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ON PRACTICE

Written in 1937, this critical essay attacked misconceptions about the role of theory and practice prevalent at the time among certain circles of the Chinese Communist Party.

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By Mao Tse-tung

IN THE STUDY of the problem of knowledge, pre-Marxist materialism leaves man's social nature and historical development out of account. Hence it cannot explain the dependence of cognition upon social practice—its dependence upon production and class struggle.

First of all, a Marxist regards human productive activity as the most fundamental practice determining all other human activities. As a cognitive being, man depends mainly upon his activity in material production for a gradual understanding of nature's phenomena, its characteristics, its laws, and its relation to himself; at the same time, through productive activity, man comes to understand gradually and in varying degrees certain human interrelations. No such knowledge can be obtained apart from productive activity. In a classless society everyone, in his capacity as one of its members, works together with other members of society, comes into certain relations of production with them, and engages in production to solve the problem of man's material life. In various kinds of class societies members of society from all classes come in different ways into certain relations of production with each other and engage in production to solve the same problem. This is the fundamental source of the development of human knowledge.

Productive activity is not the only form of man's social practice. There are various other forms—class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic activities. In short, man participates as a social being in every sphere of the actual life of society. Thus, besides his cognition of the things of material life, man comes to know in varying degrees the different kinds of human relations through his political and cultural life closely connected with his material life. Among these, class struggle in its various forms especially exerts a profound influence on the development of man's knowledge. In a class society everyone lives with a certain class status, and all his thoughts are stamped with the seal of his class.

According to the Marxist, man's activity in social production develops step by step from a low stage to a high stage, and consequently man's knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a low stage to a high stage, from the elementary to the advanced, and from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in human history, people were, as they could only be, limited to an understanding of the history of society in its individual phases. This was due on the one hand to its constant distortion by the exploiting classes with their biased views, and on the other to the small scale of production which limited the breadth of view of the people. Not until the modern proletariat appeared, along with greatly increased productive forces or big industry, did man begin to have a comprehensive and historical understanding of the development of society and turn his knowledge of society into a science. This is none other than the science of Marxism.

According to the Marxist, man's social practice alone is the criterion of truth in his cognition of the external world, for in actuality human cognition is verified only when man arrives at the results predicted, through the process of social practice, namely, through the processes of material production, of class struggle, and of scientific experiments. If anyone wants to be successful in his work or to achieve the anticipated results, he must make his ideas correspond to the laws of the external world; otherwise he will fail in practice. It is from failure that one derives lessons and corrects one's ideas so as to make them correspond to the laws of the external world. This is how one turns failure into success. This is exactly what is meant by failure being the mother of success, and by "a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit."

The epistemology of dialectical materialism raises practice to a position of primary importance. It regards human knowledge as being at no point separable from practice, refuting all the incorrect theories which deny the importance of practice or which separate knowledge from it. Thus Lenin said, "Practice is more important than (theoretical) knowledge because it not only has the virtue of universality but also the virtue of direct reality."¹

Marxist philosophy, dialectical materialism, has two most

outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly declares itself to be in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, practice being the foundation of theory which in turn serves practice. One's theory or cognition is judged to be true or untrue not by how it is subjectively felt to be, but by what objectively is the result in social practice. The criterion of truth can only be social practice. The viewpoint which emphasizes practice, is primary and basic in the epistemology of dialectical materialism.²

But how, after all, does human knowledge arise from practice and serve practice in turn? This will be clear after an examination of the developing process of cognition.

At first man sees in the process of practice only the phenomena of things, their individual aspects, and their external relations to each other. For instance, a number of outside people came to Yen-an on an observation tour. On the first day or two, they saw the topography, the streets, and the houses of Yen-an; met people; went to feasts, evening parties, and mass meetings; heard what was talked about; read what was written—these are the phenomena of things, their individual aspects, and their external relations. This is called the perceptual stage of knowledge, namely, the stage of sensation and imagery. It is also the first stage of knowledge, the stage in which these different things in Yen-an affected the sense organs of the gentlemen of the observation commission, gave rise to sensations, and left many images in their brains, together with a crude outline of their external relations. At this stage one cannot as yet form profound concepts or draw logical conclusions.

