


**abc**

OF SOCIAL AND  
POLITICAL  
KNOWLEDGE

# WHAT IS Personality?

G. KIRILENKO,  
L. KORSHUNOVA



**ABC** of Social and Political Knowledge

G. Kirilenko,  
L. Korshunova

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PERSONALITY?**

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**АВС СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ЗНАНИЙ**

**Галина Кириленко, Лада Коршунова**

**ЧТО ТАКОЕ ЛИЧНОСТЬ?**

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## INTRODUCTION

It would be no exaggeration to say that the question of why humanity exists is central to philosophy; this problem has interested thinkers throughout the ages. Human attitudes towards their natural environment, towards natural phenomena in themselves, towards people amongst whom they lived, and at the same time towards their ancestors and descendants; the limits of human freedom; the sense of existence; the question of death and immortality—all these form a far from complete list of issues which together amount to what we call “the question of humanity”. “Questions as to the meaning of being human and the purpose of man’s terrestrial venture

are as old as humanity itself...<sup>1</sup> These words, pronounced by Aurelio Peccei, the founder of the Club of Rome, may well be used as an epigraph to any study of the human question.

Interest in the human question heightened in the epoch of social revolutions, national liberation movements and rapid scientific and technological progress. Every turning point in the history either of humankind or of a particular individual is accompanied by closer attention to problems relating to the meaning of life and choice of value orientations. "Nobody will deny," said Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad, a prominent figure in India's national liberation movement, "that the question of humanity is the key problem of our times and that the future of humankind depends upon its successful solution." Fundamental social changes in different countries, however, are affecting both the milieu of, and the answers to, these "meaning of life" questions.

In a society built on socialist principles, there is a growing need for active, industrious people, whose inner requirements become closely connected with the high goals of societal transformation. In a capitalist society, on the contrary, the process of evolution and human improvement

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<sup>1</sup> Aurelio Peccei, *The Human Quality*, Pergamon Press, Oxford-New York-Toronto-Sydney-Paris-Frankfurt, 1977. p. 15.

comes against considerable difficulties. On the one hand, the STR makes great demands on the individual's development, knowledge, skills and will power; on the other, scientific and technological progress severely exacerbates the process of the individual's alienation in the capitalist world. Everything human genius has created — sophisticated machinery and domestic appliances, cultural values and "the taming of" nature — opposes the individual as something alien and hostile. People lose their self-confidence, their belief that they can achieve the goals they have set themselves, and even their faith in the sensibility of their own existence. Western sociologists regard this as typical of modern society. According to David Riesman, a US sociologist, individuals of the 20th century are oriented "without"; they have lost their foot-hold in the world, as well as their ability to set goals, take decisions, or assess reality, thus turning themselves into human radar sets geared to the values forced upon them.

The loss both of incentives towards social activity and of a belief in lofty ideals, accompanied by simultaneous growth of cruelty and aggressiveness, are seen by Western theorists as a dangerous symptom, a sign of a crisis situation. They suggest widely diverse recipes to awaken creative powers and stimuli to spiritual development — from mass-psycho-therapy to interference into

the human genetic code. There are also other opinions voiced, like, for example, that of Marshall McLuhan of Canada, who says there is no ground for worrying, since the loss of an active life position is a great social benefit for the individual.

For all the diversity of views on the individual and his/her place in contemporary society, Western scholars are unanimous on one point—all of them combine a heightened interest in “human” problematics with a reluctance to raise and consider complicated social issues; yet, without doing that, the sense of human existence cannot be fathomed either. As it is, the interest in the human question, based on our human, metaphysical opposition to Nature and society, proves to be a kind of pretext for refusing to solve these wide-ranging social problems. Non-Marxist philosophers do not go beyond studying certain absolute human “traits”; they hold these to be the cause of all social calamities, and in getting these traits right, they see a panacea against social cataclysm. The human world, Schopenhauer says, “reminds one of the plays by Gozzi, in which the same characters appear again and again, with the same thoughts and the same fate: the motives and events differ, of course, from play to play, but the general spirit is always unchanged: the characters in one play do not know anything about the events in another, though they them-

selves took part in it; that is why, all the experience gained in the former plays notwithstanding, Pantalone has not become any more agile or generous, Tartaglia — more conscientious, Brighella — more brave, and Kolombine — any more modest.”<sup>1</sup> Because Marxism does not reduce the subject of philosophy to studying an unchangeable set of human traits, many Western scholars are of the opinion that the theme of humanity is outside of the sphere of interests of Marxism, and that it should therefore be “amplified” with “humane” problematics. This gives rise to ideas about the coming together of existentialism and Marxism, of Marxism and Freudianism, and of materialist and religious world outlooks; furthermore, it harbours Utopian, thoughts of a “new humanism” and “humane socialism”.

Now, where, in Marxist philosophy, is the study of humanity? It is by no means a side-issue; no, it is the *central* problem in a Marxist-Leninist philosophy which pervades the entire content of philosophical science and which provides the key to understanding its thrust.

So what is a human being, and where is the boundary line between things “genuinely human” and not-human? The human being is you, me and a third person; a newborn baby and

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<sup>1</sup> *Schopenhauer's Sämmtliche Werke in fünf Bänden*, 1 Band, *Der Welt als Vorstellung*, Inserverlag zu Leipzig, pp. 253-254.

a centenarian; a great scholar and an illiterate peasant; a male and a female; an aborigine of the African continent and a European, a Russian and an American, an Arab and a Japanese — all of them equally belong to the human race.... What is it, then, all of them have in common? Is it their outward appearance or their common biological characteristics?

According to supporters of "human ethology", the entire human "'culture' is simply the species-specific behaviour of a particular primate, and must be explained on the same principles as the evolved behaviour of any other primate...".<sup>1</sup> For all their apparent distinctions, every one no doubt possesses some stable outward features and common morpho-physiological characteristics. Having studied human biological traits, we can see that the human being is a biological species which has freed itself, as a result of protracted biological evolution, from the "despotism of heredity", so that its behaviour is no longer determined by just a set of unconditional reflexes. It is noteworthy, however, that this characteristic of "human biology" itself points, as it were, to the inadequacy of interpreting the human being as a biological species alone. Indeed, if we take the human being as a species stripped of the biologi-

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<sup>1</sup> Robin Fox, "Primate Kin and Human Kinship", in: *Biosocial Anthropology*. Ed. by Robin Fox, Malaby Press, London, 1975, p. 9.

cal ways of regulating its relationships with the environment and not "compensated" for that, then we must see him as an inferior animal which would have perished long ago. This, however, has not happened. Consequently, though they are quite indispensable, biological characteristics alone are insufficient.

What is the most essential trait of human nature?

The answer seems to be rather simple: the foundation, on which all material and spiritual values created by humankind are based, is human reason.

Of course, it is his reason that accounts for humankind's fantastic success in mastering Nature. Yet, is it reason alone that lies at the root of the feats of heroism shown by soldiers when defending their Motherland from an aggressor? Is reason the essence of the staunchness of champions for a revolutionary transformation of the world along just principles? Or is reason the basis of maternal love? It is obvious that the sphere of human relationships is to a large extent regulated by moral values which are not always in harmony with reason.

There is a different stand exposed in philosophy, too. According to that view, it is not reason, and not goodness, but an esthetic feeling, an indefatigable striving for beauty which is a gen-



uinely human feature, so that the world's salvation lies in its beauty.

Evidently, all of the above-mentioned traits — the thirst for the truth, the need for beauty, and the striving for justice and good — are important characteristics of the spiritual life of humankind. But if we restrict ourselves to determining the human essence to be a carrier of Truth, Beauty and Good, we shall be faced with a host of contradictions.

By no means, indeed, can all of us be considered to be the carriers of the abovementioned trinity. Some people are devoid of the sense of beautiful; others are anything but seekers of the truth; and there are others still, who do not think twice about trespassing the boundaries of good, i. e. who readily violate ethical rules. Besides, Reason, Good and Beauty have appeared in various ways, in different societies, and in different historical epochs.

For example, the beautiful Droupadhi, the heroine of the ancient Indian poem *Mahabharata*, describes in fine poetical language the handsomeness, bravery and cleverness of her five husbands. Regarded as a moral feat in those remote times, her love and fidelity would seem just amoral to contemporary society.

It would be quite natural to suppose that our cognitive abilities, as well as our moral and esthetical needs are determined by our social mi-

lieu — that is, without any bias on our part, the definition of humanity has become imperceptibly affected by society and human history.

The essence of humanity cannot be reduced to its spiritual sphere alone, however. The individual is a world, a whole world in which he lives, occupying in it what is for him his own, particular place in a system of social relationships. As Marx put it, "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of the social relations."<sup>1</sup>

Thus, it is impossible to define the concept of man in a couple of words: it has too many shades of meaning to it. Sometimes we call "man" a concrete *human individual* with distinctive biological characteristics, peculiar outward features, unique traits of spiritual life, a definite status in society, and a specific road in life, typical for that particular individual.

When we speak about *man's essence*, though, we mean something entirely different. "Man" here is not any concrete person, but an abstract notion, pointing out the principles by which he stands apart from Nature by indicating the character of his links with society; it is an objective groundwork of human subjectivity, and the sphere of application of human endeavour.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 7.

Does it mean, then, that we can be satisfied with these two concepts—the “human individual” and “man’s social essence”—in order to fathom our own inner world, our social status, our opportunities and requirements? If we confine ourselves to these two concepts, we shall have the following model of human relationships with society: the whole aggregate of social relationships, social links (man’s social essence) is imprinted, as it were, on the individual in the form of instructions, rules and behavioural norms accepted in society. The human individual thus proves to be only an object of social impacts, a kind of mirror in which the social world is to a greater or lesser extent reflected.

If society is a monolith, and if demands made on the individual are simple, unambiguous and not contradictory, then, indeed, this model will be close to reality. Society, as it were, instils a set of instructions into a person by which that person—an obedient executor of the will of the social whole—lives and acts. But the modern individual lives in an extremely complicated and contradictory world, prevailed by a great number of conflicting tendencies: diverse social structures, different political parties and scientific schools exist in it, all of which often come into conflict. There is a multitude of quite contradictory norms, rules and principles functioning in society. If man is a passive imprint of the social

whole, his spiritual world will be inevitably turned into an arena in which opposite trends clash with one another. Yet, the human being's principal mission in society is that of a worker. Whatever the philosophical positions from which we approach humanity as an object of study, we cannot deny that the human mind, will power and hands have created the most sophisticated instruments, built cities, laid roads and erected bridges, that it is to the human mind, will power and hands that we owe scientific breakthroughs and fine objects of art. Logically, the question arises: how can the individual act, if its spiritual world is dominated by an "anarchy" of confronting precepts, rules and notions? While being "imprinted" in the individual's consciousness as disorderly sets of contradictory rules and standards, the social world utterly suppresses his/her social activity and will to act. The individual would appear to be in the position of Buridan's donkey, torn apart by opposite, though equally powerful desires. Yet experience proves that events do not develop that way: the more complex, differentiated and contradictory a society, the more manifest is our capability for vigorous, independent actions.

So we can see that the concept of the human individual as a passive "imprint", as an object of social impacts, is not exhaustive, since it does not make it possible to explain the basis of human ac-

tivity. To investigate that basis, to understand the human being not only as an *object*, but also as a *subject* of social relationships, it is necessary to examine yet another concept: human *personality*. The personality is not a simple cast or imprint of social relationships—these are merely refracted through the prism of individual requirements, goals and ideals. A personality, however, presupposes a capacity for an independent critical assessment of the existing system of social relationships, for an independent way of thinking and performance, for decision-making and actions. The personality embodies the entirety of existing social relationships to an extent proportional to its ability to break away from its immediate milieu, to compare existing economic and political systems, and to formulate an independent view of these. Thus the personality is a human individual in its social characteristics; it is regarded both as an object and subject of social activities. The above indicates still another trait of personality—its historical nature. The objective need for a relatively isolated position of the human individual in society did not arise immediately. Personality emerges in the process of society's historical development.

The emergence of personality at a definite stage of human history does not mean, though, that all individuals become personalities. The process of shaping a personality in the course of

individual evolution requires considerable effort. For someone to become a personality and remain such to the end of his or her days is a major goal of education and personal development. The Marxist interpretation of personality is equally far removed both from primitive sociology (according to which the personality is a passive imprint of society, an object of social impacts) and from subjectivism (according to which the personality is exclusively the subject in all social processes). Marxism recognises the objective social dependence of the shaping of personality; at the same time, it regards the personality as an active figure in society. Typical of Marxism is a historical approach to the personality, taking account of the unique, exclusive nature of its spiritual world. In this book, an attempt is made to analyse the historical stages of the emergence of personality and the major parameters of its spiritual world from a Marxist viewpoint. We shall delineate the image of man about which philosophers of the past ages dreamed; we'll consider the problems the individual faces in capitalist society; we'll see what kind of individual is needed by socialist society today; and in the setting of coexistence of two social systems, we will examine the basic principles for the development of personality.

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# I. PERSONALITY AS A HISTORICAL PHENOMENON

## 1. Human evolution

While not trying either to analyse in detail the "birth" of human-kind, or to clearly define stages of the emergence of *Homo sapiens* and of his isolation from animate Nature, we shall still have to dwell on the major landmarks of this process.

Distinctions between the human and the animal can be based on different principles: by outward appearance, anatomical features, life conditions, food, articulate speech, etc. However, the human being itself begins to realise that it stands apart from Nature only in the course of its labour activity. It is in work that our specific links with the surrounding world arise, and our specific attitude to our

own kin is born; this subsequently leads us beyond the boundaries of the globe, enabling us to delve to the seabed and the Earth's bowels, to make great scientific discoveries and to create wonderful objects of art.

At first glance, every person has the same needs as any other living creature. They must eat, drink, protect themselves against cold and heat, rebuff enemy attacks and care for their offspring. Yet the human being realises all these needs in a way which is quite different from that of an animal. The animal is always prompted by its immediate biological needs, no matter how complicated or similar to a human's its actions may seem to be. What does this mean? Any action accomplished by the animal is the result of its thirst to satisfy its "initial", primary biological needs, even though it may sometimes seem to us that it has developed some other kind of needs. As distinct from the human, the animal never develops any new needs — it can only learn to perform rather complicated actions. Thus, an ability to distinguish between simple geometrical figures, to discern certain words and word combinations and to obey a certain number of the trainer's commands does not yet mean that an "interest" in geometry or an infatuation with acrobatics has been awakened in the animal. These "humanlike" actions are actually prompted by the wish to escape pain (punishment), or to win



a reward (a titbit). Therefore, multifarious objects of the surrounding world are not reflected in the animal's psyche in all their wealth, but only in the aspects directly connected with the satisfaction of its biological requirements. As far as the animal is concerned, an object which does not touch upon the basic foundations of that animal's vital activity does not, as it were, exist. For instance, a monkey, for all its notorious curiosity, or, as scholars put it, for all its developed orientational reflex ("What is it?"), will never take an interest in the way a toy is made. It can be attracted by the outward appearance of an external object, by its ability to move or produce a sound — i. e. by everything which may frighten it, which it can eat, with which it can play, etc.; but the objective laws of the object's structure — that which arises the interest of a curious child ("Why is the toy moving?") is beyond the sphere of a monkey's interests. The animal is not interested in the surrounding world as such, in its existence outside itself.

