ideal, purpose and improvement of man, the relations between the individual and society, the determination of the principles of morality form the core of Belinsky's ethical thought. He believes that it is the humane ideal that should determine the meaning of man's existence. Belinsky explained the difference in the concepts of good and evil held by various nations by the fact that these nations are at different stages of historical evolution of conscience. In assessing a given act of conduct, it is important to know a person's motives, for if the intention includes some degree of selfishness, the act is to be regarded as immoral. In the 1840's a scientific, realistic and materialist approach to ethics prevailed in his views. The evolution of his outlook can be traced to his

study of contemporary society in which "everything human, in any way wise, noble or talented is doomed to oppression and suffering ... and in which the very freedom of thought has been extinguished". Belinsky's criticism of this "disgusting" reality (i.e., the reality of Russian serfdom and Western bourgeois mode of life) seems to be as fruitful as his elaboration of a positive social and moral ideal which, in his writings, acquires democratic and socialist features. (All men should be brothers and happiness of one depends on the happiness of all.) Belinsky rejects the harmony of social organism if it is based on suffering of individuals. He is equally critical of religious ethical concepts. He believes that evil is not to be sought inside the individual but rather inside the society, and, thus, once social order is changed moral climate will also change. In a reasonably organized society, in which class and rank privileges have been eradicated, the rights, dignity and liberties of an individual will be restored and every person will become a unique personality. Belinsky

emphasized the unity of ethical, moral and practical aspects of social life and saw material need as a starting point in moral improvement, but he also stressed the value of such human qualities as spiritual affinity combining feeling, reason and will. At the same time, in his understanding of the nature of morals he still stuck to *naturalism* and anthropology. He exerted strong influence on social thought in Russia ("Letter to Gogol", 1847). In addition to letters which are important to grasp the evolution of Belinsky's views, see also such writings as "Literary Dreams" (1834), "An Attempt of a System of Moral Philosophy" (1836), "Hamlet, a Drama by Shakespeare" (1837), "The Idea in Art" (1841), "Alexander Pushkin's Works" (1843-1846), "A Guide to the Study of Modern History" (1844), "Parisian Secrets" (1844), "A View of Russian Literature of 1846" (1847).

BENEFICENCE (often identified with good deeds), an action of positive moral value assessed by moral conscience as *good*.

Sometimes the term beneficence is treated in general social terms, while a good deed in a specifically moral sense (by analogy with the concepts of "benefit" and "good"). In this respect beneficence implies action (usually purposeful), the objective result and the consequences of which are in compliance with the interests of people and which are useful to society. As regards a good deed, it may mean an act committed in accordance with the standards of morality and induced by moral motives (in the name of lofty ideals, or the interests of a person or society). In non-Marxian ethics these concepts were often opposed to each other, while Marxist ethics treats both in their dialectical unity (*Beneficiary, Consequential ethics, Moral goodness, theory of*).

BENEFICIARY, an object of *beneficence*, a person or a group of persons in whose favour an act of beneficence is performed. If beneficence is viewed as a special type of duty of an individual before all others and the community as a

whole (Deontological *intuitionism*), beneficiary is regarded as the only interested person who needs a moral act of the benefactor, while the community as a whole and other persons are considered as indifferent to this act. From the angle of Marxist ethics, any moral act has a wide social meaning, and its moral significance should not be identified with the gain of the beneficiary since the satisfaction of the interests of an individual, if this is not detrimental to other people or a community, is the actual goal of socialist society.

BENEFIT, a general notion used to designate the positive *value* of objects and phenomena. Conception of benefit is formed in the process and on the basis of the practical attitude of people towards the external world. Natural and social phenomena become benefits as long as they meet positive human needs and promote social progress. The concept of benefit is a basic concept in the theory of ethics. It was introduced by ancient philosophers who perceived it as the purpose

of man's activities (*Plato, Aristotle*). In the ancient world, benefits were subdivided into external and inner ones, the latter being subdivided into corporeal and spiritual. Benefit characterizes human activity as a whole. It acquires moral content as the highest good, i.e., the aim of the aims, the ultimate perfect aim of human activity. In the ethics of the ancient world, the highest good was identified with *happiness* the components of which, besides the perfect moral state of the soul, are also wealth, good fortune, health and other factors which can go beyond man's control. Subsequently, the concepts of benefit and the highest good began to be increasingly associated with *good* (occasionally the notions "benefit" and "good" are used synonymously in everyday speech). Owing to the contradictory nature of the historical process and the opposite interests of different classes, "what is a boon for the one is necessarily a bane for the other; each new emancipation of one class always means a new oppression of another class" (*Engels*). This

does not mean that there cannot be benefit common to all mankind and that there are no objective criteria for the evaluation of different phenomena covered by the concept of benefit. What it really means is that the definition of benefit in terms of the *interests* of the people is incomplete, because these interests themselves depend upon social being and its historical laws. Soviet philosophic literature dealing with ethics does not provide a well-elaborated theory of benefit. However, the concept of benefit plays an important role in the ideological practice of Soviet society where it means the well-being of man. Thus, the slogan purposefully put into practice reads: "Everything for the benefit of man."

BENEVOLENCE, compassionate and active love reflected in the readiness to help anyone in need and extended to all people and, ultimately, to all living beings. The idea of benevolence comprises two aspects, the emotional, i.e., taking to heart someone else's suffering as one's own, and the practical

one, i.e., the impulse to render real assistance. Without the former, benevolence degenerates into cold *philanthropy* and without the second, it turns into empty sentimentality. Benevolence as a moral principle is rooted in the archaic tribal solidarity which made it imperative to help one's kin but excluding "outsiders". It is not by chance that the words "kin" and "kind" are of the same root: if someone belongs to my kin that person is kind to me, and one cannot expect kindness from a stranger. True, tribal solidarity may be extended also to those beyond the circle of "one's own", but such persons have to be somehow associated with it (obligations towards a guest, the attitude to the bonded people and newcomers, etc.). However, neither this ancient morality of regulated customs and obligations towards the rigidly limited categories of people nor a later concept associated with the rise of civilization, for instance in the ancient world, recommending the exercise of restraint in the treatment of the defeated enemy, are not yet benevolence in the

true meaning of the word. We can speak of benevolence only when all barriers between one's kin and aliens are removed if not in everyday practice then at least at the level of ideas or individual heroic moral acts and when someone's suffering is no longer an object of cold condescension. Benevolence was first preached by world religions which transcended the bounds of the ethnocentric mentality, primarily *Buddhism* and *Christianity* (*Christian ethics*). Buddhism perceives life in general as suffering, and that is why it interprets compassion as a universal principle underlying the attitude to everything alive. The ideal of Buddhism is a hermit who would rather be eaten to feed a hungry lion. Its principle is *ahimsa* (harmlessness). Beasts as the object of benevolence are treated like people which logically follows from the concept of the transmigration of souls. Christianity introduces a specific motivation of benevolence: one's love of Christ who places himself in a position of help to all in need of compassion. This opens an alternative for every believer: either to ren-

der benevolence to the Lord or to deny it. A Greek Christian thinker and preacher, St John Chrysostom (d. 407), says that benevolence is more surprising than the working of miracles: by achieving a miracle through his prayer, a man accepts God's gift which is normal. By performing benevolence he can become a giver to the Lord which is incredible. The ideal of benevolence requires that distinctions between one's own and aliens be renounced. This unites even those separated by the group intolerance. For a long time, Soviet theory of ethics dealt inadequately with the concept of benevolence and even rejected it, largely because it believed that social transformations were expected to bring about a happy order of things which would render benevolence totally unnecessary. Experience has demonstrated otherwise. Even if property inequality is eliminated, there will remain loneliness, old age, illnesses and other sufferings, and they require not only social care but also more sensitive individual compassion.

BENTHAM, Jeremy (1748-1832), English philosopher of morality and law, proponent of the ethics of *utilitarianism*. He denounced theories of moral sense (*Moral sense, theories of*) and natural rights. In his "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation" (1789) and "Deontology, or the Science of Morality" (1834), he theoretically justified the experimental nature of the source and basis of morality which he, like hedonists, saw in the pursuit of pleasure. His view is that usefulness is what is common to all acts of conduct bringing pleasure. Utility is the sole goal and standard of conduct, the foundation of happiness. Society for Bentham is a totality of individuals and social interest — a sum of personal interests. Hence, the goal of moral life is to secure "the greatest happiness of the greatest number". This happiness may be calculated (by using "felicific calculus"). With this aim in view, he constructs a scale of pleasures and pains. Bentham replaces the French materialists' theory of correctly understood interest with his theory of the right

method of calculation. His teaching glorifies private interest as the basis of social welfare, and bourgeois society as heading towards tranquility, equality, wealth and abundance. Applied to the realm of law and politics, the doctrine of utility served as a theoretical platform for the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in the struggle against state interference in social life and expanding suffrage. Owen relied on Bentham's principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number as a basis for his own ethical theory of utopian socialism.

BERDYAEV, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1874-1948), Russian theologian and philosopher. Berdyaev attempted to combine certain tenets of Marxism and Kantianism, as well as *Nietzsche* and to provide ethical justification of socialism. His hostile attitude towards the democratic movement and materialistic theory soon led him to God-seeking and mysticism. He actively contributed to the programmatic collections of Russian idealists: "Problems of Idealism" (1902), "Landmarks"

(1909), to the anti-revolutionary collection of articles, "From the Depth" (1918). His outlook is that of a religious existentialist. His doctrine postulates (following the trend of German mystics of the 16th and 17th centuries), that freedom is primary in relation to being and that it is beyond God and is rooted in "nothingness". This is the basic premise of Berdyaev's *theodicy*: God is thus relieved of responsibility for world evils the source of which is "uncreated freedom"—boundless spiritual potentiality. Thanks to the freedom spirit can be released from God. Due to the Fall, the world of nature and history (forms of manifestation of the primal spiritual reality) is subordinated to *alienation* and disappearance of the individual in the whole, to socialization which erases human originality. This is the realm of pain and violence—the "ethics of law" which outwardly differentiates between good and evil, divides people into kind and vicious, is supported by *fear* before the law and punishment and thereby generates *fanaticism, formalism* and *hypocrisy*. It is only the "ethics of

grace", with its *redemption* for *guilt* and salvation for all (the kind and the vicious alike) by Christ, and the "ethics of creation", which removes the evaluation of deeds in terms of good and evil (this betrays Berdyaev's subjectivism), that enable man to respond to the call of God who does not rule the enslaved world but is a revelation to it. In the realm of history, the dialectics is revealed of relations between freedom in God and freedom in man, they are synthesized and God-man-kind evolves. It is not only man who needs God but God also needs man. Though embodied in things, man's creative activity falls under the spell of necessity and non-freedom (in this sense the spiritual experience of man is tragic) it nevertheless brings closer the ideal of God-man envisioned by Berdyaev eschatologically (*Eschatology*). When this ideal is attained, history comes to an end and the eternal reign of spirit, freedom and immortality commences. Here we deal with the so-called religious conciliarism, i.e., voluntary communion of people, with their individual personal traits

retained and their relations being mediated by God. Contrasting the individual to the social, identifying the personality with spiritual principles, Berdyaev's concept is essentially a form of modernizing Christian teaching. Berdyaev's writings: "The Philosophy of Freedom" (1911), "The Meaning of the Creative Act" (1916), "Freedom and the Spirit" (1927), "The Destiny of Man" (1931), "Essays on Eschatological Metaphysics" (1947), "Self-knowledge" (1949).

BERGSON, Henri (1859-1941), French idealist philosopher, representative of *intuitionism*. Bergson's ethical doctrine is expounded in "The Two Sources of Morality and Religion" (1932). Bergson treats social relations between individuals by analogy with the interrelationship between the cells in an organism. According to Bergson, the natural (closed) morals are instinctive and require that the interests of an individual be unconditionally subordinated to the interests of a whole, the way a bee subordinates its interests to a beehive. Its injunctions are

dogmatic and impersonal: it should be done because it needs to be done. The aim of this morality is to prepare the nation if not for attack, then for defence, but in any case—for an act of war. According to Bergson, two maxims are easily reconciled: "Man is God to another man" and "Dog eat dog". In the first instance, a fellow-tribesman is meant, and in the second—an alien. The militancy of the instinctive morality prevails over all the stratifications of civilization, for it is rooted in the biological nature of man. The conservative trends of the closed morals are supplemented with a static religion. The highest type of morality is open morals rooted in intuition with which only the selected few are endowed, who thus can overcome the biological morals and join the "vital impulse" (*élan vital*) and become imbued with mythical love for all mankind. In Bergson's view, this kind of love is the same as God's love for his creation. A dynamic religion is associated with the open morals. Only men of genius, saints and mystics can overcome the inborn inertia

of mankind and show it a path of moral perfection. The propagation of mystical open morals can save mankind from the threat of annihilation which became quite feasible because of the excessive progress of human intellect that has given birth to present-day science and technology. These ideas illustrate the *irrationalism* and elitist nature of Bergson's ethics.

BETRAYAL, violation of *loyalty* to a common cause, bonds of solidarity, comradeship or love. The negative appraisal of betrayal given by moral consciousness is determined by the positive significance lent to these bonds.

BIGOTRY, a *moral quality* showing one's disposition to adhere to obsolete principles, customs and traditions, the inability to grasp and support the new, the progressive, the dictates of the day (cf. *Feeling for the new*). In terms of morality bigotry is expressed in moral *dogmatism* and *absolutism*. The roots of bigotry as a social phenomenon should be sought in

conservatism of the established social relations and habits and also in the interests of those social groups which deliberately oppose anything which may change their position. Bigotry is a characteristic feature of the classes and social groups which are not interested in altering and promoting social relations which could infringe upon their selfish interest. In socialist society the manifestations of bigotry are caused by the gap between the interests pursued by the bureaucratic managerial establishment and public interests. In the final analysis this is associated with an insufficient development of democracy and diverse forms of self-government by the people. In the personal aspect bigotry is conditioned by one's social passivity, complacency and the conservatism of one's personal position.

BIOETHICS (biomedical ethics), a field of *ethics* which evolves at the intersection of medical ethics and the ethics of science. Its emergence was largely prompted by radical changes in medicine and public

health services under the impact of scientific and technological progress. The term bioethics was introduced in 1971 by a US scientist Van R. Potter who regarded bioethics as a link bridging the gap between traditional natural sciences and humanities. Today bioethics is treated as an interdisciplinary field of research and expert examination whose subject are the problems of value involving relations between the physician and the patient, as well as ethical problems of biomedical research and behaviouristic sciences, e.g. in experimentation on man; ethical aspects of allocation and distribution of resources for the public health system and medical aid; ethical problems of experiments on animals and, in a broader aspect, the interaction of man and living nature. The centrepiece of bioethics is the concept of medical practice as a specific type of moral responsibility of the physician towards his work (*Professional ethics*) since the physician has the right and even the duty to intrude into the vital processes and functions of human organism.

Bioethics deals with a broad range of problems and covers such so far poorly related fields as moral and ethical problems involved in genetic engineering and genetic therapy; the moral aspects of the transplantation of organs; moral problems associated with the spread of new childbirth techniques (artificial insemination, maternity "on hire", i.e., the bearing of the foetus by a woman substituting the legal mother of the child, etc.); ethical standards of the public health system; *euthanasia*, etc. On the whole, the development of bioethics is characterized by the growing moral significance of such values as health and a healthy way of life and by the fact that society should pay attention to these issues.

BRAVERY, a *moral quality* characterizing man's ability to suppress fear, overcome diffidence, misgivings concerning difficulties and unfavourable consequences. Bravery provides for man's resolute actions to further the goal he set himself, allegiance to the chosen ideals and principles in spite of

hostile circumstances and pressure on the part of other people, frank expression of one's opinion particularly when it diverges from the accepted views or those sanctioned by the authorities, irreconcilability to evil and injustice. Specific expression of bravery are *feats, initiatives*. Bravery is closely associated with such moral qualities as *staunchness, loyalty to principles*, self-possession, resourcefulness and directly approximates *courage*. Its opposites are *cowardice, timidity*, time-serving. The moral evaluation of courageous deeds depends on their specific social content. Bravery is morally justifiable if it is directed at furthering humanistic and just aims, if it springs from urgent social needs and is embodied in humane and socially progressive acts. Otherwise acts of personal bravery are caused by despair (acts performed in defiance of the logic of history), bravado, ostentatious oppositionism, anarchist rebelliousness, *nihilism* and adventurism, although when expressed in such destructive forms it nevertheless

inspires respect as a personal trait.

BUDDHISM [Skr *buddha* enlightened], one of the world religions. It was founded in the 6th and 5th centuries B.C. in India, spread to Central and Southeast Asia. Buddhism among Buryats, Kalmyks and Tuvinians adhere to Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) that developed in the 14th and 15th centuries in Tibet. Buddha, prince Siddhartha Gautama of the Sakyas (also called Sakyamuni, i.e., a sage of the Sakyas) who supposedly lived in the Ganges River valley (India), is considered to be the founder of Buddhism. As a young man he led a happy life in the palace of his father but then was shocked by his encounters with an old man, a sick man, with a corpse and with an ascetic. As a result, he decided to devote himself to asceticism and to seek the cure for suffering. Having attained enlightenment through meditation, he became a wandering prophet of the new religion and morality and a founder of the first Buddhist

monk community. Scanty facts of his life and preaching can be found in the canonical literature of Buddhism. More detailed portrayal of his life (Mahavastu, Buddhacharita, Lalita Vistara) dates from the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Information in these writings might have been an echo of the real events combined with descriptions of miracles born of the imagination. Physical death, for Buddhists, does not mean the end of one's existence because a dead man is reborn in another man, in a divinity, spirit, animal and so on. Such reincarnation, according to the ethics of Buddhism, is not good but evil, for all existence is suffering. Existence-suffering has no origin: the divine creator could not have created such an imperfect world. The grace of supreme divinities—buddhas, i.e., those who have won salvation through their many rebirths and accumulation of virtues, is manifested in that they point to the path towards salvation, towards overcoming suffering and attaining absolute non-being (nirvana). The shape of reincarnation,

life path and sufferings are determined by karma, i.e., by actions, thoughts, and feelings in previous life. The reason for new reincarnations lies in one's attachment to life. For early Buddhism, the main thing to achieve salvation is to restructure one's conscience and one's own behaviour, or, in other words, to observe the requirements of religious morality. Reincarnation can be stopped only by those who can withstand any tortures with humility and submission, sever their earthly attachments and repress all emotions and desires. One of the most important moral requirements of Buddhism is to observe ahimsa, i.e., non-violence and non-killing. In the teaching of Lamaism, all life of a believer is regulated through ten black evils and ten white virtues

which specify the ethics of the early Buddhism. Sins are divided into bodily ones (taking life, taking what is not been given, incontinence), speech sins (telling lies, slander, backbiting, mockery) and evils of conscience (envy, spite, heresy); correspondingly, the punishment is meted out for sinners. As regards virtues (such as mercy, alms-giving, righteousness, reconciling enemies, respect for the holy scriptures, temperance, and faith in the truth of religion), they are rewarded through a better incarnation, through being in paradise and through final salvation (nirvana). The Buddhist ideal is a meditator who has repressed all emotions in himself and who dispassionately looks upon injustice, violence and oppression.

C

CALVIN, John (Jean Caulvin, 1509-1564), religious reformer, founder of one of the three primary theological systems of Protestantism (Calvinism, Lutheranism and the Church of England). His theological system expounded in the "Institutes of the Christian Religion" is based on the doctrine of predestination. According to its teaching, people are foreordained either to live in paradise or to suffer in hell. Unable to change the predestination given from on high, man can only contemplate his future lot judging by his actual life: everyday success accompanies those who are elected by God, while failures indicate that a person is condemned by God. As a bourgeois form of Christianity, this doctrine expressed the interests of the bourgeoisie in the period of the initial accumulation of

capital. This is reflected in the advocacy of worldly asceticism, which demands that man give up worldly pleasures and be thrifty, diligent and pious. In Geneva, the centre of Calvinism in the 16th century, Calvin's "worldly asceticism" was practised through strict monitoring of private morality, the prohibition of all kinds of entertainment, including theatrical performance. Any sign of free thought was persecuted, most notoriously in the case of Servetus, Spanish theologian and physician who was burnt at the stake in 1553, as decreed by Calvin. Dozens of dissenters were persecuted. At present, Calvinism takes on various forms: Reformist movement, Presbyterianism, Congregationalism, with the doctrine of predestination remaining its basic feature.

CAMUS, Albert (1913-1960), French writer and thinker, representative of *existentialism*. Camus's philosophical and ethical views are expounded in his plays, novels and essays which deal with the problem of man in society. Camus shares the existentialist view of man treating him in terms of his existence in specific situations. The basic source of Camus's moral philosophy is the concept of the absurd: through his instincts man is attached to life and aspires to it, but he exists in a world which is alien to him, irrational and absurd. Consequently, the very existence of man has no sense. The concept of absurd originally formulated by Camus reflects not only the reality of the bourgeois society but also one of the typical features of bourgeois consciousness which reflects conflict situations and contradictions of this society in a distorted way and is unable to cope with them. The *pessimism* of Camus's philosophy and ethics, which originated at the time of Hitler's occupation of France, is embodied in the character of Sisyphus doomed to eternal suffering. To avoid

this pessimism, Camus justifies rebellion against the world's absurdity and thus finds in it a basis for genuine human existence and morals. But this rebellion is limited to the sphere of spirit and moral consciousness and is exclusively individualistic. In Camus's view, the way to overcome *alienation* is attainment of happiness which boils down to the identification of man with his own self, his conformity with his own essence. Hence his protest against everything alien that is imposed upon man from the outside, which alienates man from his own self: against the state and its institutions, against formal morals and official religion. However, this protest, based on his idealistic outlook, is inconsistent. In Camus's view, external rebellion and active struggle are incompatible with genuine human existence. Man does not eradicate evil but "rectifies it". The highest degree of happiness is achieved through solidarity and love for each other. The most important works which reflect Camus's moral philosophy are as follows: "Le Mythe de Sisyphe" ("The Myth of Sisy-

phus", 1942), "L'Étranger" ("The Outsider", 1942), "La Peste" ("The Plague", 1947), "L'Homme Révolté" ("The Rebel", 1951), "Lettres à un ami allemand" ("Letters to a German Friend", 1943-1944), "La Chute" ("The Fall", 1956).

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT. The attitude to capital punishment, its approval or disapproval, its treatment as an exceptional measure of punishment or a demand for its more extensive use for prevention of crime, the recognition or rejection of the difference between "admissible" and "inadmissible" methods of capital punishment, are typical indicators of the morals and moral consciousness of society. Human morality approves those changes in this field which exclude the most cruel methods of capital punishment and lead, in the long run, to its full abolition. In many countries it has been abolished. The advocates of capital punishment believe: this measure keeps in check the growth of crime by intimidating potential criminals or even encouraging them to reform,

eliminates the danger emanating from hardened criminals and restores, as far as possible, justice because it is a retribution for capital offences. These arguments evoke the following objections: by accepting capital punishment as an effective instrument in crime prevention, society breeds erroneous ideas of the strategy of this struggle since the growth of crime is restrained in fact not so much by the severity of punishment as by its inevitability. It is more humane not to presume that a criminal is incorrigible and that every person can be reformed, although none of these propositions is irrefutable. If there are no truly extreme circumstances and given goodwill, society can neutralize a dangerous criminal without resorting to capital punishment. It is hardly justifiable to believe that the destruction of someone's life can somehow compensate the losses sustained by society. Convincing arguments can be adduced in favour of capital punishment based on sensibility and expediency. However, in the final analysis, it cannot be sanctioned either morally or ethically.

CAREERISM, a negative *moral quality* associated with the behaviour and nature of an individual, who directs all his social activity at getting a promotion (*Ambition*) and is ready to meet the demands made on him only to the extent that it advances his personal position. Careerism is an expression of *egoism* in the sphere of one's service which is hypocritically portrayed as devoted and selfless service to the common good (the society as such, organization, agency, enterprise). Historically, careerism appears on the basis of social and bureaucratic hierarchy of society which evolves in conditions of social inequality. Socialist society retains careerism owing to material inequality and differences in social status. A careerist is a person who lacks any principles and who easily adjusts himself to a situation, changing, if necessary, his convictions in tune with the changing situation. His other features are irresponsibility, indifference to other people and to the common cause.

CASUISTRY [L. *casus* case], the theory of "casus of conscience" which regulate the conduct of an individual in cases of moral difficulties based on a system of abstract rules. Casuistry deals with conflicts between various *obligations* of man when it becomes necessary to establish the sequence of priorities of these obligations. The aim of casuistry is to create a diversified system of imperatives which would make it possible to identify direct instruction for any real situation. The method for accomplishing this is to select from the initial indisputable theses the more differentiated propositions pertaining to concrete "casus", i.e., cases, events. Interpretation of the concrete as the last stage of general differentiation is typical of those forms of knowledge which had reached classical maturity back in antiquity (*Aristotle's* logics, *Euclid's* geometry, Roman law, the theory of rhetoric, etc.). In a broader sense, casuistry is a phenomenon typical of all developed cultures treating morality as law. For instance, it is typical of the morality of Confucianism (*Con-*

fucius) regulating a nobleman's conduct in all situations and establishing the hierarchy of obligations. In Greece, casuistry can be found in the Sophists and *Socrates*, the founders of the reflective self-orientation of the individual. All attempts of the Stoics to go beyond the maximalist paradoxes and devise a system of conduct for real people (Panetha, *Seneca* and others) invariably led to casuistry. The classical expression of antique casuistry which influenced European moralists of the Middle Ages and of modern times is the treatise by *Cicero* "On Duty", particularly the third book dealing with conflicts between *honour* and *usefulness*. On the whole, European culture rejected casuistry and the very term acquired a negative connotation designating irrelevant *formalism*, false reasoning concerning moral issues, which in itself indicated the transformation of social consciousness. A certain revival of casuistry can be seen in modern applied ethics, for instance, in the efforts to reconcile *euthanasia* and humanism. To theoretically analyze and grasp the

ethical essence of casuistry it is important to define its sources: a desire to support moral fortitude by rational arguments or, on the contrary, to justify departure from moral standards.

CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE, a basic category of *Kant's* ethical theory; Kant's moral law is expressed as follows: act only as if the principle on which the action is based could become a universal moral law. Kant thought that through the categorical imperative he had opened up an a priori principle from which more specific moral obligations can be deduced that can be acceptable to all. Kant was infrequently reproached for the fact that his categorical imperative in a stricter form reproduced the *golden rule* although he himself rejected such reproaches. Simultaneously, the categorical imperative was criticized for its *formalism* since by means of it, one could only determine whether the chosen line of *conduct* is related to morality. However, it did not provide an essential *criterion of morality*. This principle therefore could be extended to any,

including erroneous and even reactionary moral system. The categorical imperative indeed does not indicate what *acts* are in order. However, the second wording of the categorical imperative given by Kant sets an important humanistic principle of morality: "Act so that you always treat mankind, in your own person and in the person of any other, as an end and never as a means." The categorical imperative can also serve as a kind of justification of the idea of equality in morals: whatever may be the content of moral imperatives, they should always be of universal character and applicable to all people. The categorical imperative (unconditional injunction) differs, according to Kant, from the conditional imperative (if you want to reach a goal you have to take certain action using them as a means), considering the latter unfit to serve as a criterion of morality. Kant points out that the conditional imperative does not provide a rule common to all people because their aims and aspirations always differ. Kant rejected the principles of conditional imper-

ative as a moral criterion, and opposed a narrow utilitarian understanding of morality and calculating practicisim. Kant contrasted the categorical imperative with conditional (hypothetical) imperatives (imperatives of ability and sensibility) which were of operational (technical), or pragmatic, nature and indicated the means attaining certain ends (*Ends and means*). Since the goals, aspirations and *interests* of various people differ, the hypothetical imperatives cannot provide a general rule, a universal moral principle. Finally, the categorical imperative implies the *autonomy* of man as a subject of morality, as a possessor of the will establishing universal laws. According to the third practical principle of the categorical imperative, the will "should not be simply governed by law but governed in such a manner that it be regarded as the will which established laws for itself and only due to that is subordinate to law (whose creator it may regard itself)". Following his *duty*, man discards any selfish interest and, as an independent law-making entity, remains true to

himself by opting for maxims of his deeds. Consequently, the categorical imperative is not just an absolute moral law but is such an absolute law which an individual sets for himself based on reason. The second practical principle of the categorical imperative gave the Neo-Kantians ground to treat Kant as a founder of socialism (*Ethical socialism*). At present, categorical imperative concept is frequently applied to denote the cardinal moral requirements of our time: the struggle for peace, preservation of nature, survival of the human race, while the principle of treating man not only as a means but also as an end, is regarded as a most important criterion in the humanistic justification of social development.

CATEGORIES OF ETHICS

[Gk *kategoria* statement], the basic concepts of *ethics* which reflect the most essential features and aspects of morals and underlie the theory of ethics. Categories of ethics may be united into an integral system with a single pattern. In the history of ethical thought, the spe-

cific content of the categories of ethics, their logical form and place in the general system of concepts, were changed in conformity with the changing conception of the nature of morality. In the history of ethics, basic categories included notions of *good*, *duty*, *virtue* and *conscience*. Proponents of *rationalism* in ethics have always tried to devise a strictly ordered, usually deductive system of concepts, in which each category of ethics would be defined through more general concepts. Some philosophers considered the concept of good (benefit) as the fundamental principle (*Plato*), others—the concept of duty (*Kant*), and all other concepts were derived from that one. However, the devising of such systems entailed great difficulties and some thinkers arrived at the conclusion that there is no unity between the categories of ethics. For example, proponents of deontological *intuitionism* assert that there is no logical connection between the concepts of good and duty (*Deontology*). Marxist ethics bases its system of categories in

accordance with the historical-materialist understanding of morals as a method of regulating people's behaviour the mechanism of which is rather complex and diversified but only represents something which is inherently integral. However, such a system is still to be elaborated. One can surmise that a system of categories reflecting the structure of morality itself will be the most complete and meaningful one. The main aspects of morality are present in the categories of moral activities, moral relations and moral consciousness each of which, in its turn, embraces many other related notions. Furthermore, since all these three aspects of morals are closely interconnected, some ethical notions simultaneously relate to all these categories, i.e., they reflect all aspects of morals. For example, the idea of *moral standard* simultaneously reflects a type of moral views of society, a special manner of moral activities and a form of moral relations between people. In its key elements, moral consciousness reflects some aspects of moral ac-

tivities and relations. That is why we can come across one and the same concept as occurring both in moral consciousness and among the categories of ethics (for example, the concepts of good, duty, conscience, *dignity, honour*). This does not mean, however, that the ethical theory and our ordinary moral consciousness impart one and the same meaning to these concepts. For example, in the first case the concept of duty is a scientific category revealing a certain attitude of man towards society. In the second case, it is an idea of how a person should act as a bearer of morals. Any moral concept is normative, it always prescribes or evaluates something. In ethics the concepts of duty and value find theoretical justification (*Normative ethics*) and become an object of theoretical analysis which reveals what particular moral attitude is thus expressed. Scientific precision demands that the categories of ethics as a formal body of the theory of ethics be distinguished from moral views (concepts) which are formed spontaneously in society, although

there is no absolute line of demarcation. The categories of ethics and the forms of moral consciousness have points in common: the former have a normative aspect and the latter refer to rational argumentation. Categories of ethics are continuously developing and enriched with new concepts in accordance with the theoretical development of ethics itself.

CAUSALITY (in morality). The problem of causality as applied to morality is connected with the solution of the following main questions: first, do moral imperatives rely on any objective basis, is their content determined by conditions which are beyond the limits of moral consciousness or by this kind of consciousness itself? Second, if we suppose that man's conduct is causal, then how does determinism go with man's ability to make a *moral choice*, his sense of responsibility for his actions? There have been various interpretations of determinism in the history of ethics: the content of moral is determined by the laws of the Universe (*Cosmic teleology, ethics of*), by biol-

ogical evolution (*Evolutionary ethics*), by man's nature outside the context of history, by his inherent drive for pleasure and happiness (*Hedonism, Eudaemonism*), etc. All these varieties of ethical *naturalism* gave a mechanistic interpretation of causality in morality, which sometimes led to *fatalism* in interpreting social history and man's behaviour. To counterbalance determinism, there were numerous efforts to prove that history is developing in conformity with man's moral concepts. The origin of moral concepts themselves was most often seen in people's likings and inclinations. It often led to moral *voluntarism* (*Existentialism, Neopositivism*). According to Marxist-Leninist interpretation of causality, moral imperatives reflect socio-historical necessity and do not oppose it as people's subjective wishes. This by no means minimizes the significance of people's personal activities. The conflict arising between moral imperatives and objective preconditions for their fulfilment reflects the contradictory nature of the historical process itself. At its

every moment, new requirements appear which are to be solved only in the course of further development of society. Causality in morality has some specific features. Social necessity is reflected in moral consciousness as the concept of duty, as a goal to be attained, rather than simply as a cause operating irrespective of man's will. It is precisely for this reason that the individual is responsible for his deeds, and his acts can be assessed as *good* or *evil* (*Evaluation*).

CENSURE, see *Sanction*.

CHERNYSHEVSKY, Nikolai Gavrilovich (1828-1889), Russian utopian socialist and revolutionary democrat, economist, philosopher, sociologist, writer and literary critic; forerunner of Marxism in Russia. Chernyshevsky's world outlook continues the traditions of the Russian revolutionary democrats (*Belinsky*, *Herzen*) and progressive West European philosophy: 18th-century French materialism, utopian socialism of *Saint-Simon* and *Fourier*, and *Feuerbach's* philosophy. Cher-

nyshevsky formulated his task in ethics as creating a system of morality based on revolutionary-democratic principles (service to the people and struggle for its freedom and happiness, revolutionary humanism, historical *optimism*) in no way inferior, in theoretical terms, to natural sciences. Its aim was to help educate the generation of "new people"—revolutionaries. Chernyshevsky's "natural requirements" and "social habits and circumstances" constitute the main factors forming moral consciousness. He maintained that the people's conditions of life and property relations should be changed by means of social revolution. In this respect, Chernyshevsky advances further than the utopian socialists, as he exposes to criticism the reformist hopes for an enlightened monarch, an honest politician and the like. Chernyshevsky's ethics is based on the anthropological principle and conception of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*). Man belongs to the natural world and this determines man's essence while the social form conditions realization of the inherent as-

piration of the human nature for pleasure. Egoism, according to Chernyshevsky, underlies the entire activity of man. However, man must act "rationally" in order to gain advantage. His own personal *interest* prompts the "rational egoist" to perform acts of noble self-sacrifice. He acts freely, without thinking of duty, sacrifice or *retribution*, in order to advance towards his chosen *ideal*. Chernyshevsky denied man's *freedom of the will*, recognizing the operation of the *causality* law in the moral sphere too: "The phenomenon which we call will, is itself a link in the chain of phenomena and facts connected by causative ties." However, man is not deprived of freedom of choice for he can choose between a particular trend in social development. Only the choice of a progressive tendency is indeed a reasonable one. Attaching paramount importance to reason in man's behaviour, Chernyshevsky closely linked his socialist doctrine to education, which enables people to discern the new progressive tendencies, thus transforming them into "new people". The anthropo-

logical principle, in Chernyshevsky's view, if it is consistently applied, coincides with the principles of socialism. Although vulnerable in logical-philosophical terms, the theory of "rational egoism" as an ethical system adequately reflected the social requirements of the time, the ideals of the "new people", contributing to their transformation into a political force. Chernyshevsky's ideals exerted great influence on many generations of Russian revolutionaries. Chernyshevsky's most important works expounding his concept of ethics are: "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" (1860), the novel "What Is to Be Done?" (1863).

CHRISTIAN ETHICS. The precepts of Christian ethics were first formulated against the background of the crisis of the ancient civilization and the decline of its values. In the later epoches, they retained their polemical struggle with secular morals and practical notions of daily life. Hence, the paradoxes of their wording: "but many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first"; "blessed

are the poor in spirit" (voluntarily poor); "blessed are they that mourn" (who do not accept the rule of evil in the world and in their hearts). Christian ethics treats most moral norms of Judaism (*Ten Commandments* with their implications) as an imperative law, as the minimum that should be overcome by *grace*. The ban on immoral deeds becomes a positive requirement for a proper state of the heart from which proper deeds ensue as if by themselves. For instance, the renunciation of killing is not sufficient. What is necessary is the heart which does not accept wrath and is full of *love*. In Christian ethics, the fullness of all commandments, the commandment of love being the primary one, is ontologically linked with the divine aspect of existence ("God is love"). This is double-sided love: the love of God is realized in the love for one's neighbour. Love underlies the Christian social *ideal* the outlines of which have undergone substantial changes (beginning with the time of St John Chrysostom (d. 407), who placed charity above miracle-working, up to

Christian socialism of the 19th and 20th centuries and other similar phenomena), while the religious ethical structure remained the same. Every member of society must be guided by love and take upon himself all disharmony in relations between people thereby overcoming it. But this requires a special kind of love, the love identified with extreme self-sacrifice and aloofness. Christianity substitutes the ideal of total openness attained through aloofness for identity with a certain ethnic, family, tribal or some other collective "organism". Christianity believes in the transcendental *dignity* of man which, however, remains a possibility rather than a reality on Earth and is realized only at the mystical level of the believer's existence. He is not protected from the torments of the soul either, from temptations, internal humility and self-accusations. Christian ethics prohibits him in any situation to consider himself absolutely right and creates the culture of awareness of one's own guilt (for instance, in Augustine's "Confessions", 5th century). It

is exactly at the peak of the full loss of reliance on one's own strength that grace visits the faithful: "my strength is made perfect in weakness". The Christian doctrine advises that the state of the faithful in this life be not a tranquil aloofness of a Stoic wiseman or a Buddhist monk but, on the contrary, intense struggle with oneself and suffering for others. The humanism of modern times has been engaged in the secularization of Christian ethics with the stress being laid on the idea of the unity of the human race, the dignity of the poor and humiliated, committed love, the condemnation of violence, etc. Nowadays, in appraising Christian ethics it is necessary to distinguish between its content elucidated in the Bible and its contradictory and sometimes conservative role in real history.

CHUANG-TZU (365-290 B.C.), Chinese philosopher, one of the founders of Taoism and a compiler of the treatise "Chuang-Tzu". The Chuang-tzu doctrine is an extension of the *Lao-tzu* school and a trend of transforming *Tao* (the primary

cause of all being) into an abstract and ideal essence. The gist of Chuang-tzu's teaching is creating a concept of life-asserting, critique of morality and revaluation of values. He interprets *Te* as a singular manifestation of *Tao*, as something unrelated to morality. *Te* is a driving force in a "real man" who, being an element of the creative power of the universe, is like an infant staying "on the other side of good and evil". Chuang-tzu criticizes the Confucian and Moist (*Mo-tzu*) ethics alike. He believes that the concept of virtue is historically changeable and too individualistic to reduce it to any unified *moral code*. According to Chuang-tzu, morality is unnatural, and its standards favour the rulers whom he labels as Big Thieves stealing the "improved morals" and making good use of the virtuous, i.e., deceived, people, to personal advantage. Chuang-tzu qualified "official wisemen" as the custodians of the "reigning criminals" saying that the virtues they cultivate often help them get promotion and, consequently, are not all that disinterested. To be free one has to

resign from government service, which Chuang-tzu incidentally did, and, as far as possible, to conceal one's virtues and become useless to society so as not to be used as an instrument for utilitarian purposes. Chuang-tzu believes that it is necessary to leave things as they are. A Tao-man is not bound by the norms of outward decency and is free of moral complexes. However, the Tao virtue cannot be taught for it is the product of personal experience. A Tao wiseman hears only his own voice, the calling of Tao which is more magnificent than his own ego. Relying on his nature he follows his destiny in which freedom and necessity merge into naturalness (*tsujan*). Chuang-tzu compares *benevolence* and *justice* with an inn in which one can spend the night but cannot live. The self-determination of morality is realized through *sincerity* which is perceived as a cosmic force inalienable from Tao.

CICERO, Marcus Tullius (106-43 B.C.), Roman orator, writer and philosopher. Ethical aspects make a significant part of

his practical philosophy which alone, he believed, can have real value in life. The philosophical principle which was widespread in ancient Greek philosophy (*Stoicism*, in particular) that one must live according to nature and be guided by reason through which perfection is attained, is the basis of Cicero's ethics. In his opinion, man must strive for continuous self-education and the development of his character traits in correspondence with four cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, courage and temperance. The gratification of an individual's interests ought to match the interests of the whole, e.g. society. A person is guided not only by his own interest but also by the desire to help others because all men belong to a single human race. Reason assists the resolution of contradictory strivings—those which compel a person to serve others and those which compel others to serve him. Cicero considered sincere *friendship* and glory to be life's greatest blessings when they are based on virtue which is a condition for happiness and makes it possible to overcome

old age, pain and death. Cicero was inclined towards the Stoics' view that virtue for virtue's sake is the highest good. He was against *fatalism* and advocated the idea of free will, believing that it alone gives ethics the right to exist. His basic works are as follows: "De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum" ("De Finibus: or, Concerning the Ends of Things Good and Evil"), "Tusculanae Disputationes" ("Tusculan Disputations"), "Cato maior, or De Senectute" ("Cato; or, An Essay on Old-Age"), "Laelius, or De Amicitia" ("Laelius, or, An Essay on Friendship"), "De Officiis" ("Offices").

COLLECTIVISM [L *collectio* summary (prayer)], one of the basic *principles* of socialist morality implying relations of an individual, a group and society which are based on the collective, joint nature of social activities (*Man and society, Individual and community*). Having acquired a decisive significance under capitalism in the morality of the working class (which was determined by the nature of labour in capitalist society and

the tasks of concerted actions of workers against capitalists), under socialism collectivism is proclaimed as an ideological and moral principle. As a concept best corresponding to the social essence of man and capable of eliminating contradictions between the individual and the society, collectivism is becoming a main criterion for appraising the personality. The principle of collectivism may be formulated as follows: "Act in such a manner that your personal interest would be in accord with the collective social interest." In the social and moral aspects collectivism is the opposite of *individualism* and corporativism (group *egoism*). In the process of historical development, the correlation between the individual and the collective, social elements in collectivism varied ranging from the unconditional domination of the social over the personal to the proclamation of their harmony and mutually complementing each other. Since socialism appeared in countries characterized by strong elements of the patriarchal-feudal social system, the

principle of collectivism was often interpreted in the spirit of the collectivity of the communal type with a strict control over individual consciousness and behaviour, and disregard for the interests of an individual. This interpretation served as an ideological justification for the economic and political dependence of an individual on the collective and through the latter on the state. The social base of collectivism is public ownership of the means of production and the ensuing community of individual, group or society's interests and goals. However, the distortion of the principles of planning, stimulating and evaluating socially useful activities, the violation of social justice and underdeveloped institutions of democracy and forms of social independent activities, result in the *alienation* of the individual from social life and, eventually, undermine the principle of collectivism. The practical implementation of this principle in socialist social relations depends on the extent to which the economic, social and political mechanisms of society ensure the harmony between

private and communal interests, the ideal being a social system in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all". Socialist collectivism implies individual responsibility in which everyone is responsible not only for one's own deeds and life style but also for the destiny of other people (*Altruism*), the collective and, in the final count, the destiny of the society at large (*Patriotism*). And here the mutual responsibility of an individual and a collective, an individual and society is based on relations of *comradeship*, mutual assistance, reciprocal exactingness, *loyalty to principles, honesty, trust and respect*.

COMMANDMENT, *moral standard* conceived in *moral consciousness* in the form of a command coming from a person of authority. The fact that commandment was lent the form of a moral standard goes back to the past, when commandment was thought to be based not on social needs, but on someone's command (*Authoritarianism*). In religious interpretations of morality God is

such a law-giver. In modern literature dealing with the problems of morality, the term commandment is sometimes used to denote a moral imperative in general in order to stress the fact that it is addressed to concrete persons (for instance, commandments for physicians).

COMMITMENT, voluntary assumption by a person of an *obligation* to society or to other people. The practice of reciprocal commitments (promises) plays a significant role in society, from personal relationships to interstate relations. A person's commitment allows others to expect a definite conduct on his part in the future. Thus, commitment provides a way to mutually coordinate actions among individuals. Many forms of commitments (treaties, contracts) are sanctioned by law. In ethics, the practice of mutual commitments takes the form of a requirement to abide by and meet one's promises. Some ethical conceptions of commitment treat it as a source of all other moral imperatives. In the *social contract* theory, an individual's moral duty to so-

ciety comes from his voluntary agreement with all others to follow certain rules of communal life. Commitment is an example of the universally recognized moral *duty*. It is individual and depends on specific circumstances and on given personal relations. As a result of a radical change in circumstances or a change in relations with other people to whom a commitment was made, a person may withdraw the commitment but this must be done absolutely openly, honestly and in agreement with other people concerned. A secret violation of commitment or its unilateral and arbitrary violation is meanness, *perfidy*.

COMMUNICATION, a form of human interaction. People cannot maintain normal life, share experience, work-related and everyday skills without communicating with, and influencing, one another. Communication enables people to form a view of the world, reach mutual understanding and find a "common language". However, it is also an exchange of actions, acts, thoughts and emotions with others, as well as drawing

on one's own inner world—memories, consciousness and aspirations. The “secret” of communication lies in one's desire and ability to live with other people in harmony and in an atmosphere of good will, generously sharing with them the riches of one's own heart. Communication is a combination of education and *self-education* in which people influence one another without didacticism or *moralizing*. This makes the issue of the moral content and cultural forms of communication very important. Genuine human communication is a form of creative activity that helps bring out one's best qualities. Communication is based on respect for the dignity of others, for basic universal moral standards. The spoken word is the most meaningful, all-embracing and expressive means of communication. An ability to talk, listen and converse is an essential condition for mutual understanding and a means for checking on the truth or error of one's own views and ideas. What might be called the “mute language” of communication of emotions has in its ar-

senal the look and the gesture that may be warm or offensive, nice or vulgar, conveying sympathy or antipathy, while posture, manner in conversation, etc., are also a measure of civilization and breeding. The manner and means of communication have an ethical, humanistic meaning in that they indicate the extent to which one is able to put oneself in place of another. Formation and development of the need for communication is a major task of *moral education*. It is also a guarantee of proper orientation in the evolution of socialibility, of the standards of communication itself.

COMMUNIST MORALITY, a historic type of morality corresponding to the communist socio-economic formation. The historical peculiarity of communist morality is elucidated by *Marx's* proposition on the three successive types of social relationships: “personal dependence”, “dependence mediated by things”, and “free individuality”. In Marxist philosophy, communism is perceived as real humanism, the return of man to

his essence by eliminating private property, exploitation, fragmented development, i.e., by rejecting the forms of activity which separate, alienate and humiliate people and are typical of a civilization split into antagonistic classes. This prospect expressed in ethical terms and translated into an imperative form is the crux of communist morality. Actually, it is a matter of elevating the communist social ideal to the level of a moral imperative. This is quite justified since communism itself is an association in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all", i.e., a moral ideal of humanity formulated as a historic objective. For a long time, a typical misconception was that communist morality was identified with the moral practices of socialist society. However, real social practices to a substantial degree reproduce the traditional contradiction between necessity and reality and, consequently, cannot be proclaimed as a moral principle. To have an adequate idea of communist morality it is important to reveal its attitude to

the values common to all humanity. On the whole, as regards a general attitude to the ethical and moral experience of the past, and to the values common to all humanity, socialist development proceeded from their negation to their positive assimilation. This is natural in the transition from one social formation to another. Communist morality is being filled with a concrete content as it gradually becomes integrated with universal moral values. It is most vividly reflected in the concept of the priority of the universal human values over class values. One of the key postulates of communist morality is Lenin's idea that the struggle for the final and complete establishment of communism is the basis of communist morality. It would be wrong to interpret it, as unfortunately was the case both in theory and practice, in a vulgar sociological spirit as an expression of ethical relativism, in particular, as the justification of violence in the class struggle of the proletariat. The true message of the Leninist formula is: only that which is moral leads to communism.

COMPASSION, see *Sympathy*.

COMRADESHIP, relations between people based on a community of *interests* and *goals* and *solidarity*, mutual *respect* and *trust* conditioned by it. Comradeship enriches the ties established by people in co-operation where they act as partners and in collaboration as colleagues, as it supplements these links with new forms of intercourse, such as social work, free time spent together, common entertainment, sports together. Relations of comradeship are one of the expressions of *collectivism* ensuring moral and psychological support, including in distress.

COMTE, Auguste (1798-1857), French philosopher, the founder of positivism. Comte's ethical doctrine is organically linked to his philosophy and sociology. From Comte's positive philosophy, it follows that an individual is a member of mankind whose rules of conduct are determined not by personal interests but by the general order of things. An isolated individual is only an abstraction. As

viewed by Comte, the laws of ethics reflect the permanent conditions of people's life together. The basis of morality is not its *usefulness* which presupposes a long social connection but a social instinct, or a pull towards social life, which is based on feeling and does not depend on personal *interest*. As Comte himself admits, this view goes back to the ideas of the Scottish moral school—those of *Hume* and Adam Smith. Personal instincts predominate in personal life. The family, which is the primary social organism, generates sympathy. This frees reason from selfish motives and induces one to live for the sake of others. The awareness of being an organic part of the social organism develops man's understanding of the importance of a personal deed for society. This cultivates some noble features and natural inclinations, while evil instincts either wither away or serve the public good. The highest moral idea is that of mankind which develops through a combination of individual and social forces. Comte considered love to be the principle of social life,

order as its basis and progress as its goal. Comte's ethics is basically idealistic and closely tied up with the idea of evolutionism. For him, the major obstacles on the path to social progress are not social and political difficulties but moral problems which can be overcome through the progressive evolution of ideas and the improvement of morals (*Moralizing*). His theological doctrine is presented in his major work, "A Course of Positive Philosophy" (1830-1842).

CONCEIT, negative *moral quality* typical of the conduct of a person who has lost a critical attitude to himself, overestimates his abilities and virtues, does not consider the opinion of others, and rejects, without sufficient grounds, generally accepted concepts in a particular field of knowledge and culture. As a rule, conceit appears on the ground of previous successes (real or imaginary) and affects those who exhibit excessive *self-esteem*, *vanity* and *arrogance*.

CONDUCT (moral), a complex of man's acts of moral significance committed in a relatively prolonged span of time under steady or changing conditions. Whereas the concept of moral *activities* pertains only to purposeful and morally motivated actions, conduct embraces all the actions of man as a whole since they can be subjected to moral *evaluation* irrespective of whether they are purposeful or unintentional, prompted by moral or other motives. As distinct from *custom* which presupposes homogeneous actions of different persons, conduct embraces heterogeneous actions of one and the same individual (a separate man as well as a collective, an organization or a mass of people) which reveal various sides of his *moral character*. The concept of the line of conduct points to the relative continuity and consistency of separate actions and to distinctive features of a man or a collective. Marxist ethics presumes that man's conduct is in the final count the only objective indicator of his moral character, his moral qualities, including *motives*. It does not

contrast man's inner world with his "external" actions. Such opposition and efforts to find a certain innate, subjective indicator of genuine morality connected with it, arise due to the fact that man in real life is bound to act contrary to his motives and *intentions*, to be hypocritical in some way. Conduct is regarded as an insufficient indicator of morality until the contradiction between the aspirations of the individual and society as a whole seems irremovable. Marxist ethics is based on the possibility and necessity of overcoming this contradiction although this is a long process. Therefore it regards motives and actions, intentions and deeds as closely united. Motives behind man's actions are revealed, in the final count, not in man's own assessment of his actions, but in his general line of conduct over a long period of time under various conditions. When all realize the essence of moral imperatives, motives which prompt man's actions cease to be something mysterious for him and for his associates. A community, one's associates are

able to more or less correctly see into the "innermost recesses" of the soul of a person, discern the motives judging by his actions and to distinguish genuine from sham morality.

CONFORMISM [*L. conformis* similar], social orientation which does not stem from independent decision-making (or responsible participation in decision-making) on social and moral issues but from passive adjustment to the established order of things. A conformist does not develop his own moral standards in dealing with objectively conditioned problems, but tries to adjust himself to those standards and rules of conduct which put the maximum pressure on him, i.e., which are imposed upon him directly (through force) or indirectly (through persuasion, through *tradition* or in some other way). Conformism in morals means rejection of one's own *moral reason*, of one's own choice and placing the responsibility upon external factors (things, public institutions and so on), denial of one's own self as a personality. Moral irre-

sponsibility of any conformist is also found in the dogmatic observation of the standard course of action or thinking, as well as in one's obedience to the whims of changing *fashion*.

CONFUCIUS (Kung Ch'ius, c. 551-479 B.C.), Chinese philosopher and political leader. He preached his ideas orally. The basic source of his teachings is the record of his statements and talks made by his disciples, "Lun yü" ("Discourses and Dialogues"). His basic idea is that of "jen", or human-heartedness. It is through "jen" that the relations between people should be established in society. "Jen" should be the aim of moral improvement. Consequently, relations between people should be based on wisdom and loyalty to duty. Hence the moral precepts formulated by Confucius: do not do to others what you would not have them do to you (cf. *Golden rule*); do good in response to good and justice in response to evil; first know your own self; respect and love your elders and your superiors; strictly observe the existing family and so-

cial relations; honour your forefathers; take care of the young. For Confucius, moral standards come from the supreme power—Heaven. For that reason, he does not advance any new moral precepts but only elucidates the old customs which being strictly observed lead to the attainment of "jen". Confucius's ethical and political teaching is theoretically based on his teaching on the "rectification of names" ("jeng ming") in accordance with which the name, the word, should be in compliance with the essence of a thing it nominates. Consequently, a person's title should correspond to his actual position in society, and his conduct to his status and title: "A king should be a king, a subject should be a subject, a father should be a father, and a son should be a son." In this way, Confucius's teaching perpetuated traditional patriarchal customs and social inequality. For millennia, Confucianism was used by the ruling classes of China to hold the people in submission and to preserve, with the aid of the developed system of rituals, a feudal sys-

tem in China, with its hierarchy and rigorous regulation of social relations. Certain elements of Confucianism were developed by his disciples and turned into a religious system and Confucius himself was deified. Confucianism is still an organic part of Chinese culture and serves as a criterion for investigating and assessing present-day problems.

CONSCIENCE [L *conscire* be privy to], a *category of ethics* which embodies the inseparable connection between human personality and morality and characterizes the individual's ability to exercise *self-control*, to independently formulate one's moral *obligations*, to demand that they be fulfilled and evaluate one's own acts; an expression of *self-consciousness*. Conscience may manifest itself not only in the form of moral assessment of one's own actions by reason, but also in the form of emotions, e.g. pricks of conscience or the gentle emotion of "peaceful conscience". Many thinkers considered the concept of "peaceful, clear conscience" as a contradiction of

the definition (*Schweitzer*). Since a strong moral personality is usually dissatisfied with himself, strives for *self-improvement* and typically assumes upon himself the *guilt* for the moral disorder in the world, such a person's conscience can never be at peace. Thus, conscience signifies a person's awareness of his *duty* and *responsibility* to society and at the same time to himself. Conscience testifies that morality has become ingrained in a person and is indicative of the person's spiritual wealth. Guided by his conscience, man takes upon himself the burden of evaluating *good* and *evil* as if from the inside and himself sets a criterion of moral evaluation. This subjective form of conscience served, in the history of ethics, as a source of its numerous idealistic interpretations. Conscience was interpreted as the voice of one's "inner I", as an inborn sense (*Moral sense, theories of*), as the sole basis of moral duty (*Kant, Fichte*). It was often opposed not only to submission to external authorities, but also to the requirements of society (*Existential-*

ism). In fact, conscience is organically linked to the nature of man as a social being. If *shame* reflects the dependence of the individual on society, conscience reveals the reverse dependence. It fixes the ideal, perfect image of man and society which is construed by a particular person, and it is not by chance that people say of an impeccable man that he is their conscience. Marxist ethics proves that conscience has social origins, is defined by man's social life and education, becoming, as it does, his moral pivot. Society's measure of humanity is determined, to a considerable extent, by the possibilities it offers to the individual of acting in accordance with his conscience.

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS, in the broad philosophical meaning of the word it coincides with the concept of *freedom*. Conscientiousness is the highest measure of developed morally responsible conduct. It implies that man must choose appropriate actions and the purpose of life on the basis, on the one hand, of the com-

prehension and voluntary acceptance of the actual social essence of moral precepts and basic interests of the people and, on the other, knowledge of socio-historical laws (*Ideological integrity, Loyalty to principles, Conviction, Fanaticism*).

CONSCIOUSNESS, ETHICAL, in everyday usage a synonym to the concepts of moral consciousness, ethics, ethical knowledge; in science—a concept to signify interaction, mutual enrichment and mutual penetration of *morality* and *ethics* in the process of social development. Ethics, singled out from morality, is a historically and socially conditioned process, which is engendered not only by the necessity of theoretical justification of moral concepts. It cannot be reduced to the latter. The development of ethical knowledge comes under the influence of philosophical teachings, people's ideas concerning nature, society and man, cultural traditions, etc. Ethics, in turn, exerts influence on moral consciousness (*Consciousness, moral*), exercising the function of regulation

and evaluation, expounding a rational-theoretical view of the moral problems of being. With the development of ethical knowledge, the moral values of the progressive classes are increasingly influenced not only by social and moral practice, but by progressive ethical thought as well, i.e., prerequisites are created for the formation of ethical consciousness as a special sphere of society's spiritual culture. The relative independence and activity of ethical consciousness as a phenomenon of 20th-century spiritual culture, manifests itself in a wider sphere of its activity. This is dictated by the necessity to evaluate the problem of war and peace, ecology, trends of scientific and technological progress, furnishing value reference points for political, legal, economic and cultural activities. Moral consciousness is of methodological importance as it makes it possible to consider morality and ethics within the general framework of the spiritual culture of society, covering the different levels of the moral-ethical perception of

human relations both in everyday and theoretical terms.

CONSCIOUSNESS, MORAL, a form of social consciousness reflecting, as its other forms (political, legal, aesthetic, religious consciousness), the social life of people and primarily relations of production. Moral consciousness registers the historically changeable and developing *moral relations* and represents the subjective aspect of morality. In literature on ethics, there is no agreement on the nature of the relationship between moral consciousness and moral relations. In analyzing the specific nature of moral consciousness, one should start with the role *morality* plays in the system of social relations, as well as the method by which it regulates people's social activities. Morality prescribes that people perform certain acts as their *duty*. For this reason, moral concepts express the objective social needs of mankind and class interests in a peculiar form, in the idea of an obligation (that which should or should not be accomplished). This moral form of people's

awareness of social necessity is given a specifically moral justification. Man should perform those deeds which signify benefit, good and are preferable to all other possible acts. Thus, moral consciousness does not consider phenomena and acts in terms of their causative conditionality, but in terms of their virtue and *value*. Morality provides man with a choice between good and evil which he makes not because he is compelled by necessity, but because he himself recognizes this necessity. Accordingly, moral consciousness evaluates people's actions and social phenomena: it does not explain their origin, but merely defines its favourable or unfavourable attitude to them, censuring or approving them (*Evaluation*), which is the most important specific feature of moral consciousness. Hence, it follows that moral consciousness has its own specific and limited sphere of action. It is capable of guiding man's actions inasmuch as he has a real possibility of free choice, above all in the sphere of individual conduct. At the same time, moral consciousness

is not capable of changing or at least explaining the social practice of any given society as a whole. Therefore, *moralizing* is inadmissible. Overestimation of the socially transforming potential of morality (*moralizing*) is as dangerous as its underestimation which leads to *cynicism*, utilitarian attitudes and the loss of humanistic perspective in human activities. Moral consciousness is part and parcel of the purposefulness of human actions. Prior to eliminating a social phenomenon it must be recognized as evil and, equally so, before making efforts to attain some positive goal it should be comprehended and recognized as good. Moreover, moral consciousness is capable of foretelling the logic of the historical process (though it cannot reveal its objective character). "If moral consciousness proclaims an economic fact unjust ... it is a proof that the fact has outlived itself" (*Engels*). The content of moral precepts and concepts changes historically depending on social conditions, with some common distinguishing features of moral consciousness remaining un-

changed. First, moral consciousness as a whole and its simplest element — *moral imperative* — have, since the formation of morality in human history, possessed the following stable properties: they are normative, impersonal, provide general and universal evaluations and moral precepts. Secondly, the structure of moral consciousness, which is a system of concepts expressing these or other moral views (*Universal and class elements in morality*), remains relatively stable. Each adequately developed system of morality contains the following elements: *moral standards* united in a *moral code*, concepts of *moral qualities*, evaluations, moral and social ideals, *principles*, concepts of *good and evil*, *justice*, etc. Each of these forms of moral consciousness has its own peculiarities and directs people's conduct in a specific way. These forms are interrelated and interdependent. The structure of moral consciousness determines the peculiar *logic of the language of morality* used by people in substantiating various moral con-

cepts and when solving specific moral problems.

CONSEQUENCE, an objective result (a resulting state or the developments that followed) of man's *action*. Consequences are the result, on the one hand, of man's interference into the natural course of events, and, on the other, of the influence of the course of events on the immediate outcome of an *act* (*Deed*). The category of consequences played an important role in the history of ethics. Since consequences often did not correspond to *intentions* and efforts, various viewpoints were expressed as to whether it is rightful to take consequences into consideration in estimating an act (*Consequential ethics*).

CONSEQUENTIAL ETHICS, ethical theories in which the moral significance of the acts of conduct is determined in accordance with the *consequences* to which they lead. These theories include *utilitarianism*, *hedonism*, *eudaemonism*, *axiological intuitionism*. All the materialist concepts of ethics come from the ideas of consequential

ethics and proceed from the supposition that morality fulfills in society certain useful functions and meets people's interests, and, consequently, that moral imperatives are purposeful in nature (*Teleological ethics*). Basic principles of consequential ethics were repeatedly attacked by theorists of morality (among them *Kant*, adherents of deontological intuitionism). Marxist-Leninist ethics considers the nature of morality as stemming from its social and historical functions, but rejects the utilitarian idea that the measure of moral value of each individual act of conduct is determined by its consequences in each particular case. To a certain extent, the aftereffect of a particular act may depend on casual developments which are not caused by the nature of the *action* itself. The moral value of an act is fully determined by its content (including the *motive* behind it). The content of actions is prescribed by morality on the basis of the most typical consequences which people's actions usually have in routine situations. Marxist ethics takes into

account not only the typical results of generally accepted actions but also the historical significance of actions that fall out of the general rule and reject the established order for the sake of the highest ideals (even if these actions do not bring tangible practical results at the given time but can serve as models for generations to come, the models of courage and humanity). Hence, the demand that moral acts be given an all-embracing analysis of their social significance.

CONTEXTUAL ETHICS [L *contextus* joining together], a term sometimes used to designate the ethical theories in which *choice* is considered a pivotal moral problem, the choice being made by the individual on the basis of his assessment of the specific situation (context). Contextual ethics underestimates the role of general *principles* and *standards* of morality. Contextual ethics is often attributed to the moral theories of *existentialism* and French personalism (*Self-fulfilment, ethics of*). The adherents of *Neo-Protestantism* describe

their ethical doctrine as contextual ethics. They hold that each situation requires a revaluation of moral aspects. Contextual ethics should be regarded as an expression of *relativism* and *irrationalism* in ethics (see also *Situation ethics*).

CONVICTION, attitude of a person to his acts and beliefs displaying his confidence that he is in the right. As a form of moral *self-consciousness*, conviction provides an ideological and psychological basis for the development of such volitional qualities as courage, steadfastness, self-control, restraint, initiative, loyalty to chosen ideals. Genuine conviction is based on real conscientiousness, on profound understanding of social-historical processes, the needs of society and people, the meaning of moral standards which a person puts into life. However, it can take distorted forms, when a person mechanically assimilates certain ideas, dogmatically believes in the indisputability of the principles he professes or of some kind of authority, or in his own infallibility (*Dogmatism, Fatalism,*

Authoritarianism). This type of conviction is usually combined with *bigotry* and extreme *fanaticism*, with the inability to take into consideration practical experience and justify one's persuasions, unwillingness to pay attention to facts, to the views of others. The conduct of a person of this type of conviction is often characterized by *formalism, rigorism, hypocrisy*. False conviction often conceals within itself a perverted understanding of the meaning of moral standards and serves to justify immoral behaviour (both in the eyes of oneself and of others). As a rule, a false conviction is typical of the consciousness of those people who, due to their social status or education and upbringing, cannot comprehend social laws. Thus, depending on its content, conviction can represent a positive or a negative *moral quality (Moral freedom)*.

COSMIC TELEOLOGY, ETHICS OF [*Gk telos* end, *logos* reason, word], a trend in non-Marxist moral philosophy which became especially widespread, in the first half of the 20th century, in the USA

(Frederick Woodbridge, Walter Lorenzo Sheldon) and in Great Britain (William Olaf Stapledon). It combines the elements of objective idealism and *naturalism*. Cosmic teleology states that the evolutionary development of the universe is caused by a certain purpose in nature, each stage of the evolution being predetermined and is reached through the adjustment of available means for achieving this purpose. Morality is interpreted in the same way: man is conceived as part of nature rather than a social being, and thereby biological characteristics are imparted to morality which is considered outside the framework of society (*Evolutionary ethics*). At the same time, it interprets nature itself as the realization of an ultimate power, eternal purpose and in this way comes close to religious ethics.

COURAGE, a *moral quality* characterizing the behaviour and moral make-up of a person of *bravery*, firmness, *self-control*, *selflessness*, self-respect. It finds expression in the ability to act boldly and most expediently in

perilous and difficult circumstances, to mobilize one's strength in order to attain a set goal and readiness to sacrifice oneself if necessary. Although courage is a specific quality of one's will and is commonly associated with the peculiarities of human psychology, in the record of moral consciousness courage has been always imbued with a certain social meaning. In antagonistic class society, courage was usually regarded as a merit characteristic of a certain class. For instance, *Plato*, the ideologist of the slave-owning society, interpreted courage as a specific quality of the warrior caste (while the virtue of wisdom was ascribed to the rulers and philosophers and temperance, to the toiling people). This concept of courage retained its currency in feudal society where it was interpreted as the virtue of the knights. Socialist morality applies the concept of courage to evaluate the corresponding actions of any person irrespective of his or her social status and in any sphere of life. In socialist morality, courage is regarded as a quality indispens-

able for the manifestation of *heroism*.

COWARDICE, one of the expressions of *timidness*; negative *moral quality* characterizing the conduct of a person who is unable to perform acts corresponding to moral imperative (or, to the contrary, to abstain from immoral acts), resulting from the inability to overcome fear. Cowardice may be also caused by calculating self-love, when it is based on the fear of bringing upon oneself unfavourable consequences or someone's anger, fear of losing the benefits one possesses or social status. It can be subconscious, manifesting spontaneous fear of unknown and uncontrollable social phenomena or natural laws. In both cases, cowardice is not simply an individual psychological quality of a particular person, but a social phenomenon. It is either associated with egoism or with helplessness and despondency resulting from a condition of alienation (even fear of natural phenomena develops into cowardice only under definite conditions of social life and up-

bringing). Cowardice leads to immoral acts: to dishonesty, time-serving, unscrupulousness and entails connivance at evil and injustice.

CRIME (in morality) is an *action* or *activities* which trample upon moral *ideals* and *values*, cause moral and physical suffering, destroy the natural, cultural and historical environment and are pregnant with a threat to world peace. Crime differs from *misdeed* in the measure to which legal and moral rules are violated.

CRITERION OF MORALITY [Gk *kriterion* a standard], one of the major problems of ethics throughout its history which was interpreted in different ways, depending on the understanding of the nature and the origin of morality itself. Various ethical schools advanced as a criterion of morality human nature, God's will, the self-evident principles of reason, etc. According to Marxist ethics, the actual basis (and correspondingly the criterion) of morality is an objective historical necessity as embodied in the

needs and interests of people, classes and social groups. These needs and interests, in turn, are reflected in our ideas of justice, good and evil, in the content of moral standards. As society developed, the content of moral standards also changed. Some moral standards changed their meaning altogether, others remained in force since some conditions of man's life common for all epoches were preserved (*Universal and class elements in morality*). Within the general issue of substantiation of the moral system and its principles, a more specific question is also considered: the question of a specifically moral criterion of evaluation of specific acts of conduct and justification of certain moral standards. Since the general trend in social and historical development of society has already found its reflection in moral consciousness in the form of certain moral principles, moral and social ideals, standards, etc., then the assessment and choice of a particular act of conduct are usually justified on this basis. Each individual has to be aware of the

general moral principles (*Conscientiousness*) and know how to correctly apply these general provisions in specific situations (*Discretion and creativity*).

CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM [Gk *kritike* observation, judgement or review], a way of expressing *public opinion* which helps to overcome the contradictions and obstacles in the development of socialist society. At the same time, criticism and self-criticism are one of the fundamental requirements of socialist morality, as well as a particular manifestation of moral self-consciousness of the individual. The need of criticism and self-criticism implies a free expression by people with reference to shortcomings on the part of the state, of public organizations or managers and joint discussion of steps to be taken to overcome these shortcomings; assessment by superior bodies and their heads of the work of lower organizations and individual workers; influence of a collective on its members, and vice versa, aimed at correcting or improving their joint activities; openness, free discussion of past

and present problems, and accountability of management bodies and public figures to the electorate or to the entire people, open recognition before the public of mistakes; sober and critical attitude of each individual to himself from rank-and-file members to top leaders. Social conditions making it possible to criticize and self-criticize, one of the major instruments of influencing social life through public opinion include: socialization of the means of production; elimination of social antagonisms; harmonization of the basic goals and interests pursued by all members of society; development of democracy and Glasnost; guaranteed protection of political and civil rights of the individual. In criticism and self-criticism, their correct combination is important when they naturally supplement each other, when a person proceeds from criticism of circumstances and other people to a self-critical analysis of his own responsibility for what is being criticized. Otherwise, when some people engage in criticism and others in self-criticism, then criticism may become a means of freeing one-

self of responsibility and self-criticism may turn into public self-condemnation.

CUSTOM, a form of social *discipline*, a historically established, usual way of conduct generally accepted in a social group or society as a whole. For all its varied complexity, societal life is characterized by frequent repetition of similar situations that require similar actions. In its broader meaning, the term custom includes commonly accepted methods of work regularly applied within a society, forms of socio-political activities, marriage and family life, daily relationships, religious *rituals*. Customs serve to transmit forms of mass activity to the individual who absorbs them as he is educated by society, and from generation to generation which maintain and pass on customs. Custom in the narrow sense applies only to such actions which are reproduced by the wide public spontaneously. Accordingly, custom does not include, for example, routine activities established by any set of instructions. Custom should be distinguished from

purposely trained social *habits*; from forms of production and distribution, these being governed by relations of property; from socially sanctioned rules and state-enforced legal norms (*Morality and law*). Customs maintained in *moral relations* are known as *morals*. Customs constitute a component of moral *activities* but moral behaviour is not limited by customs, because in addition to generally accepted acts of conduct, morality implies some exceptional actions (*heroism, feat, self-sacrifice*). Moreover, moral standards and actions are frequently superior to common forms of conduct. At times they even negate the existing order of things and are of historically progressive nature. Customs, on the other hand, merely reproduce forms of conduct which have been established as an element of a socially accepted way of life, which in turn is a set of various customs. As society evolves and especially during a change in the social order, customs undergo transformation and destruction, involving a struggle between old and new customs.

CUSTOMARY LAW, *customs* codified by the state as legal norms. Customary law comes into being with the formation of class society and the state. In primitive society, the conduct of individuals was regulated by tribal self-government bodies (elders, council of elders) and by customs. The earliest legal systems were made up largely of customs adapted to the interests of the governing class. Only those customs develop into law which protect the existing social system. Customary law is found both in slave-owning and feudal societies. Examples of customary law are "Laws of the Twelve Tablets" ("Leges duodecim tabularum"), "Russian Law" ("Russkaya Pravda") and "Saxon Mirror" ("Sachsenspiegel"). Customary law often sanctioned some very reprehensible customs. The victorious bourgeois revolutions excluded the most obsolete and barbaric customs upheld by customary law. On the other hand, in order to arrive at a compromise with the nobility, the bourgeois retained some customary law norms. Courts in modern bourgeois states apply customary

law, although on a limited scale, to specific cases. Customary law retains a measure of importance in international commerce. In socialist countries, customary rules have legal force only in rare cases (e.g. division of family property); harmful customs are punishable by law. Customary law is an important record of and source for studying public morals.

CYNICISM [Gk: (1) *kunikos* (*kuon* dog, nickname of Diogenes); (2) *Kynosarges* the name of the hill in Athens where Cynic philosophers taught and held discussions], a *moral quality* characterized by contempt for accepted cultural, spiritual and, in particular, moral *values*. The term Cynicism originates from the philosophical school of Cynics in ancient Greece which was

founded by *Antisthenes* in the 4th century B.C. The Cynics preached contempt for the accepted rules of conduct, advocated the individual's complete independence from society and argued for a return to a "state of nature". Later on, Cynicism came to denote sneering pessimism, disbelief in human sincerity and goodness, mockery of moral principles. Cynicism is characteristic of the conduct and beliefs of those who pursue their own egotistical interests using unscrupulously any means at their disposal, including immoral means (*Amoralism*). It is also characteristic of people who, having become disillusioned with some ideals, degenerate into moral bankruptcy and spiritual evil. Cynicism is often an inadequate reaction to moral hypocrisy and ideological Pharisaism.

D

DEATH, the end of life, the total cessation of vital functions. Since death, alongside birth, is one of the most essential definitions of life, any self-consciousness trying to grasp what is life, and even more so world outlook, needs also to explain death, to comprehend it in spiritual and moral terms. Various mythological and religious concepts already in the early stages of human thinking did not interpret death merely as something incomprehensible and horrible, but morally defined it as a result of some *evil deed, revenge or retribution* for some act, especially because natural death was a comparatively rare occurrence in primitive society. In later views, death acquired the character of a certain moral *value* and was interpreted as an ordeal, as a means of delivering oneself

from the burdens of earthly life. With the evolution of human self-consciousness death began ever more often to be viewed not as the end of personal existence, but as a moment of its radical change through which life acquires, in the sacrament of death, a new essence, to continue in other forms: migration of the immortal soul from the mortal body into the existence of the divine universe, or transition to personal existence in the next world. Belief in life in the hereafter to a certain extent rids man of the *fear* of death, substituting for it the fear of punishment in the next world which is an impelling motive for the moral evaluation of one's acts, for the differentiation between *good* and *evil*. This, however, depreciates the value of earthly life held to be only a preliminary state which can be

neither complete nor true. At the same time, it is precisely the concept of death, the awareness of the finite and unique nature of human personal existence, that contributes to the comprehension of the moral meaning and value of human life. Awareness of each moment of life as unique and irretrievable, and in some cases irreparable, enables man to ascertain the measure of his *responsibility* for his deeds. The awareness of death as a purely physiological act which affects only the human body and in no way human deeds, which exist independently in their results, demands that people's behaviour, words and deeds be evaluated not only by the limited and specific measure of momentary interest, but by the full and ultimate measure of human life and death. Owing to this specific essence of the concept of death, any attempts to evolve an ethical teaching outside the category of death come into collision with man being doomed to death, with the futility of his effort because he is destined, in the long run, to face morally incomprehensible and spiritually

insurmountable death. In this event, negation of the moral essence of death is a form of negating the moral essence of life and can but serve as a basis for irresponsible behaviour according to the principle, "après moi le déluge" (after me, the deluge). Comprehension of the moral meaning of death is thus capable of equipping the mature moral consciousness with criteria of evaluating human acts. The philosophy of *Stoicism* formulated the principle of "memento mori" (Latin: remember that thou must die), suggesting that man always act in a way as if his deed or his word were the last one in his life. This principle essentially pertains not to death but to the infiniteness of life, prompting a person to refrain from acts which cannot be rectified in case of his death, thus inculcating in people responsibility for their deeds and words. The dialectical materialistic conception of the world implies both a scientific understanding of death and its exhaustive spiritual appraisal. Such a world outlook is based on the unique character of human life and

personality, their infinite value which are to be compensated neither by eternity nor by benefit in this or the other world, as well as on the awareness that acts once performed no longer depend on people's will, continuing as they do their existence in the products and results of people's actions and taking the content of human life beyond its purely physiological bounds.

DEED, *action* treated in terms of its practical meaning and achieved result (what has been done, what changes a given deed makes in social reality). On the plane of moral *evaluation*, good deeds (*Beneficence*) and *evil deeds* are distinguished. Deed is a product of the interaction of man and objective conditions under which the action is performed. Depending on whether man did or did not pursue a positive result, intentional and unintentional deeds are distinguished. As a unity of action and result, a deed is usually distinguished from the *consequences* of an action which are considered separately as a state of things or course

of events following the completion of the action.

DEMOCRITUS (c. 460-c. 370 B.C.), Greek materialist philosopher, representative of the ethics of *eudaemonism*. Democritus set forth his ethic views in his major work, "Little World-System", of which only insignificant parts have survived. The ethics of Democritus is characterized by *naturalism* and *rationalism* (wisdom is the highest virtue, reason is the criterion of moral conduct; a wise man is identified with a moral one, an ignorant, with an immoral man). Democritus believed that choice of conduct and responsibility for one's acts exist insofar as man's behaviour corresponds to the laws established by man himself, while good, evil, justice, duty, shame and conviction occur only in relations between people. Inherent in Democritus's teaching are also elements of *utilitarianism*: good is something which is useful, evil is something that is harmful, usefulness is the criterion of distinguishing various kinds of pleasures; the principle of the "golden mean": sense of pro-

portion, temperance. Eudaemonism is the kernel of his system (happiness as the highest good; tranquility, joy, serenity achieved through spiritual and moral health, freedom from fear and prejudice and communication with like-minded friends). The historically limited character of Democritus's ethics is revealed above all in his treatment of social relations exclusively within the framework of slave-owning democracy (slaves are outside morals, happiness can be achieved only by a free man, woman's subordinate position is justified). Democritus's eudaemonism was further developed in the works of *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*.