With the continuation of man's social practice, the sensations and images of a thing are repeated innumerable times in his practice and then a sudden change in the cognitive process takes place in his brain, resulting in the formation of concepts. Concepts as such no longer represent the phenomena of things, their individual aspects, or their external relations. Through concepts man comes to grasp a thing in its entirety, its essence, and its internal relations. Conception is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different from perception. Proceeding from concepts, we can employ the method of judgment and inference

and arrive at logical conclusions. What is known as "knit your brows, and the idea comes to your mind" in the *Tale of the Three Kingdoms*, or "let me think" in our workaday language, refers to the employment of concepts in our brains to form judgments and draw inferences. This is the second stage of knowledge.

After having gathered various kinds of data and in addition reflected on them, the gentlemen of the observation commission may arrive at the judgment: The policy of the National Anti-Japanese United Front pursued by the Communist Party is thorough, sincere, and honest. If these gentlemen themselves were sincerely in favor of unity for national salvation, then after having made the above judgment, they could go a step further and conclude that "the National Anti-Japanese United Front can succeed." In the complete process of knowing a thing, this stage of conception, judgment, and inference is more important than the first stage. It is the stage of rational knowledge.

The real task of cognition is to arrive at thought through perception, at a gradual understanding of the internal contradictions of objective things, their laws, the internal relations between this and that process—that is, at rational knowledge. To repeat, the reason why rational knowledge is different from perceptual knowledge is that perceptual knowledge is knowledge of a thing in its individual aspects, its appearance, and its external relations, whereas rational knowledge, marking a great step in advance, is knowledge of a thing in its entirety, its essence, and its internal relations. When one arrives at rational knowledge, one is able to reveal the internal contradictions of the surrounding world and thus grasp the development of that world by considering it in its entirety—the internal relations of and between all its aspects.

Before the advent of Marxism no one had proposed a theory of knowledge that takes into account the developing process of cognition that is based on practice, that proceeds from the elementary to the advanced, and that is dialectically materialistic. Marxist materialism for the first time correctly solved this problem, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the ever-deepening process of cognition, a process that turns perceptual knowledge into rational knowledge through the complex

and regularly recurring practices of man as a social being in his production and class struggle. Lenin said: "The abstract concept of matter, of a law of nature, of economic value or any other scientific (*i.e.*, correct and basic, not false or superficial) abstraction reflects nature more deeply, truly, fully."³ According to Marxism-Leninism, what characterizes respectively the two stages of the process of cognition is that in the lower stage knowledge appears in perceptual form and in the higher stage in rational form; each of these two stages, however, constitutes a stage in one united process of cognition. Perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge are different in nature, but not separate from each other, being united on the basis of practice.

It is our practice that proves that things perceived are not readily understood, and that only things understood are more profoundly perceived. It proves that perception only solves the problem of how things appear, and that understanding answers the question of what their essence is. Thus these problems cannot be solved at all apart from practice. If anybody wants to know something, he cannot do otherwise than to come into contact with that thing, that is, to live (practice) in its setting.

In a feudal society one cannot know beforehand the laws of capitalist society, because, capitalist society not yet having appeared, there cannot be any practice appropriate to it. Marxism can only be the product of capitalist society. In the age of the capitalism of free competition, Marx could not know concretely beforehand some of the special laws of the age of imperialism, because this age, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet arrived and there was no practice appropriate to it. Only Lenin and Stalin could shoulder this task.

Aside from their genius, what enabled Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin to formulate their theories was mainly their personal participation in the practice of the class struggle and scientific experiments of their time. Without the latter condition no genius could succeed in such a task. "A scholar knows all that is happening in the world without going out of his door" was only an empty phrase in the technologically undeveloped times of old. Although this dictum could be true in the present age of technological development, nevertheless real knowledge through direct acquaintance is only for all those in the world who are

engaged in actual practice. Through practice these people obtain knowledge which, when put into the hands of the scholar through the communication of language and technical devices, enables him indirectly to know about "all that is happening in the world."