The same principles underlie the animal's relationships with its kin. Humankind has always been enraptured by the perfectly coordinated activity of ants in an anthill. Yet scholarly investigations proved that when ants are engaged in taking something somewhere, the forward motion of their burden is not the result of a complex coordinated activity, in which each participant is

assigned a definite role to play, but the result of a mechanical adding up of the "power" of all the ants, each acting "on its own". There is an episode described in the Bible about people who agreed to erect a tall tower in Babel that would reach right up to heaven. All of a sudden, they began speaking different languages and ceased to understand one another, so the Tower of Babel was never built. The situation which followed — the Babel as it has come to be known ever since — is actually typical of the behaviour of animals in tackling some complicated task (if the place of each of them is not determined by an unconditioned reflex). So, if a few monkeys are simultaneously set the task of putting one crate upon another to reach a banana hanging from the ceiling, the banana will certainly remain where it is. Observations have shown that each monkey would act on its own, without any regard for the rest; a brawl could ensue, and the needed structure would not be mounted. A single monkey, though, when faced with the same task, accomplishes it quite easily.

Thus, the animal cannot abstain from, or "forget" about its requirements. Therefore, the animal cannot recognise the world as it is — (a gnosiological attitude to the world is beyond its powers); it does not derive pleasure from observing this world, the clear blue skies and the deep green forests, the sparkle of rivers and the ma-

jesty of mountain ridges — (it is incapable of an esthetical attitude to the world); neither is the animal capable of putting itself in another's place — (a moral attitude is also alien to it).

Such "separation" of the human from the animal kingdom is apt to raise objections. Indeed, many animals, some people may say, can act "like human beings" — they "use" stones, sticks and other "tools" — that was the case even in our examples with monkeys. Still, there are essential distinctions between the ways human beings and animals use identical objects. For an animal, a stick or a stone is subject to the "logic" of its natural motions: for instance, it can perform the function of extending a limb (an arm, as when a monkey tries to reach out for a fruit with the help of a stick). People, as it were, "obey" the same logic, a logic which is contained in the very tools of labour itself and that is why human tool construction has exerted an impact on the specific structure of the human hand. The "tools" used by animals are more often than not just random things, i. e. the function of the tools is accidental, not fixed in the case of each particular object. When there is no more need in using the object, the same stick turns, for a monkey, into a thing useless for its behaviour, so it discards it immediately. The human being, on the contrary, specially searches for a suitable object, and later makes a tool from it and carefully preserves it for

future use. It is as if the function of a tool is for ever fixed in the human mind. Animals do not make tools, they are unable to detach the objects they make use of from the particular, temporary situation. They cannot, as distinct from man, single out, and mentally set apart the object of their action, the means of their action (tools) and themselves who are the subject of that action, and who initially conceive in their mind the purpose of their action. It is precisely in this human ability to separate, assess and plan activity in summarised form, that the unique nature of specifically human attitudes to the world is put into a nutshell.

What has caused the emergence of a fundamentally new attitude to the world, and what enabled human evolution? The answer has been provided in the famous formula coined by Frederick Engels: "Labour created man himself."<sup>1</sup>

Our distant ancestors — anthropoid apes — were given a powerful impetus to labour activities by the change in the conditions of the environment which started some 70 million years ago. The human being actually descends from *Driopithecus* — ancient anthropoid apes. The very first links in the human evolutionary chain come down to *Tupaidae*, ancient insectivorous mam-

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 170.

mals. The disappearance of forests and the reduction of the quantity of vegetable food led to changes in the way of life: highly developed apes began to hunt for small animals and had to stand upright, on their hind legs, because the vertical position was much more advantageous for observation and orientation in the savannah. Food was scattered over vast areas in the savannah, so hunting alone was difficult. As a result, small herds with a more or less distinct system of signals (on the whereabouts of food and shelters to hide in, or about some danger) make their appearance. The use of stones, sticks and animal bones in the course of hunting provided great advantages for biological evolution.

At present, the lower boundary of the inception of prehuman forms is held to be 5,500 thousand years ago. The process of transition to human beings occurred in the Ice Age, when cold periods were from time to time interrupted by warmer ones, so that conditions for the existence of all living things on Earth drastically changed (3.5 million-10,000 years ago). *Homo sapiens*, or the human being known to us all, came into existence only about 50-40,000 years ago.

The process of biological evolution, as a result of which the contemporary human emerged, has been long and contradictory. It has not been a strictly onward, consecutive advance. There were more promising species, in evolutionary

terms, who coexisted side by side and came into conflict with other, more backward ones. Sometimes, the former resorted to direct physical extermination of the latter to consolidate their own privileged position on the evolutionary ladder. The entire tragedy of "trial and error" committed in the process of evolution accompanying the ascent of man and the expedient destruction of a nascent humanity, which would otherwise open the way for a more mature human being, is exposed by the British author William Golding in one of his novels.

There are quite a few controversial issues in the doctrine of human evolution even today. One of them concerns the morphological traits of humanity: what should be considered decisive—the upright walking, a flexible handwrist, or the capacity of the brain? Another controversy is about the place where humankind first appeared: did it emerge in a particular territory and descend from a single species of apes, or has it emerged in different areas of the Earth from different species, and does this explain the existence of racial distinctions? Debates are also held as to whether so-called Neanderthal man, who lived about 100,000 years ago, was our immediate predecessor, or was he a side line of evolution which did not have any impact on human development? Contemporary science is as yet unable to provide clearcut answers to any of these questions. How-

ever, one thing is certain: the emergence of the human being and humankind has been a logical outcome of the development of matter. As a result of the formation of specific biological human traits, the laws of the struggle for existence, of natural selection, i. e. the laws of biological evolution, have lost their omnipotent significance. A new form of evolutionary progress of matter — the social form — arises, and this does not eliminate but subordinates the biological laws of human evolution. In order to fully comprehend this general theoretical proposition, let us recall that people satisfy their requirements, even of a purely biological nature, in a manner radically different from that of animals. The clothes, for example, which at first only served to protect our forbears from the cold rain or wind, have gradually assumed a number of other functions which are often in contradictions with their initial function: they become an object of esthetic pleasure, a symbol of social position, and (in the Christian world view) even a reminder of original sin. The succession of styles in clothes does not depend on climatic changes, but rather on the succession of historical epochs. Besides, the all-powerful mechanism of vogue makes us choose our clothes by social considerations, and we forget all about their primary purpose.

Negation of this basic thesis no longer presents a controversy of expert opinion on some particu-

lar issue. Today, like in the past, it serves to divide scholars into two camps—materialists and idealists—no matter how sophisticated the terminology applied to camouflage objections against the materialist conception of man's descent. One of the concepts opposed to the materialist one is known as *finalism* (from the Latin *Finis*—the end, the goal). There is a certain "striving" contained in Nature to the emergence of humankind as the supreme goal of natural development, determined by the universal spiritual principle. "To provide a place for thought in the world," Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a French scholar and theologian writes, "I had to interiorise Matter, to imagine the energy of the Spirit... to render a direction, peak and critical points to Evolution, and in the final account to combine everything into a *Something*." <sup>1</sup>

Of late, the idea that life, and in particular life forms with the power of reason, have been brought to Earth from outside, from outer space, has been spread far and wide. The idea, which came off the pages of science fiction and right into the consciousness of the masses, has ceased to be harmless, however. Reflected in the uncritical everyday consciousness, every one proves to be just an animal, only able to maintain an upright

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<sup>1</sup> Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène humain*, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1955, p. 323.



position if their eyes are all the time turned “upwards”. While in the past they “saw” up there a powerful and fearful God, today the latter has been replaced by no less powerful creatures from outer space. In fact, it is in this non-traditional wrapping that the highly traditional ideas of *creationism* (the doctrine about the world and humankind being created by God) penetrate human consciousness. No doubt, Erich von Däniken’s film, *Reminiscences about the Future* is a long way from the religious idea of creation. Yet knowledge of the objective prerequisites for the origin and development of humankind will come in handy in avoiding a temptation to “fill in” the gaps in humankind’s evolution by fantastic suppositions that deprive humankind of the right to be master of its own destiny, to have its own history — in fact, not only of its past, but of responsibility for its future as well.

So we have taken a brief glance at the period of human evolution. What specific human traits have been pointed out, though? Was it human morpho-physiological characteristics, such as the upright position, the specific structure of our vocal chords, the capacity of the human brain, the structure of the hand, or the ability to think, feel and derive pleasure from mixing with his/her own kind? When Frederick Engels coined his classical formula — “labour created man himself”, he meant that human evolution is at one and the same

time the emergence of a biological nature and of a social essence — these are the two interconnected and interdependent aspects of one and the same process.

On the one hand, natural conditions stimulated the upright position and caused activities which developed the human hand and in the final account changed its structure. On the other, the upright position opened up broad vistas in human activities and widened our field of vision. On the one hand again, the initial sprout of labour activity stimulated the appearance of speech, and on the other, speech itself promoted abstract thinking, improved the brain structure, and so on.

What is labour activity? To put it in a nutshell, it is a specific form of interaction between humankind and Nature. As Marx said, "Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature."<sup>1</sup> Consequently, labour is *purposeful* activity, directed at transforming and adapting Nature to satisfy our needs. Attaining the goals set is only possible with the help of *implements* of labour and is conditioned by joint, *collective* actions.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1984, p. 173.

These three features of labour activity set it apart from any actions performed by animals, even the most complicated of them. The fundamental difference between labour activity and actions by animals is clearly seen on the example of organisation of primitive collective hunting. Actions by each participant in the hunt are first of all geared to the need for food, yet everybody is assigned his own, strictly defined function in this complex collective feat. One of the participants is the beater — he must raise the animal and drive it towards where others are waiting in ambush. So concludes the beater's active part in the hunt. The direct result of his activity does not satisfy his hunger, though; moreover, he sees the hunted animal going away from him but does not make any attempt to overtake it — that is, the activity of the beater, which is in fact only a link in the complex collective effort, assumes a relatively independent significance. If the hunt is successful, the satisfaction of the sense of hunger will be determined by the connections existing among members of the given collective, and not simply by their natural need for food. Each member of the human community, as it were, "forgets" for a time about his natural needs in order to render the collective hunt successful. To do that, he must imagine all the links of that complex activity and know what will be the final result, i. e. he must coordinate his own goal with that of the

whole collective, to possess a complete image of the situation and be aware of the part assigned in the hunt to each of the participants, and to have an idea about the character of the landscape and about the plants and animals typical of it. In other words, he must be oriented towards objective characteristics of a constantly changing situation. Animals behave in quite a different way. Their actions, which on the surface seem to be purposeful and reasonable, are in fact the opposite. For example, a spider receives a signal through its vibrating web that there is a prey caught in it, so it hurries along to get it. Yet, if the vibration is produced artificially, the spider will hurry off all the same, raised by the signal, even though this time there is no prey to be found in the web.

The human being becomes human precisely by its ability to abstract itself from the striving to satisfy its requirements immediately, by its comprehension of the complexity of the road leading to the set goal, by its ability to realise that there are circumstances that are not dependent on its own will. The means used in this human labour activity require an evergrowing concentration, and goals which were formerly thought to be of decisive importance (satisfaction of physiological needs) are sometimes moved to the background. Here we can draw a parallel with a school pupil. Trying to get a high mark, which is at first his

only goal, he suddenly notices that he is carried away by the means of achieving that goal, that he is interested in the process of learning itself. The same happens to humanity as a whole: trying to protect itself with the assistance of labour against the cold and hunger, it gradually began to understand that sometimes it is easier to go on without vital necessities than without "luxuries" which are actually redundant. So labour is transformed from a means into a goal, because labour activity gives rise to a new set of purely human needs—the need for knowledge, contacts and creative endeavour. Yet, there is a great rift between the possibilities for human development, contained in the most primitive labour activity, and the actual realisation of all human potentialities, the acquiring by the human individual of genuinely human traits. Let us consider the main landmarks along the human road to selfrealisation.

The long course of evolution has produced a new biological species, distinct from other living creatures not only in outward appearance, but also by an almost full absence of biologically programmed behavioural patterns. "A tiger knows how to be a tiger. A spider lives like a spider. A swallow has learned what it takes to be a swallow."<sup>1</sup> And only the human species has to study the art of how to be.

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<sup>1</sup> Aurelio Peccei, *The Human Dignity*, Op. cit., p. 59.

The evolution of personality takes place in the course of personal development (ontogeny), which in turn is included in the process of historical development (phylogeny).

Relationships which determine the essence of the human being are not given once and for all, for all times and for all nations. Different social relationships were formed in different historical epochs. These were relationships of collectivism and equality, domination and subordination, those mediated by material things and immediate personal dependence, etc. Now *historicism* is a historical approach, necessary both in studying human society and man himself. And our human attitudes towards Nature, other people and ourselves also undergo changes in the ever-changing social world, as do our concepts, ideals, and our opportunities for interpreting and transforming the world.

The Marxist view of humankind, though, is not limited by the changeable nature of our work patterns in different historical epochs. It is very important to understand the objective *patterns* of changes taking place in human attitudes to the environment, and to bring out the material basis of the formation and evolution of our spiritual world. A historical approach to human understanding is an inalienable element in a historico-materialist approach to society as a whole.

Finally, Marxist historicism is manifest in the

interpretation of the individual-human-personality relationship. The absence of a biologically-programmed behavioural pattern only offers an *opportunity* for the individual to realise the essence of its social existence, and then to be included in the exuberant world of social relationships. Numerous facts are known when an individual, finding itself in complete isolation from society, remained human only in biological form. Thus the Indian girls Amala and Kamala, who spent their early years among animals, could not even walk upright and moved instead on all fours, using their elbows and knees; other human features were absent in them, too — for example, the ability to think and speak. The image of Mowgli, who had grown to be a man while living in the woods, among animals, and then returned to his own kin, is a far cry from what we observe in real life.

Therefore, the process of human *socialisation*, i. e. the assimilation of social norms, rules of behaviour and customs, is an indispensable condition for a human being turning into a personality. Yet, for an individual to turn into a personality, it is not enough just to acquire the norms provided by society. The personality is sure to be a certain stable entity — a system of goals and needs. What we mean is that the individual must, of course, “appropriate” the norms, rules and customs; they must become its inner proper-

ties and in their turn exert a certain influence upon social life. In certain cases, the personality can and must show independence, be able to destroy outdated social norms and traditions, and create new ones. The opportunities conducive to the emergence of personality, however, appear only at a definite stage of society's development. Personality is a historical phenomenon. Marx wrote: "The further back we go in history, the more does the individual, and accordingly also the producing individual, appear to be dependent and belonging to a larger whole."<sup>1</sup>

This lack of independence of the individual, or, in other words, its "belonging" to a larger whole, its "relationships of personal dependence" (on the next person, on the family and tribe, and on the "lord of the manor", etc.), though manifested in diverse forms, were a distinctive feature of all pre-capitalist formations.<sup>2</sup> Therefore, the general condition of the historical process of the formation of personality is a gradual liberation of the human individual from all forms of personal dependence, and a consequent growth of personal freedom.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 18.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.