DEONTOLOGICAL INTUITIONISM, see *Intuitionism*.

DEONTOLOGY [Gk *deon* that which is binding, *logos* teaching; the teaching on moral obligation], the branch of *ethics* treating problems of *duty* and what is obligatory, i.e. expresses moral standards in the form of precepts. The term was introduced by *Jeremy Bentham* who

used it to define the theory of morality as a whole. However, subsequently deontology came to be distinguished from *axiology*—the teaching on values, on *good* and *evil*. It is a peculiarity of moral consciousness as a specific form of social consciousness that it reflects social necessity, the requirements of people, society and historical development, in a specific subjective form—the concept of the obligatory, and determines to what extent an actually existing phenomenon corresponds to this concept and is morally justified. *Moral imperatives* are formed out of the concept of the obligatory. For man, they are his duties which, in a generalized form of rules equally applying to everyone, are formulated into *moral standards* and precepts (*commandments*). All these ethical categories are studied by a special branch of ethics—deontology. One of the most important issues in the theory of morality is the problem of the relationship between deontology and axiology, in particular, the relationship between two basic categories of ethics—*duty* and *good*. *Kant*

was confronted with this particular difficulty: while recognizing that the concept of duty must be based on the concept of good (duty is doing good), he determines good through duty (good is fulfilling duty). It is difficult to correlate these categories because in this case, we counterpose two types of morality—inner pursuit of good and virtue on the one hand and the external subordination to moral law. In the final account, this logic leads to the opposition of two fields of moral theory—deontology and axiology, characteristic of non-Marxist ethics, and of deontological *intuitionism* in particular. In its ideal model, socialist morality is based on the identification of good and duty. From this point of view, the duty of man is based on the demand that he do what is good for other people. On the other hand, in his service to society, each person must proceed not simply from his own understanding of good, but rely on the standards and *principles* which have been worked out by the collective consciousness of society. That is why moral good is that which

corresponds to the prescripts of morals (the obligatory). However, since the individual himself interprets these prescripts and his personal situation, no ideal model can relieve him from doubts and responsibility.

DESCRIPTIVE ETHICS, special branch of ethics which deals with concrete sociological and historical analysis of morals of a particular society, describes real moral phenomena. It studies the practised *customs*, *mores*, *traditions* and other forms of social *discipline*, the specific content of *moral standards* maintained in a society, the structure of *moral consciousness* and the social essence of universally accepted ideas of morals. Some of these questions are also studied by ethnography and empirical sociology. The special investigation of the mechanism of society's *moral relations* and moral consciousness based on concrete historical material, is of great importance not only for recreating the world history of morals, but also for developing practical methods of *moral education*, as

well as for solving some general theoretical problems of ethics.

DETERMINISM, see *Causality* (in morality).

DEVIANT BEHAVIOUR, a particular form of moral *evil* manifesting itself in negative deviation from the standards and patterns of conduct. In assessing deviant patterns of behaviour, some neopositivist theorists (*Neopositivism*) equate a genuinely negative behaviour, e.g. criminality, with the efforts of the masses to overcome dominant (bourgeois) morality. Human behaviour is subject to moral assessment both in terms of universal norms and of ethical *ideals*. Accordingly, far from covering all actions which do not conform to everyday morals, deviant behaviour rather refers to such actions which run counter to the ideal. However, deviations from the norm which stand above the everyday level (e.g. *fear*), are of positive moral significance and aim at improving existing social and ethical relations. For that reason, they do not constitute deviant beha-

viour. Deviant behaviour is rooted in an individual's inadequate assimilation of the principles and standards of morality, his or her inability to apply them in difficult situations, and in different levels of ethical culture. Deviant behaviour is dictated by the diversity of consequences of social processes (urbanization, growth of consumption), which are cementing social *mores* but generate certain problems in *moral education*. Deviant behaviour may be overcome through a combination of all means available to the system of social education and through a closer link between ideological, organizational, economic and cultural aspects of human activities in society.

DEWEY, John (1859-1952), a founder and main systematizer of the philosophy of US *pragmatism*; author of instrumentalism, a version of pragmatism, in the context of which his ethical views evolved. Rejecting the neopositivist tradition going back to *Hume*, Dewey did not make any fundamental distinction between evaluative (including moral) and empirical judge-

ment. According to Dewey, research is as important in morals as in natural sciences. But he understood research as a process of transforming an indefinite problematic situation into a definite and clear one. In solving a moral problem it is necessary, according to Dewey, to find a correct type of action. The most successful solution, based not on intuition but on reason, i.e., on taking into account all conditions and alternatives, constitutes good. It means that the peculiarity of morals as a specific form of social regulation of human conduct is being veiled, while ethics merges with the general theory of valuation. Dewey was against making an absolute of ethical categories (duty, justice, moral ideal and the like) and rejected the concept of the highest good, and thereby actually substituted relativistic, instrumentalist and individualistic ethics for *normative ethics*. Each moral situation, according to Dewey, is unique and has its own irreplaceable good and its own and only goal. Dewey objected to the principle "the end justifies the means" which is often as-

cribed to pragmatism (*Ends and means*). Although the means can be justified by the end alone, some means, apart from achieving the end, can produce such side effects which might devalue the end itself. Dewey disapproved of the revolutionary transformation of society, which is supposedly directed towards general and unrealizable ideals. He stood for partial improvements within the framework of particular situations and for the betterment of existing relations by means of gradual accumulation of these improvements. Dewey stood on the positions of *meliorism*, and although recognizing US society as imperfect, he was convinced of the possibility of its improvement. He declared democracy of the US type as an indispensable precondition both for the normal functioning of social institutions and for meeting the needs and interests of each individual. His ethical views are expounded in his "Ethics" (written jointly with James H. Tufts in 1908), "Reconstruction in Philosophy" (1920), "Human Nature and Conduct" (1922), "Theory of

Valuation" (1939) and other works.

DIGNITY, a moral concept expressing the idea that the value of any person is his personality; special moral attitude of man to himself and the attitude to him by society recognizing the value of the individual. On the one hand, man's awareness of his personal dignity is a form of *self-consciousness* and *self-control*, on which man's self-discipline is based. In order to assert and maintain one's dignity, one should perform corresponding moral actions (or, vice versa, should not perform actions which are beneath one's dignity). In this sense the concept of dignity, along with *conscience* and *honour*, is one of the ways for man to become aware of his responsibility to himself as a personality. On the other hand, an individual's dignity demands that other people as well respect it, recognize his corresponding rights and opportunities, and are exacting towards him. Personal dignity is an expression of the highest degree of man's historical evolution which accords with cer-

tain conditions of social activities. In feudal society, man's dignity was almost completely comprised of his social estate honour which left all too little room for his personal dignity. Bourgeois morality initially interpreted the individual's dignity as man's self-assertion by means of personal abilities and enterprise regardless of his social status. But it turned out that in reality this dignity was, as before, largely determined by man's social status and private property. As regards workers, their forced and exploited labour essentially denies them the dignity of a free individual. In an antagonistic society, a person can really assert his dignity primarily through protest, in the struggle against the foundations of that society. By rebelling against the inhuman social system, people prove in deed (and understand) that they are worthy of better living conditions. Socialist morality holds dignity as the supreme moral value.

DILIGENCE, *moral quality* characterizing a subjective disposition of a person to his work

which is externally expressed in the quantity and quality of its socially useful results. It is manifested in labour activity, *conscientiousness* and perseverance of a worker. Diligence can be contrasted with *parasitism*. As a social quality of a person, diligence is an expression of one's positive attitude to work, which psychologically implies: a need and ability for work, interest in work and in its useful results. In this sense, diligence is the opposite of an attitude to work as forced labour, inevitable evil, source of profit or a means of securing public office (*Selfishness, Careerism*). The positive moral significance of diligence is revealed in the context of its aesthetic aspect and one's goals in life. That is why it is so important to combine it with noble goals and a creative and enterprising approach to work.

DISCIPLINE [L *disciplina* teaching, learning], a definite system of human behaviour providing for concerted action within a collective and the obligatory mastering and fulfilment by people of the established

standards (legal, moral, political, ethical) and rules. It also deals with the ways by which this order is maintained. As a means of social control over people's everyday conduct, discipline reflects in itself the dominating social (primarily economic) relations and serves to maintain them. The forms of social discipline can be most varied—from direct coercion by the state to the force of *public opinion* and personal *conscientiousness* of people. The various forms and means of maintaining discipline are as follows: *customs, mores, traditions*, standards, social *habits*, tastes, the *authority* enjoyed by state and public organizations or individual public figures, social education of people (*Moral education*), and various forms of *persuasion* and compulsion. The predominance of a definite type of discipline is characteristic of each social formation. Primitive society was dominated by spontaneously formed habits; here the common bond was maintained by force of habit, tradition, and respect for the elder of the clan. In slave-owning and feudal so-

cieties, direct non-economic compulsion played a great role. In capitalist society economic compulsion predominates. Socialist discipline is "the discipline of class-conscious and united working people, who know no yoke and no authority except the authority of their own unity" (*Lenin*).

DISCRETION AND CREATIVITY (in morality), man's fulfilment of moral imperatives to assert himself as a *moral person* capable of not only performing the duties imposed on him, but of independently setting himself moral tasks to be accomplished without external (whether material or spiritual) coercion. Discretion and creativity in morality provide for: understanding of a moral requirement and its fulfilment not under compulsion but based on the dictates of one's *conscience*, prompted by the aspiration to do good to individual people and society as a whole; independent solution of moral problems; critical attitude towards the obsolete and participation in creating new moral norms (*Feeling for the new*),

readiness to oppose traditional customs which contradict the requirements of genuine morality. The classics of German philosophy were the first to devote much attention to the problem of discretion and creativity in morality. However, they resolved it primarily in terms of freedom of the individual. *Kant* and *Fichte* reduced it to freedom of personal conscience. *Fichte* considered "ego" as the only criterion of moral conscience and submission to external authority as lack of conscience. *Kant* maintained that a genuinely moral law is the law man frames for himself. Other theorists of morality proposed other solutions: contradistinction between "free" morality and submission to the norm, virtue and the eternal urge to do good, to "morality of duty" (*Deontology*). The exponents of *existentialism* consider the creative approach to morals as the morality of personal design, as man's assertion of himself in contrast to the "dogmatic" morality of fulfilling the accepted norms. This understanding of creativity in the spirit of *individualism* always leads, in the final

analysis, to the opposition of the individual to society. Marxist ethics solves the problem of discretion and creativity not only in respect of the individual, but primarily in respect of the mass of the people. A new morality is created as new forms of social *discipline* are established on the basis of practical mass experience. The need to display an independent and creative approach in morality is engendered by two factors. First, requirements of morality are of an extremely abstract, universal nature. Thus, their fulfilment in specific cases is each time unique and cannot be their simple mechanistic application but demands an independent and creative approach of an acting individual. Second, in the life of countries and peoples there occur disasters when the only way out is initially individual and then mass-scale *heroism*, creation of new moral relations between people.

DOBROLYUBOV, Nikolai Aleksandrovich (1836-1861), Russian literary critic and journalist, philosopher, revolutionary democrat. Dobrolyubov be-

lieved that social conditions form the basis for the evolution of morality and that moral progress of society can be achieved by social revolution and the destruction of the exploiter system holding the masses in poverty and ignorance. Dobrolyubov placed man and the main motives of his activity in the centre of his moral philosophy. The problem of what is universal in ethics Dobrolyubov treats in anthropological terms, maintaining that the external interest common to all humankind does not depend on private, civic and political considerations. At the same time, he believed it necessary to judge man's actions taking into account the conditions under which his character was formed and which determine his behaviour. Dobrolyubov insisted on a deterministic approach towards human behaviour, and argued against absolute freedom of the will and arbitrariness which turns into slavish dependence on fortuitous circumstances. Dobrolyubov considered action undertaken in the name of lofty ideals to be moral. The revolutionary thrust in his ethics was

expressed in his view of the "new people" who combine lofty moral ideals with positive knowledge and practical activities for liberating the people. A prominent place in Dobrolyubov's ethics is occupied by the concept of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*) which links morals to human needs. Its substance is explicitly expounded in his article "Nikolai Vladimirovich Stankevich" (1857). His major works dealing with problems of ethics are as follows: "The Importance of Authority in Education" (1857), "The Organic Development of Man in Connection with His Mental and Moral Activities" (1858), "Robert Owen and His Attempts at Social Reform" (1859).

DOGMATISM [Gk *dogma* doctrine, opinion], a way of thinking characterized by the uncritical acceptance of certain propositions (views, doctrines or norms) as dogmas, i.e., unconditional postulates or practical principles. As a rule, an *authority* (a legendary, mythological or real person, social institution, the supreme body of an

organization) to which omniscience and infallibility are ascribed is recognized as a source of dogmas. The *authoritarianism* of dogmatic thinking excludes rational substantiation and comprehension. It renders argumentation and internal accord of a doctrine or a *moral code* irrelevant. Dogmatism artificially interrupts the causal sequence and imposes restrictions on the competence of human reason. In this respect, the postulates of the authority are regarded as the touchstone for verifying the truth of new information, i.e., the old and the settled is applied as a criterion for appraising new phenomena. Hence the inability of dogmatic consciousness to assimilate new knowledge and new experience, intolerance towards the new (conservatism) and to anything unorthodox (*Fanaticism*). Dogmatism is typical of mass religious consciousness. That is why in the history of thought anti-dogmatism often merged with anti-clericalism, enlightenment, liberalism and democratism. The struggle against dogmatism was facilitated by the free development of science and the

extensive dissemination of natural and social sciences. Today, dogmatism is a feature of the ideology of conservative classes and groups and their corresponding ethically immature systems of values and standards, as well as persons propagating that ideology or striving to realize their personal interests under the guise of an authoritative opinion (*Selfishness*) or conceal their own incompetence. Since moral principles are of a universal nature and claim to be absolute they provide a fertile soil for dogmatism. That is why their application in the practice of human intercourse must be combined with a critical approach towards reality.

DOSTOYEVSKY, Feodor Mikhailovich (1821-1881), Russian writer and thinker who extensively treated moral and philosophical problems in his works. The police raid on the circle of the utopian socialist Petrashevsky, of which Dostoyevsky was a member, the arrest which followed, the death sentence which was then commuted to penal servitude, along

with the growing individualism, immoralism and nihilism in public circles of czarist Russia at that time, bred in Dostoyevsky disbelief in social upheaval and enhanced his moral protest against reality. He concentrated his pursuits on the ideal of a "positively beautiful" person whose embodiment he sought to present in his novels. Dostoyevsky was not satisfied with the tenet in the French materialists' theory concerning the influence of the social environment, that man as a product of social conditions was relieved of moral responsibility. He did not treat the interrelationship between circumstances and morality as a universal law. The roots of good and evil, Dostoyevsky believed, go not so much into the social system as into human nature and even deeper than that—into the universe. Dostoyevsky was convinced that man is capable of tearing himself loose from the predetermined goal and freely choose his own moral position by means of correctly distinguishing good from evil. The interpretation of these categories, as offered by the theory of "ra-

tional egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*), also did not satisfy Dostoyevsky. He did not regard reason as a basis of morality, because the conclusiveness and cogency to which reason appeals compels a certain conclusion exclusively by the force of logic, thus doing away with the involvement of free will in a moral act. The pursuit of freedom of choice is, according to Dostoyevsky, inherent in human nature. In this respect, man is motivated either by destructive wilfulness, asserting his freedom in every possible way, or by a feeling of admiration for the beautiful. But Dostoyevsky was aware of the duality of beauty, and believed that only the conscience aspiring to an ideal personality, which is embodied in the image of Christ, is able to distinguish between good and evil. God-personality alone can atone for human suffering and meet the human need for perfection, salvation and well-being of both the entire world and each individual, lending meaning to man's existence and immortality. Dostoyevsky recognized only man's free love of God, which is

neither forced by fear nor enslaved by a miracle. Accepting the religious conception of evil, Dostoyevsky as a keen observer nonetheless pointed out its concrete manifestations in the life of his day. This is individualism and wilfulness, despotism and coercion, regardless of the ends (satisfaction of personal pride or the achievement of universal happiness) which guided the bearers of these qualities. This is corruptness and cruelty. Dostoyevsky's efforts to link a humanistic social ideal with personal self-improvement are contradictory. His ethics is based on the unconditional will to assert the absolute. Although contradictory but profoundly humanistic and sensitive to human suffering, the ethics of Dostoyevsky exerted, and still exerts, a strong influence on moral consciousness and the philosophical thought of our time. Owing to its complexity, there exist different, including mutually exclusive, views on the ethics of Dostoyevsky. His ethical views are reflected, apart from his "Letters", in "Notes from the Underground" (1864), "Crime and Punishment"

(1866), "The Idiot" (1868), "The Possessed" (1871-1872), "A Raw Youth" (1875), "The Brothers Karamazov" (1879-1880) and "An Author's Diary" (1876-1881).

DUTY, one of the main *categories of ethics*; it implies a moral *obligation* equally binding on all people being transformed into one's personal task and formulated with reference to one's specific situation at a given moment. Whereas a moral precept expresses the attitude of society towards its individual members (it is formulated by society and demanded of its members), duty appears as an attitude of an individual towards society. In this respect, the individual is an active bearer of definite moral obligations to society, who is aware of them and fulfills them. The category of duty is closely linked to other concepts characterizing the moral activity of the individual, such as *responsibility*, *self-consciousness*, *conscience*, and *motive*. The interpretation of the nature and origins of duty has been one of the most difficult problems in

the history of ethics. The foundations and sources of duty were alternately sought in divine commandments, in the a priori law of morals (*Categorical imperative*), and in man's natural pursuit of pleasure and happiness (*Hedonism*, *Eudaemonism*). There were also different answers to the question who and what, in the final analysis, has the right to define the substance of duty: society (*Socio-approrative theories*), God (*Neo-Protestantism*), conscience (*Fichte*), or moral feelings (*Moral sense, theories of*). Consequently, the *authority* of a particular kind (*Authoritarianism*) was proclaimed as the basis of duty. The advocates of *existentialism* arrived at an extremely subjectivistic conclusion, whereby it is altogether unimportant what man does and in what he sees his duty. The only thing that counts is that he follows his personal intentions. The question of the principles of duty also remained unresolved. The advocates of *deontological intuitionism* believe that when man performs his duty only the action itself is important and not the

motives behind it. The adherents of another trend (*Moral goodness, theory of*) were of an opposite view, attributing decisive importance to the nature of the motive. In Marxist ethics, the problem of duty is examined as part of a general question of the origin and substantiation of the requirements of morality. However people may view the origin of these requirements, moral precepts, ultimately, always reflect the laws of the objective process of social development which, in a certain way, are materialized in the needs of a society, a class and individuals. In comprehending the category of duty, production, civic, political-party and other obligations (professional duty, military duty, etc.) should be distinguished from moral duty as such implying an unconditional respect for human dignity in every person, the assertion of humanism. Moral duty is not reduced to a simple sanctioning of obligations stemming from one's specific social status and particular interests. It only establishes a critical attitude to these obligations from the view-

point of universal moral values (*Universal and class elements in morality*). Therefore, the relationship between moral duty and empirical obligations of individuals is often rather strained and pregnant with conflict (e.g., military duty requires the killing of the enemy, while moral duty is based on the imperative, "Thou shalt not kill"). The socio-utilitarian orientation in ethics is rather inclined to elevate various practical interests and the benefit of society to a moral principle and an obligatory moral duty. However, as it turns out, more instrumental is the conception of morality as the supreme expression of social interests thereby imbuing it with a value of its own. To understand moral duty, it is important to answer the question: who has the right to define the substance of moral duty? Only society as a whole is capable of developing general moral requirements on the basis of the collective experience of the people. However, the task of solving a moral problem as applied to a particular concrete situation is placed primarily on the one who fulfils these re-

quirements, i.e., on each member of society. On the one hand, each person must himself be aware of the objective substance of his moral duty, and no reference to a social authority or a generally accepted opinion can justify erroneous understanding of one's duty. On the other hand, a person's responsibility to his conscience is ultimately expressed in his responsibility to society, which gives

public opinion the right to judge whether the given person understands his duty correctly. But the limits of responsibility of society and the individual in this respect are specified by concrete historical conditions, with the general trend in the evolution of social morals being directed towards greater personal responsibility of each member of society.

E

ECOLOGICAL ETHICS, most widespread name of the trend in contemporary non-Marxist philosophy of morality which emerged in the mid-1970's in connection with the discussion of the causes and consequences of the ecological crisis and attempts to find socially acceptable ways to resolve it. Ecological ethics is represented by theoreticians of various world-view orientations (Daniel G. Kozlovsky, George H. Kieffer, Jan Tinbergen, et al.) who are all equally anxious concerning the negative consequences of man's influence on the environment and question the very possibility of human civilization's further progress, preservation of the environment, survival of people as a biological species. Proponents of ecological ethics, unlike theoreticians dealing primarily with socio-economic and

political aspects of global problems, concentrate on their moral and ethical aspects, stressing the wide gap between ecological and ethical development. They regard discussion of global problems in isolation from moral imperatives, ethical values and orientations as fruitless. Representatives of ecological ethics are unanimous in their conviction that present-day ecological problems demand a new approach to the environment, one based on ethics orientated towards the future and establishing an organic link between man and nature (*Attitude to nature*). This ethics has different names: the global ethics (Tinbergen), the new international moral order (Ervin Laszlo), the new ethics. Many scholars prefer to call it ecological ethics (Kieffer, Kozlovsky, et al.) appealing to such

ecological values as survival, security, satisfaction of people's vital needs (food, clothing, housing), improving the quality of life, etc. The ideas of ecological ethics are expounded in the following works: D.G. Kozlovsky, "Ecological and Evolutionary Ethic" (1974), G.H. Kieffer, "Bioethics" (1979), in the works of the representatives of the Club of Rome. In recent years these problems have been extensively discussed by Soviet scholars and writers.

EDUCATION, moral, see *Moral education.*

EGOISM [*L ego I*], a principle of life and a *moral quality* which characterize a person from the standpoint of his attitude to society and other people. It implies, in choosing one's line of conduct, giving preference to one's interest as regards the interests of society and other people. Egoism is an undisguised manifestation of *individualism*. It was usually regarded as a negative quality in the history of morality, although a certain positive sense was sometimes attributed to it. Along

with the appearance of private property, when primitive-communal relations disintegrated, egoism became a widespread social phenomenon. It acquires particular significance in bourgeois society when private property relations matured. Private enterprise, serving egoistic purposes, is in fact the only kind of socially useful activities (*Usefulness*) for a capitalist. That is why a bourgeois, on the one hand, cultivates his egoism, while, on the other, views the accumulation of capital as a kind of charity he renders to society. This paves the way for ethical theories advocating egoism (*Egoism, theories of*). Capitalist relations mould the psychology of egoism not only among the ruling class, but to a considerable extent among the petty bourgeoisie and even among working people. In certain periods of historical development, the principle of egoism played a relatively progressive role. For instance, from the Renaissance up to the establishment of capitalist relations literature, art and philosophy displayed heightened interest in egoism, treating it as the right

of every individual to happiness (*Eudaemonism, Hedonism*). It played a certain role in liberating people's consciousness from medieval religious ideas of the earthly life as something transitory and low, in recognizing the individual's dignity, in awareness of one's interests and legitimate pursuit of happiness. As capitalist relations took firm root, the essence of private enterprise became ever more pronounced in distorting relations between people. Socialist morality counterposes to egoism the principle of *collectivism*, striving for harmonious combination of social and personal interests, concern for people, comradely mutual assistance. However, the isolation of interests and alienation of the working people from group and national goals, also create objective prerequisites for the reproduction of egoism under socialism. The elimination of egoism is facilitated by the large-scale improvement in the quality of life, the harmonization of social relations and creation of conditions for free and profitable activities of man which contribute to social progress and pros-

perity. Egoism as a negative moral quality should not be confused with an absolutely natural specific characteristic of man which consists in realizing his personal requirements and interests in his behaviour.

EGOISM, THEORIES OF, ethical concepts according to which man is free to be guided in his activities solely by self-interest, *egoism* being the basic principle of moral behaviour. The theory of egoism is both a philosophical teaching of the nature of man and his innate drive for pleasure, to avoid sufferings and take care of his private interests, and an ethical teaching postulating that people should pursue personal interest in their moral activities. The thought that man is an egoist by nature and that any morality must proceed from this premise has been known since the times of antique philosophy (*Democritus, Epicurus*, see *Hedonism, Eudaemonism*). These views were finally formed in the ethics of the 17th and 18th centuries (*Spinoza, Mandeville*, French materialists) which was an attempt to create morality

based exclusively on people's earthly interests and directed against feudal Christian morality with its belief in God and the rejection of worldly pleasures. The ethics of French materialists was named the theory of "rational egoism". Its essence consists in the following: since man in his activities is capable of pursuing only his private interests, he should not be taught to reject his egoism, but to take a rational view of his interests and to follow his natural requirements. Provided society is organized in the same reasonable way, personal interests of individuals will not come into conflict with the interests of other people and society at large but, conversely, will serve them. The ideas of "rational egoism" were formulated in their entirety in the works of *Helvétius*, their nature being specifically bourgeois. In fact, they idealized the private entrepreneur who, in pursuing his own interests, at the same time is objectively serving the interest of society by providing the population with necessary goods and services. *Feuerbach*, German materialist philos-

opher of the 19th century, propagated similar ideas. The Russian revolutionary democrat, *Chernyshevsky*, was also an adherent of the theory of "rational egoism" in its extreme, revolutionary variety. *Chernyshevsky*, in his ethics, emphasized the individual's service to society. Man's conscious subjecting of his aspirations to the needs of the revolutionary struggle is, to his mind, precisely what best suits his personal interest. The characters of *Chernyshevsky's* novel, "What Is to Be Done?", are guided by this very principle of "rational egoism" with its idea of self-sacrifice. Such an interpretation of personal interest was connected with anthropological philosophy which traced the sources of morality in man as such, outside the context of society.

EMOTIONAL - VOLITIONAL THEORIES OF MORAL VALUE, a trend in contemporary non-Marxist ethics and *axiology*, all the varieties of which are characterized by subjective-idealist interpretation of the nature of moral values as the

determined psychological attitude of the agent to the object. US philosophers Wilbur M. Urban, David M. Prall, John R. Reid, Clarence I. Lewis, James B. Pratt are typical representatives of this trend. Supporters of emotional-volitional theories believe that the moral value of the object (an act, the character of a person or a phenomenon), is not associated with its own distinctive properties, but is the result of the agent's (the person evaluating this phenomenon) psychological attitude to it. This attitude itself is of an emotional-volitional nature, i.e., is the sum total of man's desires, *emotions*, *inclinations* and needs. Consequently, the significance of phenomena and objects for man is deduced from his subjective attitude to them. Social and class origins of moral judgements is substituted by purely psychological ones which depend exclusively on the emotional-volitional type of the individual. In reality, people's attitude to the phenomena around them is always socially conditioned, as they play a certain role in man's vital activities, have objective

social significance independent of his consciousness. Psychological interpretation of the nature of moral values leads the theorists of this trend not only to subjectivism, but to *relativism* as well; i.e., to the conclusion that the value of a particular moral phenomenon is valid only within the limits of a concrete situation and changes depending on the psychology of the subject who is evaluating it.

EMOTIONS, an affective form of manifestation of moral *feelings* (should be distinguished from the volitional form—*inducement*). Whereas a feeling is a stable attitude of man to something (love for one's Motherland or for another person), emotion is a feeling experienced at a certain moment in a specific situation. Psychology and physiology study emotion as a process (changes in heartbeat and in lungs, rush of blood, contraction of muscles, intensification or suppression of usual reactions, changes in facial expression, intonation, gestures, etc.). Ethics deals solely with the social content of emotions (it studies how they

reflect man's attitude to society and affect his behaviour). Such feelings as approval, censure, satisfaction, joy, sympathy, dissatisfaction, antipathy, as well as anger, shame, aversion, indignation can be classified as moral emotions, but only provided the individual's moral *evaluation* of his own or other people's actions is present in it.

EMOTIVISM, see *Neopositivism*.

ENDS AND MEANS. The problem of ends and means in ethics is a reflection of the contradictions of class society where, as *Engels* stated, "in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization or the means of attaining them are insufficient" (*Engels*). Humanists of the past, and especially philosophers of the Enlightenment (*Rousseau*, *Schiller*, et al.), repeatedly noted that all material and spiritual cultural progress goes, in the final analysis, against man. The moral con-

sciousness of society has comprehended this fact in its own way, noting that good goals and elevated ideals being realized even partially often lead to results which are morally *evil*. In its turn evil, including base motives, becomes a motive force of social progress and testifies to its contradictory character and anti-humanism. The paradox of the contradiction between ends and means is usually explained by the argument that immoral methods are applied to achieve moral aims. From this point of view it would seem that it is impossible to combine ethics, the doctrine of ultimate ends, with politics, the practical ways of achieving them (*Morality and politics*). Theoreticians of morality often concluded from this that any means may be justified by a good end (*Jesuitism*, *Machiavellianism*). Other thinkers came to the opposite conclusion—that good ends should be attained only by good means, and that the task of morality is only to deal with ways and methods of achieving a desired end. The ends themselves are assessed for the most part outside the sphere of morals. If the

results of historical movements of the past seem anti-humanistic, then the reason for this is not just unfit means. Bourgeois ideals of freedom and equality realized in practice contain new forms of inequality and exploitation. The divergence of ends and means examined in its historical essence indicates that humanity is still at the stage when the means of some groups of people are attained by sacrificing the *benefit* of the others. The historical experience of the socialist movement proved more than once that the use, let it be forced and limited in scale, of inhuman means deforms even the most beautiful ends. That is why it is important that a concrete historical appraisal of particular ends and corresponding means proceeding from "what could be done" should be supplemented and corrected by a humanistic moral appraisal based on "what should be done".

ENGELS, Frederick (1820-1895), *Marx's* friend and comrade-in-arms, created the Marxist doctrine together with him. Engels, from the very begin-

ning, interpreted philosophical and ethical problems in the context of criticism of class society, capitalist society in the first place. Having gradually overcome the influence of moral utopian criticism of the Young Hegelians, Engels adopted the standpoint of scientific historicism. By the 1840's the starting point of his ethical programme becomes such a change in the character of man's activities which will help to do away with "the inner dichotomy of labour" (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 430). Engels counterposes to the latter people's free activity in the future communist society, where "labour becomes its own reward" (*ibid.*, p. 431). Advancing the task of "the independent creation—voluntarily and by its own effort—of a new world based on purely human and moral social relationships" (*ibid.*, p. 464), Engels gives his first though yet general outline of the communist *ideal*, however, not devoid of anthropocentrism and even anthropotheism, the elevation of man to

the role of the supreme criterion. In "The Holy Family" written jointly with Marx (1845), Engels formulates an important principle of Marxist philosophy as follows: "history is not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means..., history is nothing but the activity of man..." (Vol. 4, p. 93). Engels contrasts bourgeois morality which, as well as law, is the result of abstract interpretation of man (ibid., p. 193) with communist morality inseparable from the struggle for man's integrity (*All-round integrated development of the personality*). In his work "The Condition of the Working-Class in England", (1845) he criticizes bourgeois education for its flabbiness, subservience and resignation to one's fate (Vol. 4, p. 527). In "The German Ideology" written jointly with Marx (1845-1846), the historical nature of morality, its links with concrete social formations, classes, etc., is retraced, and morality and ideology of class society subjected to criticism. At the same time, Engels and Marx do not separate the concept of the moral agent from concrete persons

and come out against turning it into social forms in isolation from the real human activities engendering them (ibid., Vol. 6, p. 48). In his "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy" (Ch. III, 1886) Engels criticized, from the standpoint of historicism, Feuerbach's abstract moralistic ethical conception and his attempt to create a new religion. In "Anti-Dühring" (1877-1878), he examined the problem of the correlation of the class essence of morality and universal moral standards. "All moral theories have been hitherto the product ... of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality. It has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or, ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. ...A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes

possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms ... but has even forgotten them in practical life" (ibid., Vol. 25, pp. 87-88). However, to reduce morality to purely functional, class and official phenomena is equally erroneous as this leads to *relativism*, to the negation of the progress of *moral reason* together with the whole spiritual culture of humanity. Engels laid the foundations of the critique of economic materialism, in particular, of its most vulgar trends which interpreted morality as an appendage of the economic social organism in isolation from human activities, thus confining moral criteria to the criterion of usefulness and functional expediency. Engels demonstrated that the restoration of the sovereign right of every human being to have moral judgements of his living conditions is a realistic objective of remaking the world.

ENVY, a resentful, hostile feeling towards the success, popularity, moral superiority or preferential status of another person. Envy appears in man on

the basis of self-love (*Egoism*) and its related *ambition* and *vanity*. The feeling of envy impairs the individual and the interrelationships between people (e.g. it evokes in man a desire to see another meet failure or misfortune or bring discredit on himself, and frequently induces immoral deeds). Socialist morality contrasts to the feeling of envy *mutual assistance* in attaining a common goal.

EPICETETUS (c. 50-138), Roman Stoic philosopher, originally a slave; a follower of Musonius Rufus, a Roman Stoic. His independent activity came to an end in the nineties after Emperor Domitian banned all philosophical schools in the city. After that, he lived and studied in Nikopolis ad Istrum (Epirus) in Greece for the rest of his life. Like many Greek philosophers, he did not write treatises. His "Discourses of Epictetus" and "Encheiridion" ("Manual") recorded by his pupil Arrianus, came down to us. Epictetus, as primarily a preacher of morality, did not work out its theory. He dwelled

on individual freedom as the highest good making man happy (such is the *eudaemonism* of Stoics) in more detail than other representatives of *Stoicism*. He who disposes only of what is within his powers can be called free: "And when you are thus prepared and thus exercised ... to keep your desire, to keep your aversion carefully turned to this point; whom have you any longer to fear?" Man is not the master of his wealth and body (he can be stripped of his property and made a slave). Thought and will are man's genuine property. He is quite free at this point. Whatever happens is inevitable. Therefore, one should courageously endure misfortunes without a murmur. Good and evil are not inherent in things, but in the soul. It is not the events themselves that make man depressed, but the views of them. Epictetus argued that in conditions of slavery free will and outward welfare are incompatible. Hence one should renounce everything for the sake of spiritual independence and peace of mind. Thus, Epictetus's ideal is negative, ascetic

freedom, which in fact is non-freedom, for man is unable to develop himself and reveal his worth renouncing the social and cultural wealth of the material world created by society. To live according to Epictetus's precepts, means to live in harmony with nature—with the world reason and the laws of truth and good, i.e., in harmony with God whose providence is in everybody. It is exactly this community with God which helps the individual to distinguish good from evil by intuition. Epictetus's ideas of the value of any labour, of everybody's equality in the face of God, his condemnation of cruelty and luxury, reflected his opposition to the slave-owning system. According to Epictetus, the essence of philosophy is its practical significance. He himself led a truly ascetic and stoic life. He did not even let his descendants know his name ("epictetus" means one's "purchase" or "slave"). Although Epictetus did not recognize the immortality of the soul, still other aspects of his teaching exercised considerable in-

fluence over the followers of Christian morality.

EPICUREANISM, a trend in the history of ethics and moral teachings; a moral *principle*; an eudaemonic trend in ethics often treated in the spirit of *hedonism*. Named after *Epicurus*, the Greek philosopher who taught that bliss and pleasure are the highest good and that all moral virtues are associated with attaining it. In his view, pleasure-seeking and avoidance of pain are inherent in every living creature and implanted in the human soul by nature itself. Epicurus's doctrine opposed individualistic treatment of morality to its religious justification which canonized traditional principles of Greek society of those days and saw the sources of morality in the human being rather than in God's power. The teaching of Epicurus was later misrepresented as pleasure-seeking and a corresponding way of life.

EPICURUS (341-270 B.C.), Greek materialist philosopher, founder of *Epicureanism*, the individualistic ethics which

evolved from the ideas of *eudaemonism* of *Democritus*. He founded a school in Athens known as "The Garden" (c. 307 B.C.) and inscribed over the gate: "Wonderer, you'll be fine here; the highest good here is pleasure." Epicurus rejected the supernatural origin of moral feelings, seeking their source in man himself, in his natural, in-born desire to attain pleasure and to avoid pain. Virtue is merely a means to achieve bliss—the supreme purpose of moral life. Epicurus's ethics is based on *hedonism*. However, emphasizing the sensuous nature of pleasure, he gave preference to those pleasures which bring a stable feeling of happiness, i.e., spiritual bliss rather than transient and momentary bodily pleasures. The highest good, that is happiness, is achieved, according to Epicurus, by means of wisdom which teaches one to live in conformity with nature rationally comprehended by man, the peace of the mind brought by avoidance of unnecessary fears and desires in private and public life, and by *friendship* uniting like-minded persons. Epicurus

approved reasonable bodily pleasures and believed that only a man capable, if necessary, of confining himself to only natural and necessary pleasures can hope to attain happiness. However, he attributed more importance to the absence of pain caused by intemperance than to pleasures. Hence his teaching of *ataraxia*—freedom from disturbance, the highest bliss being attained by avoiding one's passions and desires. Only a wise man who overcomes all sufferings through his lofty spirit and lives without inner contradictions is really happy. Epicurus's life is a model combination of one's behaviour and principles. In his school, there was a rule: do as if the teacher himself were observing you. His ethics is fairly democratic since everybody is able to understand and follow its directions. There were women and slaves among his pupils. Major works: "Main Thoughts", "Letter to Menoeceus".

EQUALITY (in morality), a formal principle of morality providing for *moral imperatives* equally applying to all people

irrespective of their social status and conditions of life. In personal terms, this principle stipulates that man must assess other people's acts applying the same criteria as he uses to evaluate himself. One of the first attempts to formulate the principle of equality in morality was the *golden rule*. In modern times, this principle was formulated by *Kant* (*Categorical imperative*). Moreover, equality does not imply that one identifies oneself with another individual but recognizes that individual's self-value (*Schopenhauer*). The idea of equality receives its normative expression in the principle of *altruism* and in corresponding necessity for compassion (pity), mercy and involvement (*Soloviev*). In modern ethics, the principle of equality has been expounded by the neopositivist Richard Mervyn Hare who holds that it is applicable to any moral requirements. Any morality that has ever existed in human history formally based its principles equally bearing upon a multitude of people. However, together with society's evolution, the content of the prin-

ciple of equality in morality kept changing. As historical experience demonstrates, moral equality can be realized only given a certain socio-political and cultural status of the people which is characterized by economic and political independence, possibilities to raise one's educational and professional level, spiritual development with the sine qua non being responsibility of each member of the society for the results of his or her actions.

ESCHATOLOGY [Gk *eschatos* last, *logos* learning], religious doctrine concerning the ultimate fate of the world. According to Christian dogma, the history of mankind is a composition of the following basic aspects: God created man in His own image, gave him moral law and *freedom of the will*, thus making him responsible for his actions. Adam and Eve committed disobedience (the Fall) and God doomed the whole of humanity to eternal punishment. Jesus Christ sent by Him to Earth redeemed mankind (*Redemption*) thus making possible the future salvation of

man from sin in the "Kingdom of God" which will come after the Day of Judgement when the righteous will be separated from sinners. Conclusions of moral significance are drawn from these mythological ideas: man should rely in his moral activities on God's mercy rather than on his own power (*Humility*). The supreme moral sanction is that virtue is rewarded and sin is punished in the next world, not here on Earth (*Retribution*). Although man is free, he cannot but sin, as he has inherited the original sin. A deadly sin is not the violation of moral rules, but arrogance (*Pride*), one's claims that he has overcome sin and achieved moral perfection.

ETHICAL AND AESTHETIC, THE. Any social phenomenon, man's *acts* or *motives* are both of aesthetic and ethical importance (*value*) and can be evaluated, on the one hand, as beautiful or ugly and, on the other, as *good* or *evil*. Moreover, moral and beautiful have long since been conceived, both by social and individual consciousness, as an organic unity. Such

interpenetration of the two relatively independent concepts reflects the most important value orientation elaborated by social consciousness in the course of its historical evolution. From the humanistic standpoint, only that which is ethical, moral, which elevates and ennobles man is beautiful, whereas the ethical cannot be recognized as morally good if it is not inherently connected with beauty. It is precisely this inner affinity, essential unity of ethical and aesthetic spheres that produced the specific meaning of the concepts of "lofty", "base", "heroic", etc., where ethical and aesthetic evaluations of a phenomenon or an act are inseparable. However, the dialectics of interrelations between the ethical and the aesthetic is not confined to their unity. Relations between these two spheres may acquire a rather complex and often extremely contradictory nature in a concrete historical context. The conflicts between the ethical and the aesthetic gave rise to a number of theories and concepts which contrast one sphere to the other as if they

were basically alien and incompatible forms of people's activities. Marxist ethics regards contradictions between the ethical and the aesthetic primarily as a product of abnormal social conditions, disharmony between the real and the ideal, natural and spiritual, internal and external in people's activities themselves. As regards the sphere of individual behaviour and relations between people it is manifested, in particular, in the underestimation of the form of an act or a contact which can be either polite or rude (*Politeness, Rudeness*), elegant or vulgar, or, on the contrary, in disregard for the meaningful aspect of conduct and communication most visually demonstrated by "pure" forms of the ethical and the aesthetic (*Etiquette, Fashion*). The ethical can also conflict with the aesthetic when a person likes or takes pleasure in what is morally defective or immoral (e.g., approval of the specimens of so-called mass culture with its cult of violence, cruelty, sexual perversion and the like). Vice, vulgarity, spiritual poverty and narrow-min-

dedness often hide their true essence behind a mask of surface polish, good manners and words. The difference between real beauty and the imaginary one can be revealed in its attitude to good, i.e., through its human content proper. Moral evaluation of a fact, an event or an act, is an organic component in the structure of the aesthetic description of any social phenomenon. Thus, the ethical and the aesthetic are two sides of a single whole in man viewed in the context of his multiform ties with concrete historical and social realities. Thus, the real basis of "accord" as well as "discord" between the ethical and the aesthetic should be found in man himself. The contradictions which misrepresent the meaning of the ethical and the aesthetic can be overcome and all forms of actual *alienation* removed, provided there are necessary preconditions for the *all-round integrated development of the personality*. Art plays an important role in revealing the real dialectics of the ethical and the aesthetic.

ETHICAL SOCIALISM, liberal bourgeois concept according to which the essence of socialism is not its political and socio-economic relations but moral values. Its basic ideas were first formulated at the turn of the century in the works of Neo-Kantianists of the Marburg School — Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, Rudolf Stammler, Karl Vorländer, as well as Leonard Nelson and others, who substitute the principles of idealistic ethics for (or supplement them to) the theory of scientific socialism. Emphasizing that socialism is the sphere of imperatives, the kingdom of purposes, they replaced the materialist interpretation of history by the Kantian theory of practical reason. They believed it was *Kant* who first substantiated from the standpoint of ethics the socialist idea of solidarity and respect for everyone's dignity, in his formulae of the *categorical imperative* (which teaches that man must regard mankind, both in himself and in anyone else, always as an end and never as a means). They held that Kant thus promoted the elaboration of an

ethical ideal suitable for everybody irrespective of his material, social and class interests. Ethics, in their view, must be a kind of social education which would help to eliminate class conflicts and consolidate society.

ETHICS [Gk *ethika*, from *ethos* custom, habit, character], a philosophical discipline, the science of *morality*. Ethics is one of the oldest theoretical disciplines that appeared as an inalienable and, according to many thinkers, most important part of philosophy. The term ethics was introduced by *Aristotle* to designate the teaching of morality. As distinct from everyday moral consciousness formed spontaneously in the process of people's social practice, ethics as a philosophical science appeared as a result of the separation of mental-theoretical activities from material-practical activities, i.e., with the division of society into classes. Ethics was to resolve in theory the same kind of practical moral problems man had to face in reality (what is proper *conduct*, what is to be con-

sidered *good* and *evil*, etc.). Thus, since antiquity, ethics has been usually regarded as practical philosophy, unlike purely theoretical knowledge. Any theoretical knowledge has, in the final analysis, practical significance. It not only equips man with means and methods of remaking the world, but also deals with a world outlook, imparts justification to the purposes of practical activities. The above pertains not only to ethics, but to philosophy in general, as well as to other humanitarian sciences. The specific character of ethics in this case, is that the aims mentioned above are formulated as the ideas of the imperative, of good and evil, as *ideals*, moral *principles* and standards of conduct, as the teaching of man's predestination and the purpose of his life. Two kinds of problems have gradually become discernible in ethics: those concerning how man should act (*Normative ethics*) and theoretical aspects of the origins and essence of morality. It was exactly its normative nature that determined the specific character of ethics and its special place in the sys-

tem of scientific knowledge. The traditional task of ethics was not only to describe and explain morality but above all to teach it, i.e., to offer an ideal model of relations between people which is free from *alienation* between the individual and the community and in which *happiness* is identified with good. Various ideal models were opposed to reality as if offsetting its imperfections and constituted a kind of a spiritual "niche" which often distracted the minds of individuals from the worries of everyday life. The practical implementation of those models was associated with man's rising above empirical passions and goals and renouncing them. This was clearly revealed, for instance, in the ideas of *asceticism*, in contrasting duty and *inclinations*. Ethics attempted by means of its normative programmes to subjugate a specific man to an abstract man. It came into conflict with real individuals whose real life could not be squeezed into the suggested normative confines. And the more substantiated and logically impeccable were the moralistic systems, the

less they were able to impel real people to rise to the level of a moral ideal. Having initiated its irreconcilable confrontation with real life, which was quite a justifiable negation of the immorality of class society, ethics actually doomed itself to the lack of practical results. The contradiction between the claims of ethics to the role of practical philosophy and the unreality of its ideals, was fully revealed in modern times. Professional philosophical ethics objectively faced the need to choose between the lofty moral ideals deprived of real basis and real life devoid of moral merits. And ethics made its choice in favour of life by criticizing morality as a form of consciousness alienated from man and hostile to him. *Kierkegaard* and *Nietzsche*, each in his own way, were the heralds of ethical anti-normativism. Their teaching of the affirmation of empirical individuals by violating moral standards was further elaborated in irrationalist philosophy, above all in *existentialism*. A specific variety of anti-normativism is substantiated within the framework of

positivist philosophy. In particular, in its neopositivist version (*Neopositivism*), it denies scientific approval to moral standards by erecting an insuperable barrier between facts and values. It reduces ethical judgements to a strictly verified content seeing in it an instrument which can prevent the turning of morality into an artificial ideological structure. In other words, it proclaims a value-wise neutrality of ethics as a science. Anti-normativism is a typical feature of the Western ethics of the 19th and particularly the 20th century but does not exhaust its content. There are ethical schools, which would at times gather strength and even move to the fore (as is the case now), more directly and harmoniously linked with classical ethics (e.g. ethical doctrines within the framework of philosophic anthropology, phenomenology, naturalistic schools). Recent years witnessed the turn of ethics towards applied ethics (*bioethics*, the *ethics of science*, of business, etc.). The attitude of Marxism to ethics is associated with its overall philosophi-

cal and historical position, and first of all with the philosophical concept of practice and the social ideal of communism. Instead of construing ethical-moral ideals which are not far from the reality and supplement its defects, Marxism sets the task of perfecting reality itself, harmoniously combining moral and pragmatic motivations and synthesizing good and happiness. Marxism differs from the ethics of the past not in that it sees the direct content of morality and ethical concepts (such as goodness, duty, happiness) in a different light but because it views them in an entirely new dimension, that of their practical implementation. It substantiates the prospect of non-alienated morality coinciding with life transformed along communist lines. It proceeds from the moral resolvement of the socio-practical problems to the practical solution of moral problems by society. An alternative of either an immoral reality or unreal morality, is overcome in Marxism by postulating a moral reality. In a sense, this approach to morality could be regarded as an outright repudi-

ation of traditional ethics. "One therefore cannot deny the justice of Sombart's remark that 'in Marxism itself there is not a grain of ethics from beginning to end'; theoretically, it subordinates the 'ethical standpoint' to the 'principle of causality'; in practice it reduces it to the class struggle" (*Lenin*). The analysis of the specific course of the struggle for the humanistic transformation of social relations, the course which substantially specified and put off the initial forecasts, and particularly the contradictory experience of socialist development, revealed a need to make use of the social potential of morality as a relatively autonomous form of consciousness and to create, on the basis of Marxism, ethics proper. There exist many versions of Marxist ethics which differ, among other things, depending on what spiritual traditions, besides Marxism, they rest on. Thus, in his discourse on ethics, Georgi *Plekhanov* addresses the *utilitarianism* of enlightenment; Karl *Kautsky* appeals to Darwinism, György Lukács, to the Hegelian philosophy and

Eduard Bernstein, to Kantianism. In the Soviet Union, ethics existed for a long period within the framework of party journalism and pedagogics. As a relatively independent branch of knowledge, it began to evolve beginning from the 1960's. In Soviet philosophic literature, the comprehension of ethics covers many aspects: the philosophical analysis of morality, normative ethics, the history of ethical doctrines, the theory of moral education, as well as the general methodological problems of professional and applied ethics, the problems of sociology and psychology of morality. The basis of ethics is the teaching of the nature of morality as a specific social phenomenon and form of social consciousness, of the role of morality in society, of the laws of the evolution of moral ideas reflecting people's material living conditions, of the class character of morality. Together with these general principles formulated by historical materialism, Marxist ethics deals with more specific problems. Above all, it analyzes the social mechanism of morality and its as-

pects—the nature of moral *activities*, *moral relations* and moral *consciousness*. Basic elements of moral relations, consciousness and activities are generalized and reflected in the *categories of ethics*. The study of the structure of moral consciousness and its various forms (*Logic of the language of morality*), makes a special field of research. The problems of the nature of moral values (*Axiology*), are studied in close connection with the problems listed above. Ethics does concrete sociological research into the morality of various types of society (*Descriptive ethics*), demonstrates the role of the moral factor in the social and spiritual evolution of society and moulding human personality, how this factor can be used in combination with the methods of education and social management. It is only by solving all these theoretical problems that the principles of socialist morality can be given a genuinely scientific substantiation which is the basic task of Marxist normative ethics.

ETHICS AND PSYCHOLOGY, sciences closely related in their study of man's behaviour (*conduct*) and *motives*, but doing their research from different angles. Up to the 18th century, there was no clearcut borderline between ethics and psychology. *Naturalism* and *psychologism* predominated in ethics which interpreted the nature of moral motives as man's natural desires and feelings. This idea was particularly pronounced in the theories of moral sense (*Moral sense, theories of*) which derived concepts and principles of morality from some inborn senses and emotions (approval and censure, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with oneself). *Kant* was the first in the history of ethics to level criticism against naturalism and psychologism in the interpretation of morality. He pointed out that man can approve good and censure evil, feel inner satisfaction for his good deeds and suffer pangs of remorse for the immoral ones, only if he is already a moral *person*. One should therefore first define moral consciousness and only then speak of the feelings it itself re-

veals. As distinct from psychology which deals with the psychic nature of man and reveals actual subjective reasons and mechanisms of his actions, Kant defined ethics as the science of man's proper conduct and of what his motives should be, even if he does not follow them. Kant interpreted moral consciousness as an a priori one as opposed to psychology which is conditioned empirically. There is yet no simple answer to the problem of correlation of ethics and psychology. Psychology studies the laws of human psyche, general specific properties of the individual and social groups, developments in man's consciousness which form inner subjective motives of his actions. Ethics studies man's conduct and his spiritual world in so far as they are determined by socio-historical laws of morality, conform (or do not conform) to moral standards (*Consciousness, moral, Logic of the language of morality*), have moral significance (*Values*). Hence different aspects in interpreting certain concepts in ethics and psychology. Psychology studies man's traits of

character from the standpoint of their dependence on definite psychic mechanisms (stereotypes, habits, inclinations, needs, feelings) which can be either inborn or acquired and cultivated under certain social conditions and manifest themselves in corresponding actions typical of the given individual. Ethics studies *moral qualities* irrespective of psychic mechanisms, as general characteristics of behaviour of a great variety of people and estimates them either as positive or negative depending on whether they conform to moral standards. Psychology studies will-power from the standpoint of psychic mechanisms governing man's behaviour. Ethics regards it as a positive moral quality meeting certain moral requirements which reflect definite social needs. Thus, both psychic properties and moral qualities are causal, but they express different types of *causality*. In spite of all the differences between ethics and psychology they are interconnected. Ethics explains moral significance of certain acts, motives or characters studied by psychologists,

while psychology reveals the psychological nature of these moral phenomena and the conditions under which they are formed.

ETHICS AND SOCIOLOGY.

The question of the relationship between these two disciplines arose in the second half of the 19th century when sociology emerged from social philosophy as a more concrete social science. Before that, the subject-matter of ethics had been broadly interpreted as the entire sphere of society's regulation of man's conduct, at times even covering the sphere of law. Some sociologists reduce ethics to sociology and proclaim philosophical ethics unscientific (Émile Durkheim and Lucien Lévy-Brühl, see *Approbative theories*; Carl Mannheim, Vilfredo Pareto and William Sumner, see *Scepticism*; George Mead and Albion Small, see *Pragmatism*). On the other hand, many philosophers, representatives of *formalism* and *irrationalism* in ethics, are disposed to divorce the subject-matter of ethics from that of sociology and consider data and

methods of sociology of no importance for ethics. In this case, the subject-matter of sociology is regarded as causality and the general patterns of man's behaviour or as purely outward dependences of man on his social surroundings. Adherents of this view contrast moral philosophy (*Metaethics*) or practical philosophy—the study of the world of “unique” values (*Intuitionism*) and sociology, with the sphere of irrational, emotional-volitional principles in man (*Neopositivism*) and with his genuine existence in “absolute freedom” (*Existentialism*). Actually, both ethics and sociology study social mechanisms of regulation of human activities, and *morals* is one of them. At the juncture of ethics and sociology, there arise, on the one hand, *descriptive ethics* and, on the other, sociology of morality which study how moral standards function in a particular society, morals and their effect on social groups and classes. Since sociology studies only mass actions of people and their patterns within the framework of a certain social system, individual and exceptional actions (if they

do not exercise considerable influence over mass conduct under given conditions), can be regarded only as deviations from the general rule. Consequently, the sociology of morality does not entirely cover the sphere of morality. Ethics, for its part, studies both those mass actions which become a *custom* and individual acts (and their motives) which exceed the framework of a given social system and acquire historical or moral significance for the future, as manifestations of *self-sacrifice* and *heroism*, as the acme of human morality. Acts of this kind are regulated and motivated not by generally accepted rules but by more complex forms of moral consciousness—ideals, concepts of good, justice, conscience. They establish the life style different from the one accepted in the given society. Just as the criteria of morality exceed the limits of the conditions obtaining at the moment, so is subject-matter of ethics broader in this respect than that of sociology. Ethics enters here the sphere of philosophy of history.

ETHICS OF SCIENCE, a system of moral precepts, standards and rules governing relations and actions of scientists and defining what is admissible and encouraged and what is inadmissible for a scientist in various situations. With the evolution of science and its ties to the society becoming more intricate, this system undergoes certain changes retaining, however, the basic ethical values. First, the standards of the ethics of science embody generally accepted moral precepts and bans specified in relation to science (*Professional ethics*). Thus, plagiarism can be qualified as the violation of the commandment, "thou shalt not steal", and an intentional distortion (falsification) of experimental data as the violation of the commandment, "thou shalt not bear false witness". Second, the standards of the ethics of science serve to assert and protect the specific values of science itself. The first of these is a selfless quest for and defence of the *truth*. Since it is often impossible to unambiguously determine whether the knowledge is true or not, the

standards of the ethics of science do not require any research should bring true knowledge. It is necessary and sufficient that the result be, first, new knowledge and, second, knowledge which is logically, experimentally or otherwise substantiated. The existence and stable reproduction of scientific activities and, in particular, the further development of the achievements made by one's forerunners and colleagues, would be impossible if there were no reciprocal trust between them. Consequently, any violation of ethical standards in science, as soon as this becomes known to the public, legitimately entails moral censure by the scientific community, and these measures can be rather severe for the perpetrator up to leaving the culprit on the sidelines of scientific development. The standards and rules of the ethics of science are seldom formulated as codes. As a rule they are assimilated by a scientist in the process of professional training. At the same time, philosophy and sociology of science attempt to identify, describe and understand these

standards and rules. On this basis, the ethics of science emerges as a special discipline dealing with science and scientific activities from the point of view of their moral essence. The ethics of science strictly regulates most diverse aspects of scientific activities: research, publication of the results of scientific experiments and discoveries, scientific discussions, the functions of experts and teachers. Today, particularly acute are the ethical problems of relations between science and a scientist, on the one hand, and society, on the other. At the present stage of scientific progress, the social *responsibility* of a scientist is primarily expressed in the effort to foresee possible undesirable consequences for man and society, in informing the public of the probability of such consequences, in the search for ways of avoiding, minimizing and eliminating them.

ETHNIC RELATIONS, ETHICS OF. In the process of joint activities, people establish moral relations not only as members of particular social,

professional, demographic or cultural groups and various organizations, as participants in social movements, but also as citizens of states and representatives of certain nations (ethnoses, nationalities). In the latter case, there is a system of moral obligations, rules of conduct which forms the ethics of ethnic relations. In the modern world, the ethics of ethnic relations imply consistent abidance of the principle of *equality* in relations between nations and people of various nationalities. The basic principle in the ethics of ethnic relations is the freedom of nations, irrespective of their racial affiliation and social and cultural level or the twists and turns of their historical destiny (e.g. joint habitation or dispersal, the presence or absence of statehood, religious or sociopolitical differences). While reflecting by spiritual means the legitimate interests and aspirations of various ethnic groups, the ethics of ethnic relations simultaneously morally condemn any forms of national discrimination, both the assertion of national and racial superiority and exclusiveness on the

one hand, and humility and the feeling of ethnic inferiority on the other. The standards and values of the ethics of ethnic relations favour cooperation and solidarity of nations in the course of their progressive development and in the event of social upheavals or natural calamities, the implementation of the principles of social *justice* in the sphere of ethnic relations. The ethics of ethnic relations are a component of the culture of inter-ethnic intercourse. They are based on the conviction that ethnic self-identification of a personality is an important stage in identifying one's social essence, while the respect for ethnic feelings and traditions is a specific expression of respect for human dignity. The ethics of ethnic relations imply not only the understanding of other people's national sentiments but also restraint in expressing one's own national feelings.

ETHOS [Gk: custom, habit, character]. According to the concepts of ancient Greeks, the actions of any person are determined by his or her unchange-

able nature, the "physis", and by the vacillating ethos, a calm moral character, which is contrasted to the disorderly and unstable "pathos". In other words, ethos denotes that second component of human nature which is in the power of man himself, can achieve various degrees of perfection and is an object of *moral choice*. The concept of *ethics* is associated with the term ethos. Initially, as far back as the time of Homer, ethos meant the dwelling. Later on, it acquired new meanings of which the basic one was the stable nature of a particular phenomenon, the custom, the disposition, the character. Aristotle used that word to coin an adjective "ethikos", denoting the virtues of human nature, as distinct from the virtues of reason. And he called the science dealing with these virtues ethics. In the 20th century, in the sociology of morality, the concept of ethos is mostly applied to the accepted rules and models of everyday behaviour, as well as to the way of life of any community of people (a social class, a professional group, a social stratum, a generation).

In a number of cases, it is used to identify universally accepted moral principles which emerge in world-historic situations threatening the solidarity of people and the very existence of civilization.

ETIQUETTE [F: ticket], a set of rules of conduct which regulate the outward aspect of people's relations (social behaviour, appropriate forms of address, *manners*, clothes). Etiquette is a component part of the culture of the individual and society. It includes those standards that make up a more or less strictly prescribed code of social behaviour. Although etiquette reflects, in the final account, the meaning of certain moral principles and respect for other people, in traditional society it is, as a rule, transformed into a *ritual*, with its outward form being isolated from its moral essence, and acquires the character of a canon. It is an intricate system of meticulously elaborated rules of courtesy which precisely differentiates the rules of conduct in relation to persons belonging to various classes and estates,

to officials depending on their rank (form of address, use of titles), rules of behaviour in various circles (court etiquette, diplomatic etiquette, high society etiquette). At the same time, strict observance of etiquette can conceal unfriendly attitudes and disrespect for other people. Quite frequently, it is essentially an accepted form of *hypocrisy* in everyday communication. Etiquette in present-day society is of an absolutely different nature as it reflects the processes of democratization and humanization of social life. It is considerably simplified, more natural and a manifestation of one's friendly and respectful attitude to all people regardless of their rank and status. Courtesy towards women, respect for aged people, forms of address and greeting, rules of conduct in conversation, table manners, treatment of guests, style of dress on various occasions—all these proprieties reflect commonly accepted concepts of man's dignity and the simple requirements of comfort and ease in social intercourse. The outward form matters here only in-

asmuch as it reflects the ideas of beauty in the appearance and behaviour of man (*Ethical and aesthetic, the*). Etiquette under socialism, on the whole, coincides with universal rules of *politeness* and tact. The stereotyped forms of conduct on special occasions (at the table, on a visit) are increasingly becoming a form of general respect for people in any situation regardless of any specific aspects (social, ethnic, etc.). Etiquette of personal contacts, apart from knowledge and observance of definite, for the most part conventional, rules, is also characterized by amiability which is an important moral virtue, an indication of a person's high moral standards and good breeding. However, if the loosening of the rules of etiquette is not made up for by appropriate upbringing this can produce not only brusque but even boorish manners.

EUDAEMONISM [Gk *eudaimon*: fortunate, happy], a methodological principle of ethics often used to substantiate morality and interpret its nature and purposes. Eudaemonism,

similar to *hedonism* in many respects, had often been its concomitant, a kind of variety of behaviour (in the teaching of *Epicurus*, the ethical theories of the Renaissance). But unlike hedonism, eudaemonism considered the concept of *happiness* as the basic category of ethics, the starting point of morality. It declared its attainment to be the highest criterion of virtue and the chief motive of moral behaviour. Eudaemonism, like hedonism, is a variety of *rationalism* and is usually linked to the individualistic interpretation of morality. The category of happiness had already advanced to the forefront in the ethical theories of ancient Greece. The founder of the school of Cynics (*Cynicism*), *Antisthenes*, did not associate the concept of happiness with that of pleasure and even contrasted one to the other. Pleasure, according to him, makes man dependent on his environment while happiness is man's complete independence of any sensuality. *Cicero*, a Roman follower of *Stoicism*, also set off the state of happiness to sensuous enjoyment.

Aristotle, on the contrary, interprets happiness as a specific case of pleasure, as stable and harmonious pleasure. *Thomas Aquinas*, medieval scholastic philosopher, regards the striving for happiness as a moral principle, attributing specific religious significance to this concept: happiness is something contrary to worldly pleasures. During the Renaissance, the striving for happiness was again declared to be quite a legitimate moral principle of behaviour. *Hume's* ethical teaching contained elements of eudaemonism. The principle of eudaemonism acquires particularly great significance in the ethics of the French materialists of the 18th century. They proclaimed man's happiness to be the ultimate aim of any society and any useful human activity. Aspiration for happiness was interpreted as an inborn quality of man, and its attainment as the realization of man's genuine predestination. Modern non-Marxist ethics contains elements of classical eudaemonism (for example, *Otto Neurath's felicitology*). Marxist ethics considers that eudaemonism can-

not serve to substantiate morality. The category of happiness cannot characterize any definite social or personal psychological state of man. It can reflect moral ideas concerning man's destiny. The concept of happiness can be given various interpretations depending on concrete historical and social conditions and in conformity with the vital interests of a particular class, social group or individual. Happiness cannot serve as a substantiation of morality, as it itself, like other moral ideas, needs to be substantiated.

EUTHANASIA (mercy killing), a medical concept which contains a profound moral sense as it implies bringing about the death of a patient for his or her *benefit*. Most traditional moral systems and doctrines reject euthanasia. However, recently, due to scientific and technological breakthroughs in medicine and health services, the attitude to euthanasia has become far from simple. In a number of cases, modern technology makes it possible to maintain for months the life of an incurably ill patient with ir-

revocably lost consciousness. It entails substantial expenditures and requires resources which otherwise could be used for restoring other patients to normal life. Besides, the problem of euthanasia is becoming more acute because of the expanding practice of transplantation: the longer a patient is in the state of coma the less are the chances for the use of his or her organs in transplantation. In these conditions, in the medical practice of a number of countries, euthanasia by a patient's consent (if he or she had made a will while still in sound mind) or with the consent of the patient's relatives (trustees), is becoming ever more widespread. One of the basic moral arguments advanced in favour of euthanasia, is the assertion of every person's right to dispose of his life. The arguments against euthanasia also have moral grounds: (1) while the patient receives medical treatment maintaining life, new medical methods of cure can be found; (2) the danger of maltreatment by physicians if euthanasia becomes an accepted practice; (3) euthanasia undermines faith

in the sacredness of human life and can be qualified as murder, thereby posing a threat to the entire system of social moral values. Experts distinguish between active euthanasia (when a physician undertakes it, for instance, by switching off the device maintaining the vital functions), and passive euthanasia (when a patient dies due to the fact that a physician does not undertake resuscitating measures). In the current ethical discussions, passive euthanasia enjoys wider support than active euthanasia.

EVALUATION(moral), approval or disapproval by moral *consciousness* of various events in social reality. Moral evaluation establishes whether an *act* (as well as a *motive* or *conduct* in general), an individual's traits and a social way of life, conform or do not conform to certain moral *imperatives*. Man can express his positive or negative attitude to objects in the form of praise or reproach, approval or criticism, sympathy or dislike, *love* or *hatred*, and by means of a range of actions and *emotions*. Moral *feelings* (Con-

science, *Pride*, *Shame*, *Repentance*) play an especially important role in *self-evaluation*. All these outwardly different manifestations, however, have the same underlying content in that they define an event in terms of either *good* or *evil*. Evaluation has a special function in moral activity. Unlike precepts which in the form of general rules prescribe that the individual should act in a definite way, evaluation compares these precepts with specific phenomena and events that have already taken place and establishes their conformity or nonconformity with the precepts of morality. For example, by assessing an act as evil, an individual comes to understand that he should not act this way. There exists a derivative form of evaluation, whereby possible future acts are assessed. For example, when out of several possible actions an individual chooses the act he ought to perform. With this type of assessment an individual, as it were, anticipates the future, mentally views different possible actions as already having taken place and assesses them in advance in

order to make the right choice. In non-Marxist ethics, there are two trends of understanding the nature of moral evaluation. One school (e.g. deontological *intuitionism*), regards evaluation as a mere act of disinterested contemplation, and does not explain how man proceeds from evaluation to an understanding of his duty and then to action. The other school sees evaluation as a concealed form of precept and rejects cognitive function (*Neopositivism*). Marxist-Leninist ethics views evaluation as a unity of cognitive and prescriptive functions. If evaluation can control man's conduct, it is because it stems from the knowledge of the objective social meaning of various acts. Evaluation may be proved (or disproved) by the application of universal moral concepts—*moral qualities, principles, ideals*, concepts of good and evil, as well as by analysis of social *consequences* of particular acts (*Consequential ethics*). Moral evaluation has always been present in human activities as their basis, constant background and final stage. Before some phenomenon is

eliminated, it has to be qualified as evil and, equally so, in order to attain some positive goal it must be perceived as good. In the course of activity itself, moral evaluation serves to verify how adequate are the means regarding the set goals. Finally, upon the completion of the activities, an evaluation is used in order to compare actual results with the original intention.

EVIL, one of the basic concepts of moral consciousness and a *category of ethics*. It denotes the negative aspects of reality, activities of people and relations between them. Evil is the opposite of *good, benefit* and in the most general sense is something which impedes the satisfaction of man and mankind and thus has to be eliminated, if it has emerged, or prevented. In ethics, moral evil associated with the arbitrariness of beings, is traditionally distinguished from physical evil, such as bodily pain, illness, *death*, natural calamities caused by objective natural laws irrespective of human consciousness and will. However, although these forms

of evil were distinguished, there has always been a tendency to treat them as an integral whole. Thus, moral evil was interpreted as a violation of natural and divine order which entailed *punishment* of the perpetrator irrespective of the *intentions* and efforts of other people. Within this classification, social evil (i.e., the negative impact on people's interests of objective social processes, such as crises, wars, social cataclysms), occupies an intermediate position between physical evil and moral evil. Classical ethics perceived evil in two basic dimensions: as a state of social morals and of an individual soul. According to Aristotle, evil in social morality is engendered by the distorted form of the state: the erroneousness or ineffectiveness of its laws. Evil in the soul is determined by: (1) the lack of moral fibre (brutality); (2) its weakness (intemperance); (3) its deficiency (depravity). The division of depravity into opposite forms (impudence and baseness) can be traced to Plato and Aristotle. In public life, insolent people become tyrant rulers, while scoundrels

become the dregs of society. This happens because as it sinks into evil, a depraved soul is either striving to boldly and arrogantly rise above normal human level or descend much lower. In the history of ethics, there were two opposite theories, absolutist and normativist, each differently interpreting the essence and origins of evil. According to the former (religious-idealistic and naturalistic ethics), moral evil as something alien to the nature of things, the order and harmony of existence, is evil for all nations at all times. According to the latter (ancient Sophists and Sceptics, empirical ethics of modern times, the socio-approbative theories of morality, etc.), evil is engendered by people. It is the result of the violation of the arbitrarily established norms, the refusal to abide by the rules of the game introduced by a segment of society for all its members. The identification of evil with the activities of an insidious and unfair God-destroyer or with the material substance, and of depravity with the bodily nature of man (Gnosticism, Manichaeism) has become an

extreme form of ethical absolutism. The ascetic taming of carnal desires was regarded as the main instrument in combatting evil. Religious ethics declared that the main vice was arrogance which is an untenable claim by man and all mortal beings to divine omnipotence. Rationalist ethics (*Socrates*, *Confucius*, *René Descartes*, *Leibniz* and others), perceived evil as ignorance and delusion which could be eliminated by upgrading the intellectual potential of a person. Whereas the depravity of an individual was perceived as a derivative of the disharmony between different components and functions of the soul, the emergence of evil in social morals was explained by the discord between the components and functions of the social organism, mainly the state. In both cases, the cause of disharmony was seen in the departure from the requirements of reason. The authors of more consistent concepts saw the root of evil in private property, the propertied and class inequality of citizens. The eradication of main vices — *individualism* and *particularism*

(*selfishness* and *ambition*), was linked to enlightenment and the consequent transformation of society, the establishment of social stability or homogeneity. The practical attitude of ethics to moral evil was characterized by two opposite trends: fanatical moralizing (the principle of the unconditional eradication of any evil) and immoralism (indifference degenerating into an apology for evil). In the history of ethics, the varieties of immoralism are: hedonistic (the Cyrenaic school), naturalistic (Sophists, Thrasymachus, Callicles and others), political (*Machiavelli*), sadism, the "philosophy of life" of Friedrich *Nietzsche*, etc. Marxist-Leninist ethics substantiates the dialectical understanding of evil according to which, the latter has a historically concrete content which is transformed in the process of social evolution. Moral evil is also interpreted as a one-sided, deficient and perverted activity of man in comparison with the real models of *conduct* and *ideals* elaborated in the progressive development of society. It is conditioned by the underdevelopment or de-

formation of the individual moral consciousness and immature social relations. While good is oriented towards the integrity and universality of human activities, evil, on the contrary, is disintegration, incompleteness and partiality. Moral evil is essentially the degeneration of individuals to the level of tools in the hands of others. The teachings of *Marx* and *Engels* reveal the link between moral evil and class antagonisms, exploitation and the *alienation* of man. *Lenin*, investigating the nature of private-owner psychology, *philistinism*, selfishness, *parasitism*, bureaucratism and other phenomena alien to socialist morality, exposed their social roots, their connection with insufficient maturity and the general historical limitation of socialist social relations. To overcome the morally negative phenomena, it is necessary not only to improve social relations but also to wage a consistent struggle against the concrete bearers of evil.

EVIL DEED, the opposite of good deed and *beneficence*; an action which in itself is an of-

fense against the standards of morality and violation of the principle of humanism and justice; a deed that is a moral *evil* in the nature of the action and motive and a social evil in its consequences. Evil deeds are usually classified as intentional and unintentional, premeditated and unpremeditated (*Misdeed*). The specific content of an evil deed can be diverse—murder, theft, deceit, treachery, fanatical cruelty. The question of the objective causes of an evil deed is inseparable from the general problem of the origin of social and moral vices, the basis of which is social injustice, exploitation and oppression of people and class antagonism. The eradication of the social sources of an evil deed constitutes a task of moral significance for socialist society.

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS [*Evolutio* unrolling], a trend in moral philosophy interpreting the origin, nature and purpose of ethics from the standpoint of biological evolutionism. *Spencer*, who regarded morality as a form of evolutionary process, is considered to be

the founder of this trend. Spencer's ideas were further developed in 20th-century ethics in the teachings of the US neorealist Edwin Holt, English philosophers Julian Huxley and Conrade Waddington, French theologian and paleontologist *Teilhard de Chardin*. There is one methodological principle common to all the theories of morality of this trend for all their differences: morality is regarded not as a specifically social phenomenon, but as a manifestation of the process of biological evolution and the history of society, as its certain phase. For instance, Holt denies that morality can be of any social character at all. The concepts of good and duty, from his point of view, constitute the means by which man finds his bearings in natural reality. They help people fulfil the requirements of organic evolution through their conduct which brings it in conformity with the environment. Biologism is not so strongly pronounced in other theories of evolutionary ethics and becomes apparent primarily in the methodology

and concepts borrowed from the theoretical body of evolutionary biology. The adherents of evolutionary ethics often oppose subjectivism and extreme *relativism* in interpreting morality and try to find their own ways of objective justification of morality basing themselves on natural-science data. In a sense, the concepts of the Russian cosmic thinkers (*Fyodorov*, *Vernadsky*, et al.), which declare that it is the moral duty of man to assume upon himself the mission of continuing world evolution and to create a new harmonious society which would be in harmonious unity with the cosmos, border on evolutionary ethics. At present, some problems raised by evolutionary ethics are seriously discussed in sociology and genetics, the biological sources of *altruism* for one.

EXACTITUDE, high moral demands made upon a person and recognition of his *responsibility* for their fulfilment. The degree of exactitude is determined by the estimate of the moral capabilities of a person. The in-

ability to correctly determine the limits of the actual abilities of a person in specific historical conditions, usually leads to a misunderstanding of exactitude, to extreme *rigorism* or, on the contrary, to moral *scepticism*.

EXAMPLE, in morality a form of *initiative* manifest in the actions of a person (group, collective) becoming a model of conduct for others. As distinct from initiative, the person setting the example not only impels others to follow him but advances a ready form of activity then spread among other people, becoming the norm of conduct of many people. In this respect, example is one of the ways of establishing social *discipline*, manifestation of the activity of members of a collective, their mutual *moral education*. In morality, every separate act is essentially either a positive or a negative example. Still, to follow other people's example does not mean simply to imitate them. It always presupposes the *evaluation* of the act committed. If there is no such appraisal and assessment of the moral significance of the model

for imitation, following someone's example is not an act of free choice or conscious moral activity. The force of an example in a certain sense, is acquired by the actions which demand extraordinary efforts close to *heroism*. Example always played an important role in everyday personal relations, the maintenance and development of customs, mores and manners. Within the social motivations of behaviour, the force of example is a historically changeable entity. The sphere of the effectiveness of an example in most cases is limited by the socially homogeneous conditions and possibilities. (Thus, the examples of noblemen's magnanimity, although recognized as an honourable ideal, could not serve as an effective personal example regulating principles for peasants and craftsmen.) The social need for an example as a motivating force becomes particularly acute in the crucial transitional periods when the old institutionalized mechanisms of social life are destroyed, while new ones have not yet

been created or need time to gain strength.

EXISTENTIALISM [L *ex(s)istentia* cf. *ex(s)istere* to exist, appear, emerge], one of the influential trends in current moral theory, a variety of ethical *irrationalism*. Existentialism has its roots in the philosophy of life (*Nietzsche*, Wilhelm Dilthey, et al.), Husserl's phenomenology. *Kierkegaard* and *Dostoyevsky* exercised a strong influence upon its proponents. Existentialism appeared in the 1920's in Germany as a philosophical and ideological trend, and in France before the Second World War. At present, its ideas are also widespread in the USA, where they are developed above all by neo-orthodox theologians (*Neo-Protestantism*), and in other countries. Existentialist ethics, as well as philosophy, do not have any uniform school. There are two distinct branches—the atheistic (*Heidegger*, *Sartre*, *Camus*, Simone de Beauvoir) and the religious (*Jaspers*, *Marcel*, Martin Buber, *Berdyaev*, Lev Shestov). Existentialists not only differ in their theoretical views, but in their

socio-political positions as well. Still, one can trace a set of common principles and ideas in the ethics of existentialism, which, regardless of their personal convictions, are of an individualistic orientation. The central problem of existentialism is the status of the individual in society. In their analysis of the structure of existence of the individual, theoreticians of existentialism observe characteristic features of man's life in the society of monopoly capital—his depersonalization, loss of freedom and individuality (*Conformism*), of the *purpose of life*, people's loneliness and isolation. They seek a way out of this moral crisis within the framework of their philosophy (*Alienation*) and see it not in changing social conditions, but in the ability of the individual to overcome (above all through his attitude to God, to nothingness, to death) his untrue, unreal existence and find his own unique existence. Subjectivist interpretation of the nature of man lies at the basis of this concept: man's real existence is not objectively determined, but he himself chooses it of his own

free will, according to his own design. Return to the authentic existence and the basis of existential morality is made possible only if the individual is aware of his unlimited freedom. As they ignore the unity of objective socio-historical conditions of man's existence and his practical activities, existentialists contrast freedom with necessity, believing that man can be free only within the sphere of his personal spiritual aspirations. Such an interpretation of freedom makes man subordinate to reality, implies his withdrawal from reality into the sphere of intimate emotions. According to the existentialist concept of morality, every individual is to choose his line of conduct, find himself, regardless of social standards, regardless of any objective criteria and irrespective of other people. Adherents of existentialism believe that man becomes responsible for his existence only if he makes his

moral choice in complete solitude, guided solely by his absolutely independent intentions (*Freedom of the will*). But such a concept of responsibility justifies any kind of action. The difference between good and evil is no longer existent. Freedom becomes, in fact, arbitrary and responsibility turns into complete irresponsibility. Existentialist ethics makes man realize his situation is hopeless and he has to submit to it. Pessimistic motives in the ethics of existentialism are most distinct with the representatives of its religious branch, bringing them to *eschatology*, and in Heidegger. Existentialist ethics is permeated with the motifs of doom, solitude, absurdity and senselessness of life, resignation to reality, desire to die. Existentialists in their negation of bourgeois morality turn to justification of nihilism and amorality.