If one wants to know directly some things or some kinds of things, one can do so only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change existing conditions, to change those things or kinds of things. Only thus can one come into contact with the phenomena of those things or kinds of things; and only thus can the essence of those things or kinds of things be revealed and understood. This is actually the path to knowledge along which everyone travels. But some people deliberately argue to the contrary to confuse and confound.

The most ridiculous people in the world are those "know-alls" who pick up crumbs of knowledge piecemeal and proclaim themselves, each of them, "the number one of the world." This serves merely to show that they have not taken proper measure of themselves.

Knowledge is a matter of science, and there is no room for the slightest insincerity or conceit. What is required is decidedly the opposite—sincerity and modesty. If one wants to have knowledge, one has to participate in the practice of changing existing conditions. If one wants to know the taste of a pear, one has to transform the pear by eating it oneself. If one wants to know the composition and properties of atoms, one has to perform physical and chemical experiments to change their original state. If one wants to know the theory and method of revolution, one has to participate in revolution.

All knowledge originates from direct experience. But no one can directly experience everything. As a matter of fact, most of our knowledge of ancient times and foreign lands belongs to this category, but for the ancients and foreigners it is knowledge of things directly experienced. If this kind of knowledge of the ancients and foreigners from their direct experience conforms to the requirements of "scientific abstraction" mentioned by Lenin and reflects objective things scientifically, then it is reliable knowledge; otherwise it is not. Hence one's knowledge consists of two parts: knowledge of things directly experienced and knowledge of things indirectly experienced. And what is indirectly

experienced by one is nevertheless directly experienced by others. Hence, taken as a whole, any kind of knowledge is inseparable from direct experience.

All knowledge originates in man's perception of the external world through his sense organs. If one denies perception, denies direct experience, and denies personal participation in the practice of changing existing conditions, one is not a materialist. This is exactly where the "know-alls" are ridiculous. The Chinese have an old saying: "If one doesn't enter the tiger's den, one cannot obtain tiger cubs." This statement is as true of epistemology as of man's practice. Knowledge is impossible if separated from practice.

In order to understand the dialectical materialist conception of the process of cognition based upon and issuing from the practice of changing existing conditions—the process of cognition in its gradually deepening movement—let us take a few examples.

The knowledge of capitalist society which the proletariat had in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle, was only perceptual knowledge. It was only a knowledge of the individual aspects and the external relations of the various phenomena of capitalism. At that time the proletariat was what is called a *class in itself*. But when this class reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious, organized economic and political struggle, there emerged the ideology of Marxism as a result of the practice of this class, its experience of constant and continuous struggle, and the scientific summary and integration of all these experiences by Marx and Engels. When this ideology was used to educate the proletariat and enabled it to understand the essence of capitalist society, the relation of exploitation between classes, and its own historic task, it transformed itself into a *class for itself*.

The Chinese people came to know imperialism in the same way. The first stage was one of perceptual knowledge of the appearance of things. It was marked with the indiscriminately anti-foreign struggle of the Taiping (1850-1864) and the Boxer (1900) revolutionary movements. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people arrived at rational knowledge. They saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism. They also saw the essence of the exploitation of China's broad

masses by imperialism in alliance with the comprador and feudal classes. This kind of knowledge came to light only about the time of the May Fourth Movement of 1919.*

Let us look at war. If those who are to direct a war have no experience of it, they will not understand at first the deep underlying laws for conducting a particular war such as our Agrarian Revolution of the years 1927-37. In the beginning they merely go through the experience of much fighting and many defeats, but subsequently from such experience (of victories and especially of defeats) they are able to understand the inner thread that runs through the whole of the fighting, namely, the laws of that particular war. They thus understand strategy and tactics and are able to direct the fighting with confidence. At such a time if an inexperienced man is appointed to take over the command, he still will not be able to understand the correct laws of war until he has also suffered defeats and gathered experiences from them.