## 2. "We" and "They"

What was the reason for personal dependence at the early stages of human history, in primitive-communal society? In a nutshell, the essence of relationships between the individual and society at that stage was the former's oneness with the collective and the objective conditions of his productive activity. This unity of the individual and society was based first of all on joint ownership of the means of production. In contemporary socialist society, however, where public ownership is also dominant, it would be absurd to speak about complete identity between the individual and society. On the contrary, the building of socialist society and its development are only possible with the active and independent actions of individuals, who are not afraid to "go against the stream". So, it is not enough just to mention public ownership of the means of production, to comprehend the entire complex of conditions under which the individual lived and acted in primitive society. We should also find out how joint ownership was realised, and what kind of means of production were possessed in common by all members of primitive communes.

As a rule, a narrow range of human practice and a low level of development of the productive forces are emphasised when characterising specific features of primitive labour activities. Produc-

tive forces are the means of production created by people possessing labour skills, knowledge and experience and capable of setting goals and finding a suitable way to attain them. Today, since it has gone through a great many intermediate stages of processing, the object of labour has as a rule lost its immediate natural shape; for man in primitive communal society, though, it was just a part of Nature—a stone, bone, stick or animal skin. There was no “second Nature” then, standing between humankind and Nature; the “second Nature” which is a result of the labour of many generations, is comprised of buildings, warm clothes and smooth roads, and sometimes completely separates humankind from virgin Nature.

Primitive humanity was immersed in Nature, and was part of it; the human being was constantly aware of its kinship with Nature and did not yet feel already opposed thereto; furthermore, people did not realise that they were capable not only of adjusting themselves to Nature, but of adjusting Nature to themselves while maintaining, accumulating and developing their own abilities. At the initial stages, the labour activities of man can be characterised as “appropriating” rather than producing. Man appropriated (of course, in a more or less human way) that which was “produced” by Nature itself—doing it in hunting, gathering and fishing, and accu-

mulated stocks of food thus obtained. It is only after that he began to domesticate animals and then to till the land. But how did he manage to offset the natural dangers which surrounded him on all sides? Can it be explained by a presence of mind, resourcefulness and quick reaction which most of us display in extreme situations? It would seem that an analogy drawn between ancient and contemporary man—a kind of Robinson Crusoe who has found himself on an uninhabited island—provides an ideal model for explaining the situation typical of primitive society. Yet the contemporary person, even if for some time isolated from society, actually never loses contact with that society; for each knows only all too well both the laws of evolution of the universe, and the well-established theories of cause-and-effect. Similarly, each of us is perfectly aware of the fact that it is impossible to change the environment with the help of magical manipulations but that it may well be changed through practical activities; everyone can also distinguish between regular and accidental phenomena, as between essential and inessential things. And finally, all of us nowadays have a certain knowledge of geography and biology, and we possess certain labour skills: we can compare, analyse and investigate things and phenomena; we can draw analogies, make conclusions, produce proofs, come forward with suggestions and controversial arguments. In

other words, the contemporary person, enriched by human development throughout the ages, is in many respects much better equipped for any emergency situation than his counterpart in primitive society who was unable to form abstract notions, and was unaware of the laws of evolution, etc. A contemporary individual, though, when finding itself in a precarious situation, is inclined either to philosophise, which is a brake on quick action, or to display a recklessness leading to rash actions or undue sentimentality. All these shades of spiritual life have also been imprinted on mankind's memory. Contemporary society has produced a regular gallery of human types, talented men and women, and outstanding personalities; it is therefore extremely difficult to predict how this or that particular person would behave in certain circumstances.

The great variety of behavioural patterns (models), which is one of the greatest achievements humankind has won in the course of its evolution, would have been disastrous for them who lived some 50-10 thousand years ago. The primitive human could only oppose its hostile environment, by creating a special organisation of social life, based on the greatest possible unity of all members of the primitive community, the existence of the same norms for all community members without exception, and a detailed regulation of each member's behaviour, i. e. on the unity of

the individual and the tribe. In this type of society, there was no division into rights and responsibilities and there was no free time during which the individual was absolved of its social responsibilities. When speaking about themselves, primitive people spoke about their tribe, since they did not distinguish between their own life and that of their community. There was no individual responsibility for any action either. The violation of a ban by some community member, the failure of a hunter, or female barrenness, were not personal offences; the responsibility for all these rested with all the community members who were all connected with one another by unseverable internal ties. But, being very close to the members of their own tribe, primitive people were very far removed from those of other tribes. "The tribe remained the boundary for man, in relation to himself as well as to outsiders.... Impressive as the people of this epoch may appear to us, they differed in no way one from another, they were still bound, as Marx says, to the umbilical cord of the primordial community."<sup>1</sup>

"Man" in the full meaning of the word was for a primeval individual his own tribespeople. People were members of their own clan, community

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Engels, "The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State", in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 267.

and tribe. The names of many tribes in translation mean just "people". All other people, not belonging to a given tribe or community, were "them", outsiders, "non-people". "Outsiders" lived in a different world, and things might occur to them which did not occur to real "people". Thus, members of a Nigerian tribe used to believe that their neighbours, belonging to another tribe, spent their nights sleeping on the river bed, which was, of course, impossible for "people". It is well known that a primordial community was a complex unit. Small communities united into clans, and clans—into tribes. The closest ties between people, naturally, existed within a small community. Such a community was the centre of the Universe in the minds of our ancestors; the weaker a tribesman's links with his commune, the lower his social value. He was still recognised as a person, but was referred to as if from a lower order. The weaker the people's links with their community or social group, the less valuable were they considered.

While sensing his unbreakable ties with his commune, the primitive individual did not understand that he was a member of humankind as a whole: he had no notion about the fact that "we" and "they" actually comprise a single whole. Here we see an expression of the individual's personal dependence on a local human community. The process of our gradual libera-

tion from personal dependence goes hand in hand with the realisation of our belonging to a broader social entity.

People's oneness with "their own" world and "their own" people was also reflected in the fact that they felt themselves to be a link in the long chain of their ancestors — from their own parents to the distant, and often barely imaginable, forefathers of the tribe. Such primordial "historicism" was actually its antipode, anti-historicism. Primitive people not only cherished the memory of the past, and of their distant ancestors: they did not distinguish themselves, the living, from their ancestors, the dead; rather, they identified themselves with their forebears, constantly feeling their presence, and doing the same things they used to do. An illustration of this state of affairs can be found in the Old Testament in the book of Ecclesiastes: "...That which hath been is that which shall be; and that which hath been done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun... Is there a thing whereof men say, 'See, this is new?' It hath been already, in the ages which were before us...."<sup>1</sup> Thomas Mann, a progressive German author of this century, describes in his novel on the old testament theme, *Joseph and His Brothers*, this speci-

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<sup>1</sup> *The Holy Bible*, Ecclesiastes, I, 9-10, Cambridge, the University Press, 1909, p. 679.

fic feature of ancient consciousness. "The 'I' of the ancient man was not clearly delineated," he writes about one of the Biblical characters, "having laid beyond the limits of his own personality and life experience, he was, as it were, opened from behind, merged into the past; he absorbed these experiences into himself, and thus was he bound to remember and recreate them, so as then to look in the light of the sun upon all things, not in the form of the original person, but in the form of a third."<sup>1</sup>

Primitive people merged not only with the community, but also with the objective conditions of production, with the surrounding Nature, with the land they tilled and on which their huts did stand; they were as one with the woods, the mountains, and the animals. Primitive-communal ownership presupposed that everyone regarded the conditions of their activity not just as something they "possessed", but as a part, an aspect of their world, a part of their own selves. "We" in the consciousness of the primitive human were not only people; "we" were also the land and the animals, the woods and the river. Therefore, even the simple presence of a stranger on their tribal land was, according to the logic of primitive people, fraught with danger: it could

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Mann, *Joseph und seine Brüder*, Erster Band, Bermann-Fischer Verlag, Stockholm, 1948, p. 134.



weaken the link between those people and the natural forces, their very world. As he crosses the Karumari river, an Australian aborigine begs the river spirit: "Don't do any harm to me! I am one of this land!" A constant awareness of their unseverable link with the land was reflected, for instance, in the fact that the Masai in Eastern Africa avoided sticking their spears into the ground, being afraid of wounding Earth. Contemporary people could be nostalgic about their home, too, and might even express the wish to be buried in the land of their kin; in primitive-communal people, however, it was not only a respect for tradition, or the memory of the past — it was an indispensable condition of their very existence.

At first glance, the fusion with their own kin, with the land and forest, with the river and mountains, is a cherished but hardly realisable ideal for contemporary people, separated from Nature and their own kith and kin. The calls to reject civilisation and set up communes, in which members live in harmony with Nature and with themselves, are a real vogue in Western culture today. The ideal of our human oneness with Nature has been expressed over the last decade or so, in the consciousness of some Western theoreticians, in the Biblical myth about Eden, the heavenly garden in which man and woman lived in perfect bliss and in harmony with the plants

and animals. They interpret this myth as a model of human primordial relationships with Nature in the past, and as an ideal for the future person, freed at last from all vices of modern civilisation. The Utopias of Eden, which call for crisis—and conflict—free relationships between humankind and Nature, are opposed by another and no less Utopian model—also focussed on the past—of the relationship between man and Nature.

In his novel *Aftenlandet* (The Land of the Sunset), the Norwegian writer Knut Faldbakken depicts a society in the near future, in which people who, deprived of their natural link with Nature and the natural habitat, lose their capability for leading an active, creative life; they then place all their hopes in an inordinately expanded “second Nature”—an artificial habitat created by society. But already, society cannot control relationships between humankind and nature; nor can it cope with the artificial environment which it itself has selected. A rational and regulated life begins to cede positions to the chaos of natural forces. Gradually, the “second Nature” turns into a rubbish heap of useless things about to drown the city. And in the midst of that giant rubbish heap, a new life arises, a new type of being emerges (a model of the future person). It is as if the new return to their roots, once again beginning a struggle for existence. A new scale of values is formed: physical strength, agility, nat-

ural resourcefulness, animal lust for life, and even cruelty and individualism. Humanity, as it were, resurrects its harmonious relationship with Nature, but only at the price of losing all the benefits of civilisation.

However, both the Old Testament idyll of Eden and the image of a cruel and egoistic "natural" people waging a struggle for their existence, are a far cry both from real forms of relationships between primitive humankind and Nature, and from genuine historicism. The price paid by the primordial individual for harmony with Nature, his tribesmen and himself would seem inordinately high to us today, because this harmony was bought at the price of individuality. Modern society, concerned with the destinies of humankind and each particular individual, regards the entire globe as its "large home", while for primitive people, the whole Universe, the entire humankind was reduced to the size of their own tribe, their own community. Whatever lay beyond the boundaries of their settlement and beyond the sphere of their activity, was also outside the sphere of their thinking and imagination—it was assessed by them as "an ocean of dirt", as chaos, darkness, and death. The world of primitive folk was exceptionally narrow. As he climbed forbidding mountain ridges and went down into deep caves, primitive man had a sensation that he was approaching

the "end of the world". But if, in those remote times, such a world outlook was an objective historical necessity, then attempts made today at resurrecting the world view of primitive people, at casting off the burden of personal responsibility for the actions performed, and at submerging into the "collective unconsciousness", in fact amount to humankind being "de-personalised", to a belittling of its human essence.

Now what served to enable people to tie up the primitive community, humankind and the environment with such strong bonds? All studies on primitive culture are unanimous on that score: people of those times were united by blood relationships. Of course, these were of vast importance. But now we come across reminders of some of the common "ancestors" of all commune members: a puma, or an antelope, a kangaroo, or an ostrich.... Even a plant or an object of inanimate Nature could be thought to be such an "ancestor". Here we are faced with attempts at explaining all complicated relationships between people, between humankind and Nature, and even the connections between natural phenomena, by drawing on concepts about immediate, blood kinship. Hence, not only did all specific features of the primitive human being's way of life stem from blood relationships, but these relationships themselves served as a universal principle for interpreting the environment. This is one

of the most typical traits of the consciousness of primitive man, known as *mythological consciousness*.

What does mythological consciousness amount to? This is a particular way of interpreting the environment and one's relationships thereto, based on the recognition of the "kinship" or the identity of humankind and Nature, humanity and society, spirit and matter. Primitive people were not yet aware of the abyss which already existed between themselves and the environment. They first of all saw the oneness — the unity of a sign, a symbol and an object, the essence and a phenomenon, the particular and the general, the past, present and future, things close and distant, possible and impossible, their own concepts of a thing and the thing itself, cause and effect. Mythological consciousness does not distinguish between reality and illusion, desire and reality, material and ideal; critical attitudes are alien to it, and emotions prevail over reason. This unity, or, as it is usually referred to, *syncretism*, of primitive consciousness underlies the likening of properties characteristic of natural phenomena to human traits (anthropomorphism) or to human society (sociomorphism).

Mythological interpretation of the world underlies the way the primitive human behaves, while making use of a whole system of magical acts. A *magical* act is an action based on an illu-

sory use of the allegedly existing immediate "blood" ties between an object and its image, between the whole object and its part, between a symbol and the object it stands for, between the name of a being and the being itself. Such an illusory, fantastic way of interpreting the environment had an important psychological function. It gave people an assurance of their success in surmounting obstacles, rallied them together in their struggle to overcome all sorts of difficulties, and created an illusion of absolute knowledge against the backdrop of almost complete "ignorance". Today, too, it sometimes seems to us that resort to various social symbols renders us strength. For example, a banner has always served as an epitome of power, courage and unity during military actions; to capture a banner has always inferred the loss to the enemy of a substantial portion of his strength. It is far from always that contemporary folk establish their own ties with the world and their kind by relying on reason, analytical thinking. They, too, are sometimes overwhelmed by an irresistible power of genuine emotion as they interact with Nature and society. And they are helped in this by the world of symbols and tokens. Tokens become all kinds of "strongpoints" for their emotions. Nowadays, such an immediately-emotional cognition of the world is intermingled with a complicated rational activity, and this does not allow folk to be

submerged in the world of illusions. Even today, however, attempts are made to subjugate people's consciousness by illusory, fantastic concepts; to plunge them into mythological notions about the world; and to eradicate the very possibility for them either to harbour doubts, or to take a critical view of the reality around them.

Specific traits of our early ancestors' mythological consciousness, their integrity and oneness with Nature, their high emotionality and so on, were also manifest in their attitudes towards themselves: if there is no clear-cut boundary between Nature and society, then there cannot be any "I" who is unique and absolutely different from other "I's", an "I" who I preserve through all the different periods of my life in the most diverse circumstances, an "I" who always remains "me". Such an attitude towards oneself, such an assessment of oneself, typical of the contemporary human being, was alien to ancient people. A child, and later a youth who participates in so-called "transitory" rites, does not just pass from one age group to another, but is born anew, as it were, and begins to perform a different social function. A six to eight-year-old child from an African tribe of Kikuyu undergoes the rite of "second birth", and after that he is held responsible for his behaviour. In ancient times, the rites of initiation marked the birth of the adult, capable of starting his own family. The "new man"

was given a new name, too, which sealed his social status. The name was regarded by mythological consciousness as an inalienable part of the individual himself: there was a specific magical line between the name and the person; indeed, the name was the person. People kept their personal names a secret, so that the enemy or an Evil Spirit could do them no harm. Many religions forbade the pronouncing aloud of the name of God. Names were given by the tribe, and that served as an expression of the closeness of the individual-the name-the community bond.