F

FAMILY AND EVERYDAY MORALITY, a sum total of standards and rules regulating relations of people in the family, at leisure and in the process of free *communication*. As other spheres of human life, family and everyday morality is historically conditioned, and the rules and actual human behaviour are often at odds. Archaic and early class societies attempted to rigidly regulate all human relations, particularly marital and family relations (e.g. rules of marriage, rights and obligations of spouses, relations between children and parents). The division of labour by sex and age was hierarchical and imposed from above as a rule. The traditional religious morality sanctified this social inequality regarding it as natural and inviolable. However, the sphere of individual discretion

and choice gradually expanded, while the concept of personal life began to be interpreted as something autonomous, free from external social regulation and rather regulated by inner moral stimuli. Whereas in the Middle Ages individual sex love was perceived as a force striving to destroy marriage, bourgeois society declares that only a marriage based on love is moral. Progressive-minded thinkers of the past asserted the equality of men and women in principle and their right to marriage and divorce. The other aspect of the growing individualization and psychologization of marital relations is their diminishing stability, the growing number of divorces, weaker ties between relatives and, as a result, the feeling of social and psychological alienation, loneliness, etc. Hence, new trends in

moral consciousness: the rising value of the institutions of marriage and family and the sense of responsibility of every person for his or her life and, particularly, the future of their children. It concerns strictly personal, intimate relations: the quality of family life, love, tolerance, the fair distribution of household chores, the methods of dealing with conflicts in the family, etc. Family and everyday relations can reveal their inherent humanistic essence if based on a high level of social and material wellbeing.

FANATICISM [L *fanaticus* inspired, frantic], a term applied to persons whose convictions and conduct are characterized by a completely uncritical attachment to a central idea that rejects a rational approach to all other doctrines. As a principle of conduct, fanaticism is characterized by inflexibility, which is usually accompanied by cruelty (in extreme cases, barbarity), the use of any means or the sacrifice of people to achieve the desired goal (*Ends and means*), and a refusal to resolve ideological conflicts by

means of persuasion or logical proof. Historically, fanaticism led to several slaughters of "non-believers" (the Inquisition in the Middle Ages and the witch hunts). Fanaticism is characteristic of several religious sects and other ideologies in which the theoretical analysis of reality is substituted by demagoguery and *dogmatism*. In modern conditions, the social foundations of fanaticism are totalitarian, repressive political regimes and authoritarian systems of education and propaganda impeding the independent and creative development of individuals and frustrating the free pursuit of one's personal interests in social life.

FASHION, a temporary form of standardized mass behaviour under the influence of the moods, tastes and infatuations prevailing at a particular moment in a particular society. In the process of *communication*, people exert influence on each other. One of the forms of such influence is the reciprocal transfer of the peculiarities typical of one's image and *conduct* (speech, clothing, facial ex-

pressions, *manners*, etc.), transmission of the external forms of culture based on the psychological mechanism of imitation. Fashion emerges as a certain type of behaviour, the *life style* of man although, as a rule, people begin to follow fashion according to the perception and imitation of things, objects and manners. As a regulator of human intercourse, fashion is a peculiar appendage to *traditions* and *customs*. It is unofficially legitimized by the power of mass *habit* and is secured by the force of *public opinion*. As a social phenomenon, fashion is closely associated with the way of life and social-economic and cultural conditions. The susceptibility to fashion and the nature of dedication to it, depend on a particular person, his or her integrity, the level of consciousness and culture, moral and aesthetic development. Thus, the social and ideological thrust of fashion is determined by the value orientation of society and a particular personality which condition the nature and dynamics of its evolution. Fashion can encourage the feeling of

community and reciprocal respect of people for whom the observance of social conventions, standards of good taste and the experience of communal living accumulated by the previous generations, is an expression of inner requirement, rather than a formal obligation. Since fashion affects and reflects the image of a person only superficially, the adherence to its trends cannot serve as an indicator of the moral make-up of a person. However, infatuation with fashion, the lack of integrity in following its trends and indiscriminate borrowing of its standards in vogue, can negatively affect the moral development of an individual. The striving to be "in", becomes a socially dangerous disorder if the outward, material aspect of life prevails over the spiritual aspect and man is possessed by consumer psychology. In socialist society the use of the fashion mechanism is coordinated with the aims of aesthetic and moral education.

FATALISM [L *fatum* oracle, destiny; *fatalis* fatal, unavoid-

able], a view of history and the individual's fate as something pre-ordained by God, fate, or the law of development and the subsequent conception that fate cannot be changed by human effort. Fatalism in the sphere of morality includes different approaches, but most often teaches *humility* and obedience to one's fate. This dooms people to passivity and submission, the refusal to struggle for the transformation of society (*Stoicism*). For example, the religious teachings concerning the root of evil on Earth, and the idea that it can only be overcome by expiation in Christ and ultimate salvation (*Eschatology*), are fatalistic. At times, fatalism takes the opposite forms, and individuals believe in predestination and consider themselves to be the messengers of fate, the conductors of God's will who should apply all their powers to fulfil that which has been predetermined. Such manifestations of fatalism usually come close to *fanaticism*. Marxist ethics is based on the historical-materialist teaching concerning the objective laws of society's development

and the role of the masses and the individual in history. According to it, historical laws, which indicate the overall trend of social development, leave room for *moral choice*, and thus do not absolve the individual from responsibility for his actions and obligations, or the resultant moral evaluation.

FEAR, short-lived emotion or stable feeling emerging in man as a result of real or imagined danger. As a psychological phenomenon, fear, whose causes may be inborn in the individual or be of social-cultural character, materializes in anxious and self-tormenting emotions, fright, terror, panic, as well as in actions (spontaneous or conscious) aimed at self-preservation. Fear causing man to lose control over himself or to act in contradiction with requirements of morality, is regarded by moral consciousness as *cowardice*. And on the contrary, man's overcoming fear is characterized as *bravery* and *courage*. Fear may indicate a stable trait of consciousness not only of the individual but of a social group and society as a whole.

For instance, primitive man being practically in the power of the laws of nature and in no position to control them, feared the unknown. The socialization of fear developed differently in different conditions of the micro- and macro-environment, but it is intensively reproduced in the society of oppression, lawlessness and alienation. Under capitalism, the workers' fear for the future is caused by the growing danger of unemployment, whereas the private businessmen's fear is based on the threat of bankruptcy. Fear for the future is a typical trait of the consciousness of the classes and social layers disappearing in the process of historical changes. Many non-Marxist philosophers (*Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler* and others), regard fear as a natural condition of man who is aware of his loneliness and the absurdity of his existence. In *Berdyayev's* view, fear underlying the individual's life, rules the world. For *Kierkegaard, Heidegger* and other existentialists, the subject of fear is "nothing". Unfathomable terror of "nothing" origin-

ates, in their view, from "neglect" and from man's perpetual anxiety since he is forced to assume *responsibility* for the choice of solution which has no rational grounds. Closely linked to emotions of suffering, *guilt, shame* and contempt, fear has always acted as an important regulator of personal conduct (fear of punishment, of the authorities, etc.). As a regular outcome of class society, fear as a social-psychological phenomenon emerges as a means of preserving exploitation. Fear is not infrequently presented even as a moral incentive. Religious morality imputes to people the fear of God, of "the Day of Judgement", considering fear the most reliable guarantee of complaisance with its requirements. In line with Lenin's concept of socialism according to which people of their own free will unite their efforts to attain common goals and place under collective control the operation of economic and social laws, fear as a regulator of behaviour should have become a secondary phenomenon of social psychology and morality. However, the experi-

ence of building socialism reveals that given the administrative-command system of running state affairs, fear becomes a main driving force of social behaviour, a fact which vividly testifies to the discrepancy between *ends and means*, an unnatural combination of *good and evil*. However, as the *discretion and creativity* of the people develop, their activity and culture grow and, what is most important, with democratization and Glasnost becoming a norm of public life and the establishment of a law-governed state, fear can no longer play the role of a regulator of their conduct. Moral thinking and behaviour imply that each individual should fulfil his duty to society not on the basis of fear of punishment or even moral condemnation of his wrong acts, but on the strength of his inner *conviction*, prompted by his *conscience*, i.e., consciously and freely.

FEAT, an act of *heroism*, a deed requiring an extreme effort of the will from man, connected with overcoming extraordinary difficulties, the socially

useful result of which exceeds any ordinary act. The drive to perform a feat is especially great during revolutions and wars, as well as under extraordinary circumstances in everyday life. In the course of social development, there often occur situations which require that people's actions go beyond the limits of the generally accepted moral standards. A heroic exploit requires self-sacrifice and is a choice made at the price of happiness and, not frequently, life itself. That is why it is an exceptional fact. The attempts to elevate a feat of heroism to the everyday norm of behaviour are merely sham moralizing. Such an exclusiveness is the lot of not only outstanding individuals. A feat is significant in that it can become an initiative of the mass movement and then the exceptional becomes common. Besides, a feat, even if it is a one-time act and displayed in an extraordinary situation, exerts a lasting influence on the social surroundings and the hero himself, because it opens new and wider prospects for moral improvement.

FEELING, CULTURE OF, reveals the level of social progress, maturity of man's feelings and emotions. Feelings are a product of life, the social experience of a person, of his *communication* with others, a product of upbringing. In a sense, to be man and to be cultured are synonyms, if we agree with *Kant* that the essence of culture lies in the social value of man. Man, including his feelings, is a part of Nature but endowed with culture. Even the primitive sentiments with which man is born, are the result of the social-historical and cultural evolution in the course of which a process of "humanization" of biological forms takes place. For example, hearing and vision become cultured, socially developed, depending on the capacity of the sense organs for human enjoyment, the ability to discern beauty and ugliness, to love, suffer, etc. This is ever more true of the higher—social, moral and aesthetic—feelings. Culture of feeling is developed in the course of man's contact with nature, in the process of work, through interpersonal contacts

and perception of art. The criterion of man's culture, of his level of education is the correlation between the expression of one's moral feeling and the interests of another person. *Emotions* are a means of sociability and a regulator of people's social *conduct*. For example, respect for the dignity of other people in the sphere of everyday life, is primarily expressed in the form of immediate emotional contact or response, in the sense of tact expressed in the simplest means of emotional interaction—intimation, glance, gesture. All these elements of emotional interaction may unite individuals or repel them from each other. The lack of proper culture of feelings is expressed in the absence of tact, in *rudeness* or in indifference and it not only spoils the mood of those around you but has serious social and moral consequences since this type of behaviour divides people. The main element in the culture of feeling is its content, i.e., friendly attitude towards other people, interested and sincere involvement in their griefs and joys. Emo-

tional culture is a good indicator of one's general culture. And this is true even in those cases when we refer to those who are in general quite educated as ill-bred people. Since culture is not exhausted by the level of education, it covers the whole spiritual and moral world of man. That is why the culture of expressing emotions is a necessary condition of a full moral life, a sign of sound *personal ethic*.

FEELING FOR THE NEW, a positive *moral quality* opposite to *bigotry*, characterizing man's ability to correctly understand the requirements of society's further development, pose and solve urgent problems (in production, sciences, art, personal relations), to reveal in the obtaining state of affairs budding signs of new life, to advance, encourage and translate into life progressive initiatives. Feeling for the new is most distinctly expressed in actions bearing a character of *initiative*, creative *example*, which break down obsolete traditions and standards. It is an indispensable prereq-

uisite for *discretion and creativity* in the sphere of morality.

FEELINGS, one of the forms (together with intellect and will-power) of the manifestation of the individual's attitude to objects and phenomena of life which corresponds to personal requirements and *interests* and has a personal significance for the individual. By their psychological nature, feelings are stable conditioned-reflexive formations in man's consciousness, which constitute the basis of his affective-volitional reactions in different situations (*emotions* and urges). By its social content, man's moral feeling is his personal attitude to various aspects of social being. For instance, the feelings of *love, hatred, trust, sympathy, compassion, jealousy, envy* are a subjective-psychological expression of the practical relationships between people, while *self-esteem, pride, vanity, chastity* define man's attitude to himself as a member of society. Moral feelings bear a social character both in their origin and in their significance, evaluated by moral consciousness as

positive or negative moral qualities characterizing the moral character of the individual. Moral feelings differ from *persuasions* not in their content but in their psychological form. Moral principles such as philanthropy, patriotism, optimism, pessimism, nationalism, associated with serious complexes, take root in people's consciousness not only in a rational form, but also in an emotional form, referring not only to their view of the world, but to their emotional attitude to the world, as well. Similarly, norms, evaluations, ideals, concepts of justice, good and evil having a rational content, are mastered by man in a sensuous form of attitudes, aspirations, sympathy and antipathy. Finally, all that which adds to the content of the moral *self-consciousness* of the individual (obligation, responsibility, conscience, dignity, shame) also manifests itself in appropriate emotions (sense of duty, responsibility, dignity, compunction, profound shame). Acting according to his convictions, man assesses the situation in the light of his knowledge, reaching on this

basis a particular decision. However, in solving individual problems, man is practically unable each time to analyze the moral concepts established by society. In everyday life, he often has to perform a moral act, to instantly respond to the given situation without meditation or discussion. Here, moral feelings come to his assistance. Guided by them, man responds to the situation spontaneously, involuntarily, automatically activating the past experience accumulated and deposited in his psyche (*Habits*), which immediately manifests itself in emotions and urges.

FELICITOLOGY [*L. felicitas* happiness], the doctrine concerning the attainment of *happiness*, propounded by some contemporary neopositivists including Otto Neurath. As a theory of ethics, it continues the tradition of *eudaemonism*. However, according to this doctrine happiness is not the basis of morality, but simply a person's psychological condition for which he naturally strives (so-called psychological eudaemonism). Morals are

treated by felicitology as a means to achieve happiness. Thus, the question of the moral meaning of people's pursuit of happiness is removed. Felicitology is not a doctrine of goals for which man should strive, but a choice of the path to happiness. In such an interpretation of the issue, the concept itself becomes vapid. In Neurath's view, it is unimportant what people are actually striving for and what social results are achieved. Only the feeling of happiness is important. In the final analysis, ethics is transformed into a "science" concerning the method of instilling in people a feeling of happiness.

FETISHISM [F *fétichisme*, fr. Port *feitiço* charm], in *moral-ity*—a sum total of false concepts and stereotypes expressed in imbuing social phenomena with the moral significance which does not correspond to their social-historical role. Fetishism is associated with *dogmatism* in morals and *absolutism* in ethics. In the theory of ethics, the elements of fetishism are seen in ascribing the natural

origin (*Naturalism*) or some absolute principle (*Neo-Thomism*, *Neo-Protestantism*) to moral values or in attaching self-evident nature (*Intuitionism*) to moral concepts. Naive forms of fetishism can be traced to the moral significance that is ascribed to the phenomena of natural origin, natural calamities, for instance. They are perceived as the action of the evil cosmic forces or a divine punishment meted out to people for their sins. Moral fetishism has certain epistemological and social roots. In a society where spontaneous social forces alienated from individuals are at work, ideological concepts are often isolated from the social relations conditioning them and acquire in the mind of man the appearance of some absolutes dominating his consciousness. Fetishism is also conditioned by the fact that within the framework of the class-based concept of the world, moral ideas and values not only perform a critical and imperative-transforming function as regards the present social reality but also act as a means of pursuing class inter-

ests. Fetishist concepts are historical in their content and, as a rule, express the ideological and moral postulates and principles of a social group, class or a society which have been formed at the previous stages of historical development and no longer reflect the actual order of things. Conditions for overcoming moral fetishism, are an adequate realization by people of their social being, their economic and political independence, the availability of objective opportunities for their active and creative endeavours.

FEUERBACH, Ludwig (1804-1872), German materialist philosopher. Beginning with 1837 when he was dismissed from his university teaching post for the publication of the "Thoughts on Death and Immortality" (1830), he lived almost exclusively in the country, and did not participate in society. The essence of the anti-feudal and anti-religious thrust of Feuerbach's philosophy and ethics, is contained in the critique of Christian ascetic morality and the assertion of the ideal, integral, perfect, educated man. Feuerbach's ma-

terialistic substantiation of morality is based on the principle of *egoism*, which he treats as the conformity of man's conduct with nature and reason. In his view it is egoism that denies theology, religion and despotism, that is, those powers which stipulate that man conduct himself in a manner which is imposed on him from the outside and is contrary to his real nature and needs. These become the basis of morality only when they regulate man's behaviour acting as his personal, egoistic interests. The treatment of good as the satisfying of individual needs predicated exclusively by nature, is the result of the anthropological character of Feuerbach's materialism (good is that which corresponds to the egoism of all people). This anthropological characteristic also lends an emotional tinge to his theory of morality (feeling is the criterion of morality; good is that which gives people satisfaction; the striving for happiness is man's highest pursuit). In Feuerbach's ethics, the means to avoid extreme individualism are also deeply anthropological: individual mor-

ality is non-sensical because morality considers not only the presence of "I", but also its contact with other persons, i.e., with "you". The pursuit of happiness by a person is inseparable from the happiness of those near him. Therefore such a pursuit at the same time becomes a moral duty—not to hinder the happiness of others. Feuerbach asserts *eudaemonism* as wishing of happiness of another individual. That was a substantial contribution to the eudaemonistic principle of ethics. In the theory of morality advanced by Feuerbach, a revolutionary critical attitude to reality is excluded (this concept involves an abstract interpretation of the essence of man and views any deviation from this essence as a temporary and individual shortcoming whose elimination does not require changes in the existing order). The perception of reality based on such morality remains in the framework of *moralizing*. Feuerbach acknowledges the transformation of elemental moral principles into religious dogmas and the deification of individual-psychological human

relationships as the sole means to give morality efficacy. His efforts to go beyond an idealistic understanding of history (for example, his recognition of the legitimate egoism of a particular group of people, and especially his conjectures concerning the common nature of human existence), did not exert any real influence on his system of ethical thought. It did, however, have some effect on the development of the theory of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*) and in particular on *Chernyshevsky*. *Marx and Engels* criticized the ethics of Feuerbach for its abstract nature. They elaborated their historical-materialistic views of man and society in direct opposition to the world outlook of Feuerbach under whose strong influence they once had been. Despite the pertinence of that criticism, the theory of ethics elaborated by Feuerbach constituted an outstanding chapter in the history of ethics. Feuerbach's ethics is expounded in his works: "Das Wesen des Christentums" ("The Essence of Christianity", 1841), "Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zu-

kunft" ("Foundations of the Philosophy of the Future", 1843), and "Eudaemonism" (1867-1869).

FICHTE, Johann Gottlieb (1762-1814), a representative of classical German philosophy which served as a source of Marxism. Ethics occupies a central place in Fichte's doctrine, because it resolves what he considers to be the most important problem of man's activity. Fichte viewed action itself as the realization of a moral law. To discover this law was to solve the contradiction between freedom ("ought") and necessity ("is"). Activity, according to Fichte, is free when it is performed as a result of a corresponding *goal* rather than as a reaction to another activity or action. However, freedom is not the same as absolutely arbitrary action. The contradiction between what ought to be and what really is, is resolved by Fichte in a postulate on the supraindividualistic and the transcendental "ego" which creates both the "is" and the "ought" and the empirical individuals themselves. Affirming

that freedom is only attainable in the realm of the moral law's operation, Fichte attempts to overcome abstract individualism and to conceive of freedom as the result of social evolution. Although activity is the act of an individual, he may only achieve freedom in society, which Fichte viewed as an effective community—the interaction of individuals organized by themselves in correspondence with their own laws. Submission to such laws does not preclude freedom. Thus according to Fichte, the effective community is an interaction of individuals acting freely. Therefore rights constitute a necessary condition of morality (rights and morality together make up the ethical sphere), and rights cannot exist without the state, which guarantees the conditions of normal everyday life to the members of society (and first of all guarantees to each member his property). However, for the foundation of a perfect society, the state should be the organ of the single will of all the members of that society. The utopian quality of such a view when there exists an order

based on class antagonisms, is expressed in Fichte's understanding of the moral *ideal* as the unity of spirit, achieved by means of moral self-improvement. The latter implies the purification of the morally perfect transcendental "ego" freeing it of flaws and weaknesses inherent in separate individuals (in empirical "egos"). The essence of the transcendental "ego" is expressed in the demands of *conscience*, the single basis for moral duty: "The form of my pure 'ego' is invariably defined by the moral law." Thus, only conscience always and unconditionally rules the person. Only action which corresponds to it and is not under the influence of external conditions, may be truly moral. The real transformation of social relations in Fichte's ethics is, as a rule, replaced by moral self-improvement. Although Fichte sometimes evaluates activity directed towards a real transformation of social relations as moral activity (including by revolutionary means), in the end, he does not escape the confines of the abstract juxtaposition of "is" and "ought".

Fichte's ethics is presented in his works: "Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre" ("The Science of Ethics as Based on the Science of Knowledge", 1798), "Der geschlossene Handelsstaat" ("The Closed Commercial State", 1800), and "Die Bestimmung des Menschen" ("The Destiny of Man", 1800).

FORMALISM [*L forma* form, figure, external content]. 1. The moral characteristic of the method of meeting moral requirements expressed in: (a) a purely outward compliance with the rules which is due to indifference to an object of an action or a subject of a rule or to the desire to conceal the true motives such as, for instance, selfish and corporatist motives; (b) such discharging of one's *duty* when an individual does not ponder over the social significance and the actual essence of his deeds or is unable to motivate them. Furthermore, the scrupulous execution of strictly set moral rules is often accompanied by violating the most important general principles of morality—*humanism*, *justice*,

and respect for people. A typical manifestation of formalism is moral piety when the outward devotion to proprieties conceals injustice, inhumanity and lack of respect for the individual. The formalist attitude to morality reduces a person's *responsibility* for his actions and deeds and underestimates the meaning of consciousness and conviction. The source of moral formalism is the dogmatization of moral demands which conceals their social meaning in ethical conceptualization. The essence of such ethical concepts is that a duty itself should be carried out for the sake of the duty (deontological *intuitionism*). In such circumstances, a certain independence of moral demands of concrete circumstances is treated as their absolute autonomy and there appears a predilection to the "letter of the law" rather than to the meaning of the moral demand. 2. Ethical formalism is a methodological principle underlying many ethical theories, in which formal points of investigation prevail over the analysis of the content of the moral problem. In past the-

ories, this was characteristic of *Kant*, who sought a universal ethical principle that would retain its significance irrespective of the essence of the goals and the concrete circumstances of an action. Kant termed this principle the *categorical imperative* implying the universality, autonomy and humanistic thrust of every moral action. The formalism of Kantian ethics (although this is denied by some researchers), was a method of comprehending and asserting the universality of morality as an imperative principle in conditions when human life lacked such universality and was torn apart by selfish interests. Ethical formalism is found in some theories of contemporary bourgeois moral philosophers (e.g. the neopositivist Richard Mervyn Hare). However, the outright refusal to deal with moral problems and issues of *normative ethics* is, in general, typical of them (*intuitionism*, *Neopositivism*, etc.). They are almost exclusively interested in problems of the *logic of the language of morality*, grammatical form, the semantics of moral judgements, and possible de-

initions of moral terms. Marxism does not negate the significance of logical-formalist issues in ethics, but maintains that they should be considered in correlation with ideological and social issues.

FOURIER, François Marie Charles (1772-1837), French utopian socialist who was critical of the bourgeois system and depicted a just society of harmony and happiness. Drawing upon many of the French materialist doctrines of the 18th century (though his reasoning was presented in a mystical religious form), Fourier, in his philosophical and ethical constructions, attached particular meaning to man's natural "passions" (the pursuit of health, love, self-fulfilment, creation, etc. — a total of 12 passions). All these passions are useful and necessary and in beneficial conditions should demonstrate their positive qualities. Humans do not have intrinsically sinful, criminal, or harmful desires or inclinations. However, in the circumstances of the decline of civilization, which was how Fourier viewed bourgeois so-

ciety, all human relationships are abominably distorted. In spite of the fact that altruism is part of human nature as well as the desire to work and help each other, parasites rule in society, work is compulsory. Instead of healthy competition there is ruinous rivalry, antagonism between the interests of the individual and society. As a result, "a physician wishes that his patients have more ailments, and a prosecutor—that each family be engaged in a lawsuit. An architect dreams of severe fires which would destroy a quarter of the town, and a glazier's desire is a good hail which would break all the glass-panes. This is how in a civilized economy, each individual is engaged in a conscious struggle with the mass; the inevitable result of the anti-social economy where people suffer." Fourier criticized the bourgeois family where marriage has turned into a commercial arrangement, and women have no rights. He also criticized the existing educational system, which mentally and physically crippled the children. Fourier's ideal was a new society which would guar-

antee the solidarity and harmony of all human interests. The fundamental social unit of Fourier's new society is the phalanx, a productive and consumer community of free workers. In this society, although material inequality is preserved, people's activities are organized on the basis of everyone's preferences in work and on competition. By changing jobs, in correspondence with their inclinations and abilities, Fourier thought, people would work with joy and enthusiasm, would not know unhealthy envy and would freely give way to their passions and inclinations. Only in such circumstances, can the highest (thirteenth) passion, that of unitarism, be fully developed, which could not manifest itself in bourgeois society. Unitarism is the striving for universal wellbeing, and to combine individual benefit with the wellbeing of all members of the human race. Under these circumstances, the family loses its significance as an economic unit and is replaced by a free unit of loving people. Liberated women will occupy the same positions as men. Fourier at-

tached great significance to the social upbringing of children and to the unity of upbringing and productive labour for the good of society. In spite of the utopian and often fantastic nature of Fourier's views of the future society and of the ways to achieve it, he brilliantly foreshadowed a future communist society. The fundamental works in which Fourier developed his ethical views: "Théorie des Quatre Mouvements et des Destinées Générales" ("Theories of Four Movements and Universal Destinies", 1808), "Traité de l'Association Domestique et Agricole" ("Treatise on the Domestic and Agricultural Association", 1822, published posthumously), "Théorie de l'Unité Universelle" ("Theory of the Universal Unity", 1941), "Le Nouveau Monde Industriel et Sociétaire" ("The New Economic and Social World", 1829), "Le Fausse Industrie Morcelée" ("The False Economy Cut Up", 1835-1836).

FREEDOM, MORAL, a *category of ethics* embracing the problems pertaining to man's

possibility and ability to act as an independent and creative personality, to express in his moral activity his truly human essence. Various idealist theories regard moral freedom as inherent in man as such: endowed to him by nature or by God (*Freedom of the will*). This innate quality of man is a prerequisite for his morality: only thanks to freedom can man be a moral being responsible for his acts. This formal assumption of freedom led to its extremely abstract interpretation. In everyday consciousness, and in some ethical doctrines moral freedom is understood as freedom from external dependence (natural and social), as a possibility of performing acts only in conformity with one's own intentions and decisions, as the unrestricted self-fulfilment of the individual, his requirements and interests. This concept of moral freedom is insufficient for it is still not clear from where the intentions, requirements and interests of the individual stem. Besides, life demonstrates that frequently people are "hostages" of their

own habits, inclinations and moral traits, while the unrestricted satisfaction of some requirements does not at all bring about the desired satisfaction and, for all intents and purposes, cannot be regarded as a sign of freedom. Marxist ethics considers human freedom in specific historical terms as a person's state achieved only in definite circumstances as a result of his social and spiritual development. Engels wrote: "Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends." From this general philosophical definition of freedom, follows the understanding of moral freedom whose objective premise is the overcoming of contradictions between *man and society*. As a result, moral requirements cease to oppose the individual as something alien, contradictory to his human needs. Moral freedom is formed under the influence of the evolution of man's con-

scientiousness with external moral necessity being transformed into his inner requirement, while submission to moral precepts is turned into voluntary obedience to one's own *conscience*, mere observance of social rules converted into creative adherence to moral principles on the basis of personal choice. However, without excluding self-compulsion, this moral freedom is incomplete. Full moral freedom is achieved only when the comprehended necessity turns into a personal moral urge and an inner requirement of man whose interests are inseparable from those of society. With reference to individuals, this state is achieved in the process of the individual's all-round education and self-education. As a typical social phenomenon, characterizing the activity of the broad masses of people, it is associated with the prospects of future development.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL, a philosophical category implying, in most general terms, man's ability, in accordance with his accepted world out-

look, to independently define his deeds and act within his own discretion. As the *category of ethics*, freedom of the will signifies that in accomplishing an act, man makes a *moral choice* between good and evil, the moral and the immoral. The choice depending on man himself, entails moral *responsibility*: his acts may be interpreted to his credit or his *guilt*. The problem of freedom of the will in the history of ethics has often been approached in idealistic terms. Exponents of the indeterminist concept (*Causality*) consider freedom of the will to be independent of external causes. They see the source of man's actions and his ability to choose his acts, in will itself, which is opposed to any necessity. Freedom of the will divorced from the objective world is closely linked to the view that it is in principle impossible to achieve freedom of the will in real life for it is restricted only to the realm of the spirit. Back in ancient times, *Epictetus* advanced the idea that since good and evil exist only in man's reason, no coercion could deprive man of the freedom of choice.

In essence, the same meaning was imparted to the concept of freedom of the will by *Kant* who differentiates reality between a world of natural necessity where man acts in conformity with the laws of causality, as a natural and non-free being, and a comprehensible world beyond space and time, in which alone man enjoys freedom of the will. According to Kant, only good will is free, but it, too, is incapable of manifesting itself, in practical terms, in the world of necessity. Some theorists of the later period (*Stirner*, *Nietzsche*, *Schopenhauer*) classified the concept of freedom of the will (whether treated as a trait of man or as something absolute, independent) as unrestricted arbitrariness which frequently leads to extreme *individualism* and *amoralism*. The concept of freedom of the will is a central category in the ethics of *existentialism* and *personalism*. Materialist thinkers (*Hobbes*, 18th-century French materialists, Russian revolutionary democrats) rejected the indeterminate understanding of freedom of the will, asserting that all man's acts are causally conditioned.

But exponents of pre-Marxist ethics did not answer the question: how is it possible to combine man's ability to make a choice as regards his actions with the objective laws operating in the world. For this reason, many of them treated the causes determining man's actions in a mechanistic way and arrived at the conclusion that each person's act is predetermined beforehand by the general course of events (*Hobbes*, *Holbach*, Anthony Collins). Thus, the erroneous solution of the problem of freedom of the will ultimately brings them to one of the two extremes—either *voluntarism* or *fatalism*. From the dialectical-materialist point of view, man's activities accomplished on the basis of his chosen goal, reflect, in the final analysis, the laws of the development of nature and society, i.e. objective necessity. The latter is reflected in the interests and needs of people and classes, determining the *motives* of their acts. This necessity is not to be considered only as something external in respect to man, for not only people's acts are conditioned by the laws of

nature and society, but man in his turn is capable of influencing the environment and transforming it and thus expanding his freedom and possibility of choice. Within the framework of general social-historical necessity fulfilled by the totality of actions of a huge mass of people, an individual or a relatively large social group enjoy freedom of choice (for instance, whether to join a certain social movement, how to act in a personal situation). It is within this framework that Marxist ethics poses the problem of man's responsibility for his acts. (See also *Activities, Freedom, moral, Discretion and creativity*).

FREUDIANISM, a widespread doctrine concerning the nature of man, whose ideas have permeated to a significant degree contemporary sociology, philosophy, anthropology, ethics, pedagogy and aesthetics. Freudianism (or psychoanalysis), arose at the end of the 19th century. Its founder, the Austrian neurologist and psychotherapist Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), initially developed psychoanalysis as a method for

treating neurotic ailments, but later expanded it to encompass social relationships in general. The basis of Freudian ethics is man's innate psychological complexes. Freudianism bases the structure and motives of human behaviour upon its unconscious, and especially sexual (libido), inclinations. Freud considers the unknowable Id (the unconscious) as the primary element in man's internal world. The Id acts as ungoverned energy or striving which is ruled by the pleasure principle. The Id manifests itself in males as a contradictory complex of sexual inclinations towards their mothers and as aggressive impulses towards their fathers (the Oedipus Complex). Similar inclinations are attributed to women (the Electra Complex). According to Freud, human action is based on these inclinations as if inherited from primitive times. However, with the formation of society, moral rules of behaviour appear which limit and repress the open display of unconscious inclinations. Thus, in Freud's view, at a certain time of societal development the Super-ego

developed and later was communicated hereditarily. The Super-ego is the result of man assimilating moral standards. Observing the character of the individuals' interactions with bourgeois society, Freud came to the conclusion that every society is hostile to man because it represses his inclinations and is the result of the transformation (sublimation) of mental energy into various aspects of his cultural activities. The inclinations which are not sublimated manifest themselves in neurotic ailments and immoral behaviour. Thus, social contradictions are treated by Freud as the manifestations of man's anti-social nature. In the 1930's, a Neo-Freudian movement (*Neo-Freudianism*), in particular so-called Freudo-Marxism, developed in psychology, sociology and other areas of culture in the US (its most influential representative was Erich Fromm).

FRIENDSHIP, interpersonal relations based on community of interests and mutual attachment. In primitive society, friendship was usually associ-

ated with symbolic relationship (blood friendship, brotherhood) and was frequently indissoluble as a matter of principle, while the rights and duties of friends were rigidly fixed by *tradition*. With the disintegration of communal-tribal relations, the concept of friendship was gradually divorced from kinship and drew nearer to *comradeship* based on the community of interests. Initially, the emphasis was on the practical usefulness of friendship (e.g. with the Sophists). More complicated relationships between the individual and society make the need of emotional contact and psychological intimacy more acute. This leads to the individualization of friendship, its rapprochement with *love* and, in the end, to the concept of friend as an alter ego, a second self (*Aristotle*). The psychological intimacy implied by friendship is shaped on the basis of more elementary forms of comradesly intimacy resulting from personal contacts and joint activities, membership of the same community and the like. However, friendship is more individual and selective

than comradeship. It implies not only community of status and interests, but mutual sympathy and emotional attachment as well. The psychological substance and function of friendship changes with time. Childhood friendship is ingenuous and associated mainly with joint activities. However, it is an indispensable school of *altruism*, allegiance to principles and the ability to understand another person. With the development of self-consciousness in juveniles and teenagers, there appears the need of intimate friendship and a friend with whom it would be possible to discuss and compare personal experiences. Juvenile friendship, as a first independently chosen attachment, is highly emotional and in many respects anticipates love. In girls, the need for intimate friendship appears earlier and is more strongly expressed than in boys who tend towards comradeship within a group. During the period of maturity, the range of a person's contacts becomes differentiated, and there appear new significant attachments (love, family and parental feel-

ings). The relations of friendship lose their exclusiveness and combine with other relations (family, public, production). The role of friend remains extremely important nonetheless. This is especially strongly expressed in critical personal situations. As a force uniting people, friendship has always been an important social and moral value. It is not by chance that in the broad sense, the concept of friendship denotes not only interpersonal but social relations as well (friendship of nations, treaties of friendship between states and the like). Ancient philosophers saw in friendship even a cosmic force of union (in contrast to enmity). In the history of ethical thought, the unselfishness and selflessness of true friendship has long since been opposed to false relationships based on a self-seeking deal. But French materialists (*Holbach*, *Helvétius*) already revealed the relative character of such a distinction (the need to unburden one's heart can be no less egoistic than the desire to use the money of a friend). The moral appraisal of concrete re-

lations of friendship is based on the nature of its general aims and principles: whether friendship serves to attain a noble social goal or serves partial, group interests. The code of friendship is an embodiment of the moral norms of the ideal communal life in general. It is incompatible with *egoism*, perfidy and vacillating convictions.

FROMM, Erich (1900-1980), US psychoanalyst and social philosopher of German descent, one of the major proponents of *Neo-Freudianism*. He created humanistic psychoanalysis, and on this basis advanced his version of *humanistic ethics*. Fromm reviewed several theoretical positions of classical psychoanalysis and criticized Freud for his separation of psychology and ethics. He was a proponent of the view that moral and ethical norms compose the organized principle of man's activities. In his view, the problem of neurosis (one of the issues dealt with in psychoanalysis), is indissolubly tied to ethics, because every neurosis manifests itself as a moral problem often brought about by

moral conflicts. This observation led to Fromm's interest in moral problems, and to his efforts to understand the ethical and moral aspects of human existence in the world. Reviewing the various ethical concepts, Fromm does not adhere to the view that man is intrinsically evil and inclined towards aggression by nature. Nor does he support the view that man is innately good. He was critical of the existential treatment of values in which moral rules and value judgements acquire relativist shades. In contrast to the concept of socially immanent values (according to which the standards of ethics being identified with social norms serve to maintain the status quo of capitalist society which is conducive to the alienation of man), and to the theory of biologically immanent values (which levels the specific aspects of human nature and regards egoism and competition as the highest values in life), Fromm expounds on the concept of humanistic ethics (or "biophilia"). He feels that man simultaneously possesses two potentials: primary, which is called

biophilia (love of life), and secondary, which is called necrophilia (love of death), the latter being a pathological phenomenon. For Fromm, the basic alternative of ethics is a choice between the biophilia and necrophilia. In capitalistic conditions, the necrophilic orientation, with its peculiar characteristics of radical *hedonism*, unbridled *egoism* and violence (which results in the individual losing the reason for his existence), predominates. Humanistic ethics are necessary for a person to keep his originality. These ethics do not negate the individual, but support him in all manifestations of his life. They affirm the achievement of "freedom for" rather than "freedom from", and they value the sociability of people based on common love rather than antagonism between individuals. Fromm's development of humanistic ethics assumes individual self-enlightenment instead of fundamental transformation of social relationships. This enlightenment is to be achieved by means of the methods of humanistic psychoanalysis. Thus Fromm does not go

beyond the framework of the abstract-humanistic utopia of the purification of society by means of the moral-ethical improvement of individuals. Fromm's utopia contains the moral precepts of Christianity, with their emphasis on love for one's neighbour, and the moral orientation of *Zen Buddhism* whose focus is the enlightenment of the individual and the attainment of his inner self. The ethical views of Fromm are contained in the following works: "Die Furcht vor der Freiheit" ("Escape from Freedom", 1941), "Man for Himself; an Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics" (1947), "The Art of Loving" (1956), "The Heart of Man" (1964), "The Revolution of Hope. On Humanistic Technique" (1968), "The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness" (1973), "To Have or to Be?" (1976).

FYODOROV, Nikolai Fyodorovich (1823-1903), Russian thinker, the author of a moral Utopia of a global cosmic nature. The ethical views of Fyodorov are expressed in his work, "The Philosophy of the Common

Cause". As all Utopians, he bases himself on the criticism of the existing order of things in the world but its change he links not so much with the solution of social problems as with moral, natural, evolutionary and cosmic transformations. According to Fyodorov, the main source of *evil*, the cause of all misfortunes and sufferings, is *death*. That is why it seemed reasonable to him to divide society not into the poor and the rich but rather into the living and the dead. Death and destruction exist in animate and inanimate nature, among plants and animals but only man, the crown of evolution, is aware of death, perceives himself as a mortal being and does not want to reconcile himself to the fact. Fyodorov does not see in this desire a selfish striving of man for immortality but his *duty* to the forefathers who gave the living everything: life, the material

world and culture. The *obligation* to the dead is a moral imperative underlying Fyodorov's utopian project of "immanent resurrection" of all people who once lived on the Earth. He believed that for this it was necessary to unite the efforts of all sciences, the synthesis of biology, astronomy and history. Fyodorov believes that the struggle against death is the main concern of all mankind and calls his philosophic theory the "philosophy of the common cause". Fyodorov grasps the idea of the link existing between man and outer space and the need to explore space and inhabit it. His theory is also linked to religious, mystical and mythological teachings. The philosophic and ethical theory of Fyodorov made an impact on the world outlook of Russian thinkers including *Soloviev*, Pavel Florensky and *Dostoyevsky*.

G

GANDHI, Mohandas Karamchand (1869-1948), a leader and ideologist of India's national liberation movement. Gandhi addressed ethical questions in order to morally corroborate the policy of Satyagraha (passive resistance as a method of gaining political and social reforms) and to involve in it masses of people, above all the peasantry. By means of ethics, he substantiated the ideals of elevating the dignity of the individual and of eliminating social inequality and discrimination based on caste, creed, property status or colour of skin. His basic principle was "ahimsa"—the principle of non-violence and doing no harm. The main attribute of ahimsa is love which is an all-embracing moral category. "Where there is love," Gandhi said, "there is life; hatred leads to destruction."

Love is incompatible with inflicting suffering upon anyone, and an adherent of "ahimsa" must accept his own suffering. From this follows the second attribute of "ahimsa"—compassion for all living beings, austerity and sexual abstinence, associated, in particular, with the vow of celibacy. Gandhi attaches great importance to developing such qualities as courage, bravery, and ability to overcome fear. He interprets these and other categories in the spirit of individual self-improvement. Thus, bravery must be displayed not in bold actions against existing evil, but primarily in a readiness to accept suffering and self-sacrifice. In the sphere of property relations, Gandhi propounded the principle of "aparigraha"—non-covetousness, appealing to the wealthy to restrain their greed

and to respond to the needs of the destitute and hungry. This principle is an important component of the morality of *asceticism* he preached. The entire complex of moral standards, according to Gandhi, is united by a universal moral law that is divine in its origin. Under its influence, there develops the process of the individual's moral perfection, as a result of which selfish desires are completely eliminated. Self-analysis, control over one's thoughts, words and deeds constitute the most important means of implementing this law. Gandhi's ideas on ethics exerted profound influence on various social strata of India. Gandhi's spiritual and political experience testifies to the high degree of practical effectiveness of morality as inner self-improvement of the individual and non-violence based on principle.

GHAZZALI Al-, Abu-Hamid Mohammed (1058 or 1059-1111), medieval Muslim theologian and philosopher. The ethical views of al-Ghazzali are expounded mostly in "The Restoration of the Sciences of Reli-

gion" in the spiritual self-purification and self-improvement of man. Ghazzali discerns positive virtues embodied in good deeds and passive virtues—abstaining from evil deeds, and gives his preference to the latter. This does not indicate the rejection of the real world. According to Ghazzali, a person not of this world is incapable of being dutiful to those who need his assistance and support. In isolation, it is impossible to bring up a child or to identify one's shortcomings the struggle against which is called by the Islamic tradition the great Jihad. Ghazzali subdivides vices into those associated with certain parts of the body (gluttony, unrestrained sex urges, empty talk, lies if they are not for the sake of salvation, *slander*, informing against someone); self-assertion (malice, *envy*, *vanity*) and greed, craving for high posts, *hypocrisy* and *arrogance*. He believes that virtues (traits facilitating salvation), are developed in consecutive order: first there is repentance, temperance, poverty, patience and gratitude to God, then the stages of spiritual self-improve-

ment — truthfulness, *fear*, hope, reliance on God as indivisible and unique, an immovable mover of the material world and the cause of being, possessing a tangible and absolute existence. At the end of his path on Earth man becomes possessed by all-consuming love of God which embraces all basic kinds of love. Ghazzali explains moral behaviour by God's help allowing man to distinguish between the moral and the immoral, the *good* and *evil*, right and wrong, a desire to accomplish a virtuous deed and a hope for a tangible opportunity and favourable objective conditions. Striving to reconcile the concept of man's moral responsibility for his deeds with the assumption that God is the sole cause of everything, Ghazzali addresses himself to the concept of "appropriation" ("kasb"), according to which man's deed occupies an intermediate position between pure coercion prevailing in the material world and absolute freedom of choice (*Moral choice*) characteristic of God.

GOAL, a planned result (conceivable, desired or designed) of an *act* or *deed*. Ethics distinguishes between the following goals: (1) subjective (based on personal *motives* and *intentions*) and objective (depending on the universally significant incentives); (2) relative (chosen for the attainment of another, more important, result) and absolute (whose attainment is a moral value in itself, while its essence coincides with the *ideal* and serves as a foundation for moral *principles*); (3) positive which conform to the requirements of morality and negative which are at variance with them. According to *Kant* the goal is moral if it is dictated by the *categorical imperative* and associated with the concept of *duty*. These are self-improvement and the *happiness* of other people. Goals are realized by resorting to certain means. The latter bring a result which never fully conforms to the ideal goal. The moral value of a deed is determined by the moral significance of the goal, the means and the practical result (*Ends and means*). In other words, all human activities which pursue

definite ends, employ the necessary means to achieve them and lead to an objective result, should be given moral evaluation.

GOLDEN RULE, ancient rule of ethical conduct expressing the universal substance of morality (*Universal and class elements in morality*). Its most widely current wording is as follows: "Whatever you wish that men would do to you, do so to them" or "Do to others as you would have others do to you". The golden rule is mentioned in the earliest written monuments of many cultures (e.g. in the teaching of *Confucius*, in the ancient Indian "Mahabharata", in Homer's "Odyssey") and deeply penetrated social consciousness of subsequent epoches. Historically, this requirement figured under various names: maxim, principle, guiding principle, the first consideration, and the like. Its current name dates from the late 18th century. In ancient ethics, the golden rule was mentioned mainly as a requirement of worldly wisdom and practical prudence. In the Christian

ethics of the Middle Ages (e.g. *Augustine*), efforts were made to raise it to the key principle of theocentric morals. In the ethics of modern times, the golden rule is treated as a basic and self-evident requirement of morality (*Hobbes*, *Locke*, *Johann Herder* and others). The emergence of the golden rule testifies to the breach in the consanguineous narrowness of consciousness as well as to the transition from impersonal responsibility of the clan to the responsibility of the individual. The positive moral significance of the golden rule is determined by its assertion of the right and duty of the individual to assume responsibility and act in accordance with his notion of what is best; it practically orients the individual towards developing an important element in the mechanism of moral conduct—the ability to identify oneself with another and emotionally relive the latter's experience. The universal significance of the golden rule is associated with its underlying idea of *equality*.

GOOD, one of the most general evaluating and imperative concepts and a *category of ethics*. It reflects the positive moral significance of social phenomena and their correlation with the *ideal*. The opposite of good is *evil*. Historically, the first concepts of good contained the idea of the valuable and useful in general. This reflected the syncretism of the mode of life and man's consciousness in primitive tribal society. In this sense, the concept of good merged with that of *benefit*. Traces of this identification can still be found in philistine consciousness. With the division of labour and emergence of class civilization, the concept of good is idealized, and, on the other hand, acquires a specific moral aspect. This is reflected in counterposing good and practical usefulness. At the same time, the concept of good treated in its own right among other moral concepts, is being revaluated utilitywise. Consequently, in philosophy, too, there are two approaches to the interpretation of good and morality. Religious and idealistic ethics absolutized the separ-

ation of good from everyday values imbu- ing it with a divine, transcendental nature. Good is interpreted as a manifestation of the divine will (*Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Soloviev*), as the supreme idea in the realm of eternal and unchangeable essences (*Plato, Neo-Platonists*), activity in conformity with the laws of the mentally perceived world (*Kant*) and one of the absolute goals (*Hegel*). Here, good is perceived as both the philosophically postulated ideal kingdom and human activities aimed at merging with it. In the naturalistic theories of morality basing themselves, as a rule, on philosophical materialism, good is interpreted as *happiness* or something which is conducive to it (*Hedonism, Utilitarianism, Eudaemonism*) or which meets the needs of a social group or a society (*Mandeville, utopian communism, socialism*). In the evolution of ethics, along with these extreme positions, attempts had been made to synthesize them. This did not enjoy broad recognition but was, nevertheless, very fruitful. For instance, *Aristotle* interprets good as a path to

happiness and at the same time as a substantial element in its structure. An intuitive analysis of the nature of good was the peculiar reaction to the dilemmas of classic philosophy. Moore criticized all previous ethical doctrines detecting in them a "naturalistic error" which, he believed, consisted in reducing good to particular natural properties of objects. In the intuitive interpretation good is an objective, simple and primary property of objects. This in principle is indefinable and perceived by intuition. According to the analytical concept (Richard Hare and others), good is indefinable not because it is an unnatural property, but because the word itself is used in various contexts not making it possible to establish its general meaning. *Pragmatism* (Dewey), which links the indefinability of good with the variability of the human, cultural and historical experience, draws the same conclusion. Marxist ethics attaches vital importance to the changeability of the concepts of good and their objective and specific historical essence. Since good is not a

natural property, it embodies the need of a particular society for behaviour which would be in accordance with its trends of development. As a value concept, good is considered within the framework of a particular system of class morals. Within the bounds of moral consciousness, good as an absolute, self-evident universal human value is perceived as humaneness realized in deeds. Despite its extremely abstract character, this concept of good imbues all its historical and situational specifications with humanism. Marxist ethics developed the idea of the dialectical unity of good and evil: good is embodied in deeds (*beneficence*) and personal qualities (*virtues*) when it is perceived by a person as the opposite of evil. At the same time, the concept of good becomes socially specified only when it is converted into the totality of man's positive *obligations* to society, other people and himself. The dialectics of good and evil cannot be interpreted as the elimination of any distinction between them. Despite the fact that at times in a concrete historical situation,

good may turn into evil or evil may lead to good, within the limits of morality the boundaries separating them are absolute and such transitions are impossible. An important question posed by classic philosophy is the problem of the correlation of good and *duty*. The intense discussion of this issue in modern non-Marxist ethics, reveals two trends: ethical *axiology* proceeding from the primacy of good and ethical *deontology* insisting on the primacy of duty. From the viewpoint of dialectics, the concepts of good and duty in their ideal form correspond to different but interdependent elements in an intricate mechanism regulating human behaviour. The concept of good reflects the striving of man for improvement and for the elimination of the factors impinging upon human dignity and constricting opportunities for self-realization. As a goal, the concept of good regulates human behaviour thus operating as a social requirement, an imperative. In the ethics of the past, this distinction was reflected in the distinguishing of the "material" (content and

value) and "formal" (imperative) aspects of a moral act. Moral good consists in deeds performed for the benefit of another person, leading people to happiness and to the assertion of the self-value of every individual. In the historical perspective, good is realized in the vigorous efforts to establish social relations worthy of man. While ideally the personal and socio-political aspects of good should coincide, in real life there are contradictions between them. These contradictions engender equally limited attitudes to life: moralizing negation of history or disregard for moral criteria justified by historical necessity. Genuine humanism implies a socio-historical activity which is guided and corrected by the idea of good shared by all mankind.

GOOD DEED, see *Beneficence*.

GRACE, a category of *Christian ethics* implying the supernatural assistance of God to man. It is assumed that the free will of man is challenged by the dilemma: whether to begin the struggle for purification and im-

provement of one's life. However, if it is left to its own devices, the will cannot solve this problem. And in this situation, grace comes to the assistance of the sincere will and makes possible that which is beyond man's powers. According to Christianity, the primary move of goodwill, although free, has been predetermined by God. Hence the paradox: all depends on man but all is done by grace. "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God which worketh in you both to will and to do of *His* Good pleasure," says the Bible. This concept led to disputes concerning *predestination* throughout the entire history of theology. The question of the correlation between grace and *freedom of the will*, has a multifaceted content which cannot be simplistically rendered into the language of other ethical theories. One of its major aspects is the problem of the correlation of the objective and the subjective in the moral choice constantly facing man and society in practice. As for the term itself, it shared the fate of many other religious con-

cepts. More often than not, the consciousness of modern man does not imbue grace with a religious connotation, and implies by it goodwill, favour, or a quality of being pleasing and attractive.

GRATITUDE characterizes the attitude of a person in response to kindness or *benefit* rendered by another person (group or agency), which is expressed in a special sense of readiness to respond with reciprocal kindness and practical action. The need of morality to repay kindness appeared long ago in the past when man began to identify himself as an individual in a primeval collective and when the practice of reciprocal services became possible. The significance of the obligation of gratitude is more extensive in bourgeois society as an additional instrument (which is not legally formalized), in economic and legal relations connected with mutual exchange of commodities and services. However, owing to the opposite interests of people, this obligation is most often violated here (e.g. when a benefactor happens to

become a competitor). Socialist morality admits that gratitude is one of the manifestations of the principle of *justice* in relationships between people. Gratitude should be distinguished from fawning, bribe-giving, uncivilized, immoral forms of "settling" personal affairs in society. Extremely difficult situations arise when the obligation of gratitude is at variance with higher principles such as *humanism*, *honesty*, *patriotism*, etc. Although gratitude belongs to the sphere of personal relations, it also has a value of its own and is an indispensable moral principle of society.

GROTIUS, Hugo (Huig de Groot, 1583-1645), Dutch jurist, sociologist and statesman, one of the founders of the theory of natural law and *social contract*. In his work "De Jure Belli et Pacis", Grotius opposed the theory of the divine origin of the state, of legal and moral standards. He believed that primitive communistic relations, based on public property, were lost because of moral reasons. The lack of love and justice in relationships between

people undermined the foundations of equality in the sphere of production and consumption and led to property and class inequality. In order to curb passions and disturbances, people unite into a state by conscious and voluntary agreement to secure protection of the law and for mutual benefit. The law appears from the people's striving and ability for peaceful communication based on universal principles of reason. The violation of these principles, the manifestations of enmity and repudiation of justice, i.e., recurrences of relations which existed prior to the social contract, are, according to Grotius, the reason for wars and social conflicts. Grotius criticized the theological explanations of the nature of state and law and saw their origins in human reason and experience.

GUILE, a moral attitude of an individual planning an *evil deed* directed towards *hypocrisy* and deception. Guile goes hand in hand with slyness and double-dealing. Guile is based on the conscious adoption of the immoral principle according to

which the selfish goal justifies any means. In the *Ten Commandments*, Moses made the first attempt to morally forbid guile as a form of bearing false witness. This tradition was continued in *Christian ethics* but with a greater distinction between guile as such and false witnessing. More than once, the New Testament relegates guile to the so-called sins of the flesh. In further elaborating this postulate, an early-Christian theologian, Tertullian, lists guile as a mortal sin. However, the subsequent orthodox Christian theology expels guile from the codified list of the seven mortal sins. Despite the negative attitude on the whole to that immoral principle, in the history of social thought guile fitted into various moral and ethical systems. For instance, *Machiavellianism* accepts guile as a normative and even virtuous act if it serves "noble" goals. Modern social consciousness condemns it believing, quite justifiably, that it enhances the destructive role of an evil deed regarding it as a principle of conduct.

GUILT (guiltiness), state (condition) opposite to innocence, in which a person finds oneself having violated moral or legal standards, committed a *misdeed* or a *crime*. The state of guilt is an expression of the individual's moral attitude towards other people and society as a whole. Since man, basing himself on his reason and will, chooses his way of action and is responsible before society for his own deeds, he is considered guilty if he evades the *responsibility* conferred on him, disregards the established moral values and fails to fulfil his moral *duty*. In law, if the guilt of a person ignoring public interests and standards is established, this provides grounds for punishment; in morals, however, guilt involves only censure (*Sanction*). If a person pleads guilty, he may (depending on his ideological and moral maturity) experience suffering, pangs of *conscience*, *repentance*, sense of *shame* or simply *fear* of retribution. In religious morality, guilt is recognized as an inborn quality, a consequence of the original *sin*. That is why atonement of guilt is above all

regarded as dependence on God's will. Some schools of modern non-Marxist philosophy treat guilt also as a permanent feature of the personality. For *Freudianism*, guilt is the result of tension, invariably engendered by the discrepancy in the requirements of the Super-ego (conscience and the requirements of society) and the Ego proper (consciousness based on reality). In *existentialism*, man is guilty merely because he never realizes the opportunities of his existence, he

is uncommunicative and lonely (and hence prone to personal conflicts), and is opposed to nature. Marxist ethics considers guilt a temporary state of man caused by a specific situation, a consequence of his immoral actions (including refusal to act in accordance with *moral standards*). He can overcome such a state if he is aware of his guilt, improves his behaviour, and subsequently performs actions which will serve to repent the guilt.

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HABITS, *acts* and *actions* the fulfilment of which has become a need; a line of *conduct* which became deeply rooted in a person's psychology and manifests itself in actions of the same kind recurring under similar conditions. The process of resolving a task gradually becomes automatic as a result of repeated performance of similar actions. Corresponding *skills* and *inclinations* are cultivated and when man finds himself in a habitual situation they start functioning without thinking. Habits make the process of man's social activity much easier and simpler. The act which used to require analysis of the situation, working out a solution and sometimes self-compulsion, is done without thinking and effort of the will when it becomes habitual. From the social standpoint, habit is an ele-

ment of moral relations, one of the ways of regulating people's behaviour. Habit is the simplest form of maintaining and transmitting *customs* to succeeding generations. It consists in a certain social need which requires certain acts from a person being reflected in the psychology of many people as their own needs and inclinations. The role of social habits becomes more important in the process of building socialist society. The process of working out a new habit is not confined to the mere training of people to follow rules imposed upon them. It presupposes the inculcation of *persuasions*, *conscientiousness*, which then become a habit.

HAPPINESS, a concept of moral *consciousness* signifying a state of man which expresses

his greatest inner satisfaction with the conditions of his existence, meaning of his life, attainment of his human purpose. Happiness comprises two components: *moral qualities*, the measure of virtue of a person and the combination of the factors determining his wellbeing (health, prosperity, good luck, etc.). The reference to happiness as a moral *motive* is typical of practically all ethical doctrines in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, as well as the overwhelming majority of the doctrines in modern times. However, the treatment of happiness as an essential and primary basis of man's moral life, is a distinctive feature of a particular trend and tradition in ethics—*eudaemonism*. It identified happiness with the highest good, thereby stressing the personality's self-value. Happiness, in the same way as a dream, is a sensuous-emotional form of the *ideal*, but unlike a dream, happiness does not signify the individual's aspirations, but their fulfilment. The concept of happiness does not merely characterize a specific situation or state of man. It conveys the idea

of what man's life should be like, precisely what is blissful for him. Consequently, this concept bears a normative-value character. The content of happiness is interpreted in terms of purpose and meaning of human life. This concept bears a historical and class character; a slave-owner and a slave, a feudal lord and a serf, a bourgeois and a proletarian, a city dweller and a villager, an old person and a youth ascribe to it different meanings which correspond to their conditions of life and interests. In practice, in the socially alienated antagonistic class society, it always happened that the striving of the oppressed destitute classes for happiness was ruthlessly sacrificed to the same striving of the privileged layers of society. That contradiction determined the fact that in the history of moral consciousness the category of happiness was always imbued with a double meaning. On the one hand, happiness was regarded as the innate right of man but, on the other, morality, above all official morality, regarded it only as a reward for virtuousness, the sacrifices as-

sociated with the abundance by its requirements (*Retribution*). Religious morality postponed the attainment of happiness till the life hereafter. On the other hand, at times it was recognized as legitimate to strive for happiness in the life on earth. Their happiness was declared not only a reward for virtuousness but, conversely, its source. Ludwig *Feuerbach* understood happiness exactly in this way: "The urge towards happiness is innate in man, and must therefore form the basis of all morality" (*Engels*). In describing his personal perception of happiness, *Marx* once said that he saw it in struggle. Such a concept is at variance with all traditional notions of happiness. This is no longer an idyllic state of contentment with the existing situation but, on the contrary, a constant craving for a better future and the surmounting of obstacles along its path: not the attainment of one's own well-being but a full development and application of one's abilities in the conscious effort for the attainment of common goals. In the system of vital goals of modern man, happi-

ness occupies as high a place as it did in people living in the preceding epochs. However, this has not been adequately reflected either in ethics or social moral consciousness.

HARTMANN, Eduard von (1842-1906), German idealist philosopher, representative of *irrationalism*. The point of departure of Hartmann's philosophical system is the unconscious spiritual principle invested with two attributes: will and conception (*idea*). According to Hartmann, the conflict between them defines the entire course of world evolution, determining the place of mankind within the system of the world as a whole and its purpose; it also leaves its imprint on people's mentality and behaviour. Like his predecessor *Schopenhauer*, Hartmann adhered to an extremely pessimistic view in ethics: the unconscious principle produced a world in which suffering and misery exceed joy. Hartmann regards the pursuit of happiness to be no more than an illusion. At first, people counted on achieving happiness in

earthly life (in antiquity), then hoped for the hereafter (Middle Ages), and, finally, associate their hopes for a happy life with social progress (modern times). However, having realized the futility of these efforts, mankind must come to the one and only correct decision—to reject all desires by a universal collective act and free themselves of the misery of existence. Thus is realized the mythical goal of the world process—the victory of consciousness over inert, unreasonable will, and the world ceases its existence. Basing himself on these views, Hartmann formulated the principles of man's moral behaviour. Rejecting conduct guided by self-seeking aspirations (egoistic morality) and sanctified by the authority of the family, the Church and the state (heteronomous morality), he declares that autonomous morality, the roots of which are in religious consciousness, is genuine morality. Every moral obligation, Hartmann argues, exists only as an obligation in relation to God. Man acts morally if, being aware of his unity with the unconscious spiritual

principle, he identifies the goals of the latter with his own goals. Hartmann's basic works on ethics are: "Die Philosophie des Unbewussten" ("The Philosophy of the Unconscious", 1869), "Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins" ("The Phenomenology of Moral Consciousness", 1879), "Zur Geschichte und Begründung der Pessimismus" ("On the History and Justification of Pessimism", 1880), and "Ethische Studien" ("Ethical Studies", 1898).

HARTMANN, Nicolai (1882-1950), German philosopher, objective idealist, whose views were influenced by the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism and then by Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler; representative of modern *axiology* and one of the creators of phenomenological ethics. The basic substance of Hartmann's axiology is presented in his work "Ethics" (1925). *Values*, according to Hartmann, depend neither on the appraised objects nor on the very act of appraisal. They are objective, although they lack the real attributes of objects. Values are

beyond both the consciousness of man and material reality. They belong to a special sphere of being—the kingdom of ideal essences which is beyond space and time. Hence, they are absolute, eternal and invariable. Here, Hartmann follows the tradition of *Plato's* idealism. He characterizes values as the principles generating reality. As Hartmann sees it, moral values, for example, have meaning in that they demand agreement between the real and the necessary, as well as the assertion and preservation of what is valuable. However, in themselves values cannot be materialized in reality and change the existing world, because everything in it occurs according to the laws of cause and effect and not by the logic of the imperative. The requirement of value can be realized only by man who lives in the real world and thus possesses real active power. He is simultaneously involved in the world of values and of duties, and thus possesses *freedom of the will*. Unlike all other beings of nature, man has a "fate", a "destiny" to fulfil what is valuable and

proper, overcoming resistance of external necessity. Man recognizes values by intuition, because the nature of values is marked by irrationality. This concept of Hartmann, with its distinctive elements of *irration-alism*, reflects certain aspects of the spiritual life of a modern individual, especially an intellectual. The latter constantly finds himself in a contradictory situation which, on the one hand, demands that he take steps in accordance with external social necessity, practical advantage, political setup and personal interest, and, on the other hand, leads him to fulfill his moral duty which often contradicts the logic of social relations. The acute sense of this contradiction found its expression in Hartmann's idea of two worlds (values and real existence) and of the division of human existence into the spheres of the real and the ideal.

HATRED, moral *feeling* corresponding to the relations of reciprocal enmity. Outwardly hatred may be perceived as something integral and indivisible. However, by its actual

content it comprises a number of interrelated facets, for instance, aversion and wishing bad to another person, refusal to come to the assistance of the object of hatred, opposition to all his or her intentions. The feeling of hatred is the direct opposite to the feeling of love. However, at the same time, this way or another, it implies love, e.g. the hatred of evil implies the love of good.

HEDONISM [Gk *hedone* pleasure], in the history of ethical thought—a widely used theory for justification of morality and interpretation of its nature and purposes. Hedonism reduces the entire content of the diverse moral precepts to one general end—to get pleasure and avoid pain. This purpose is viewed as the principal motive force of man implanted in him by nature (*Naturalism*), ultimately determining all his actions. As a principle of morality prescribing worldly pleasure-seeking, hedonism (just as *eudaemonism*) is the opposite of *asceticism*. In ancient Greece, *Democritus* and *Aristippus* were among the first philosophers

advocating the principle of hedonism in ethics. *Epicurus*, whose name is associated with an entire trend in the theory of morality, *Epicureanism*, was the most famous among the philosophers who justified hedonism. Ideas of hedonism were also advocated by Lucretius, a Roman follower of Epicurus. In the Middle Ages, the Christian Church condemned hedonism, considering earthly pleasures sinful (*Sin*). The principle of hedonism in ethics was again revived with the emergence and assertion of bourgeois relations. That was absolutely natural since it fully accorded with the bourgeois views on man as above all a private entrepreneur (the motive force of society is a private person pursuing his own interests; the goal of society and, consequently, its morality must be the *benefit* of this private person, while his material prosperity is, ultimately, the substance of universal welfare). In their conflict with the religious understanding of morality, *Hobbes*, *Locke*, *Pierre Gassendi*, *Spinoza*, and 18th-century French materialists frequently resorted to the hedonistic inter-

pretation of morality. Later on, hedonism found its fullest expression in *utilitarianism*. The ideas of hedonism are shared by many theoreticians of modern non-Marxist ethics—George Santayana, Moritz Schlick, Durant Drake and others. In antiquity and in modern times, hedonism, on the whole, played a progressive role in ethics, since it was an attempt to interpret morality from materialistic positions. However, hedonism cannot be considered as a scientific principle of ethical theory, the more so since it does not conform to the modern level of knowledge of man. Marxism views man as a social being. From this viewpoint, reducing the diversity of human needs to the achievement of pleasure is extreme simplification and, in the end, is based on the biological or purely psychological understanding of man as only a natural being. The hedonistic principle is, besides, of an individualistic character and gravitates towards ethical *relativism*.

HEGEL, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831), repre-

sentative of classical German philosophy, objective idealist, founder of dialectical logic. In Hegel's philosophical system, the teaching of morality and morals (Hegel insisted on the differentiation of these concepts), is dissolved in the general substance of his "Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts" ("The Philosophy of Right", 1821). True, his philosophical system as a whole contains elements of moralizing ("what is rational is actual"; coincidence of the process of the absolute spirit with the freedom gained by the spirit). A distinctive feature of Hegel's ethics consists in that, instead of discussing abstract moral principles, he concentrated on those social forms in which the moral activity of man proceeds. This revealed his apologetic attitude towards the Prussian monarchy and corresponding underestimation of the specific character of morality. In place of moral virtue, Hegel puts "respectability" sanctioned by the existing society and state, while the idea of serving mankind as a whole (which in its abstract form is expressed in Kant's

categorical imperative), he replaces by definite and specific duties, in which he finds elements of the individual (family), the particular (corporation and estates in society), and the universal (state affairs), the latter playing a determining role. Thus Hegel's ethics is a morality of duties towards family, society and state. In this connection, Hegel denies the significance of moral criticism of the existing status quo from the position of what must be, while freeing great personalities from the criteria of conventional human morality. Hegel leaves aside the subjective aspect of moral relations (problems of conscience and ideal) and the moral responsibility of the individual, as well as the correlation of individual and social (public) morals (in particular, the possibility of a conflict between them). The one-sidedness of Hegel's ethical views determined their similarly one-sided interpretation. For example, such a one-sided critical response came from Søren Kierkegaard. The British Neo-Hegelianist Bernard Bosanquet centred his attention on the ethical

justification of the state and state coercion, while the Italian follower of Neo-Hegelianism Giovanni Gentile adapted Hegel's ethics to the needs of the totalitarian fascist regime. *Engels*, while noting the conservatism and "impersonality" of the Hegelian ethics, stressed its dialectical depth and richness of content in specific historical terms.

HEIDEGGER, Martin (1889-1976), German philosopher, a founding father of *existentialism*. He considered the meaning of Being through the analysis of socially isolated human existence and the exposure of its specific features as the major task of his fundamental ontological doctrine. He was interested only in man's moral and practical attitude to reality, to other people, his own ego, that had gone through the inner (existential) experience. Heidegger declared the whole sphere of social life to be false existence (he termed it "man"). Thus, the person loses his ego (ceases to be himself) or his individual mental state, because in his thoughts, feelings and

deeds he has been guided by socially acceptable morals, and subdued by *public opinion*. A human being could get rid of the supremacy of the impersonal and perceive existence as personal and pertaining only to himself, as a result of the peculiar cast of his mind and owing to the feelings and sentiments (dread, anxiety, loneliness, pangs of conscience, etc.) given to him a priori. According to Heidegger, it is only in this subjective sphere, that a person displays his complete originality, freely choosing his way of behaviour as an actual moral individual responsible for one's actions. Every human being has his own destiny. His life has a beginning and end, and is confined between birth and death. Due to this limited span of time, existence gradually unveils itself to a person as a highway to the future full of possibilities. However, Heidegger from this came to a pessimistic conclusion: *death* is the last resort and possibility of existence. The entire human life is treated as a preparation for death. Precisely the fear of death enables the individual to grasp the inte-

grity and essence of existence, releasing him from social connections (death is always my death, nobody can deprive anyone of his death). Subsequently, he shifts to the contemplative attitude towards reality, with a discernible bias towards objective idealism. His attention is focused on a certain abstract Being per se instead of human existence. According to Heidegger, man's purpose in life is to seek and be "the shepherd" of Being through the almost mystical power of language, return to the sources of civilization, comprehending the inexpressible and inexplicable. Major works: "Sein und Zeit" ("Being and Time", 1927), "Brief über den Humanismus" ("A Letter about Humanism", 1947), "Holzwege" ("False Ways", 1950), "Einführung in die Metaphysik" ("Introduction to Metaphysics", 1953).

HELVÉTIUS, Claude Adrien (1715-1771), materialist philosopher, ideologist of the 18th-century French revolutionary bourgeoisie. In his works, "De l'esprit" ("The Mind", 1758) and "De l'homme" ("Man",

1773), Helvétius considers philosophical, socio-political and ethical problems in close interrelation. Sensuous qualities and self-love, enjoyment and correctly understood personal interests underlie all morals. The natural equality between people in intelligence, the unity of progress of reason and progress of industry, the natural goodness of man and the omnipotence of education constitute the main points in his system. Dividing personal, private (corporational, social-estate) and public interests, Helvétius viewed common interest (in fact, idealized bourgeois interest) as the criterion of genuine morality. Since according to Helvétius, correctly understood personal interest necessarily coincides with public interest, the contradictions between them, as testified by history, are bred by the selfishness of private interests, people's ignorance, the imperfection of laws and, consequently, their lack of knowledge of some moral truths. Perfect legislation, based on the foundations of morality, is the consequence of enlightenment and the removal

of the exponents of private interests (the gentry and the clergy) from political power. According to Helvétius's teaching, political power is exercised by an enlightened monarch. Helvétius defines religious virtues (*asceticism*, celibacy, humility) as being false, since they are harmful to society, and declares humanism as the first among the social virtues. To the civic virtues he also attributes truthfulness, justice, loyalty to friendship, adherence to one's word and commitments in relation to society. In Helvétius's ethics, which is revolutionary in nature since it emancipates the individual, a link can be traced to the ideas of socialism. Its narrowness consists in the fact that it makes an absolute of the dependence of the moral development of man on external circumstances.

HEROISM, a specific form of human behaviour which, in moral terms, represents a *feat*. The hero (an individual, group of people, occasionally a class or a nation), undertakes to solve a task which is exceptional in its scope and complexity, and

takes upon himself a much greater amount of *responsibility* and *obligations* than are required of people by generally accepted standards of conduct under usual circumstances. As a result, he has to overcome extraordinary obstacles. The problem of heroism has been repeatedly raised in the history of ethical thought. Some theoreticians of the past (Giambattista Vico, *Hegel*), linked heroism exclusively with the heroic period in the history of ancient Greece as reflected in antique mythology. A mythological hero was endowed with superhuman powers, enjoyed the patronage of the gods, and performed feats in the name of mankind. From the viewpoint of Vico and Hegel, there was already no place for heroism under the conditions in which they lived, when strictly established standards of behaviour implying an equilibrium between rights and obligations of the individual, had been formulated for each person. Bourgeois society excludes heroism from the everyday life of people, since it is dominated by the spirit of gain and philistine prudence, per-

sonal right and dogmatism in morals. However, the assertion of bourgeois relations during the Renaissance called for actions of heroes—harmoniously developed and revolutionary-minded individuals. "It was ... a time which called for giants and produced giants—giants in power of thought, passion and character, in universality and learning. The men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations" (*Engels*). The bourgeois romanticists (Friedrich Schlegel, Thomas Carlyle and others), attempted to revive the ideas of heroism. However, in their interpretation heroism acquires a strictly individualistic character. Their hero is an outstanding individual who towers over the "multitude" and humdrum everyday existence, and does not recognize universally accepted moral standards. The "philosophy of life" (*Nietzsche, Bergson*) addresses a hero as the sole creator of new values. However, this concept did not oppose immorality. That is why subsequently the idea of a hero (the "superman" of Nietzsche,

in particular, who breaks off from the morality of the "herd") was reinterpreted by the ideology of fascism in a caricature and inhuman form (the teaching of the higher race to which everything is permissible; the idea advocated by Adolf Hitler that the Führer absolves his subjects from moral responsibility). The Russian Narodniks (Populists) gave a different interpretation to the concept of heroism in their theory of the hero and the multitude. They denied the active role of the people in history, believing that the masses rise to revolution only through the example of individual extraordinary personalities. *Existentialism* interprets heroism in its own way as well. According to the Marxist understanding of heroism, the dialectics of the historical process demands that during a definite period (e.g. during a revolution) not only individuals, but the widest sections of the people sacrifice their private interests for the sake of a common cause and perform feats that are not typical of usual conditions. Mass heroism is related to excep-

tional circumstances in society and to crucial moments in history. That is why the objective of victory of a new society "cannot possibly be fulfilled by single acts of heroic fervour; it requires the most prolonged, most persistent and most difficult mass heroism in plain, everyday work" (*Lenin*). Marxist-Leninist ethics draws no fundamental distinction between individual and mass heroism. An individual feat can serve to stimulate *initiative* and set the *example* for many people and thus turn into mass heroism. A heroic individual, as understood by socialist morality, excludes himself from the general rule only in the sense that he takes upon himself a much greater responsibility than is normally expected, sacrificing his interests for the interests of others and society as a whole. In other respects, a true hero does not make for himself any exceptions whatsoever including in the moral rules of conduct.

HERZEN, Alexander Ivanovich (1812-1870), Russian revolutionary democrat, writer, jour-

nalist, materialist thinker. He was twice exiled for his revolutionary convictions (1835-1840, 1841-1842). From 1847 he lived abroad. Established the Free Russian Press in London (1853), and published the first Russian revolutionary newspaper "Kolokol" (The Bell) in 1857-1867. In the 1830's, Herzen tried to resolve the question of man's place in the universe, of the interrelation between the hero devotee (*Self-sacrifice*) and the "multitude", of the significance of personal initiative and the sense of self-sacrifice, the correlation of will and destiny. Influenced by the ideas of *Saint-Simon*, Herzen as a socialist, interpreted love as a prototype of relations of future human brotherhood. In the 1840's, after he had accepted atheism, he gave a revolutionary materialistic interpretation to the ideas of anthropologism. He saw the meaning of human life not only in love (as was the case with *Feuerbach*), but in social and civic activity. Herzen believed that mastering progressive social and philosophical theory was the prerequisite for truly human "deeds". In his

effort to rationally define the basis of moral life, he at the same time opposed the extremes of rationalism and Hegelian "formalism", and suggested that one "open one's soul to everything human, suffers and enjoys suffering and the delights of modern times, works just as much for the kin as for oneself". From the viewpoint of the coincidence of the moral, the beautiful and the humane, Herzen criticized both medieval morals and the callousness of bourgeois morality which makes property the main value. The defeat of the revolution of 1848 in France was a personal tragedy for Herzen. He was then given to a pessimistic and sceptical mood, and intensified his criticism of the amorality of contemporary society. At the same time, a certain shift to *individualism* and *voluntarism* occurred in Herzen, as well as overestimating the role of personal self-improvement. In the 1850's and 1860's, he overcame these sentiments and made a renewed effort to resolve what he considered to be the basic problem of morality—the interrelation

between the individual and society, which, as he believed, had not yet been solved either by social life or social science. In analyzing this problem, Herzen argued against the ideology of *philistinism*. Herzen interpreted the levelling of the individual in bourgeois society as a sign of its decay. He insisted on the individual being responsible for the events taking place, and criticized the preaching of the absolute freedom of human passions. Harshly criticizing the features of *authoritarianism* in François Babeuf's system, Étienne Cabet's ideas of universal regimentation, *Fourier's* phalanxes and *Proudhon's* anti-humanist theories, Herzen was against introducing elements of these theories into the socialist doctrine. According to Herzen, future society will embody a true harmony of the individual and society, reason and passion, science and beauty. A special place in his creative pursuits was occupied by the development of the foundations of revolutionary ethics and the principles of a revolutionary's morals which determine his relations with the people he leads and his

ideological opponents. Herzen's ethical views are reflected mainly in such works as "Whims and Reflections" (1847), "Some Remarks on the Historical Development of Honour" (1846), "From the Other Shore" (1850), and the articles he included in his novel "My Past and Thoughts" (1852-1868) — "Western Arabesques", "Reflections Apropos the Broached Questions", and "John Stuart Mill and His Book 'On Liberty'".