Comrades who are not brave enough to accept an assignment are often heard to say: "I have no confidence." Why have they no confidence? Because they have no systematic understanding of the nature of the work or the conditions under which it will be undertaken. Probably they have had little or even no contact with this kind of work and hence cannot know its underlying laws. After a close analysis of the nature and conditions of the work, they feel more confident and are willing to undertake it. If these people have gained experiences in this work after a period of time, and if they are not given to approaching things subjectively, one-sidedly, or superficially, but endeavor to understand them with an open mind, they are able to draw their own conclusions about how they should proceed, and their courage to undertake the task is greatly enhanced. Those are bound to stumble who approach problems only subjectively, one-sidedly, superficially, who, upon reaching any place, start to issue orders or directives in a self-assured manner without considering their environment, without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present state as a whole), without coming into contact with the essence of things (their qualities

* An anti-imperialist students' movement.

and the internal relations between one thing and another).

It is thus seen that the first step in the process of cognition is to come into contact with the things of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception, to rearrange and reconstruct them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgment, and inference. It is only when the perceptual data are abundant, not fragmentary or incomplete, and are in correspondence with reality, instead of being illusory, that they can serve as the basis for valid concepts, judgments, and inferences.

Here, two important points are to be emphasized. To repeat what has been mentioned before, the first one is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. If one thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge, one is an idealist. In the history of philosophy there were the so-called rationalists who admitted only the reality of reason, but not the reality of experience, regarding reason alone as reliable and perceptual experience as unreliable. The mistake of this school consisted in turning things upside down. What is rational is reliable precisely because it originates from the senses, otherwise it would be like water without source or trees without roots and would become something unreliable and self-engendered.

As to the sequence in the process of cognition, perceptual experience comes first. We point out with special emphasis the significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because it is only through social practice that human cognition comes to pass, that people begin to obtain perceptual experience from the external world. There can be no such thing as knowledge for a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears, and totally cuts himself off from the external world. Knowledge starts from experience—this is epistemological materialism.

The second point is that knowledge depends upon a deepening process, upon developing from the perceptual into the rational. This is epistemological dialectics. If anyone thinks that knowledge may stop at the low stage of perception and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable, but rational knowledge is not, then one repeats the historical mistake of empiricism. The mistake of such a theory is that it fails to take into account the

fact that although the data of perception are the reflection of certain realities of the external world—I am not speaking of the idealist empiricism which limits experience to so-called introspection—yet these data concern merely the aspects and appearances of things. This kind of reflection is incomplete and it is not a reflection of the essence of things. To reflect a thing in its entirety, its essence, and its underlying laws, it is necessary to ponder over the wealth of data, to remodel and reconstruct them to form a system of concepts and theories by straining the refined from the crude, sifting the true from the false, deriving the yet unascertained from the ascertained, and probing into the deep-seated from the superficial. To do all this, it is necessary to leap from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge.

After this kind of reconstruction knowledge is not emptier or more unreliable; on the contrary, only what has been reconstructed scientifically on the basis of practice in the process of cognition can, as Lenin said, reflect nature or objective things more deeply, truly, fully. Vulgar plodders absorbed in daily trifles do not know this. They bow down before experience and despise theory; hence they cannot have a comprehensive grasp of the entire objective process, lack a clear direction and a long perspective, but are self-satisfied with one instance of success, one ray of light. Were these people to lead a revolution, they would direct it to a dead end.

Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge has to develop into rational knowledge. This is the epistemology of dialectical materialism. Both rationalism and empiricism in philosophy fail to account for the dialectical and historical nature of knowledge, and although each represents an aspect of truth (here it is materialist, not idealist, rationalism and empiricism that are in question), yet both are invalid in so far as their respective epistemologies as a whole are concerned. The dialectical materialist process of cognition from the perceptual to the rational applies to a minor process of cognition such as knowing one thing or one undertaking, as well as to a major one such as knowing a society or a revolution.

But at this point the process of cognition is not yet concluded. If we stop the discussion of the dialectical materialist process of cognition merely at rational knowledge, we have touched upon

only half of the problem. And from the point of view of Marxist philosophy we have only touched upon the half that is not quite so important. What Marxist philosophy considers most important is not understanding the laws of the external world and thereby explaining it, but actively changing the world by applying the knowledge of objective laws. Theory is important from the viewpoint of Marxism; its importance is sufficiently shown in the statement Lenin made: "Without a revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement."⁴ But when Marxism emphasizes theory, it does so precisely and only because it can guide our actions. If we had a correct theory, but merely prated about it, pigeonholed it, and refused to act accordingly, then that theory, however good, would be totally devoid of significance.