Thus, the oneness of the individual and the clan was in fact an absence of an individual consciousness itself and of a "sense of personality", of a capability to mentally separate oneself from the community. The process of existence of the individual, deprived of inner stability, is considered by mythological consciousness to be a succession of states similar to re-incarnation. It is not an accident that many of the ancient religions, which retained specific features of such consciousness, always represent the idea of the transmigration of souls. It might be expected that by the force of these circumstances, ancient man was completely devoid of the striving to express himself in an activity, was devoid of the competitive spirit, of rivalry. That was not the case, however. On the contrary, it was exceptionally important for ancient man to be the best in the activity allotted to



him. This activity, of course, was strictly regulated by the community. To infringe these regulations, to claim some other function, or to violate a taboo, was just unthinkable for the primitive individual. Researchers have often identified a so-called "psychogenous" death (caused exclusively by human consciousness or the psyche) with the accidental violation of a taboo. Albert Schweitzer, a Nobel Prize winner and an outstanding humanist, described a case when a boy died on learning that he had eaten from a pot in which bananas had been cooked previously because, for him, this fruit was taboo.

As we can see, primitive people are both similar and different from us, modern people. While realising that the type of human beings we have considered could be brought to life only by the socio-historical conditions typical of those remote times, with their low level of production, almost no division of labour, closeness to Nature, absence of knowledge, etc., we must not forget that in our day, too, we sometimes witness in our contemporaries some traits that are very much like those of our distant ancestors. However, the sense of being as one with Nature and history which we experience today should not be regarded as a sign of mythological consciousness, but rather as an esthetic emotion, a sense of history.

Further historical development produced a new type of person. This process is essentially

rooted in the sphere of material relationships. "...In the course of historical development," Marx and Engels wrote in *The German Ideology*, "...there appears a cleavage in the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labour and the conditions pertaining to it."<sup>1</sup>

### 3. "Nothing So Wondrous As Man!"

This "cleavage in the life of each individual" was underlined by a new form, a new stage in the relationships of personal dependence — those of domination and subjugation — which did and do prevail in a class society. In primitive-communal society, relationships of personal dependence were those of interdependence between all commune members, all of whom held uniformly relationships to the means of production. In a society where the means of production no longer belong to all of its members but instead are the private property of a few, the relationships of domination and subjugation are maintained through *non-economic* coercion, i. e. by means of direct physical compulsion or coercion with the help of custom, law, ideology, or religious pressure.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The German Ideology", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 78.

Now in a class society, of the sort which came to replace the primitive-communal one, what kind of an imprint do these relationships of domination and subjugation, seen in all spheres of life, have on people and their personal development? We find graphical examples of the appearance of man's new attitude to his fellow-men and himself in the slave-owning societies of ancient Greece and Rome. The new stage in the evolution of the human individual, the new social estimate of man has been expressed in a typically classical, simple and emotional way by Sophocles in his famous tragedy, *Antigone*:

*"...Wonders are manifold;  
Nothing so wondrous as Man!"*<sup>1</sup>

Freedom and responsibility, courage and heroism, the sense of shame and guilt—a whole spectrum of new human values, unknown to the old, primitive-communal system, appeared at that time and became an object of intensive study and discussion.

We have already said that each new stage in human history is a new step on the path to freedom, independence, and the realisation of our own potential. As Engels wrote in his

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<sup>1</sup> *The Antigone of Sophocles*, Cincinnati, The Robert Clarke Company, 1911, p. 35.

*Anti-Dühring*, "each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom".<sup>1</sup>

But why does a surge of personal feelings occur in a society based on suppression and subjugation, i. e. on "non-freedom"?

Extended family relationships, which served to knit together into a single whole all members of a community, were destroyed in a class society. Private property gives rise to a private interest — to protect and multiply that property. Economic relationships led to the objective isolation of those who stood guard over their own private interests, and this in turn led to opposing other individuals, groups, and society as a whole. This economic isolation, though, should not be interpreted simplistically, as a complete isolation of the individual in a class society. In fact, it is just the opposite. Increasingly intensive trade, wars against neighbouring states and internecine strife, a dynamic political life, the atmosphere of political debates and an open discussion of complicated affairs of state — all of this served to rally people together. Of course, these were no longer the immediate and direct interlinks, which had been typical of the communal way of life and which had brought about an identity of individual interests and a merger of a primordial col-

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 133.

lective into a single whole. It was the other way round—all intensive economic, political and cultural contacts were now stimulated by the existence of a private interest. But while pursuing their own private interest, people learned to recognise their own like in the citizens of other states. Gradually, the division of all humankind into “we” and “they”, into “people” and “non-people”, that typical feature of archaic consciousness, disappeared. Thus Aeschylus, who described in his tragedy, *The Persians*, the enemy camp as it were from the inside, saw nothing inhuman there.

The boundaries of the human world are now actually expanding. We recognise the existence of time and space to be the same for all people, and we acknowledge that the Universe extends far beyond the human habitat.

It is as if humankind has at last broken the chains of its blood relationships. People can now make their own decisions, and build their own lives.

Yet we, who find ourselves face to face with the environment, ourselves and our own “tamed” but not fully fathomed desires and passions, are frightened and confused. For an ancient Greek, everything unknown which life had in store for him, was embodied in the image of Fate, or Destiny. The voice of the implacable Fate declared his freedom to be imaginary. All people were

equal in the face of Destiny—a tsar and a soldier, man and woman. The higher you had been raised by your Fate, the more you have achieved in life, the greater power and might and wealth you possessed—the more terrible would be your downfall if your deeds were not in harmony with what had been predestined for you.

The reason why the Persians sustained a defeat in their war with the Greeks was interpreted by the latter as a violation by the former of their predestined “measure”; having been destined to possess the continent, they claimed the sea. Fate was inexorable, nothing and nobody could divert it, it was blind and “dark”. It did not even depend on the will of Gods; they only saw to it that it be fulfilled. Polycrates, the Greek tyrant of Samos, who was very successful almost all his life, who was rich and healthy and seemed to be master of his own Fate, threw his favourite precious ring into the sea because he was afraid of his Fate and tried to deceive it. But the ring, promptly found in the belly of a fish pulled out of the sea by some fishermen, was returned to Polycrates: Fate “had not accepted” the offering, and very soon Polycrates lost all his wealth and died a terrible death. So, as the ancient Greeks saw it, Fate was not to be “traded” or compromised with, and even the Gods they worshipped were only its obedient servants.

The world of ancient Greeks was not as clear

as that of primitive people. They could no longer be fully immersed in the harmony of the subconscious, that illusory time and space which was the milieu of their primitive forebears. On the one hand, they became more and more aware of a multiplicity of their links with space and their own kin, and they began to see themselves as a part of an increasingly bigger whole. On the other hand, their immediate links with the environment which had been embodied in the blood kinships of primitive people, grew weaker. For the first time ever, people began to realise the tragedy of their own existence, expressed in contradictory relationships between death and immortality, the final and infinite, necessity and freedom, accident and law. The idea of Fate was a definite stage of human self-consciousness; the idea of an independent, "separate" human existence in the world began to pave a way for itself, though as yet in a contradictory form, and clad in a mythological attire.

Everyone is a part of the whole, of "the kosmos", and every life is ruled by the laws governing the whole. Our social nature cannot yet be realised other than by an appeal to forces outside society. Typical of ancient Greeks, however, were desperate attempts at fathoming the blind power of Fate, at revealing its secrets and curbing it. The chief controversy of human existence, the meaning of life began to be formulated in the

human struggle with Fate. Fate is both an external law, and a blind, dark, unconscious element within the human being. In the process of struggling with Fate, the world, society and themselves, people begin to know themselves, their strengths and weaknesses, their own "measure" in the Universe, the state and the family. Sophocles describes in his *Antigone* how the heroine performed funeral rites over the body of her brother Polymices, though it was forbidden by her uncle, Creon, the king of Thebes, because Polymices was proclaimed a traitor. As a result, Antigone is condemned to be immured alive and hangs herself to escape that tortuous death; her fiancé, Creon's son dies, and Creon's wife commits suicide. Of the characters in the tragedy, who is right, and who complied with the rulings of Fate? Antigone, who remained true to the ancient custom of her clan, does the right thing by the family but ignores the interests of the state. Creon, who stands guard over the state interests, is right, too, but he tramples upon the individual, upon the very right of man to live and die in dignity. Antigone's fiancé is also right in not wishing to know anything about any other law except that of love. And Creon's wife is right, too, in her judgement that to sacrifice the holy right of motherhood to the interests of the state is immoral. So we see how multifarious are the forms assumed by Fate, which in fact proves to



be of quite "earthly" origins. The more active and gifted a person is, the more difficult it is for him to act in conformity with his "measure" which, in the final account, is a tangle of moral, political and spatial laws.

Despite the fact that all clashes of humankind with Fate and its true servants — the Gods — end tragically, the individual nevertheless retains the right to oppose blind Fate, and to remain himself. Marx noted that already in Aeschylus's tragedy *Prometheus Bound*, the Gods were "tragically wounded to death".<sup>1</sup> Aeschylus condemns the Gods for their cruelty and blindness and acclaims Prometheus, who violated the Gods' ban for the sake of the people, as the bearer of reason and good. People can fight against Fate, and not only can but must, if they wish to remain human! It is not an accident, then, that the image of Prometheus has always been a symbol of our best human traits.

In the consciousness of the ancient Greek, Fate itself began to assume new characteristics. In philosophical theories of the time, there were no longer any discourses suggesting the basis of the world was a blind, irrational principle. The source of the world was not a blind Fate but

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 179.

a *logos* — the absolute rational principle. The *logos* was accessible only to the wisest people; it was reflected differently in the soul of each particular individual, in the state, and in the harmony of the Universe. The greatest benefit for any human being, in Plato's opinion, was the overcoming of the blind, dark, "lusting" principle within, and the emergence and development of that part of the soul called "reason". Thus reason, or the rational part of the soul gained the upper hand over Fate, a Fate still embodied in the "lusting" part of the soul. This victory, though, was not easy to win. Man had to recognise himself, to come to know that which was good and that which was bad in him, to discover the secrets within, and only then to reject everything that did not correspond to a genuinely human "measure"—this was what the Greeks' doctrine said.

The so-called *catharsis* (purification) they regarded as a universal means for bringing to light our most secret thoughts.

At present, the function of purification is usually assigned to the arts. In ancient times, however, *catharsis* was achieved through an actual reproduction and overcoming of the destructive forces hidden in man, and in wide-spread national religious performances which reflected the myth about the murder of God and his subsequent resurrection in the image of a holy animal.

The first act of such a performance—the

“murder” of God — sometimes assumed the form of an unbridled orgy, in the course of which people displayed outright looseness. The next act was an agonising repentance for such sinful behaviour, profound remorse for their guilt, and an all-pervading grief. And finally, the resurrected God returned to the world, so general rejoicing ensued. The rite was a specific form of struggle against the dark, animal passions, and against Fate, that Fate which so dominated man. It demanded that everybody revealed for all to see, everything that due to this irrational principle existed within, and that each should ask themselves when so doing: “Is this really freedom?” Each participant in the rite was gradually led to the idea that the much-coveted freedom from social restrictions was imaginary.

People cannot be free while violating social norms prescribed for them from above. If an attempt is made to describe the situation from the point of view of modern philosophical thinking, it may be said that there’s a lesson here, no matter how naive and “material” its form; and so we learn that we cannot discard social rules like old clothes which have long been getting on our nerves, because our very essence is social. On the contrary, while violating social bans, we commit an act of coercion on ourselves. Thus, with all the power of our natural feelings we realise ourselves to be social beings. In this particular case, God

was turned into a symbol of the general human moral principle.

Thus, tribal ties between people were gradually replaced by the conscious awareness of their social essence. If the heroes of ancient myths were born to fulfil the will of the heavens and if, therefore, they were incapable of self-development, then in the heroes of ancient tragedies, we can trace a sense of personal responsibility for their actions and a feeling of individual guilt, even though within those deeds, Fate did play a decisive role; as a result, they were guilty involuntarily, in spite of themselves, as, for instance, Oedipus, the hero of Sophocles' tragedy of the same name.

A significant indicator of the evolution of the human individual is the development of ethical consciousness. This is associated with the emergence of optional situations resulting from the individual's life growing more complicated and family relationships becoming autonomous. The sense of *fear* in the face of hostile forces and the judgement of Gods is replaced by a more complex gamut of feelings: the sense of shame and honour, pride, and thirst for fame ("What will people say? What will they think about me? What will be their estimate of my behaviour?). It is as if a person has always been in need of external confirmation, by other people, by society —

of his own emerging humanity; no one wants to be "an island."

Society "sets" us "models" of behaviour; it is society which provides us with various patterns, and having made our choice of one of them, we can then act in accordance therewith. At this stage, the best way of perfecting ourselves is to copy the perfect patterns of unquestionable authorities. Yet hidden herein is a source of contradictions which are apt to aggravate in subsequent epochs. While trying to behave in compliance with the perfect patterns we are in danger of losing our own identity. Imitation may turn into worship. As was mentioned earlier, during ancient times, all relationships between people were personal in nature; they were relationships between particular individuals, who were not yet screened by things or impersonal administrative mechanisms. As a rule, however, the individual's status in society, and first of all its material position, did not wholly depend on personal qualities. At the previous stage, under the tribal system, the individual's authority and place in society directly hinged on his courage, physical strength, cleverness and skills; in class society, however, the power of authority turns into the authority of power. In mass consciousness, the formula "economic status — power — authority" makes a turnabout, as it were, so that its final link is now taken for the initial one. The might

and power of the individual in society is explained by his/her possession of exclusive personal merits. The person who is at the helm of power is elevated to an ever greater height, and becomes a "demigod". But such a great authority should not be imitated, of course: it can only be worshipped. It was not by chance that Alexander of Macedon, the conqueror of Persia, Northern India and Egypt, proclaimed himself to be the son of the god Ammon; he realised that the power of authority must rely upon the authority of heavenly origin. The Emperor's authority in the Roman Empire also rested on his reputation for being a symbol of supreme power, an envoy of the Gods. The emerging sense of man's social nature went through the most fantastic transformations: for example, his love for the country turned into love for the Emperor who, as it were, symbolised the state.

The nature of *authoritarian* consciousness, which made its appearance in the period of the formation of the individual and which exists today, gave food for the meditations of Dostoyevsky, who wrote: "...trivial fanatics, try as they might, cannot understand how to serve an idea other than by fusing it with the person, who, as they see it, expresses this idea."