HESIOD (fl. 8th cent. B.C.), the first moralist in the history of European culture. In the didactic epic poem, "Works and Days", attributed to him and describing the life of Greek countrymen in the epoch when the slave-owning system was in the making, Hesiod formulated for the first time the essence of a morally virtuous life. While pessimistically describing the moral decline of Greece of his time and appealing to the demons personifying Shame and Conscience, the poet shows the social usefulness of the morally correct way of life and suggests a

moral *ideal* expressed in an honest life of labour and justice. Hesiod ascribes universal significance to the moral imperative to work which he interprets as purposefulness, pursuit of benefit, thriftiness and other virtues of the life of the peasant. Justice is interpreted by him above all as the observance of law by all people born free. As distinct from Homer who initiated the tradition of substantiating the aristocratic *ethos* (a way of life with a characteristic set of moral values and principles of the "elite" of the class societies in the antiquity, the Middle Ages and partially the modern times), Hesiod elevates the way of life pursued by the petty producer-proprietor to the level of moral law.

HOBBS, Thomas (1588-1679), English materialist philosopher. In Hobbes's theory, ethics appears as a link between philosophy and socio-political teaching. Hobbes elaborated on the premise of Francis Bacon on innate egoism, emphasizing the immutability of man's nature, and on usefulness as a deter-

mining moral principle. The mutual limitation of people's egoism on the basis of the natural law of self-preservation and the appearance of the state on the basis of social contract, puts an end to "the war of all against all" and to the pre-moral state of mankind. In their moral substance, civic duties coincide with moral duties, right is the source of morality, while the law is its criterion. Hobbes averred that the natural equality of all people breeds rivalry and enmity which, restrained by the power of the state, appears in the form of competition. Virtues promote gain, vices promote loss, the former testifying to the individual's strength and the latter to his weakness. The worthiest win, for they are able to make use of both their own virtues and the vices of others. Hobbes expressed the essence of all natural laws in one rule: "Do not do to another which you would not have done to you." *Utilitarianism*, outright egoism, the interpretation of the origin and essence of morals outside religious dogmas, and *rationalism* constitute the distinguish-

ing features of Hobbes's ethics set forth in his works: "Elements of Philosophy" (1642-1658), "Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil" (1651), and "Of Liberty and Necessity" (1654).

HOLBACH, Paul Henri (1723-1789), materialist philosopher and atheist, ideologist of the 18th-century French bourgeois revolution. Holbach systematized the ethics of *Helvétius* and developed his views mainly in the "Éléments de la Morale Universelle, ou Catéchisme de la Nature" ("Fundamentals of Universal Morality, or Catechism of Nature"), "La Politique naturelle, ou Discours sur les vrais principes du gouvernement" ("The Natural Politics, or Discourse on the True Principles of Government") and "Système social, ou Principes naturels de la morale et de la politique" ("Social System, or Natural Principles of Morality and Politics"). Holbach viewed true morals as a foundation for reasonable legislation and politics and shared his views on the interrelationship between inter-

ests and the determining role of social interest: "Virtue is nothing else than the usefulness of people living in a society... To be sociable ... is to contribute to the happiness of those with whom we are bound by our destiny in order to inspire to contribute to our own happiness." But unlike *Helvétius*, Holbach considered people's natural inequality as the basis of their mutually beneficial cooperation. "True morality has not been created to be changed. Let us draw our morals from nature, from reason... Relying on these morals, we will be happy and contented in this world; we will make ourselves agreeable towards our fellow citizens." Holbach considered humaneness, justice, prudence, temperance and power (active involvement in socially useful work) as the most important virtues, whereas vices are qualities which "hinder our activity, courage and energy necessary for the support of society". "Hence Holbach's theory is the historically justified philosophical illusion about the bourgeoisie just then developing in France, whose thirst for

exploitation could still be regarded as a thirst for the full development of individuals in conditions of intercourse freed from the old feudal fetters" (*Marx and Engels*).

HONESTY, a *moral quality* reflecting one of the most important moral requirements, includes *truthfulness*, *loyalty to principles* and to obligations assumed, *conviction*, *sincerity*. The opposite of honesty is deceit, falsehood, theft, *perfidy*, *hypocrisy*. The requirement of honesty is conditioned by people's joint social activities, mutual co-ordination of their actions and by the needs of their daily life.

HONOUR, a concept of moral *consciousness* and a *category of ethics* closely connected with and in many respects similar to the category of *dignity*. Like dignity, honour reveals man's attitude to himself and the attitude of society towards him. However, as distinct from dignity, in the concept of honour a person's moral value is associated with man's specific social position, his activities and the moral merits attributed to him.

While the concept of dignity proceeds from the principle of *equality* of all people in moral terms, the concept of honour, conversely, presupposes a differentiated approach to the evaluation of people, which finds its reflection in their *reputation*. Accordingly, honour demands that man maintains and justifies the reputation enjoyed by himself or the community to which he belongs. Historically, the concept of honour appeared in the moral consciousness of society as a conception of family and social group honour (a moral requirement prescribing for man a way of life and action never impairing the dignity of a stratum or family). Class honour in feudal morality banned equal relations with people of the lower strata, employment humiliating a nobleman, enjoined that offenders be challenged to duels, etc. The group perception of honour is also retained in social consciousness after the abolition of feudal privileges. The concept of honour depends on the social status of a person. That is why in the atmosphere of class and social *alienation*, this con-

cept retains its socially differentiated content and is linked with hierarchical relations and various forms of inequality. That is why honour can degenerate, on the one hand, into *arrogance*, *vanity*, and engender, on the other hand, among those deprived of social privileges, a feeling of offended *pride*, and at times humiliating aspiration to assert their prestige by servile imitation of the higher strata, by flattery, by ingratiating themselves with those in power. Honour is an important stimulus of social behaviour. At the same time, the attitude of an individual to his or her own actions from the point of view of honour is not the supreme form of *conscientiousness* or morality of the motives. Here a broader concept of dignity is more important. The concept of honour implies in the attitude to a person the measure of respect that the person deserves, while the dignity of the individual is based on everyone's equal right to be respected.

HSÜN-TZU(c. 298-238 B.C.), Chinese philosopher who was the first, in his treatise "Hsün-

tzu", to systematically expound Confucianism, although the assertion that he belonged to that school can be disputed. In his view, man is distinguished from the world of animals and birds owing to his sense of duty and moral principles, for consciousness is also the property of animals. According to Hsün-tzu *good* is not an immanent element of nature (after all, it is the source of natural calamities) but is introduced into life by man. However, he criticized *Meng-tzu* who claimed that man is kind by nature. According to Hsün-tzu people from birth are endowed with passions including the pursuit of gain. The inbred *egoism* of man is the cause of *evil*, *envy* and *enmity* which lead to violence and crime, while the indiscriminate satisfaction of one's requirements breeds disorder. Since man is by nature a social being, a contract is the source of morality. Society must influence an individual through "li" (norms of behaviour, ritual) which coincide with "fa" (laws) and include three types of social entities: the state system, the *socium* and the *moral code*.

The original evil of human nature is surmountable on the path of moral education when natural requirements are satisfied in a proper manner. But education alone is not enough. Hsün-tzu believes that people should be relieved of excessive duties and provided with access to education. Bad predispositions can be eradicated by self-control and obedience to the teacher. "Li" define the proper level of consumption and are opposite to both excessiveness and *asceticism*.

HUMANISM [L *humanus* (*homo* man)], a system of values (including morality), at the root of which lies the conviction in the boundless capacity of man and his ability to achieve perfection, the demand for freedom and defense of the individual's *dignity*, the idea of man's right to *happiness* and of meeting his needs and interests as an ultimate aim of society. This principle evolved on the basis of a broad ideological movement which emerged during the Renaissance and was an expression of the struggle of the bourgeoisie, craftsmen and

peasants, against the rule of the feudal aristocracy, the clergy and medieval religious ideology. In opposition to the religious-ascetic understanding of man and morality (*Asceticism*, *Sin*), the humanists (Petrarch, Leonardo da Vinci, Copernicus, *Montaigne*, Francis Bacon, William Shakespeare), regarded man as the crowning achievement of nature, the center of the universe. As they saw it, man has to be a harmonious combination of the natural and spiritual, has the right to happiness in earthly life, and his "natural" pursuit of pleasure and happiness must become the foundation of morality (*Hedonism*, *Eudaemonism*). In contrast to the religious interpretation of morality, they regarded it as the realization of earthly aims — freeing man of every social and spiritual oppression, delivering him from injustice, vice and ignorance, perfecting the human personality, and allowing people to achieve complete material and spiritual wellbeing. The humanists attached great importance to man's reason and demanded that sensuous impulses be subordinated to its

control. From the very outset, there were two basic tendencies developing in humanism. The bourgeois humanists placed the individual in the centre of their consideration. They believed the inviolability of private property to be the foundation of human wellbeing and freedom. Their attempt to reconcile public and personal interests in a bourgeois society found expression in the teaching of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*). The second tendency reflected the pursuits of the working people. Its advocates – the forerunners of Utopian socialism (Thomas More, Tommaso Campanella, Thomas Münzer), raised the question of equality in property and even of eliminating private property as a necessary condition for freeing man and delivering him from moral vices. They see the solution to the problem of correlating an individual's needs and his duties to society, in labour which must become not only a duty of each person but also a source of people's pleasure and happiness. The tradition of Utopian socialism was further developed in the works of

Robert Owen, *Saint-Simon*, *Fourier* and the Russian revolutionary democrats *Belinsky*, *Dobrolyubov* and *Chernyshevsky*. Communist humanism was theoretically justified in Marxism. Analyzing the influence of private property on the individual, Marx and Engels exposed the anti-human nature of capitalist society, in which the achievements of social progress and culture turn against man (*Alienation*). Marx showed that only the proletariat was capable of freeing mankind because its own emancipation from exploitation contains universal human emancipation. A full embodiment of the principle of humanism will be achieved, according to Lenin, "by society as a whole ... with the object of ensuring full wellbeing and free, all-round development for all the members of society" (*Lenin*). Humanism does not simply declare *love* and *respect* for man as its basic principle. It also raises the question of creating within society itself truly human conditions necessary for the harmonious development of the individual (*All-round integrated development of the personality*).

HUMANISTIC ETHICS, a trend in non-Marxist moral philosophy that began to spread in the US from the 1920's. Its main representatives were Werner Fite, Irving Babbitt, Christopher Browne Garnett, and Israel Levine. The theory was so named by its authors because they construct morality from the specifically human phenomena of the individual's psychology and from the peculiarities of his behaviour and mentality. The attempt to limit oneself in this case to the experience of an isolated individual brings the proponents of this trend to an individualistic and subjectivist understanding of morals. Humanistic ethics rejects the significance of general principles in morals applying to all people. As a result, each individual appears as the sole judge of himself. Thus, according to Fite, the concept of good is always individual and has a meaning exclusively for the consciousness of a particular person. On the other hand, the only significance of good in other people is that it helps the individual to understand himself. From this, Fite concludes

that a person does not have to respect the interests of others if they cannot stand up for themselves. Individualism thus turns into a justification of outright *egoism*. The ideas of humanistic ethics were peculiarly interpreted by some representatives of *existentialism* and *Neo-Freudianism*, among them *Sartre* and *Fromm*.

HUMANITY, a *moral quality* expressing the principle of *humanism* with respect to the daily relationships of people. It embraces a number of other, more specific qualities—goodwill, *respect* for people, *sympathy* for and confidence in them, *magnanimity*, self-denial in the interest of others, and presupposes *modesty*, *honesty* and *sincerity*. The concept of humanity is also used in a broader sense as a synonym of *good*, *humaneness* and a system of relations and a social atmosphere emerging when the *benefit* of man becomes a goal.

HUME, David (1711-1776), British philosopher, representative of the theory of *moral*

sense. Hume, after *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson*, deduces morality from senses inherent in man which, in his view, are simultaneously hedonist-utilitarian and altruistic by nature. He associates the difference between vice and virtue with that between sense of pleasure and displeasure, between the concepts of beneficial and harmful for the individual. The beneficial acts as a stable pleasure insured against unexpected and intense suffering. Still, social instinct and sympathy are also inherent in man. Man is capable of being infected by other people's emotions by association: someone's happiness provokes pleasant emotions and unhappiness—unpleasant ones. The mechanism of sympathetic feelings, according to Hume, is connected with the triumph of moral good, social harmony and man's happiness. As distinct from theories which treated man as a one-sided creature (as only an egoistic or, on the contrary, an altruistic one), Hume's moral psychology is more concrete. He strived to make ethics descriptive in character (*Descriptive ethics*), advo-

cated the study of facts of moral life and cautioned against religious scholastic doctrinarianism. Still, such an interpretation of ethics by Hume stemmed from his idea of the subjective and fortuitous nature of moral experience. Hume did not approve of the change which takes place in ethics from the usual link-verb (is or is not) to another variant—must or must not. Neopositivists referred to this statement in their justification of the gap between facts and values. Hume's major works on ethics are: "Treatise of Human Nature" (1739-1740), "Essays" (2 Vols, 1741, 1742), "Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (1751).

HUMILITY, a *moral quality* characterizing man's attitude to himself and expressed in a low estimate of one's *dignity*, disbelief in one's powers, belittling one's possibilities, surrender to external forces, readiness to submit to fate, admit defeat and relinquish hopes for a better future.

HUTCHESON, Francis (1694-1747), Scottish moral philos-

opher, a representative of the subjective-idealistic *moral sense* school. Hutcheson bases himself on *Shaftesbury's* postulate on man's inborn predisposition to order and harmony, which is equally manifested in virtue and beauty. Goodwill is inherently and permanently present in human nature, similar to gravity in the physical world. According to Hutcheson, various innate senses reflect a person's surroundings and people's activities, e.g. a sense of good and evil—in oneself or in others. This inborn sense manifests itself in activities and inclinations, in the approval of good and the condemnation of evil. For, according to Hutcheson, the creator of nature made good a basic form of inducement to action and endowed human beings with strong passions to stimulate their virtuous deeds. The criterion of virtue is a striving for the common good. That is why actions inspired by self-love are irrelevant. But since man is part of a rational system, his personal virtues can be subjected to moral evaluation. Major works on ethics: "Inquiry Concerning Beauty,

Order, Harmony, and Design" (1725), "Inquiry Concerning Moral Good and Evil" (1725), "Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections" (1728).

HYPOCRISY, a negative *moral quality* which attributes a moral meaning, lofty motives and humane aims to deliberately immoral acts (motivated by selfish, base interests or performed for anti-human purposes). This concept characterizes the action in terms of the correlation between its actual social and moral significance and the meaning ascribed to it. Hypocrisy is the opposite of *honesty*, straightforwardness and *sincerity*—qualities which reflect man's awareness and open expression of the true meaning of his actions. In conditions of social injustice and class antagonisms, hypocrisy, far from being only an individual characteristic of one's mentality, becomes a widespread social phenomenon. Hypocrisy is generated by the disparity between actual social relations and their reflection in ideology, including in the

dominating morality (*Alienation*). A specific form of hypocrisy, including in the socialist society, is the gap between word and deed, between official slogans, promises and un-gainly reality. The need for hypocritical concealment of

things emerges when something shameful is done. That is why the struggle against hypocrisy requires the elimination from social life of such phenomena as *careerism*, *dema-gogy*, *insincerity*, *perfidy*, *slander*, *sanctimony*, *pharisaism*.

I

IBN-MISKAWAYH, Abu Ali Ahmed ibn-Muhammed (d. 1030), Arab philosopher, historian and poet. Ibn-Miskawayh says that the path to philosophy lies not through logic but rather through ethics which teaches one to live in accord with nature and reason instead of matter and passions. However, moral improvement (the "healing of the soul"), is impossible if man is alone. Man cannot live without help from others even if his requirements are reduced to the minimum. That is why his duty is to serve other people and request from them no more than he is able to give them. Ascetics (*Asceticism*) isolating themselves from others, can be neither generous nor just. They deprive themselves of an opportunity to acquire virtues and thus imitate inanimate bodies. Man can learn of his shortcom-

ings from his friends and even more from his foes. Following *Plato*, ibn-Miskawayh associates wisdom, courage and temperance with the three parts of the soul. Their harmony begets the fourth virtue—*justice*. A person who is from birth a "tabula rasa", is capable of theoretical and practical refinement through assimilating knowledge and improving character. Ibn-Miskawayh interprets *happiness* as a variety of *benefit*. He believes that it consists in health, prosperity, respect, success and sound mind. Benefit is both the goal and the means for attaining happiness which, according to ibn-Miskawayh, is relative and has no substance of its own. The happiness of an individual is the beginning and the necessary prerequisite for collective happiness. Truly happy people are

like angels, i.e., they do not know the passions of those who do not know happiness and are like animals. The latter are not much different from the pious who perform their religious duties and live in temperance in the hope that their denial of little things to themselves in this world, will be rewarded with many pleasures in afterlife. The major ethical works of ibn-Miskawayh are "On the Improvement of Character" and "The Arrangement of Happiness".

IBN-SINA, Abu-Ali Al-Husain Ibn Abdullah (980-1037) known as *Avicenna*, a representative of Oriental peripatetism, encyclopaedic scientist and physician. According to ibn-Sina, ethics as one of the practical sciences has *good* as its goal, a desire for perfection. The moral improvement of man should be preceded by the identification of one's own shortcomings. He believed that self-improvement is the inculcation in oneself of the moral qualities corresponding to the four cardinal virtues: temperance, *courage*, wisdom and *justice* associated correspondingly with psychic forces.

These, and other virtues which are their combinations or specific manifestations occupy, as a rule, an intermediate position between the vicious extremes: temperance and generosity between greed and wastefulness; justice between oppression and the inclination to oppress others; modesty between greed and carelessness; courage between *cowardice* and recklessness. Ibn-Sina held, that one and the same psychic force, is capable of serving as a source for both good and evil *deeds*. Thus, the force of imagination deceives people. The force of wrath turns them into brutes. The force of lust makes beasts of them. However, if subjugated to the intellect, the same forces can correspondingly help man to find an intermediate solution to a syllogism or create a beautiful work of art, turn people into heroes, extend the lifespan of an individual and the entire human race. Ibn-Sina believed that these forces were inborn, while moral qualities were acquired by people in the process of life. Ibn-Sina attached primary importance to habit in their inculcation: moral health

can be strengthened by getting oneself used to proper conduct. This can be also observed in the life of states: good rulers, by encouraging their subjects' good deeds, make them good people, while bad rulers and the "oppressors of megalopolises" make their inhabitants bad people. Ibn-Sina says that the supreme degree of *morality* is attained when good is being done for the sake of good without any expectations, be it even an expectation of gratitude or making a good impression. Supreme happiness is attained when harmony reigns in the "practical part of the soul", i.e., in each of the forces engendering moral virtues. The ethical views of ibn-Sina are expounded in his encyclopaedic works: "Ash-Shifa" ("The Recovery") called "Sufficiencia" in Latin versions, "A Treatise on Love" and allegorical works ("A Treatise on Haye, the Son of Yakzan", "A Treatise on Birds").

IDEAL [Gk *idea* concept, idea], a concept of moral consciousness and a *category of ethics* containing supreme moral re-

quirements whose possible realization by a person would allow that person to attain perfection; the image of the most valuable and great in man; the absolute basis of the imperative; the criterion applied in discerning *good* and *evil*. The content of a moral ideal takes shape in the process of people becoming increasingly aware of the injustice and unnaturalness of their position as an alternative to the existing order of things. Since morality and the moral ideal are a specific reaction to the antagonism engendered by social contradictions and to the alienation of man in a class society, the moral ideal irrespective of the form it may assume, is first of all the embodiment of a dream (hope, expectation), of unity and fraternity of people and contains a corresponding requirement for an unconditional *humanity* (*Altruism*, *Humanism*) in relations between them. The cultural-historical specifics and the diversity of the ideals, stems from the concrete historical role and social interests of the classes and social strata whose aspirations it reflects. Within the

framework of class ideologies, social ideals are formulated as forecasts for, or the utopias of, a social order which realizes the moral ideal and allows a person to attain perfection. In ethics, the moral ideal is primarily perceived as a spiritual overcoming of imperfect reality. The theoretical elaboration of the concept of the moral ideal began in the epoch of Hellenism and for the first time it acquired great significance in Christian morality when the crisis of classical society revealed a deep contradiction between the imperative and the reality. At that time, the idealized image of a morally perfect personality—Jesus Christ, the man-God, was counterposed to the imperfection and depravity of laymen. Characteristically, this ideal is not projected into the future, but into the past, while the ideal person is pictured in the image of a great martyr atoning for the *sin* of humankind with his suffering. In Christian morality, the ideal is usually presented as unattainable by man (*Neo-Protestantism*). Similar concepts penetrated philosophical ethics as well. For example, according

to *Kant*, the moral ideal is an unattainable prototype which can never become a reality. *Feuerbach* attempted to bring down to earth the moral ideal from the unattainable heights. However, his realism remained only an appeal for moral improvement of man in general. The characteristic feature of Marxist ethics is that it regards the moral ideal in indissoluble unity with the social ideal and recognizes the possibility of its realization within the bounds of human history. Marxism proclaimed the communist ideal not just an antithesis of the existing society but as a goal of the practical movement and advanced a doctrine theoretically substantiating the path leading to the attainment of that goal.

IDEOLOGICAL INTEGRITY, a *moral quality* characterizing one of the most important aspects of the individual's moral *self-consciousness* and activities; it denotes the individual's commitment to a definite idea, relying on which he acts and to the service of which he devotes his life. Ideological integrity is expressed in the general pur-

posefulness of man's actions. The nature of one's goals in life, their correlation with the objective needs of historical development and interests of people, define the substance and social significance of ideological integrity. It is manifested in the awareness of actions and the entire life of the individual, in his profound *conviction* in the rightness and ultimate triumph of the cause he promotes, in his ability to see the overall perspective behind the concrete and individual tasks he has to solve every day. History demonstrates that ideological integrity is a distinguishing feature of champions of social justice who devoted their life to the emancipation of oppressed peoples and classes. Only commitment to progressive ideals which accord with the objective laws of history, makes it possible for man to really achieve ideological integrity. Such ideological integrity is, as a rule, associated with a belief in a better future of mankind (*Optimism*), with *humanism* and the loftiest aspirations, and promotes the development of other high moral qualities—*heroism*, *nobleness*.

And, vice versa, the adherence to reactionary ideas and interests of classes receding into the past leads, in the end, to the loss of ideological principles. Unscrupulousness and the use of criminal means in politics, *hypocrisy* and *cynicism* in state affairs, *dogmatism* and *nihilism* in ideology, *fear* of the future and the loss of faith in man—these are the manifestations of the lack of ideological principles and ideals. Ideological integrity should not be confused with *fanaticism*, as the former implies ideological pluralism, the renunciation of run-of-the-mill thinking, and offers prospects for ideological development and moral improvement.

INCLINATION, a trait of an individual reflecting a selective approach to the satisfaction of his or her particular requirements, *interests*, *feelings*. Essentially, inclinations can be moral, immoral or amoral. As a form or a mechanism of self-identification, inclination is opposed to moral requirements implying not just an immediate, spontaneous and subjective but a conscious choice of a goal corre-

sponding to moral necessity. *Morality* makes man responsible for his intentions and the motivations of his *actions*, and this requirement can be realized in feelings, natural disposition or inclination. However, the moral meaning of these psychic phenomena, consists in the fact that man of his own free will perceives them as imperatives corresponding to the dictates of *duty* (*Categorical imperative, Alienation, Freedom, moral*).

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY, one of the key problems in *ethics*. Marxism has shown that an individual perceives himself as a personality differing from others only in joint activities with other people, in practical mutual relations with them. The question of the correlation between *man and society* is often substituted for the problem of the individual and the community, the emphasis being laid primarily on the social nature of man and his activities. Actually, this problem is much narrower and limited to relations between an individual and specific social

groups. There is a great deal of such qualitatively heterogeneous groups beginning with bureaucratic substitutes for community, where an individual is assigned the role of a passive executor of someone else's will, to voluntary associations in which individuals participate of their own free will and all decisions are adopted by consensus. One way or another, each individual simultaneously belongs to various groups and communities. His status in them depends, on the one hand, on the nature of their goals, structure and content of their activities and, on the other, on the system of values and self-consciousness of a particular individual. The classification of social groups and communities, the analysis of their typical problems and conflicts, constitutes the domain of sociology and social psychology. However, in examining any conflict situation, it is necessary to evaluate it from the moral point of view. An *a priori* assertion of the primacy of the common over the individual interest, often serves as a pseudo-moral justification for the lack of principle and *confor-*

mism. The development of the individual and the community is interdependent: the variety of personalities and human individualities engenders the diversity of collective ties, while the community provides conditions for an all-round development of the individual. However, the recognition of the personality's self-value is the basis for the harmony between the individual and the community.

INDIVIDUALISM [L *individuus* indivisible]. As a concept and personal philosophy of life, individualism emerged with the appearance of major socio-economic formations and the individualization of human life. The social-ethical views embodying the ideal of individualism had been advanced already in ancient Greece (beginning with *Democritus* and the Sophists). As a social-cultural phenomenon, individualism spread with the establishment of Hellenism. This was consistently reflected in the philosophical ethical doctrines of *Epicurus*, *Stoicism* and *scepticism* on the freedom of the individual, his independence from external cir-

cumstances and the whims of destiny. During the Renaissance, doctrines addressing individualism played an important role in substantiating the value of an individual and freeing man from the shackles of the theological world outlook. However, in the process, individualism acquired the form of elitarianism or titanism implying the all-round development of only a handful of chosen unique personalities, Titans rising above the crowd. The flourishing of individualism is linked to the consolidation of capitalist relations which gave full play to free enterprise, i.e., social activity which required the individual's autonomy and ability to independently put one's own initiative into practice. Bourgeois individualism was theoretically justified within the framework of socio-philosophical and ethical liberalism which had been developed by *Hobbes*, *Locke*, *Franklin*, *Bentham* and *Mill*. As an ideology opposed to absolutism and class corporatism, individualism proclaimed the freedom of man from social restraints. At the same time, it consistently orien-

tated man towards an independent attainment of his goals even at the expense of the interests pursued by other people. This was perfectly in accord with the type of relations between people in which the principle of *usefulness* prevailed. Although liberal philosophy recognized the good of other people and common good as an important value (*Utilitarianism*), it regarded happiness and an all-round development of the individual as the supreme goal, while social groups and institutions were regarded exclusively as a necessary foundation and the means for attaining that goal. That approach led to the transformation of individualism into its specific and typical form—*egoism* (*Stirner*). At the same time, as the ideology propagating the necessity of the personal activity of the individual, the reliance on one's own forces, and asserting the sense of *responsibility*, moral *dignity* of man and respect for other people, individualism finds expression in *altruism* and moral principles requiring people to fulfil their *duty*. In progressive socio-political movements, indi-

vidualism was infrequently intertwined with the ideas of equalitarianism (*Puritanism*, Protestant ethics, Christian socialism). With the transition of capitalism to its monopolistic stage, bourgeois individualism goes through a crisis. On the one hand, it regenerates into *authoritarianism*, corporatism and *conformism* with the corresponding abrogation of a number of personal rights and freedoms of an individual in favour of a corporation or an authority. On the other, it evolves into conservatism (sometimes assuming extreme forms), appealing to the ideas of the 18th century and negating any forms of public and state control (*voluntarism*, anarchism). At the same time, in the second half of the 20th century, the growing role of the state and corporations in the capitalist society gave rise to various movements for civil rights and freedoms, while the danger of a nuclear conflict and total annihilation served as an impetus to the peace movement whose participants are guided by the awareness that decent life and sound development of the individual,

are possible only if the entire human race is preserved. Socialism has proclaimed the priority of common, collectivist values which are a synthesis of the free development of all individuals. However, in real life, the supremacy of common interests often led to disregard of individual interests. As historical experience shows the contradictions between common and individual interests are removed only when social interests are met through satisfying individual interests. In the political sphere, it implies the recognition of the civil rights of a person and in morality, it means the recognition of individual moral dignity and responsibility.

INDIVIDUALITY [*L. individuus* indivisible], a specific and unique embodiment of universal features in a personality. In all societies, individuality at the personal level is incidental. The biographical peculiarity of one's life is incidental for the individual alienated from history. Incidental individuality is partial and limited because it is reproduced in a limited sphere

of creative non-alienated activities, while it is not individuality as regards the entire world of social relationships, culture and society. This predicates the prevalence of the valuational-descriptive definition of individuality as uniqueness or as an empirically observed diversity of individuals. As distinct from the relations of personal or property dependence, free individuality is based on "the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their communal, social productivity, which is their social possession" (*Marx*). The concept of individuality makes it possible to elucidate the logic of the transition from man moulded by property relations and guided by the principle of *individualism*, reducing the multifaceted world to his own moral conceptions, to a person as an individuality for whom another person is as much a universal world, which cannot be reduced to moral values, as he himself is. Morality based on abstract absolute values creates an illusion of elevating man to the universal, to his genuine human essence,

and simultaneously shows that this is possible in the historical perspective. Creative personalities realizing themselves to the utmost as individualities, usually transcend the bounds of the prevailing normative consciousness. It is no accident that in the history of culture the supreme achievements of the human spirit were often perceived as the personification of *evil*. The concept of individuality is not only a theoretical but also a valuational-normative concept reflecting the high appreciation of an integral and brilliant personality. The image of an ideal moral person realizing abstract absolute moral values and subjugating his or her personality to these values, is not the image of individuality but the personification of the universal human essence which still remains alienated. On the contrary, the concept of free individuality comprises morality as a quality of social man integrated into concrete existence.

INDUCEMENT, a sensuous form of manifestation of a *motive* or *intention* to do something. Inducement is a motor

impulse from the standpoint of its psychological nature, an emotional-volitional drive guiding man's actions. Basing themselves on the sensuous form of inducement, the adherents of behaviourism (a trend in US psychology of the early 20th century, whose representatives believed that man's conduct is a purely physiological reaction of the organism) and *Freudianism* in ethics, came to the conclusion that conscious motives play no considerable role in people's behaviour, that man has no rational understanding of real motives of his activities, but carries them out subconsciously. Marxist-Leninist ethics considers it necessary to distinguish the content of a motive (that which induces an action, although a person may not realize it at the moment) from its psychological form (how a person reacts to a motive in one or another case). If, as a result of moral education, man starts to fulfil moral precepts feeling an inner inclination to do so, this does not at all mean that his acts are not motivated. On the contrary, sometimes this means that a moral motive took such

deep root in man's consciousness that he ceases to distinguish it from the motives dictated by his personal interests (*Feelings, Habits, Inclination*).

INITIATIVE [*L. initiare* to begin], undertaking; man's independent decision entailing his own participation in a particular sphere of public activities; a form of realization of man's social activity. Initiative is expressed in voluntary activities (for the good of society, social group, in personal interest), in a creative attitude to work and to the established forms of conduct (*customs, mores, traditions*). It can be manifested in a *feat, enterprise, personal example*. In moral terms, initiative is characterized by man assuming a greater measure of responsibility than is required by a mere observance of the generally accepted standards. Initiative is a component part of social *discipline*, interrelationship of the *individual and community* with the former emerging as the active principle. The measure of initiative which society is capable of developing in people, indicates the extent of

real prerequisites it creates for man's freedom and the development of the personality. Having become a permanent stimulus defining and encouraging man's acts, initiative is turning into personality's moral quality—resourcefulness which characterizes man (collective, broad mass of people) in terms of social activity, and is expressed in conscious actions aimed at the fulfilment of moral *principles and ideals*.

INJUNCTION, see *Language of morality*.

INTENTION, the resolution to perform an action in order to obtain a certain result. Intention is a volitional attitude (*Inducement*) which is the result of previous mental activity: the understanding of the task facing a person which is determined by interests and requirements (his own, social or those of other people), the *goal* he sets himself, selection of appropriate means with which he is going to attain it. All these mental actions can be performed both in abstract and emotional forms. Socialist morality stresses the

importance of the content and measure of conscientiousness in intention and the extent to which one's actions correspond to one's intentions (*Conscientiousness, Conviction, Sincerity*).

INTEREST, purposeful attitude of man (class, society as a whole) to an object of his requirements. Depending on the conditions of man's life, his interests illustrate his need for certain objects of the surrounding world. Man produces, masters and consumes the objects of his interest by means of purposeful actions. Ethics analyzes the category of interest primarily from the viewpoint of its correlation with *duty*. In a class society, social and personal interests permanently clashing, man is to meet the requirements of morality often in defiance of his own interest. Instead of finding the source of this contradiction and ways of overcoming it, ethical teachings either failed to recognize it or considered it insoluble. Some thinkers reduced moral duty to personal interest, "to rationally comprehended" *egoism*, to man's aspiration for happiness

or pleasure (*Egoism, theories of, Eudaemonism, Hedonism*). Others held that man can fulfil his duty only in defiance of his own interest (*Categorical imperative*). Marxist ethics solves the problem of correlation between interest and duty in the following way: since the contradiction between interest and duty is rooted in opposing class interests, in personal and social interests, as well as in individual, private interests, this contradiction can be solved only in the process of building a society of universal social justice, when man discharging his duty to society, serves, in the final analysis, the common interest of all people. With the difference between social and personal interests not yet cancelled out under socialism, the difference between duty and personal interest continues to exist.

INTUITIONISM [*L. intueri* to gaze at, contemplate], a trend in ethics whose exponents assert that moral concepts (e.g. *good, duty*) cannot be substantiated by reason or experience, alleging that they are apprehended by man intuitively as

self-evident truths. Elements of intuitionism were contained even in some ethical theories of antiquity (*Socrates, Plato*). In the 17th and 18th centuries, intuitionism was elaborated in Britain as the opposite to the doctrines of intellectualism by Cambridge Neo-Platonists, Samuel Clarke, William Hyde Wollaston and Richard Price and Sentimentalists (*Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume*). This held that the concepts of good and duty are simple ideas which could not be defined or substantiated through discussion. In the 19th century, this thinking was further elaborated by Henry Sidgwick. Of wide popularity in modern non-Marxist ethics, is the intuitionist trend founded in the early 20th century by *Moore*, which spread in England, USA and other countries. Maintaining that ethics should not study people's behaviour but moral concepts, Moore and his followers opened the door to *formalism* in ethics. Moore criticized the exponents of the naturalist trend in ethics (*Utilitarianism, Hedonism, Evolutionary ethics*), altogether denying the possibility

of defining good and its rational analysis, thus contrasting *morality* and *science*. Modern ethics distinguishes two trends: axiological (*Axiology*) with George Moore, Hastings Rashdall, John Laird, Oliver Johnson and Brand Blanshard asserting that all moral concepts including duty (which consists in doing good), are derived from good. The followers of the deontological trend (*Deontology*) Harold Pritchard, William D. Ross, Edgar Carritt and Charlie D. Broad consider that duty does not depend on good nor does it logically precede it (good consists in fulfilling one's duty), thus formalistically interpreting morality: duty must be performed for its own sake. In the view of deontological intuitionism, moral obligations are eternal and unchangeable and are not based on social requirements. Epistemologically, intuitionism stems from the real difficulties involved in defining morality, logical comprehension of its autonomy and self-sufficiency. Its social roots lie in the gap between moral and pragmatic motives. By elevating

this gap to a norm, intuitionism thereby sanctions it and, all moral criticism notwithstanding, serves as a kind of apology for the obtaining social reality.

IRRATIONALISM [L *irrationalis* unreasoning], a methodological principle of interpreting the nature of morality, characteristic of a number of theories of morality. Elements of irrationalism are to be found in various ethical theories of the past but it was most fully developed in the mid-19th century (*Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer*) and particularly in the 20th century when its ideas provided a basis for *existentialism* and *Neo-Protestantism*. The essence of irrationalism in ethics is the repudiation of any general moral laws, exaggeration of the importance of the specific and unique in each moral problem, from which it is inferred that reason and science capable only of generalizing from diverse phenomena are absolutely inapplicable to morality thus making it unknowable. The irrationalists attach primary importance to solving moral problems to "life feeling", will, un-

conscious aspirations or some spiritual abilities opposed to logical thinking. They assert that the illogical and irrational are closer to the understanding of man's existence than any form of rational thinking which allegedly leads to dogmatism and deprives man of freedom and individuality. Irrationalism in ethics divorces its values from real facts, the individual from social morality. Maintaining that each situation in life and the position of each individual are unique, the irrationalists conclude that moral requirements imply, each time, a perfectly different meaning. Thus, it is impossible, in their view, to formulate general moral principles on whose foundation man could make specific decisions in various practical situations. Considered in these terms, man follows the laws of causality and acts from expediency, guided by reason and concepts elaborated by science, submitting to the laws and requirements of society and universal *moral standards*. In the view of the irrationalists, this presents only the external side of man's existence, a

sphere of non-genuine morality—utilitarian, dogmatic, canonized morality. Human or genuine existence is not subject to the laws of society and nature and is indefinable. It is a sphere of the individual's absolute freedom in which man asserts himself in his morality in defiance of society, contrary to material considerations. This division of human existence into two perfectly independent spheres on the one hand, displays a critical attitude to modern bourgeois civilization, and on the other, a quest for ways to save man from the capitalist inhuman relations through escapism (*Individualism*). The irrationalists deny, in the final analysis, the social nature of morality. They assert, as they themselves state, an ambiguous and paradoxical morality. However, such morality not only fails to indicate proper behaviour for man. It also engenders a feeling of doom and fear of the future.

ISLAM [Arab submission (to God)], or Mohammedanism—a faith canonized in the Koran, the book of Mohammed (c. 570-632), the Prophet wor-

shipped by believers; one of the world religions. The ethics of Islam was essentially formed in the pre-Islam period. The Koran, Sunna ("path" or rule of action), consisting of numerous Hadiths (sayings of and about the Prophet on religious and social matters), shariah ("the sacred law of Islam") only formulated, legalized and reorganized the established moral standards. Some bans and restrictions of the Islamic canon emerged to eliminate the customs of the Arabian paganism (e.g. the custom was broken to bury in the sand a certain number of new-born girls). The traditional norms sanctifying, for instance, bonds of kinship, sanctity of hospitality, assistance to travellers and beggars raised to the status of duty, were transformed and supplemented with other rules. The precepts recorded in the Koran reveal a great number of evident borrowings from the Judaic and Christian religions. This created serious contradictions in the moral consciousness of the Muslims since many rules did not accord with each other. In addition to prescribed

acts of worship: daily prayer, giving alms to the poor, fasting and performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, the Koran and particularly the Hadiths, reflected the age-long experience of moral relations expressed in such rules as respect for the elderly and the parents, prohibi-

tion of games of chance and consumption of wine, firm condemnation of falsity and theft. Islam, whose social essence is similar to that of any other religion, may be associated with various social tendencies as a result of the different positions of believers.

J

JASPERS, Karl (1883-1969), a leading exponent of German *existentialism*. Jaspers considered the solution of moral problems to be the specific task of philosophy. The task of philosophy, to his mind, is not to formulate knowledge of man and his environment, but to discover means of "salvation", to help man retain his integrity under the domination of technology, standardization and regulation of social life. Man, in his true existence, is more than a mere product of nature and history. He is an integral being inimitable in his originality whose inner essence is freedom. The real purpose of existence becomes clear to man in moments of special existential enlightenment, in crucial (marginal) situations requiring mobilization of all his strength (struggle, illness, suffering,

guilt, fear, death). Precisely at these moments, man breaks free from the vanity and banality of his external existence in which he is usually involved as a member of a particular social organization or a community and turns to his inner world. And here, the concept of freedom makes sense manifesting itself in man's resolution to choose a certain way of conduct in specific situations. Abstracting himself from all kinds of necessity (be it laws of nature or moral obligations), man must remain true to himself, be sincere, act according to his experiences, moods and inclinations. Moral choice, according to Jaspers, is a kind of a "leap into the unknown", i.e., is made unconsciously and irrationally. Thus, man's conduct cannot be estimated from the standpoint of general moral principles.

Man is responsible for his deeds only to himself and is the creator of all moral values in his inner life. In an attempt to break free of ethical *relativism*, Jaspers advances the idea of communication and transcendence. He regards the act of communication as profoundly personal emotional-spiritual contact between individuals owing to which man's "ego" becomes his own self through its reflection in others, through interaction with them. Jaspers sees the causes of moral evil in the inability to communicate with and understand alien existence. The personality, according to Jaspers, asserts itself in its attitude to the absolute, to the absolute limitation (*das Umgreifende*) of any existence and thinking (transcendence). Human existence can take place only if it is brought into correlation with transcendence. But the existence exceeding its confines (transcending) and turning to the absolute, man is unable to cognize it, since the latter does not lend itself to rational comprehension. Man is pushed to transcendence by the finiteness of his existence, and

the awareness of this finiteness, the desire to rid himself of despair. The same factors bind him to the historical world, the world of the people in which he attempts to realize his potential. Jaspers is interested in the axiological (value-wise) approach to history and in the search for its essence which he found in "axial time" (*Axenzeit*), the time when mankind was getting rid of mythology and laying the foundation for its spiritual community. In his view it makes possible human communication which transcends all cultural barriers. His major works: "Die geistige Situation der Zeit" ("Man in the Modern Age", 1931), "Philosophie" ("Philosophy", 1932), "Vernunft und Existenz" ("Reason and Existence", 1935), "Die Schuldfrage, ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage" ("The Question of German Guilt", 1946), "Einführung in die Philosophie" ("The Way to Wisdom", 1950).

JEALOUSY, unfriendly feeling, resentment of another person's success, property or popularity, as well as his independence in

actions and feelings. Jealousy signifies man's striving to have everything—success, rewards, respect, undividedly belonging to him alone. Jealousy is incurred as a result of egoism, self-love, vanity and envy at other people's success. A particular case is jealousy in relations between man and woman for sexual love is associated with the natural feeling of mutual possession and intimacy of two people. However, one must control one's acts lest the feeling of jealousy assume extreme forms causing mutual disrespect, encroachment upon personal freedom, despotism and suspiciousness.

JESUITISM (Jesuitry), antihumanistic system of moral principles appearing, as a rule, within a closed group, caste or organization which serves to conceal or justify activities that are essentially immoral and directed outside the group, caste or organization. The term is derived from the name of a Catholic order of priests, the Society of Jesus, and is historically linked to the clerical-political organization of the Jesuits founded at

the Papal throne in the 16th century and based on a hierarchical principle. The Jesuits' efforts were aimed at achieving the maximum possible spiritual and temporal power (up to world domination) of the Pope and the Catholic Church as a whole. Covert and overt control over the conduct and thoughts not only of the brethren of the Society of Jesus, but also of a possibly larger number of people in various countries, non-Catholic countries included, and the unconditional obedience of the clergy of lower rank to those of higher rank, was combined with the Jesuits enjoying exceptional privileges and leading a rather loose life. The word "Jesuitical" achieved its derogatory sense due to the more than doubtful political morality of the Jesuits. It permitted any immoral action (justifying it by a noble end), including political intrigue, murder and perjury, if only this was to promote Catholicism. "The end justifies the means"—this moral postulate ascribed to Ignatius Loyola, subsequently became the practical principle of Jesuitism (clerical and secular)

and is used both for egoistic personal ends and in the sphere of politics. Deception for the sake of justifying essentially unlawful actions, is thus characteristic of Jesuitical morality, as is the complete subordination of the substance of moral principles to the arbitrarily and casuistically interpreted legal and moral standards, and the hypocritical appeals to far-removed lofty ends for the sake of justifying immediate base actions. In the long run, Jesuitical practices prove to be incapable of either achieving the proclaimed good ends, since the objective results of human activities are functionally dependent on the means used, or of attaining its true ends (essentially immoral) for long, since the Jesuitical moral principles begin to operate within the organization which accepted them, thus dooming it to corruption and eventual destruction.

JUDAISM, ETHICS OF, bases itself on the regulation of conduct given in the so-called Pentateuch of Moses, or the Torah ("Law"), the first five books of the Old Testament. It com-

prises the Decalogue (*Ten Commandments*) which is also recognized by Christianity and exerted an indirect influence on the ethics of *Islam*. In this text, religious prohibitions to worship pagan gods or create idols, to take the Lord's name in vain and defile the Sabbath with labour, precede general moral prohibitions such as: "honour thy father and thy mother", "thou shalt not kill", "neither shalt thou commit adultery", "neither shalt thou steal", "neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbour", "neither shalt thou desire any thing that is thy neighbour's". On the whole, the commandments of the Torah simultaneously regulate ethical, legal and ritual aspects. The biblical books of the prophets, while giving priority to the moral principle before ritualism, do not destroy their fundamental unity. Moreover, the unity of ethics, law and ritual and the unity of man's religious and moral responsibility are a characteristic feature of the ethics of Judaism also in its subsequent forms. The new elements introduced in ethics by

the Bible compared to the ethical concepts of the pagan ancient world, are associated with biblical monotheism, the belief in the law-giving *authority* which is one, and "there is no unity like unto his unity". This belief, combined with the emotion of dedication, engendered a special attitude to the commandments, a serious and, simultaneously, passionate attitude. Besides, the reverence instilled by the Bible towards the sanctified tribal principle, gave rise to very strict prohibitions on homosexuality and infanticide, the phenomena quite common for other nations including the most civilized ones. Later on, the normative nature of the commandments prompted the development of *casuistry*, i.e., the bringing of the commandments, without repealing or reinterpreting them, into line with the changing conditions of life. The work of the "scribes" who had scrupulously specified the limits of the permissible or impermissible, had been codified in the Talmud in the 2nd and 3rd centuries especially in its sections containing religious legal norms and rules. The cus-

tom of ascetic celibacy which was observed in the Jewish communities ceases from the time of the Talmud. Now, in sharp contrast with the ethics of *Buddhism* and Christianity (*Christian ethics*), the absolute ideal of the ethics of Judaism is marriage and procreation. The ethical thought of Judaism comments on the initial regulation accumulating new circles of commentaries: now the Talmud as if comments on Torah, and inside the Talmud itself there are commentaries on some of its sections. The Middle Ages witnessed the emergence of commentaries on the Talmud as a whole (Rabbi Solomon ben Isak Rashi, 1040-1105; Moses ben Mainon Maimonides, 1135-1204). In modern times, attempts have been made to reinterpret Judaism ethics on the basis of the ideals of the Enlightenment (Moses Mendelssohn), the categories of Kantianism (Hermann Cohen) and the personalist philosophy of dialogue (Martin Buber).

JUSTICE, a concept of moral consciousness expressing not

some value or benefit, but their general correlation and distribution among individuals; a proper order of communal life corresponding to the ideas of the essence of man and his inalienable rights. Justice is also a category of legal and socio-political consciousness. As distinct from the more abstract concepts of *good* and *evil* which morally evaluate phenomena as a whole, justice defines the correlation of several phenomena from the point of view how good and evil are distributed among people. This concerns, in particular, the correlation between the role individual people (classes) play in society and their social status, between *deed* and *retribution* (crime and punishment), between people's merits and their recognition by society, between rights and duties. Any disparity between the former and the latter is evaluated by moral consciousness as injustice. The meaning people bestow on the concept of justice seems to them implicit and quite suitable to evaluate all conditions of life which they wish to have preserved or changed. In actual

fact, however, justice bears a concrete historical character, depending, as it does, on these conditions. *Engels* wrote: "The justice of the Greeks and Romans held slavery to be just; the justice of the bourgeois of 1789 demanded the abolition of feudalism on the ground that it was unjust." Yet the concept of justice has universal significance. Though it is limited by specific historical and social conditions, at certain periods of history, it is capable of overcoming these limitations and inspire people to revolutionary transformations of society in conformity with the objective laws of social development. *Engels* wrote: "If the moral consciousness of the masses proclaims an economic fact unjust, it is proof that the fact has outlived itself." In the history of mankind, justice was initially understood as a demand for punishment for the violation of norms of the primitive-communal society. *Lafargue* called this demand retributive justice. One of its expressions was clan *revenge*, which in its most developed form required complete correspondence of the punishment to a

crime ("an eye for an eye, a life for a life"). Retributive justice displays a principle of levelling equality typical of the tribal system. This initial concept of justice became a stable moral image deeply ingrained in social consciousness. With the emergence of private ownership and property, inequality justice no longer coincides with equality and is treated as the differentiation made between people as regards their position in society depending on their merits. But any interpretation of people's merits has always been transient, limited by class interests and specific historical conditions. Feudal morality regarded them as noble birth, the bourgeoisie as a person's resourcefulness and zeal displayed in the past and embodied in his accumulated wealth. Antagonistic class society recognizes equality as the basis of justice only to a degree. Feudal Christian morality admitted the equality of people only because all people originated from God and were equally involved in the original *sin*. The bourgeois understanding of justice provides for a measure of equality

of rights (political rights, equality before law, equal opportunities). However, it remains formal justice conducive to the inequality between the rich and the poor. Nevertheless, it fixes an important stage in the historical evolution of justice and is its inalienable manifestation. It is not by chance, that in social consciousness, justice is more often than not identified with a just court without respect of persons and the ancient Greek goddess Themis is depicted with a band on her eyes as a symbol of impartiality. The economic concept of justice expresses here equivalent exchange (of goods, labour, services). However, the "exchange" of the worker's labour for wages paid to him by the capitalist, practically signified exploitation of hired labour. The socialist concept of justice suggests that man's merits defining his position in society and his right to the social benefits and honours, consist in his own socially useful activity and not in his social status or money. This understanding of justice is embodied in the socialist principle of distribution according

to work. But, however superior this concept of justice may appear compared to all its preceding forms, it is still limited. First, even given the ideal implementation of the principle "to each according to his work", which never happens in practice, it does not eliminate social inequality. Second, the real experience of socialism reveals that the distribution of social benefits according to work is a problem which is yet to be solved since thus far there has not been found a mechanism more perfect than the market which would make it possible to appraise the social value of labour and reduce its qualitatively heterogeneous forms to a common basis. All previous principles of justice ("an equal share to everyone", "to each according to his or her true worth", etc.) are still present in modern social consciousness and serve as a productive principle in specific spheres and situations of social life. In this sense, the socialist principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according

to his work", is pivotal in the concepts of justice prevailing in socialist society but do not exhaust their multifaceted content. Justice cannot be reduced to any one formula. To express the scope of its content a number of various, including internally polemical, definitions are needed. Besides, for all the full and specified character of formalized knowledge of justice, it retains some residue which finds its expression only in the feeling of justice. Justice based on moral feeling is as needed in society as justice relying on law and the formula is; they correct each other. According to Marxist theory, supreme justice fully coinciding with social equality is attained with the achievement of perfect equality of opportunities for each individual which stipulates for the development of people's abilities, elimination of essential differences in the character of labour, adherence to the communist principle: "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs".

K

KANT, Immanuel (1724-1804), forefather of German classical philosophy, founder of critical or transcendental idealism. Very considerable is Kant's contribution to the study of the specific aspects of morality and to acquiring a clearer view of the subject-matter of ethics, including the question of overcoming *naturalism* in ethics and distinguishing *ethics and psychology* as objects of research. In general, according to Kant, morality is a sphere of human freedom in contrast to the sphere of external necessity and natural causality. This definition did not yet overcome the limits of traditional views on idealistic ethics and permitted rather vague interpretation of morals. More specifically, in Kant's view, morals are the area of the imperative (*Moral imperative*) which is of a universal

character (*Categorical imperative, Equality*). Fundamentally, this is a correct definition, but Kant did not proceed from the understanding of the social nature of morals and, for that reason, did not reveal the specific nature of *causality* in morals. As a result, this approach led him to contrast duty to social and historical necessity, that which should be and that which really exists. Hence, Kant's scepticism as regards the motive forces of history (in his view, people are most frequently prompted by immoral motives), and his idea to the effect that the moral ideal can be attained only in the other world of goals. In contrast to the widely recognized view that good and evil are logically prior to the concept of duty or determine it, Kant thought that duty was a major element of ethics, an element that charac-

terized the concept of good (good is what corresponds to duty). Kant's criticism of *hedonism* and *eudaemonism* was justified inasmuch as it did not contradict the logic of moral consciousness. However, it led Kant to the conclusion that morals are irrelevant to the satisfaction of man's social-historical requirements and interests. In his view, man should carry out his duty for the sake of duty itself. In the sphere of morals, this viewpoint can be considered as *rigorism* and *formalism*. Although Kant subjected the theories of moral sense (*Moral sense, theories of*) to criticism, he nevertheless maintained that the basic factor in meeting the requirements of morality consisted in goodwill and submission to duty rather than in performing practical actions (*Moral goodness, theory of*). The idealistic elements in Kant's ethics is also the idea of the a priori nature of moral consciousness, the idea of the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as a guarantor of just retribution for moral behaviour in earthly life. Kant's ethics has exercised great in-

fluence on modern philosophy of morality, especially on *existentialism* and *intuitionism*. Some of its concepts served as an ideological basis for one of the trends in Marxism and the workers' movement (*Ethical socialism*). However, classical Marxism, while giving credit to Kant's theoretical elaboration of many ethical problems, rejects the idealistic and formalistic postulates of his doctrine. Kant's major writings on ethics are as follows: "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" ("Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals", 1785), "Kritik der praktischen Vernunft" ("Critique of Practical Reason", 1788), "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft" ("Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone", 1793) and "Metaphysik der Sitten" ("The Metaphysic of Morals", 1797).

KAUTSKY, Karl (1854-1938), theoretician of German social democracy and of the II International. Having advanced his own concept of morality, which opposed the ideas of *ethical socialism*, and Kant's ethics, he

tried to combine the ideas of Darwin and Marxism. Kautsky held that Marxist ethics is a direct continuation of Darwinism: Darwin gave an explanation of the origin of morality and Marx elucidated the problem of the moral ideal. Morals rest upon the social instincts of man: selflessness, courage, loyalty to the common cause, discipline, upright attitude towards society and ambition, which are as powerful as the instincts of animals for survival and reproduction. The totality of social instincts forms a moral law, a universal moral sense—inspiration to make one's acts conducive to the benefit of society even if this harms one's personal interest. "An animal impulse and nothing else is the moral law," Kautsky wrote. "Thence comes its mysterious nature, this voice in us which has no connection with any external impulse, or any apparent interest." A person, who has a sense of duty, follows it instinctively, without thinking. For Kautsky, the specifically human aspect of morals is expressed in moral standards established as society developed and subject

to continuous change. Opposing Kant's *categorical imperative*, Kautsky, as a matter of fact, arrives at the same timeless, abstract categorical imperative only this time interpreted biologically. Kautsky's viewpoint is essentially non-historical: proletarian and bourgeois morals differ from each other only by the degree of intensiveness of social instincts. When society falls into decay, social instincts of the ruling classes grow weaker and the instincts of those exploited, on the contrary, become stronger. This brings Kautsky to the conclusion that socialism arises from social instincts, thus denying its scientific and historical nature. Kautsky's major ethical writings are "Ethik und materialistische Geschichtsauffassung" ("Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History") and "Der Ursprung der Moral" ("The Origin of Morality").

KIERKEGAARD, Søren Aabye (1813-1855), Danish mystic philosopher, writer, forefather of *existentialism*. He opposed official religious ideology and the Church and justified a per-

sonal kind of religion which would relate man directly to God. That is why Kierkegaard is so interested in the issues of ethics. He was of the opinion that Hegelian absolute idealism and rationalism ignored human existence proper, the passions and emotions which are as real as man himself. Kierkegaard believed it is not the cognition of the real world but the cognition of one's own self in one's true existence that was the primary mission of a thinker in whom Kierkegaard saw the specific ideal of man, his actions, behaviour and life. According to Kierkegaard, the world is in a state of mortal sickness expressed in despair. All that exists appears as a paradox: the most unhappy person is the happiest one, and the happiest is the unhappiest, truth is falsehood, and falsehood is truth, reality is illusion, and illusion is reality, and so on. This is what Kierkegaard describes as paradoxical dialectics. The individual should take care only of his own self, of his "inner" world, for "truth is subjectivity". Kierkegaard singles out three stages of life through which man has

to pass to attain his goal: the aesthetic stage when man deals only with possibilities which never materialize, i.e., man lives solely an imagined life; the ethical stage when man lives a real life and develops a sense of responsibility for his own existence (this stage is characterized by continuous passions and emotions and a profound analysis of one's own "ego"); the religious stage when man is to resolve the either/or dilemma facing him and ultimately chooses eternity instead of finiteness. Kierkegaard's ethical works as well as his philosophical writings are a response of Christian romanticism to materialist and dialectical-rationalist views. His views influenced *Barth* and other Protestant and Catholic philosophers. Kierkegaard's major ethical works: "Either/Or. A Fragment of Life", "Fear and Trembling" (1843), "The Concept of Dread" (1844).

KOHLBERG, Lawrence (1927-1987), head of cognitive psychology the basic propositions of which underlie his theory of moral education. Kohlberg re-

gards the task of education as stimulating the natural process of moral development which is prompted by the interaction of the individual's psychological and cognitive structure with the social milieu. According to Kohlberg, thanks to that interaction, morality progresses from one stage to another reaching its maturity at the last, sixth, stage. Mature morality is distinguished by the ability to identify oneself with others, care for them and, above all, to be guided in one's behaviour by the principles of *justice and humanism*. These stages of morality reflect the general thrust of its evolution. Kohlberg holds that universal forms of moral consciousness (principles, standards, values) exist in all epochs and differ only in the degree of their maturity. He believes that the supreme goal of education is the moulding of a personality which contributes to the establishment of a just society. Since the individual possesses the potential for self-perfection he forms and programmes his behaviour. Moral development is primarily the result of man's psychological

ability to perform moral actions, while social environment is only a stimulator inducing an individual to seek a new programme of action in any new situation. However, Kohlberg fails to provide an answer to the question whether the attainment of harmony between the individual and society depends on the nature of social environment, and to what extent. In his theory, the movement of morality to the supreme goal remains an abstract feasibility. The basic works of Kohlberg in which he elucidates his concept of education: "Educating for Justice: A Modern Statement of the Platonic View" (1970), "Stages in the Moral Development of the Personality: The Basis of Moral Learning" (1971), "Meaning and Measurement in Moral Development" (1979), "Educating for a Just Society: An Updated and Revised Statement" (1980), "The Philosophy of Moral Development. Stages of Morality and the Idea of Justice" (1981).

KROPOTKIN, Prince Pyotr Alekseyevich (1842-1921), Russian revolutionary, theorist of

anarchism, advocate of positivism. From 1876 to 1917 he lived in emigration. Moral problems play a major role in his system of "anarchic communism". Rejecting the divine interpretation of the categories of morality, Kropotkin treats their essence biologically, and thinks that good and evil, justice and other moral concepts, should be explained on the basis of observations of the life of nature. In society, the notions of morality are developed in the same way as they were borrowed from nature. That which is useful for sustaining one's clan is moral and that which is harmful to it is immoral. Moral progress in the human race is the result of natural evolution. Kropotkin endeavoured to elaborate the principles of the universal human morality which would form the basis of any class morality. From Kropotkin's point of view, this type of morality should facilitate the development of personal creative abilities and initiative. This is achieved through a combina-

tion of two aspirations of the individual: to submit other people to one's personal objectives and to unite with other people (general human solidarity, mutual dependence). Kropotkin believed that a future anarchic, or communist, society should be based on that kind of morality. For Kropotkin the moral principle of anarchism is the principle of equality (everyone should treat others the way one would have them treat oneself) and activity (excessive vitality). Kropotkin called upon man to give love, reason and energy to make other people happy and it was in this that he saw the highest personal happiness. Modern representatives of social biology (*Naturalism*) regard the biology-based ideas of Kropotkin as a forerunner of this trend. His major ethical writings are: "Ethics" (Vol. I, 1922), "Moral Principles of Anarchism" (1904), "Anarchy, Its Philosophy and Ideal" (1896), "Mutual Assistance as a Factor of Evolution" (1907).

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LA BRUYÈRE, Jean de (1645-1696), French moralist and author. Coming from a bourgeois background, he served as a lawyer, official, tutor of Prince Condé's children. He summarized his observations of the life of the French aristocracy in his famous "Caractères" ("Les Caractères de Théophraste traduits du grec avec Les Caractères ou les Mœurs de ce siècle", 1688), modelled on the "Characters" of the Greek writer Theophrastus. La Bruyère's book written in the form of aphorisms, dialogues and meditations, portrays sketches (often of living people with disguised names) exposing the vanity and corruption of the court nobility, the selfish church ministers and presenting a vivid satirical picture of Parisian society. He demonstrates that *moral char-*

acters are formed under the influence of social environment and he censures moral vices (hypocrisy, pharisaism, greed, flattery, etc.), the characteristic traits of the aristocracy. La Bruyère considered class inequality and the power of money a great evil. Contrasting the people who are of benefit and do good to the aristocrats who only promote evil, La Bruyère writes: "An aristocrat is capable of great evils. A man of the people will never do any evil. If I were to make a choice, I wouldn't doubt: I wish to be of the people." La Bruyère's views in many respects, anticipated the ideology of the Enlightenment. His criticism of the vices of the civilized society was continued by *Rousseau*.

LAFARGUE, Paul (1842-1911), active in the French and inter-

national workers' movement, friend and follower of *Marx* and *Engels*, theorist and popularizer of Marxism. Maintaining that moral standards are dependent upon specific historical conditions, Lafargue revealed the origin of the moral concepts of *good* and *justice*. Dealing with the problem of the class character of morality, Lafargue showed that the ethical theories of the bourgeoisie and its moral practices are, in the final analysis, conditioned by its interests and position as a ruling class. "A ruling class always considers that what serves its economic and political interests is just, and what does not serve it is unjust." Lafargue criticized the bourgeois theories of morality, including *Spencer's* ethics, the ideas of *ethical socialism*. He exposed bourgeois morality which inculcates in people egoism, misanthropy, hypocrisy and pharisaism. Lafargue regarded the source of all moral vices in private property which divides people, putting them against each other. It is from these positions, that he exposed Lombroso's theory which placed all responsibility for the

crimes in capitalist society exclusively on the criminal himself who allegedly is born with a depraved disposition. Opposing the doctrine of the personality's moral self-improvement, Lafargue stressed the premise of Marxist ethics that a radical change of moral consciousness and moral relations is made possible only by the revolutionary transformation of the old order and the establishment of a socialist society: "Change the society and everything will immediately change: morals, habits, passions and sentiments of men." Despite his Marxist position on the whole, Lafargue propounded, in the solution of ethical problems, erroneous views and ambiguous premises. Thus, carried away by the exposure of the morality of the exploiting society, Lafargue was inclined to reject the progress of morality in presocialist formations. In focusing attention on the sociological explanation of morality, Lafargue underestimated its psychological roots and its inherent inertia. Lafargue's ethical views are expounded above all in his work, "*Le déterminisme économique*

de Karl Marx" ("Economic Determinism of Karl Marx", 1909).

LANGUAGE OF MORALITY.

Dealing with moral problems, substantiating their moral requirements, standards and evaluations, proving or refuting certain propositions in the course of discussing moral problems people use the same concepts for all the difference of their ideological views; therefore they imbue them with different meaning (*Universal and class elements in morality*) and employ their specific methods of arguing. This logical apparatus of reasoning constitutes the language of morality. *Moral judgements* and terms are its prime elements. Moral judgements can be prescriptive ("People must speak the truth", "Man should not be an egoist") and evaluative ("Honesty is good", "Stealing is evil"). Moral terms here ("good", "evil", "must") constitute logical predicates. There are also definitive judgements which give the definition of a moral term (e.g. "Good serves the interests of man and society") where the

moral term is the subject of the sentence (and of the judgement). Any form of moral *consciousness* or its separate acts, can be expressed by means of corresponding judgements. E.g. *valuative judgement* is used to estimate a certain act: "This act is good (or evil)." People making moral demands upon others use *prescriptive judgements* naming the act the person should perform (e.g. "You must help your friend"). *Definitive judgements* are usually employed when it is necessary to elucidate the meaning of a particular moral concept (what is good, what is duty). *Moral standards, principles and ideals* are expressed through corresponding judgements. People's convictions and motives often manifest themselves in their psychology in the form of emotions. But even the essence of our feelings can be expressed in corresponding judgements. E.g. the sense of duty can be expressed in the statement: "I must keep the promise I made", and pangs of conscience—with a *valuating-prescriptive judgement*: "I did a bad thing; I should not have done this."

Thus, psychological and speech forms which an act of moral consciousness assumes, should be distinguished from its logical form, where its essence is most precisely expressed. Logical forms of the language of morality in the everyday practice of ordinary moral consciousness are often used spontaneously, unconsciously and are intricately interwoven with emotional forms. The language of morality as such, is a logical form of moral thinking. Ethics elucidates the laws of the latter by means of studying the language of morality. Theoreticians of *neopositivism* do their research into the language of morality along two lines. Some confine themselves to a mere description of the way man usually reasons in an everyday situation, i.e., identify the logic of the language of morality with the external form of expressing thoughts. As a result, they reproduce the methods of everyday thinking in their theory instead of producing a scientifically verified method. Others, on the contrary, substitute formal or mathematical (symbolic) logic for the analysis of the lan-

guage of morality with all its peculiarities, as well as construct a purely deductive system of moral concepts (*Rationalism*). Both approaches to the language of morality should be regarded as one-sided. The basic difficulty and the most important task involved in the investigation of the language of morality, is to blend it with the historically meaningful analysis of morality.

LAO-TZU (Li Erh), Chinese philosopher and traditional author of the philosophical and ethical treatise "Tao-Te-Ching" (4th-3rd centuries B.C.) which interprets the world, man's place in it and the ways of genuine virtue people must follow to regain the happiness they have lost. Man, as the entire world, being naturally engendered by Tao (interpreted both as a structural element of being and as a natural law), is in Lao-tzu's view a part of nature, destined to follow the way of virtue, Te, i.e., to live according to nature. Any attempt to change the order conforming to nature is doomed. Evil emanates from defying the laws prescribed by

nature for which the rulers and their selfish favourites should be blamed. Lao-tzu associates the contradictions in moral phenomena with the emergence of inequality. Since Lao-tzu understood a "deed" as violation of the natural course of things, he propounded the principle of moral "non-action" (Uwei). This, however, does not imply passivity but action in conformity with the laws of nature. Lao-tzu considered that a real person's basic feature should be natural virtue which prompts him to act morally not for purposes of reward or of fear of punishment, but following his own nature. "The Sage does not store things for himself. The more one does for others, the more he has for himself. The more one gives to others, the more he keeps for himself. The Tao of the Sage is to act without competing." People need no education to achieve happiness, for happiness and knowledge are mutually exclusive goals. Lao-tzu holds the spreading of knowledge as responsible for the deterioration of morals, inequality, greed, ambition—all

that comes from those in power. He preaches a return to the patriarchal tribal system he idealized. Lao-tzu formulated the basic ethical principles of early Taoism: its aim is to follow the path pointed by nature. Its principle is "non-action"; its concept of happiness as good of the people is in return to equality, simplicity and ignorance of the "golden age", happiness as the good of the sage lies in temperance, tranquility and proximity to nature.

LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, François de (1613-1680), French writer and moral philosopher. His major work "Réflexions ou Sentences et Maximes Morales" ("Reflections or Moral Maxims", 1665), is the result of his observations of the morals and mentality of the French aristocracy. Extending the results of his observation of the morality of one class to the whole society, La Rochefoucauld arrives at a generally pessimistic conclusion that man is vicious by nature. Aware of the hypocrisy of the church morality with its conception of the original *sin*, La Rochefoucauld

seeks confirmation of his views in the materialist teaching of Pierre Gassendi who held that passions depend on the state of the organs of the human body. La Rochefoucauld, however, sceptically treated the idea that reason and will are able to curb passions, to restrain people's selfish emotions. Egoism, vanity, greed, envy are the motive forces of man's acts. Virtues are, according to La Rochefoucauld, in most cases only "skillfully disguised vices". La Rochefoucauld's moral pessimism bears resemblance to the ethics of *Hobbes* who maintained that man in society always pursues his selfish aims. La Rochefoucauld's book is a brilliant example of criticism of the morality of 17th-century aristocracy and is one of the most popular moralistic books even today.

LEGALISM, 1. [*L. legalis* of the law], a concept frequently used in the history of ethics to signify people's conduct which only externally conforms to the generally accepted moral standards but actually does not correspond to the genuine spirit of

morality. The concept of legalism was interpreted in different ways, depending on the understanding of morality. *Kant* perceived legalism in man performing acts required of him without being prompted by genuinely moral motives. For instance, acts committed not out of duty (*Moral goodness, theory of*) but out of the wish to prosper, out of prudence or even the wish to do good to others. *Neo-Protestantism* interpreted legalism as efforts to reduce the spirit of the moral teaching of Christ to concrete *commandments* and *principles* which are advisable to be applied in society. In the view of the followers of this teaching genuine morality does not demand man's compliance with specific requirements in his practical activities, but only a particular mood (*Theonomous ethics*), recognition of one's sinfulness and *humility*. The legality-morality dilemma reflects an aspect of the problem of the criteria of moral action. An action may correspond to a moral requirement but still be not a moral deed because it was performed for utilitarian, conformist con-

siderations or even by chance. The outward observance of prescribed requirements can be regarded only as an initial stage in one's moral formation. But moral maturity is expressed in the conscientious (*Conscientiousness*) and principled (*Loyalty to principles*) application of *moral standards* and *values* in relations with other people.

2. [cap.] One of the basic schools of the ancient Chinese philosophy. Its main representatives were Kuan-tsu (7th cent. B.C.), Tsi-Chang (6th cent. B.C.), Shang-Yang (390-338 B.C.) and Han Fei-tzu (c. 280-233 B.C.). Legalists were against tribal relations and rejected the ethical rules of Confucianism, humanism, the ritual ("li"), justice and universal love. Treatises of the Legalist school are composed in the form of recommendations to the ruler whose relations with the people were perceived as antagonistic. Legalists advanced the thesis of the supremacy of one single law in the state which rendered moral standards and culture redundant. They believed that people were prone to evil deeds there-

fore order in their life could exist only as inevitability and lack of freedom. Politics should be divorced from morality. The most fateful sin of society is the weakening of the central authority and the absence of firm laws. The two levers of government reflecting two aspects of the law are *reward* and in particular *punishment*. According to Legalists the main criteria of human virtues are the personal loyalty to the sovereign and the unconditional abidance by the law. But even the most merited people promoted to high posts should not be fully trusted because they conceal their aim of overthrowing the sovereign at an appropriate moment. This is confirmed by many cases in history. That is why, on the one hand, it is necessary to measure words by deeds, to discern the *truth* and lies based on facts, as well as to encourage people to act as informers and surround themselves with informers. On the other hand, it is important that power is not turned over to one's subordinates. The sovereign should be astute and ruthless, should strictly supervise the fulfilment of his orders and

prevent dissent. In state policy, one cannot be guided by personal whims and weaknesses but only by the "major interests" of the country and the "major usefulness". Legalism became a part of the official ideological doctrine of imperial China, a doctrine based on reformed Confucianism.

LEIBNIZ, Gottfried Wilhelm von (1646-1716), German idealist philosopher, educator, mathematician, public figure. Leibniz's initial idealistic principles determined his approach to the problems of ethics. His ethical teaching is based on the assumption of the divine creation of the world. In creating the world, God admitted together good and evil as its inevitable companion. Leibniz subdivided evil into: metaphysical evil—generated by the limited and finite nature of things, physical evil closely associated with it—disasters and suffering of rational beings, and moral evil emerging as a result of human *sin*. Thus, there is the necessity to justify God, the creator of the imperfect world. For this, Leibniz resorts to *theodicy*, a

teaching aimed at absolving God from the responsibility for the existence of evil, which he expounded in "Théodicé" (1710), one of his basic works.

LENIN, Vladimir Ilyich (1870-1924), theorist of Marxism, founder of its new stage—Leninism, leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the international communist movement, founder of the world's first socialist state. Lenin already expounded problems of Marxist ethics in his earlier works, in particular, in polemics against views which contended that the Marxist interpretation of morality allegedly condemns man to complete subordination to historical circumstances without affording him freedom of choice. In his work "What the 'Friends of the People' Are and How They Fight the Social-Democrats" (1894), Lenin rejected the subjectivist-voluntaristic interpretation of the *freedom of the will*, demonstrating that the thesis of the conflict between determinism and morality is groundless and proving that recognition of the dependence of human be-

haviour on social-historical conditions does not exclude man's relative independence in the choice of his action or deny his freedom and, consequently, responsibility for his actions. Marxist understanding of social determinism "far from assuming fatalism in fact provides a basis for reasonable action" (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 420). Only from positions of determinism, can the individual's activity be given a precise and correct moral evaluation. Defending the materialist tradition in ethics, Lenin reviews in his works the evolution of the humanitarian trend in the history of philosophy and proves that the thesis that idealism, unlike materialism, allegedly "always has in view only the interests of the individual" holds no water (*ibid.*, Vol. 35, p. 129). Lenin criticized the concept of religion as the foundation of morality, and the ideas portraying socialism as a new religious system called upon to save mankind, uniting the individual with society. In a number of works (particularly written after the

1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia), Lenin emphasized the role of the moral factor in the revolution. He recognized the need for revolutionary violence in periods of extreme aggravation of the class struggle, but contended, however, that the final victory of the revolutionary cause is won by the moral *authority* of the victorious proletariat and its party. Lenin stressed the great importance of this authority which derives its strength not from abstract morality, but from the morality of the revolutionary fighter, which is formed in the struggle of the working class for its social liberation. This morality serves "to unite all the working people around the proletariat, which is building up a new, a communist society" (*ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 293). Expounding the principles of revolutionary humanism, Lenin demonstrated that proletarian humanism embraced profound humanity, magnanimity, mutual assistance. Lenin assigned an important role to *heroism* in the revolutionary struggle and the building of socialism, in which he distinguished "heroism of indi-

vidual impulse" displayed in wars and open class conflicts, and the most protracted, the most stubborn, the most difficult heroism of mass everyday work. In his writings, Lenin introduced a scientific analysis of the problem of *discipline* in socialist society: "discipline must be built on entirely new principles; it must be a discipline of faith in the organizing power of the workers and poor peasants, a discipline of comradeship, a discipline of the utmost mutual respect, a discipline of independence and initiative" (ibid., Vol. 27, p. 515). Highlighting the moral aspect of the problem of truth in politics, Lenin pointed out that if objective irrefutable facts are ignored for the sake of subjectivist volitional wishes and decisions, this generates phenomena extremely harmful to the revolutionary cause. Lenin demanded that the party be ruthlessly purged of careerists, bureaucrats, of those who joined its ranks not to serve the revolutionary cause, but in order to gain personal advantage. Lenin contended that the party must not be afraid of acknowledging its

mistakes or of them being criticized (*Criticism and self-criticism*), for concealing from the masses even grim and unpleasant truth "would be sinking to the level of bourgeois politicians and deceiving the people" (ibid., Vol. 27, p. 249). Lenin believed in the unlimited possibilities of man but, nevertheless, opposed voluntarist embellishment of the level of the moral consciousness of the masses, and attempts to present the members of the socialist society as ideal people. He stressed that the working people "do not abandon their petty-bourgeois prejudices at one stroke ... at the behest of a slogan, resolution or decree, but only in the course of a long and difficult mass struggle against mass petty-bourgeois influences" (ibid., Vol. 31, p. 115). Thus, education of a new man is a protracted process of breaking up the old moral standards and values and new ones being moulded, in the process of views being changed on relations between people, attitude to woman, on the interrelationship of the collective and the individual and, conse-

quently, on the obligations of the individual to society. Touching, in his conversations with Clara Zetkin, on the problems of marriage and sexual relations, Lenin exposed the proponents of asceticism and the sanctity of the bourgeois morality of marital and family relations. At the same time, he firmly denounced vulgarized "leftist" theories rejecting any regulatory forms in this sphere. Lenin stressed that the socialist revolution and Soviet family legislation unearthed the roots of hypocrisy, pharisaism and women's rightlessness in marriage and divorce, and the status of illegitimate children. These were, however, the first steps on the path to women's liberation and socialist restructuring of the family. The establishment of communist relations in everyday life necessitates the real liberation of woman from her unjust position in the family, from exhausting household work. The moral ideal of communism was most fully expounded in Lenin's classical work "The State and Revolution" which reveals the economic, social and political pre-

conditions for the supreme moral freedom. With people acting on the basis of deep personal conviction, *moral progress* liberated from the antagonistic form of its manifestation, will lead to the ultimate triumph of the principles of humanism and justice.

LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY, a trend of Protestant theology widespread in the second half of the 19th century (as applied to ethics it is also called "the social gospel" movement). Its representatives (Walter Rauschenbusch, Shailer Mathews, Francis Peabody in the USA; Alois Riehl, Ernst Troeltsch, Adolph Harnack in Europe) conveyed the idea of transforming Christian faith into a concrete social and moral programme to solve the political and moral problems of modern times (*Social ethics*). As compared to many other trends in Christianity, this one is distinguished by an optimistic view of man and his historical possibilities. Its representatives strove to draw to the utmost the biblical mythological ideas closer to the concepts of world-

ly morality. They interpreted God's Kingdom as a social *ideal* achievable for mankind in the course of history with the image of Christ as a model, as a moral ideal for people to pursue in worldly life. The ideas of liberal Christianity were criticized from the right by the followers of *Neo-Protestantism*. The ideology of liberal Christianity retains its influence in certain Protestant sects in the West (for instance, among the Quakers). Liberal-democratic religious figures of the West working for peace, for the equality of nations, unite under its banner.