Cognition starts with practice and through practice it reaches the theoretical plane, and then it has to go back to practice. The active effect of cognition not only manifests itself in the active leap from perceptual knowledge to rational knowledge, but also, what is more important, manifests itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. After having grasped the laws of the world, we must redirect this knowledge to the practice of revolutionary class struggle and national struggle as well as of scientific experiments. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the entire process of cognition.

The problem of whether theories correspond to objective realities is not entirely solved in the process of cognition from the perceptual to the rational as mentioned before: there it cannot be entirely solved. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice and apply theory to practice to see whether it can achieve preconceived results. This is the reason why many theories of natural science are regarded as truths not only at the time of their discovery by natural scientists, but also subsequently when they are verified by scientific practice. The reason why Marxism-Leninism is regarded as truth lies in the fact that it was not only scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, but also subsequently verified in the revolutionary practice of class struggle and national struggle. Dialectical materialism is a uni-

versal truth because no one in his practice can escape from the sphere of its applicability.

The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete but that this incompleteness is remedied when put to the test of practice. Many theories are incorrect but their mistakes are corrected when put to the test of practice. That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why the standpoint of practice is "first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."⁵ Stalin stated very well: "Theory becomes aimless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory."⁶

When we get to this point, is the process of cognition completed? Our answer is yes and no. Through the reflection of the objective process and the effects of their own capacity for activity, men, as social beings engaged in the practice of changing a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development (irrespective of whether the practice is one of changing a natural process or one of changing a social process), are enabled to advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, bringing forth ideas, theories, plans, or programs which on the whole correspond to the laws of that objective process. These are then put into practice in the said process. If they enable us to realize the preconceived aim, namely, when these ideas, theories, plans, or programs are changed or on the whole changed into facts through practice in that objective process, then so far as this concrete process is concerned, the process of cognition is regarded as completed. For example, in the process of changing nature, the realization of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacturing of a utensil or instrument, and the reaping of agricultural produce; and in the process of changing society, the victory of a strike or of a war, the materialization of an educational plan—these can all be regarded as the realization of a preconceived aim.

But generally speaking, in the practice of changing either nature or society, people's original ideas, theories, plans, or programs are hardly ever realized without any change whatever. This is because those who are engaged in changing existing conditions are limited in many ways. They are limited not only

by scientific and technological conditions, but also by the objective process itself, both in its development and in the degree to which it reveals its aspects and its essence. In such a situation, because of unforeseen circumstances discovered in practice, our ideas, theories, plans, or programs are often partially and sometimes even entirely changed. That is to say, the original ideas, theories, plans, or programs may not correspond partially or entirely to reality and are partially or entirely incorrect. It often happens that failures are repeated several times before our cognition is corrected of its errors and made into knowledge that corresponds to the laws of the objective process, so that subjective things can be transformed into objective things, namely, preconceived results can be achieved in practice. But in any case, at such a point, the process of knowing a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development is regarded as completed.

But as the objective process advances from stage to stage, one's process of cognition is by no means completed. As any objective process, whether natural or social, advances and develops as a result of its internal contradictions and conflicts, one's cognitive process should also advance and develop accordingly. In terms of social movement, not only must a truly revolutionary leader be adept at correcting his ideas, theories, plans, or programs when they are mistaken, as mentioned above, but he must also be adept at making himself and his fellow participants in the revolution advance and change their subjective cognition accordingly when a certain objective process has already advanced from one stage of development to another. That is to say, he must propose the new revolutionary tasks and programs in such a way as to correspond to the new changes in the circumstances. The situation in a revolutionary period changes quickly. If the cognition of revolutionaries does not change quickly with it, they cannot lead the revolution toward victory. However, people's ideas often fall behind actual events because man's knowledge is limited by many social conditions.