While still not actually aware of ourselves and of our human essence, we begin to separate ourselves from that essence and to worship it as

something alien. Thus a complicated and multifaceted process is started by our alienation from our very essence. Till all the best in an individual is not separated from him completely, it continues to be possessed by that person. But it is not true of all people. Only the chosen possess their essence; only those who, according to an authoritarian consciousness, become an object of worship. An outstanding personality, a "charismatic leader" ("charisma" comes from the Greek word meaning benefit, benevolence, grace — the conferment on a person of such qualities as exclusiveness, sinlessness, and supernatural powers) is a prophet, a preacher, or a political leader who is not seen simply as a representative of the administration; for he himself is a source of power. General notions (power, the state, moral values, and society as a whole) are represented in authoritarian consciousness as single notions. For example, such is the "Father of the Nation" — a dictator — in the novel by a Colombian author Garcia Marquez, *The Autumn of a Patriarch*. Now it is well known that socialist society has also not escaped the cult of a personality — that manifestation of authoritarian consciousness. Were there any objective prerequisites for the emergence of this phenomenon? Up till recently, it has been maintained that the cult of a personality is a vestige of pre-socialist forms of consciousness, and that socialism does not provide objective condi-

tions for its inception. But is this really so? While bearing in mind that under socialism the role of the human factor increases in all areas of societal life, we must not forget that, under certain circumstances, an individual can be vested with great social responsibility for the destinies of society and that thus that individual can become a sort of "banner" in the struggle for new relationships and a symbol of the new epoch. In such a case, there is a possibility in the common consciousness, that the representative of power may turn into the source of power, that the symbol may be identified with what it symbolises. It would be wrong, though, to regard authoritarian consciousness as an essential characteristic of socialist consciousness. Rather, it testifies to the fact that consciousness in socialist society should not be allowed to take shape spontaneously. Marx wrote in a letter to Wilhelm Blos as far back as 1877: "When Engels and I first joined the secret Communist Society, we made it a condition that everything tending to encourage superstitious belief in authority was to be removed from the Rules."<sup>1</sup> The modesty of Lenin can serve as a model for all political leaders to follow. Rejection of all manifestations of authoritarianism both "from above" and "from below" is an indis-

<sup>1</sup> "Marx to Wilhelm Blos in Hamburg, *London, November 10, 1877*", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 291.



pensable element for the radical restructuring of all aspects of social life, now underway in the Soviet Union.

#### 4. In the Image of...

Humankind made a great step forward in the development of human personality in antiquity. The individual's right to independent actions was recognised; each was now obliged to turn to their reason as a means of self-control. Each was aware of their rights and duties not only in respect to members of their own narrow circle, but to all of humanity.

At the same time, the individual, in search of a place in the world and their own way forward, was faced with numerous problems; these, in order to further advance along the road to freedom and personal development, they had to resolve.

In the Middle Ages, under the feudal system, every problem which caused our forebears' anxiety was concentrated in problems of their relationship with God. Under Christianity, those issues of human struggle against Fate that could not be changed even by God, seemed to be removed from the agenda, and God's Providence came instead of the dark, blind forces of Fate. Everyone was given their own special place, in the perfectly harmonious schema of the world

suggested by Christianity. There was nothing accidental in that world; everything was subject to a single regulatory principle — God, a God who embodied absolute knowledge, absolute perfection and Supreme Good.

The human being was announced to be like its Creator — God. The human, they said, is the crown of creation. Rocks just exist; plants not only exist, but are alive, too, though they cannot feel; animals do feel, but have no reason; and only a person both exists, lives and feels, like others of God's creatures, and is endowed with ability to understand and think — so a human is "angel-like". If people develop this godly gift, they will fulfil their predestination and be "saved". The whole world, according to Christian theology, is involved in the "drama of salvation", but it is only humankind which is capable of achieving it. The architecture of a medieval cathedral is in fact a model of the world striving towards the heavens, towards the heavenly bliss.

Well, one might think that humankind, while possessing godly essence, is also endowed with godlike power. It would seem that we need not enter the unequal contest with Fate since each is the master of their own future. But in the Middle Ages, the human image was far from being that optimistic; we have pointed out only one of its aspects.

It seemed that all the world's riddles had been

solved. Numerous encyclopedias, compendiums and "summaries of knowledge" were compiled in that period, all of them claiming to offer final wisdom; "world histories" were written describing the road humanity had travelled in the past, was treading in the present, and would cover in the future. Even the Earth's position in space was assumed to testify to our human extraordinary, cosmic exclusiveness: the Earth, that cradle of humankind, was at that time considered the centre of the Universe.

The belief in humanity and the potentialities of human reason, however, were restricted by Christian theologians themselves. The world was recognisable as once created, final in space and time, they asserted, thus setting the limits to the opportunities of human perfection in this finite world. It is not just reason, but only a Reason led by belief that can fathom God's creations — that was their postulation. So the method they suggested for cognising God's creations was far from scientific.

Since the world does not exist by itself, they said, it is like a book written by God; therefore, to learn everything about any element of this world is only possible by revealing the place this particular element occupies in God's overall conception. The goal of cognition is therefore to establish hierarchical links between the heavenly prototypes and their earthly incarnations, and

not to engage in painstaking experimental research, involving inductive methods of generalisation or a search for cause-and-effect connections between phenomena. The essence precedes existence, the general comes before the particular, the whole foreruns the part, and the typical anticipates the specific... The key to the world's riddles can only be found if we see all earthly things as symbols of the invisible heavenly essence. *Symbolism* was typical of our view of the world in the Middle Ages.

Medieval consciousness took the same view of man himself. In man, only that aspect of the individual which is of a supra-individual nature, i. e. which is connected with the Creator, was regarded as specifically human. The human individual exists as a certain entity, it was said, only in so far as he is serving God. Hence the censure of all manifestations of his conspicuously individual traits. The "anonymity" of human existence was considered a supreme virtue. At that stage, and for this reason, the genre of autobiography was practically non-existent in literature, for all "biographical" (or rather, hagiographical) writings emphasise not the individual traits of the heroes, but only their general features. Humankind, it was deemed at that time, must only embody virtues that were typical of all good people.

So we can see that the proclamation of humankind as the "crown" of creation amounted in

real life, firstly, to its subjugation to the authority of religion and generally recognised Christian virtues; and secondly, to a denial of the right to freely manifest individual characteristics. God rather than man proves to be the centre of the Universe, and *anthropocentricity*, the concept according to which humankind is the centre of the Universe and the ultimate goal of the creation of the world, is in fact replaced by *theocentricity*, the theory that God is the real, true centre. On the one hand, human predestination is to be master of the world; on the other, we are completely dependent on God's grace. Thus the contours of a contradiction come into sharp relief—the contradiction which pervaded all aspects of feudal society. The frightening shadow of dualism has always hung over humanity. The human being was the very hub of contradictions, an arena of struggle between the immortal Spirit and the perishable flesh, sin and virtue, the finite and the infinite, the general and the particular.

It is nevertheless necessary to distinguish between the real contradiction of the evolutionary process of the personality principle, and the recognition of the human nature's contradictory character as an indispensable element of the Christian doctrine of man. People must wage an unflagging struggle against their base, lowly instincts, they should try to consciously suppress their desires, and not to sin either in deeds or in

thoughts. Christianity implants the universal tragedy of contest between good and evil into the human soul, attempting in this way to completely immerse the individual in Christian ideology.

An exaggerated interest in one's inner world, a thirst for self-cognition and self-analysis, a self-assessment of oneself and others, were some of the results of this "contradiction" penetrating human consciousness. The awakening consciousness gives birth to doubts as to the infallibility of current dogmas and to attempts, at first timid but with time ever more persistent, to verify them by reason. While not yet rejecting the Christian concept of humanity, the individual already formulates a personal, and highly emotional attitude towards it: "What a piece of work is a man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?..."<sup>1</sup> Hamlet's irony here is a form of awareness of the growing discrepancy between the Christian concept of humanity and a person's actual "sense of personality". The Christian religion has inculcated into

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<sup>1</sup> William Shakespeare, *Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*, Act II, scene II, p. 42.

every believer's mind the idea that hope for salvation, for "eternal life", depends on the individual, both, on the profundity of his belief in God, and on his own good deeds. Hence an intensive emotional colouring of the individual's inner life; he hopes, he suffers, and he acts. He is far from being immersed in an Olympian calm typical of a stoic, who calls on all to take imperturbably sufferings and losses alike, and all the blows that fate may mete out; he is also far removed from hedonism, or the pursuit of pleasure characteristic of Cyrenaics. He subjects his whole life to a single purpose—to achieve eternal bliss rather than earthly happiness. Yet, just as the science of chemistry was born as a result of medieval alchemists' activity, so pursuit of eternal salvation, despite the illusory nature of that goal, promoted human purposefulness and will power; it instilled the habit of self-assessment; it developed our emotional sphere; and it endowed us both with an ability to observe ourselves and with the gift of reflexion.

As we have seen, the individual's position in the Middle Ages was extremely contradictory. On the one hand, man's inner world developed intensively, as well as his capacity for independent action; on the other hand, man was regarded as God's slave. Dostoyevsky analysed this situation in *The Karamazov Brothers*, in the poem about the Grand Inquisitor: "There is nothing

more seductive to man than the freedom of conscience, but nothing can cause greater torment. ... There exist three forces, the only ones on earth capable of overcoming and holding captive for all time the consciences of these weak rebels and to do so for their own happiness. Those forces are: the miraculous, the mysterious, and the authoritative."<sup>1</sup>

Social processes underway in feudal society also had a bearing on the complex and contradictory nature of the individual's inner world at that time. Society was divided into estates. One's belonging to a certain *estate* — a social group whose economic position was confirmed by legislation and by various forms of social consciousness — was inherited. The individual was included, "forged" into its own estate, and very firmly so: being part of a certain estate was not a social function, neither was it a temporary role; a person's estate determined their entire way of life. In feudal society, one was an estate individual. Religion also had a hand in this. One's inclusion into the Christian community was the primary condition of one's socialization. Life was regulated even in details and confined within the boundaries of an estate. Each estate had its own system of "virtues". The family, rural community, par-

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<sup>1</sup> F. M. Dostoyevsky, *The Karamazov Brothers*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, p. 389.



ish and estate — was a complete set of a person's social connections at that period. These connections were of the domination-subjugation type; at first, it was subordination to the family elder; then, during apprenticeship, submission to the master; then vassal dependence on the seignor; and at last, relationships of subject to the head of state. Personal relationships were also mediated by religion. Everything was imbued with meaning in feudal society — every jesture was full of sense, every ritual was a symbol, and each was treated by religion as a manifestation of God's will. The human community was, as it were, a reduced model of the world created by God. The social credo of those times is expressed in Apostle Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians: "Let each man abide in that calling wherein he was called."<sup>1</sup> This credo contains yet another contradiction no less profound than that which has already been formulated earlier: the medieval individual's state of freedom and simultaneous complete lack of it. Everybody's equality before God is coupled with the "earthly", social inequality, embodied in the state social hierarchy.

Still, our forebears of the Middle Ages were much more complex than their "one-dimensional" anti-historical projections. In their

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<sup>1</sup> *The Holy Bible*, The First Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, Cambridge, Printed at the University Press, 1909, p. 173.

view of the world, there were already some germs of an awareness of their active, creative nature.

How can a person's abilities be manifested and improved? In vigorous labour, of course. It is well known, however, that Christianity regarded labour as punishment for original sin, committed in times gone by the world's first people: Adam and Eve. Christ, as the legend has it, did not work. One's existence in the vicinity of God, and one's worship of God were valued higher than everyday labour. Suffice it to recall that, according to the Bible, Christ held Saint Mary's contemplative piety in higher esteem than Martha's incessant hustle and bustle about the house.

The attitude to work on the part of labourers themselves, though, was quite different. The economy of feudal society did not rely exclusively on coercion: elements of economic interest begin to appear. Labour was looked upon not only as a heavy burden, but as a calling. Christianity, as it tried to adapt to society's socio-economic requirements, found a religious explanation to that view of labour, even though it essentially contradicted the initial Christian principles. God himself was proclaimed to be the world's first labourer as the "architect of the world". The stained-glass windows of medieval cathedrals were adorned not only with scenes from the lives of the Saints, but also with those from the lives of working people. Thus the worker and the master were

as it were equalled to the Saints, and the craftsmen's guilds all had patrons in heaven. Labour was now proclaimed as a way to the salvation of one's soul. Any creative endeavour generates a sense of pride in the accomplished work, but this feeling is in contradiction with Christian humility. The attitude to creative activities in the Middle Ages was thus two-sided and contradictory; the boundary line between the humble worship of God and the human, earthly "arrogance" was much too vague, so creativity was in turn likened now to the road to salvation, and now to the Devil's schemes. William Golding's novel *The Spire* reveals the whole gamut of feelings experienced by the architects of a cathedral, which they see now as a symbol of "the flesh", now as a prayer cast in stone addressed to God. Such a dual and contradictory view of labour is also graphically expressed in the social estimate of spiritual activity.

Seen from positions of the Christian world view, spiritual activity is a spark of God burning in all of us. For that reason, it is not regarded as an inalienable, inherent feature of the individual, a result of his own efforts. Wisdom and talent are God's gifts, bestowed on people from above. Therefore, the work of a teacher, poet and musician was not paid for a long time: indeed, why should you be paid for that which does not belong to you? This serves to explain the fact that

so many unclaimed works of art were created in the Middle Ages: the true creator—God—does not need any confirmation of his authorship.

But by no means was that the only case of denying people their intrinsic, creative rights. For a long time, man was denied the right of “authorship” with respect to himself. Individuals were indeed themselves, only in so far as they could be held responsible for their own actions, both past and present. However, our concept of ourselves today consists of the sense, not only of self-identity, but also of self-development. Childhood, adolescence, youth, maturity and old age—each period of our lives has its typical set of values and interests; and our views of the world, our attitudes to people, to life and death—all undergo changes. In the Middle Ages, however, man was actually deprived of childhood. Even the divine babies painted on icons were just miniaturised copies of grown-ups, not of children. The human individual was regarded as immobile, or “static”. At the same time, he was “discrete”, i. e. he was not regarded as a unique individual totality of actions, thoughts and sensations. He was aware of himself as an arena of struggle for certain general forces, general human properties—virtues and vices, arrogance and humility, stinginess and generosity, wisdom and foolishness, etc. We sometimes take the im-

personal character of medieval sculpture, paintings and writings as a sort of inadequacy on the part of the artist, unable to portray the individual and unique. But in actual fact, such depersonification of man's outward appearance reflected a definite concept of man as a carrier of general features, one of which prevailed in each given man. The identified concepts of personality and individuality, served in the Middle Ages to reflect various human phenomena.

A question is relevant here: did the very concept of the individual exist in the Middle Ages? Generally speaking, it began to take shape in Ancient Greece and Rome. Initially, the Greek "prosopon" and the Latin "persona" denoted a theatrical mask. Later, in Rome, the concept assumed a legal meaning, designating a person possessing certain rights and responsibilities. In the Middle Ages, the concept of the individual was enriched with some ethical content. The Roman philosopher of the 6th century Boethius, for one, provided a classical definition of the individual as a rational indivisible entity. So reason becomes the individual's basic feature. Thomas Aquinas (13th century) speaks about the individual's responsibility before God for his deeds thus recognising the individual's right of free will.