LIFE STYLE, stable, reproducible distinguishing features of *communication*, everyday life, *manner* of behaviour, *habits*, *inclinations*, etc. inherent in a person or group of persons, which reveal the originality of their spiritual world, the trend of their private life reflected through external forms of being (work, leisure, rest, daily life, manner of behaviour and speech, etc.). As a concrete and singular part of the more general concept of way of life, it registers, to a greater degree,

and considers people's individual and psychological peculiarities of conduct, tastes, preferences, interests and inclinations. The life style of an individual or group of people is not to be interpreted as mere assimilation or repetition of the general and the peculiar aspects of a given society. Possessing individual originality, relative independence and value, a life style is capable of exerting formative influence on a particular way of life. The individual (or group, subcultural) life style, integrated at times in the structure which a particular (greater or smaller) social community adheres to, embodies it in the way of life which has become the norm for mass behaviour and mass consciousness. Life style is an essential feature of the individuality, of personal development which depends, in many respects, on value orientation, level of culture and psychological peculiarities of the person himself. Consequently, the process of the individuality's development coincides with the formation of a unique personal life style. The concept of life style implies an

obvious moral meaning since the formation of one's own personality (*Self-education*) is directly correlated with the interests of other people and of society. The most humane forms of self-fulfilment and self-education are embodied in the life style expressing originality of the spiritual pattern and personal individuality which can serve as an example.

LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS, see *Neopositivism*.

LOCKE, John (1632-1704), English philosopher and educator. Locke based his theory of cognition on the principles of empiricism and denied the theory of innate ideas. In the philosophy of religion, Locke is a deist; one of the founders of liberalism. His ethical ideas expounded in the "Essays on the Law of Nature" (1676), "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" (1690) and "Two Treatises on Government" (1690) are not systematized. In developing his epistemological views, Locke criticized the theory of innate practical principles advanced by Herbert of

Cherbury, Cambridge Neoplatonists, René Descartes. He believed that man had been endowed by nature only with the striving for happiness (*Eudaemonism*). According to Locke, the approval of virtue depends on its *usefulness* (*Utilitarianism*), while compliance with moral rules was due to their determination by legislature, education and customs (*Social contract*). Locke believed that although *moral*s as a law of nature stemmed from the divine concept, they are comprehended by reason. Thus, moral rules had to be proven. While rejecting the existence of innate moral concepts and *principles*, Locke simultaneously believed that there could be no morality without religion and that the Gospel was an excellent treatise on morality. Locke's definition of *good* and *evil* reflected the tradition of *hedonism* and rational *egoism* (see *Egoism, theories of*). However, he held that good and evil had moral significance in regard to law. Regarding morality as a variety of relations, Locke identified three types of laws or rules: divine (revealing the ex-

tent of sin and the fulfilment of one's duty), civil and philosophical, or public-opinion laws (specifying the measure of virtue and vice). Locke believed it was not the will that was free but the personality possessing that will and for this reason freedom is a manifestation of human intellect which is revealed in the ability to perform an action or refrain from it. In his natural state, man is free of the supreme power and is subjugated exclusively to the law of nature, while in society, the freedom of man is restricted by the law established by a trustworthy legislative power which was called upon to protect him from autocracy and lawlessness. The epistemological ideas of Locke influenced the formation of the ethical views of *Shaftesbury* and *Hutcheson*.

LOGIC OF THE LANGUAGE OF MORALITY, a totality of logical forms of the *language of morality*, and their relations and associations. These forms and dependencies must primarily be analyzed on the basis of investigating the structure of moral *consciousness*, which links, in its

own particular way, the different forms of concepts and *judgements*. If, for example, it is asserted that "stealing is evil" (evaluating judgement), it is logically to conclude that "People should not steal" (prescriptive judgement). The individual moral prescription: "You must keep your promise", is based on reference to the general norm: "People must keep their promise". Moral norms, in turn, are substantiated in different systems of morality by means of more general concepts — moral *principles* and *ideals*. Thus, the problems of the logic of the language of morality embrace many methodological issues associated with moral reasoning, discussion of moral problems, as well as with the justification or criticism of the general premises of a given system of morality. In substantiating a premise of morality, particularly if different moral positions clash, the problem may finally be solved beyond the framework of moral consciousness proper, by analyzing the social reality and laws of history. In terms of the logic of moral lan-

guage, it means that moral judgements can and must, in the final analysis, be substantiated through scientific judgements, experience and theoretical generalizations (*Truth*).

LOVE, a feeling which does not render itself easily to definition. As a relationship between people which is characterized by the highest emotional and spiritual intensity, love is based on revealing the maximum value of a particular person. Unlike friendship, it is not reduced to moral assessment. Love as a profound intimate feeling, can be addressed to another person, a community or an idea (e.g. love for children, parents, the motherland, life, the *truth*). However, the essence of love is most fully revealed in relations between people. Its most striking, mysterious and inevitable form is personal sexual love. The absolute acceptance of a concrete person, leads to a situation in which the customary rules of *conduct* and evaluations lose their incontestable authority and become relative and subordinated to a specific human tie.

As one of the forms making it possible to overcome *alienation*, love is recognized as the summit from which one can see the limits of any abstract morality. Love is self-ruling and free. Hence, its tragic aspect engendered by the conflict of "absolute rule" of the prevailing moral requirements and their relativity within the confines of love. The tragic element is typical not only of an ill-starred (unreciprocated) love. A happy (reciprocal) love still more forcefully propels lovers beyond the bounds of the customary and conventional. Various cultural traditions recognized the special role of love in moral purification, the assimilation of genuine values embodied in ideas, God or man. This was noted by *Plato*, *Augustine*, the classics of *Sufism* and German romanticists. Ludwig *Feuerbach* reveals the source of the valuating-cognitive ability of love: it "elevates the subject to the level of essence and, hence, the subject only as the essence becomes the object of love". *Hegel* stresses the transforming role of love: "It removes all one-sidedness, all exceptions,

all bounds of virtues." In the history of culture, the interpretation of love was accompanied by the distortion of its essence and the elevation of love to the level of an absolute value and norm alienated from man when a "man who loves, the love of man" is transformed into a "man of love" (*Marx*). Thus, Christianity regards love as a new divine behest, a principle surpassing all other human abilities. However, not only religion but also a number of social Utopias (*Feuerbach*, *Fourier* and others), use the concept of love to justify the possibility of attaining the necessary through restructuring the emotional and value aspect. An important aspect in the comprehension of love in the 19th century, is its opposition to bourgeois pragmatism and emphasis on its ability to extricate man from a system of limited socio-political and personal interests, from functional role relations. Love is a free manifestation of human essence which cannot be regulated. However, the moral principle of love imposed on man as his supreme *duty* reflects the concept of man as a

free individual assuming full *responsibility*. In the final analysis, love reflects the striving of man to attain integrity and to take the universe in all its rich diversity.

LOYALTY, a *moral quality* characterizing the individual's unfailing, dedicated attitude to other people and to one's cause, to discharging *duty*, adherence to chosen principles and the moral *ideal*. Loyalty is determined by other moral qualities, such as ideological commitment, deep belief in the righteousness of a chosen cause, *loyalty to principles* demanding from a person consistency in his convictions and actions, fortitude in dealing with difficulties and temptations, and selflessness. The lack of these qualities leads, more often than not, to a person forsaking loyalty, to *betrayal*. Loyalty is only a formal characteristic of the individual and his actions and in itself does not speak of their substance. If it is combined with man's uncritical attitude to his work and lack of initiative, loyalty turns into conservatism and *dogmatism*. Pre-

cisely the substance of a cause and its social importance determine in many respects the degree of loyalty usually professed by its adherents. The higher the aim of the struggle the stronger the moral unity of its adherents.

LOYALTY TO PRINCIPLES, a positive *moral quality* characterizing an individual and his activities; designating fidelity to a certain idea and consistent implementation of it into one's conduct. Loyalty to principles in itself is not a moral characteristic of the substance of man as it refers solely to the form of his moral consciousness (inner conviction) and way of conduct (consequence), but does not touch on their orientation. Therefore, denouncing unscrupulousness under any conditions, morality assesses man's loyalty to principles, always taking into account the concrete content of those moral *principles* which are professed and implemented. Loyalty to principles is opposed to *fanaticism* and *dogmatism* since it is based on the rational, critical and independent comprehension by a person of moral culture and on

adherence to it in behaviour. The humanistic measure of one's loyalty to principles is the extent (and not the ultimate but the immediate one) to which it is in accord with the *benefit* of those people in whose name it is followed.

LUNACHARSKY, Anatoly Vassilievich (1875-1933), Soviet statesman and public figure, theorist and propagator of Marxism. In his earlier works, Lunacharsky subjected to criticism the ethical ideas of the Russian idealists (*Berdyayev*, *Shestov*, *Sergei Bulgakov*, *Ivanov-Razumnik* and others), denying their allegations that Marxism ignores moral problems of the human personality. In the period following the defeat of the Russian revolution of 1905-1907, he shared the idea of god-building, defending "religious atheism"—religious feelings to be used as a basis for inculcating in the masses the ideals of collectivism. Lunacharsky overcame those misconceptions, harshly criticized by Lenin, after the victory of the 1917 Socialist Revolution in Russia. While occupying the

post of the first commissar of education in the Soviet State, Lunacharsky theoretically substantiated the principles of communist education. He emphasized that isolating reason, feeling and will is alien to Marxist ethics and denounced vulgar sociology in ethics. Lunacharsky criticized bourgeois ideologists who portrayed communism as a society which curtails the individual's right to free development, preventing man from asserting his individuality. He also proved that ascetic doctrines depriving man of his right to all-round satisfaction of his needs and interests, have nothing in common with Marxism. Lunacharsky maintained that the most important aspect of education was education of a spiritually and emotionally developed personality achieved by mastering the cultural wealth of mankind. From these positions, Lunacharsky opposed philistinism as well as constructivist theories of urbanization, technicism and mechanization which extolled the role of technology to the detriment of moral, emotional culture. Lunacharsky contrasted

Marxist humanism to the narrow, utilitarian and pragmatic views of life, regarding the centre of life in man himself, in his freedom and happiness. Lunacharsky's major ethical works: "Idealism and Materialism. Bourgeois and Proletarian Culture" (1923), "Science, Art, Religion" (1923), "Morality and Freedom" (1923), "Morality Viewed from Marxist Positions" (1925), "Education of New Man" (1928).

LUTHER, Martin (1483-1546), religious reformer, founder of one of the three main trends in Protestantism (Lutheranism). As Professor of the Scripture at the University of Wittenberg in 1517, in his "95 Theses" he opposed the sale of indulgencies (granting the absolution of sins) and other abuses by the Catholic Church, as well as its claims to mediating between man and God. This was an important act of the Reformation—the anti-feudal and anti-Catholic social movement in 16th-century Europe, whose moderate trend was led by Luther himself. At the core of Luther's teaching, lies the principle of "justifica-

tion by faith" which proceeds from the general sinfulness of mankind (*Sin*): man who has lost his ability to do good may find salvation only in faith which is granted from above as God's blessing. The impossibility of attaining inner righteousness is made up for, to some extent, by a righteous life which is prescribed to man by God. In contrast to the Catholic faith which considers earthly life as a preparatory stage of the believer for the other world, Luther maintained that it is in earthly life that people embark on the path to faith which helps them to overcome their inclination for sin. Luther denounced *asceticism*, monasticism, contempt for earthly interests. However, he draw a line between religious and social activities in earthly life. He con-

sidered faith, the Church and the religious sermon to belong to religious activities, and the state, reason, civic morality and "earthly" affairs of people—to social activity. However, Luther did not draw an absolute line between these two kinds of activities. Luther's teaching actually led to deeper inner religiousness of people. As Marx put it: "Luther, we grant, overcame the bondage of piety by replacing it by the bondage of conviction. He shattered faith in authority because he restored the authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen because he turned laymen into priests. He freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the inner man. He freed the body from chains because he enchained the heart."

M

MACHIAVELLI, Niccolò di Bernardo dei (1469-1527), Italian thinker, statesman, historian and writer. Machiavelli was one of the first bourgeois thinkers who approached socio-political problems based on reason and experience rather than on theology. He believed that such law-governing forces as fate and fortune operate in history, while simultaneously it is an arena of man's actions, of his reason and free will. Machiavelli links the activities of the individual to the conflicts of social groups. He dwells on the subject of the struggle between the propertied classes and the poor and maintains that this struggle is responsible for the specific socio-economic status of various population groups and is the source of many political principles. In this sense, he separates the theoretical ana-

lysis of policy from morality. Machiavelli knew only the theological ethics and moral principles sanctioned by the church. He realized that they were practically nowhere observed, that the top strata of society, particularly the clergy and Papal court, were wallowing in vice. Besides, these principles paralyzed the will, cultivated suffering and failed to take into account people's real interests. Machiavelli held that moral principles separating reality and necessity were doomed to failure, as a rule. People are prone to commit evil deeds and only necessity leads them to virtue. This necessity is revealed as power based on force. Machiavelli believed that in the conditions of his time, any means were permissible in order to create a united Italy, a free, powerful and independent

state which was his cherished goal. Virtuous is the man for whom nothing is higher than the benefit of his homeland and for her sake practically everything is permissible. "One's country should be defended whether with Disgrace or Glory," Machiavelli wrote expressing the views of the Italian bourgeoisie struggling for national consolidation, "she is properly defended in any Way whatsoever." As *Hegel* noted Machiavelli, "having the profound consciousness of the necessity for the formation of a state, has ... exhibited the principles on which alone states could be founded in the circumstances of the times". This idea led to counterposing *moral* and *politics* (which is inevitable in a class, particularly bourgeois, society). It subsequently resulted in formulating the principles in politics which came to be known as *Machiavellianism* and which should not be identified with Machiavelli himself. Indeed, he believed that ideally the *goals* eventually correspond to the means (*Ends and means*). He saw his duty in teaching good to

the youth and appealed to them to avoid vice and engage in work, calling the noblemen loafers. Although Machiavelli believed that good order (having in mind primarily the bourgeois republic) made people happy, his teaching lacks the idea of harmony reconciling common and individual interests, while the individual was sacrificed to the state. His basic ethical ideas are expounded in "Il principe" ("The Prince", 1513, published in 1532).

MACHIAVELLIANISM, a concept describing the mode of action of a person (an organization) whose principle of behaviour, particularly in politics, is the use of any, including immoral, means (e.g. lies, slander, cruelty, etc.) in order to attain the set goal. The term itself is derived from the name of the Italian statesman and writer Niccolò *Machiavelli* who stressed that politics allowed the transgression of moral laws for the sake of great goals, for instance in order to save one's country from invaders. His teaching reflected political principles guiding the nascent

Italian bourgeoisie of the 16th century which sought to unify the country and consolidate the independence of partitioned Italy tormented by her enemies. However, since the bourgeoisie had yet to adequately understand its historic mission and did not possess sufficient means for attaining its goals, it pinned its hopes on absolute monarchy, the power of knights and was prepared to recognize the legality of any means employed to establish a strong centralized state. The views expounded by Machiavelli should not be confused with Machiavellianism, for the latter is a theory based on the principle "the end justifies the means" which always permits the use of any, including immoral, means. This inevitably led to counterposing *moral* and *politics* whose principles become indeed incompatible in the pursuance of strictly limited group or class interests. Machiavellianism is often applied in politics but is seldom openly recognized.

MAGNANIMITY, positive *moral quality*; form of humanness in the everyday interrela-

tionship of people, whereby humanity surpasses the generally accepted standards or is displayed with regard to someone who does not fully deserve it, e.g. self-sacrifice in the interests of others, pardon granted to someone who has committed an offense or inflicted damage, humane attitude towards a loser.

MAKARENKO, Anton Semyonovich (1888-1939), Soviet educator and writer who was engaged in elaborating the theory and methods of communist education and dealing with the problems of communist morality. The innovation of Makarenko in education consists first and foremost, in the successful attempt to sociologically substantiate the process of education. Makarenko saw the basis of education not simply in the interaction between the educator and the pupil but in the organization of concerted activities of the pupils in line with the trends of social development. Makarenko perceived the essence of socialist discipline in such practical arrangements of collective life where, on the one hand, an individual

acquired the habits of behaviour which would correspond to the principles of communist morality and, on the other, which protect private interests and provide conditions for unrestricted social creativity to attain social goals. Hence, the uniform principles applied by Makarenko in education and ethics: drawing the individual into active participation in socio-economic practices as a goal of education; organization of a collective and of joint activities as the main instrument of education; a cardinal new place of the individual in socialist society as the prerequisite for moulding individuality in the process of assimilating the communist ideology and ethics. Makarenko advocated the fusion of labour education and moral and political education in the belief that without that, labour is a neutral process in terms of education. Makarenko believed that moral requirements applied to man should be ahead of the real level of his actions. This ensures the continuity of education. Makarenko linked the problem of freedom, responsibility and the fostering

of initiative with the development of self-administration in a collective. Makarenko stressed that it was necessary to consider ethical categories and moral problems inseparably from the solution of large-scale social problems. But here he underestimated the relative autonomy of moral criteria. Makarenko's major works: "A Book for Parents" (1937); "The Methodology for Organizing the Educational Process" (1935-1936); "The Goal of Education" (1937); "On Communist Ethics" (1939); "Willpower, Courage, Purposefulness" (1939).

MAN AND SOCIETY, a general philosophical problem of the relationship of man and society which is decisive for the understanding of the nature of morality and the way of solving the basic problems of ethics. Bourgeois understanding of the problem is essentially based on the antithesis between the concepts of man and society. On the one hand, it treats the essence of man as human nature independent of society, and society as a sphere only of exter-

nal manifestation or restriction of man's inner traits (*Social contract*). On the other hand, it regards society as something external to man, as a social machine, as the environment or circumstances shaping man's character. This accounts for the dual understanding of morality. Morality is interpreted as either an expression of the natural and only inner requirements of man and the moral sense inherent in him (*Hedonism, Eudaemonism, Moral sense, theories of*), or as a manifestation of external principles completely independent of man in general (*Intuitionism*). Thus, either man asserts his freedom in morality only in a negative form despite external necessity and the human world of *communication*, or morality consists in man's submission to external dictate. The problem of the realization of the social and moral *ideal* is solved accordingly. It is suggested that hopes be placed either on the true nature of man which, in principle, is contrasted to everything social; or on some fatal change of conditions without man's participation. Marxism considers that human es-

sence is a totality of social relations. For this reason, society cannot be regarded as something external with respect to man, a kind of environment. Marxism does not contrast the truly human to the truly social, for it views them as one and the same thing. Thus, it solves the problem of educating a truly moral man in conjunction with the task of establishing a truly human society by people themselves. Rejecting the abstract counterposing of man and society, Marxism shows where it came from. As a result of the division and *alienation* of labour, the productive forces (as well as social relations and all social culture), emerge as a peculiar world, as something absolutely independent of, and divorced from, the individual. Man does not visualize in society the results of his activities or his essence. Society converts him into a character playing the part assigned to him by moral bans and injunctions in the form of ready-made formulas. Man, for his part, views society as a means to achieve his selfish aims, aspiring to achieve freedom contrary to society, to as-

sert his "I" in his individual inner world, his own morality contrary to the social morality imposed on him. He appears to himself as an out-of-society being. The contradiction between the individual and society can, in Marxism's view, be solved together with the abolition of the social conditions which gave rise to it. Communist social relations presuppose reasonable ties and comprehensive communication in which people develop their creative abilities. The more universal and disinterested are man's aspirations, the more he evolves as a free personality (see also *All-round integrated development of the personality, Freedom, moral*).

MANDEVILLE, Bernard de (1670-1733), Dutch physician who made his name in England as moral philosopher, a pupil of *Locke*. Mandeville is famous for "The Fable of the Bees" (1705, supplemented by commentaries and appendix in the 1723 edition), a scathing satire on the society in which he lived. Mandeville depicts the life of a bee-hive in which vices and abuses

flourished and where every inhabitant looked only after his own interests. In order to chasten the bees, Jupiter made them all honest. This resulted in the ruin of the beehive. The fable concludes with the following words: "So Vice is beneficial found,/When it's by Justice lopt, and bound;/Nay, where the People would be great,/As necessary to the State/As Hunger is to make 'em eat./Bare Vertue can't make Nations live,/In Splendour; they, that would revive/A Golden Age, must be as free,/For Acorns, as for Honesty." The fable and the supplements were directed against abstract morality unrelated to the social conditions and, in particular, against the ideas of *Shaftesbury* who believed that virtue is always good and vice is always evil. Mandeville was the first to advance the idea, which was subsequently developed by *Hegel*, on the inevitability and even necessity of evil in the conditions of social inequality where the weal of a nation rests on the poverty of the working people. While advocating the idea of taking into account

human nature moulded by private-property relations, Mandeville regarded *egoism* as an invisible driving force of personal and social development. The image of an individual possessing selfish traits was subsequently christened the "Mandeville man". Mandeville made his imprint on the work of *Hutcheson*, *Helvétius*, Adam Smith, as well as the later materialist philosophers.

MANNERS, the way of comporting oneself, the external form of *conduct*, the way of treating other people. Manners also comprise the sum total of speech peculiarities (expressions used, the tone and intonation) typical of a person, the gait, gestures, facial expression (sometimes the manner of dressing is also mentioned). Manners belong to the standards of conduct and are regulated by *etiquette*. Attitude to manners varies depending on a particular social group. The aristocracy regards manners as the inbred nobility of a person representing the "upper crust" of the society or as an outward gloss demonstrating affiliation

with "high society". The democratic perception of manners is based on the assumption that beauty and grace must be an external manifestation of the moral fibre of the personality. In modern society, manners are perceived as a form of the everyday display of modesty and restraint, one's ability to keep in check one's actions (*Self-control*), an attentive and considerate attitude to people (*Tactfulness, Respect*). The lack of manners or uncouth manners introduce a destructive element, petty tensions and awkwardness in personal relations, while their excess usually called affectation, does not contribute to harmonious relations either. In the modern dynamic life and with the rapid change of fashion, it is difficult to find a correct measure in the external forms of behaviour. That is why good manners increasingly depend on the internal culture, moral profundity and tactfulness of a person.

MARCEL, Gabriel (1889-1973), French philosopher, head of so-called Christian *existentialism*. The corner-stone

of his philosophy which he himself defined as "neo-Socratic", are moral principles. While criticizing the vices and contradictions of bourgeois society, he links the trend towards depersonalization of man and the scientistic orientation in cognition to the assertion of rationalism in thinking and to the democratic ideals of the Enlightenment. He believes that the lost feeling of being "at one" with existence and people, can be attained only through a considerate attitude to one's own life ("recueillement"—internal concentration leading to wisdom), attention to the moral premises of cognition. The most important condition of the truly moral existence, according to Marcel, is a critical differentiated attitude to the "ready-made" social norms and official values and slogans. The problems of inner freedom, choice and responsibility constitute the centre-piece of his philosophy. However, as distinct from *Sartre*, Marcel recognizes real limits to the individual freedom of man: one cannot be held accountable for everything. One cannot fulfil oneself to the ful-

lest extent. Faith in the transcendental, in God, Marcel believes, becomes the last resort of individual freedom. Addressing religion, Marcel attempts to mitigate the rigour of moral requirements applied by other existentialists to the individual. In his view, despite the fact that such existentialist categories as involvement (engagement) and risk, reflect the real motives of human behaviour in a specific situation, they are too subjective and despairingly tragic. Therefore one has to admit that they are of a specific nature against the background of all-embracing (religious) truths. However faith, as interpreted by Marcel, is opposite to rational convictions: one cannot rely on it in passing a final verdict or making categorical judgements. An inalienable part of man is his emotional world, passions in which he expresses himself to the fullest extent. The ethical programme of Marcel, typical of existentialism as a whole, is in many respects at variance with official Thomism. A means of restoring the feeling of "harmony with the world" in man, Marcel saw in

the poetical spiritualization of nature. He held conservative political views. The basic works expounding his ethical concepts are: "Journal métaphysique" ("Metaphysical Journal", 1927); "Homo viator" (1944); "Les Hommes contre l'humain" ("Man Against Humanity", 1951); "Le Déclin de la sagesse" ("The Decline of Wisdom", 1954); "L'Homme problématique" ("Problematic Man", 1955); "Paix sur la terre" ("Peace on Earth", papers, 1964); "Pour une sagesse tragique" ("Tragic Wisdom and Beyond", 1968).

MARCUS AURELIUS, see *Aurelius*.

MARITAIN, Jacques (1882-1973), French Catholic philosopher, representative of *Neo-Thomism*. Studied philosophy at the University of Sorbonne, a pupil of *Bergson* whose opponent he later became. He lived and worked in the United States for many years. Maritain criticizes the bourgeois society from the religious standpoint reproducing relations which are draining the spirit of man and

confining people to their earthly interests that thus prevent them from thinking of God. Maritain advocates the return to the Middle Ages which he perceives as a path leading forward. His criticism of capitalism, however, is more apologetic than destructive. He would like "to better" or "improve" the existing capitalist world. A follower of *Thomas Aquinas*, he proclaims religious moral principles as the eternal and supreme values for they purify man turning his deeds and thoughts towards God. Maritain asserts that it is religious morality that facilitates genuine progress. He says that man's genuine freedom lies in the establishment of closer contact with God, for which purpose man has to strictly and rigorously observe the rules prescribed by religious morality. Only by abiding by its guidelines can man attain eternal bliss, individual immortality and divine grace. Maritain's ethics is abstract and stretches beyond the confines of history. This is also true of his theory of "integral humanism". However, Maritain approves of repressive

measures applied to counteract revolutionary actions because the latter are aimed at violating the foundations of the existing society.

MARX, Karl (1818-1883), founder of scientific communism, the philosophy of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and scientific political economy. His philosophical and ethical views evolved in the process of creative search and discoveries, the analysis of fundamental ideological problems. In the earlier period, until 1842, of his spiritual evolution, Marx studied the philosophical and ethical culture of classical German idealism. He contrasts the world of necessity to the world of existing reality. These worlds form two absolutely independent basic principles. However, back in 1837, Marx repudiates his dualism and advances the requirement for a monistic, rational treatment of reality (Marx, Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 12). It was not a rejection of his previous critical attitudes. Rather, it indicated an attempt to solve the problem of necessity on the

basis of a more profound comprehension of reality. However, while Marx still upheld the objective idealistic point of view (close to the ideas expounded by the Young Hegelians), his revolutionary democratism inevitably brought him back to dualism: between the idea of the state, i.e., the ideal of "the people's self-representation" (*ibid.*, p. 306), and the really existing states. Marx introduces the concept of "the free intelligence" which is an expression of the universality of the popular spirit and is therefore not subjugated to any specific utilitarian function (*ibid.*, p. 301). Marx clearly defines the connection between *ends and means*: "an end which requires unjustified means is no justifiable end" (*ibid.*, p. 164). In 1843-1845, Marx proceeded from idealism and revolutionary democratism to dialectical and historical materialism and to scientific communism. While arguing against the ideas of utopian subjectivistic communism advanced by the Young Hegelians' circle of "the free" with their appeal to pure necessity, Marx advances the

principles which he subsequently applied to develop his philosophical and ethical views into Marxism as such. Man belongs to reality as its heir and successive creator. Man is a world of creative forces, culture, including moral culture. However, in a class society, this world is an alienated reality (*Alienation*). That is why "emancipation is a reduction of the human world ... to man himself" (Vol. 3, p. 168). At the same time, anthropocentrism inherited from *Feuerbach*, can be traced here: man is the sun for himself, the root and the source of his origin (see *ibid.*, pp. 176, 182, 305-306). In defining genuine necessity, Marx proceeds from the contradictions inherent in the social division of activities which turns them into a class antagonistic division, from the contradictions engendered by the alienation of labour. A communist transformation of the world is a historic task whose solution is tantamount to the elimination of all alienation and which is nothing but a historically genuine necessity. In this light, the

essence of man appears as a totality of social relations; it is in a state of perpetual development revealing the human potential. First and foremost, man is a subject of *communication* linking him with other people by thousands of invisible threads. These threads are determined by history. As distinct from the anthropologism of *Feuerbach*, Proudhonism (*Proudhon*), "genuine socialists" and the like, Marx examines the moral ideal from the standpoint of historicism. For him, history is not a background for moralizing criticism but a contradictory process involving the real humanization of man. For that reason, sound philosophical and ethical guidelines in understanding the historical process require that the substantial logic of thinking be genuinely dialectical. This logic allowed Marx to perceive the historic process as the creation of social reality by people themselves and draw the conclusion that social history is always the history of men's individual development.

the opposite of vulgar ("bar-rack") pseudo-communism. Socialist revolution is not just a change in the order of things: by changing the world, people transform themselves and we see the revolutionary process of self-re-education (Vol. 5, p. 53). This approach to man is at odds with concepts depriving the individual of moral independence. From the mid-1840's until his death, Marx worked on "Capital" in which he revealed how economy dominates people and culture. At the same time, he indicated how to overcome that dominance and pointed the way to the genuine kingdom of freedom: communism. Behind the relations of things which enslaved people, Marx saw and investigated relations between people themselves, relations of production. Marx drew a line between the general historical logic according to which people make their history, and historically transient forms for the realization of that objective logic: the forms of alienation, depersonification, the division of man caused by the antagonistic division of labour. In "Capital",

Marx provided an example of dialectics as logic. Marx's theory is neither an instrument nor a rational apparatus limited by the sphere of means and irrelevant to values: it is also human philosophy. It is the logic of human reason not only grasping goals but also appraising them (*Moral reason*). Indeed, in addition to covering the objective dialectics of the world of natural objects, it also elucidates the dialectics of the cultural and historical process. According to Marx, a communist ideal is a process of resolving concrete contradictions facing capitalist society. It is a constantly expanding goal of the genuine struggle for the establishment of a society in which justice reigns supreme. Its aim is to overcome the division, first of all class division, which splits man himself and is thus directed towards creating opportunities for his integral development (*All-round integrated development of the personality*), the liberation of man from the role of an agent in the direct process of material production as such, so that not the work hours but free time, become the

yardstick of his wealth, towards turning the development of all essential human forces from being a vehicle subjugated to "an external expediency", into a process pursuing the goal of this comprehensive development, "the absolute movement of becoming" (Vol. 28, p. 412). These requirements are basically historical and simultaneously truly moral. In the 1870's, Marx grappled with the problem of the nascent economic materialism which emasculated the ethical essence of Marxism since it perpetuated the supremacy of economy over culture, reduced historical reality to economy and its attending appendages, while assigning human beings the predetermined roles of economic subjects. Marx firmly dissociated himself from this vulgarization of his ideas. Genuine Marxism absorbs the achievements not only of the material, scientific and theoretical culture but also the spiritual and moral culture of humanity. For it, "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Vol. 6, p. 506).

MELIORISM [L *melior* better], a point of view on the correlation of *good* and *evil* in the process of the evolution of the world, a view aspiring to overcome the extreme points of *optimism* and *pessimism*. The term "meliorism" was introduced by an English novelist George Eliot (pseudonym of Mary Anne Evans). This term was thoroughly elaborated by James Sully, English psychologist and specialist in ethics, in his book "Pessimism. A History and a Criticism" published in 1877. He believed that optimism and pessimism were equally one-sided points of view. Absolute optimism according to Sully is associated with the idea that evil is transient and that good prevails in human life. Thus, there is no need to change it. Pessimism, on the contrary, means that evil and suffering always prevail in the world and that it is impossible to improve it. Thus, Sully believes, both these principles paralyze the practical activities of man. He suggested an in-between solution—to recognize evil as inevitable but to admit that society gradually improves

and that man by his actions can expand the sphere of good and increase the number of happy people. Different variants of meliorism are elaborated, for instance, by some US philosophers, such as *Dewey*, *Durant* *Drake* and *Ralph Barton Perry*. The weak point of the meliorist principle is that it presents the correlation of good and evil in human life as an eternal conflict of abstract principles not associated with history. Also typical of meliorism is that it prescribes to people a gradual and infinite approximation to good and rejects revolutionary action as a way to attain social justice (in this sense, close to it is the so-called theory of insignificant pursuits propounded by Russian *Narodniks* in the 1880's). The concept of meliorism is no longer used in modern literature on ethics.

MENCIUS, see *Meng-Tzu*.

MENG-TZU (c. 389-305 B.C.), Chinese thinker, author of a treatise by the same name which later was included in the four great texts of Confucianism—The Four Books. Meng-

tzu held that moral sense is in-born in man and that it serves as a basis for moral qualities. Moral feelings are natural and even instinctive. Man is kind by nature but he has to reveal and develop his natural kindness. Pity is the basis of humanism. Shame engenders justice, tractability and respect—politeness, and on the basis of the sense of the *truth* and lie there emerges wisdom. However, people do not preserve the moral potential given to them by Nature. As a result of social habits and the influence exerted by external forces, they are becoming coarse and lose natural feelings. To preserve them, one needs to make internal efforts, resort to impartiality (preventing the influence of external events) and self-control, the uninterrupted cultivation of feelings. Meng-tzu opposed the reduction of justice and the purpose of the human life to *usefulness* and gain which contradict natural moral principles. He advocated humane rule and condemned cruel rulers and self-interested officials. Probably under the influence of Daoicism, in his work "Exhaus-

tion of the Mind", Meng-tzu presents sincerity ("cheng") as the quintessence of *moral qualities*, as the main virtue.

METAETHICS, a term introduced by *neopositivism* to denote a philosophical theory of morality opposed to *normative ethics* and taken in isolation from moral problems. Neopositivists counterpose metaethics to normative ethics as they negate the possibility to substantiate moral judgements by scientific methods and, simultaneously, create a philosophy of morality that would be "neutral" as regards any moral convictions and principles. As neopositivists see it, the sphere of metaethics must not extend beyond the analysis of the *logic of the language of morality* and should be reduced to the elucidation of moral terms and views (*Language of morality*). Neopositivists attempt to solve all these problems, which are really very important for the theory of ethics as a whole, by a formal logical method or through a simple description of the methods of thinking applied in everyday moral judgements.

This superficial, non-historical approach to the study of morals and lack of an analysis of their social nature and functions in society, although they are prompted by the desire to make ethics scientifically precise and devoid of any false excessive vindications, doom the theory of ethics to be meaningless and barren. A purely descriptive study of moral language leads neopositivists to an indiscriminate transfer of prejudices besieging ordinary consciousness into their ethical theory. Metaethics should be distinguished from the issue of isolating methodological and logical problems of ethics into a special field differing from normative ethics. The term metaethics is also used by Marxist researchers to denote this field of ethics.

MILL, John Stuart (1806-1873), British positivist philosopher, logician and economist, and systematizer of *utilitarianism* in ethics (the term was first introduced by Mill). Following *Ben-tham*, Mill upheld the idea that the purpose of human life was the attainment of happiness.

However, he linked happiness not only with the amount but also with the quality of pleasures and divided them into lower (sensuous) and supreme (intellectual). Only supreme pleasures correspond to the moral fabric of man, his self-esteem. Mill attempted to bring into accord the principle of egoistic usefulness with the traditional values of consciousness: conscience, duty, respect for juridical laws and *public opinion*, practical philanthropy. Mill believed that public opinion served as the criterion of qualitative superiority of one pleasure over another and in the controversial cases it was the opinion of the majority ("moral plebiscite"). Mill linked duty with the use of such means of attaining a personal goal that would not infringe upon common happiness which he defined as the greatest sum total of common weal. The latter he associated with social wellbeing, order and the striving for virtue. Justice, the supreme of the social virtues, imposes an obligation to respect the legitimate rights of a person (freedom and property rights),

to return good for good, not to deceive and be impartial. The acquaintance with the Chartist movement brought Mill to *ethical socialism* and support for liberal labour organizations which strived to influence the bourgeois government through parliamentary levers. The ethical views of Mill are presented in the last chapter of the 6th book "System of Logic" (1843) and in his "Utilitarianism" (1863).

MISANTHROPY, a principle of conduct and convictions indoctrinating oppression, suppression and exploitation of man, even justifying the most brutal forms of violence and mass extermination of whole nations, social groups and people of other beliefs; one of the extreme manifestations of *amoralism*. This principle endorses anti-humanism, injustice, hostility between people, families, tribes and nations in antagonistic society. The exponents of misanthropy attempted at times, to provide it with moral justification, imparting to it a semblance of humanism by distorting the interpretation of

man's interests or by contrasting the "chosen" to the "inferior" masses (the jesuitical principle of "saving the soul" of the heretic by burning him at the stake; various theories of "the elite and the mass", propounding the defence of the "chosen" from the power of the "mob"). Racist theories justify the enslavement of peoples and the discrimination against certain nations by the teaching of their "inferiority", and concern for the "salvation of the superior races" and even world civilization. Fascism reduced this principle to a programme of general extermination of individual nations. Humanistic morality is irreconcilable to any manifestations of misanthropy. Misanthropy as a social ideology and practice should be distinguished from a personal disposition of an individual to shun other people, getting tired of them and inclined to solitude.

MISDEED, an *act* which in its essence is a violation of moral requirements. Misdeed can be intentional or unintentional (depending on whether the per-

son intended to commit it or it happened independent of his will—see *Intention*), deliberate, predetermined (committed with malicious intent or regardless of the requirements known to the given person) and unpremeditated (committed as a result of erroneous interpretation of moral debt or to unawareness). The idea of what should be considered a misdeed varied depending on the content of moral requirements themselves, on whose interests, of what classes and social groups, these needs expressed. The measure of a misdeed is determined by the content of the act itself, conditions under which it has been committed (as well as the conditions of life and upbringing of the person who committed it), the character of the motive and the intention which led to it.

MODESTY, a *moral quality* characterizing an individual in terms of his attitude to his environment and to himself, manifested in one's failure to claim remarkable merits or particular rights, in one's voluntary submission to the requirements of

social discipline, in limiting one's needs to correspond to the material conditions of the given society, in respect for all people, in a tolerant attitude to other people's minor shortcomings with, at the same time, a critical view of his own merits and shortcomings. The individual must be modest because, as a product of nature, he is mortal and as a social being he is strong as a member of the human race. Modesty is a form of an individual's conscious awareness of his *obligations* to society and his fellow-men. A modest person does not attach particular importance to his own positive qualities for he regards them as reasonable and absolutely compulsory. True virtue is not an aspiration for glory, but free activity for the benefit of mankind. Modesty can be also ostentatious and displayed in the forms which distinguish a particular person against the general background and attract the attention of other people. In this case it turns into disparagement and a disguised form of *vanity*.

MOHAMMEDANISM, see *Islam*.

MONTAIGNE, Michel Eyquem de (1533-1592), French writer, educator and Sceptic philosopher. His philosophy was markedly influenced by *Socrates*, *Seneca*, *Epicurus* and Plutarch. His ethical views are characterized by the materialistic trend of thought and elucidated in his "Essays" (three books, 1580-1588) which reflected the sentiments of the progressive strata of society during the Renaissance. Montaigne focuses his attention on the science of man which he interprets in the spirit of *hedonism*: pleasure is one of the basic kinds of usefulness. Montaigne advocates individualism, "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*). In rejecting the religious ascetic ideal, Montaigne believes that man must enjoy all benefits of life. And this can be achieved by living in accord with nature, thus ensuring a contented state of one's spirit. However, in order to follow nature in a proper manner, it is necessary to know oneself. According to Montaigne, the moral ideal is to live according to rea-

son: if suffering, pleasure, love and hatred obey reason, then *virtue* emerges. Since life is an integral whole of opposite trends, happiness can be attained by finding a path along which man would increase pleasures and mitigate misfortunes. Montaigne calls upon people to be moderate in pleasures. "Intemperance is the pest of pleasure," he writes. Stoic motives play an important role in the ethics of Montaigne. In his opinion, moral perfection can be attained only in motivation, in one's inner attitude to the Universe. His ethical concept served as a foundation for his views on education which greatly influenced the educational thought of that time and has not lost its significance to this day. Montaigne believes that an educator should teach one to understand the essence of the matter rather than convey individual bits of knowledge. According to Montaigne, the basic goal of education is not to train a specialist in a narrow field of knowledge but shape a personality.

MONTESQUIEU, Charles Lois
de Secondat (1689-1755),

French philosopher of the Enlightenment, political figure and historian. He displayed keen interest in moral philosophy. As a deist with a strong inclination towards materialism, Montesquieu saw the basis of morality in the nature of man, natural relations between people established by the order of things. However, while accepting the general concepts of the natural-law theory Montesquieu, as distinct from the authors of consistently rational concepts, rejected the possibility of constructing a universal system of "natural laws" on their basis, because conditions of existence and the characters of nations are different. He believed that the basic factors shaping morals are physical factors—the geographical environment, and particularly climate. Thus, according to Montesquieu, cold climate helps form courageous and sturdy people, whereas hot climate breeds weak and faint-hearted people with a propensity for sensuality. Morals also depend on the social environment which Montesquieu identifies with the concept of the political system and legislature.

In distinguishing three forms of government in history, Montesquieu places in the first place, in moral respect, the republic where the principle of political virtue prevails: love of laws, the homeland and the readiness to sacrifice one's life for its interests. He sharply criticizes the mores of the nobility of feudal absolute monarchies, although as an ideologist of political compromise between the bourgeoisie and the nobility, he advocated in practical politics a moderate constitutional monarchy. Montesquieu firmly rejected despotism, the rule of one person, because the governing principle in such a system is fear. Sceptically indifferent towards the matters of religion, Montesquieu censured religious ethics. However, he recognized the moral importance of religion in society. From his point of view, religion is necessary to maintain social order: it mitigates despotism and improves the mores of the subjects and their rulers. Montesquieu's basic works expounding his ethical views are "Lettres Persanes" ("Persian Letters", 1721), "Considérations sur les

Causes de la Grandeur des Romains et de leur Décadence" ("Reflections on the Causes of the Grandeur of the Romans and Their Decadence", 1734), "L'Ésprit des Lois" ("The Spirit of the Laws", 1748).

MOORE, George Edward (1873-1958), British neorealist philosopher, founder of ethical *intuitionism* and after the division in that trend, the head of axiological intuitionism in Cambridge. One of the founders of *formalism* in ethics. Moore subjected the typical moral theories of the past to a formal-logical analysis and found in them the presence of a logical circle in defining the concept of good: the notions by which good is defined (e.g. pleasure, happiness, interest, God's will, see *Hedonism*, *Eudaemonism*, *Interest*, *theories of*, *Neo-Protestantism*) are themselves good. The basis of morality to which an objective scientific, philosophical or religious meaning was ascribed, was essentially a normative foundation, i.e., reflected the moral concepts of a particular epoch. However, Moore thus drew the conclu-

sion that the notion of good is in principle indefinable but is an object of intuitive self-evident knowledge. This laid the foundation for intuitionism in ethics. But in his declining years, Moore himself, began to doubt this position. In rejecting the socio-historical nature of morals, Moore interpreted them as something autonomous of the laws observed in the material world. Although Moore criticizes some forms of objective idealism and subjectivism in ethics, his desire to separate ethics from positive knowledge and contrast them to other sciences, did not imbue the theory of morality with the degree of precision which Moore had hoped to attain. His basic work is "Principia Ethica" (1903).

MORAL CHARACTER, the aggregate of characteristics or distinguishing features of the individual that are the object of moral *evaluation* and education and which at times becomes apparent in man's behaviour. Qualities comprising man's moral character can be conditionally subdivided into: ideological-social (*ideological inte-*

grity, conscientiousness, loyalty to principles, initiative, conviction), those characterizing one's attitude to labour (*diligence and parasitism*), to property (*thriftiness and greed*), towards other people (*humanity and misanthropy, respect and arrogance, politeness and rudeness*), to oneself (*pride, self-esteem and vanity, conceit*), features pertaining to honesty (*truthfulness, loyalty, sincerity and hypocrisy, perfidy*), volitional qualities (*self-control, self-restraint, courage, bravery and timidity, cowardice*). At times one and the same feature (e.g. loyalty or *selflessness*), can simultaneously be indicative of a person's attitude towards society, towards other people and to oneself, and the features of his will as well. The morality of each socio-economic system created its own conception of moral character—positive and negative images—and accordingly constructed the goals of ethical education. Christian morality brought forth the image of a holy righteous man—the ascetic who had overcome earthly passions (*Asceticism*). Early bourgeois morality produced the

image of the frugal hoarder, shunning luxury and censuring the nobility's idleness. In socialist morality the concept of moral character is based on the interrelation of three groups of qualities: of ideological integrity (loyalty to principles, justice, conscientiousness), moral unselfishness (selflessness, personal unpretentiousness) and will-power (persistence, courage, tenacity).

MORAL CHOICE, a moral act expressed in the individual's conscious preference of a certain system of values, line of behaviour or definite variant of a deed, when a person has to make a *moral decision* independently and ensure that it is realized. The subject of moral choice can be: an individual making a decision on a deed; a group (community) of people forming standards of mutual relations of its members; a social class working to change or preserve an existing social system; society as a whole. Individual moral choice embodies the essential moral preferences of a group, community, class and the whole society. Moral choice

reflects the degree of moral *freedom* of the individual and society. The preference of one deed to another makes it necessary to correlate moral choice with the circumstances, expediency with *loyalty* to moral principles and humaneness, and choose the necessary means (*Ends and means*) which ensure the attainment of the goal and the organic unity of *motive* and *consequences*. Moral choice is especially clearly revealed in a conflict situation (*Moral conflict*) when there is a clash between the interests of the individual and of society (individual inclination and duty), personal and other people's interests (considerations of *egoism* and *altruism*) or contradiction between various moral requirements (e.g. when the fulfilment of a *commitment* can cause harm to society or individuals, when the demands of gratitude entail a breach of principles). Conflict situations and a need to make a moral choice arise when various values clash with the standards as a result of social contradictions, lack of co-ordination between various *obligations*, someone's insuffi-

ciently thought-out actions, or some chance phenomena. Moral demands made on a person who finds himself in a conflict situation of choice, presuppose that the consequences of the adopted decision be taken into account, and enjoin preference of an outcome with a minimum of evil and a maximum of good. Socialist morality presupposes that moral choice is a result of inner conviction (*Conviction, Conscience*), censures evasion of personal responsibility and efforts to justify one's deeds by referring to anyone's authority, official order, compulsion or the example of others. At the same time, personal conviction as such, which is the basis of a particular moral choice, must accord with the general requirements of socialist morality. Marxist-Leninist ethics rejects the individualistic viewpoint of *existentialism* which attaches importance not to the moral substance of a chosen action, but only to the independence of the moral choice itself.

MORAL CODE [L *codex* book], a code of obligatory

moral standards. As a rule, a moral code compiled by a particular author, reflects moral requirements which have been already spontaneously elaborated by societal moral *consciousness*. A moral code comprises both the standards of conduct practised by the overwhelming majority of the people and those which are often violated but regarded, nevertheless, as obligatory. Thus, the task facing a compiler of a moral code is fraught with a contradiction: a compiler must reflect in the same form the standards of conduct which are the historical gains of the given society and the requirements which it is not yet in a position to put into practice. Moses's laws with their social contradictions typical of the Hebrew society, can serve as an example of such moral codes. Some enlighteners also intended to elaborate a moral code. Morelli attempted to write a moral code in the spirit of the genuine laws of nature, *Rousseau* dreamt of a moral code which would comprise in a positive form the maxims that should be recognized by all and

in a negative form those which should be renounced. However, all attempts to elaborate universal codes were doomed to failure because they were based on a wrong premise that such rules could be formulated once and forever to suit all circumstances and historical conditions (*Dogmatism, Formalism*). The impossibility to elaborate a universal moral code led some thinkers to seek a general principle which would make it possible to logically deduct the rules of behaviour and moral requirements (*Rationalism, Categorical imperative*). The code of the standards of conduct in socialist society regulates everyday life in all spheres of social existence (labour, the way of life, etc.). It reflects the level of the social and spiritual development of those who abide by these rules in life and interpret them in their moral consciousness. The socialist standards of conduct comprise all norms of human community life which were formed in the history of society in the process of people's joint activities, primarily in joint labour, as a result of the struggle waged by

the working people against social injustice and the resultant social and moral vices. The rules of socialist community life protect both the interests of society at large and those of every individual.

MORAL CONFLICT, a specific situation of *moral choice* in which a person making a *decision* registers a contradiction in his mind: the realization of any of the possible *acts* for the sake of some kind of *moral standard*, simultaneously causes a violation of another standard which also represents a certain moral *value* for this individual. Thus, a conflict situation requires that a choice be made between the conflicting moral values in favour of one of them. Moral conflict is a specific reflection of social contradictions. Due to existing class antagonisms and non-antagonistic contradictions, the situations of moral conflict can be divided into two types: those between the standards of different moral systems and those within the framework of one system of moral values. The conflict between the standards and principles of bour-

geois and socialist moralities can serve as an example of the antagonistic type of moral conflict. The social basis of a moral conflict within the framework of one system of morality, is different in principle. It expresses non-antagonistic contradictions of a person and society, of a person and a community, in interpersonal relations and so on. Here are some conflict situations of this type: confrontation among various levels of moral consciousness, between the standard and the ideal, between various types of *obligations*, between *duty* and *inclination* and so on. The solution of a moral conflict is based on the realization of the hierarchy of moral values and the dialectics of the absolute and the relative as applied to any moral standard. The fact that moral contradictions can be successfully resolved from the point of view of the uniform demands of humaneness and social expediency, makes the personal *responsibility* for a choice especially significant. However, a personal decision is not accomplished in some social and spiritual vacuum and is conditioned

first of all, by man's participation in the activities of a community or society and by the historical conditions.

MORAL DECISION, intellectual phase of *moral choice*; rational procedure of moral consciousness determining the choice of an act to be performed with preference for certain moral values and rules. The main stages of the procedure of making a moral decision are the following: analysis of the moral situation, formulation of its problems, comparison of possible alternative acts, evaluation of the *consequences*, adopting a decision. Whether a correct, optimal and humane moral decision would be reached, depends on the individual's adequate ability. This in turn is conditioned by man's personal moral experience and by *personal ethic*. Such mechanisms of consciousness as reason, mind and intuition participate in the procedure of making a moral decision. Reason successfully discharges its functions in solving comparatively simple moral tasks (according to a pattern, or following a

stable stereotype). However, in non-standard situations, reason gives way to mind capable of a creative moral decision thus helping the individual to find his bearings in novel and contradictory circumstances which are not subject to stereotype thinking. Moral intuition comes into play, in a situation which does not offer sufficient information to adopt a decision, demanding at the same time maximum speed in determining an act. Accumulating in an original way man's moral experience, intuition "substitutes", as it were, the missing possibility of weighing all "pros" and "cons" with respect to each alternative act. The three listed mechanisms complement each other, but only the one which meets the specific situation of the moral choice enables one to adopt a correct moral decision.

MORAL EDUCATION, an important aspect of a multifarious process of personality formation; the assimilation of moral values by the individual; the acquisition of moral fibre, the ability to be guided by an *ideal* and to live in conformity with

the principles, standards and rules of *morality*, when the convictions and the conception of the imperative are embodied in real deeds and conduct. Education is a process involving the practical solution of two basic issues which have always been of humanity's concern: first, how an individual should live and, second, what he or she should (or should not) do. Every person goes through the stage of moral upbringing because morality is not inherited. Moral education is a component of socialization: an individual can become a moral person only in a society, a family and a collective through *communication*. Moral education is not a spontaneous process, for people and social institutions may not only inspire but also demoralize an individual. Each society has its own ideal of a moral person, which, while reflecting the historical and specific social limitations, does not however exhaust the potential of moral education which is geared to universal human values and the humanistic future. Each society sought to present its programme of moral

education as special *moral codes* including *moral standards*, rules and *principles*. Moral education is not reduced to instruction, accumulation of knowledge and assimilation of cultural values. It is a process of moral personal self-determination wherein a person moulds himself or herself through personal *deeds* and *conduct* (*Self-education*). Moral *convictions* which cannot be imposed from without are the innermost basis of the personality, its spiritual kernel. Moral education is inalienable from the very existence of man as an intelligent being possessing freedom of choice. In the intricate process of moral evolution and the formation of fundamental human qualities, a person must be aware of the imperative necessity of morality and its vital significance, and develop an attitude geared to elaborating moral self-consciousness and its supreme expression, *conscience*, which does not allow digression from moral criteria. The acquired moral staunchness will help to form the desire and the ability to withstand lures, resist the temp-

tation of self-vindication when moral rules are transgressed and develop a feeling of *shame*. Compassion and *benevolence*, ability to place oneself in another's situation, not only *love* for people but a desire to serve them, to perform good deeds and to resist *evil* — all these constitute the motives characterizing a morally educated person. The alternatives to callousness and hard-heartedness are *modesty* and *honesty*, care not only for one's own *interests* but also respect for the interests of the others, and an acute sense of *justice*. Awareness of one's moral imperfection serves as a stimulus for further moral development. On the whole, moral education as a socially meaningful, spiritually assimilated and personally realized process, has two interwoven aspects: the development of man himself, his improvement and the improvement of human society.

MORAL GOODNESS, THEORY OF, an ethical concept whose adherents believe that in moral activities it is not so much the *deed* (what has been

done) that counts as the *motive*, *inducement*, i.e., something for the sake of which an action has been made. It can be also defined as goodwill ethics. This point of view was propagated in the religious teachings of *Luther*. A typical representative of this viewpoint was *Kant* who believed that in the performance of one's moral *duty* the specific content of actions was not as important as the feeling of an absolute obedience to duty. Similar views can be encountered in modern ethics, for instance in *existentialism* and *Neo-Protestantism*. Thus, *Sartre* believes that genuine morality is associated not with the adherence to certain moral requirements but with a particular subjective attitude to man's actions by man himself (the recognition of one's absolute responsibility for one's deeds and the circumstances of one's life). The proponents of Neo-Protestantism assert that genuine morality lies not in the attempts to do good but in the recognition by man of his total inability to overcome evil and the refusal to seek moral improvement. The social message of the the-

ory of moral goodness is that it concentrates on man's inner self-improvement, often underscoring the practical results of his actions. Marxist ethics holds that in appraising human deeds it is necessary to take into account the nature and social significance of a particular deed, as well as its motive. The significance of a motive often helps to reveal not only its social content and thrust but also the moral make-up of the person who committed the deed. Based on such thinking, one may predict the future behaviour of the person (*Intention*).

MORAL IMPERATIVE, a most simple element of *moral relations* maintained by social individuals. In these relations, a person subordinates himself to various forms of obligations, which are reflected in the corresponding forms of moral *consciousness*. Thus, in every concrete situation, the person must perform a definite act (*Duty*); in all cases, he must act in accordance with the rules of conduct obligatory for all. In doing this, he must base himself on the *evaluation* of his pre-

vious acts; develop within himself definite *moral qualities*; abide by all general moral *principles* in his daily conduct; strive to achieve moral perfection. All these requirements as regards personal as well as social activities, which people seek to co-ordinate with their moral concepts (*Ideal*), in the final account, reflect objective social-historical necessity. But this necessity in the sphere of morals acquires different forms depending on how the moral imperatives are formed. Moral imperatives have a number of general characteristics: (1) they are normative and categorical, i.e., obligatory, regardless of the concrete tasks to be solved in a given situation; (2) moral imperatives are impersonal, non-subjective (in contrast to legal norms, which are legitimized by the state), they express the objective laws of social life; (3) they always have general significance, that is, they are in equal measure applied to all people regardless of their particular position or profession. All special duties and tasks are moral imperatives in so far as they contain in themselves

something obligatory for all people (*Professional ethics*); (4) moral imperatives are universal in character: each moral evaluation or precept reflects the diverse needs and interests of man, a class, society, humanity. In so far as morality as a whole is composed of imperatives in the most varied forms, their specific features are simultaneously the features of *morality* in general.

MORALITY [*L. moralis* (*mos* usage, custom, pl. *mores* morals), a concept associated with personality, character, disposition and habits. Etymologically the Latin word *moralitas* and the Greek word *ethica* are the same]. Morality is the subject of *ethics*, a form of social consciousness and a type of social relations which are channeled towards assertion of the self-value of the individual, the equality of all people and their striving for a happy, decent life and to express the *ideal* of humanism and the humanistic perspective of historical evolution. Morality regulates human behaviour in all spheres of social life: labour, everyday

life, politics, science, family, personal, intragroup, inter-class and international relations. As distinct from the specific requirements applied to man in each of these spheres, the principles of morality have a socially universal meaning and concern all people since they incorporate the general, basic and fundamental principles which make possible the existence of these specific requirements themselves. They provide the value foundation of society and relations between people. They sustain and sanction in the most general form, certain social principles, way of life, *communication* between people or, on the contrary, require their change. The principles of morality reflect the inner layers of the socio-historical conditions of the existence of man and his essential requirements, and claim to be absolute. Morality is what is left in human relations if we mentally deduct from them the concrete and objectively determined content, their social form. While it belongs to the basic types of the normative regulation of human conduct, such as law, *customs*, *traditions*,

morality simultaneously noticeably differs from them. Whereas in law and organizational regulations rules are formulated, approved and carried into life by special establishments, the requirements of morality (as customs), are elaborated in the practice of mass behaviour, in the process of human communication and reflect the practical and historical experience of people directly in collective and individual concepts, feelings and the will. *Moral standards* are daily reproduced by the force of mass habits, volitions and appraisals made by *public opinion*, *persuasions* and *inducements* inculcated in the individual. Compliance with the requirements of morality can be checked by all people without exception and every person individually. The *authority* of a particular person in morality is not associated with any official standing, real power or social status. It is a spiritual authority, i.e., the authority determined by that person's moral qualities (the force of *example*) and the ability to adequately express the message of the moral require-

ment. As distinct from customs, the rules of morality are ideologically expressed in universally established concepts (*commandments, principles*) indicating the appropriate way of conduct. However, in morality reflecting an integrated system of ideas as regards social life, the imperative and the actually accepted, often do not coincide. The role of consciousness in the sphere of moral regulation is also reflected in the fact, that a moral sanction (the approval or disapproval of actions) is of an idealistic-spiritual nature. It performs the role of an evaluation corresponding to universal principles, norms and concepts of *good* and *evil* which must be grasped by man himself who should accept it internally and act accordingly in the future. That is why in morality the individual consciousness (personal convictions, motives and self-appraisal) plays a tremendous role. As *Marx* noted "morality is based on the autonomy of the human spirit". In morality, not only the practical actions of people are appraised but also their *motives*, motivations and *intentions*. In

this connection, particularly important in the moral regulation is the formation in every individual of an ability to relatively independently determine and direct his or her line of conduct in society also without daily external control which crystalizes in such concepts as *conscience*, the sense of *dignity* and *honour*. The goal of moral requirements is not to attain some partial or immediate results in a certain situation but the abidance by the universal rules and principles of behaviour. That is why the form of expression of a moral standard is not a rule of external expediency. Rather, it is an imperative requirement to be unconditionally observed in implementing the most diverse goals. Moral standards reflect the requirements of man and not social requirements confined to specific circumstances and situations. They are the summation of the tremendous historical experience accumulated by many generations. These standards allow the appraisal of both the particular goals pursued by people and the means of attaining them. Consequently, morality is a per-

sonalized image of harmonious social relations. Self-regulation is an adequate form of moral regulation, *self-education*—of moral education, and *self-evaluation*—of moral appraisal. The force and justification of permanently rigid moral requirements lies in the need for the individual to apply them to himself and apply them to other people exclusively through his own experience (see *Golden rule*). The concept of morality and the identification of its specific features is one of the cardinal and permanent problems of ethics. This problem, in its philosophical nature an "eternal" one, does not render itself to a simple and indisputable solution. The comprehension of morality is an inalienable element in the elaboration by an individual of his or her own moral position. In Soviet works on ethics, there also exist different viewpoints on the essence and specific nature of morality. Theoretical efforts and arguments in this field continue. To a considerable degree, this is stimulated by the fact that morality with its values of *collectivism*, the love of one's

neighbour and *tolerance*, is now becoming an increasingly more effective instrument in social and personal life than was the case in the past. In conditions of the increasingly more integrated and interdependent modern world when mankind is challenged by global dangers threatening its very existence, a responsible attitude to morality and the recognition of the priority of universal human values and universal morality becomes the only reasonable alternative (*Universal and class elements in morality*).

MORALITY AND ART are two forms of social consciousness and spiritual and practical activities of man which are closely associated and interact with each other. The basis of their unity is the interconnection of the *ethical and the aesthetic* in social phenomena, participation in the elaboration of the modus of human existence as moral or immoral, spiritual or soulless. Both morality and art help man to know himself and his place in the world, as well as to deal with the problems of the *purpose of life* and its *values*. In

the form typical of a particular art, the latter depicts the clash between *good* and *evil*, *interest* and *duty*, *happiness* and the purpose of man, and other moral concepts. In other words, moral problems are part and parcel of art. The same problems are investigated by *normative ethics*. In the sphere of art, these problems are interpreted and presented in the form of certain situations and conflicts and the controversy of opposite principles whose outcome is not always predetermined by their moral properties. In this respect, too, art reproduces the moral problems of man much more comprehensively and dialectically than any abstract theories or moralizing. This does not imply that moral problems exhaust the content of art or that art can be substituted for the theory of morality. The correlation of morality and art is more intricate. An artist reflecting a certain aspect of reality is invariably tendentious, whether intentionally or not, and by the very method employed in its depiction compels the reader, the viewer or the audience to accept his moral

appraisal. Thus, his aesthetic position includes a certain moral position. The morally perfect is the aesthetically beautiful in art. If, in a work of art, the beautiful and the moral are opposite entities, this usually bears a certain moral message and is used to prove the superiority of the internal, spiritual and moral beauty of man over the purely external physical beauty (here we may recall the typical characters in Hugo's novel "L'Homme qui rit", Gwynplaine and la duchesse Josiane, or Quasimodo and Phoebus in his novel "Notre Dame de Paris"). The moral impact made by the means of art on human convictions is achieved not through the employment of rational arguments and by adducing logical proof in support of the obvious advantages of virtue over vice. Rather, it is an emotional and aesthetic influence which involves imagination and the creative activity of the subject including also his perception of his own life and moral experience under the impact of the work of art. The educational impact of art is the stronger the

more profoundly and artistically it reflects the laws of life, historical trends, problems and contradictions of reality as well as man's feelings, thoughts and aspirations. The condition for a true artistic freedom is a strictly definite moral stand of an artist, the guaranteed possibility of his self-expression.

MORALITY AND LAW. The problem of the correlation between *morality* and law is one of the cardinal issues in ethical theories and is associated with the basic problem of the relationship of society and man. As forms of social consciousness and social relations, morality and law have many similarities since they perform a common social function, that of regulating the social behaviour of people. Both morality and law constitute a sum total of relatively stable standards (rules, precepts) which express the will of the ruling class, as well as, to a certain extent, universal human ideas regarding justice and duty. These standards are of a general character and applicable, at least formally, to all members of society. Despite the

fact that legal norms, with rare exceptions (the so-called *customary law*), are officially proclaimed by the state, whereas moral standards basically exist in social consciousness, both morality and law are developed systems of the rules of conduct covering practically the entire range of social relations. Law is subdivided into branches such as criminal, civil, labour, family, state, and international law, and the norms of all these subdivisions are customarily brought into codes of law. Morality, in its turn, includes subdivisions regulating particular spheres of social relations (*Work ethics, Professional ethics, Family and everyday morality*) although here differences are not so clearly defined. The most important difference between morality and law involves the method by which they regulate people's behaviour. Abidance by legal norms can be ensured, if necessary, by coercion (administrative, criminal and economic sanctions) by means of a special legal apparatus, when law is enforced by official persons. Moral requirements are maintained by the force of *cus-*

toms, *public opinion* or personal conviction. Consequently, a moral *sanction* is applied through measures of spiritual influence which is exerted by the entire community, social group or society at large, rather than individual people who possess some special powers. A substantial part of social relations is regulated simultaneously by the norms of law and the standards of morality. In most cases, when the requirements of law and morality are at variance with each other, these divergences are prompted not by the differences in morality and law as such but by contradictions within these forms of social control (between legislature and its practical application, the norms of universal human ethics and class morality, the requirements of society and personal conscience). Although any anti-social misbehaviour deserves moral censure, far from all anti-social actions are punished by law. In socialist society the relations between morality and law are formed in a contradictory way, while drawing, however, closer together. Furthermore, the dia-

lectics of morality and law cannot be interpreted in a simplified manner as the mere elevation of a "low" law to the level of a "high" morality. In real life, legal consciousness is simultaneously a stage in the development of morality itself, a historical form in the realization of its most important values.

MORALITY AND POLITICS constitute two methods employed in regulating behaviour and two forms for its substantiation in social consciousness. As relatively independent factors of social life, although in the final analysis determined by the mode of production, morality and politics cannot be identified with each other. Politics reflects relations between people, institutions and organizations (representing class, national, regional, professional and group interests) as regards the use of power or the influence upon it. It concentrates on the issue of political expediency, i.e., the most effective expression and protection of class interests. Morality also reflects certain interests and formulates them in its own way as universal

requirements pertaining to all people and is of universal significance. Morality deals not only with substantiating the nobility of the goals pursued but also involves the justification of the means of activities (*Ends and means*). These specific features make the interaction between morality and politics in different historic epoches and different social systems diverse and multifaceted. Political struggle is accompanied by the clash of conflicting moral principles and by attempts to subjugate some universal standards to a specific interest. Politics is characterized by a certain strategy and certain tactics. In its strategic goals, it contains moral values (*ideals*) and, consequently, has an internal (progressive or reactionary) thrust. Politics in tactics and the choice of means of struggle, proceeds from the considerations of their effectiveness and accessibility but cannot ignore the problem of their appraisal by *public opinion*, their moral justification, permissibility, etc. Politics is a more effective instrument the more it is based on precise information, the objective knowl-

edge of the situation. However, morality also has a cognitive potential (the historical moral experience accumulated by generations), although transformed through evaluation and behaviour. Politics is not only a science but also an art and as every art it is based on improvisation, the risk of making a choice relying on the moral positions held by rivals when there is not enough time for a scientific analysis. It is natural that the separation of the private and common interests of morality and politics, when political problems were solved by violating moral standards, engendered pessimistic views on the relationship between morality and politics. In their theories, Chinese Legalists, *Machiavelli*, *Hobbes* and many other thinkers of the past, based themselves upon the premise that politics and morality were incompatible and that political expediency and morality are mutually exclusive. The recognition of that incompatibility was expressed in two opposite ideological positions: immoral policies and abstract *moralizing*. In the first case, the stress is

laid only on politics, while the moral essence of behaviour as such is ignored. Morality is slighted and violated for the sake of "political expediency" or turned into an obedient instrument of the demagogic concealment of political goals. In the second case, the meaning of morality is made absolute, while the real (political) means of struggle are ignored or underestimated. Both these positions are essentially alien to the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of morality and politics which is based on the assumption that the most progressive, far-sighted and promising politics corresponds to moral requirements. Morality influences politics by supplying moral consciousness of the people with the understanding of the real goals, conditions and methods of activities. They reveal the socio-political interests operating behind particular moral standards. The task is to achieve the maximum internal harmony between politics and morality. This is attained through the realization in social life of the principles of democracy, mutual trust, comprehens-

ive development of *criticism and self-criticism*, moral responsibility, honesty, loyalty to principles, truthfulness, humanity. In present conditions when the world is becoming increasingly integrated and interdependent and mankind is facing global (nuclear, ecological and other) dangers threatening its very existence, we need a confluence of morality and politics. This can be attained on the basis of the priority of universal human values, a conscientious political orientation towards non-violence (*Non-violence, ethics of*), tolerance, *peaceableness*, mutual understanding and cooperation. Politics is reasonable and effective to the extent to which it is moral. Morality performs its humanitarian function of elevating man and society to the extent to which it is translated into concrete political actions. The essence of new political thinking proclaimed by the Soviet Union, is that it conscientiously limits and corrects its goals and means in accordance with universal human morality (*New thinking and ethics*).

MORALITY AND RELIGION.

The problem of the correlation of morality and religion, two forms of social consciousness, is essential in the field of ethics since it is directly associated with the problem of the *criterion of morality*. The adherents of religious justification of morality advance the following arguments: historically, the first moral rules were formulated in religion; moral precepts have meaning only if their absolute authority is recognized, i.e., their divine origin is acknowledged. The latter argument is regarded by religious thinkers as the only guarantee against the relativization of morality and turning it into a mere product of the changing socio-historical conditions of human existence. Indeed, one of the most acute problems in the philosophy of morality is the question of the danger posed by subjectivism and *relativism* in moral concepts. Secular philosophy treats this problem in the context of the correlation between objectivity, general significance of moral requirements and the *autonomy* of morality: morality retains its specific character

only if it does not depend on any outside considerations. *Kant* insisted that the criterion of morality can be only an unconditional and absolute nature of the moral law itself. In this sense, morality is independent of religion which often subjugates moral consciousness to religious considerations which it holds above any moral norms. Already in ancient Greece, the religious justification of morality was criticized (*Epicureanism*). The Enlightenment also subjected the religious interpretation of morality to criticism. French materialists placed in opposition to theology the theory of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*). They pointed out that an individual rationally understanding his interests would be a truly moral person since the violation of moral requirements would entail damage to his own interests. The defeat of that illusion led to the restoration and consolidation of the religious tradition in the interpretation of morality. According to Marxism, the religious substantiation of morality was one of the most widely spread forms in the preceding

history because it best corresponded to the relations among people in a class society in which man's abilities were alienated from himself (*Alienation*) and confronted him as forces beyond his control (*Man and society*). The religious world outlook is only a specific form of moral concepts, a method employed to prove and interpret them in a systematic manner. Religion includes in the divine commandments only what has been spontaneously elaborated by the moral consciousness of society. Moreover, different religions advanced different, sometimes opposite, moral precepts. The real source of moral concepts is the real life of the people, above all their social needs and interests.

MORALITY AND SEXUAL RELATIONS. One way or another, each society regulates sexual relations including by resorting to morality. However, the content and methods of such regulation varied in different periods of history. In the most ancient archaic societies, moral standards existed side by side with other forms of social con-

trol, and influence was exerted above all on the aspects of relations which were of real significance for the survival of the tribe and the maintenance of social order. Normative taboos included the rule of exogamy excluding incest; protection of the institution of marriage and the family by prohibiting or condemning extramarital ties; a double standard establishing different rules in the sphere of intimate relations for men and women; a more strict control over the sexual behaviour of women. All these rules affected, first of all, the reproductive behaviour (procreation) and the reproduction of the existing social hierarchy, in particular the preservation of the social roles and the nature of man-woman relations. As for sexual erotic feelings, each culture had its own attitude towards them. Thus, Tantrism, Daocism and Hinduism favour and cultivate them, while in Christianity they are tabooed and suppressed. The general trend in the evolution of sexual morality characterized by the transition from the external norms and prohibitions implying the maximum

regulation of human behaviour, to the internal moral and aesthetic values and a greater individualization and personalization in the selection of a partner, are closely associated with more diversified concepts of *love*. Although marriage and the family still remain the most important socio-moral values sexual relations to a certain degree are becoming more autonomous. Increasingly, modern young people begin sexual relations before marriage, and these relations are assessed above all by the presence or absence of love, affection and dislike. More widespread is becoming the view that sexual moral principles should be the same for men and women alike. Some aspects of sexual relations which were strictly regulated in the past, for instance sexual techniques, today are left entirely to the discretion of the sex partners. The attitude to divorces is becoming more tolerant. The liberalization of sex morals expands the sphere of personal freedom simultaneously entailing substantial social costs. Sexual relations with many partners not only lead to deindividualization but also

contribute to the spread of dangerous diseases, AIDS in the first place. From the point of view of ethics, an extended individual choice in sexual relations does not mean unrestricted permissiveness but implies a higher level of personal moral responsibility in this sphere of human relations, and first of all for the birth and upbringing of children.

MORALIZING, an appraisal of social phenomena which is not based on the analysis of the objective laws governing the evolution of reality but on abstract ideas and wishes. Such appraisal made without comprehending the essence of phenomena is, as a rule, the consequence of an untenable extension of the principles and criteria pertaining to moral *consciousness* to the fields of human practical and theoretical activities where their application alone is patently insufficient. Furthermore, subjective ideas of the desired sequence of events and moralists' indignation when these events take a different course, are substituted for the scientific cognition of reality and of the laws governing its evolution.

Thus, the teachings of bourgeois enlighteners and various advocates of an "ideal society", actually did not transcend the framework of moralizing. The latter is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism which takes into account the objective historic necessity in actions and make a scientific analysis of the laws governing social development. In socialist society, moralizing is more frequently reflected in inappropriate methods of education, in the substitution of edification and admonition for actual moulding of convictions, feelings and habits.

MORAL JUDGEMENT, a statement formulating a principle of morality in the form of a precept or *evaluation*; one of the simplest elements of moral language. Moral judgement is particularly studied by deontological logic and logic of evaluation (sections of modal logic), while in ethics it is investigated by the *logic of the language of morality*. Since moral judgement always furnishes in one form or another, a moral requirement, its logical properties reflect the peculiarities of this

requirement and moral consciousness in general. Moral judgements are always normative by their modality. The necessity and *value* expressed in them bear an impersonal character, i.e., they do not imply the will of any subject. Even when moral judgement is a single one, a general meaning can always be ascribed to it. (The statement: "You must act this way" implies "everybody must act the same way" in similar situations.) Injunctions and evaluations of morality always rest upon specific premises (*Criterion of morality*). Nevertheless, the problem of the epistemological status of moral judgements and the applicability of the criterion of the *truth* to them remains debatable. But those who answer it positively disagree on the question of the specific mechanisms and procedures of verifying moral judgements.

MORAL PROGRESS, ascending evolution of morality from less developed historical conditions (stages) towards the more perfect (regress in morality has an opposite meaning). Defining

man's progressive spiritual development, movement to the higher and the better, moral progress thus includes the aspect of *value* (*Axiology*). This created serious difficulties in understanding the evolution of morality as a real empirically registered process of substituting one kind of *morals* and moral systems for others, which should be evaluated from the standpoint of the perspectives of attaining a higher state. Non-Marxist ethical thought, facing this difficulty, opted, as a rule, for one of two extremes: *relativism* which regards every specific historical form of morality as corresponding to its time and place and therefore supposedly subject to no comparative estimation, and *absolutism* which elevates a particular morality to the rank of eternal, invariable and absolutely true and considers the whole historical evolution of morality as deviation from its abstract principles, a mistake, etc. In both cases, the development of morality was not regarded as progress. Evolution of morals, predicated, in the final account, by socio-historical progress, is relatively in-

dependent, accelerating it or slowing it down. Moral progress has its own specific features. Among them are: extension (from one formation to another) of the favourable influence of morality on the process of emancipation of working people, intensification of the influence of morality on various spheres of social life (politics, culture, everyday life, etc.); structural and functional complication and development of morality along with the transition from one social system to another, growing variety and flexibility of its regulatory mechanisms; the development and improvement of the spiritual wealth, subtlety and profundity of man's inner world, an ability to accumulate the most intricate movements and changes in the emotional and volitional sphere; the deepening of the humanistic content of the moral standards and restrictions, appraisals and ideals; the development of ethics as a science dealing with morality (an indirect indicator of moral progress). However, moral progress is neither automatic nor linear. It does not depend on

the level of the productive forces but on the level attained in the development and freedom of the individual. The moral culture of society requires constant care and protection. Mankind is doomed to perish unless it takes conscientious efforts in this direction.

MORAL QUALITIES, a concept of moral *consciousness*, which helps to reveal and evaluate in terms of morality the most typical types of conduct (*magnanimity, truthfulness, perfidy, parsimony, generosity, conceit, modesty, etc.*). Moral qualities may be described as *acts* of conduct irrespective of who performs them. The same may be said of certain aspects of conduct revealing the nature of a person. E.g. the concept of *honesty* may be used with reference to an action irrespective of who performs it (honest act), or it may speak of a general moral quality of a person or group of persons who always act in good faith. Moral qualities may be divided into positive and negative ones (which are sometimes described as *virtues* and *vices*). As compared with a *moral*

standard, the concept of moral qualities is more general and more complex. It does not show which action a person should take and which he should refrain from taking, and characterize and assess only certain aspects of conduct and in a very general way for that matter. The concept of moral quality necessarily includes an evaluative aspect: revealing a certain (positive or negative) attitude towards it. That is why certain qualities of an act (or a person) serve as a criterion of its moral evaluation (e.g. "This act is evil because it is treachery"). The concept of moral quality was first mentioned in ancient Greek ethics (see the concept of virtue in *Aristotle's* works) with a special stress on the qualities of a person. Moral qualities were interpreted in the same way in medieval ethics. As regards representatives of the Enlightenment and especially utopian socialists, they assessed moral qualities not so much as traits of character but rather as the manner of conduct characteristic of a particular type of society. Proceeding from the

fact that a person is the product of circumstances, they thought that virtues and vices were conditioned by the nature of society and not by the nature of the individual. To make man a moral person, society should be first changed. Marxist-Leninist ethics strives to overcome the one-sidedness of both of these concepts of moral qualities by establishing a dialectical correlation between social conditions and the character of man. In revolutionary practice, man is simultaneously transforming society and himself. Despite the fact that moral qualities are objectively determined by social conditions of life and the psycho-physiological constitution of man, their moral content is acquired and depends on the quality of the activities and the real moral stand of the individual. Consequently, every person bears responsibility for his or her moral qualities.