We are opposed to the die-hards in the revolutionary ranks. Their ideas do not advance with the changing objective circumstances and have manifested themselves historically in the form of right opportunism. These people do not see that the conflict

of the contradictions has already pushed the objective process forward, and their cognition still remains at the old stage. All die-hards have shown this characteristic in their ideas. Their ideas having departed from social practice, they cannot advance at the head of the chariot of social progress as its guide. All they do is to trail behind and grumble that it runs somewhat too fast. They attempt to halt the chariot and drag it back.

We are also opposed to the idle talk of the "left." The ideas of these "leftists" are far ahead of a given stage of development of the objective process. Some of them regard their hallucinations as the truth; others strain themselves to realize at present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They have separated themselves from the practice of the majority of the people and the realities of their time, and their ideas, when translated into action, reveal themselves in the form of adventurism.

Idealism and mechanistic materialism, opportunism and adventurism are all characterized by the separation of the subjective from the objective, the divorce of knowledge from practice. The epistemology of Marxism-Leninism, characterized by its scientific social practice, cannot but be strongly opposed to these incorrect ideologies. A Marxist recognizes that the development of the total process of the universe is absolute, whereas the development of each particular process in this total process is relative. Hence in the great river of absolute truth man's knowledge of a particular process at each given stage of development is only relatively true. Absolute truth is compounded of a sum total of relative truths.⁷

The development of the objective process is full of contradictions and conflicts, and so is the development of the process of man's cognition. All the dialectical movements of the external world can sooner or later find their reflection in man's knowledge. The process of coming into being, development, and elimination in social practice as well as in human knowledge is infinite. As the practice of changing objective existing conditions based upon certain ideas, theories, plans, or programs moves forward step by step, man's knowledge of objective reality also deepens step by step. The movement or change of the world of objective realities is never finished; hence man's recognition of

truth through practice is also never complete. Marxism-Leninism has in no way put an end to the discovery of truths, but continues to blaze the path toward the recognition of truths through practice. Our conclusion is that we stand for the concrete and historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, and of knowledge and action; we are against any incorrect ideology, whether right or "left," that departs from the realities of history.

At the present stage of the development of society the responsibility of correctly understanding the world and of changing it has already fallen with the whole weight of history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its political party. This process of the practice of changing the world on the basis of a scientific knowledge of it has already reached a historic moment both in China and in the whole world, a moment of such importance as the world has never witnessed before. This change is none other than the complete overturn of the world of darkness both in China and elsewhere and its transformation into a world of light that never existed before.

The struggle of the proletariat and revolutionary people in changing the world consists of carrying out the following tasks: to reconstruct the external world; to reconstruct their own subjective world, that is, to remold their faculty of knowing; and to change the relations between the subjective and external worlds. Such a change has already been effected in one part of the globe, namely, the Soviet Union. The people there are still expediting this process of change. The people of China and the rest of the world are either passing, or will pass, through this kind of change.

What is meant by the external world which is to be changed includes the persons who are opposed to that change. To be remolded they will have to go through a stage of compulsion before they enter into a stage of remolding of their own accord. When the whole of mankind of its own accord remolds itself and changes the world, that will be the age of world communism.

The discovery of truths through practice, and their verification and development through practice; the active development of perceptual knowledge into rational knowledge, and, by means

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of rational knowledge, the active direction of revolutionary practice and the reconstruction of the subjective and the external world; practice, knowledge, more practice, more knowledge, and the repetition *ad infinitum* of this cyclic pattern, and with each cycle the elevation of the content of practice and knowledge to a higher level—such is the whole epistemology of dialectical materialism, such is its theory of the unity of knowledge and action.

REFERENCE NOTES

1. This is translated from the author's citation of a Chinese translation of V. I. Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*. No English translation of this work is available.
2. Cf. Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," published as the Appendix in Frederick Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, pp. 82-94, New York, 1941; and V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, in *Selected Works*, Vol. XI, pp. 200-05, New York, 1943.
3. V. I. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, as quoted in *Handbook of Philosophy*, edited and adapted by Howard Selsam from the *Short Philosophical Dictionary* by M. Rosenthal and P. Yudin, p. 26, New York, 1949.
4. V. I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?* p. 28, New York, 1929.
5. V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.
6. Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, p. 28, New York, 1939.
7. Cf. V. I. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-200.

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