Thus, the chief "parameters" of the individual already took shape in the Middle Ages—i. e., a definite step forward was made in humankind's

awareness of its own essence. Simultaneously, however, processes involved in the emerging individual's alienation from their intrinsic traits, and of their "projection" into the other world, also gained momentum. The imprint left by religion on all aspects of society's life accounted for an extremely contradictory position of the individual personality in feudal society.

The development of capitalist relations, having helped to resolve many contradictions in the spiritual world of the individual in the Middle Ages, caused new, and even more profound contradictions.

## 5. An Upsurge of Individual Awareness

At the dawn of the capitalist system, it seemed that a new Golden Age had set in for an active, earthly man who had shed the shackles of medieval scholasticism and had freed himself from the pressure of authoritarianism. But for a few exceptions, the culture of Antiquity was forbidden under feudalism, so turning to it once again was a particular form of struggle against the medieval traditions, social norms and values. The period from the 14th to the early 17th centuries, when new capitalist relations sprouted within the feudal system in Europe, is called the Renaissance.

Emerging on the new socio-economic foundation was a new concept of humanity. While per-

son in the past epochs had been firmly "embedded" into the social structure, society, class, estate, community and family, during Renaissance links between people and society were no longer that rigid. The development of commodity-money relationships, the growth of cities and the expansion of production put to the fore the figure of an active person, who could lead a guild and hold an elective post (this was typical of Italy with its city-states), be engaged in recruiting mercenary soldiers of fortune, carry out usury deals, and participate in diplomatic talks. Society was no longer characterised by any ossified, rigid social functions, and "the various forms of the social nexus confront(ed) the individual as merely a means towards his private ends, as external necessity".<sup>1</sup>

The parameters of vital, human activities changed and diversified; their extent grew much wider. In the Middle Ages, when subsistence economy had been a dominant economic structure, links between settlements had been irregular, roads inferior, and travelling had been considered dangerous and too time-consuming. There had been no exact measures of area or volume; all of these had been very approximate, such as the rod, pole and perch, the foot and the yard.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, p. 18.

There'd been no unified system of measuring accepted in all regions, so the measurement of each particular plot of land had hinged largely on the individual characteristics of its owner. People had not yet been able to separate themselves from the plot of land on which they had been born and with which they had been connected during their whole lifetimes.

There now was a new epoch of growing commercial links and great geographical discoveries: the discoveries of America and of the sea route to India, and the first round-the-world voyage accomplished by Magellan; out they sailed into the open sea, far away over vast distances to unknown lands. They began to feel like conquerors of new lands. Space ceased to be an inherent property of the unchanging, human habitat; it turned into an object of human activity; and no longer was a person an inherent part of their "space" or environment.

Human relationships with time also underwent a change. In the Middle Ages, they could not dispose of their own time and spend it at their own discretion — like man himself, time also belonged to God. There was no need to measure time exactly, to spare or cherish it — the pace of life was far from quick. Prevalence of agricultural labour also caused people to adjust their existence to Nature's seasonal pace, so they could not feel themselves to be masters of time. As indus-



tries emerged and developed, a new need arose—to know the exact time and never to waste it. Clocks were put on city council buildings to measure secular, not church, time; as a result, a new attitude towards time appeared: time was not fused with human life; it was a constant stream, the same for everybody; it could be divided into equal parts and made the most of, and it became an important factor in production and in all kinds of human activity.

Space that could be mastered and fast-flowing time made people hurry to perform as many useful and beneficial deeds as possible; these were newly arisen values which testified to the fact that humankind's position in the world has changed. The human being was first of all an active, industrious creature, capable of turning any part of space into an object of his activity; one who could stand in opposition to the surrounding world and take a critical view of the existing traditions, norms and rules.

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, a thinker of that epoch, thus presented the image of a free creative individual, though of course not without referring to God's will: "O Adam, we give you neither a definite place, nor individual form, nor special duty, so that you yourself shall be able to determine the place and form and duty which then you shall have, in conformity with your own desires and decisions. The image of all other

creatures is defined within the limits of laws we have laid down. But we do not restrict you by any limits; and you shalt shape your own image in conformity with your own free will, the power of which I now bequeath to you."<sup>1</sup>

The content of ideas exposed by Renaissance thinkers, though expressed in religious terms, is in fact opposed to a Christian theocentrism which places the figure of God in the centre of all living things. Humankind is now made the actual centre of the Universe, and *anthropocentrism* is substituted for theocentrism. Religious terminology is often just the form considered appropriate for expressing recognition of high human values. For instance, to emphasise the power of his talent, the great Rafael was called an earthly, "mortal God".

The former dual model of man (man as a carrier of a divine soul and perishable flesh) has collapsed. Everything in a person is worthy of delight, everything is "divine", both the spirit and bodily manifestations. The conflict between the individual and its personality, typical of the Middle Ages, is also obliterated. The growing interest in the human personality is manifest in the appearance of a huge number of autobiographies and life stories. A "rehabilitation" of the human

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<sup>1</sup> Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *Antologia*, Edizioni Virgilio, Milano, 1973, p. 175.

body is also underway — not of an ideal, perfect body, but just the human body as such, in all its individual peculiarities; and all ages are now recognised as beautiful — be it childhood, middle or old age. Even the fear of death and persistent references to it — *memento mori!* — are in fact only a call for humankind to live an active, creative life on Earth.

But an active, vigorous life always implies, a confrontation with other people, and the performance of certain moral actions. What was the relationship between morality and humanism as Renaissance thinkers saw it? Did the ethical principle underlie their love of and their interest in humankind? On the one hand, the greater the accord between a person's will power and virtue, the more fruitful his activity. While on the other hand, the ideas hatched by Renaissance thinkers paved the road to unbridled egocentrism. One of these, the "Might is right" principle, passed for a manifestation of human nature; and the humanitarian thesis, "Do as you will", as an expression of man's creative freedom, changed into Machiavellian calls to kick Fate into submission, like men used to do to a woman. Thus, the moral principle began to depart from man's active nature.

The issue of harmony between the acting and thinking principles in time resolved itself. The transition from a passive-contemplative to an ac-

tive-transformative attitude to Nature was sometimes ahead of real opportunities provided by the nascent natural science. Therefore, "old", illusory-magical means born in the past epochs were often resorted to in an attempt to obtain the practical knowledge of natural laws. This is the reason why astrology, alchemy and the occult sciences flourished alongside the advance of natural sciences. God's prophecies, geometrical necessity, philosophical argumentation and experimental data were all placed on the same footing. Religious beliefs and a critical mind had not yet divided the spheres of influence between themselves and had not yet realised their incompatibility: for instance, Marsilio Ficino, an Italian philosopher, had in his home an iconlamp burning day and night at the bust of Plato, as a token of respect for his doctrine.

The world outlook of Renaissance man was a specific attempt at combining Christianity with the heritage of Antiquity, the rational with the irrational, science with magic. But this combination was not effected by constructing harmonious universal systems, but by recognising the right to existence of all cultures, all philosophical doctrines and systems, of each and every human individuality. Rather than a striving to subordinate one to another and to establish a rigid hierarchy, it was an attempt at understanding one's neighbour, and at holding a dialogue with another; it

was humanity's dialogue with itself as the bearer of different positions and different points of view, Renaissance man had an "open" mind; he did not cut everybody to a single measure, but tried to imbibe the entire wealth of diverse views and concepts. The greatest cultural value of the Renaissance lay precisely in this "openness", in this knowledge of the incompleteness of human knowledge. The Renaissance model of humanity included another opportunity, to be realised in subsequent epochs: the recognition of the right to existence of any point of view can lead to relativism, to a denial of the notion of a theory's genuineness, to a purposeless juggling of concepts, ideas and ideals, to a loss of one's own identity and, finally, to a destruction of the personality.

A queer combination of the rational and irrational, and of the ethical principle and egocentrism, reflected that moment in human evolution when the individual, who already possessed "social autonomy", could not yet fully realise that he was tied up with society, culture and history, by countless invisible threads. The Renaissance man was like a child who has run away from his too strict nurse and is enjoying freedom while not yet aware of the dangers involved.

Gradually, the vivid colours of the humanitarian world view begin to fade and fall apart into separate, and far from always attractive components. The bonfires of the Inquisition

kindled all over Europe put a stop to Renaissance free thinking. Creative man turned into an ordinary capitalist entrepreneur; and a confused egoism was substituted for humanitarian individualism.

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## II. WANDERING THROUGH THE LABYRINTHS OF ALIENATION

### 1. The Fruit of Knowledge

The establishment of capitalist relationships in Europe, and the transformation of the bourgeoisie into a politically dominant class, brought about many changes in all aspects of social life. The demands of society on people became different, too. As distinct from someone of the Renaissance period, one who had all roads open to him and who could achieve everything he aspired to, who was at one and the same time both "divine" and "of the flesh", a new model of humanity began to take shape from the beginning of the 17th century — a person more restricted, definite and rationalistic. With the help of reason all human abilities and requirements were

taken stock of and registered, while human passions were often traced down to distant ancestry. What started as the Enlightenment — an epoch of great illusions and great discoveries — became in its own way a period of self-awareness of this new society, and, of a new bourgeois individual; all this was also an indispensable condition for a final consolidation of bourgeois relations in the field of industrialisation. Technical inventions and breakthroughs accomplished at that time influenced people's attitudes towards themselves. The invention of gun-powder, of the compass and foundries, of mechanical traction and book-printing, testified to humankind's enormous potential. Discoveries in the field of astronomy made by Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei and Johannes Kepler (and these eliminated the old concepts about the structure of the Universe, about space and the world's finite nature); the discovery of the blood circulation system by William Harvey; the creation of Newtonian mechanics (which explained and systematised discoveries made in astronomy, physics and mechanics); the elaboration of the theory of knowledge by Francis Bacon and René Descartes; the spread of empirical methods of research and argumentation; the use of mathematics in the natural sciences — all these breakthroughs graphically proved the power of the human mind and its boundless opportunities. Religious ideology was meanwhile



pushed to the background in cultural life, giving place to the conviction that all the diverse manifestations of human activity — be it in economics or politics, science or ethics — were guided by the universal laws of Nature, and these are all part of the natural order of things. As a result, ideas of “natural religion”, proclaiming the law of Nature as God’s law, as well as those both of a natural law, and of the natural human being, became widely current.

Cognitive optimism typical of our forebears of the Enlightenment knew no bounds. Reason, it was held, enables one to know not only the surrounding world, but oneself, too. Having learned how to count, to be economical with time, to measure space and fathom Nature’s secrets, the human race also felt it was master of its own abilities, habits and desires. People were their own masters as well: they had broken the estate, family and even religious chains, and no longer recognised any power and coercion except for the voice of their own consciences and a sense of personal dignity. At the initial stages, capitalism was a society which needed active, industrious and self-conscious individuals who could take their own decisions.

The so-called *anthropological approach* to humankind (from the Greek: *anthropos* and *logos*, man and reason) emerged as a form of awareness of these objective requirements of a developing

capitalism. This was an abstract and unscientific interpretation of humankind, explaining its social life by people's eternal, "natural" traits, rather than deriving the essence of the human being from his/her social relationships. The anthropological approach is not identical to an absolutely biological principle; instead, the concept of "human nature" is explained rather by a striving to confirm the objectiveness and independence of that nature from external norms, rules and laws. From the anthropological angle, it is not society that is the basis of "human nature"; on the contrary, society understood as a "simple multitude" of individuals functions in conformity with the laws determined by "human nature".

What, then, is "human nature"? A person consists of the life of his mind, heart and senses. The German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, a supporter of anthropology at a later stage, offered the following definition of the human essence: "The complete person possesses the power of thought, will-power, and the power of the heart. The power of thought is the light of knowledge, will-power is the energy of personality, and the power of the heart is Love."<sup>1</sup> The anthropology of the 17th and partly of the 19th

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<sup>1</sup> Ludwig Feuerbach, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, Leipzig, Verlag von Otto Wigand, 1883, p. 36.

centuries is rational, with reason recognised as the chief natural asset of humankind.

But if reason is the "supreme ruler" of human nature, then all human misfortunes, like those of the entire humankind, proceed from human stupidity, from an insufficiently developed mind. So the enlightenment of the human mind was announced to be a necessary condition for improving the climate in society, and for modifying it along rational principles. A person's upbringing and education in effect amount to a bringing to the fore of their natural essence, and to their protection from outward, coercive impacts. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the famous French Enlightenment of the 18th century and a passionate champion of social equality, said that primitive society was dominated by the so-called natural, human state, by "natural law", and under this all were equal and free, and... independent of one another. Indeed, he argued, what links could bind together people who possessed nothing? In other words, in Rousseau's opinion (in this case his opinion is typical of the anthropological approach to humanity), primitive people lived in complete isolation, like so many Robinson Crusoes, each, as it were, on his own island. From this angle, it can even be said that man himself is not a part of the human continent, but an island, separated from other parts of land by insurmountable obstacles. If we recall the specifics of

the individual's position in primitive society described earlier in this book, the naïveté of this view comes in sharp relief. Rousseau's concept does not only amount to an idealisation of the past, of humanity's "Golden Age"; it is also a kind of anticipation (though in an illusory form) of the practice of bourgeois society — a society of free competition, in which each member is in need of liberation from numerous social ties curbing their initiative in the sphere of economics. As Marx wrote, "The real man is recognised only in the shape of the *egoistic* individual."<sup>1</sup>

Rousseau regarded the restoration of natural equality among people — which was violated when, as a result of our ability and striving for perfection the development of some people went ahead of that of others — as an ideal for future society. Restored equality was proclaimed in the Social Contract he elaborated. For people to remain free while coming into contact with others, Rousseau stated, a part of their individual rights should be alienated in favour of the social whole. Yet, though losing the natural state, the individual still retains the most precious things: his freedom and his right to property.

This theory was so simple, intelligent and humane that the best minds of that epoch were en-

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 167.

raptured by it; however, it already contains some germs of the future antagonisms typical of capitalist society. First of all, one cannot ignore the closeness of the concepts of freedom and the right to property. As Rousseau sees it, a person can sacrifice many things when agreeing to the Social Contract, but not by any means that "holy" right of his. "To be" (free, happy, an equal among equals) and "to have" are two notions which go together in the anthropological concept of humanity. We, human beings, can "possess" not only land plots, houses or jewels. Our own nature, too, is one of our eternal possessions. And if we "possess" our own nature, we ourselves can best dispose of it. In agreeing to the Social Contract, we make a good bargain: we exchange certain of our rights, for the guarantee of others.

But how can we be certain that we are not cheated in such an exchange? Where is the guarantee that society will not demand too much, like the devil in folk tales, who in the final account, in exchange for some earthly blessings, claims the most precious of personal possessions — his victim's very soul?