MORAL REASON, a well developed ability of social man to interpret social reality and himself in terms of moral and general values. For moral reason, reality is not a predeter-

mined order of things, or a closed system, but an open process which requires of man not only understanding of the existing situation but the ability to critically evaluate it, to transform and create fundamentally different possibilities. Moral reason synthesizes cognitive and socially creative moral culture, which presupposes man's broader and richer inner world. The problem of moral reason was posed, from the anthropocentric standpoint, by Kant. The Marxist concept of moral reason is based on overcoming the dualism between man's scientific-cognitive abilities and his spiritual and moral development. Man apprehends truth on the level of moral reason no longer as neutral, but as the truth including the solution of axiological (*Axiology*) and ethical problems. Moral reason is but a critically thinking *conscience* enriched with human experience and made wise by historical lessons. Consequently, moral reason always manifests itself in the search for a solution to social and moral problems.

MORAL RELATIONS, a specific form of social relations, the sum total of dependencies and ties which evolve in a group of people in the course of moral activities. In the most general form the moral obligations of man are subdivided into his obligations towards society, to other people and to himself. Examples of the individual's attitude to society include the duty to work, loyalty to one's homeland, to the interests of the working people (*Work ethics, Patriotism, Solidarity*). Another set of moral relations covers an individual's gainful activity (*Professional ethics*) and his involvement (whatever it is) in various fields of social activities (*Family and everyday morality*). An individual has special obligations to those members of society who are in a special position—children, the elderly, women (*Attitude to women*), members of the group to which he belongs (class, party, work team, family), people with whom he maintains special relations (*Love, Friendship, also Obligation, Gratitude*), and people whom he contacts in one way or another (conduct in

public places, *etiquette*, assistance to injured persons, small services to strangers). Man's moral relation to himself covers many aspects (e.g. *happiness, temperance, courage*). Whatever the specific sphere of an individual's obligations and regardless of the particular person or persons (private individual, a group) to whom they are addressed, an individual is, in all cases and in the final analysis, involved in certain moral relations with the entire society and with himself as a member of society. The specific forms of moral relations are distinguished by the way in which the individual sees his or her *moral imperatives* and the extent to which the latter are generalized or concrete. Moral imperative may take the form of a single instruction to an individual to perform a certain act in a specific situation, or it may require all people to perform certain acts in similar situations (*Moral standards*). It may require that an individual work constantly to develop certain *moral qualities*, develop a way of life and select a line of conduct in accordance with the more general moral

principles, that he make his activities subordinate to some supreme goal in order to transform society along truly moral principles and to attain personal perfection (*Ideal*). An individual's attitude to society differs in the face of different forms of moral imperatives. Also, these imperatives are always reflected differently in specific personal forms of moral relations (*Duty, Responsibility, Honour, Dignity, Conscience*), each of which reflects the extent and method of an individual's *self-control* in the course of his moral activities. Finally, as they engage in joint activities, people develop various ties, subordinate themselves to a social *discipline*, follow established *customs, traditions, mores, habits*, and evaluate each other's acts (*Sanctions*). They display initiative, set *examples*, influence the acts of those around them by the force of their moral *authority*, compete with one another, participate in mass movements, etc. Each of these forms of moral relations always involves two parties—a subject and an object—who are constantly

changing roles. For example, since an individual has certain obligations to society and to other individuals, he is the subject and society and other individuals are the objects of his moral activities. The same person is the object of the moral obligations of other individuals and society (society also has the duty to protect his interests). On the one hand, society formulates the obligations of an individual and evaluates his acts, i.e., its position is one of a subject versus an object. On the other hand, moral requirements become the personal duty and responsibility of each individual, who is aware of them and actively carries them out in practice. Furthermore, a person morally appraises society, the social order, the administrative apparatus, the imposed canons of behaviour, etc. and thereby reduces it to the level of an object. The deeper an individual's *conscientiousness*, the more he is capable of independent control and direction of his acts, the more of an independent subject he is (*Discretion and creativity*). Specific cases of content, spheres and forms of

moral relations are the subject of various *categories of ethics*, reflected in corresponding forms of moral *consciousness*.

MORALS, a concept which is synonymous to *morality*. In the history of ethics, morals were sometimes interpreted as something different from morality. Thus *Hegel* attached a higher significance to them. However, in his doctrine the term morals is used in various meanings: first, *customs* and *mores* in which the individual does not discern his personal ways or distinguish them from the forms of behaviour spontaneously shaped by society and spontaneously assimilated by man, i.e., something which historically precedes morality as such or more simple forms of regulating conduct than morality, since customs retain their significance in modern society. Second, the concrete obligations of man before the state, estates, corporations, the family, treated in terms of morality. Both concepts represent various stages in the historical evolution of social morality. In Soviet ethics, together with the

prevailing identification of the concepts of morals and morality, there are other points of view. According to one of them, morality is a form of consciousness, while morals are the realm of practical deeds, customs, mores and manners. According to yet another point of view, morality is the regulation of conduct by means of rigidly established standards, external psychological coercion and control, group criteria and *public opinion*; whereas morals are a sphere of moral *freedom* of the individual where social and universal human requirements merge with the inner motives. There exists a point of view that morality expresses humanness in the ideal, a perfect form, while morals only register its historically specific measure.

MORAL SENSE, THEORIES OF, a variety of the *approbative theories*; ethical concepts in which the origin of morality and its nature are explained through specific *feelings* inherent in man. The moral sense school existed in Great Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries (Adam Smith, David Hume, Shaftes-

bury, Hutcheson). In modern ethics, its representatives are Edward A. Westermarck (Finland); William Mc Dougall, Arthur Kenyon Rogers and Frank Chapman Sharp (the United States); and Arthur E. Sutherland and Alexander Faulkner Shand (Britain). The basic idea of the theories of moral sense is that special moral feelings constitute the source of the concepts of *good* and *evil* on the basis of which man evaluates various phenomena and elaborates the principles of his behaviour. They believe that these feelings are inherent in human psyche. Sometimes this principle is treated in such a way that the judgements and prescriptions expressed by people actually reflect only their feeling of approval or disapproval, but do not express the objective significance of the appraised actions and social phenomena. As regards the origin of these feelings, representatives of different trends within that school provide different answers. Shaftesbury and Rogers hold that moral sense has an innate, *a priori*, rather than an acquired

nature. Hence, the conclusion: space and time are irrelevant to good and evil (*Absolutism*). Westermarck and Sharp, on the contrary, recognize that moral sense is formed in people in the process of their *moral education* and is conditioned by social circumstances. However, since they actually reduce their investigation to the study of moral sense itself, they arrive at the conclusion that moral concepts are of an extremely relative character (*Relativism*). The emotional mechanisms of morality do not reveal its nature and specific aspects as a special form of regulating relations between people.

MORAL STANDARD, one of the most simple forms of *moral imperative*. It is simultaneously an element of *moral relations* and a form of *moral consciousness*. On the one hand, it is a rule of conduct, a *custom* which is constantly reproduced in similar actions of a multitude of people as a moral law which is imperative for all. Any society objectively requires, that in certain frequently repeated situations, people should behave in

a similar manner. In practice, this need is realized through a moral standard. Its obligatory power for each individual is based on the force of the mass *example*, *public opinion*, the power of the collective *habit* and other forms of the practically expressed will of society (*Discipline*) which is embodied in the established *mores* of a particular society. A moral imperative expressed as a standard is also reflected in moral consciousness as a set of corresponding rules, *commandments*. This is another, subjective aspect of moral standards. Moral consciousness moulds the moral standard as a commandment equally addressed to all people to be strictly obeyed in the most diverse cases. Some of the *Ten Commandments* set forth in the Holy Bible (e.g. "Honour thy father and thy mother", "Thou shalt not kill", "Thou shalt not commit adultery", "Thou shalt not steal"), can serve as an example. Many of the moral standards elaborated by humankind over many centuries retain their validity in socialist society (*Universal and class elements in morality*).

However, moral standards by themselves cannot serve as a comprehensive guide in moral activities. Their implementation requires that an individual should have enough spiritual energy, creativity and tact making it possible to apply a generally recognized standard to exclusively individual, unique situations. The problem of applying particular moral standards should be solved concretely, taking into account the given conditions and circumstances. Here, one should proceed from the more generalized moral concepts: *principles*, *ideals*, the concepts of *justice*, *good*, *evil*, etc. Abidance by moral standards does not imply that a person invariably resorts to a rational procedure of "assessing" them in any concrete circumstances. One of the most important and difficult tasks of upbringing and education, is to make moral standards an inner imperative, a form of personal inclinations and habits observed without any external or internal coercion. This is also an indication of a person's moral maturity.

MORES, *customs of moral value* which are maintained in society by *moral relations*. Mores also include customs which are frequently occurring deviations from moral requirements, i.e., have a negative moral value. The concept of mores is close to the concept of the rules of conduct. However, as distinct from the latter, it does not characterize the method employed to maintain social *discipline* but the content of conduct (the accepted way of behaviour) typical of a particular society, social group, class or community.

MOTIVE [*L moveo* to set into motion, propel], an internal, subjective personal stimulus for action, interest in its fruition. Since the motive is the basis of an act, it stands apart from related concepts such as stimulus, *intention*, and *goal* which are associated with the ideal aspect of the *act*. The motive is realized in the goal although in practical moral activities the goal and the motive may diverge. In the history of ethics, there have been suggested most diverse interpretations of the genuinely moral content of the motive de-

pending on the understanding of the nature and purpose of morality. Among the moral motives, there were the striving for pleasure and happiness, a reasonably understood private interest, service to God, curbing of the flesh (*Asceticism*), obedience to the *categorical imperative*, etc. "Moral virtue", i.e., man's aspiration for good, was often set against "moral duty", i.e., self-subjugation to the moral law (*Formalism*, *Deontology*). Marxist ethics strives to overcome the barrier between the morality of duty and virtue, the internal morality of the motive, on the one hand, and the "external" morality of the deed (*Legalism*), on the other. Since moral requirements are directed at the observance of certain social needs, the actions performed by people are of primary importance. However, besides the objective result of any action, the motive is also important since morality regulates human behaviour to a substantial extent through the consciousness of every person. The measure of *responsibility* (*guilt*) of a person for a committed act increases (exacerbates) if a

deed entailing negative consequences stems from anti-human, selfish motives. It is mitigated if it was prompted by commiseration, pity, and the like. Immoral actions committed "out of weakness" are distinguished from those committed intentionally. If, in his actions (even adequate to the circumstances and moral standards), a person is guided by the fear of punishment, egoism, careerism or vanity rather than by moral motives, this person will be capable of committing an immoral deed in other circumstances (when his interests are at variance with the social interest or if he feels that his immoral actions will go unpunished). That is why ethics regards man's motives and deeds inseparably. A special and rather difficult problem is the identification of real motives by which a particular person is guided. The difficulty involved is that often the motive and motivations of actions do not coincide. That is why a motive should be appraised not by the consciously formulated intentions of an individual but rather by the moral essence of his action. However,

an action does not always provide an adequate idea of the motive behind it because it may be incidental. The problem can be solved if we trace a number of actions over a rather protracted period of time and identify their moral purpose which precisely coincides with the motive. Moreover, a distinction should be drawn between insignificant and significant, cardinal actions because in the latter, the degree of correspondence to their motive is much higher than in the former. On the whole, man's *conduct* is the reflection of his moral motives.

MO-TZU (Mo Ti, c. 468-390 B.C.), Chinese philosopher after whom one of the major schools of Chinese philosophy is named. In Mo-tzu's view, moral norms appeared with the emergence of society. They are historically changeable and associated with people's living conditions (e.g. depend on the harvest). People are inhuman by nature, seek their own benefit and strive for personal happiness. The source of morality was a contract which emerged as a reaction to the dis-

cord caused by the clashing interests of various people. Although Mo-tzu called Heaven the model and criterion of moral deeds, in his theory it is only a formal metaphysical substantiation of morality. In Mo-tzu's interpretation, the will of Heaven is a force encouraging universal *love*, which does not exclude the person possessing this virtue, and mutual benefit. According to Mo-tzu, the criterion of good and justice is mutual *usefulness*. He criticized, from the standpoint of *utilitarianism*, Confucian ethics (*Confucius*) and rituals for excessive traditionalism and orientation towards the canonic tradition. Mo-tzu believed that if a personal interest is at variance with common usefulness it should be rejected, while duty to the parents can be sacrificed to the interests of the Celestial Empire. The ruler must influence people by his own *example* but if this does not work he must apply a system of *rewards* and *punishments*. The state needs unity and unification. According to Mo-tzu, the state must be like a machine whose unified parts can be set

into motion by the will of the ruler thus mobilizing the people for the attainment of common goals. The ideas of Mo-tzu influenced *Legalism*, while their implementation contributed to the establishment of a despotic totalitarian state. However, his views and those of the school named after him did not fit into the basic system of Chinese ethics and remained on its outskirts.

MUTUAL ASSISTANCE, relations between people based on community of interests and aims. In primitive society, mutual assistance was a determining factor in the relations between people. The emergence of private property and classes bred discrepancy between the social nature of man and the antagonism between people. On the basis of class *solidarity* of the working people, there appear and develop *comradeship* and mutual assistance between them. Mutual assistance in socialist morality is an integral part of the principle of *collectivism*.

N

NARCOMANIA [G *narke* numbness, stupor, *mania* madness], a kind of *deviant behaviour*. Narcomania is regarded by science as an illness in which the functioning of the organism is supported at a satisfactory level only by drugs which leads to the total physiological depletion and the moral degradation of the personality. Historically, drugs were taken as a medical remedy although they were frequently resorted to for relaxation, relieving stresses, overcoming *fear*, attaining euphoria (religious ecstasy), etc. In recent decades, narcomania has become more widespread due to the well-organized underground drug production and distribution, as well as an extensive use of quasi-narcotic, so-called hallucinogens, psychedelic drugs, psychotomic stimulants and toxic substances

(toxicomania) among youth groups, informal communities with their non-conventional norms often leading to behaviour transgressing legal standards. In conditions of social moral veto and the government-organized struggle against drug abuse, narcomania is linked to illegal activities. However, the legal statistics of some countries show that there is no direct link between narcomania and crime and that drug addicts do not break law more often than other population groups. The flexibility of the system of social censure and prevention of drug abuse is the most important means for thwarting its affiliation with the criminal world. Sociologists have established that people with a particular moral and psychological make-up are prone to narcomania. They take a fatalistic and

pessimistic view of the world and reject the prevailing values and rules of behaviour. Such people would rather be incorporated in small informal groups. Their typical features are emotional instability, low level of self-esteem and self-control. In our time narcomania constitutes a serious social problem.

NATURALISM [L *natura* (*nasci nat* be born)], methodological principle applied for substantiating morality which is used in many old and some present-day theories of ethics. Its essence boils down to, first, explaining morality as based on the eternal and invariable nature of man rather than on the social conditions of his existence and, second, constructing theories of ethics based on the data and methods provided by natural sciences. Naturalism was spearheaded against the idea of the supranatural source of morality and, in certain conditions, against social relations impeding the realization of the innate nature of man. The naturalistic interpretation of the requirements of morality

emerged in antiquity. Some philosophers attempted to derive them from man's natural pleasure-seeking and the avoidance of pain (*Democritus, Epicurus*). The naturalistic interpretation of morality acquires particular importance in modern times in the ethical doctrines of the Renaissance (Giordano Bruno and Bernardino Telesio), the theories of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*) and later in *utilitarianism, evolutionary ethics* and other theories of morality. At the beginning of the 20th century, *Moore (Intuitionism)* accused all previous ethics of "naturalistic fallacy" by unjustifiably broadly using the term naturalism to denote all theories in which the categories of good and duty are defined through extramoral concepts such as the *interests* of man, natural or social and even supranatural laws, pleasure, happiness, etc. This interpretation gave him grounds to include into the rank of naturalistic theories not only vulgar materialistic, biological and psychological theories of ethics but also some religious moral doc-

trines, e.g. the theory of the natural law (*Neo-Thomism*), and sometimes Marxist ethics as well. In the 1960's, a turn in the direction of naturalism was evident in which many philosophers saw an alternative to positivist schools in ethics (*Neopositivism*). They associated naturalism with an opportunity to identify a correct correlation between values and facts and overcome the principle of autonomous morality prevailing in ethics. Moreover, the above-mentioned features of the naturalistic approach to ethics acquired a specific tinge in the modern concepts of naturalism. E.g. the explanation of morality is directly linked to the breakthroughs in biology and genetics. The proponents of naturalism base the methodology of ethics on the laws operating in these sciences. Moral values are derived from natural evolution, while the social characteristics of morality are examined "on a par" with its biological roots. Marxism rejects the naturalistic concept of morality on the strength of the premise that the specific requirements of man are moulded in the process of

history and, in the final analysis, the nature of moral standards, principles and ideals is shaped by the specific social reality. At the same time, the study of the biological components in human behaviour and the comparison of the functioning of human and zoological communities is an important factor in the scientific knowledge of man and morality.

NEO-FREUDIANISM, a trend in modern non-Marxist philosophy and psychology investigating the psychological problems of ethics on the basis of classical psychoanalysis and also taking into account cultural and social factors in the moral activities of people. Neo-Freudianism emerged in the late 1930's as a result of the non-recognition of some theoretical ideas contained in the psychoanalytical doctrine developed by Sigmund Freud (*Freudianism*) of man and culture associated with the biological determination of the structure of man's character, moral standards and value orientation, and the absolutization of the man-civilization conflict. Neo-Freudianism

was widespread in the United States (Erich Fromm, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, Abram Kardiner). The ethical theory of Neo-Freudianism is based on the postulates of the psychology of the unconscious but, as distinct from Freudianism, also on the recognition of the social nature of the individual. Neo-Freudians associate the personality split and neuroses directly with moral problems proceeding from the assumption that neurotic conflicts grow out of unresolved *moral conflicts* whose elimination is the goal pursued by the therapeutic psychoanalytical practice. As distinct from the ethical doctrines which postulate a subjective relativist interpretation of the nature of morality (*Existentialism*) and the biologically immanent interpretation of ethics (*Naturalism*), Neo-Freudianism is the search for the objective criteria of moral *values*. The theoreticians of Neo-Freudianism attempt to elaborate the principles of humanistic-objective ethics and believe that good is the assertion of life, the development of man's abilities in knowledge, la-

bour and love, that virtue is responsibility for human existence and evil is the irresponsibility of man towards himself. They discern two kinds of ethics: universal ethics (relevant to any culture and embracing the rules of behaviour which serve the purpose of an all-round development of the personality) and the socially immanent ethics (based on the rules of behaviour which are indispensable for the functioning and flourishing of a particular society and its members). Neo-Freudians believe that in modern society there is an exacerbating conflict between the universal and socially immanent ethics reflecting the historical dichotomy of human existence. While criticizing the existing social system engendering contradictions between social and private interests, they advance a programme of the transformation of bourgeois society into a truly humane society by awakening the critical consciousness of the individual and spreading new forms of psycho-spiritual guidelines tantamount to the religious systems of the past. The hope for the implementation of

this programme is associated with a humanitarian psychoanalysis allowing, in their view, the elaboration of the rules of conduct and value attitudes which would be adequate to the essence of man.

NEO-HEGELIANISM, see
Self-fulfilment, ethics of.

NEOPOSITIVISM [*G neos* new, young, *L positivus*], one of the basic trends in the modern moral theory which comprises several different trends. It is an attempt to apply the methodological principles of neopositivist philosophy (logical positivism and, subsequently, linguistic analysis) to the investigation of moral consciousness. In the variety of moral phenomena the adepts of that trend see primarily specific terms and judgements. That is why the task facing moral philosophy they also reduce to the study of the *language of morality*. As a result of this curtailment of the subject-matter of ethics, they do not explain the origins and content of moral ideas and concepts but rather deal exclusively with the problems of their logical

form (*Formalism*). Neopositivists denote their formalistic theory of morality as *metaethics* to distinguish it from the ethics in the traditional sense of the word. From their point of view, in order to be scientific, the theory of morality should not be *normative ethics*, i.e., must refrain from tackling any moral problems. This perception of the subject-matter of ethics by neopositivists is the result of their cardinal postulate on the impossibility to substantiate moral judgements by resorting to factual knowledge. The concretization of this proposition is the basic theoretical content of the neopositivist ethical theories. In the 1920's and 1930's, there emerged a branch of neopositivism, emotive theory of morality, a variety of which is sometimes called volutive or imperative ethics. Its more distinguished representatives are Alfred Ayer and Bertrand Russell in Britain and Charles Stevenson, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach in the United States. Emotivists affirm that moral judgements cannot be empirically verified: they are neither true nor false (*Truth*).

Their significance is purely emotive, i.e., the moral judgement reflects only emotions of a speaker and serves as a command for the listener. It is totally impossible either to justify or disprove moral judgements. They are absolutely arbitrary and express only the predispositions and wishes of those who express them (*Voluntarism, Relativism*). Emotivists perceive moral judgements exclusively as an instrument of persuading other people and even identify morals with politics (*Morality and politics*) and propaganda (*Felicitology*). Sentiments experienced by a certain cross-section of bourgeois intellectuals are reflected in an extremely nihilistic attitude of the emotivists towards morality. The 1940's and 1950's, gave rise to a new trend in neopositivism, the school of Linguistic Analysis in Ethics (Stephen Toulmin, Richard Mervyn Hare and Patrick Horace Nowell-Smith in Britain and Henry David Aiken in the USA, et al.). Although the proponents of this trend criticize the most nihilistic statements made by emotivists as regards morality, they in

fact draw basically the same conclusions: moral judgements cannot be true, they cannot be proved by means of factual knowledge. Normative ethics cannot claim to be scientifically substantiated. As distinct from emotivists who were primarily concerned with the significance of individual moral judgements, analysts pay much attention to the *logic of the language of morality* as a whole. They search for ways to substantiate the rationality of morals. In particular, Hare formulated a principle whose essence boils down to the following: first, a moral judgement bears the potential to induce people to perform similar actions in similar situations; second, as distinct from a common imperative, moral principles underpinning that judgement have universal significance. However, Hare uses the principle of universality only as a rule of logic in the formulation of moral requirements. It cannot compel people to perform certain actions. Consequently, it cannot prevent arbitrariness. From the point of view of representatives of that school, it is the universal signi-

ficance of moral judgements and principles, rather than the objective content of concrete situations and the uniformity of moral relations which they reflect, that serves as a foundation of the correctness of moral judgements and principles. Hence the conclusion: in the final analysis man's moral conviction is his personal affair and, thus, the ethical theory is of no assistance to people to resolve their moral problems.

NEO - PROTESTANTISM [G *neos* new, young, L *protestare* to declare publicly], a trend in modern Western theology also termed "neo-orthodoxy", "crisis theology" and "dialectical theology". Neo-Protestantism became popular after the First World War, in Europe where it was elaborated by theologians Karl Barth and Emil Brunner. In the 1930's, it was propounded in the USA by Reinhold and Richard Niebuhr, Paul Tillich and others. The followers of Neo-Protestantism criticized the ideas of *liberal Christianity* in ethics and appraised the latter as naive moralizing. They condemned the

social and moral vices of modern capitalism and saw the root-cause of these vices in the natural essence of man as such and society in general. Neo-Protestants declare that man is malicious by nature, is irreparably sinful and unable to follow the commandments of Jesus Christ in his social life. Since the apologists of that doctrine recognize the impossibility of carrying out Christian principles in social life, they have to transfer genuine morality into the realm of faith. Neo-Protestants split human existence into two uncorrelated spheres. The first is the earthly life and social practice. In that area, man pursues worldly interests and acts according to the principles of practical usefulness, improves technology and promotes science, subjugates Nature and attempts to rationally organize social life. However, all this is not genuine existence but the sphere of material dependence and practical calculation. Genuine existence is man's appealing to God, trust in His mercy, abandonment of faith in one's own potential and the search for the gist of life on the oppo-

site side of social practices. If liberal Christianity essentially identified the requirements of religious morality with the demands placed upon man by society, non-orthodox thinkers oppose earthly morals to Christian morality. Earthly morals, they claim, are the morality of calculation and stem from the material selfish interests of man, and serve to satisfy his external, social needs rather than genuine requirements. Genuine morality is the morality of love, forgiveness and absolute justice which are attainable only through the service to God. As a result, it turns out that absolute morality is incompatible with the real, i.e., social, life of man. It cannot be expressed in the categories of reason applicable to social reality, nor can it be formulated as a system of practical principles which can be put into practice in social life (*Theonomous ethics*). Genuine morality demands of man not so much a struggle against evil and vice as the recognition of the utter futility of his efforts to overcome social injustice, to build a better society and realize his moral ideals.

NEO-THOMISM, a trend in modern philosophy of ethics which embodies the principles of the Catholic philosophic teaching elevated to the level of official doctrine, the name Neo-Thomism being derived from a medieval scholastic *Thomas Aquinas*. The more notable representatives of Neo-Thomism which is also known in ethics as the "natural law" theory, are French philosophers Jacques *Maritain* and Etienne Gilson who had many followers among the orthodox Catholic theologians sharing the idea of Protestantism and religious philosophers. As distinct from *Neo-Protestantism*, which underestimates the role of reason in morals, Neo-Thomism is an attempt to incorporate some principles of ethical *rationalism* in the religious view of the world. This is reflected in the elaboration of a deductive system of concepts which are applied in order to substantiate moral requirements and render the basic moral principles universal. Neo-Thomists consider the divine law, which has several gradations, as the ultimate and supreme principle of

morality. Its highest stage is the eternal law determining the nature of God himself. Whereas Neo-Protestants believe that the source of morality is the changeable will of God, the Neo-Thomists perceive the divine nature as something invariable and hold that divine reason has established the content of moral requirements once and forever. In this connection, a rational justification of these requirements is admissible within certain limits although it is regarded as inadequate if deprived of religious faith. The next stage is the natural law, or the nature granted by God to man. According to the Catholic moral doctrine, morality is not only the demands placed upon man by society but, simultaneously, the requirements of man himself. Consequently, there is no contradiction between them. The next stage of the divine law is the human positive law which in fact implies laws formulated by the state, legislature and the Church. As it interprets these laws as a specific extension of the natural law, the ethics of Neo-Thomism proclaims strict

abidance by the will of the state and other social institutions as the genuine virtue. Whereas eternal law is interpreted in the absolute spirit, positive law, on the contrary, is presented as something changeable depending on specific circumstances.

NEW THINKING AND ETHICS. The basis of new thinking is the concept of the primacy of universal human values over social and group values (professional, class, national, etc.) and the recognition of the priority of what is common to all mankind as a vital necessity and the chief imperative of the present epoch (*Universal and class elements in morality*). Values common to all mankind are identical with moral values insofar as, first, by its nature morality is a universal human phenomenon and, second, every motive or practical action acquires a moral quality to the extent to which it can be elevated to the level of universal principle. That is why new thinking has its ethical beacons. The perils threatening mankind in the epoch of the scientific and technological revolution

with a fatal, deadly outcome (nuclear, ecological, demographic and other catastrophes), stem from the unnatural combination of the universal potential of modern technology with the retarded value concepts. To bridge this gap it is necessary to radically reevaluate values. It is not only a matter of formulating new values but of elaborating a new approach to the well-known and recognized values of human morality and of translating them into practical actions. This approach is typical of the new ethics. The new ethics is the reaction to a new historical situation in which everything which unites people is becoming more important than anything which divides them. This ethics asserts: the right to live is the most important privilege and value of man and it can be ensured only if life is imbued with a humane and worthy meaning. The ethical (moral) dimension of new thinking is associated with the fact that the preservation of life and the solution of other global problems, are today becoming priority goals of world politics. It is not

moral appeals but sober consideration and wisdom that require today of states: renunciation of nuclear weapons and war in general as a method of resolving inter-state contradictions; transition to non-violent methods of the struggle for social justice; voluntary limitation of state sovereignty and elaboration of global forms of regulation in the spheres of international relations involving ecology and the preservation of the habitat; material and legal support to the exchange of information and human contacts; firm condemnation and the elimination of all forms of misanthropy, and first of all of racism, nationalism, religious and ideological fanaticism; recognition by the world public opinion of the unconditional dignity of the individual and his right to the freedom of thought, movement, life choice, development of one's abilities and creative activities; introduction of the fundamental norms of honesty in international relations. In conditions of the growing integration of the world, political practices are as far-sighted and

wise as they are becoming moral.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900), German philosopher-irrationalist, representative of the philosophy of life, philologist. The study of the state of culture in his time, led Nietzsche to the conclusion that Europe was on the brink of a crisis. In his view it was corroborated by the emergence of *nihilism* which meant that the "supreme values are losing their worth", that the period of decadence and the rise of false values was at hand. Nietzsche believes that both religion and democratic and socialist theories whose alleged goal is to place on an equal footing all people, to make strong people weak and vice versa, were responsible for this situation. Hence, his contempt for Christian morality and the humanistic, above all socialist, tradition in European culture, his calls for "transvaluation of all values" and the existing moral norms. The main principle of philosophy and ethics to which he attached cosmic import, was the doctrine of "the will to

power". Nietzsche regarded morals and art not only as an antidote to nihilism and decadence but also as an instrument for overcoming them (on the condition that morals and art should acquire a new content in the spirit of "the will to power"). Nietzsche rejects traditional morality as the striving for an ideal and an external restraint on behaviour and holds that morality destroys instincts and life: "It is necessary to destroy morality in order to liberate life." Hence his exaltation of the "superman", unscrupulous and superior to ordinary morality. Nietzsche develops his theory of the "superman" standing beyond the good and evil which embodied the basic postulates of his ethical doctrine. His criticism of bourgeois values made an impression on his contemporaries. However, it was criticism aimed at consolidating authoritarian power and it served as a theoretical justification of the rule of the "elite". The cult of a strong personality, the "superman", the negation of morality, the will to dominate, constitute the basic ideas of Nietzsche's philosophy and

ethics. Major works on ethics by Nietzsche: "Also sprach Zarathustra" ("Thus Spake Zarathustra", 1883-1884); "Jenseit von Gut und Böse" ("Beyond Good and Evil", 1886); "Zur Genealogie der Moral" ("Towards Genealogy of Morals", 1887); "Der Wille zur Macht" ("The Will to Power", 1888-1901); "Umwertung aller Werte" ("Revaluation of All Values", 1889-1901).

NIHILISM (moral) [L *nihil* nothing], a principle characterizing the attitude of man to moral *values* of society; it implies the rejection of the accepted *moral standards, principles* and *ideals*. In this respect, nihilism is close to moral *relativism* and in its extreme form is transformed into *cynicism* and immorality; the non-acceptance of any social authorities. In modern capitalist society, nihilism is a rather typical view of the world among the petty bourgeois and intelligentsia and usually expresses an anarchic and individualistic protest against the prevailing ideology and morals. By making use of the spontaneous dissatisfaction

of the masses and their mistrust of the official bourgeois morals, nihilism condemns greed, conformism and consumerism. However, it simultaneously makes an absolute of the subjective aspect of morals, ignores the social nature of moral feelings and diminishes the role played by norms, knowledge and reason in favour of the irrational "ethics of the heart" or instinctive actions. The ideas of nihilism are theoretically justified by a number of trends in bourgeois ethics (*Existentialism, Neo-Freudianism*). Nihilistic attitudes to the traditional and official values and nihilism as the world outlook usually precede and accompany the turning points in history. Young people are usually prone to it.

NOBLENES, a *moral quality* which characterizes a person's behaviour from the point of view of high ideals as its motivation. In different historical periods, nobleness was understood differently. In accordance with the morals of the exploiter society, nobleness was usually associated with the ruling classes. Thus, the morality of the slave-

owning society regarded nobleness as a feature of the aristocracy and associated it with various forms of spiritual and political activities, contrasting it to the utilitarian needs and mentality of plebeians and slaves engaged in manual work. In feudal society, as the social estate barriers became more pronounced, nobleness was understood as an innate quality of high-born persons (noble birth). Bourgeois conscience tended to treat nobleness as the individual quality of a person capable of rising above the circumstances and routine forms of behaviour. At the same time, a utilitarian mercenary consciousness reduces nobleness to a farce in the attempt to uncover selfish interest in it. Socialist morality developing humanistic traditions perceives nobleness as moral staunchness and selflessness in serving people, an ability to rise above egoistic motives (lust for vengeance, malicious joy) and to accomplish selfless deeds.

NON-VIOLENCE, ETHICS OF, a sum total of ethical and moral concepts based on the

conviction that moral goals, above all social justice, can be attained only by non-violent means. The specific feature of ethics of non-violence is not the fact that it renounces violence in relations between people, for this is typical of any genuine ethics and universal morality, but that it treats the ideas of non-violence in terms of their practical implementation and concrete programmes of social movements. The term non-violence emerged in modern European languages as a translation of the key concept of *Gandhi's* philosophy: the "ahimsa". The definition of the ethics of non-violence to a considerable extent, depends on what is understood by violence. Some modern researchers (Johan Galtung, Hildegard Goss-Mayr), regard as ethically renounced everything leading to the lag in the physical and spiritual development of man from the level which can really be attained at present. The ethics of non-violence stem from the negation of violence perceived as any destructive and degrading influence on man. They cannot be identified

with passivity and non-resistance. The ethics of non-violence are the ethics of an active struggle for moral goals but a struggle waged by special (non-violent) means. Typical representatives of the ethics of non-violence are Tolstoy, Gandhi and Martin Luther King, an active advocate of the Blacks' civil rights in the USA.

NORMATIVE ETHICS [L *norma* rule, pattern], a component part of ethics which deals with problems of the *purpose of life*, the content of man's moral *duty*, substantiates certain moral *principles* and standards and which plays the role of a theoretical extension of the moral consciousness of a society or a class. In normative ethics, an attempt is made to apply philosophy and science to solve those problems which are spontaneously tackled by ordinary consciousness in specific historical conditions. All moral doctrines and ethical theories advanced in the course of history, in the final analysis, dealt with practical moral problems. However, these problems and

the methods employed to resolve them differed. The question of whether normative ethics is scientifically sound or not, actually coincides with the problem of the scientific basis of ideology. Through normative ethics, the theory of ethics blends with morality as a form of social consciousness. In normative ethics, morality is further developed and reaches its completion. In particular, normative ethics more precisely formulates and systematizes the principles which are spontaneously formed in social moral consciousness. It perfects moral reasoning and creates images ideally reflecting the human essence of a particular moral system. In Marxist theory of morality, normative ethics is an inalienable part. Besides, theoretical ethics resolves broader problems associated with the development of morality, its place in the system of social relations, the nature, forms and structure of moral consciousness (*Ethics, Moral relations, Logic of the language of morality*).

O

OBLIGATION (moral). *Moral imperative* seen as a person's duty and a challenge imposed on him. Unlike duty, obligation is, on the one hand, of a more general nature in that it formulates requirements applying equally to many people. On the other hand, it is of a more specific character as it defines the content of actions to be performed by a person, i.e., what specifically he must do. One's duty is to meet certain obligations. The latter include a broad variety of actions dictated by the particular field of activities (*Moral relations*) under which they come, e.g. family, social, work-related obligations. Performance of obligations in some situations becomes a duty. All of the elements of the social organism can function in unison and social discipline be maintained,

only if every individual meets his or her moral obligations. Conversely, neglect of obligations undermines social discipline, destroys the prestige of moral requirements and encourages a climate of connivance at evil, lawlessness and mutual distrust. Accordingly, the moral duty of every individual is to respect moral requirements when their social consequences are clearly beneficial. It is also to encourage strict abidance by one's moral obligations and the assertion of moral principles which he professes. In actual life, different obligations may not be correlated and may even be conflicting, posing a *moral choice*.

OPTIMISM [L *optim(um)* best], a view of the general course of historical changes, according to which the possibility

always exists of bringing reality closer to the ideal of good; a conviction that goodwill eventually triumph over evil and justice over injustice, that man is capable of infinite social development and moral improvement. Opposite of *pessimism*. As a social attitude and a system of philosophical and ethical views, optimism is closely related to the concept of social-historical and *moral progress*. As an instrument of man's practical orientation, optimism enables people to expect that the future will bring fulfilment of their desires and fruition of their planned actions. For this reason, optimism is seen as a constructive basis for an individual's conduct. Trust in a better future, helps to develop an individual's abilities and promotes positive personal qualities. In the history of ethics, optimism has been presented in different ways. *Plato*, the idealist, for example, admits the existence of absolute justice and good, confining them, however, to the realm of ideas. In the empirical world, man may be virtuous on condition that reason, through which

man is related to the world of ideas, controls every aspect of his life. There is a greater measure of realism in the optimism of *Democritus*, *Aristotle*, *Epicurus* and other classical philosophers who saw the basis of a virtuous and happy life in rational control by man of his sensuous drives and actions. Although Christian morality and medieval philosophy admitted that evil would eventually be overcome (*Augustine*, *Thomas Aquinas*, et al.), the triumph of good was predicated on the will of God and its victory relegated to the next world. Life in this world, in their view, was one of woe and suffering, and *sin* and *guilt* were proclaimed to be essential and inherent properties of man's nature. In modern times, *Leibniz* supported the concept of absolute optimism. He believed that the world is inhabited by imperfect beings, only God is infinite and perfect, making evil in society inevitable. However, since the all-merciful God could not have created an evil world, the goodwill eventually prevails over evil. Moreover, evil exists as a backdrop for the triumph of

good and this world is the best of all possible worlds. Goethe, *Fichte* and other philosophers, espoused the idea that evil is a step on the path towards good. *Hegel's* optimism is based on his teaching of progress in history. According to Hegel, good is realized freedom and the end purpose of the world. Although evil is a necessary aspect of life it must, in Hegel's view, be inevitably overcome. The optimism of the Russian revolutionary democrats (*Herzen*, *Chernyshevsky*, et al.) comes from their faith in social progress, a revolutionary transformation of society and in the triumph of truth and justice. Marxist social-ethical thought is also optimistic. Though it recognizes the complexity of the present situation in the world due to the difficulties involved in tackling global problems (the problems of war and peace, ecological, demographic, energy, etc.), it links the negative aspects of reality which frequently engender pessimism with the specific, historically transient conditions of social life. In order to eliminate these conditions and the evil engendered by them, man must

wage an active and conscientious struggle against them.

OWEN, Robert (1771-1858), British utopian socialist. Owen delved into ethics beyond the bourgeois limitations of *Helvétius* and *Bentham*, whose ideas, for all their divergence, stemmed from the commonly held conviction that a moral society based on private property was a possibility. Owen advanced the idea that private property disunited, antagonized and brutalized people, so that a moral society was possible only if based on commonly owned property and mutual cooperation. Like 18th-century French materialists, Owen believed that man's views were determined by the environment. According to Owen, feelings, convictions and will are dictated by impressions made on man's natural organization by external factors. "His whole character, physical, mental and moral, is formed independently of himself." Owen concluded from this premise, that the cause of man's vices is to be found in the social system in which he exists. He went beyond the French

materialists in his analysis of the social environment which forms man's moral views, including in it both the body politic and the economic system. In this connection, Owen sharply criticized the capitalist system. He contrasted capitalism to socialism which he viewed as a rational social system that creates the necessary conditions for forming a highly moral human being. The pursuit of happiness by each individual coincides in a socialist society with the achievement of happiness by all. Owen, however, took a metaphysical view of the determining effect of circumstances on man: "The character of man is, without a single exception, always formed for him. Man ... never did, nor is it possible he ever can, form his own character. It becomes therefore the essence of irrationality to suppose that any human being, from the creation to this day, could deserve praise or blame, reward or punishment." Thus, Owen rejected the possibility of choice in man's

conduct, which was, in fact, a rejection of morality. Owen attached exceptional importance to this erroneous view, regarding it as the path towards a society of universal happiness. To enable people, made vicious by the existing social system, to pursue the course of liberating themselves from their vices, Owen appealed to truth and reason. He saw ignorance and error as the source of evil, and truth and reason as the source of good. The ideas of moral education in the socialist society of the future occupied an important place in Owen's ethical teaching. Owen saw productive activities and education as the main field of endeavour for that society. Owen's major writings reflecting his ethical views include: "A New View of Society, or Essays on the Principle of the Formation of the Human Character" (1812), "Book of the New Moral World" (1836-1844), "Revolution in the Mind and Practice of the Human Race" (1849).

P

PARASITISM, a negative *moral quality* characterizing an idle way of life, aversion to and disregard of socially useful work. Parasitism as a social phenomenon arose with the appearance of private property and exploitation, when some social classes possessing the means of production, were able to appropriate the labour of others without themselves taking part in socially useful activities. Parasitism is morally condemned by all societies. However, in societies where labour bears a coercive character and is only a means of existence for the producer, condemnation of parasitism was combined with the encouragement of the idleness of exploiters. In particular it is expressed in the "philosophy of enjoyment" (*Hedonism*). Parasitism should not be confused with idleness as a vir-

tue in the aristocratic *ethos*: idleness is a state opposite only to the manual, obligatory, systematic and forced labour which is a source of existence. The establishment of capitalism, to the extent to which it was encouraged by puritan ethics, was associated with the condemnation of both parasitism and idleness. However, with the development of bourgeois relations when the social value of a thing coincided with its cost, the differences between parasitism and socially useful labour began to be obliterated. This situation is aggravated by the inevitable consequences of the scientific and technological revolution under capitalism, such as the growth of unemployment and the increase of free time for leisure and entertainment. In bourgeois ideology, this process is recognized as indicating the ad-

vance of consumer society. In practice, forced parasitism reveals that under conditions of the domination of private property there is no possibility for the creative activity of all. The social roots of parasitism are undermined with the establishment of the obligation of socially useful labour. In socialist morality, parasitism is regarded as an attempt to avoid labour, unconscientious labour, an effort to receive social benefits which do not correspond to the quantity and quality of work done (illegal means of enrichment, theft, abuse of one's social position for selfish aims). Nevertheless, parasitism persists, partially being an inadequate reaction to the hard exhausting forms of labour and partially as a consequence of social injustice. Parasitism is censured from the moral point of view only as a form of social sponging: it cannot be reduced either to the question of income sources or to the question of person's being or not being on the official payroll. Parasitism will be totally eliminated when labour becomes man's primary vital necessity and all members

of society enjoy a totally free spiritual life.

PARSIMONY, a *moral quality* characterizing a special attitude to material values when they are regarded as treasures and their retention becomes an end in itself. For its sake the useful purpose of material values as an object of consumption is overlooked and the *interests* and requirements of man (one's own or those of other people) are sacrificed. *Morality* condemns parsimony as it condemns excessive luxury and squandering since both run counter to the interests of the self-development of the individual. The former limits and the latter deforms, personal requirements and introduces discord in relations between people and becomes a source of conflicts.

PASCAL, Blaise (1623-1662), French mathematician, physicist and religious philosopher. His ethics shows traces of Stoic (*Stoicism*) and Descartes's influence. In his "Lettres Provinciales" (1657), Pascal exposes the hypocrisy and insincerity of

probabilism which the Jesuits (*Jesuitism*) used as a means of disguising the amoral nature of the principle "the end justifies the means". His main philosophical work, "Pensées", was not finished (published posthumously in 1669), as Pascal suffered from a serious nervous disease when he was working on it. Incompatible extremes meet in the ethical views of Pascal: he asserts (following Descartes) the power of the human mind and speaks of man's worthlessness and impotence before God, in the spirit of the most gloomy statements of *Saint Augustine*. He strives to resolve the enigma of human existence and recognizes its insoluble nature, is apt to scepticism, deprived of any hope, and tries to take refuge in religious fanaticism. His leading idea is the most profound *pessimism* as regards the destinies of man and humanity. Pascal detects in man's existence mainly illusions, falsehood and hypocrisy, the domination of inclinations alien to justice and reason, the sense of grief and despair. There are only two ways which can help man over-

come despair: that of courage, awareness of the power of reason, of Stoic virtue, and through emotions—the ecstatic love of God which overcomes doubts and needs no reasoning of the mind. Pascal, in the final count, is drawn to the second way: "Humble yourself, weak reason. Silence yourself, foolish nature, learn that man infinitely surpasses man, and hear from your master your real state which you do not know. Hear God." Historical significance of Pascal's ideas is contradictory: his struggle against the Jesuits, his hymn to reason and moral courage, played a progressive role promoting anti-feudal ideology. His pessimism and religious-mystic ecstasy, on the contrary, served the aims of clerical reaction. Pascal's moral paradoxes and doubts evoke a response in people even today as is testified by the popularity of his work "Pensées".

PATRIOTISM [*Gk patris* one's fatherland], a social and moral *principle* defining people's attitude to their homeland which is manifest in a certain mode of action and in the entire spec-

trum of public sentiments which is usually called love of one's native land. "Patriotism is one of the most deeply ingrained sentiments, impregnated by the existence of separate fatherlands for hundreds and thousands of years," Lenin wrote. Love of one's homeland includes: concern for the interests and destiny of one's country and readiness to self-sacrifice for its sake; faithfulness to one's native land, waging war against its enemies; pride for its social and cultural achievements; sympathy with the suffering people and disapproval of social vices; respect for the historical past of one's homeland and its traditions; attachment to one's place of residence (to one's city, village, region and the whole country). Patriotism as a social phenomenon lies, above all, in the sphere of social psychology, being simultaneously also of moral significance. All the manifestations of patriotism listed above had an effect on the moral consciousness of humanity and the substance of various moral requirements. This is precisely why the concept of patriotism is one of the

principles of morality. The moral importance of patriotism is determined by the fact that it is one of the forms allowing the coordination of personal and public interests and making man and his homeland one integral whole. However, patriotic feelings and ideas elevate man and the nation only when they are inseparable from respect for other nations and do not degenerate into the psychology of national exclusiveness and mistrust towards "aliens". This aspect in patriotic consciousness, became particularly important in the last decades of the 20th century when the threat of a nuclear self-destruction or an ecological catastrophe required a revaluation of patriotism as the principle impelling everyone to spare no effort in order that his or her country should contribute to the preservation of the planet and the survival of humankind.

PEACEABLENESS, a principle of *morality* and politics based on the recognition of human life as the supreme social and moral value and establishing the maintenance of peace as the

ideal in relations between nations and states. Peaceableness implies respect for the personal and national dignity of individual citizens and entire nations, for state sovereignty, human rights and the right of nations to choose their own way of life. Peaceableness contributes to the maintenance of public order, mutual understanding between generations and promotes the development of historical and cultural traditions, the interaction between various social and ethnic groups, nations and cultures. In the history of morals peaceableness and aggressiveness, enmity oppose each other as two basic trends. The landmarks in the evolution of the traditions of peaceableness were the realization of the value of man in classical philosophy, opposition to the ideology of enmity and the psychology of forgiveness in the Bible, the recognition of the right of man to personal dignity in the philosophy of the Renaissance and modern time, the substantiation of the fact that man is the only subject and goal of history in Marxism, the humanization of social relations as

the imperative of modern civilization. In present-day conditions, enmity between the social-political systems, between society and nature can lead to the destruction of life on the Earth. Peaceableness was substantiated in the philosophy of moral policy elaborated by *Gandhi*, *Tolstoy's* theory of non-resistance to evil and by *Schweitzer's* ethical principle of reverence for life. Today, peaceableness is advocated by various public movements, parties and governments. The wide recognition of the priority of the values common to mankind, including the value of peace and the survival of humankind, has paved the way to new political thinking (*New thinking and ethics*).

PERFIDY, a negative *moral quality* characterized by deliberately treacherous action, conscious betrayal of another's trust or gross violation of undertaken commitments. The following actions are usually considered as perfidy: deliberate violation of a promise or of an agreement or a tacitly implied obligation resulting from

relations of solidarity, love and friendship (*Treachery, Betrayal*); *slander*, false denunciation of another person dictated by envy, hatred and an effort to exploit another's misfortune; perjury, taking an oath with the intent to violate it in the future; conscious misleading of another person in order to subsequently exploit his erroneous conviction and use it against him for egoistic purposes; engaging in intrigues that take advantage of the interests and aspirations of another person and used to achieve an end harmful to him.

PERSON (moral), subject of moral *activities*. Man becomes a moral person when having comprehended the content and meaning of his acts, he voluntarily submits them to the moral requirements of society. Capable of embracing moral aims and making decisions applicable to specific circumstances, a moral person independently evaluates his acts and the actions of others and educates himself (*Self-education*). The concept of a moral person is one of the most important *ca-*

tegories of ethics, closely associated with other concepts (*Duty, Responsibility, Self-consciousness, Conscience, Self-evaluation, Dignity, Persuasion*). Individualistic ethics reduced, as a rule, the problem of moral person to theoretical justification of the individual's ability independently (of society) to formulate for himself moral imperatives. Marxist ethics poses not only a theoretical, but also a social problem of a practical character, namely the need for conditions to be created for the development of a genuinely moral person.

PERSONAL ETHIC, a characteristic of the level of moral maturity of a person which reflects the degree of the assimilation of the moral experience accumulated by society, the ability to naturally and persistently implement moral values, rules and principles in the conduct of relations with other people, readiness for self-improvement. Under the impact of various factors including life experience and upbringing, ethical education and art, the individual accumulates, to a certain degree,

in his or her consciousness and behaviour, the achievements of the moral culture of society. Personal ethics helps one to act in conformity with moral standards in traditional situations, and due to creative elements of consciousness is instrumental in making a *moral decision* in difficult situations. The aim of personal ethics is to attain the best combination of traditional and creative elements and to fuse the specific experience of a person with the wealth of social morals. Personal ethics is an integral system of elements which incorporates the culture of ethical thinking (an ability to pass a moral judgement, to apply ethical knowledge, discern good and evil in whatever disguise they may be, and to apply moral standards to the specific features of a given situation); man's culture of feelings, an ability to sympathize and share in the suffering of others; the standards of conduct characterizing a specific way of implementing ideas and feelings in moral practices, and the degree of their mutation into everyday standards of behaviour; *etiquette* as a means of indicating

the dedication of a person to the rules governing the forms and *manners* of the individual's conduct in the course of *communication*. The highest level of moral culture of the individual can be characterized as moral wisdom, an ability to ensure one's optimal, harmonious moral activities, the readiness for worthy deeds in all circumstances.

PERSONAL EXAMPLE, see *Example*.

PERSONALISM, see *Self-fulfilment*, *ethics of*.

PERSUASION (moral). 1. Rational basis of the moral activities of a person permitting him to perform a particular act consciously with rational understanding of its necessity and advisability. Persuasion is linked to deeply rooted moral ideas in man's consciousness (*moral standards, principles, ideals*, etc.) which he considers obligatory. Predetermining the acts of a person, persuasions take the form of *motives*, which direct him in his activities. Persuasions are formed under the influence

of objective, daily conditions in the process of the social practice of people, social transformations and labour activities, their mastering the spiritual culture created by society, in the course of personal practical experiences, which makes it possible to deeply master definite moral principles and standards and to understand the need to observe them. The process of the formation of persuasions is one side of the process of *moral education* of the individual (*Man and society, All-round integrated development of the personality*). 2. The transmission of moral ideas from one person to another, from society to its individual members, carried out mainly by means of clarification. Persuasion is the main method of moral education, which requires conscious mastering of moral principles by the individual.

PESSIMISM [L *pessimus* worst], an attitude according to which evil predominates in the world, man is doomed to suffering and there is nothing good in store for him in the future; the opposite of *optimism*. Pessimistic sentiments are usually

caused by the rupture of habitual social relations when individual social groups or whole classes are in a state of crisis and are doomed to disappear. Pessimistic sentiments are sometimes spread among the working people when they are economically and socially oppressed and see no way out of their situation. Man is profoundly affected by moods of doom and purposelessness of existence which quite often overcome him. This is particularly evident during crucial periods of history, when many people suffer from the collapse of their ideals, as well as in times of reaction when man is deprived of spiritual freedom and of the possibility to creatively approach his social-political activities. Shades of pessimism can be traced to the poetry of the epoch of disintegration of the primitive-communal system. E.g. the Greek poet Hesiod (8th-7th cent. B.C.) thought that there was no way for man to avoid grief and suffering; this is the will of the gods. Pessimism in the evaluation of man is characteristic of the ethics of *Stoicism*. Religious

morality is also fundamentally pessimistic. According to Christian dogma, evil dominates the world and man is sinful by nature. "Therefore I hated life... For all is vanity and vexation of spirit," we read in Ecclesiastes in the Bible. "Yet man is born unto trouble," the book of Job notes. *Buddhism* considers things fastening man to life as the cause of his suffering. Religious morality "softens" its pessimism, though, admitting the possibility of getting rid of grief and suffering in the other world (Christianity) or in the state of nirvana, i.e., in complete aloofness from everything terrestrial (*Buddhism*). But such an optimism is illusory: it is based upon rejection of the value of life on earth, on eschatological expectations of Doomsday, on belief in the forthcoming mystic reign of spirit. The spread of pessimistic sentiments in modern times is caused by social contradictions of the period of establishing and achieving domination of capitalist relations. In literature and poetry, it manifests itself in the decadent perception of reality. "Bitterness and boredom,

that is our life; it is so because the world is muddy... Our race is fated to nothing else but death," wrote Giacomo Leopardi, Italian romantic poet. Pessimistic concepts also appear in philosophy. According to *Schopenhauer*, man's wishes can never be satisfied, and "life is thus essentially suffering". It is only in giving up his lust for life will he be able to get rid of suffering. Eduard *Hartmann*, developing Schopenhauer's ideas, believes that humanity, having realized that happiness is impossible to attain and that suffering is inevitable and eternal, admits the absurdity of existence and craves for non-existence. Their German follower, Philip Mainländer, speaks of the will to death, as there can be no other purpose for humanity in the world which is perishing. *Nietzsche's* concept of pessimism is rather peculiar. Rejecting the philosophy of decay and pessimism of the kind Schopenhauer proposed, Nietzsche, in order to achieve the ideal of superman, calls for justification of life, including its most horrible, ambiguous and false aspects. Pessimism of

strength—this is how he calls the mortal struggle with the weak, inclination to everything vile, evil, horrible. The ideologists of fascism borrowed this idea of Nietzsche's and interpreted it in the spirit of racism. In modern philosophy, the pessimistic outlook is expressed in *existentialism* (the idea of freedom and existence for the sake of death). Marxist ethics rejects the pessimistic view of the world, as it contradicts the whole history of the development of society and paralyzes man's social activity. It regards the problem not only in respect to the correlation of good and evil in a certain period of time (evil often triumphed over good in history) but in connection with the interpretation of the laws of the progressive development of society, ideas of social and moral progress. Such a view of reality does not presuppose negation of the existence of social and moral evil but the understanding of the necessity to fight it.

PHARISAISM, a negative *moral quality* which characterizes the individual in terms

of how one fulfils moral demands. It is an expression of moral *formalism* and is a form of *hypocrisy* and *sanctimony*. It involves the strictly formal, prescribed, but superficial carrying out of moral obligations to the extent that they have received official sanction or have become part of tradition. This understanding of morality leads to the observance of set *rituals*, which have lost real social and human meaning. The term itself is derived from the name of an ancient Judaic religious-political sect—the Pharisees, originally a democratic and relatively progressive sect in comparison to the other forms of Judaism. However, the Pharisaic movement later took on elements of extreme *fanaticism*. The earlier Christian ideology subjected the Pharisees to criticism and counterposed the internal morality of religious feeling to the outward morality. When Christianity became the predominant ideology, its morals acquired in some cases, a Pharisaic character. This term is used to define the efforts of individual persons to represent morality as a set of common truths, to give it an of-

ficial bureaucratic character, and to substitute external supervision for personal convictions. It also implies the fulfilment of moral demands not in keeping with the individual's moral code but for show and hiding under the guise of morality, *careerism*, hypocritic and moral unscrupulousness.

PHILANTHROPY [Gk *philanthropia* love for mankind], charity as a specific form of *humanism*; the aggregate of moral ideas and actions directed towards the assistance of the poor, the maimed, weak, or any person who suffered tragedy and is in a miserable situation which he cannot change. The historical situation engendering philanthropy is characterized by the fact that people engaged in philanthropic activities do not maintain family or any other rigid ties imposing on them obligations as regards reciprocal assistance. They noticeably differ by their social status and level of wellbeing, recognize universal humanistic ideas of the human fraternity and active love for one's neighbour. Philanthropy forms a

zone of a morally selfless behaviour and is aimed at mitigating social contrasts and softening social morals and manners. Philanthropy did not exist in primitive society or classical antiquity. The practice in Greece and Rome of holding social meals, giving money, building temples, public baths, etc. was of a different nature because the aid was for all free citizens. It was not an act of *beneficence*, but an obligation of the government and the wealthy. Philanthropy began in Imperial Rome to calm down the rapidly increasing numbers of the free poor, who were inclined to rebellion. The wealthy citizens and the state were forced to give voluntary donations. As Paul *Lafargue* accurately stated, "Fear is the mother of public charity." The newly formed Christian Church used philanthropy to win the poor over to its side. Subsequently, it began to regard philanthropic activities as its predestination and linked them to religious motives (a remission of sins, a place in the paradise, etc.). A beggar, an encounter with whom in ancient times was considered a bad

omen, was now declared to be a person pleasing to God. The young bourgeoisie were strongly opposed to philanthropy, which they viewed as an element of feudal oppression and a source of inactive *parasitism*. A special decree issued during the Great French Revolution in 1793, for example, declared alms-giving a *misdeed*. Having maintained their own rule, the bourgeoisie changed its view of philanthropy and began to practise it widely both in state and private forms. Philanthropic organizations and activities play an important role in the social mechanism of the bourgeois countries. Many philosophers of the modern epoch were not inclined to see an adequate form of humanism in philanthropy. *Kant* believed that philanthropy humiliates a poor man. *Marx*, *Engels* and *Lenin* criticized philanthropy for they believed that, being incorporated in the logic of antagonistic class relations, it becomes a smokescreen for exploitation and is a manifestation of moral *hypocrisy*. Exploitative elements try to display generosity to the very people

whom they themselves have plundered by giving back to them only "the hundredth part of what belongs to them" (*Engels*). Philanthropy creates a sense of worthlessness among those who receive alms, and among those who give them—a sense of vanity and superiority. The concrete role of philanthropy, both as an ideology and a practice, in the history of the Soviet society, confirms that the assimilation of the humanistic experience of the past by socialism was not a smooth process. It proceeded from confrontation and negation to *tolerance* and acceptance. The socialist revolution put an end to charity as it had been practised in Russia and in doing so, it was guided by the conviction that humanism should become an effective philanthropy which permeates all aspects of social relations rather than being demonstrated in extraordinary circumstances. However, actual experience refuted these expectations and reproduced, although in a much mitigated form, the historical situation to which a natural reaction was the revival of such a form of

philanthropy as charity. It is necessary not only as an instrument for assisting the least socially protected strata of the population but also as a channel of social activities, the display of kindness and moral self-education.

PHILISTINISM, a *moral quality* which in a general form characterizes the way of life and thinking limited by the pursuance of narrow personal interests. In Russian, it is close in meaning to "bourgeois". It may also be associated with *cowardice*, political cringing, *hypocrisy* in morals and *vulgarity* in tastes. Initially, in pre-revolutionary Russia the term philistine had only a socio-economic meaning (the urban middle class). However, already beginning with the mid-19th century, under the influence of the comedy by Jean Baptiste Molière "Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme", which was translated into Russian as "The Philistine in the Nobility", that term began to imply a certain moral and aesthetic connotation and, later, an ideological political meaning characterizing world

outlook and behaviour typical of that social stratum. Philistinism began to denote interests limited to the pursuance of personal happiness accompanied by a profound scorn of those lower on the social ladder, fawning before high society, and vulgar tastes. Today philistinism means a desire to make one's life "easy-going" by any means, to adapt to a situation, make a career and attain personal prosperity, a slavish imitation in tastes; attempts to stand apart from the rest of the people and prove one's superiority and originality, unscrupulousness in public affairs and politics. In the individual psychological aspect, philistinism is flabbiness of the moral fibre, aesthetic vulgarity, utilitarianism and pettiness.

PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE, the orientation of an individual's view of his place and role in public life (as distinct from his social status and position). On a moral plane philosophy of life is a system of conduct of life which is determined by the individual's *persuasions, ideological integrity* and *conscience*.

Man's position in relation to any socially significant issue constitutes his philosophy of life inasmuch as it corresponds to the objective logic of development of social reality and reflects the actual alignment of social forces affecting this development. The criterion of truth and rightness of a particular philosophy of life is based on its conformity to the progressive tendencies in the development of society and the interests of the advanced social forces. Philosophy of life constitutes one of the most important features of the individual's personal development, determining his place in the historical process. The development of the individual is at the same time his conscious choice of a particular position on life (*Moral choice*). The substance of personal choice of a certain philosophy of life is, finally, determined by the ideals and values of society, a class or a social group to which this individual belongs. But this in no way belittles the role of the individual himself in determining his attitude to the world. Philosophy of life is an expression of

the social activity of man which is based on ideological conviction and adherence to principle. The moral basis of an active position in life is the principle of unity of word and deed expressed in man's striving to realize a social, including a moral, ideal in practice. The active stand in life is countered by a passive one, in which man assumes the position of a detached and neutral observer. In the moral sense, such passivity is identical to indifference which, more often than not, nourishes *treachery* and desertion. A special case of departure from an active position in life is the gap between words and deeds, which testifies to the declarative, formal nature of man's conviction, and at times to his moral *hypocrisy*.

PISAREV, Dmitry Ivanovich (1840-1868), Russian revolutionary journalist, literary critic and materialist philosopher. Was imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress in St Petersburg from 1862 to 1866. One of the most brilliant representatives of the school of *Chernyshevsky*, Pisarev was a con-

sistent opponent of feudal and bourgeois morality. Hence, the accusing (nihilistic) character of the enthusiasm in his speeches aimed at refutation of medieval religious-moral dogmas, the ideas of *authoritarianism* and time-serving preached by the ideologists of bourgeois liberalism. Genuine morality presupposes man to be himself, free manifestation of every feeling without any external control and uneasiness, Pisarev believed. His ethical concept is based on the conviction that moral relations and ideas in society are stipulated by social relations. Thus, any change in morality is in the final count caused by changes in the sphere of material life. Pisarev regarded social apathy of the mass of the people of his time, the undeveloped sense of self-respect among the peasantry, and inclination to spontaneous outbursts of the poor as the result of the influence of circumstances upon working people in a society where private property predominates. Pisarev pointed out the necessity to elaborate the morality of "the new people", of revolutionaries who

assume the responsibility for people's destinies. Following Chernyshevsky and in accordance with the principle of *utilitarianism*, he gave a revolutionary interpretation to the theory of "rational egoism" (*Egoism, theories of*), referred to science and rational knowledge as the basis of the new morality. Man's knowledge-based conviction in the righteousness of his cause is, according to Pisarev, a major moral quality. Admitting the legitimate nature of a forcible revolution as a possible way to the future society, Pisarev still believed that clashes between the mass of the people and their oppressors can unleash passions and lead to excessive bloodshed. To avoid this, a high moral consciousness of revolutionary leaders is needed who must strive to reduce force to a minimum. The principles of revolutionary ethics developed by Pisarev influenced the progressive youth of his day as well as revolutionaries of the succeeding generations. The effort to subordinate all human activities to the principles of utilitarianism, tes-

tifies to the historically limited scope of his concept.

PLATO (428/7-348/7 B.C.), Greek philosopher, disciple of *Socrates*, founder of the teaching of objective idealism, head of the Academy (philosophical school) he founded in Athens. Plato's philosophical works (the major ones are "Sophist", "Parmenides", "Theaetetus", "Republic") are written in the form of dialogues, epigrams and letters. Plato considered being, which cannot be sensuously perceived and can be cognized by reason alone, as the basis of everything existent. Being ("ideas") is counterposed to non-being or matter—the principle of the appearance of things in space. Plato proclaimed the "world soul" embracing the world, to be the mediator between "idea" and "matter". The "idea" of good reigns over the kingdom of eternal and invariable "ideas": it gives objects the ability to be known, to exist and become an entity. Good is not an entity, but is above the limits of an entity in its virtue and force and is the origin of everything. The

idea of good imparts the character of teleological idealism to the teaching of Plato, based on the idea of the highest expedience governing the world, as well as of ethical idealism: all things are aimed at good, although their sensible nature prevents them from achieving this good. The highest purpose of all living beings, the object of their aspirations, is happiness which is to possess good. Plato considered the teaching of the "idea" of good to be the highest of all philosophical teachings. The world of sensible things is, according to Plato, in the middle between the sphere of being and of non-being and is the unity of opposites: of being and non-being, the identical and the non-identical, the invariable and the changeable, the motionless and the moving, that which is pertaining to unity and the plural. The ethics of Plato is permeated with theological concepts of his theory of "ideas" and the teaching of the triple structure of being: actually existent ideas, the world soul and the world of sensible things. This triple structure is reflected in man's soul, in which

Plato distinguishes three abilities: intellectual, volitional and emotional (the first is the dominating one). Plato imagined this as a winged chariot, where the charioteer—reason—drives the two horses personifying the volitional and the emotional principles of the soul. Every individual soul, according to such an interpretation, is the outflow of the world soul. The main virtues are determined by the triple union of the soul: wisdom (the virtue of intellect), courage (the virtue of the will) and temperance (the virtue of enlightened passions or emotions). The fourth cardinal virtue—justice—carries out the synthesis and equilibrium of these three. The ethical teaching of Plato has undergone a certain evolution. In his early dialogues, Plato is under the considerable influence of the ethical rationalism of Socrates and regards any knowledge as virtue. Then knowledge is associated with love (Eros), and in the "Republic" it is regarded in unity with the state of the body. In the "Phaedo" the body is regarded as the grave of the soul. Plato's views on the correlation of the

intellectual element and pleasure are typically Hellenistic. On the one hand, happiness is achievable only for the spirit, for the thought that gets free of everything sensuous and is drawn to good, to Deity (from this standpoint even the only function of the state is to serve the philosophical virtue). On the other hand, the ethical teaching of Plato is concluded with the teaching of the unity of reason and sensuous pleasure. The basic concept of Plato's ethics is the equilibrium of spiritual, as well as corporal forces and abilities. The concurrence of knowledge and virtue is regarded as the wise and blissful state of all the natural abilities of man.

PLEKHANOV, Georgi Valentinovich (1856-1918), an outstanding leader of the Russian and international workers' movement, theoretician and propagandist of Marxism in Russia. Plekhanov believed that the superiority of the Marxist dialectical method of research is most pronounced in the sphere of morality, for only Marxism gave scientifically jus-

tified answers to age-old moral problems. Plekhanov subjected to criticism false concepts of the history of ethical thinking, according to which, invariable human nature is the basis of morality. Plekhanov regarded morality as a social phenomenon. He wrote that "the moral development of humankind gradually ... adjusts itself to the actual requirements of society... But the historical process of this adjustment takes place ... independently of the individual's will and reason." Regarding the problem of the correlation between personal and public interests, Plekhanov opposed both the substantiation of morality by egoistic calculations (he pointed out the weak points of *Chernyshevsky's* theory of "rational egoism" in this connection) and the repudiation of the interconnection between morality and people's practical interests. "The basis of morality," he wrote, "does not consist in the pursuit of personal happiness but of the happiness of an integral whole—a tribe, a nation, a class, entire humanity". This does not exclude the "utilitarian base of

this lofty aspiration"; individual altruism stems from "social egoism". Noting the class character of morality in class society, Plekhanov further elaborated the Marxist concept of the downfall of bourgeois moral principles in the course of class struggles and the appearance of a new, proletarian morality. He showed that the moral ideal of the proletariat is being formed in close connection with the sum total of social relations and with the position of the given class in society. Free moral activity is a manifestation of man's conscious implementation of his ideals elaborated on the basis of the scientific knowledge of the laws of development of nature and society. Plekhanov criticized the viewpoint of idealists regarding the correlation of morality and religion and insisted that morality is not inherently linked to faith in the supernatural. He emphasized that religion sanctifies the morality of the ruling classes. Plekhanov's research into the history of ethical thought, including the ethical outlook of the French materialists of the 18th century, is of

great interest. Their theoretical contribution to ethics, according to Plekhanov, is the conclusion that man is a product of his environment. Still, Plekhanov believed, the French materialists concentrated on man's individual nature and his individual development and ignored the laws of social history. Plekhanov pointed out the formal character of *Kant's* ethics. He highly appreciated the dialectical approach of *Hegel* to the sphere of morality and the new ideas *Feuerbach* brought as compared to the ethical teaching of the French materialists. He gave an all-round characterization of the ethical teaching of *Chernyshevsky*. In positively assessing it, he still noted that *Chernyshevsky* did not go beyond the narrow limits of the ethical views of the Enlightenment and saw reason as the mainstay of morality. Plekhanov subjected to sharp criticism, *Tolstoy's* teaching of all-forgiving love and non-resistance to evil. He opposed *ethical socialism* disclosing the attempts of revisionists and Neo-Kantians to supplement Marxism with idealist ethical theories. In the

years of the First World War, Plekhanov referred to the simple rules of morality to justify his defencist position. Plekhanov's concept of Marxist ethics exerted strong influence on the development of ethical thought in the USSR. In particular, it borrowed Plekhanov's idea of social utilitarianism and social usefulness as the foundation of morality, an idea which is far from obvious in its essence and contradictory in its practical consequences. Plekhanov's ethical views are expounded in his "Essays on the History of Materialism" (1896), "On the So-Called Religious Seekings in Russia" (1915), and "N.G. Chernyshevsky" (1909).

PLOTINUS (c. 205-c. 270), Greek philosopher who systematized idealist teachings based on *Plato* and called Neoplatonism. Plotinus's works were published by his disciple, *Porphyry*, who divided them into the six "nines" ("Enneads")—nine treatises each. Besides *Plato*, Plotinus's ethical views were formed under the influence of *Aristotle* and of the

ethics of *Stoicism*. The ethics of Plotinus was formed in the epoch of Hellenism with its characteristic huge slave-owning monarchies, which destroyed the polis democracy and, like the ethics of the Stoics, is of an individualistic nature. He rejects the social ethics of Plato and develops his ethical ideas only in the context of individual morality of personal improvement. But unlike the cosmopolitan ethics of the Stoics (the teaching of obedience of the "citizen of the world" to the laws of the Universe governed by Providence), the ethical individualism of Plotinus is the teaching of "escape" from evil and from the imperfect material world, to the transcendent one by way of self-improvement and dialectical ascent through the intuition of beauty to the highest good. Man's purpose, according to Plotinus, is to rise above the material world through ascetic virtue and to become God-like. The first stage of virtues is the stage of civil virtues. Their particular feature is measure, which is characteristic of the ideal world

of forms, the limit and "eidoses" (mental "types"). They are followed by the virtues of "purification"—riddance of everything bodily as alien to the essence of the soul. Purification makes man sinless, improves him. However, the final goal is not to become sinless, it is to become God-like, to become assimilated with Reason. Thus, purified virtues are superior to the civil ones and contemplational virtues are superior to the purified ones. The ascent of the soul to the highest good lies through the path of aesthetical life (the ascent to the universal beauty), through passions of love (the ascent to bodiless beauty) and through philosophical life (the ascent to genuine reality). The latter is implemented by means of mathematical education and dialectics—the basis for gaining and improving natural virtues and principles of morality. Happiness, according to Plotinus, is life as a whole. But for every living being happiness is only a possibility. Man attains happiness when he leads not only a sensuous life, but also lives by his reason, for happiness lies in

the rational part of the soul. It coincides with perfection, i.e., does not depend on external boons and is attainable only by the real (inner) man who has everything for happiness inside himself. External boons are not genuine as they only provide the necessary conditions for bodily existence. The moral ideal of Plotinus is flight from evil. Evil is defined as matter, as the lack, antithesis or absence of good. Absolute lack of good is evil. The relative or partial absence is vice. It is the weakness of the soul which in itself has plenty of forces. The flight from vices is the victory of the soul over matter which, although it cannot occupy the place of the soul, still darkens the light emanated by the soul making it dim. Thus, a vice is the light of the soul dimmed by matter. Despite the illogical and irrational elements, the ethics of Plotinus is the ethics of Hellenistic intellectual idealism. In the epoch of feudalism it was ousted by *Christian ethics*.

POLITENESS, a *moral quality* characterizing the behaviour of a person for whom respect for

others has become an everyday standard of behaviour and habitual conduct. Politeness is an elementary requirement of *etiquette*, which includes: consideration, outward display of benevolence in relation to everyone, a readiness to perform a service to anyone in need of it, deference and tact. The opposite of politeness is *rudeness*, boorishness, *arrogance* and disdainful attitude to people (*Personal ethic*).

PRAGMATISM [Gk *pragma* deed], a trend in the philosophy of morality widespread in the USA from the beginning of the 20th century up to the sixties. William James, the founder of the ethical teaching of pragmatism, formulated its two initial principles: good is that which meets a definite moral requirement; every moral situation is unique and therefore it needs an absolutely new decision in every single case. Later these theses were developed into a whole theory by the philosopher Dewey, by the ethicist James Tafts, by sociologists George Mead and Albion Small. Pragmatists declare

themselves the opponents of the two extremes in ethics: on the one hand, of moral *dogmatism* and *absolutism*, which regard moral values as something universal, timeless, separated from changing situations in life; on the other, of *irrationalism*, *scepticism* and *neopositivism* which deny the fact that moral ideas are based on knowledge. However, analysis of the content of the pragmatist theory of morality still reveals that it did not escape relativism itself. Emphasizing the "practical" character of their ethical theory, pragmatists, at the same time, deny the significance of common moral principles. They insist that man himself is to solve his moral problems in each concrete situation. Thus, in fact, pragmatists deny any theoretical treatment of practical problems. To their mind, only the problem of choosing the means and methods of achieving the set goals can be solved by reason, the goals themselves cannot be substantiated by reason, and this issue exceeds the limits of ethics and morality. Goals, according to Dewey, are determined by the volitional aspira-

tions of people and can be stated by man's reason only antedate, when he is already acting. The role of reason in morality is confined to the solutions of purely utilitarian tasks: what is the most effective way of achieving a particular (no matter what kind of) goal. Reason itself as a means of theoretical thinking is reduced to common sense.

PREDESTINATION in the religious systems of thinking is the predetermined nature of the moral *conduct* of man and, hence, of his "salvation" or "condemnation" by divine will. From the point of view of consistent monotheism all existence, in the final analysis, is determined by God's will as the primary cause. However, the idea of predestination clashes with the doctrine of the *freedom of the will* and man's *responsibility* without which no ethics are possible. This logical disparity exacerbates the contrast between the two types of religious psychology: on the one hand, the feeling of despairing *guilt* and irrational dedication to God and, on the other, dog-

matic rationalism based on the concepts of the "merit" of a good deed and salvation as a "reward" for it. The theological elaboration of the idea of predestination is given in the message of Paul the Apostle which links it to the concept of *grace*, as the divine gift bestowed on man which makes his own independent efforts a mere illusion. *Saint Augustine's* doctrine of predestination further emphasizes this tenet and is based on the pessimistic view of man, the sense of man's utter dependence on grace: divine predestination is recognized since without it there is no salvation for man. Augustine's doctrine was formed in polemics with Pelagius who believed that the free will of man was enough for salvation. The East adhered to the principle advanced by St John Chrysostom according to which, one should not speak of predestination but of God's prevision. God in some mysterious way, does not impose any restrictions on man's free will. In the West, disputes around this problem continued even after the denunciation of Pelagianism. The attempt of

Gottschalk (c. 805-c. 865), to treat Augustine's thesis on predestination as leading not only to salvation but also to destruction was condemned as an opposite extreme. Mature scholastics, especially the followers of *Aristotle* and *Thomas Aquinas*, stressed the free cooperation of man's will with divine grace. During the Reformation *Luther*, in further elaborating the motives borrowed from St Paul and Augustine and rendering them more explicit, advanced a doctrine of justification by faith alone in contrast to the Catholic concept of "merit". John *Calvin* went still further, bringing the doctrine of "dual" predestination to the idea that Christ sacrificed himself not for the sake of all people but for the chosen few. Calvinism became an ideological foundation of the behavioural stereotype of *Puritanism*. The merciless rejection of the condemned in contrast to the traditional pity for an unfortunate sinner, characterizes the new bourgeois attitudes ousting feudal patriarchal mores. Catholic counter-reformation opted for opposition to Augustine's line. Par-

ticularly consistent were the Jesuits who counterposed extreme ethical optimism to the gloomy views of the Protestants regarding the possibility of the free will. The Jesuit Luis Molina (1535-1600) went so far as to totally replace the idea of predestination with the doctrine of the "conditional awareness" of God and the readiness of the righteous to cooperate with grace. Precisely this awareness provides God with the possibility of rewarding the worthy ones "in advance" by bestowing on them spiritual gifts. Thus, the concepts of "merits" and "rewards" have been rendered universal. Modern Catholic theologians usually defend freedom of the will and the optimistic perception of predestination, and go so far as stating that even if man is not predestined for salvation, he can achieve it through his own efforts. At the turn of the century, the attitude of liberal Protestantism to the problem of predestination was dual: while idealizing the Augustinean-Lutheran psychology, its representatives were critical of its pessimistic nature which was,

however, approved by the so-called dialectical theology. The doctrine of predestination is a specific religious form of posing such important general ethical problems as the question of reconciling determinism and moral responsibility.

PRICE, Richard (1723-1791), English theoretician of morality, the head of the Neoplatonic ethical school in Cambridge. Price's principal ideas in ethics summarized in his work "Review of the Principal Questions in Morals" (1757) deal with two problems—the ontological nature and ways of cognition of *moral qualities* and *freedom of the will*. Analyzing Hutcheson's concept of the innate nature of moral feelings, Price goes further, posing a question: does it follow from this that the concepts of good and duty depend only on people's natural predisposition? Price comes to the conclusion that moral characteristics are objective and do not at all depend on consciousness. Duty is a primary indefinable quality of the human world (stipulated neither by useful-

ness nor pleasure, nor by any other social or natural relations). It is therefore comprehended by man as something self-evident, unconditional. Accordingly, the idea of duty is an elementary indecomposable concept; it has an a priori nature in man's consciousness. This aspect of the doctrine of Price and his adherents (Samuel Clarke, John Balguy, Ralph Cudworth, Richard Cumberland), was later developed by Henry Sidgwick in the 19th century and in modern *intuitionism*. The problem of freedom of the will is not solved by Price either in terms of ontology or psychology, but from the viewpoint of man's moral ability: man must possess it to be virtuous and answer for his deeds.