The subsequent history of capitalism shows that our possession of our own essence is nothing but an illusion. Instead of being master of our inalienable essence, we find we have at our disposal only an empty "physical" shell of that essence.

Thus, the harmony between "to be" and "to have" proves to be false.

The gnosiological sources of such an interpretation of human essence, characteristic of anthropology, are found in the general methodological principles prevalent at that time. Ideas of atomism took firm root in the natural sciences, and soon spread to the sphere of social life. "Social atomism" and "social physics" were at that time not just a metaphor; they expressed the essence of the typical approach to society. Accordingly, the individual was regarded as a "social atom", a set of eternal and unchangeable features. On the one hand, such approach was quite progressive for that epoch, because it substantiated people's equality and was an ideological impulse for shattering all social barriers. Vestiges of the old, feudal society were regarded as something external, incompatible with an individual's "eternal" human nature. On the other hand, though, it manifested to a distorted interpretation of the mutual link existing between the individual and society. A person's "essential powers" were seen as a set of qualities inherent in each particular individual. In so far as society from this point of view was but a simple summary, an aggregate human existence, there could not be according to this viewpoint, any rift between the individual personality and society. And these words were pronounced at a time when the rift between the indi-

vidual and society, the process of alienation, was already well underway!

The anthropological approach was, on the one hand, a theoretical base for human emancipation from non-economic forms of coercion. "Man is born free," Rousseau wrote, "yet everywhere he is in shackles."<sup>1</sup> Fraternité, Egalité, Liberté (Fraternity, Equality, Freedom) — these slogans of the French Revolution were a perfect reflection of philosophical anthropology.

On the other hand, anthropology laid the ground for an ideological justification of the ever-deepening division of interests between each particular individual and society, a justification of the alienation processes going on in capitalist society. The interpretation of the individual as the possessor of his own essence also contained the logical possibility of "giving away one's essence", whether voluntarily or by coercion; in just such a way, Esau despised his birthright, exchanging it for a mess of pottage. The anthropological approach to humanity contained not only an optimistic affirmation of identity between the individual and society, but a theoretical justification of the rift between them as well.

The French Enlighteners — the philosophers Voltaire, Diderot, Rousseau, Helvetius and La

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<sup>1</sup> *Collection complète des oeuvres de J.-J. Rousseau*, Vol. II, *Du Contrat social*, Geneva, M. DDC. LXXXII, p. 4.

Mettrie, all ideological inspirers of the 18th century French Revolution — were not aware of this deep contradiction in their views on humankind. The epoch, though, was not to be judged only on its word. The course of history itself, and the practical activities of their followers who tried to translate the ideals of the Enlightenment into real life, exposed this contradiction; it then became their personal tragedy. A fine example of this is the life and activity of Maximilien Robespierre — the Incorruptible, as he was usually referred to, and one of the leaders of the Revolution.

It seemed that in 1794, the French Republic, having dealt with the danger of intervention, defeated domestic counter-revolution and eliminated the last vestiges of feudalism, was going to set about establishing the real realm of freedom, equality and fraternity. Yet, precisely in that period, the notes of sorrow and doom appeared in Robespierre's speeches; he was aware of the fact that victory was unattainable and that his ideals were collapsing. The embodiment of Rousseau's ideal of equality did not result in the emergence of an idyllic kingdom of small producers, satisfied with their modest earnings, free and equal, and not claiming their fellow-producers' rights. While they ruthlessly scathed everybody who infringed upon man's "natural rights", Robespierre and his comrades-in-arms



became convinced that people were not improving. The field cleared by the Revolution produced a harvest which was quite unexpected for the "sowers". Speculation, hoarding of capital, and corruption flourished under the new conditions of "equality". The Revolution's high ideas became for many people only a means for obtaining material benefits. Thus, the French millionaire Gabriel Julien Ouvrard actually waxed rich on the Revolution — i. e. on its need for printed matter. Aware of the fact that the unprecedented upsurge of political activity in the country would inevitably call for a growth in printing, he bought up huge stocks of paper at the very start of the Revolution. The leaders of the Revolution, who gave up all their strength for the ideals of humanity, in effect paved the road for a tempestuous development of the bourgeoisie, a class whose chief "ideal" was profit-making without any restrictions that could be imposed by "natural human rights".

The struggle of the nascent big bourgeoisie against the revolutionary process which in fact generated it, was for the Revolution's leaders a struggle between the moral and immoral principles in humankind, between good and evil, justice and injustice. Political, economic and ethical categories were, for them, an indivisible whole. As he read his famous speech for the prosecution of Danton, who had become his political adver-

sary, Robespierre pointed to the latter's licentiousness; trying to curb the growing dissatisfaction with the economic and political measures launched by the revolutionary government, he suggested that the "cult of a supra-natural being" be introduced in order to invigorate the French people's "natural virtues". But, as Lenin said, "the idea of equality most completely", logically and decisively expresses the goals of the bourgeois-democratic struggle<sup>1</sup>. Life itself demonstrated that there was a deep abyss between the abstract notion of our "intrinsic human nature" and the economic interests of a particular individual under the conditions obtained in capitalist society.

The fact that the ideals of the Enlightenment began to be doubted subsequently gave birth to a great many proposals on how to resolve the problem of relationships between society and the individual. Some maintained that human nature is "alienated" from the individual; others, on the contrary, asserted that the genuine human essence is in principle "inalienable", indivisible from the individual, and this makes any one person incapable of intercourse with the "others". There also emerged an idea about the possibility of a direct and immediate "transferring" of socie-

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<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, "The Strength and Weakness of the Russian Revolution", *Collected Works*, Vol. 12, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, pp. 354-55.

ty's demands to a person's spiritual world, through the application of the newest technological hardware. The most variegated and bizarre concepts took shape concerning correlation between the individual and personality, the personality and "human nature", the individual and society. Interest in the given set of theoretical problems was but a reflection of the real social contradictions which had been non-existent in the pre-capitalist epoch. Indeed, speaking about primitive-communal society, we pointed to the identity of the social and the individualistic, of society and the individual. In antagonistic conditions, however, we see that the human individual is gradually singled out, personal responsibility increases, and the sphere of individual activity expands — i. e. we observe the historical process of the emergence of the individual. Finally, under capitalism where the individual is freed from non-economic forms of coercion, we have every right to speak about the appearance of a complicated system of individuality-personality-individual-society relationships. These relationships are extremely contradictory. The specific position of the individual in capitalist society is reflected in congested form in the concept of alienation. We shall try to explain that concept below.

## 2. To Find and To Lose

There is one feature common to all forms of alienation, variegated as they are: results of human activity turn into an independent force, not hinging on, but dominating people, and even hostile to them; it is a force that reduces to nought all human expectations. Since people are aware of any form of activity one way or another, awareness of the process of alienation of the results of their activity gives birth to distorted, fantastic images, which are summarily called *alienated consciousness*.

To understand why such alienation occurs, let us consider the process of capitalist production, the workers' attitudes towards labour. The workers produce various goods but they cannot make use of them: they give all their power, all their abilities, in fact, their whole lives to their labour activity; in doing that, they lose possession of all of these, which are "transferred" to the things they produce, and which then return as goods they have to buy with their wages. Thus labour is valuable to the workers only because it gives them their wages with which they can then buy certain goods; it is only a means for the satisfaction of their requirements in food, clothes, housing, etc. According to Marx, "the worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when

he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home.”<sup>1</sup>

Labour and work thus turn into a gloomy interval between the hours spent amongst relatives and friends, or in pursuit of a favourite hobby. Yet labour, interpreted by the worker as an inevitable evil, is the manifestation of a specific, human requirement. Let us recall the first chapter of this book, where it was shown that labour has literally created the individual, that labour is the source of all the treasures of material and spiritual culture. Hence it is not labour itself that is the source of alienation, but labour under the conditions of private property, the results of which are appropriated not by those who produce, but by some other person. Therefore, the alienation of labour is simultaneously our “self-alienation” of the human essence from the individual. Labour proves to be not a way to satisfy our principal, essential requirements of creativity, knowledge and transformation of the world, but a means for meeting the narrow set of our so-called vital needs which, being torn apart from other human requirements, assume an animal character.

The “self-alienation” is manifested in the destruction of a complicated aggregate of elements

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<sup>1</sup> See: Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844”, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1975, p. 274.

comprising an individual's spiritual world. Reason is regarded as the sole feature worthy of humanity ... while the feelings of love and hatred, compassion, sorrow and delight are seen as just a nuisance, a superfluous appendage inherited from the past, a hindrance in people's attempts to attain the goals they have set themselves. Or, on the contrary, reason, good and beauty are announced to be the curse of humankind, since they prevent us from immersing into the world of the irrational. The alienated and estranged spirit, however, avenges itself. In his play, *Desire under the Elms*, the contemporary Irish author Eugene O'Neill describes his heroes as being possessed by primitive desires — the thirst to own land, and the animal lust for one another. All of a sudden, true love flares up between them; they develop genuine moral qualities, and these become their undoing. Here the traditional plot of a classical ancient tragedy — the hero's clash with the dark, blind forces of Fate — is, as it were, turned inside out: it is not the animal, irrational passions, but genuinely human feelings which destroy the heroes.

A situation which is at first glance opposite to the above can also take place, and such was described in a somewhat unusual form by Pavel Vezhinov, the Bulgarian author, in his short novel *The White Pangolin*. A certain "super-man", created as a result of directed mutation, is

utterly devoid of any capability for love or hatred; he is unable to be afraid of something, to get indignant or to experience any other "earthly" sensation, being overwhelmed by the rational principle which is developed in him to perfection. However, life proves that he is an under-man rather than a super-man, and he collapses under the impact of the intrinsically human feelings which are alien and hostile to him.

People are alienated from each other, because the social nature of labour hidden behind its private property form, is distorted; and this alienation proves to be a form of people's estrangement from one another.

People are alienated from Nature, too, both externally and within themselves, since they are, in essence bio-social creatures. Interaction between humankind and Nature in its universal characteristics, the former's penetration into the essence of natural laws — those of interaction between Nature and society — is also an important aspect of our human "generic" essence, i. e. of man as he could be. The process of estrangement from Nature amounts to a replacement of the entire spectrum of human interaction with Nature by the viewing of it only as an instrument of production, or as a means of supporting human, biological existence. Very soon, however, Nature surrounding us and nature within us will begin to avenge us for such an attitude. This is manifest-

ed in the depletion of natural resources, lower soil productivity, illnesses and neuroses afflicting people, and so on.

The worker and the capitalist are, as it were, the extreme points of this alienation process: for the worker, labour is only the means for his/her "private" life, while for the capitalist, the process of production is a way of deriving profit, a final goal, and sometimes even his "private" life is turned into a means for achieving success in business. But the extremes tend to converge. Both the "masters of life" and the "outcasts of Fate" are harnessed to one and the same carriage. Both of them display a defective approach to productive activity, and both of them are incapable of an integral attitude towards labour. Work as a creative activity, as the scene for displaying our human, spiritual powers, is equally alien to both agents of capitalist production. The two positions described here are but extreme points in the complex gamut of forms in which alienation is manifested in the world of capital.

The process of individual alienation means it is impossible for that person to develop his/her abilities. Thus, inevitably, people become aware of the different forms this alienation can take. They either confirm the existing objective situation as an impasse or suggest illusory ways out. Having separated from himself material objects and Nature, and having mounted a barrier between



himself and other individuals; having impoverished his spiritual world by reducing it to a set of primary needs; and having ruptured the harmony of emotion and reason, requirements and abilities, reflexion and activity; the individual in capitalist society tries to turn back and to overcome the barriers he himself erected ... but in a distorted form—in the form of *possession* and religious *worship*, in the form of *coercion* upon some other, upon some egoistic individual, and even in the form of coercion upon Nature and himself.

The question naturally arises: why do we speak about alienation only when turning to the problem of “the individual and capitalism”? Did alienation exist before capitalism was established, and is it possible for it to continue its existence in a historically more progressive—communist—type of society?

When we described human existence in ancient Greece and Rome, we considered the idea of Fate—a blind dark force, which interfered with all human plans and shattered man’s hopes—as one of the dominant ideological principles in the world outlook of yesteryear. Well, is not the presence of a certain force hostile to man noticeable in this image of individual alienation? Of course it is, but the ancient Greek was not simply afraid of Fate—he fought against it. Hand in hand with the idea of Fate here is the idea of human freedom and human might.

In medieval society, the figure of a ruler, standing on the top rung of the social hierarchy and possessing a set of absolutely perfect qualities, was an object of religious worship. Authoritarianism is but another form of alienation. However, to understand medieval consciousness, one has to analyse the idea according to which the human being is seen as the "crown of creation".

Three conclusions can be drawn from the above-said: the first is that alienation in pre-capitalist conditions was not yet a universal form of individual existence. The second amounts to the fact that people in the past could only study certain phenomena in an alienated form. It is as if man looks in one or other "looking-glass" (of Nature, art, politics and economics) and finds there his own images; he studies these, is amazed at them, and is frightened by them, not yet understanding that all of them are just images of himself. Like a curious animal, he constantly tries to look behind the looking-glass to see what is hidden there: a mighty creature perhaps, capable of producing all these wonderful images. In other words, in the hands of an ignorant person, the looking-glass of culture proves to be an object of cult.

And finally, the third conclusion. All the previous, pre-capitalist conditions were landmarks in the evolution of the individual: a progression from an "accidental" individual of primitive so-

ciety, via the "estate" individual of feudalism, to the personality as an active, industrious, self-aware individual, occupying a relatively autonomous place in society and characterised by a "free will", a complex spiritual world and a world outlook all his own. The establishment of capitalist relationships helped the individual to claim his own individuality, to demand a respect towards himself and a recognition of his rights, and to start a struggle in defence of his freedom. In capitalist society, though, all relationships between people are mediated by things, and thus the former acquire a *material* character. From whom must the individual demand respect for his dignity? Against whom must he fight? Who is to blame? What is to be done? The human mind has long been engaged with these problems. The tradition of human thinking which evolved for a long time under the conditions of *personal* relationships taught people to always look for that concrete person who was to blame for their own sufferings and the hardships of society. Under capitalism, however, the entrepreneur cannot be held guilty as a private person, since he can well abide by the legal norms, be an exemplary family man, make regular donations to the poor, etc. At the dawn of the Industrial Revolution, millworkers and ruined peasants found, or so they thought, the cause of their misfortunes — machines. Led by Ned Ludd (they were subse-

quently called Luddites after the name of their leader), they destroyed the machinery in which they saw the source of their plight and which they almost regarded as live persons, or which to put it in philosophical language they *personified*.

Something quite different occurs in respect of an isolated individual. The individual is reduced to the level of an object, a thing which can be bought and sold, i. e. a commodity. And society as a whole begins to be viewed as a giant trading company: the individual is seen as the owner of commodities, and relationships between people, as those between buyers and sellers. The act of capitalist exploitation begins as an honest act of buying and selling. But the workers who sell their labour power for a commodity, combine in themselves both the commodity and the commodity owner. The "consumption" of the commodity proves to be the consumption of the workers' very lives, and of their "inalienable rights". Thus, it is not commodity production as such that is the basis of alienation, but capitalist commodity production, which turns the worker into a commodity.