PRIDE, a social and moral *feeling*, a form of manifestation of the personality's *self-consciousness*. Like the feeling of *dignity*, pride in a certain way guides and regulates man's behaviour, demanding that his deeds accord with his idea of himself and do not allow him to act beneath his dignity and self-re-

spect. The feeling of pride is usually associated with personal merits, belonging to a special social group (nation, class, profession), with the possession of a definite property. The object of pride both reveals the moral make-up of a person (or a group of persons) and predetermines his behaviour. Pride in one's country, representing one of the most important aspects of national self-consciousness, leads people to patriotic actions (*Patriotism*). Pride associated with membership in a class guides the feelings and actions of people in different ways. The moral consciousness of the exploiter classes always associated the feeling of pride with a privileged social status. Thus, the feudal and slave-owning nobility were proud of their life of idleness and considered work, especially physical work, degrading. For a bourgeois, the amount of his capital and the profit he derives from it, determine the measure of his pride. A worker, however, is proud of living by his own labour and creating material values for the entire society. Socialist morality, highly respecting the dig-

nity of the human personality as it does, considers it quite-rightful for people to be proud of their achievements, their work, and their nation. However, it regards as impermissible the excessive praise of an individual, leading him to abandon his critical attitude to himself and turning it into complacency, conceit, arrogance and disdain for others. It demands from a person modesty with regard to the recognition of one's own merits.

PRINCIPLES (moral), a form of moral consciousness in which *moral imperatives* are expressed in most generalized form. A *moral standard* prescribes what concrete acts man should perform. The concept of *moral quality* defines individual aspects of conduct and traits of character, while principles reveal the general content of the given morals, express requirements worked out in the moral consciousness of society as regards man's moral essence, his purpose in life and the character of relationships between people. They determine the general direction of man's atti-

vities and usually serve as the basis for more specific rules of conduct (*Criterion of morality*). Besides principles which illustrate the content of morals, there are also formal principles showing the specific means of fulfilling moral requirements (e.g. *conscientiousness* and its opposites—*fetishism*, *formalism*, *dogmatism*, *authoritarianism*, *fanaticism*, *fatalism*). Although these principles do not substantiate any concrete rules of conduct, they are still closely connected with the nature of morals, illustrate the extent to which morality admits man's conscious attitude to the requirements made of him.

PROBABILISM [*L probablis* likely], a way of judgement justifying moral unscrupulousness by the ideas of *scepticism* carried to the extreme; the opposite of *rigorism*. It was introduced in ethics by the Jesuits (*Jesuitism*) who believed that while making a practical decision, explaining (*Evaluation*) any event or action without the knowledge of the whole truth, one should opt for the interpretation which seems most prob-

able and acceptable, when there are at least some grounds in its favour even if merely supposedly good intentions. Probabilism as a method of moral judgement is advanced every time when there is no reliable moral substantiation of a given action. Probabilism reflects the objective fact that moral decisions are not scientific syllogisms and depend on both the knowledge and experience, as well as abilities, tactfulness and emotional make-up of the agent. Probabilism most often acts as a means of justifying morally inadmissible and even criminal actions under the pretence that their true essence and consequences were not known and could not have been known.

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (or professional moral principles). The term is usually applied to: (1) codes of conduct prescribing a certain type of moral relations between people which appear to be optimal from the point of view of their professional activities; (2) the methods of substantiating these codes, the social-philosophical interpreta-

tion of the cultural and humanitarian purpose of a particular profession, its *ethos*. Despite the universal nature of moral requirements (*Equality*) and the presence of the universal work ethic of a class or society at large, there also exist specific rules of conduct for the increasingly growing number of types of professional activities. The emergence and evolution of such standards, of corresponding motivations and appraisals is one of the directions in the *moral progress* of humankind since they reflect the growing value of the individual and establish humanitarian criteria for professional activities. Professional ethics play a significant role in ensuring the continuity in the moral and cultural development of society: when epoches, social systems and regulation mechanisms supersede one another and the force of simple moral *commandments* grows weaker due to intensified social tensions, the explicit codes of professional ethics provide a stable order in the moral life of the people. However, these codes themselves are being deformed by the economic and so-

cial *alienation* which leads to the isolation of the professional "elite" from the body of ordinary specialists, to opposition of the interests pursued by different professional groups (professional group egoism), social degradation of professional activities and the selfish use of the knowledge and power of specialists. The elimination of private property and of exploitation of man by man, creates a situation in which the *interests* of the entire society and those of professional groups begin to coincide in the most essential points. In the final analysis, the *dignity* and interests of the representatives of a particular profession are asserted only to the degree to which they put into practice the general *principles* of socialist morality adapted to the specific features of their work and the degree of their awareness of their moral responsibility and the irreproachable performance of their professional duty. At the same time, socialism does not eliminate serious distortions in relations between the universal principles of morality and professional ethics when the first is formalized and

the second degenerates into a corporative, group "morality" which saps the ethos of the profession and becomes a component of the aggregate cause for a pre-crisis state of social morality. A low level of professional ethics is one of the most destructive and protracted consequences of the unwarranted experiments in the economy, stagnation in social life, operation of the administrative-command system in management. As a rule, professional ethics are identified in those varieties of specialized activities in which man himself is the object of research or work. (There exist *bioethics*, the *ethics of science*, managerial ethics, medical ethics, professional ethics of journalists, writers, artists, composers, workers of theatre, cinema, TV and radio, pedagogical ethics, professional ethics of the service sphere, etc.). Special *moral codes* take shape in the activities associated with the performance of specific social functions, for instance in the army and the police, in sports, in the activities of social-political organizations, etc.

PROSTITUTION [*L. prostituere* expose for sale], a kind of *deviant behaviour* involving the sale of one's own body for payment in kind or money, for satisfying sexual needs of another person. Prostitution as a profession, should be distinguished from lechery and extramarital liaisons which, incidentally, were regarded by the moralists of all times as prostitution. In the ancient Orient, there was a widespread form of prostitution when temple harlots sacrificed their virginity to gods personified by priests and visitors to the sanctuaries. For some time, it was even believed that a woman can become socially mature for marriage only through such "training". Sociological research revealed that the social status of, and the moral attitude to, prostitution directly depend on the model of the family prevailing in the given society (*Family and everyday morality*). In societies where pre.natal sex is tabooed and woman has a high social standing (but primarily for the purpose of procreation), prostitution plays the role of a compensatory alternative valve of

sexual satisfaction for most men. As for woman, her "introduction" into the world is always attended by a profound moral and psychological crisis due to the necessity of reevaluating her ego, sexual nature and social status. Many prostitutes who do not withstand the burden of social censure and the radical moral and psychological change, turn to drugs and alcohol. This stratum has a high share of suicides and neurotic ailments. The microcosm of prostitution creates its own subculture (normative and ritualized cant, specific money distribution relations, "code of honour", etc.), which exerts a pernicious influence on the personality of the woman engaged in prostitution and not infrequently she becomes entangled in crime. Prostitution is one of the most degraded forms of dehumanizing the personality and turning a person into a means of satisfying the desires of another person. This is a social and moral anomaly.

PROUDHON, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865), French petty-bourgeois socialist and theoretician

tician of anarchism, created the system of reformist petty-bourgeois socialism imbued with ethical *absolutism*. Proudhon advanced Utopian plans of the peaceful economic remaking of capitalist society into a just order based on equality of associated petty owners with the preservation of private property. Proudhon acquired his ideals of "eternal justice" from relations of commodity production. His concept reflected the mystical idea of absolute reason which supposedly rules the world and executes eternal laws of justice. In Proudhon's interpretation, the idea of justice acted as a law-governed tendency of nature and society towards offsetting antagonistic forces and phenomena and as moral justification of equality and autonomy of the individual in society, his social ties emerging in the process of exchange of reciprocal services. Proudhon regarded this petty-bourgeois justice as a normative principle of any society and idealized proprietary relations as its basis. As far as Proudhon's moral postulates were based on idealistic and

moralistic views (*Moralizing*), on the idea of the primordial plurality of incompatible and antagonistic elements in nature and society, he identified the search for social justice with the problem of establishing an equilibrium of various classes and class forces. He considered social contradictions irremovable in principle. In his concept of marriage-and-family morality, woman's role is confined to that of an obedient wife and housekeeper. He insisted that she should not be admitted to participate in production and social activities.

PUBLIC OPINION, one of the manifestations of mass consciousness expressing the attitude of people and various social groups (political, professional, age, regional, subcultural) to socially significant events and phenomena. The social status of public opinion depends on the forms of political and public life established in a given society, the degree of political and individual freedoms enjoyed by its citizens, the opportunity to publicly voice and defend one's view and by these

means influence social developments. In an authoritarian society public opinion actually becomes the view of the ruling class or a ruling social group and in this sense it can be no longer regarded as the opinion of the public. Essentially, public opinion is heterogeneous since it reflects interests of diverse social groups and individuals. It acts as a determining factor of individual consciousness and behaviour, including the views, *evaluations* and *actions* of people. Here their moral value does not lie in the fact that they are determined by public opinion (which as the view of a group, a collective or an organization can be either progressive or limited and reactionary, burdened with prejudices), but by the ability of a person to independently decide on his or her conduct in conformity with moral *duty* (*Freedom, moral*).

PUNISHMENT, a kind of *sanc-*
tion, an influence which is
exerted on man, less often on a
community or a group, in edu-
cation (in order to rectify one's
flaws and curtail one's oppor-

tunities) and in law (the lower-
ing of one's social status—the
deprivation of rights and
property, imprisonment). An
exceptional legal measure of
punishment is *capital punish-*
ment. The problem of punish-
ment in ethics is linked with the
definition of its final goals:
whether punishment is meted
out as retaliation, with the aim
of intimidating others, or as a
means of reforming the culprit.
In the historical aspect, punish-
ment stems precisely from
revenge since in principle, the
state prohibits blood feud as a
method of maintaining the bal-
ance between rivalling tribes or
communities and assumes upon
itself the obligation to protect
private persons. However, from
the moral viewpoint, punish-
ment as *retribution* is not just-
ified because revenge is retribu-
tion by evil for evil. Punishment
as an instrument for intimidat-
ing others and averting crime
in the future, is equally immoral
because in this case, an offen-
der is treated only as an instru-
ment in resolving the problems
which are associated neither
with the committed crime, nor
with the personality of the

criminal nor with his future benefit (*Categorical imperative*). Only such punishment is moral which is aimed at preventing the criminal from committing new crimes, and to this end, his freedom is being limited or he is deprived of it. Punishment is moral if it creates conditions for reforming the offender. The level of the moral and legal culture in society is measured by the attention it pays to preventing violation of the law, the conditions of confinement, the education and training of law-breakers and, after serving the sentence, rehabilitation for a decent life in society.

PURITANISM [late L *puritas* purity], way of life (*life style*) and activities of a person associated with strict adherence to the system of views characterized by asceticism, fetishistic austerity of morals, patriarchal treatment of the question of family and marriage. Historically, this term originates from the name of the religious-political and radical-reformist movement in England in the 16th and 17th centuries known as Puritanism. Bourgeois in its es-

sence, it had a pronounced anti-feudal and anti-absolutist orientation and developed under the banner of consistent "purification" of the Anglican Church from the remaining features of Catholicism. Puritanical ethics preaches hoarding, thriftiness, austerity, fanatical denial of luxury and wastefulness, rejection of luxurious ceremonies and festivities, extreme strictness in morality and religion, petty reglamentation of life and activities of the individual. Socialist morality rejects asceticism and Puritanism as a general principle of life. Requiring moral purity from people, it does not accept *sanc-timony*, *rigorism*, moral dogmatism. Man must reasonably satisfy his needs in accordance with the interests of the all-round development of his personality, the level of production and social wealth. All other considerations in favour of austerity contradict the principle of humanism and lead to moral hypocrisy.

PURPOSE OF LIFE, a concept of *ethics* and moral-ideological views through which man corre-

lates himself and his *acts* to supreme *values*, to the *ideal* (the highest good) thereby obtaining an opportunity to justify himself in his own eyes and the eyes of other people or an *authority*. From the point of view of the content of the highest good, there are the following types of the justification of the purpose of life: *hedonism* which identifies the purpose of life with physical pleasures or sensuous enjoyment; *pragmatism* which associates the purpose of life with success; corporativism (group *egoism*, loyalism) linking the purpose of life to belonging to a closed community pursuing its specific interests; perfectionism in which the purpose of life is identified with personal self-improvement; and *humanism* which sees the purpose of life in serving other people (*Altruism*). The attitude to the question of the purpose of life (in theory and practice), differs depending on whether it is con-

sidered attainable (*Optimism*), or its attainability is doubted (*Scepticism*), or life seems to be futile (*Pessimism*). It is difficult to supply a normative ethical substantiation for the purpose of life because, on the one hand, it is formulated in abstract terms, as an ideal concept, while, on the other, it should be applied to explain and assess specific actions and people in changing circumstances. The pessimistic attitude to the possibility of imbuing life with meaning is largely due to the fact that man cannot put into practice his ideas concerning an ideal life. That is why it is necessary that a universal substantiation of the purpose of life within a particular system of *morals* be perceived by every person individually in accordance with his opportunities and abilities and it must be expressed in his idea of his personal purpose and calling, of moral models and examples.

Q

QUIETISM [L *quies* peace], a moral principle formulated in the 17th and 18th centuries as a heretical teaching in Roman Catholicism; it required a passive contemplation of *good* and *evil* as manifestations of the will of God, denial of the calls of the world, indifference to suffering and readiness to accept any lot. Elements of quietism appeared in many ancient Oriental religious and mystical theories, in a number of secular theories of morality. In the ethics of *Schopenhauer*, quietism as the denial of the will to live is proclaimed as the highest good. In modern society, quietism is becoming one of the forms of moral *nilism* reflecting the sentiments of frustration, fatigue and *apathy* which are widespread among the petty-bourgeois strata. Quietism regards any

moral prescription as an attack by society on the liberty of the individual. In rejecting official morality, the spirit of *careerism* and consumption, it urges retaining moral purity by reducing to the minimum social contacts, as well as by passive fulfilment of moral obligations and by rejecting one's civic duties and responsibility for the state of affairs in society. Under socialism, too, when there arises a situation of moral *alienation*, quietism is able to captivate some people who adhere to a passive attitude to life. Its extreme forms are misanthropy, reclusion, vagrancy or a hippie way of life. But more often, it is moderate escapism, an imitation of participation in social life camouflaging the actual abandoning of one's professional calling, a "fictitious" performance of

family, community, friendship and other duties. In the period of a radical transformation of socialist society, the "doing-nothing ethics" creating an il-

lusionary peace of mind are losing their humanistic content and objectively impede the processes of democratic renovation.

R

RATIONALISM (ethical) [L *rationalis* reasonable], a methodological principle underlying many theories of morality. Rationalism manifests itself in ethics, as in philosophy, in attempts to create a comprehensive deductive system of morality based on the community of its concepts and ideas, to find a universal moral *principle* justifying all specific moral requirements applicable to different situations. People's moral concepts indeed form in their totality an integral system of logically interdependent concepts (*Consciousness, moral*) in which specific conceptions can be expounded by means of more general ones. But in making an absolute of this aspect of moral consciousness, rationalists maintain that all concrete moral problems encountered in life are solvable by a purely

logical conclusion deduced from a single general principle. They thereby belittle the importance of analyzing concrete conditions and circumstances and the individual's role in making a *moral decision*. In its extreme forms, ethical rationalism leads to dogmatized morality, to its transformation into a totality of truisms which contain ready-made solutions to all problems one faces in life. In the history of ethical teachings, rationalism most frequently manifested itself as a more or less consistent tendency. Elements of rationalism can be traced in the ethical teachings of *Plato* and *Euclid of Megara*. *Plato*, for instance, attempted to find a single basis for all individual virtues (seeing this basis in the concept of the highest good), and to give a general definition of *justice* which tabu-

lates all specific moral requirements. A rationalist tendency is contained in the teaching of the Stoics (*Stoicism*), Cicero, later in Thomas Aquinas and in Kant (*Formalism*). Essentially rationalist are the ethical systems of *hedonism*, *eudaemonism* and *utilitarianism* which reduce all moral norms and principles to one single requirement of bringing pleasure, *happiness* or benefit to people. In modern ethics, some neopositivists have been making efforts to devise a formal-logical system of concepts (*Language of morality*). All varieties of ethical rationalism equally exhibit the same methodological approach: deriving all moral requirements from a single principle, they do not scientifically substantiate it, but suggest that it be recognized as a self-evident fact which needs no proof. In the past, however, rationalism as a method of ethics (until it has been made an absolute), was on the whole progressive since its exponents set themselves the task of evolving a theory of ethics as a practical discipline to help people solve their life problems. It is precisely this as-

pect of rationalism that is most frequently criticized in modern philosophy of morality. Thus, ethical formalists assert that ethics cannot pose or solve, even in most general terms, moral problems for they do not belong to the realm of science (*Ethics of science*). Irrationalists (*Irrationalism*) consider that each moral situation being an absolutely unique moral problem, cannot in general be solved in a theoretically generalized form. Marxist-Leninist theory of morality accepts the most valuable, for the analysis of morality, aspects of the theories of ethical rationalism (*Logic of the language of morality*).

REDEMPTION, absolving oneself from *guilt* (partly or fully) for acts performed in the past, by full admission of guilt, punishment suffered or subsequent positive acts for which man merits forgiveness. Christian morality sometimes treats redemption, in a moral-symbolical manner, as a result of a *ritual* observed. Humankind's redemption from the original *sin*, as distinct from one's personal

sins, is attained through the torments Christ endured by voluntarily agreeing to the crucifixion for the sake of saving all people. This interpretation belittles the *responsibility* of man for his deeds and the *obligation* to rectify the evil inflicted on other people or society. Despite its religious form, the idea of redemption was a step forward to giving a concrete expression to the principle of *humanism*: the awareness that redemption is possible, makes it psychologically easier for man to exist in a world torn apart by social conflicts and to retain a chance for moral self-improvement. However, redemption is not reduced to *repentance* or penance which are only a necessary prerequisite for the atonement for a guilt. A guilty man must prove by his practical deeds that he deserves forgiveness.

RELATIVISM (ethical), a methodological principle of interpreting the nature of morality, underlying many ethical theories, which consists in imparting a relative, changeable and conventional character to moral concepts. In moral prin-

ciples, the concepts of *good* and *evil*, relativists see only the fact that they vary with different peoples, social groups and individual persons and are associated in a certain way with the interests, convictions and inclinations of people, being restricted in their significance by space and time. Relativism leads, in the final analysis, to the subjectivistic interpretation of moral concepts and judgments, to the denial of their objective meaning. Ethical relativism often expressed the aspiration of certain social groups to undermine and repudiate the dominating forms of morality, to which an absolute and dogmatic meaning was ascribed (*Absolutism*). Relativist views on morality were expounded already in slave-owning society. Pointing to the opposite moral concepts held by different peoples (that which is considered virtue with one people is condemned as vice with others), the Sophists emphasized the relativity of good and evil (good is that which is useful for these or other people). The relativism of the Sophists aspired to deflate the absolute moral pre-

cepts prescribed by the centuries-old traditions of the past. A similar attitude to moral principles was adopted by Plato's later followers who reflected in their ethical doctrine the ideological crisis of the slave-owning society. *Hobbes* and *Mandeville* developed the ideas of ethical relativism in modern times, attempting to undermine the fundamentals of the religious-dogmatic morality of feudalism, refuting the concept of its absolute character and divine origin. They counterposed their vulgar-materialist interpretation of morality to its religious-idealist understanding: the source of morality is to be found in the interests and inclinations of people, in their concepts of the useful and harmful as well as in the requirements of the state order. Emphasizing the relative character of moral concepts, *Mandeville* criticizes the teaching on inborn moral feelings spread at that time (*Moral sense, theories of*). Some modern philosophers of morality expound extreme forms of ethical relativism combined with vigorous denial of any objective foundations of

morals. For example, the adherents of the emotivist theory (*Neopositivism*) hold that moral judgements, far from having objective content, express but the subjective attitudes of those who make them. It follows from this, that moral judgements can be considered neither true nor false and that their justification or legitimacy should not even be discussed: each man has the right to adhere to the principles he prefers, any point of view in morality being equally justified. This form of ethical relativism is close to *nihilism*. By proclaiming the principle of an absolute *tolerance* in morality the emotivists thereby, whether they want it or not, do not provide any guarantee against immorality and unscrupulousness.

REPENTANCE, admission of one's own *guilt* and condemnation of one's former actions. Repentance is manifested either in public admission of one's culpability and readiness to undergo punishment, or in a peculiar feeling of regret for the acts committed or designs conceived. Repentance has always been considered by moral con-

sciousness as an inevitable part of *redemption*. Repentance may be a manifestation of *conscience* or of the feeling of *shame*, but in both cases it conveys the role of man's *self-evaluation* of his deeds, which prompts his further actions. As a specifically moral act, repentance performs, however, a peculiar role in law which defines the measure of punishment, taking into account the repentance of the guilty party. This is an example of the interaction of *morality and law*.

REPUTATION [L *reputare* to compute, consider], opinion formed by people of the morals of a particular person (community), based on his past conduct, expressed in the recognition of his services, *authority*, in what is expected of him in the future, what measure of responsibility is imposed on him and how his acts are evaluated. Reputation is a specific case of moral relations. On the one hand, it embodies social recognition of the merits of a person's past activity, and on the other hand, exerts influence on the role and place of this per-

son in future joint activities. The reputation of a person is determined by the correspondence of that person's behaviour and individual traits to the moral criteria and personal moral standards.

RESPECT, one of the most important demands of morality, implying an attitude to people which in practice (in the corresponding acts and motives, as well as in social conditions), shows respect for the *dignity* of the individual. The concept of respect formed in the moral consciousness of society presupposes: justice, equal rights, the possibility to fully satisfy the interests of people, granting of their freedom; trust in people, careful attention to their convictions, their aspirations; tactfulness, politeness, consideration, modesty. The concept of respect is determined by the character of society and social relations.

RESPONSIBILITY (moral), a category of *ethics* and a moral concept that characterize an individual in terms of his or her performance of moral require-

ments; it expresses the extent of an individual's and a social group's involvement both in their own moral amelioration and in the improvement of social relations. Whereas an individual's *duty* is to understand moral requirements, apply them in a specific situation and observe them in practice, the extent to which this requirement is met or to which a person defaults on it (*Guilt*), is a matter of personal responsibility. Thus, responsibility is a measure of the correspondence between an individual's moral activity and his or her duty, such correspondence being assessed in terms of the individual's capabilities. Accordingly, the problem of responsibility covers the following issues: whether the individual is at all capable of meeting the requirements imposed on him; the extent to which they are correctly understood and interpreted; how far the individual's ability to act extends; whether or not the individual must be accountable for a required result and for such consequences of his actions which are influenced by outside conditions; whether or

not he can foresee such consequences. Moral theorists have dealt with these questions based on their view of the individual's position in their own society. In a primitive tribal society, man was fully controlled by "destiny" and at the same time held to blame for every consequence of his actions, which he could not have foreseen. Since the individual's position in modern society remains equally contradictory, many philosophers either hold man fully responsible for the consequences of his actions irrespective of the effect of external conditions (*existentialism*) or acquit him completely for his failure to correctly understand his duty and to achieve the desired results (*deontological intuitionism*). Marxist ethics resolves the problem of responsibility in specific historical terms. A person bears responsibility for the social content of his or her life within the bounds of the opportunities granted by the existing social relations and circumstances. As regards the moral choice of a person and the attitude to his or her actual place in the system of social

ties, here responsibility is not limited by anything but the moral requirements themselves. Thus, a slave bears no responsibility for his being a slave but is quite responsible for his attitude to his position as a slave. The extent of everyone's personal responsibility is directly linked to the objective opportunities and the specific historical level of responsible behaviour in society. It increases with the development of the *activity, consciousness* of people, the initiative and creativity of people in all spheres of life. Responsibility should be dealt with in terms of the organic unity of rights and *obligations*, with due regard for the position held by individuals and groups in the system of social ties. An individual's responsibility is proportional to his or her social authority and actual ability. The problem of responsibility is, in the final analysis, the question of the real moral *freedom*. This depends on the freedom of other people and is realized in full only given the all-round development of every individual (*All-round integrated development of the personality*).

RETRIBUTION, reward or punishment for deeds committed in accordance with their moral *value*. Equal retribution has long since been considered one of the indispensable requirements of *justice*. The principle of retribution is used in law (punishment in conformity with the degree of the crime) and also underlies the material incentives of man's activities. In morals, the problem of just retribution appears in connection with the exacerbation of contradictions between public and private interests leading to the gap between the *virtues* of man and his success in life. The essence of moral retribution is the restoration of harmony between *good* and *happiness* which was possible, according to many thinkers of the past, only in the idea or in the beyond. *Kant*, for instance, in order to justify the possibility of exercising good-will introduces the postulates of God and the immortality of the soul. Marxist ethics are based on the concept that the conflict between the moral claims of man and his natural striving for *benefit* and happiness, can be overcome in the course of the

humanitarian transformation of social relations.

REVENGE, a form of *retribution* exacted from the offender by the offended person himself or his relatives, the payment in kind with *evil* for evil. The classical social-cultural form of revenge is the *talion* which developed in tribal society and was based on reciprocal justice. The extension of talion to the relatives and close of kin to the culprit characterizes the blood feud. In class society, the act of retaliation is assumed by the state represented by corresponding legal bodies. However, revenge as a concept is retained in the residual forms of talion as a specific element of class "codes of honour", as well as an inescapable resort by an individual to protect certain personal interests which could be guaranteed neither by the state nor society due to the lingering differentiation (in an exploiting society) of the private and the common, of personal, group and social interests. As distinct from the blood feud and the class codes of honour which regarded it as an import-

ant social virtue in the modern society, revenge is primarily perceived as a secret vice, a kind of perfidy. From the viewpoint of *morality*, revenge cannot serve as an effective instrument for regulating personal relations and settling conflicts since it only creates the illusion of restored equality and justice while actually exacerbating misgivings, mistrust and hostility in relations between people.

REWARD, a kind of *sanction*, the opposite of *punishment*, a positive influence of an authoritative person or a social group on a person or a collective expressed in the public recognition of their merits. Reward may be associated with raising the social status or improving material conditions. Apart from *approval*, the social significance of reward is determined by the fact that it draws attention of other individuals or collectives and *public opinion* to examples worthy to be followed. Thus, there emerges a social-psychological mechanism for the reproduction of socially useful actions and their results. However, the same mechanism can

also provoke morally unacceptable *conduct* motivated exclusively by the lust for reward. That is why moral reward is an approval taking into account not only the results of an action but also its *motives* (*Evaluation, moral*).

RHAZES (Abu-Bakr Mohammed ibn Zakariyya ar-Razi, c. 865-925 or 934), Persian philosopher, encyclopaedist scientist and physician. In his main ethical treatise "On Spiritual Medicine", Rhazes shows how in his struggle against vices and shortcomings, man can subjugate passions to reason and live a virtuous life. In his book, "The Philosophic Way of Life", *Socrates* is presented as the embodiment of the moral ideal. In examining the experience of pleasure, Rhazes associates it with the return of man to his natural state and perceives pain as the departure from that state. Both these feelings are dulled if man finds himself in a natural or unnatural state for a long period of time. He taught that there should be no *fear of death* since with the extinction of the body the soul also de-

parts into the void. One should not be afraid of death believing in afterlife since there a better world awaits man. Rhazes emphasized the absolute sovereignty of human reason and its independence of any authority in discerning *good* and *evil*, the true and the false, the useful and the harmful. As distinct from most Muslim philosophers of the Middle Ages, Rhazes does not see practical value in holy scriptures and explains the viability of religious concepts by the force of the *habit* and the suppression of independent critical thought.

RIGHTNESS, a situation (state) reflecting certain moral (as well as legal, political or scientific) relations of man with society and other people. It embraces the following cases: when man's *acts*, his consciously chosen conduct answers the needs of historical development, people's interests, requirements of morality ("righteous cause", "proper actions"); when his *intentions*, aspirations and demands conform to the real state of things and existent standards of public life

("just demands", "well-grounded claims", "justifiable decision"); when his *persuasions* coincide with objective reality, are basically moral ("correct viewpoint", "genuine convictions"). The state of rightness (as well as its opposite, state of *guilt* or wrongness) is the subject of the moral *responsibility* of the individual. Irrespective of how man himself regards his actions and convictions, he is morally responsible to society for their correctness. Recognition of the wrong one has done (*Repentance*) helps man correct the mistakes of the past, choose the right direction in future.

RIGORISM [L *rigor* stiffness], a variety of *formalism* in morality; a moral principle characterizing how moral requirements are fulfilled by strictly and consistently observing certain moral standards irrespective of specific circumstances, in absolute compliance with duty, even in defiance of expediency, the interests of people and society. Rigorism is often associated with *fanaticism*, *asceticism*, developing at times into moral hy-

pocrisy and *pharisaism*. Reducing morality to the submission to strict rules, rigorism destroys, in essence, the human content of morality. Fulfilment of its requirements is transformed into pedantic abidance by the letter of the law. Man turns into a slave of false adherence to principle, blindly following moral dogma which has lost its truly moral meaning. Socialist morality, advancing high requirements for man, does not restrict his initiative or creativity by a comprehensive code of rules suitable for all occasions. It strives to equip man with general moral principles by applying which he himself will be able to decide how to act in specific circumstances.

RITUAL [L *ritus* sacred rite], a variety of *custom* or *tradition*; a historically formed or specially established standard of conduct which canonizes the form of executing actions, devoid (or gradually deprived) of direct social expediency, having only symbolical meaning. Rituals are ceremonies of a demonstrative character, performed often in a solemn atmosphere whose ulti-

mate aim is to inspire in people certain social feelings. Rituals bear a special significance in traditional societies, particularly in religious ecclesiastical practices where they serve to strengthen the religious feeling of the believers. In modern society, the ritualistic sphere is rather limited with the rituals usually practised on particularly solemn occasions such as holidays, marriage and the like. There exists a viewpoint in ethics that the essence of morality boils down to a generally accepted ritual. This point of view deprives morality of the element of purposefulness and consciousness, ignores its social significance, regards it only as an outward form and, thus, is the extreme degree of formalism in morality. It is equally wrong to counterpose morality to ritual. Many manifestations of morality, *etiquette* for instance, assume a ritualistic form. And this is inevitable inasmuch as moral standards contain the element of convention, of a simple contract.

ROERICH, Nikolai Konstantinovich (1874-1947), Russian

painter, writer, philosopher, poet, historian, archaeologist, traveller. In his work and life, Roerich put into practice the noble moral principles of *patriotism, humanism*, the struggle for peace and solidarity among nations, the protection and preservation of cultural heritage. Being better-known as a painter whose works are dedicated to the unity of man and cosmos, Roerich was at the same time the author of more than 30 literary works. A sophisticated and multifaceted personality, a zealot possessed by the great ideas of serving mankind, he set himself the task of finding the links Russia probably had with the ancient cultures of the Orient and to substantiate the idea of the unification of Asia. Roerich travelled to Tibet, Mongolia and China. He settled in India in the 1920's. Roerich was one of the initiators of the peace movement and advocated the preservation of the world cultural heritage. He was the creator of the Roerich Pact. The humanistic principles of the Pact received wide international recognition and bears the signa-

tures of 38 states. However, its future recognition was frustrated by the Second World War. Roerich, as the author of a philosophical ethical concept, attempted to blend the ethics of *Buddhism* and those of socialism. He envisaged mankind divested of *evil* and believed in people's improvement, in the power of knowledge and creativity and the transforming role of beauty. He resorted to the language of parables, sermonizing, fables and ethical legends. One can get an idea of his ethical concepts from his books and essays: "Puti Blagosloveniia", "Heart of Asia", "Fiery Stronghold", "The Gates to the Future", "Adamant", "Pages of Diary".

ROUSSEAU, Jean Jacques (1712-1778), French writer and philosopher. The peculiarities of Rousseau's ethical views are primarily determined by his social-political position. Rejecting the feudal order and its way of life, Rousseau likewise opposed capitalist relations of exploitation, bourgeois *egoism*, its unquenchable thirst for profit and the moral vices associated with

it. He subjected civilization based on the undisputed domination of private ownership to harsh, paradoxical at times, criticism arriving at the conclusion that the progress of culture caused, in those circumstances, social and moral regress, people's loss of freedom and happiness. The basis of morality, according to Rousseau, is to be found in man's initial natural aspirations not yet impaired by rational civilization. Man is good by nature and is characterized by self-preservation not developing into egoism and moderated by natural compassion. But natural man is isolated, therefore legal and moral standards regulating his conduct in society, cannot directly be derived from nature. Such standards emerge as a result of a *social contract* creating a collective organism—a civic society, in which man's acts assume a moral character, the concept of justice taking the place of instinct, and the voice of duty—the place of physical impulse. The most important moral properties of a social man, in Rousseau's view, are: diligence, simplicity of life and

morals, honesty and straightforwardness, and finally, the civic spirit, self-abatement of personal interest for the sake of social interests. The latter assumes particular importance for the ideal society built on principles of equalization and popular rule, as pictured by Rousseau, in which the extremes of poverty and wealth are eliminated, and freedom, equality and happiness of the citizens secured. However, private ownership is retained and with it the permanent threat of growing egoism. Rousseau upholds the principle of civic discipline, permitting the adoption of harsh measures of coercion in respect to the egoistical individual. The authority of the moral standards is, in his opinion, to be supported by religion. Rejecting Christian dogmas and ethics, Rousseau considered that compulsive faith in a retributive divinity is a condition of a firm state. His precepts on "civic religion" define the moral rules and citizens' obligations, the sanctity of the social contract and laws. At the same time, Rousseau justifies revolution against despotism

which violates the social contract: "Until people are forced to obey and do actually obey, they act well; as soon as, having a possibility to free themselves, they actually get free they act even better." Rousseau's educational ideas, novel for that time, are based on the entire system of his views. Rousseau maintained that the main task of education was the formation of man and citizen without coercion, by developing the child's natural potentialities and abilities. Rousseau's ideas exerted influence on the social-political and ethical views of the French revolutionaries, particularly the Jacobins. Encased within the framework of the petty-bourgeois moderate-equalizing ideal, Rousseau was not consistent in resolving the problem of harmony between the private and common interests. Rousseau's ideas greatly influenced the development of democratic and socialist thought. His major works propounding ethical ideas: "Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts" (1750), "Discours sur l'Origine de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes" (1754), "Contrat

Social" (1762), "Émile (De L'Éducation)" (1762).

RUDENESS, a negative *moral quality* characterized by disregard for the standards of conduct; the opposite of *politeness*. As an outward manifestation of disrespectful attitude to people, rudeness is expressed in uncon-

cealed ill will towards others, indifference to the interests and needs of other people, shameless thrusting of one's will and wishes on other people, inability to restrain one's irritation, unpremeditated or intentional offense of other people's *dignity*, undue familiarity, and foul language.

S

SAINT AUGUSTINE, see *Augustine*.

SAINT-SIMON, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Count de (1760-1825), French thinker, social scientist, Utopian socialist. Saint-Simon sought by applying natural-scientific methods to social science to create a philosophical system for establishing a rational society which would bestow the greatest benefit upon the greatest number of people. Like the concepts of the 18th-century rationalists, his science of man imparted a decisive role in society to human reason, to the prevailing scientific and philosophical views. However, unlike the rationalists he relied on the principles of historicism. The creative period in society's development, Saint-Simon asserts, is replaced by a destructive period. This is to be fol-

lowed by a higher social order instituted on the basis of new philosophical and moral ideas. The path to Saint-Simon's ideal—an industrial system—lies in the all-round development of the productive forces with the application of scientific principles which directly conform to his ethical views: elimination of the parasitism of the ruling classes and the introduction of compulsory productive labour for all members of society; equal opportunities for all to make use of their abilities; conversion of politics into a science of industry, and the state—from an instrument of governing people into an instrument of managing industry. To ensure that man's place in society is determined by his abilities, Saint-Simon proposes a joint working plan to embrace all entrepreneurs, which would

do away with the selfish private interests of the bourgeoisie. In his last work "Nouveau Christianisme", he "speaks directly for the working-class and declares their emancipation to be the goal of his efforts" (*Marx*). His religious-ethical concept of new Christianity was devised to supplement the material principles of the industrial system with a moral categorical imperative of religious belief. Its slogan: "all people are brethren". In addition to "The New Christianity" (published posthumously in 1825), Saint-Simon's major works are: "Du Système Industriel" ("On the Industrial System", 1821-1822), "Catéchisme des Industriels" ("Industrial Catechism", 1823-1824), "L'Industrie ou Discussions Politiques, Morales et Philosophiques" ("Opinions Literary, Philosophical and Industrial", 1825).

SANCTIMONY, as a negative *moral quality*, defines man's behaviour in terms of the ways of fulfilling moral requirements; a kind of moral *formalism* and *hypocrisy*. A sanctimonious person interprets ethical requirements in an extremely rigorous,

puritanical and intolerable way. He flaunts himself as an example of good behaviour and piety, ostentatiously demonstrating his "virtues" and making public mores his responsibility. Sanctimony as a social phenomenon, on the one hand, turns morals into a pretentious, flaunting, formal *ritual*, and on the other, transforms it into a secret surveillance, in justification of gross interference into the private life of every citizen. Sanctimony usually conceals distrust, suspicion, and a disdainful attitude towards human individuality. It flourishes when the overwhelming majority of people substitute the formal execution of moral requirements exclusively under economical, political or spiritual coercion, for a conscientious and thoughtful attitude towards morality. This is typical of all forms of oppression which imbue people with a sense of depression, passivity and indifference to everything around them. In such conditions, among the multitude of people there can always be found voluntary protectors of the existing order who express their loyalty

by supervising the trustworthiness of all others. On the contrary, the openness of social life, the democratic nature of power and all methods of social control, create conditions for neutralizing sanctimony and impeding the formation of this trait in new generations.

SANCTION (moral) [*L. sancire* make sacred], confirmation of moral requirements by justifying or condemning acts already performed (as well as social phenomena). In order to secure the fulfilment by all people of the demands required of them, society applies various kinds of sanctions—economic (material rewards or fines), legal (criminal responsibility), administrative enforcement and moral pressure. All these sanctions constitute various methods of *retribution*, *reward* and *punishment*, in one way or another associated with the real situation and interests of the individual. Moral sanction is a form of spiritual pressure exerted in terms of *evaluation* of man's conduct. In assessing an act as benevolent, moral consciousness prescribes

that not only the person who performed the given act, but also other people, should act in this way in the future. And contrariwise, a negative assessment signifies a moral ban on similar acts in future. Thus, moral sanction serves as an additional means of regulating people's conduct, strengthening the moral requirements expressed in *moral standards* and *principles*. Moral sanction does not require any officially confirmed authority or real power. Since man possesses moral consciousness, he is capable of evaluating his own acts and those of other people. The authority of moral sanction does not depend on the official or social position of the evaluator, but on his or her *conscientiousness*, and is defined by his or her understanding of moral requirements and ability to explain their meaning to other people. Moral sanction is applied not only to acts of individuals, but to social institutions, social phenomena and even to society as a whole.

SARTRE, Jean-Paul (1905-1980), French philosopher, exponent of so-called atheistic

existentialism, writer, journalist, public figure. Sartre's philosophy was opposed to the official bourgeois ideology. He associates depersonalization of man primarily with the progress of rationalist thinking, natural sciences, objective knowledge of man, seeing in them the means of converting the individual into an object of manipulation by the government. Sartre's ethical concept including elements of spiritual *stoicism*, is on the whole, a teaching of human morality subject to no coercive system whatever. Affirming the non-objective character of moral concepts emerging in man's soul, Sartre bases himself on anti-intellectualism and *intuitionism* in solving ethical tasks. In his rigorist teaching of morality which most emphatically requires authenticity, loyalty to one's principles, Sartre formally resurrects certain premises of Kant's ethics. Thus, the moral requirement formulated by Sartre: "For every man, everything happens as if all mankind had its eyes fixed on him and were guiding itself by what he does". This directly recalls the *categorical imperative*.

However, Sartre does not recognize moral standards as generally compulsory, considering each act unique and original. Fulfilment by the individual of his inner imperative is, according to Sartre, the atonement for the immorality of society and, consequently, a kind of sacrificial mission imposed upon man in any situation. The non-authentic social values themselves, Sartre asserts, are conditioned by the pusillanimity of the individual who does not dare to heed the voice of his conscience, the latter being treated by Sartre as an ingrained burden of inborn *guilt*. Freedom, devoid of a creative principle (frequently it is only a freedom to wish), appears as man's ideal unchangeable essence, present in any human act, even if absurd or irrational or perpetrated in a state of temporary insanity; man is condemned to be free. In essence, freedom is reduced by Sartre to formally comprehended autonomy of choice, indifferent to the objective meaning of the decision taken and the possibilities of its execution. Negating determinism in questions of duty and

freedom, Sartre avoids *fatalism* when he explains human conduct as directly dependent on the emotional shocks the individual once experienced (existentialist psychoanalysis). The combination in Sartre's philosophy of abstract *rigorism* with Freudian-type *naturalism* (*Freudianism*) leads, in the final analysis, to explaining moral flaws invariably by the imperfection of man. Against the symbolical background of social environment emerging as an undifferentiated anonymous bearer of violence, the moral subject again and again verifies his authenticity. This self-expression is backed by the most important categories of Sartre's existentialist philosophy: "marginal situation", "choice", "self-deception". Sartre's ethical views are expounded in his works: "L'Être et le Néant" ("Being and Nothingness", 1943), "L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme" ("Existentialism and Human Emotions", 1946), "Critique de la Raison Dialectique" ("Critique of Dialectical Reason", 1960), in his novel "La Nausée" ("Nausea", 1938), in his plays and essays.

SCEPTICISM [Gk *skeptomai* consider], 1. *moral*, a view of man and society degrading or negating their moral possibilities, denial of their moral efficiency. Moral scepticism can assume various forms: for instance, the proposition that man is evil and sinful by nature and is therefore unable to act morally, to know the true content of good, conscientiously and voluntarily strive for its fulfilment; or the denial of the possibility of overcoming the social and moral ills of society, and of creating a just and humane order to fulfil his moral ideal. This kind of scepticism is associated with disbelief in *moral progress* (*Pessimism*). Sceptical concepts of man's moral competence appear in the moral consciousness of society and in ethical theories in the periods of disintegration of a social system. 2. *Ethical*, a view of the nature of moral concepts which negates their objective significance and cognitive character. Scepticism was a noticeable trend in the post-Aristotelian ethics. From the point of view of the Sceptics, it is possible to offer clashing, alter-

native judgements on every issue, including moral problems, which would be equally trustworthy and unreliable. Hence, the requirement to withhold one's judgements which, in turn, rewards a person with emotional peace. Along with Pyrrho's scepticism (named after Pyrrho of Elis, the founder of the school), sceptic ideas in the antiquity were also developed within the Platonic tradition. Scepticism played an important role in the transition from the medieval system of thinking to the free spirit of the modern time (Pierre Bayle, *Montaigne*). A comprehensive, methodological justification of ethical scepticism was made in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (William Sumner, Vilfredo Pareto, Karl Mannheim). Present-day exponents of scepticism maintain that people's moral concepts do not reflect objective reality and thus, cannot be evaluated in terms of truth or falsity. People, they assert, are liable to ascribe to their moral ideas a rational meaning, objective significance, whereas actually they only express and substantiate their ac-

customed ways of behaviour in a particular society. This argument is fallacious not because it establishes a correlation between moral ideas and relationships, manners and customs current in society, but because it considers the latter as something casual and divorced from the objective laws of development of society. This leads to the conviction that moral concepts cannot be scientifically motivated or, to the contrary, scientifically criticized. The sceptical view of moral concepts and judgements is most pronounced in *neopositivism*. Marxist ethics regards moral concepts as a peculiar form of social consciousness which always reflects, in one way or another, the objective conditions of a society or a class. But the method of reflection in morality differs from the scientific method (*Consciousness, moral*). At the same time, the problem concerning the epistemological status of value judgements is still disputed and there is no generally recognized solution. Criticism of moral scepticism as a public sentiment and of scepticism in ethics as a methodo-

logical principle, does not imply totally discrediting sceptical motives, doubt in particular, which is a necessary and natural element of full-blooded life and research methods.

SCHELER, Max (1874-1928), German philosopher-personalist, one of the founders of *axiology*, the sociology of knowledge and philosophic anthropology. His thinking was influenced by the ideas of Edmund Husserl. In his work "Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik" ("Formalism in Ethics and Material Ethics of Values", parts 1 and 2, 1913-1916), Max Scheler, employing the phenomenological method of the intuitive "perception of essences", attempted, contrary to *Kant*, to elaborate a system of a priori essential ethics and axiology. According to Scheler, the values personified in gains (valuable things), should be set apart from gains as such. Values are not modified with the change of their bearers and are comprehended in the acts of sensuous perception as individual properties such as, light seen by vision, sounds coming to us

through hearing, etc. Being objective, they are not determined by wishes and goals. Rather, they serve as the basis of the latter and make room for the possible determination of a goal. While rejecting the identification by *Kant* of the a priori with the rational (conceivable), Scheler stresses the illogical a priori aspect of spiritual emotional acts. Following *Augustine* and *Pascal*, he speaks of the "logic of the heart" as distinct from the logic of reason and following *Franz Brentano*, considers the a priori nature of love and hatred as the ultimate basis of any other apriorism, including cognitive and volitional acts. According to Scheler, the intuitively evident nature of acts of preference and rejection establishes an ascending hierarchy of values: pleasure and *usefulness* based on it; vital values (health, etc.); spiritual values (beauty, justice, knowledge of the truth) and, finally, sacredness. All values have as their foundation the value of the infinite spirit, i.e., *God*. Values as such are absolute and only the empirical forms of their existence are relative (the historically and eth-

nically determined system of preferences — the style in art and *ethos* in ethics) and the degree of their cognition. The feeling of value should be awakened in man, and new values can be only discovered but not invented. According to Scheler, man, himself, is the bearer of *good* and *evil*, as a concrete unity (subject) of all possible acts rather than a volitional act (Kant). The value world of a person is determined by his or her frame of mind determining particular intentions, decisions and actions. Good and evil can never become the core of a volitional act because they exist as if on the reverse side of it. *Utilitarianism*, although it is a wrong theory of good and evil, reveals, however, the mystery of their social appraisal. Scheler states that any socially significant morality recognizes moral values only to the extent of their usefulness for an actually existing community. Any imperative ethics, including Kant's unyielding ethics of duty, is of a negative, critical and repressive nature, i.e., all rules and requirements are directed at eliminating negative values rather than at the practical real-

ization of positive values. The ethical ideas of Scheler were further elaborated by Nicolai *Hartmann*.

SCHILLER, Johann Friedrich (1759-1805), German poet, dramatist, art theorist. Schiller expounded violently anti-feudal and anti-monarchist views formed under the influence of *Rousseau*, *Lessing* and *Shaftebury*. Basing himself on the concept of man's nature as the foundation of morality, freedom and equality of people, Schiller denounced class prejudices, tyranny, despotism which have a demoralizing effect on the personality, adversely influencing human relations (his dramas "The Robbers", "Die Verschwörung des Fiesco zu Genua" ("Fiesco's Conspiracy in Genoa"), "Kabale und Liebe" ("Intrigue and Love") and others). In the 1790's, following *Kant's* philosophical ideas, Schiller advanced his own original ethical concept. He criticized Kant's interpretation of duty which presupposed repression of personal inclinations and sensuous desires. This interpretation, in Schiller's

view, conditioned man's quest for moral perfection by way of rigid, monastic asceticism. Schiller considered that behaviour is genuinely moral if inclinations do not contradict duty. However, the harmonious combination of the two principles, in his view, is inherent only in the ideal man. Modern society, on the contrary, is characterized by the absence of integral human essence and by one-sided development of human abilities: "Tied to an individual small fragment of the whole, man himself becomes a fragment", turning into an imprint of his work. Hence the corruption of morals (moral coarseness, supremacy of sensuous instincts among the lower classes, and perversion and flabbiness among the upper classes). Schiller held that aesthetic education can remedy the situation. Only art characterized by the even development of all creative forces, and beauty, acting simultaneously on the reason and the senses, are able to form an integral, harmonious man, establish a society of morally perfect people. Schiller regarded art, play, i.e., free devel-

opment of man's creative powers and his essence, as an instrument for reconciling the contradiction between the reality and the ideal in both the individual and society as a whole. Schiller's idealistic and utopian views on the development of society and improvement of man, are united with optimism and pronounced humanism. Schiller's ethical concept is presented in his works: "Über Anmut und Würde" ("On Charm and Dignity", 1793), "Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen" ("On Aesthetic Education of Man", 1795), "Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung" ("On Naive and Reflective Poetry", 1796).

SCHOPENHAUER, Arthur (1788-1860), German irrationalist philosopher, formulated "Lebensphilosophie" (philosophy of life). Schopenhauer opposed materialism and rationalist philosophy (particularly historicism and dialectics). The main principle of his metaphysical idealism (blind irrational will is the only reality, and idea—its phenomenon),

underlies Schopenhauer's ethical teachings which suggest proceeding from the primary fact of consciousness—idea, which then is divided into object and subject. If in contemplating life man forgets himself, he is thereby elevated to become a pure subject of knowledge, ceasing to be a subject of the will. Schopenhauer's concept of the will as the only reality turns into a cosmic principle: "The real world is the irrational will-to-live", man is not a microcosm but the world is macroanthropos. In Schopenhauer's view, people always find it dreary to study the physical aspect of the world. They find satisfaction and consolation in studying its moral aspect in which the depth of man's inner essence is revealed. Schopenhauer held that his philosophy alone, gives morality its due: for only if it is assumed that man's own will is his essence and that he is his own creation, then his acts are really of his own making. Schopenhauer's philosophy is pessimistic: "Suffering is the direct and immediate object of life." Life is always tragic, but particularly tragic is its end.

However, life and death are a tragedy for the common man who is incapable of comprehending their mystery. For the man elevated beyond everyday life, who contemplates the essence of the world—the will, and who, by comprehending it, rejects it to reach nirvana (absolute serenity), the aim of life is death. A real philosopher, a sage who has comprehended the mystery of the world, does not fear death, for already in life he has learned that he is nothing. He has no thirst for individual being. Thus, according to Schopenhauer, by killing the will to live, man may attain eternal virtue. The pessimistic and irrational motives of Schopenhauer's ethics were borrowed and developed by *existentialism*. His major ethical works: "Die Beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik" ("Two Basic Problems of Ethics", 1841), "Parerga und Paralipomena" (Schopenhauer's occasional papers, 2 vols., 1851).

SCHWEITZER, Albert (1875-1965), Protestant theologian, physician, public figure, born in Alsace-Lorraine (then part of

Germany). Schweitzer's world outlook (religious-idealistic in its foundation), embraces ethical views whose point of departure is "reverence for life". This principle, according to Schweitzer, was to impart a universal character to ethics and called upon to deal (as distinct from traditional ethics), with the attitude to life in its natural state. All that sustains life and its development, is considered good while evil is that which destroys life and inflicts harm upon it. This approach should, in Schweitzer's view, become the basis of humankind's ethical regeneration, of universal cosmic ethics, of optimistic ethical attitude to the world and life, the absence of which leads to decay of culture, the loss of its spiritual-moral pivot. Such is, in Schweitzer's opinion, the state of modern culture which, being divorced from its natural sources, impairs the individual's integrity, submitting it to the development of technology. It results in stagnant social institutions dominating the individual. Schweitzer maintains that the path to the regeneration of culture lies, in the final analysis,

through the individual's moral improvement, through creative activity in the realm of the spirit. Schweitzer's multifaceted activities permeated with lofty moral, humanistic aspirations, deservedly gained him wide popularity. He founded, in 1913, a hospital at Lambaréné in French Equatorial Africa (now Gabon) in which he worked as a doctor until his death. He was one of the first in Western Europe to speak in favour of banning nuclear weapons, for universal disarmament. He denounced Nazism, fascism, racism and other forms of *misanthropy*. He won the 1952 Nobel Prize. His major ethical works: "Civilization and Ethics" (1923), "Out of My Life and Thought" (1933), "Reverence for Life" (1962).

SEARCHINGS, MORAL, an aspect of man's spiritual life which most vividly manifests itself at times of making responsible *decisions*, in situations of *moral choice* and of averting *moral conflicts*. Associated with moral searchings is the individual's quest for the principles of a moral way of life, conduct and

ways of self-improvement. Moral searchings often lead to dramatic developments in people's life for they may result not only in the triumph of positive decisions, but in the tragedy of failure. Socialist society is interested in the conformity of the individual's moral searchings to the principles and standards of humanistic morality thus contributing to *conviction* and an active position in life (*Philosophy of life*). One of the most important tasks of ethical and *moral education* is maximum assistance to the individual in his moral searchings.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (moral), man's perception of himself as a personality and of his place in social activities. Thus self-consciousness gives man the ability to exercise *self-control* and the possibility of independently regulating his deeds as well as educating himself (*Self-education*). The individual's *conviction* and his attitude to his persuasions, are based on his moral self-consciousness. Since the individual in general, can and must regulate and control his actions, he bears moral

responsibility. Man's attitude to himself as a moral person is expressed in the concepts of *dignity* and *honour*. *Conscience* is the ability to materialize one's convictions by independent regulation of one's actions. A person who is aware of the link between his persuasions, self-evaluation and self-control and the objective process of social-historical evolution, the interests of society and people, is a conscientious person. These elements constitute the structure of man's moral self-consciousness which, however, does not reveal the actual meaning of man's moral convictions and conduct. The individual's self-consciousness continues to develop in the course of social-historical evolution. Thus, at the early stages of primitive society, an individual does not yet identify himself separately in the tribal collective and does not possess self-consciousness (*Individual and community*). Self-consciousness implies that an individual is distinguished from others not only in the sense that the individual assumes full responsibility for his or her way of life, but also in

another and more important aspect—the trend of common activities depends, and often to a considerable degree, on the position of that individual. That is why in moral terms self-consciousness is not the awareness of one's importance but rather the awareness of one's own responsibility. The sense of guilt is more typical of moral self-consciousness than the state of contentment and complacency.

SELF-CONTROL, the individual's independent regulation of his *conduct*, *motives* and desires, a component part of society's system of moral relations which includes both different forms of control by society of the conduct of its individual members, and everyone's personal control of himself. The mechanism of self-control embraces: *persuasions*, *feelings*, *habits*, *self-evaluation* of one's actions, urges and moral qualities (*conscience* being a form of self-evaluation) which gradually develop in the process of one's social activities. The degree of self-control varying with different people, is predicated in many respects by the level of

social consciousness, spiritual development and *personal ethic*.

SELF-DENIAL, see *Selflessness*.

SELF-EDUCATION, one of the aspects of moral *activities* which stimulates man's purposeful development of his ability to engage in these activities, to shape his own moral consciousness, improve his positive and repress his negative qualities. In ancient times, ethics conceived the problem of self-education in individualistic terms, as a rule, as self-improvement in one's own interests, aimed at the individual's moral development as distinct from his services to society. Deontological *intuitionism*, for instance, treats the obligation of self-improvement as an independent requirement severed from social needs. However, the specific tasks of self-improvement were actually interpreted in different ways, depending on the concept of the moral ideal which always expressed class and social interests. In socialist society, self-education assumes great im-

portance with the enhanced role of the individual's independent regulation of his moral activities and with the self-education of the masses gradually becoming a form of the social process of *moral education*.

SELF-ESTEEM, a moral feeling based on the recognition of one's *dignity* and expressing man's respect for himself as a personality. Like *pride*, self-esteem is an expression of man's *self-consciousness* in a certain way directing his acts. However, as distinct from pride, bearing a more personal character and chiefly associated with the evaluation of his own abilities and possibilities, it wholly belongs to the sphere of individual consciousness. On becoming a stable distinguishing feature of a person's character, self-esteem acquires the significance of *moral quality*. Self-esteem is a positive motive (and, correspondingly, a quality) of behaviour since it helps man to overcome difficulties and his own weaknesses in order to achieve moral results society expects of him, and since it encourages man to law-

fully defend his dignity. Self-esteem becomes an inferior quality when one's uncompromising attitude to oneself turns into unjustified pride and over-confidence which prevents a person from heeding criticism, from soberly evaluating his acts and possibilities. Such self-esteem paralyzes a person's activity and, in the final analysis, degrades his human dignity.

SELF-EVALUATION, moral assessment of one's own deeds, moral qualities, convictions, motives; a display of the individual's moral *self-consciousness* and *conscience*. Man develops the ability for self-evaluation in the process of his socialization as he consciously assimilates the moral principles elaborated by society, and identifies his own attitude to his deeds on the basis of their evaluation by others. In morality, self-evaluation and appraisal by others are inseparably linked. It can be put this way: self-evaluation is the assessment made by other people which is adopted by a person as the yardstick for measuring his

own behaviour or, to put it otherwise, one's self-evaluation which one deems necessary to be made generally accepted. Man's ability for self-evaluation largely helps him to independently direct and control his actions and even to educate himself (*Self-control, Self-education*).

SELF-FULFILMENT, ETHICS OF, a trend in modern philosophy of morality whose ideas were evolved by idealist philosophers of different schools. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the ethics of self-fulfilment was substantiated by objective idealists Francis Bradley, John McTaggart, John Mackenzie, Bernard Bosanquet (Britain), Josiah Royce (USA); personalists Borden Bowne, Mary Calkins, William Hocking (USA), since the mid-20th century by Georges Bastide, Emmanuel Mounier and Gabriel Marínier (France); Neo-Hegelian Benedetto Croce (Italy), Protestant philosopher Felix Adler and others. All of them consider that the aim of moral activities is the individual's realization of

his inner "I" which is unique and different from the "I's" of other people. Hence the conclusion that an individual's deeds are moral not because they accord with the moral *principles* common to all people, but because they are individual, original, unlike the acts of other people. This understanding of the *criterion of morality* which counterposes the individual to the common, is based on moral *individualism* sometimes leading to *voluntarism* in the interpretation of morality. The exponents of this trend claim that they have overcome the contradiction between *altruism* and *egoism*. They include multiple "individual I's" in an all-embracing system of an "absolute I" (often interpreted as God), of which the former constitute part of the integral whole. This objective-idealistic construction insures harmony, as it were, among all people: each person accomplishing only the requirements of his own I, complies at the same time with the law of the universal I, serving the whole (e.g. society) and all its parts (individuals).

SELF-IMPROVEMENT, see *Selflessness*.

SELFISHNESS is a negative *moral quality* characterizing the *conduct* and *motives* of a person who views all his actions and relations with other people only from the point of view of his personal gain. Selfishness is a manifestation of *egoism* in the attitude to material benefits. The social essence of selfishness lies in giving absolute priority to the pursuit of personal material gain in contrast to social interests. As a feature of social psychology, selfishness grows together with the appearance of private property. In bourgeois society it becomes a chief moving force which shapes the activities of individuals in public life and personal relations. Socialist society retains socio-economic preconditions for selfishness which are determined by the insufficient development of labour socialization and the private nature of consumption which may lead to separation of private and social interests. The latter is augmented when a person, for various reasons, has limited op-

portunities for active participation in social life. Inadequate family or social upbringing distorts the structure of one's requirements. A low level of material standards and the lack of sufficient means of subsistence constitute the fertile soil for greed which is also stimulated by market relations in the economy and the role of money as a universal equivalent in commodity exchange. Greed cannot be reduced to socio-economic reasons for it simultaneously has rather autonomous psychological roots and forms of expression.

SELFLESSNESS, a positive *moral quality* which characterizes acts of self-denial, i.e., voluntary sacrifice of one's interests and at times even life for the sake of other people and of the achievement of the common goal in the name of their cherished ideals. This quality is necessary in extraordinary circumstances requiring a person to exceed the measure of obligations he fulfils in his everyday life and in his usual relationships with people, and to renounce his legitimate (in the

opinion of the given society) interests, including the sacrifice of his life. On a mass level, such deeds are necessitated in conditions of wars of liberation, revolutionary movements, profound social transformations. Selflessness falls within the category of heroic exploits. The spirit of *asceticism* and self-renunciation is alien to Marxist ethics, which thus does not regard selflessness as a general moral *principle* to be abided by in all cases (*All-round integrated development of the personality*).

SELF-MASTERY, a form of *self-control*, expressed in man's capacity and habit of controlling the sensuous side of his psyche (feelings, emotions, wishes, habits, urges), of submitting his actions to the achievement of the aims and moral requirements he consciously sets himself.

SELF-SACRIFICE, a kind of moral *activities*, discharge of moral obligations in respect to others despite extremely unfavourable social conditions or personal circumstances, hostile environment and outside press-

ure, staunch, endurance of difficulties, burdens and deprivations, *self-denial*. Historically, the idea of self-sacrifice appeared as the antithesis to *heroism*. The latter was originally interpreted as some supernatural ability endowed on man by God to defeat enemies and achieve successes in any undertakings, as an exclusive characteristic of one's destiny, luck and omnipotence inherent only in outstanding personalities, in military leaders and czars (Gilgamesh in Sumerian and Babylonian epics, Homer's Achilles) but not in mere mortals. The development of class and state-hierarchical relations brings about the idea of the insuperability of profound contradictions and great obstacles which an individual with no secular or divine power, can face. Another concept of a *feat* in life is developing: man's ability to withstand the blows of fate, to accept defeats calmly and remain true to his moral principles, preserving inner freedom and dignity even when no positive results have been achieved. *Stoicism* advanced such an understanding of self-sacrifice.

Under especially hostile conditions, self-sacrifice develops into self-denial in the name of a lofty idea. This ideal, essentially a democratic one, albeit with the mark of passivity and pessimism, was later employed by world religions. Thus, Christ is an example of a man-martyr who sacrifices himself for the sake of redemption and salvation of the whole humankind. The Christian Church interprets self-sacrifice and martyrdom as suffering tortures and death from the hands of misbelievers "to the glory of God", as becoming a monk or a hermit. Revolutionary traditions of morality attach a basically opposite sense to self-sacrifice: it is regarded not only as a specific form of manifesting heroism under extraordinary conditions—the heroism of an extraordinary act, but also as the heroism of revolutionary enthusiasm, the heroism of day-to-day work. In the moral experience of humankind, self-sacrifice in everyday life is as valuable and necessary as exceptional heroism. There are epoches which require heroic exploits and cannot do without

them, while in other periods in history morality is supported by a modest imperceptible self-sacrifice. And, indeed, a worthy moral development of the individual requires, as a rule, the ability to combine self-sacrifice and heroism, the ability to pass from one to another.

SENECA, Lucius Annaeus (c. 4 B.C.-65 A.D.), Roman Stoic philosopher and writer. He held high government posts: in 57 A.D. he became a political adviser and minister to Nero whose tutor he had previously been. He was forced to commit suicide at the emperor's order on a charge of conspiracy. In Seneca's teaching, the traditional parts of *Stoicism*—physics and logic—forfeit their significance. He reduces the task of philosophy to the study of life. To live a virtuous and happy life means to live in conformity with Nature whose essence Seneca identifies with God-reason, providence and destiny. By submitting to God, Seneca teaches, man achieves freedom. Perfect harmonious reason (which is part of divine reason) helps the individual to

adopt the right attitude to the world and to the things which are independent of the human will. Man attains the highest good as a result of patience, abstinence and courage. Endowed with these qualities, man need fear neither poverty nor pain, nor even slavery and death. In a reasonable-divine universe, everything aims at the benefit of living beings while evil and sins emerge in a society dominated by untruth and the pursuit of material wellbeing. Seneca transformed this concept into the contradiction between the inner and the external, the immortal soul and the mortal body. Only by appealing to God can a person attain good, conquer his sensuous desires and material objects. It is of no importance whether one is poor or a slave. He who has concentrated in himself all his property does not want external benefits. Though Seneca maintained that the spiritual nature of the slave and his master is the same, he found it quite natural that they should occupy different social positions. He did not consider wealth a benefit. Nevertheless, he ad-

mitted that it contributed to developing one's virtues. Thus, his teaching is in actual fact a form of reconciliation with the existing order. Reproached for possessing immense wealth and not living in accordance with his philosophy, Seneca answered: "Philosophers do not discuss their own way of life, but how life ought to be lived." Seneca exerted great influence upon *Christian ethics*. He is the author of treatises on morality: "De constantia sapientis" ("On Mercy", 55-56), "De vita beata" ("Blessed Life", 58-59), "Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium" ("Moral Letters to Lucilius", 63-64).

SERMON ON THE MOUNT, the central discourse ascribed to Christ, the normative basis of Christian theology and ethics. The Sermon on the Mount which is repeatedly mentioned in the New Testament, is contained in its fullest form in the Gospel According to Saint Matthew (Chapters 5-7). The Sermon on the Mount is not an antinomy of the *Ten Commandments* of Moses. At the same time, it does not repeat them

word for word but transforms them in evangelical terms and incorporates them into a new moral and ethical system of values and rules. This "new" slant of the "old" commandments becomes particularly clear when Christ, appealing to a particular commandment, reveals its new content, while bringing the scope of prohibitions to the absolute and spreading the concept of sinfulness also to the *motive* of a possible action. Along with the interpretation of Moses's commandments, the most important part of the Sermon on the Mount is the teaching of Christ on non-resistance to evil: "Resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also."

This part of the Sermon on the Mount contains an irrevocable repudiation of *customary law* and the legitimate vindictiveness of the primitive society with its *talion* (*Revenge*) law. Talion is opposed by two new moral imperatives such as love of God and love of one's neighbour which later became the corner-stone of *Christian ethics*. On their basis, Christ in his Ser-

mon on the Mount, returns once again to the *golden rule* of morality formulating it as follows: "...All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." Although the Sermon on the Mount is only a part of the teaching expounded by Christ and his followers it made a substantial impact on the development of Christian ethics and moral philosophy as a whole (*Tolstoy*). Leaving aside its religious form and extreme imperativeness, one can say that the Sermon on the Mount is an accomplishment of the world ethical wisdom determining the main content of human values in morality (*Universal and class elements in morality*).

SEVEN DEADLY SINS, a concept of the medieval *Christian ethics*, the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church according to which all *sins* committed by a person differ in their significance. They are divided into "pardonable" sins which do not lead to the damnation of person's soul and "mortal" sins defiling the divine law whose moral evil is so great that it is

impossible to expiate them. Contrary to the ancient Greek ethics which did not regard a moral *misdeed* as a manifestation of moral *evil*, Christian theology developing the tradition of the Old Testament, regarded it only as a sin and a kind of "rebellion" against the divine will. At the same time, when Christianity was asserting itself as a world religion, repeated attempts were made to classify the types of *deviant behaviour* and first of all there were analyzed human actions which were at variance with the postulates of the church. The classification of sins was undertaken by the Church Fathers (Clement of Alexandria, Basil the Great of Caesarea, Cyprianus of Carthage and others). *Saint Augustine* identified three types of sinfulness due to impotence, ignorance and the inbred depravity of an individual. The next step in the essential classification of the sins was made in the Egyptian early Christian monastic communities: in accordance with biblical symbolism, there was defined their sacred number (seven), a specific composition and a strict

sequence. During the time of Pope Gregory the Great (590-604), the concept of the seven deadly sins was accepted by the entire Christian world. They are listed as follows: (1) vainglory or pride; (2) covetousness; (3) lust; (4) *envy*; (5) gluttony; (6) anger; and (7) sloth. Later on, *Thomas Aquinas* dealt with this topic in "Summa Theologica" in which he developed the concept of "seven virtues". Why were these particular sins to become "deadly"? The criterion for separating "pardonable" sins from the "unpardonable" ones was determined by the monastic origin of the dogma. The creators of first cloisters and their ideologists had a rather definite goal of organizing stable social systems based on the communal forms of life and opposed to the powerful state establishment of the Roman Empire. As a result, all seven sins inevitably bear the imprint either of the monastic way of life (the struggle against covetousness, envy, anger, sloth, arrogance), or of monastic *asceticism* (repression of lust and gluttony). Later, the concept of the seven deadly sins

was spread to the life of all laymen and contributed to the consolidation of the social foundations not only of the church but society as a whole. The rational kernel of the seven deadly sins concept is the purposeful resistance to moral evil which undermines the *collectivism* and *solidarity* of people.

SHAFTESBURY, Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713), British moral philosopher, exponent of the theory of moral sense (*Moral sense, theories of*). Shaftesbury's ethics is characterized by attempts to derive man's moral feelings from his inner nature, as well as by elements of *eudaemonism*. Shaftesbury advocated the concept of innate and immutable moral feelings and their independence of social conditions. In this sense, he contrasts morality to religious sentiments and utilitarian usefulness. The correct correlation of contradictory (private and social) affections of man leads to virtue, to the highest bliss. Shaftesbury's moral ideal is a harmoniously developed personality who has attained the highest combina-

tion of altruistic and egoistical aspirations. Shaftesbury strove to aesthetically substantiate his teaching of virtue as the purpose of life, identifying virtue with beauty. He said: "What is beautiful is harmonious and proportionate; what is harmonious and proportionate is true; and what is at once both beautiful and true is, of consequence, agreeable and good." Enthusiasm, in Shaftesbury's view, stimulating man in his striving for virtue, helps gain reconciliation of contradictory inclinations. Shaftesbury taught: "To love the public, to study universal good, and to promote the interest of the whole world, as far as it lies within our power, is surely the height of goodness." Shaftesbury held that the specific criterion for assessing the moral value of man's acts lies in his *intention* and not in the results attained. Shaftesbury's theory of the self-determining character of morality and its complete independence of social conditions, bore on the whole a character of ethical *absolutism*. His influence can be traced in the views of *Hume*, *Kant*, Herder and *Schiller*. His

works on ethics are collected in "Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times" (Vols. 1-3, 1711).

SHAME, a manifestation of man's *self-consciousness*; a moral *feeling* harboured by a person when he himself condemns his *actions*, *motives* and *moral qualities*, being aware of their immoral character either on his own, in emotional terms, or confessing to it under pressure of other people's condemning them. *Marx* said: "Shame is a kind of anger which is turned inward." The opposite of shame — *pride* — is one's positive attitude to oneself. Unlike *conscience*, shame bears a more external character: man visualizes his acts in terms of the evaluation they evoke or might have evoked on the part of other people. A sense of shame is the inalienable property of the human personality. It began to develop in primitive society, as soon as man distinguished himself from the community. Since the emergence of private property and development of class *honour*, shame is often manifested in a distorted form

and loses its specific moral connotation. The realization by an individual of the shameful of his actions depends on the ideals and criteria of the exemplary and proper conduct which prevail in a particular society. As a result, despite the universality of the very idea of shame, different civilizations have different concepts of shame: what some nation regarded as shameful others treated as something worthy of imitation. As a result of the separation of *moral standards* from actual *mores* and manners and the differentiation between the *motive* of an action and its consequences, the external regulation of behaviour has become patently insufficient. However, it would be wrong to conclude that shame no longer plays the role of the most important mechanism of bringing individual behaviour in line with group and social standards. At the same time, man must get rid of "false" shame which is engendered by the circumstances beyond the control of the moral individual (ignoble origin, poverty, ignorance of *etiquette* and the rules of good style, etc.).

Socialist morality attaches great significance to the sense of shame in struggle with such negative social phenomena as dishonesty, *parasitism*, money-grabbing, *envy*, *rudeness*, *careerism* and other manifestations of *deviant behaviour*.

SIN, a concept which expresses a specifically religious understanding of man's *guilt*: it is not guilt in relation to society or other people, but in relation to God. The concept of sin is also associated with the religious interpretation of *redemption* of guilt. Along with personal transgressions by individuals, which can be redeemed by *repentance*, prayer and good deeds, some religions, like Christianity for instance, recognize what is called the original sin. This guilt is supposed to attend all humankind as a result of the sinful choice made by Adam and Eve. According to the Bible, they were expelled from Paradise (Garden of Eden) when they went against God's will not to eat the fruit from the tree of knowledge. From this, according to religious teaching, spring all the

troubles of humankind, the existence of *evil* on earth, and all the personal sins committed by people since then.

SINCERITY, a *moral quality* characterizing a person and his acts; it manifests itself in a person's doing and saying what he believes to be right. Sincerity is the opposite of *hypocrisy*, deceit, attempts to create a wrong impression of the real motives behind one's actions, purely outward fulfilment of requirements for the sake of one's own profit, out of *vanity*, for reasons of *careerism*, without believing in the rightness of the acts one performs. Thus, sincerity does not characterize the content of an act, but its correspondence to the motive behind it, thus defining man's acts but only formally. Sincerity is the subjective aspect of *conviction* (registering a person's awareness of the mutual correspondence between his convictions and actions). Man may sincerely be misguided as to the moral value of his acts, perform immoral acts prompted by good intentions, cause people harm based on considerations of misunder-

stood humaneness, and the like. For this reason, recognizing sincerity as a positive quality, socialist morality does not consider it a sufficient criterion to assess people's acts.

SITUATION ETHICS, a trend in modern philosophy of morality maintaining that in his *moral choice* man does not base himself on moral principles, norms or evaluations, but only on the specific situation whose uniqueness defines the value of his choice (*Contextual ethics*). Thus, man's choice divested of an objective criterion, cannot be evaluated in the categories of good and evil, for the latter are likewise divested of their objective content and are characterized only by the extent to which they are associated with the endless chain of changing circumstances. Consequently, morality liberated from the principle of universality and necessity, turns into absolute freedom. The situational approach to ethics is inherent in *pragmatism* and *existentialism*, having become, since the 1940's, a trend in theological ethics (Emil Brunner, Paul Til-

lich, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and others). The US theologian, Joseph F. Fletcher, professor of medical and social ethics, proposed in the 70's his version of situation ethics in his works "Situation Ethics", "Moral Responsibility", "The Ethics of Genetic Control. Ending Reproduction Roulette" and others, opposing it to the legalist systems of ethics (*Legalism*) with their codified requirements as regards people's conduct. These ethical systems, in his view, are responsible for the deepening moral crisis and the spread of *conformism* in modern society, inciting man, as they do, to follow the moral principles and rules established once and for all, instead of adapting them to the requirements of the constantly developing reality. Fletcher asserts that ethics is effective only when it liberates morality of rigorous beliefs and codes. In his attempt to find a compromise between ethical *relativism* embodied in Dewey's pragmatism and the ideas of traditional Christian morality, Fletcher cites love as an absolute rule in the choice of action,

as an abstract principle defining people's benefits and their just distribution, equality and community of people. Submitting man's choice to the given moment, situation ethics deprives him of the critical attitude to reality, of the possibility to foresee the future, and by his actions facilitate its realization.

SKILLS, actions which man assimilates through long practice to such an extent that he begins to perform them more or less automatically. As distinct from *habits* which comprise both human need and inclination for action, skills are related only to the technical aspect of actions and together with knowledge form the basis of abilities. In other words, skills are revealed in the methods of their application and the use of means for the attainment of a particular goal. In their social content, skills are morally neutral and can be a subject of moral *evaluation* only in the context of assessing a person who has mastered (or fails to do so), necessary skills for a successful and expedient attainment of a goal.

SLANDER, false accusation of an individual, group or organization committed out of malice, selfish motives, *envy*, *revenge* or with the aim of wounding *honour*, social status or moral *dignity*. As a social phenomenon, slander is particularly often observed in conditions of suspiciousness and distrust towards the citizens (subjects) by the state power, in conditions of enmity and hostility between people characteristic of totalitarian regimes. Slander can be spread in such a form as denunciation, including libellous anonymous information. A real means of combatting slander is the promotion of democracy, making glasnost, openness a norm of life, the legal protection of citizens from slanderous accusations, the elaboration of legal guarantees of the freedom of speech and the civic expression of every individual.

SOCIAL CONTRACT, a concept employed by some philosophers of the past to explain the origin of state, law and morality. According to the social contract theory, man originally found himself in a natural state

that involved no obligations vis-à-vis others, with each individual being guided exclusively by the instinct of self-preservation and personal interest, and satisfying his needs by relying exclusively on his own force. This state of unlimited freedom had as its consequence, lack of co-ordination between people and even "war of all against all", to the eventual detriment of each individual. Accordingly, there came a time when people entered into a tacit, and sometimes formalized, contract requiring them to abide by a certain code of conduct and to give up part of their freedom to the state which guaranteed inviolability of life and property for each individual. Although the concept of social contract goes back to antiquity (Sophists, *Epicurus*, *Cicero*), it was developed into a full-fledged theory by bourgeois philosophers *Grotius*, *Hobbes*, *Rousseau*, and others. The social contract theory was directed against the religious, purely traditional or authoritarian explanation of the origin of law and morality. In general, however, it was an idealistic theory which implied

that although social laws are objectively needed by the human community, they come about in response to volition and consent and are a product of human reason. This theory has had some impact on a significant segment of ethical theories which derive moral requirements from an *obligation* assumed by people in respect to society at their discretion and which are guided by considerations of benefit rather than the objective interdependence of people and the laws of history. This explanation of the origin of man's moral obligations to society, makes an absolute of the factor of conditionality or tacit agreement, which is an inalienable part of moral life, and is on the whole an erroneous ethical concept although progressive in its day.

SOCIAL ETHICS, a teaching which helps some theologians adapt the absolute, i.e., the morality of Christ not associated with time or place, to the specific social conditions in modern society. In social ethics, scriptural tenets are interpreted with reference to the present

forms of property and the state legal relations. Catholics and Protestants solve these tasks in different ways. The former consider that society, notwithstanding its imperfections, is based on the eternal divine law and its requirements should be specified with reference to present conditions (*Neo-Thomism*). Neo-Protestantists (*Neo-Protestantism*) place social life and the divine will and genuine (Christian) morality and secular morality in contradiction to one another, considering social ethics to be the morality of a compromise between the supreme moral requirements of Christ (*Theonomous ethics*) and immorality to which man is allegedly induced by society.

SOCRATES (470/469-399 B.C.), Athenian philosopher who evolved the teaching of moral philosophy (in the form of dialogue and dispute). Owing to his reputation as a Sophist and his criticism of certain aspects of the Athenian democracy, the democratic leaders of Athens became hostile towards him. Charged with introducing strange gods and sentenced to

death, Socrates took poison. Socrates's teaching known in the interpretation of his disciples is incomplete and contradictory. The principal task of philosophy as understood by Socrates is the ethical one: to create a teaching on how man should live. But inasmuch as life is an art, and knowledge of art is essential for its perfection, the essence of knowledge takes precedence over the principal (ethical) problem of philosophy. Socrates interpreted knowledge as the perception of the universal (or uniform) in a number of things (or their properties). Consequently, knowledge is an idea of an object and is acquired by defining its conception. The subject-matter of knowledge can be, according to Socrates, only that which is accessible to man's purposeful actions, this being the activity of man's soul. For this reason, Socrates proclaimed self-knowledge as the paramount task of knowledge. All individual goals are submitted to one universal and supreme goal, which is absolute, supreme goodness. This idea fundamentally distinguishes So-

crates's teaching from the extreme ethical *relativism* of the Sophists. Socrates, however, admitted that comparative relativism was indispensable for any purposeful activity in conditions of man's life: benefit is conditioned by usefulness and satisfaction; goodness is useful for the attainment of the goal which defines it as good. Socrates's rationalist ethics is closely linked to his views on the role of concepts. He identifies moral virtue with knowledge. Man's activity is entirely defined by his concepts of virtue, of benefit and the goals flowing from these concepts. For this reason, Socrates asserted, no one can make mistakes or act badly of his own free will. He thus reduced immoral acts to mere ignorance or misconception, and wisdom to perfect knowledge. Socrates's ethical rationalism was noted by the ancient philosophers. *Aristotle*, for instance, pointed out that Socrates turned virtues into concepts, sciences or a particular kind of knowledge, achieved by inductive methods of defining these concepts. Platonic ethics, as well as a number

of other ethical schools the most prominent of which are Cynics and Cyrenaics, are rooted in the doctrine of Socrates. His ethical rationalism was, in the mid- and late 19th century, subjected to harsh criticism by some philosophers opposed to the intellect as an instrument of creation and knowledge (*Kierkegaard, Nietzsche*). From positions of religious *existentialism*, he was criticized in the 20th century by the Russian philosopher and writer Lev Shestov.

SOLIDARITY [*L solidus* firm], assistance and support based on compassion, community of interests and the need to attain common aims. In the revolutionary ideology solidarity becomes a moral imperative when there arises an objective need for concerted actions by various political organizations (parties, unions, committees, clubs) for the achievement of certain historical tasks. Thus, the principle of solidarity was advanced by the ideologists of the French bourgeois revolution in their fight against European feudal reaction. One

should distinguish between national, class and international solidarity. National solidarity is prominent in people's consciousness when a struggle is waged against foreign invaders (*Patriotism*). Class solidarity of the working people is of an international character. As historical experience demonstrates, the need of solidarity which is devoid of *loyalty to principles, ideological integrity and honesty*, which was not wrung through the *conscience* of every participant in the movement, turns into "mutual protection", connivance at time-serving actions and evil deeds. At present, for the first time there exists an opportunity to rally humankind in the struggle against the mortal dangers which threaten it. The opportunity also exists, on the basis of the positive goals of the interdependent world, to work for its integration. As solidarity is becoming increasingly universal the role of the moral element in its content is growing.

SOLOVIEV, Vladimir Sergeyevich (1853-1900), Russian religious philosopher, journalist

and poet. A pivotal problem of Soloviev's philosophy is that of the human personality treated in the Christian tradition. He saw in the personality not only a relatively independent spiritual reality, but the primary element of the metaphysical collective personality—humankind. Soloviev regarded man as "the connecting link between the divine and the natural world". For this reason, individual human existence assumes in his philosophy, a universal meaning. Divinity (the absolute) and the human personality are in Soloviev's view the fundamental (though non-equivalent) elements of the evolution of the universe which aims at overcoming world evil, at enlightenment and spiritualization of the world. An imperfect man endowed with the potential for infinite perfection, endures the contradiction between the search for absolute freedom and the sensation of evil in a world dominated by mechanical causality. Consequently, "the central interest of human life lies in the distinction between good and evil, truth and falsehood". In his earthly life, man has, according to So-

loviev, the possibility for realizing two kinds of freedom: positive and negative. The former is achieved through the aspiration to know the absolute and ensures man's ability to carry out the divine foreordination, the latter is achieved through unlimited self-affirmation of the individual "I" which results in the negation of freedom (unlimited self-affirmation causing non-freedom to others, ceases to be freedom for the individual himself). Substantiating in philosophic terms the inevitability of the spiritual self-destruction of the "proud man", Soloviev follows *Dostoyevsky* in dealing with ethical problems. Equally destructive, in Soloviev's opinion, is group self-affirmation. Yet, he does not consider self-denial for the purpose of a search for the absolute as rejection of freedom in general. Man realizes and experiences his freedom in the act of *love* (of people, of nature, of God) and in the moral act. The path to achieve positive freedom lies open to man through the experience of *shame*, compassion for others, as well as through critical self-observation. Fol-

lowing *Kant*, Soloviev maintained that in overcoming by a moral effort the inertia of mechanical causality, man brings himself closer to the absolute which personifies the fullness of truth, goodness and beauty. For Soloviev, knowledge, morality and creative freedom are, in the final analysis, indivisible as are indivisible misconception, evil and ugliness. In Soloviev's doctrine, *Plato's* teaching of *eros* combines, on the basis of Christian anthropology, with *Kant's categorical imperative*. Soloviev solves the problem of good and evil on earth also in a religious spirit: the personality of Christ is testimony to, and guarantee of, the final triumph of good. Soloviev regarded the Christian Church as the receptacle of humanity's accumulated moral experience registered in history. As regards the problem of the correlation of freedom and necessity in history and human life, he anticipated the ethical concepts of the 20th-century Christian philosophy and religious *existentialism*. The place of Soloviev in the history of ethics is determined not only by the

originality of his ideas and his specific conceptual influence but also by the fact that he created a moral philosophical system at the time when the European philosophical thought embarked on the path of ethical capitulation. Soloviev's principal works treating of ethical problems: "Critique of Abstract Principles" (1880), "Spiritual Foundations of Life" (1884), "The Meaning of Love" (1892), "Vindication of Good" (1897-1899), "Three Conversations" (1900).

SPENCER, Herbert (1820-1903), English positivist philosopher, exponent of evolutionary ethics. Spencer propounds the idea of world evolution which he extends from nature to society. He did not distinguish morality in social life from relations in the animal world, considering it as specific behaviour characteristic of all living beings, the ultimate result of evolutionary development. "Moral truth, as now interpreted, proves to be a development of physiological truth. ...The vital law of the social organism ... towards which cre-

ation tends ... may properly be considered as a law of nature." Like the exponents of utilitarianism, Spencer held that morality is based on aspiration for happiness which is a moment of universal evolution. In the course of evolution, morality serves as a means of quelling the conflict between egoism and altruism equally typical of society and nature. Human behaviour, according to Spencer, passes, historically, through a number of stages in the process of which moral feelings and concepts emerge and are improved. Evil harmonically develops into good, vice into virtue. Man's behaviour gradually adapts itself to the conditions of life and aims at the preservation of the human species. Moreover, the good of society and the good of the individual increasingly coincide. Behaviour approaches the ideal which, when attained, will abolish the contradiction between the individual and society to establish their balance: the individual's acts directed at the satisfaction of his needs will simultaneously contribute to the satisfaction of the needs of the entire society.

Spencer thus formulated the principal rule of life: "Obtainment of private happiness ... in conformity to the conditions necessitated by the social state." Morality, in Spencer's view, is based on the abstract principles of justice and charity. Justice is everyone's right to absolute freedom which should be compatible with that of other individuals. By charity, Spencer understood acts which afford enjoyment to others with no reward to oneself. Spencer regarded the state as evil for it curbs the freedom of the individual. His major ethical works: "Social Statics" (1850), "Principles of Ethics" (2 Vols., 1879-1893).

SPINOZA, Baruch (Benedict) de (1632-1677), Dutch materialist philosopher. Spinoza saw the main purpose of his philosophy in elaborating an ethical theory based on the teachings of eternal and infinite nature, or substance, which acts according to its own eternal necessary laws, and "modes", i.e., all things of the material world and all human souls. Man's body and thinking soul is

of one and the same essence but considered either in terms of space or thought. In his theory of ethics, Spinoza adhered to the preliminary knowledge of body processes and associations in man. He likened the method of psychology to the methods of mechanics and physics and reduced the complexity and diversity of the psyche to two simple, to his mind, principles: intellect identified with will, and feelings (or "passions"). All human feelings are derived from pleasure, pain and desire, and many derivative ones grow from each object's effort to preserve its existence. Man is not prompted by the moral laws of good or aversion to evil, but by his striving for self-preservation and personal advantage, which is the only virtue acting as human power. On these naturalist foundations, Spinoza based his teaching of freedom. He maintained that human nature depended on passions. Though repudiating the idealistic concept of *freedom of the will* and its independence of the motives behind human behaviour, Spinoza did not deny the possibility of free-

dom for man. He explained that freedom does not contradict necessity: a thing which exists out of necessity can at the same time be free if its existence is necessitated by its own nature. By this token, man can also be free since in certain conditions he can escape from the bondage of passions. Any passion ceases to be a passive state as soon as man cognizes it. Freedom, according to Spinoza, is knowledge of necessity, clear and distinct understanding of what is necessary. This dialectical concept of Spinoza was an outstanding achievement of materialist philosophy. It follows from Spinoza's teaching that for different people there exist different degrees of freedom. Though knowledge as such is powerless in the face of passions, it can become a passion itself (love of knowledge). The joy of knowledge can suppress all other passions thus conferring on man enormous freedom. Spinoza's teaching on freedom is limited by the definition of freedom as knowledge of necessity and voluntary consent to necessity. He does not associate material practice with

freedom (in this his teaching is similar to *Stoicism*). Spinoza regards freedom as supremacy of the intellect over passions, with passion for knowledge overcoming the sensuous affections. However, the circle of the subjects of freedom is extremely limited, consisting only of sages divorced from life's practices, whose life is the "intellectual love of God", i.e., passion for knowledge. Spinoza's major works: "Theological-Political Treatise" (1670), and "Ethics" (1677).

STIRNER, Max (pseudonym of Johann Kaspar Schmidt, 1806-1856), German idealist philosopher. In his main work "Der Einziger und sein Eigentum" ("The Only One and His Property", 1845) Stirner propounded his ethical theory based on principles of "pure egoism". Stirner proclaimed the concrete individual personality (my "I") with its unique features as the highest reality, the creator of all values in the world. Observing the tendency inherent in bourgeois society to depersonalize human relations, to transform man into a mere

appendage to the social whole, Stirner concluded that social institutions, moral norms, laws, etc. are inimical to the individual. Everything extra-individual, i.e., social, appears in his interpretation as something absolutely alien to the individual, hampering his free development. It is a world of spectres, phantoms which dominate people who have not yet liberated themselves from the fetishistic worship of the creations of their own reason. Thus it follows that moral consciousness orientated at public opinion constitutes, according to Stirner, nothing but a variety of religious consciousness, and standards of morality—religious dogmas. In order to gain genuine freedom, man must discard such concepts paralyzing his consciousness, as moral duty and obligation, and be guided by no social guidelines, but only by his own interests. Personal benefit is the supreme principle of human existence. Stirner included in the personal sphere not only man's ideas, experiences and acts. He considered everything that exists in the world (including other

people), in terms of its service of the concrete individual, of it being proclaimed as his property. Stirner maintained that man controls the world based on his own strength and his inner potentialities. Stirner's ethics bears an excessively individualistic character (*Individualism*).

STOICISM, a trend in Greek ethics founded by Zeno from Citium in Cyprus (c. 336-c. 264 B.C.). The name is derived from the Greek words "Stoa Poikile" (painted colonnade) in Athens where Zeno gave lectures in his school. It is a stable theoretical and normative tradition in the history of European ethics, a moral *principle*. Stoicism is the ethics of *duty*. It took shape and developed in polemics with *Epicureanism* asserting the principle of *happiness*. Stoicism proceeds from the division of human life into two levels: the external empirical field and the sphere of internal motivation. Whereas, the first one is fully and unconditionally subjugated to the necessity reigning in nature, the second is quite autonomous (*Autonomy*).

and coincides with rational comprehension. The Stoics subdivided everything that exists into three classes: *good*, *evil* and indifference (*adiaphora*). Good is *virtue* which coincides with the rational foundation of *actions* and is identical with *apathy*. Evil is the opposite of virtue and identified with vices. Indifference (neither this nor that), is an aggregate of the social and natural characteristics of man: life, health, beauty, strength, wealth, nobility, glory and their opposites, *death*, illness, etc. *Adiaphora* is the domain of the indifferent only within the bounds of the antithesis between good and evil, virtue and vice. It implies that the external conditions of the life of an individual and the state of his organism have no moral value of their own. However, beyond these limits, within *adiaphora* there emerge substantial differences: some things (health, wealth, etc.) are preferable, others are avoided (illness, poverty, etc.) and still others, such as the bending or unbending of a finger, are already indifferent not only in relation to *morality* but also to the

vital needs of man. Preferable things promote life which is in harmony with nature and belong to the category of relative benefits. Actions aimed at assimilating relative benefits form the sphere of appropriate actions. Virtue is precisely the correct knowledge of the preferable (appropriate) actions typical of man which are not by themselves a moral *value* but are only its object. A virtuous man values above all, his efforts directed at acquiring relative values rather than these values themselves. He will not be happy or miserable depending on whether he acquired or lost some things which are preferable. He does not in the least identify his moral essence with specific *goals* and concrete results of behaviour. Stoicism not only transfers virtue into the sphere of *motives* but places it above them regarding it as the highest level of the determination of behaviour, as the motive of motives. It forms, as it were, a third nature within man. A wise man, whose image is personified virtue and a normative model in the ethics of Stoicism, strives for preferable actions

but does not identify himself with them. He is prepared for any turn of events, never loses his presence of mind and if it comes to the worst, will perish amid the ruins of the world uncomplaining. He does not recognize any happiness other than inner firmness and independence of the spirit. Stoicism teaches one to be indifferent even to the most severe blows of fate. This submission serves as a source of the inner strength and pride of a Stoic wise man since, according to Stoicism, the cosmos is ruled by divine Reason and in the final count everything that happens in the world carries a beneficial meaning. That is why, by placing himself into the hands of providence, man becomes associated with the reasonable nature of the universe. The cosmopolitan concept of man typical of Stoicism, was combined with the preaching of *obligations* to one's people and the state. Stoics substantiate the need to place the common benefit above personal gain, actively participate in social affairs, are against compassion, pity and malice as factors which

constrain and deform practical activities. Stoic virtue is formal and absolute. It knows no shades or varieties. There is no gradual transition from virtue to vice. The normative *ideal* of Stoicism was one of the basic traditions of European ethics and culture. It is a model of conduct in conditions when man has lost control over circumstances and is drawn into an uncontrollable situation pregnant with social cataclysms. Stoicism taught people to submit to fate and oppose its vicissitudes with staunch spirit, to raise the strength of the inner man over the weakness of the external one and thereby asserted the self-sufficiency of moral person. As an integral, ethical concept of the world, Stoicism is the product of a class civilization. However, it contains an eternal rational content, the mastering of which, can provide spiritual support to a person facing an irremediable tragedy. The ideas of Stoicism developed by the later (Roman) Stoics (*Seneca, Epictetus, Aurelius*) acquired a tinge of moralizing. They are also represented in the works of Anicius Manlius

Boethius, *Montaigne*, René Descartes, *Spinoza*, *Kant* and many other philosophers.

SUFFERING, a state experienced by a person in the process of physical and spiritual being. Suffering has a moral and ethical meaning since the acceptance by an individual of obligations stemming from any code of conduct, is inseparable from his readiness to make personal sacrifices. The link between suffering and initiation goes back to times immemorial. In order to enter the stratum of grown-up members of society, the pristine man had to prove his ability to endure pain and *fear*. Indeed, human life constantly requires this ability. Since ancient times, other motives have been intertwined with this attitude to suffering. The latter is perceived as a restoration of the upset balance of justice in a particular society. Initially, the aim of *punishment* was not so much to restrain (intimidate) a criminal from committing a punishable *deed* as in ritualistic and moral purification. And here the religious faith implied that the ransom for the culprit can be paid by the inno-

cent. Thus, at the basis of Christianity and *Christian ethics* lies the postulate according to which Jesus Christ who was totally innocent, voluntarily accepted suffering and death for the sins of all people thereby atoning the *guilt* of the human race. Suffering breaks the inertia of the thoughtless attitude to life by impelling one to test his *conscience* and grasp the difference between true and false benefits. The extreme forms of the cult of suffering evoked justifiable criticism, in particular, the unconvincing preaching of patience addressed by the exploiters to the exploited. Beginning with the period of Enlightenment, people strove to eliminate suffering in their life through technological and social progress. However, the experiences of humankind demonstrate that this task is an intricate and multifaceted one. Whereas, the deliverance of people from gross and humiliating sufferings is a tangible and noble goal, the vision of the total elimination of suffering is utopian, for every step along the path of comfort and security engenders new problems and possibilities of

more refined sufferings and enhances the sensitivity to them. Moreover, an unscrupulous person is not a genuine human being because total insulation from suffering is an uncreative and amoral state of egotistical wellbeing. Moral behaviour cannot fully exclude voluntarily accepted discomforts of suffering.

SUFISM [Arab *suf* wool which was used for clothing by members of an ascetic Muslim sect], a philosophic-mystical teaching in *Islam* which arose in the 8th century. Sufism is characterized by a combination of the teachings on knowledge interpreted from the viewpoint of mystical pantheism (recognition of all things and phenomena as emanating from God), with the teaching of man's moral self-improvement (knowledge divorced from morality was considered disastrous, and disinterestedness, a necessary condition of truth). Sufism distinguishes three stages of man's path to the truth and true forms of being: *shariah*—acquiring knowledge of the law and compliance with it; *tarikāt*—overcoming self-love as a peculiar

form of incarceration in "the dungeon of one's own skin", leaning not only on reason, but also on the heart (particular importance being attached to the consecutive psychological states created by "stops"—*makamas*, along man's mystical path (i.e., by the ascetic's spiritual states as he approaches unity with God): of repentance, circumcision, abstinence and, in the end, poverty when man takes a vow to forgo worldly benefits); *hakikat*—the final stage which is achieved only by the chosen few. This true being is granted, according to Sufists, by rejection of one's own "I" and by communion with God. He who has achieved this stage need no longer think of laws. For possessing intuitive knowledge of the truth, he is incapable of doing evil. This principle gave grounds to many critics of Sufism to charge its proponents with *amoralism*. Sufism attached great importance to illumination, ecstasy (the latter being inspired by dancing, singing and music). The moral requirements expounded in their didactic poems and love songs, and a measure of democracy

account for the popularity of such Sufi poets as Sana'i (Abu'l-Majd Majdud), Farid ad-Din 'Attar, Jalal ad-Din Rumi, Hafiz and Mawlana Nur ad-Din Jami.

SUICIDE, a type of *deviant behaviour*, intentional killing of oneself, wishing for one's own death. Various cultures differed in their attitude towards suicide. Christianity bans suicide regarding it as a crime against the divine law and a manifestation of the devil's presence in man. The Great French Revolution was the first to demolish the traditional assessment of suicide and include in the fundamental rights of the individual both the right to live and the right to die. The secularization of consciousness and the crisis of traditional culture, the industrial revolution and urbanization, sharply raised the suicide rate in the 19th century and it is still on the rise. An in-depth analysis of the phenomenon of suicide was carried out in 1897 by Émile Durkheim. He held that in every society there coexisted social-moral opposites such as *egoism* and *al-*

truism. Until they counterweigh each other, the suicide rate remains within the acceptable social norm. However, when this balance is upset, the traditional life style and social ties disintegrate resulting in a growing suicide rate. Modern research sees the reasons of suicide in social disbalances, dehumanization of the personality and links them with various psychopathological processes, as well as the proliferation of such trends as nihilism, anarchic hedonism. Suicide is a serious social and moral problem. The history of philosophy and ethics recorded at times opposite appraisals of suicide as a social phenomenon. *Plato* and *Aristotle*, for instance, regarded suicide as an unnatural act contradicting the nature of man and inflicting irreparable damage on the state. Stoics, on the contrary, urged refraining from indiscriminate criticism of suicide particularly when it benefits a community or a state as a whole, for instance in the case of a hopelessly ill person. Modern philosophy treats suicide as a moral *evil* detrimental to society in general but limited to one indi-

vidual (*Kant*) and as an act undermining the last stronghold of the will to live (*Schopenhauer*). *Mill* and other advocates of *utilitarianism*, on the contrary, welcomed suicide regarding it as a deliverance from physical or moral pain and concerns, particularly if it can bring *happiness* (be useful) to other people. Generally speaking, in European ethical thought, the theories vindicating suicide constituted the exception rather than the rule. In terms of morality, suicide can be regarded as the violation by a person of moral obligations to oneself, similar to murder which is a violation of moral obligations to other people.

SYMBOLIC THEORY OF VALUE, an ethical concept widespread in modern *axiology* whose proponents regard the system of *values* as a peculiar symbolical world created by man. Symbolic theory of value underlies the concept of man as a "symbolic animal" who lives in a world of symbols and not things, reveals a new sphere of reality and transforms his existence in conformity with the

symbolic structure. The emergence of the symbolic theory of value is associated with the ideas of the German Neo-Kantian philosopher Ernst Cassirer, the author of the philosophy of symbolic forms, who maintained that man's ethical world emerges as man creates symbols having functional value. Cassirer's ideas lie at the basis of the symbolic theory of value advanced in the 1960's by the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, one of the founders of the general systems theory. In his view, none of the three axiological theories accepted in the West (naturalist, humanistic, ontological), explains to the full, the nature of ethical values, for they do not take into account man's symbolic activity. Emphasizing only such universal values as man's survival and happiness, these theories ignore the fact that man can doom himself to suffering, sacrificing himself for the sake of supreme ideals, i.e., choose values which may contradict his biological survival. Only the symbolic theory of value with its key categories of "symbol" and "system" can furnish, according to

Bertalanffy, a true idea of the nature of values. Whereas traditional Western ethical concepts sought to substantiate the rules of individual conduct, the symbolic theory of value considers the symbolic structure as the basis of human culture and proceeds from the fact that values are created and freely chosen by man himself with reference to a system of symbols inherent in the given society. According to Bertalanffy, the basic ethical problem consists in imposing the laws of morality on social institutions. At the same time, he distinguishes moral imperatives of social systems from the individual's moral values. Thus, contrary to *naturalism* which derives values from the laws of nature and man's natural state, the symbolic theory of value deals with the social organization of people with its inherent system of moral standards and precepts. It, however, ignores the historical character of morality and people's socially conditioned activities.

SYMPATHY, a form of love of one's fellow-men (*Humanism*); attitude to another person based on the recognition of his legitimate requirements and interests and expressed in the understanding of another person's feelings and thoughts, in moral support rendered to his aspirations, and readiness to assist in their realization. The ability to experience sympathy is an elementary and at the same time a basic quality of man as a social being. Emerging simultaneously with private interests and as a counterbalance to them, this social feeling restricted, in its own way, people's egoism, permitting each to put himself in the place of another person and see in him someone akin to himself. Sympathy is an important form of humanism in human relations. It means compassion and mitigation of depressive unpleasant feelings of another person. Sympathy demands great internal tactfulness and a high standard of human communication.

T

TABOO [a Tongan (Polynesian) word having no single-word translation], a set of concepts characteristic of rudimentary primitive thought. It expresses a categorical ban on certain actions and inducements aimed at so-called "untouchable" objects. It is associated with the feeling of *fear* of something awesome and fatal and simultaneously attractive and sacred, calling for reverence and various magic rites. Since concepts associated with it play a major role in practically all primitive communities, the term taboo is now widely used in modern ethnography, anthropology and psychology. With representatives of developed societies, similar concepts stand for a symptom characteristic of grave mental disorders. This accounts for the term taboo being also used in psy-

chiatry. In primitive tribal communities, it is above all associated with the prohibition of sexual intercourse between relatives which ensures here an archaic form of exogamy. It is also associated with the totem cult—a sacred animal after which a particular clan or family was named. In relatively more developed patriarchal communities, taboo was extended to the personality of the father, chief and priest. It ensured the inviolability of various creatures, objects and sanctuaries. Taboo is one of the most ancient forms of regulating the individual's conduct and social life in general, demanding that socially irresponsible urges be suppressed. It differs from subsequent religious, moral and legal bans in that it is irrational and is provided with no justification. Taboo is not

prescribed by God or by the law, but is exercised as self-restraint under the impact of inexplicable mystic fears of certain actions and creatures. These fears stem from the presentiment of unavoidable punishment which does not imply a real punishment meted out by one's relatives. One who has violated the taboo, himself experiences a deep depression without external interference. This depression often leads to mental derangement and even death, although the people nearby might not even suspect anything concerning the crime the person had committed. The regulating mechanism of taboo requires absolute cohesion of the common and private interests within the framework of the totem society; the equality of all its members; the depersonalization of the totemist consciousness. It possesses a significance which is universal for that particular society. An important element of taboo is totemist orgiastic festivities whose educational and organizing role is associated with the internal purification experienced by the participants as a

result of the magical violation of taboo and the defilement of the totem.

TACTFULNESS, a *moral quality* characterizing man's attitude to other people, warranting thoughtful attention to people's needs, requirements, wishes, interests, their urgent problems, thoughts and feelings; understanding of motives that stimulate people's behaviour; considerate treatment of other people's self-esteem, pride and dignity; polite attitude to everyone. As a moral requirement ensuing from the general principle of humanism, tactfulness is closely linked to other moral qualities (*Respect, Magnanimity, Modesty, Sympathy, Nobleness, Trust*). At the same time, pertaining to the sphere of everyday interrelations between people, tactfulness is a component part of *personal ethic*. It excludes *rudeness, arrogance, intolerance, suspiciousness* and mistrust towards people both in personal and official, business and political relations.

TAGORE (Thakur), Rabindranath (1861-1941), Indian writer-humanist, educator and public figure. In his works, Tagore gave a new lease of life to many philosophic ethical ideas of the Vedas and Upanishads. Tagore interprets human nature dually: on the one hand, man is a bearer of egoistic desires and is limited by his own "ego"; on the other, he possesses a spiritual basic element whose manifestations oppose egoism and place man in a special position in the world. The conflict between these two facets of the ego engenders an intensive moral life of a person. Unbridled passions do not allow a person to get rid of ignorance (avidya) and to be integrated into the life of the universe. In critically analyzing individualism as the moral thrust of Western cultures, Tagore draws the following conclusion: any development within the bounds of one's own "egoistic ego" brings tragedy into human life. That is why he sees one of the main tasks to be able to transcend the limits of oneself. Tagore believed that love was the only effective

means for overcoming egoism and isolation. Life in unity with nature is possible only as a result of a loving attitude to all its elements. The theory of morality which Tagore calls the realization of life (Sadhana), is based on Karma Yoga, release by a vigorous effort. At the same time, in criticizing the moral guidelines of the "business world" in the European countries, Tagore drew attention to the fact that business success often entails an internal collapse of the personality. That is why a poor man who has attained inner harmony is infinitely happier than a rich man. The ethical views of Tagore were applied in practice at the communal school in Shantiniketan, his father's estate. It subsequently became one of the centres of the Indian culture. Tagore believed that learning should be an extension of human abilities, i.e., be extremely individualized. Tagore opposed the colonial regime, caste alienation, inequality of women, ignorance and superstitions. The principal works reflecting the moral concepts of Tagore are: "Gitanjali: Song-

Offering" (1912), a collection of his poems which won him the Nobel prize for literature in 1913, and "Sadhana" ("The Realization of Life", 1913).

TALION (lex talionis) [L *talio* retaliation, equal retribution], a primitive *custom* which regulated relations between communities of kin and made it obligatory upon relatives to be guided in their *revenge* by the rules of simple equalizing. Subsequently (in early class society), it served as the principle of criminal responsibility requiring that *punishment* should correspond in character and degree to the offense. Its most widely spread form is the "life for life, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" principle. Talion, or blood feud, was one of the obligatory features of the tribal organization of social life. For primitive man, vengeance was not an obligation but an *honour* to be obtained. The essence of talion was not so much in encouraging blood feud as in making this practice more orderly and to provide strict control over it. It seems that talion was preceded by the unbridled

eruption of vengeance rather than the lack of, or less controlled, vengeance. Talion was based on the idea of extending the primitive concept of the world to the sphere of inter-communal relations. It was one of the first signs of dividing people into "one's own", "aliens", "close" or "distant", as well as one of the initial forms of this division being registered and reproduced mentally and practically. Talion simultaneously united and divided: it united the members of one tribe by separating them from other tribal groups. Blood feuds were impermissible between relatives. However, it was a sacred obligation when someone was offended by a stranger. The right to retaliation, regarded as a privilege belonging to all male members of a tribe but first of all to the closest relatives of the victim, is a specific expression of primitive morality. Talion was eliminated with the transition to the state-territorial organization of social life and with morality acquiring a universal form of human consciousness. We can surmise that the precept "thou shalt not

kill", as well as the *golden rule of morality*, emerged in the process of overcoming talion. In its transformed version, talion has survived to the present and it can be observed, for instance, in the lingering of features of the patriarchal system. From the system of equal retaliation comprising the moral content of talion, stems the idea of equalizing justice.

TAO and TE ("the way" and its "virtue"), basic concepts in ancient Chinese philosophy which subsequently became primarily ethical categories. Later it was finalized in the modern term "taote" (morality). In Taoism Tao (literally "way"), is an irrational stream, the unseen but ever-present principle in virtue of which all things exist but which is not a thing itself. To become a "real person" a sage discards his "ego" and becomes immersed in this stream and like it assumes a Tao-position which does not distinguish beauty from ugliness, *good* from *evil*, *truth* from *lies*. As an absolute, Tao is not given as an object of knowledge and the acquisition of Tao is

the result of independent personal spiritual efforts. By discarding his individual will, a sage follows his natural predestination. In Confucianism, Tao is a way to moral improvement, reinforced by the heavenly will, and conduct based on moral rules. Man's destiny depends on his own activities. This implies the choice of a correct way which combines ethical knowledge and corresponding actions. The correct way presupposed three basic careers: a hermit, an official or a military man. This choice depended not only on personal inclinations but also involved a favourable social situation. For the lower stratum, the correct way is inaccessible. The category of Te usually translated as feature, property, quality, goodness, virtue, dignity and the vital force, is an hieroglyph composed of the symbols of an "eye", an "action" and the "heart". The initial meaning implies an action taken on the basis of looking into one's heart. The heart is regarded as the receptacle of magic force. Te is a specific manifestation of Tao. It can be either big or small, better or

worse. This makes it possible to characterize it as a concrete Tao property of each and every thing. Te is an individual virtue determining the optimal way of the existence of a thing; its different manifestations may clash with each other. The ethical content of Te is fairly complex. Since most Chinese thinkers recognized the observance of etiquette and justice as the basic qualities of man placing him apart from the beasts, in many instances, Te implied *virtue*. However, it could also mean immorality (robbery and lechery, for example). The Te category is also associated with the traditional political theory. The status of a ruler or an emperor as the Son of Heaven, implies that he possesses Te and uses it to strengthen the state and maintain a vital link between human society and the heavenly forces. The loss of Te meant the loss of the "heavenly mandate" for power associated with the ageing and decline of the given world which becomes chaotic. Evil deeds of a ruler were regarded as the symptom of the loss of Te, the decline of

the power of a dynasty and a sign of its imminent downfall.

TEILHARD DE CHARDIN, Pierre (1881-1955), French Jesuit paleontologist, philosopher and theologian, who elaborated a Christian variant of *evolutionary ethics*. Teilhard's ethical views logically stem from his theory of cosmogenesis according to which the evolution of the universe proceeds in a certain direction and is eventually reduced to the formation and evolution of the spirit. From his point of view, morals emerge at a certain stage in the evolution of life and their purpose is to limit the egoism of man, organize and channel human energy into the proper direction. Teilhard de Chardin gives a biological and cosmic interpretation to the fundamental ethical categories: goodness is everything which promotes evolution and contributes to raising the level of the organization of matter and developing consciousness; evil is everything which impedes the confluence of the elements into highly organized systems and hampers spiritual progress.

Man is entrusted with the mission of consciously continuing the evolution. His status in the universe and in cosmogenesis, serve as an objective basis for the category of duty. Man bears responsibility for the success of the evolution. By transforming matter, he must oppose evil and contribute to the general improvement of the spirit. Man can attain a perfect spiritual state only by associating himself with collective consciousness. According to Teilhard de Chardin, evolutionary ethics must, at the same time, be Christian because without religious substantiation morality cannot fulfil its function. While *Kant* proposed to accept the immortality of the soul and the existence of God as the postulates of practical reason, Teilhard de Chardin introduces them into ethics as the imperative conditions of human efforts aimed at completing evolution. The existence of the divine centre and the possibility of the immortality of the soul, serve as a guarantee for the success of evolution. Without these guarantees, people cannot promote evolution and consciously en-

dure difficulties. The principle of collectivism and the requirement of an active attitude to the world, the assertion of human creative abilities, such are the humanistic features of his ethical views which place his theory apart from the traditional Christian ethics. Due to their contradictory character, the ethical ideas of Teilhard de Chardin are used by different social groups sometimes holding opposite ideological views. Teilhard de Chardin stated his ethical principles in "Le Milieu divin" ("The Realm of the Divine", 1927), and "Le Phénomène humain" ("The Phenomenon of Man", 1938-1940) published posthumously.

TELEOLOGICAL ETHICS [Gk *tēlos* end, *logos* learning], the name sometimes given to moral doctrines which understand morals as purposeful actions and derive moral duties from the *consequences* of actions (*Consequential ethics*). Social criteria of people's behaviour are based on the final results of their actions. In that sense, Marxist ethics also is sometimes

erroneously defined as teleological ethics.

TEN COMMANDMENTS (Decalogue [Gk *dekálogos* after *hoi deka logoi* the ten precepts]; Moses's laws), a moral religious code formulated in the Bible. According to biblical tradition, God called Moses to Mount Sinai on which, after 40 days and 40 nights, Moses engraved on two stone tables the "ten words" communicated by divine lips. The Ten Commandments are supra-individual rules of behaviour expressed in the form of indisputable prohibitions and imperatives. These Commandments comprise four groups: (1) forbidding the profaning of the Lord and his name in vain, idolatry, worship of other gods and taking the name of the Lord in vain; (2) establishing the necessity of working for six days and resting on the seventh (Sabbath) and making it obligatory on children to honour their parents; (3) forbidding violence ("thou shalt not kill") and adultery; (4) establishing the norms of social life by forbidding stealing, bearing false witness,

coveting any thing that is somebody else's property. With the final establishment of Christianity as a world religion, the Ten Commandments became part and parcel of the consciousness of medieval man and a substantial element of catechism. Ten Commandments today, too, are perceived as a *moral code* which has made an impact not only on the religious but also on the moral history of humankind. The imperative thrust of the prohibitions determines first of all the ethical significance of the Ten Commandments. Philosophic and ethical works of the past and present interpret them differently. It is necessary to discern the moral content of the Decalogue and its religious justification. Its normative essence, and primary imperative ("thou shalt not kill") in the first place, is of universal significance and is an inalienable part of the moral consciousness of modern man.

TERMINOLOGY OF MORALITY, see *Language of morality*.

THEODICY [Gk *theos* God, *diké* justice], vindication of divine providence which allows for the existence of evil on earth. Theologians and idealist philosophers who believe that God is the source of all that exists, have been always faced with the need to theoretically explain and reconcile faith in the all-mighty and all-bountiful God with the existence of evil in the world. As a rule, evil is presented as a trial placed on man by God or as an indispensable element of the predetermined harmony beyond the grasp of simple mortals. In the history of philosophy, best known are the theodicy of Stoics (*Stoicism*) and that of *Leibniz*. Modern theologians, in solving that problem, assert that evil does not come from God, but is a result of the sinful nature of man himself. At the same time, they believe that nothing can exist that is against God's will. For that reason, evil is not a reality, but the absence of the reality which is fully inherent only in God.

THEOLOGICAL ETHICS, a theological discipline in Chris-

tianity which justifies Christian morality as an indispensable condition for salvation and its advantages over other ethical systems. In the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant theological systems, these problems are dealt with differently in accordance with the basic tenets of the dogma expounded by a particular confession. However, in all cases, theological ethics is based upon the supernatural character of morals whose content is determined by God and instilled into man as an innate requirement, a moral law. Hence, the conclusion concerning the universality of religious moral precepts, their eternal and immutable nature. At the same time, Christian doctrine leaves it up to man to exercise *freedom of the will* thereby leaving him at liberty to act on his own in accordance with the moral law or contrary to it. Thus, it turns out that people do good things by the divine commandment but commit evil deeds by their own intent. However, by allowing an alternative choice between good and evil and placing the responsibility for the violation of divine com-

mandments upon people, theological ethics arrives at an unsolvable contradiction between the free will exercised by the individual and the doctrine of divine predestination. Thereby it reproduces the dilemmas of the individual and the kin, freedom and necessity, which are traditional in the history of ethics.

THEONOMOUS ETHICS [Gk *theos* God, *nomos* law], an ethical doctrine of Christianity which considers morals as a sphere of interrelationships between man and God as distinct from the worldly morality of serving society and people. Its basic idea is expounded most extensively in *Neo-Protestantism*. Proponents of that doctrine hold that genuine (Christian) morality has nothing in common with the needs of society and its members, because it is confined to relations between man and God and its requirements follow from divine providence whose nature is opposite to man's earthly existence. Theonomous ethics holds that *love* is the fundamental principle, treating it in a specifically religious sense—it is not

love of man or the striving to meet his interests and needs, but an imitation of the love which God bestows on people, i.e., compassion for their weaknesses, all-forgiveness, non-resistance to evil, and belief that man's vices are ineradicable (*Christian ethics*).

THEORY OF VALUE, the, a trend in modern ethics and *axiology* whose exponents treat the moral *value* of the phenomena of life, including *good* and *evil*, as a result of the *interest* linked to the given object. The theory of value is a variety of modern *naturalism* in ethics. In its content it is reminiscent of the teachings of *pragmatism*. It emerged in the 1920's and still exists although it no longer exerts considerable influence. Its main representatives are Ralph Barton Perry, Dewitt Parker in the USA and Frederick Robert Tennant in Britain. The exponents of this school define the significance of a particular object or phenomenon (its value) for man, depending not on the role it plays in society, but on the subjective attitude to it, on its enduring interest. Interest it-

self is interpreted in purely psychological terms as desire, mood, inclination, love, sympathy (or, on the contrary, aversion, antipathy, hatred) man feels about a given object. At the same time, the fact is ignored that the interests of people are socially conditioned by the objective laws of being and the development of society. The exponents of the theory of value treat morality as a means of mutual coordination and reconciliation of private interests. Hence the interpretation of moral duty: act in such a way as to satisfy the greatest number of private interests. Thus, the effort to meet fundamental common interests of humankind is often replaced by the mutual agreement of the rivals. Recognizing the connection between morality and people's interests, Marxist ethics, however, does not derive morals from interests, but justifies (or criticizes) these interests as genuinely human (or as immoral, egoistical, directed against man) based on the analysis of the historical laws of the evolution of humankind as a whole.

THOMAS AQUINAS (1225/26-1274), a scholastic philosopher of the Middle Ages who made the philosophy of *Aristotle* acceptable in Christian religion. His teaching is recognized as the official philosophy of the Catholic Church. According to Aquinas, God is a Christian's highest goal, towards which he should direct his entire life, all his work, and thoughts. This is the basis of Aquinas's ethical views. Since God is existence which has an eternally set arrangement and hierarchy, the moral life of man consists in following this order in both his personal and social life. A person experiences the highest bliss only in envisioning the holy spirit. But a vision of God is only given to those who fulfil all the precepts of religious morality, religious doctrine and the Church. Every person must take a place in society that is pre-ordained by God and his deputies on earth, that is, by the Catholic Church and the secular authorities. This apology of the hierarchical relations of the Middle Ages is manifested in Aquinas' works, and also in his understanding of the hierarchy

of the spheres of moral law. Each person is endowed with the natural law of striving after happiness (genuine happiness is union with God), but above it towers positive law, the official establishment of the religious and secular authorities. However, both these laws are based on eternal divine law, that is one for all times and conditions. This triad subsequently became part of the Neo-Thomist (*Neo-Thomism*) doctrine.

THRIFTINESS, a *moral quality* characterizing the care of people after the material and spiritual benefits and the opposite of squandering, extravagance, mismanagement. Thriftiness has always been an ideal of the middle strata. Already Hesiod had treated it as a worthy quality. The concept of thriftiness acquires great significance in the bourgeois morality of the epoch of the initial accumulation of capital, particularly in Puritan ethics (*Puritanism*). The concept of thriftiness reveals its moral content as a deferential attitude to the results of human labour, a rational use of wealth for the

benefit of all. Thriftiness as a moral quality becomes more important today due to ecological conditions urgently requiring the limitation of the squandering of the natural resources.

TIMIDNESS, a negative *moral quality* characterizing a weak-willed person unable to defend and practise his own moral principles because of fear for his personal interests, the dread of bringing unfavourable consequences on himself, the fear of difficulties or the lack of confidence in his own abilities. Usually timidness is nourished by social injustice, the unfreedom status of man, and the limitation of personal initiative. All these phenomena are intrinsic in a society in which people face the fact that brute force gains the upper hand over justice, crimes against morality remain unpunished, the struggle against evil, adherence to principles and honesty are turned against man himself. This situation encourages and favours unscrupulousness and connivance at evil. People lose the feeling of responsibility for their deeds, faith in the force of

moral principles and in their own ability to abide by these principles. A faint-hearted character is also formed under the impact of repressive authoritarian methods of upbringing and a family atmosphere which oppresses and humiliates the individual. However, neither the circumstances nor upbringing can exonerate a faint-hearted person. His moral duty lies in staunchness and perseverance in doing *good*, in striving for perfection and the moral ideal (see also *Courage, Bravery*).

TOLERANCE, a *moral quality* denoting an attitude to interests, convictions, habits, beliefs, and behaviour of other people. It implies an effort to reach mutual understanding and to harmonize different views and interests without applying pressure, primarily by means of persuasion and argumentation. The problem of tolerance emerged in connection with the question of freedom of the individual in a society divided into classes, ethnic and religious groups, whose interests and ideas constantly come into con-

flict. The demand for universal tolerance was advanced to somewhat mitigate the irreconcilable social contradictions. An example is the Christian interpretation of tolerance which in its consistency amounted to the non-resistance to evil. Tolerance is a form of respect for others, the recognition of a person's right to his own convictions and to be different from others. It stems from the principled conviction that a person is better than what he says or what he does. Tolerance also implies the recognition of the fact that each individual, even a morally degraded or ideologically deluded one, has a chance of reforming and rehabilitating himself. At present, the scope of tolerance has been expanded to also include tolerance of representatives of different ideologies, political leanings, traditions and moral habits. Tolerance is an important and necessary component of the spirit of fruitful cooperation between people. Its practical value has increased immeasurably in modern conditions of pluralism of opinions and when dialogue of different political

systems, cultures and ideologies have become an indispensable condition for the survival of humankind.

TOLSTOY, Lev Nikolayevich (1828-1910), Russian writer and thinker. Tolstoy's interest in moral and philosophical problems (philosophy of history, relations between the particular and the general in people's activities, life and death, personal freedom and the causality in human behaviour) manifests itself in his artistic works. To the characters embodying the ideals of his moral doctrine (self-sacrifice and self-denial), Tolstoy counterposed egoistical heroes, for whom personal gain and pleasure is the law of life. The dialectics of the struggle between these principles is brought to its conclusion in "War and Peace" (1863-1869) with the apotheosis of the family and the downfall of egoism. In "Anna Karenina" (1873-1877) and in "Confessions" (1879-1880), the apology of the family is placed in doubt. In an effort to resolve the question of personal freedom and the causality of people's conduct, Tol-

stoy regards every historical event as an inevitable fact, determined by preceding facts, and in that sense it is not free. But as a decision to fulfil the conceived action made by the consciousness that very event is free. Thus, the determinism of the particular or the general for Tolstoy arises as the causative "total" summing up many free decisions and actions of particular people. In essence, the teaching of Tolstoy is an attempt to evaluate contemporary life and culture from the viewpoint of patriarchal peasantry. Hence the "striking" contradictions in his teaching noted by Lenin. "Merciless criticism of capitalist exploitation, exposure of government outrages, the farcical courts and the state administration, and unmasking of the profound contradictions between the growth of wealth and achievements of civilization and the growth of poverty, degradation and misery among the working masses" were combined with the idealization of patriarchal relations. Tolstoy regarded social progress from the viewpoint of "eternal", "primary" concepts of moral and

religious consciousness. Rejecting the contemporary scientific concepts of progress and the welfare of society, Tolstoy considered that they were not linked to the needs and views of the people who regarded them as alien and unnecessary. The question of the *purpose of life* can be answered based on reason and *conscience*, and not on scientific research. Life can be the object of knowledge only in its indivisible entirety, which reveals itself in the self-awareness of a rational being. Rejecting science's ability to display such knowledge, he regarded the mastering of centuries-old folk wisdom and religious beliefs as the only answer to the question of the purpose of human life. Tolstoy's religion is almost equated to the morality of love and "non-resistance to evil". According to Tolstoy, past history as well as contemporary society are based on coercion, on the enslavement of the majority by the minority. Tolstoy held that force in relations between people can be overcome by completely rejecting any struggle, through moral self-improvement of each person. Cas-

tigating the hypocrisy of the church, contrasting its contemporary teachings with the moral teachings of early Christianity, Tolstoy regarded as the basic fault of the church, its participation in the social order based upon force and oppression, in its efforts to turn religion into justification of the existing social evil. Tolstoy believed that people could not know what was the best social order, but even if they had such knowledge, that system could not be achieved by political means or through revolutionary struggle, since they are based on violence and thus would only substitute one form of slavery and evil for another. Regarding all power as evil, Tolstoy came to unconditionally reject the state, that is, to anarchism. But the abolition of the state, Tolstoy believed, must not be achieved through forceful destruction, but by means of passive abstention and evasion of every member of society from all state obligations and positions, refusal to make use of state institutions and any participation whatsoever in political activities. The religious ethical ideas of

Tolstoy found followers not only in Russia, but in various countries of the West and East. In particular, Tolstoy's teaching of "non-resistance" had a profound influence on *Gandhi* and was the basis of his programme of non-violent national liberation struggle. The major works expressing Tolstoy's religious ethical views are: "What Are My Beliefs?" (1883), "The Kingdom of God Within Us" (1891), "The Road to Life" (1910).

TRADITION [L *traditio* transmission], variety (or form) of *custom*, distinguished particularly by firmness in the efforts of people to preserve the forms of behaviour inherited from previous generations. It is characterized by a careful attitude to the established way of life and to the cultural heritage of the past; attention not only to the content of conduct, but to its external aspect, to its style, as a result of which the outer form of behaviour becomes particularly stable. In those cases where this form is strictly canonized and begins to dominate the content of people's

conduct, tradition becomes a *ritual*. Formed in society or the community, tradition reflects the objective conditions of its existence and thereby expresses continuity in social life and preserves its more stable characteristics. Tradition (national, cultural, domestic, sometimes even social-political traditions) fulfils a progressive role insofar as it answers historical requirements and reflects the objectively possible degree of the humanism of interpersonal relations. But it becomes a brake on social development when it cultivates an outmoded way of life. Every society has its measure of traditionality. In the moral aspect, this measure is determined by the need to establish harmonious relations between different generations, the continuation of the link between the present and the past and a smooth transition from the present into the future. Respect for traditions is an indispensable element of historical continuity. The memory of, and the gratitude to, forefathers and predecessors should be distinguished from traditionalism as a principle of maintaining the

invariable way of life, of idealizing traditions and seeking to resolve the problems and contradictions of our day by going back to the past when these problems were non-existent or were not recognized.

TRAITS OF CHARACTER,

see *Moral character*.

TREACHERY, violation of *loyalty* to the common cause, *betrayal* of class or national interests, desertion, extradition of comrades-in-arms or state or military secrets, deliberate actions hostile to the common cause and beneficial to its enemies. Treachery has always been looked upon as an *evil deed* by moral consciousness. Treachery is usually associated with unscrupulousness, political cowardice and greedy interests. Treachery is also a violation of one's own personal obligations, the betrayal of a friend, a brother or other people with whom one is linked by traditional or voluntarily assumed moral ties. In the scale of social appraisal, this vice has always been at the bottom. As a rule, a traitor is despised even by those

in whose interest treachery has been accomplished.

TRUST, man's attitude to the action of another person and to the person himself (associate in a common cause, partner of agreement, manager, friend) which is based on the *conviction* in the latter's rightness, loyalty, conscientiousness and *honesty*. The opposite of trust is distrust and suspicion, which call in question another person's loyalty to a common cause, his readiness to abide by the common interests and conditions of mutual agreement, and the sincerity of the motives of his actions. In the history of humankind the necessity to unite efforts in work called forth the need for mutual commitments and, consequently, trust. Trust does not imply blind faith, but mutual *responsibility*. Betrayal of trust is a grave moral *misdeed* (*Treachery*).

TRUTH is a characteristic of a judgement which is either self-evident or can be proved scientifically. The criterion of truth is the social-historical practice of humankind in all its integrity.

The question of people's moral concepts, of whether they reflect objective phenomena, or can be considered true (or false), has been posed in different forms since ancient times in the course of almost the entire history of ethical thought. Most theorists of the past answered this question in the affirmative, but they comprehended the "objective phenomena" reflected by moral consciousness in different ways, depending on their concept of the origin and source of morals. They saw the object of knowledge in morality either in divine will or reason, or in eternal principles of justice, or in moral laws of the universe or man's nature indifferent to historical evolution (*Absolutism*, *Rationalism*). These theories failed, as a rule, to explain the emergence of contradictory moral positions. They were opposed by a subjectivist-idealistic view which held that moral concepts reflect nothing objective (*Scepticism*, *Approbative theories*), morality being only a sphere of tastes, preferences, a particular kind of arbitrariness (*Voluntarism*). Modern non-Marxist ethics

treats truth and morality as the correlation between morality and science. In the view of ethical *naturalism*, moral principles can be substantiated by means of scientific data, which was repudiated by most ethicists. The exponents of *intuitionism* maintain that moral knowledge being absolutely unique is acquired by a fundamentally different method than scientific knowledge. Neopositivists (*Neopositivism*) deny that moral concepts contain any knowledge or truth at all. Marxist ethics maintains that moral ideas always reflect in one way or another the existing social reality, the conditions of people's social life. Society, or a class, creates moral rules and principles, formulating the concepts of good and evil in accordance with the objective historical requirements. The moral concepts of a society or a class are true in so far as its historical possibilities are adequate to the requirements of social progress. When a particular class became reactionary and its power posed an obstacle to social progress, its moral concepts became filled with false content and

ceased to conform to the laws of history. The other side of the problem deals with the way moral consciousness reflects historical laws. The specific characteristics of moral knowledge lie in the fact that it is reflected in the form of imperatives and values, not in the concepts of truth and falsehood but in the concepts of *good* and *evil*, just and unjust, the appropriate and the inadmissible, etc.

TRUTHFULNESS, a *moral quality* of a person who is prone to speak the *truth* and not to disguise the real state of things from other people and himself. The requirement of truthfulness is universal (*Universal and class elements in morality*). It proceeds from people's need to have a correct idea of society they live in, of actions of their associates in order to appraise them, of the circumstances of one's life. Truthfulness expresses and forms moral trust between people. However,

against the background of conflicting interests and mutual alienation, this requirement is violated when the interests of different people or the interests of an individual and a group clash. In a society based on the conflicting interests, deceit and mutual deceit become a component of relations between people, an element of the policy pursued by parties and governments. Truthfulness is allowed only within certain limits and accompanied by a certain measure of white lie. In moral consciousness, this is reflected in various methods of white-washing deceit and concealing the truth: the "sacred lie" in the name of a "supreme interest"; a white lie told allegedly for the sake of the deceived themselves who will otherwise misunderstand something or draw wrong conclusions from the truth they may learn. An expression of truthfulness is openness (glasnost).

U

UNITY OF WORD AND DEED, a social and moral principle expressing in a generalized form a universal *moral standard* and moral requirement to be true to one's word. Joint activities and human *communication* are impossible without a certain degree of *trust*. That is why within the framework of any social community, its members are required to support their words with deeds. In the system of socialist morality, the principle of unity of word and deed, as applied to the individual, means the need to always abide by one's ideological convictions in practical actions and to take an active stand in life. This principle implies a conscientious attitude to social duty, and a high sense of personal *responsibility* for one's deeds (*Discretion and creativity*). The assertion of the principle of unity of word and

deed in social and political activities, implies a truly democratic character of the economic, political and cultural life of society, the accountability of the authorities to people, a total openness in the activities of all state institutions and bodies. The gap between words and deeds has a historical tradition of long standing. It has become a stable element of human psychology and the mechanisms of social life: both man and society are inclined to think better of themselves than they actually are and embellish their actions. The overcoming of this tendency requires, besides other things, sober moral evaluations, judgements made based on deeds rather than words, and critical attitude towards all sorts of self-praise whether it concerns individuals, groups

(parties, collectives) or society at large.

UNIVERSAL AND CLASS ELEMENTS IN MORALITY.

This has always been an acute problem both for moral consciousness itself and for the theory of morality. At issue is the contradictory nature of *morals*: having emerged as a specific form of governing relations between people, morality aspires to the universality and the indisputable authority of its demands and, on the other hand, historically changes the gist of its requirements. Thus, one can speak of two types of morality: morality of the ancient world allowing for the division of people into freemen and slaves and correspondingly putting the latter beyond the bounds of morality, and Christian morality which proclaimed as its ideal the equality of all people irrespective of their extraction and status. Another important aspect of the question are the differences in both the mental make-up and behaviour of various classes and layers of society which are exacerbated as one class is replaced by another in

the course of history. This cannot but influence the essence of the proclaimed moral postulates and principles. Nevertheless, the history of mankind still retains certain conditions of life and forms of human community which are common to all historical epoches. Consequently, there is the continuity of certain *moral imperatives*. This generally applies to requirements linked to basic human relations, e.g. do not steal, do not kill, help others when they are in trouble, keep your promises, tell the truth, etc. Through all times, man has in one way or another, deprecated cruelty, greed, cowardice, hypocrisy, perfidy, slander, envy, arrogance, while approving bravery, honesty, self-control, magnanimity, modesty. The conditions under which these requirements were to be applied, the extent of their applicability and the relative value of these *moral qualities* were interpreted differently at different times. Furthermore, whereas the moral content of these requirements (the actions implied) remained basically unchanged, their social meaning (the social needs

and challenges that have to be met through the application of these requirements), has always differed from one epoch to another. The common human element of morality is composed of both the totality of definite common ethical requirements and the logical structure of moral *consciousness*, i.e., the form of reflection of moral concepts. In the more complex moral concepts, such as *justice*, love of man, *beneficence*, *evil deed*, the unchanged element is only the abstract form, the way in which they are extended to cover all basic fields of human existence. In the present conditions when the world is becoming increasingly integrated, values common to all mankind are becoming more prominent, and this is indicative of the fact that morality, both in its form and essence, is becoming a universal and generally recognized regulator in the establishment of human relations at various levels (*New thinking and ethics*).

USEFULNESS, a concept of value reflecting the positive significance of objects, actions and

phenomena in relation to someone's interests. In a stricter sense, it is a characteristic of the means suitable for the attainment of a particular goal. From the point of view of *axiology* usefulness, like other values of practical consciousness (success, effectiveness, expediency, advantage), is a relative value as distinct from absolute or supreme values such as *good*, beauty, *truth*, perfection. Moral consciousness links usefulness with the concept of good. This gives rise to an ethical problem which in the history of thought has two opposite solutions: good is usefulness or a special kind of usefulness (Sophists, *Machiavelli*, *Mandeville*, *Helvétius*, *Utilitarianism*, *Chernyshevsky*); usefulness and good are opposite concepts (values) reflecting different if not incompatible aspects of life (*Aristotle*, *Augustine*, *Shaftesbury*, *Kant*, *Vladimir Soloviev*, *Moore*). The rational kernel of the former concept is that usefulness is one of the basic reference points in human activities. The reduction of good to usefulness in the theory of morality was an attempt

to identify the earthly, material roots of morality. The initial concept of usefulness was reduced to the satisfaction of vital requirements. In aristocratic and ascetic morality, the striving for gain was condemned (*Asceticism, Selfishness, Christian ethics*). At the same time, the development of commodity-money relations provided other value landmarks by asserting the priority of usefulness. The fact that usefulness became the leading principle of social life, determined a higher level of the personal development of the individual because it expanded the limits of economic, political and legal freedom, activity and initiative. However, the consistent realization of the principle of usefulness shows that in the capitalist framework, relations of reciprocal use are actually relations based on exploitation. It was the aspect pointed out by the critics of moral doctrines based on the principle of usefulness. This criticism also persisted in Marxism. In socialist ideology, the concept of usefulness has gone through several stages. Initially usefulness was interpreted as something which

corresponds only to social interest, while personal and especially private interests were actually ignored. Now there is a tendency towards the convergence of personal and common interests. This is accompanied by the creation of socio-economic mechanisms which would allow social requirements to be realized in the activities of people and collectives pursuing their private interests.

UTILITARIANISM [*L utilis* useful]. 1. Ethical theory, reflecting the interests and thinking of the British liberal bourgeoisie at the time of the flowering of capitalism in England in the 19th century, continuing the traditions of *hedonism* and *eudaemonism* in ethics. Its chief representatives are *Bentham*, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. The proponents of utilitarianism see the source of morality not in social-historical laws, but in the "nature of man" (*Naturalism*), in his natural striving to experience pleasure and avoid pain. The ethics of utilitarianism is based on Bentham's principle of usefulness, proclaiming as the single goal

of moral activities the achievement of the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. This should neutralize the conflict of class interests and the consequences of capitalist competition. *Moral choice*, according to Bentham, is the simple calculation of gains and losses which are entailed by various acts. John Stuart Mill added to the principle of personal happiness the requirement of solidarity of all people and coordination of their interests. Still, all this failed to eliminate the contra-

dictions of utilitarianism. It was subjected to criticism in some ethical theories (*Intuitionism*). But a number of contemporary theoreticians in the West are attempting to renovate utilitarianism, imparting to it a more sophisticated meaning. 2. A principle of conduct, which expresses itself in subjugating all one's acts to gaining material benefit, egoistical calculations. Utilitarianism is equivalent to narrow practicality, repudiation of noble motives, minimizing the role played by man's spiritual interest.

V

VALUE JUDGEMENT, see
Language of morality.

VALUES (moral), a form of manifestation of society's *moral relations*. First, values have a moral meaning, i.e., the worth of the individual (group of people, collective), and his deeds or the moral characteristics of social institutions. Second, value-wise concepts are formed in *moral consciousness: moral standards, principles, ideals*, concepts of *good and evil, justice and happiness*. Philosophical problems concerning the nature of values (including moral, economic, and aesthetic) are studied by *axiology*. People's deeds have definite moral significance because they exert influence on societal life, affect other people's interests, and aid or hinder social progress. It is because of the so-

cial significance of people's actions that society, through its moral relationships, regulates people's behaviour, places moral demands on them, and sets them definite *goals*. It is from these moral relationships that moral value (positive or negative) arises. Actions which satisfy moral demands are good and those which oppose them are evil. Marxist ethics holds that the nature of moral values can only be understood in analysis of social, including moral, relationships. Moral consciousness is one of society's spiritual values. The value aspect in ideals, principles, and the concepts of good and evil, reflects people's active and interested attitude to reality, as they contain, first, a moral demand (the wish that something comes true), and, second, the estimation of the value of something

that exists or used to exist in terms of its inherent moral meaning. For example, one's understanding of good constitutes one's criteria for evaluating diverse human actions. In precisely the same way, an ideal is simultaneously the final goal of moral actions and at the same time, provides the basis for critical valuation of reality (whether it does or does not conform to people's aspirations). It is precisely the value aspect of moral consciousness, which expresses people's active and interested attitude to the world, that is one of the reasons why in the history of philosophy morals have often been called "practical consciousness", in contrast to the theoretical and contemplative, disinterested, consciousness. In reality, all forms of social consciousness have a definite relationship to social practice. But in moral consciousness, this link to practical action is expressed more distinctly and more directly. Morality requires of the individuals neither knowledge nor a definite mood but first of all a certain practical position as regards the attitude of each per-

son to himself or herself and their relationships. This stand boils down to the assertion of the self-value of the individual and humaneness as the basis of cooperation between people.

VANITY, a social and moral feeling, manifesting itself as the *motive* of actions performed to gain glory, to attract general attention, with the aim of arousing the admiration and envy of others. A vain person loses the ability to judge his conduct from the viewpoint of its social significance. He considers the latter only insofar as it meets his thirst for glory. Such a person is not interested in the essence of his acts but in their effect on others, in attracting their attention. Vanity is exaggerated *self-esteem*, when the effort to be in no way worse than others develops into the desire to appear better than others. In this sense, vanity acts as a perverted feeling, which often leads people to commit anti-social acts. In the history of social moral consciousness, vanity has long met with condemnation. From the time of antiquity, humanity has

preserved the memory of the trial of the Greek shepherd Herostratos, who in his desire for glory, set fire to the temple of Artemis of Ephesus—the wonderful monument of architecture. This gave rise to the expression, “Herostratos glory”, to condemn acts of vainglory. Vanity, typified among other things by the craving for undeserved rewards and signs of distinction, can be regarded as a reliable indicator of the shallow character and moral degeneration of an individual.

VIRTUE, a concept of moral consciousness serving as a generalized characteristic of stable positive moral qualities of the individual (group of persons, class, society), indicating their moral *value*. At the same time, the concept of virtue emphasizes the active form of doing *good* in contrast to the simple knowledge of the principles of good which does not yet make man virtuous. The opposite of virtue is vice. The concept of virtue highlights the role of an individual as an active bearer of particular morals. This explains why the concept

of virtue played a particularly important role in the moral consciousness of the societies of antiquity and feudalism when, on the one hand, the individual, standing out in a primitive collective, could become the embodiment of social morals, and, on the other, there was still a widely current conviction that moral qualities were rooted in the natural inclinations of man (although they could also be acquired) and were caused by one's personal psychology. The understanding of the substance of virtue historically changed in accordance with the needs of society and its ruling class. In ancient Greece, the concept of virtue was associated, above all, with such moral qualities as *courage*, temperance, wisdom and at the highest level as *justice*, which found its expression in the teaching of *Plato*. *Aristotle* stressed that virtue is not of an innate nature, but is acquired by people in the process of practical activities. Christian ethics in the Middle Ages, propagated three basic virtues—faith, hope and love. They embodied, first of all, a religious

substance (faith in God, hope in His mercy, and love of God). An ascetic nature (*Asceticism*), rejecting worldly benefits and earthly joys in favour of a life beyond, was imparted to all these virtues. The concept of virtue continued to be widely used by the theorists of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. However, contrary to Christian teaching, they associated this concept with earthly interests and the *happiness* of man. Marxist ethics holds that society and not a single individual explains the appearance of the concept of virtue. And although the conscious volitional actions of man play a great role, the main factor in preserving, maintaining and changing *mores*, is a concrete social order appearing and developing according to objective laws. That is why people's moral qualities and behaviour are explained not only by the personal peculiarities of each individual, but also by the objective laws of each socio-economic formation.

VIVEKANANDA, Swami (pseudonym of Narendranath Datta, 1863-1902), Indian thinker, hu-

manist, religious reformer and public figure. In Europe and the US, he is known as a popularizer of neovedantism and the author of lectures on *yoga*. In his effort to reinterpret established religious concepts, he called for a struggle against religious dissociation and sharply opposed the separation of religious cults from life. Rejecting blind worship of authority and the edification of canons, Vivekananda held that the main thing is to develop a sense of personal dignity in people. He maintained that the only sin is to consider man a sinner. Expounding the teaching of yoga, Vivekananda advanced the following obligatory moral requirements: to be truthful, not to envy and to do good to people, not to harm anything living, not to encroach on the property of others. He censured those who were occupied only with their personal salvation, as well as those who being aware of lofty principles, do not follow them in their personal life. Adhering to religious and idealistic views, Vivekananda recognized the merits of science, materialism and even

atheism. The democratic substance of his teaching contributed to the liberation movement in India.

VOLUNTARISM [L *voluntas* will, choice], in morals—a subjective principle of understanding moral activity according to which man must make his moral choice regardless of any social laws and standards whatsoever, relying exclusively on his own arbitrary opinion. Voluntarism is an extreme expression of ethical *relativism*, at the root of which lies a perverted understanding of man's moral *freedom, discretion and creativity* in morals. As a practical principle of conduct, voluntarism expresses extreme *individualism* and *nihilism* which ultimately leads to *amoralism*. The term voluntarism was introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies in the late 19th century. However, voluntaristic ideas in ethics (as well as in philosophy) were advanced even earlier. Voluntarism is especially characteristic of ethical *irrationalism*, of the teaching of *Schopenhauer, Nietzsche* and *Bergson* (see also

Existentialism, Self-fulfilment, ethics of, Humanistic ethics, Causality, Freedom of the will).

VULGARITY, a moral and aesthetic concept defining a way of life which oversimplifies human spiritual values, reducing them to philistine narrow-mindedness and depreciates the very idea of personal *dignity*. Narrow interests, petty motives, triviality of actions masked by highflown reasoning and sentimental dreaminess all constitute manifestations of vulgarity. They also reflect the portrayal of narrow-minded "wisdom of life" and selfish common sense as moral principles of life, and self-satisfied mediocrity which assures itself in aggressive negation and mockery of everything truly elevated, heroic, great, exceeding the limits of prosiness, uncritical, dogmatic adoption of "copy-book truths". It attempts to solve complicated, vital problems through its narrow-minded outlook, simplified approach to reality and its requirements, vulgar tastes, slavish obsession to *fashion* and imitation of aesthetically sec-

ond-rate clothes and *manners*. Vulgarities sometimes also manifest themselves in science. Namely, it transfers into theory ideas of commonplace thinking, vulgarized ideas adopted in the past. Vulgarities is, in one way or

another, linked to *philistinism*, *bigotry* and *dogmatism*. It is not an easy matter to register vulgarities by sociological means, and it is basically through the aesthetic feeling and moral tact that it is discerned.

W

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig Josef Johann (1889-1951), Austrian philosopher who primarily examined philosophical problems of logic, linguistics and ethics. Wittgenstein was influenced by the ethical ideas of *Augustine*, *Spinoza*, *Schopenhauer*, *Kierkegaard*, as well as *Tolstoy* and *Dostoyevsky*. In the earlier period of his work, Wittgenstein was particularly interested in the concept of the will and its relation to everything that exists. In "Tractatus logico-philosophicus" (1921), Wittgenstein's concept is presented as an integral whole. The main aim of "Tractatus" is the attainment of a proper conception of the world as such, its appraisal in the perspective of eternity. According to Wittgenstein, this is possible by mastering the logical teachings of intelligent lan-

guage whose boundaries coincide with the boundaries of the world composed of individual facts. Thus, ethical, aesthetic, religious and metaphysical statements are beyond the bounds of this world because when linguistically formulated they engender senselessness since they denote no facts. According to Wittgenstein, there is no access to a sphere of the things which cannot be expressed through scientific and rational means. Moral *action* itself, substitutes any forms of *moralizing*. In his "Lecture on Ethics" (1930) reflecting a radical shift in his general philosophical outlook, Wittgenstein applies a new method, that of examining synonymic linguistic examples, in order to ensure the comprehension of ethics as a subject without any explanations.

The examination centres on the difference between the two meanings in the usage of ethical terms, the relative and the absolute. It describes the cases when the first "passes" for the second. Wittgenstein stresses that judgements pertaining to the actual situations do not point to absolute values. Convinced that the absolute ethical content in language does not lend itself to expression, Wittgenstein identifies the feelings experienced by people in comprehending values. First of all, it is surprise caused by the existence of the world as such and, second, the feeling of absolute security. In his subsequent works, Wittgenstein examines ethical problems in connection with the concept of "linguistic games" and the functional theory of the meaning of words when the ethical sphere loses its absolute nature and moral action becomes closer to other kinds of human activities. Wittgenstein's description of examples of the usage of ethical concepts in natural language has been further elaborated in the ethical concepts expounded by

the representatives of analytical philosophy, as well as in some religious ethical doctrines.

WORK ETHICS, a sum total of value-normative concepts reflecting the attitude of a social group or society as a whole, to labour. The general significance of work as a purposeful personal activity in the course of which, man creates objects necessary for satisfying his needs, is determined by the fact that labour is "the prime basic condition for all human existence" (*Engels*). From the ethical point of view, labour possesses value to the extent to which its process and results harmonize interpersonal relations, contribute to the common benefit and ensure decent existence and development to the worker and his family. Work ethics comprise the sphere of self-fulfilment of a person and the interaction of people in the process of labour. One of the first tributes to work ethics is contained in "Works and Days" by Hesiod (7th century B.C.). Work ethics are presented in the most consistent form in the Bible where for the first time la-

bour is perceived as a moral predestination of man. However, both the Bible and various concepts of the aristocratic and knight *ethos*, treat labour as a penalty, a heavy burden which is the lot of slaves and lower classes. The attitude to labour changed in the bourgeois epoch. This found its classical expression in the works of the US enlightener Benjamin Franklin (1706-1790). However, a bourgeois associates diligence with activities bringing profit, i.e., entrepreneurial, competitive activities. Socialist society should so organize labour as to combine individual, group and social interests (*Collectivism*) and orientate workers to the attainment of socially useful results. This makes labour interesting, socially and morally meaningful. The significance of labour is revealed through a system of in-

centives. First, these are material incentives urging man to work as a source ensuring consumption. Second, these are social approbative (moral) incentives to regard work as an instrument of the social self-assertion of man, the satisfaction of his claims to a certain social status, the approval of the collective and the society. Third, these are creative incentives arousing interest in work which is attractive in itself. Fourth, these are moral incentives encouraging man to work thus creating conditions for the wellbeing of others, society as a whole and the development of the personality of the worker himself. Only labour corresponding to creative and moral incentives and creating fair social relations ennobles man and becomes a factor of *moral education*.

Y

YANG CHU (5th-4th century B.C.), Chinese philosopher and representative of early Taoism. In the opinion of a number of scholars, he is the founder of one of the Taoist schools. The basic views of Yang Chu are expounded in the treatise "Lieh-tsu" in the chapter "Yang Chu". As the author of the formula "everything for oneself" he is considered a theoretician of extreme *egoism*. According to Yang Chu, the most precious value for a man is his own life. This, above all, consists of worldly riches and all morals. Yang Chu rejected the spirit of self-sacrifice expounded by Confucianists and Moists. He held that the good of the country is not worth even one lost hair. To preserve oneself, it is necessary to maintain one's character integral and pure without burdening oneself with

matters of no concern to oneself and by keeping free the mind which is usually preoccupied with the most diverse intentions. According to Yang Chu, political activity bears no fruit since society develops in a natural way and changes in it are not worth the troubles and discontent. More absurd is the false *heroism* of sacrificing one's life. For Confucian orthodoxy, the doctrine of Yang Chu is a negative example of the false motivation of behaviour.

YOGA [Hind: union], a teaching of the ways of personal perfection and spiritual freedom, a component part of many religious-philosophical concepts in India. All known attempts to expound Yoga were, in one way or another, linked to ancient sources, Yoga Upanishads and Gita and Yogasutras Patanjali.

The various interpretations of Yoga and the emphasis on its particular trends were defined by the philosophical and ethical views of their authors. All the different kinds of Yoga present a system of education of man, his spirit and body. They are divided into several trends characterizing the aspects of reasonable life: Hatha Yoga — the way of mastering one's body to be achieved by abstinence, observance of rules and complex physical exercises aimed at gaining strength, endurance, self-possession; Karma Yoga — a practical guide for accomplishing the religious, ethical ideal of action whose principal conditions are: disinterestedness; ability not to despise oneself; non-attachment, implying that passion for one's work based on self-love (I work, my work) is replaced by a calm, balanced attitude (*sattva*) which liberates man. This corresponds to the law of karma according to which any activity leaves its trace not only in this life, but in the next (*Buddhism*). Bhakti Yoga is the path to perfection in which spiritual liberation is secured by

love. Within the religious concept of the world as an embodiment of the divinity, love emerges in all its diverse manifestations, from egoistical affection to disinterested love of the world as the embodiment of perfection. The highest level of love is attained by truthfulness, sincerity, by doing no harm to the living. This form of love signifies man's complete liberation. Raja Yoga (regal Yoga) sets itself the aim of teaching man self-possession, concentration, discipline of mind and ability to control his unconscious. Jnanayoga is the way to cognize everything as integral and united. Contrasted to science which studies the external world of facts, it is considered the most philosophical trend of Yoga for it attempts to solve the problem of immortality, the finite and infinite, linking it with the corresponding ethical attitudes of man. The division and classification of the Yoga trends vary in the different religious-philosophical systems of India (*Buddhism*, *Jainism*). However, moral principles make up the most important part of each teaching.

Most famous are the lectures concerning Yoga by *Vivekananda* and integral Yoga by the religious philosopher and poet Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950), and others. Discarding Yoga's idealistic concepts of man's achievement of absolute freedom, his complete liberation of

the fetters of his material existence, and the like, modern science thoroughly investigates the recommendations and methods of coordinating man's thinking contained in this teaching. The ethical and educative experience of Yoga also requires critical assimilation.

Z

ZEN [Jap: meditation; corresponds to the Chinese *ch'an*], a transformation of *Buddhism* that evolved in China in the 6th and 7th centuries. The principles of Zen were determined by a conscious desire to overcome the existing versions of Buddhism and return to its sources. To the deification of Buddhist texts, Zen counterposes the personal spiritual experience of man. Zen appeals for overcoming the dependence on words and returning to the ability to see reality directly. In contrast to the meditative distractions of the Buddhist monasteries, Zen preaches a return to the simple forms of life. The aim of inducing man to reveal his personal potentialities paralyzed by the desire to imitate, has bred special forms of influence in educational practice. The person who asks a question is either

not granted an answer or given an unintelligible response, or he is simply beaten in order to produce a state of shock. The ethics of Zen in its different versions has a series of stable rules taking their origin from the ethics of Buddhism: not to experience hatred, not to pay attention to transient situations, to preserve spiritual calm and serenity, not to entertain desires, to overcome the power of things as something transient and not worthy of man's attention, to be in harmony with dharma, i.e., attain the highest wisdom which is the knowledge of the law of life and the overcoming of all the fetters of transitory existence. Contrary to the aim of Zen, to consider truth inexpressible and to convey it directly without writings and speeches, many written monu-

ments of the teaching have survived.

ZENO from Citium (c. 336-c. 264 B.C.), Greek philosopher, founder of *Stoicism*. Zeno's works came to us only in fragments. The goal of the individualistic ethics of Zeno is to chart a path for achieving a highly moral society by means of self-improvement of each individual. Zeno considered the principle of living in conformity to Nature as the foundation of morality. *Virtue* can be achieved only by following reason which runs through the nature of man. Equating virtue with the concordance and consistency of thought and action, Zeno viewed it, in contrast to *Epicureanism*, as something that was already a bliss in itself. He distinguished four types of virtue: wisdom, temperance, courage and justice, to which correspond four types of opposite

qualities—vices. Everything that is not related to virtues and vices, Zeno included in the category of “indifferent” concepts: life, death, illness, wealth, poverty and the like. Happiness and virtue are attained only by a wise person. Knowledge allows him to rise above the fleeting life and to restrain his passions (sorrow, fear, lust, pleasure) to which ordinary people are subjected. The moral duty of a wise person is to overcome these passions and attain the state of *ataraxia*. Zeno's teaching on virtue was an attempt to present his understanding of the ways of achieving freedom in the conditions of the collapse of the polis (city-state) order and of man losing control over external conditions of life. The Stoics saw such a way in the conscious aloofness from the trials of life and public activities.

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ERRATUM

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velopment. Thus, Marx revealed the humanistic essence and moral criteria of the communist revolutionary spirit as

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A DICTIONARY OF

Ethics

The modern world is moved by the idea of progress and creativity. The humanization of man's life has aroused interest in ethics, one of the most ancient branches of philosophy, yet also one that receives a fresh impetus at each stage in human history.

How are we to ensure the priority of universal human interests within the context of differing socio-economic systems?

What is the measure to be used in assessing the humanism of society?

How are ethical norms to be formulated?

What is morality—the sphere of human freedom, or the sphere of necessity?

What are the ethical problems facing mankind today?

In seeking to answer these and other questions, the authors are not claiming to possess the final and definitive truth, but are extending an invitation to dialogue, to joint enquiry. The reader is introduced to the basic concepts and postulates of ethics, the main landmarks in the history of ethical thought, and the normative aspects of ethics at the present stage.

The dictionary is intended for a wide readership.



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