Under capitalism, though, the individual has "something to sell", and for the capitalist "something to buy": not a single one of the pre-capitalist types of society had such a great need for organised, skilled labour, for the application of technical advances in production, for talent

and innovation, creative initiative and inventiveness.

There emerges, as we can see, a very contradictory situation. On the one hand, capitalism with its dynamic economic and political life needs those human qualities which are possessed by the individual, and therefore it promotes personal development. On the other hand, however, capitalist society immediately "deprives" the individual of everything which helped this development: freedom, creative abilities, moral values and esthetic ideals; in this way, capitalism distorts the various forms of individual existence. The abyss dividing society and the individual is growing ever deeper, and attempts at overcoming it are becoming ever more ingenious.

Thus capitalism is a society of alienation. Separate elements of alienation and self-alienation were present in pre-capitalist formations, too, but they have assumed a universal character only under the capitalist system.

Now let us say a few words about one of the most acute and "painful" problems for those who believe both in the ideals of communism, and in the fact that the future belongs to it. Is there alienation under socialism, the first stage of the communist condition? For a long time, we heard by way of an answer only a unanimous "No!" The main reason for that was a reference to the fact that under socialism a public form of ownership

prevails. Really, under the domination of public ownership alienation is deprived of its foundation: the results of labour are not alienated from the worker, rather they both belong to and benefit that labourer, and the state turns from an omnipotent bureaucratic machine into a bearer of the interests of the whole people. Why then are examples of mismanagement and wastefulness so widespread in respect of state — i. e. their own — property, and why do people so often neglect their professional duties which then result in low-quality output at a number of enterprises? Why do certain persons so stubbornly oppose the introduction of high technology into productive processes? Indeed, will not someone who has spent days and weeks and sometimes even months going from one state agency to another in the hope of obtaining a piece of information he is in need of, inevitably develop a view of the state as a soulless bureaucratic machine? And finally, we cannot just shut our eyes on the period which we refer to as that of the cult of the personality and which was characterised by a contempt for the dignity of the rank-and-file labourer; both that cult and the tragedy of Chernobyl demonstrated for all to see how the products of the human mind can turn against their creators....

These phenomena may be assessed in different ways. One is to ascribe all negative aspects of life

in the Soviet country to the residues of the past, proclaiming them to be the "birthmarks of capitalism". Another would prompt us to look for the cause of the given phenomena in the real practice of socialist construction. As public ownership takes firm root, the state turns into an instrument of the toiling majority and the economy is shifted to planned management; thus appears an *objective possibility* for overcoming individual alienation. Under socialism, alienation ceases to be a fatal necessity inherent in all forms of human life and activity. Yet, for alienation to become completely a thing of the past, public ownership should be such not only in legal enactments; each member of socialist society must acquire a feeling of really being a master at his/her enterprise with the introduction of a flexible system of economic levers; each must actually participate in discussing all issues of the country's life; their honour and dignity must not depend on the arbitrary actions of a bureaucrat; and their cash in hand must not suffer because of those who have discovered ways of turning public into their own personal property.

In other words, the symptoms of alienation do not stem from the essence of socialism; rather they are the result of a vague, simplistic and non-dialectical interpretation and utilisation of the laws of socialism. Real socialist society does not fully correspond to the concept of socialism elab-

orated in Marxism-Leninism. The restructuring of all aspects of the life of Soviet society is based on the striving to bring the practice of socialism as far as possible into correspondence with the theory, and to translate that theory into life. "Let's have more socialism!"—that is the slogan of the day.

A firm foundation for the opportunity to completely eradicate the symptoms of alienation has been laid both by the open recognition of our errors and by the ability of socialist society to take a critical view of its achievements. Marx wrote that "proletarian revolutions ... criticise themselves constantly, interrupt themselves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, weaknesses and paltriness of their first attempts..."<sup>1</sup>

### 3. To Possess, To Seem, and To Be

Alienation processes going on in capitalist society are reflected in the human consciousness in the most fantastic and, at first glance, incompatible forms; nevertheless, they leave their imprint both on how individuals interpret the meaning of

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 11, Moscow, 1978, pp. 106, 107.



life, their goals and ideas, and on how they see themselves and the surrounding world. The concepts of old, "naive" anthropology about an immediate unity of the individual and society are destroyed and replaced by the realisation of an ever deepening rift between individualistic and social, between the individual and society. The human individual develops an ability to think, speak, communicate with other people and experience feelings only in, and thanks to, society; even their outward appearances and the forms in which they satisfy their biological requirements are all dependent on the social norms, customs and traditions; nevertheless, they refuse to recognise society's "right of primogeniture".

The image of a person only as a consumer is one of the most widely spread versions of our alienated consciousness being aware of itself. This image has a profound, objective foundation. Capitalist society can function smoothly only when the participants in production have certain (even if distorted) notions, both about the society in which they live and work, and about themselves. Capitalist production requires for its smooth operation that all people believe that capitalism is a society of equal opportunities, that each of its members can achieve professional success, and that all put the drive for profit above all other considerations and strivings, making it an absolute aim of their life. If this is the case, everything

traditionally recognised as supreme human values (civic virtue, human dignity, good deeds, high esthetic standard, erudition, etc.) becomes only a means in the drive to gain success in one's business. Finding themselves prisoners chained to the chariot of profit, people resort to any means to make it move faster. Their charm, erudition and fine taste only serve as a key to open the door leading to the realm of profit.

On the one hand, one should be well-versed in all cultural events, imbibe a great volume of knowledge, and develop an understanding of the works of art; on the other, all this is necessary not for the sake of realising one's enjoyment of esthetic beauty, knowledge and creativity, but for purely pragmatic purposes. Thus supreme spiritual values are often turned only into a means used in the drive for profit. The mechanism of alienation in this particular case is manifested with special vividness: individuals in capitalist society fully submit themselves to a hostile freedom; their creative activity directed at attaining a certain goal they subordinate to this drive for profit, and their genuinely human essence they turn into a means for achieving that profit. "The *devaluation* of the world of men is in direct proportion to the *increasing value* of the world of things."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1975, p. 272.

People even develop a consumerist view of their "inalienable" features.

But what do we mean by "consumption"? It is the satisfaction of a certain requirement, in this particular case, the need for increased profit and business success. Consumption is a necessary link in the process of production; it allows the realisation of that requirement. And so the circle closes: to produce in order to consume, and to consume in order to produce. In his novel "America O. K.", the Italian author Giuseppe D'Agata tells the reader about some "great power" in the capitalist world in which buying as many things as possible is regarded as a religious ritual. Furthermore, the thing one has bought need not even be taken out of its case, because utilisation of the thing will be a brake on the sales of others of these things, and will thus retard production. A genuine religion of consumption thus develops. The process of buying a thing is likened to the rite of making a sacrifice to a formerly unknown god — the God of Profit. Hence, "consumption" in this particular case becomes something specific, something of a "symbol". A commodity has been bought — consequently, it has been "consumed". What comes of it after the act of purchase is of no consequence for capitalist production. The purpose is to meet the objective needs of production, not of the individual, so consumption is simply acquisition, or "possession".

But the whole matter does not end with the possession of a certain thing. After all, all products are an embodiment of human abilities, skills and talents, so the possession of a product begins to assume the meaning of the possession of human abilities. In conformity with the logic of alienated consciousness, society, while separating from the individual their inherent skills and cognitive powers, "returns" them, as it were, materialised in commodities. Therefore, the greater the number of things an individual is capable of possessing, the greater that person's social value, prestige and dignity. Hence the drive for things and the striving to acquire as many of them as possible, i. e. "materialism" ensues. The things someone has in his possession are the measure of his social value. But, having become an owner of a book, brushes and paints, or a musical instrument, man does not as well acquire an ability to take pleasure in beauty let alone create it. The act of buying and selling thus fails to bring about possession of the prestigious human qualities materialised in the given things.

At the initial stages of the evolution of capitalist society this drive for things took on the form of hoarding. It was clear even at that time that the "power over things" gave man a power over people, too. The accumulation of things and money in the hands of an individual rendered him supernatural strength. Gobseck the moneylen-

der, one of Balzac's characters, says: "I am rich enough to buy human conscience, and to direct omnipotent ministers... Is this not genuine power? I can possess, if I so wish, the most beautiful women and buy their tenderest caresses. Is this not real pleasure? Gold is the spiritual essence of the present society."<sup>1</sup>

At that stage of the evolution of capitalist society, alienation assumed the form of opposition between society and the individual; the latter was a certain egoistical person who consolidated his position with the assistance of material possessions and who thus created the illusion of extending limits of his own Ego by means of acquisition. Beginning with a "contract" concluded with society, its laws and norms, he ends up by striving to dictate his own terms to it. Subsequently, the model of interrelationships between the individual and society undergoes changes.

Infatuation with things, or "materialism" as a manifestation of an alienated consciousness, is not just a thirst to have more things; it is also a pursuit of lost freedoms and humaneness. A thing in the mind of a consumer proves to be valuable not because of its actual use value: it is an epitome of supreme human values. But the link between the thing's visible properties and its

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<sup>1</sup> H. De Balzac, *Gobseck*, Paris, Ernest Flammarion, Editeur, p. 40.

"invisible" social value is conditional. In reality, a thing can only be a *token* of prestige, wealth, noble origin, and high cultural standards. But alienated consciousness begins to regard these purely conditional links as mysterious, supernatural and indestructible shackles. The thing thus becomes the centre of all human ambitions, an object of worship. It is quite easy to discover elements of mythological consciousness, rooted in the hoary past, in such human attitudes towards things. The bearer of "material" consciousness develops relationships with society, characterised by a whole range of hues—from the desire on the part of the "little man" to adjust himself to society and to make a certain secret deal with it, right up to open insurrection, violation of its norms and the wish to impose terms on that society. The individual and society are interpreted as certain parties which are either in a state of clash or armistice, but which are always *opposing* each other, with relationships between them regulated through the world of things.

Nikolai Gogol's short novel "The Greatcoat" provides a fine example of such individualism; it begins with timid subordination to all norms accepted in society, and ends in rebellion. A modest official, whose dreams and aspirations have for a long time been centred around the acquisition of a new overcoat, is suddenly robbed of it. All his hopes are frustrated—of winning respect

from his fellow-officials, of being promoted in his career ... the very sense of life is lost, so there is nothing left to him but to die — and die he does. After his death, though, a legend appears from God knows where, a legend about the transformation of the little timid official into a fearful avenger, who demands that society make good for the losses he had incurred.

Alongside “materialism”, or commodity fetishism, as a form of alienated consciousness, yet another form makes its appearance — that of a functional approach towards the individual, i. e., a “market” image of the individual emerges. If the traditional psychology of “materialism” creates an image of the individual surrounded, as if protected, by things, then the “market” image turns all remaining qualities of the individual into commodities — all the traits of his character, all his habits, and even the sense of his own identity. “Everything for sale!” — this is the slogan of “market” consciousness. To maintain the “demand for himself” under any conditions of the changing free market, to be what you have to be at each given moment — this striving deprives the individual of his own identity. The difference between “to be” and “to seem”, between the genuine being of the individual and his social function or role in society becomes erased. The person is no longer playing a role, he just becomes at each particular moment what society wants him

to be, what society is in need of: a kind of elusive, "protean" man, to use an apt expression of Robert Jay Lifton, an American psychologist.

Why is it that in the not so very distant past the feeling of possessing things gave the individual a sense of assurance, promoted his sense of identity and made him relatively independent of society? In the recent past, "to be"—i. e. to be oneself, to be an independent, free person in fact spelled "to possess", and to possess as much as possible. Under the domination of gigantic industrial corporations, however, that which is possessed by each individual small owner does not ensure its master's independence and freedom. The monopoly absorption of the possessions of small producers is at the same time the destruction of their illusions of independence. Now, in order "to be", they must "seem to be" that which is expected of them by the market; thus they become a constantly modifying function in the gigantic economic and political mechanism. The very logic of possession, of a "materialism", promoted as the basis of self-reliant individualism, and developed to its logical and historical limit, brings about the individual's dissolution in its numerous social functions and so leads to his loss of identity.

When speaking about "materialism", we presented it as a typical manifestation of an alienated consciousness in capitalist society. But in a social-



ist society, too, one can observe instances of a consumerist psychology. Let us make one reservation, though: the specific "logic" of worshipping things, of "materialism", should be distinguished from the naïve aspiration for beauty, and from the wish of a whole generation of people who have lived through the privations of the Second World War and post-war rehabilitation to satisfy their need of "the good life"; sometimes, of course, that need turned into a passion for acquisition and even a philistine attempt at self-protection against all possible future vicissitudes by stockpiling, "just in case". This is not so much a manifestation of the power of things over people, as the power of dire need, the fear of poverty. "Materialism", in fact, manifests itself only *after* people's vital needs have been satisfied.

The causes for the existence of a consumerist psychology under socialism are diverse. First of all, it has its nutritive medium in the very existence of commodity-money relationships. The existence of a complex management apparatus under a planned economy provides the ground, given certain well-known historical conditions, for a consolidation of the positions of "the individual bureaucrat"; for him, "the state objective turns into his private objective, into a *chasing after higher posts, the making of a career*".<sup>1</sup> Consumerism

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's

can thus spread, under certain circumstances, to the sphere which is outside the realm of commodity-money relationships.

Socialism has succeeded in destroying the basis of consumerism — i. e. private property. There therefore, appear, for the first time ever, the objective prerequisites for overcoming “materialism”, or the power of things. Socialism does not do away with consumerism automatically, of course, it only creates the *possibility of a dialogue* between various value orientations, and this helps to strip “the thing” of its mysterious, “supernatural” properties.

“The Envy”, a story by Yuri Olesha written as far back as 1927, discloses the intrinsic polemical nature of a new socialist culture, by its personification of ideas in the image of two brothers who both love and hate each other. One brother, Andrei by name, supports the idea of a new, social and mechanised production, a new socialist culture, and a new collectivist individual. Ivan, the other brother, is a carrier of an individualist psychology, which for him is expressed as an individual’s attachment to things. He thinks that we may lose our individual identities if we are no longer in touch with our own kitchen utensils, our own hearth, pillow, and all the minutiae of

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Philosophy of Law”, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 47.

life. "Each of us wants to sleep on our own pillow," he says. The "pillow is our coat of arms", it is "our banner". Human personality is indivisible and inseparable from the material world—that is his credo. Depriving someone of their possessions would mean depriving them of their soul.

The struggle between these two orientations is now underway in each person, and much depends on its outcome. In fact, the pace of *perestroika*—the restructuring of all aspects of our life—hinges on the outcome of this struggle. It is perfectly clear, however, that the consumer in Soviet society must be opposed not by the eccentric, devoid of any interest in things and afraid of the material world. Indeed, the fear of things is the reverse side of "materialism" based on the sense of possession. Such an eccentric despises things because he does not appreciate any of their useful properties, and sees nothing in them but objects to be possessed.

The relationship to things as products of a multitude of human efforts, as an embodiment of human thoughts and skills, as a possible sphere of application of one's own abilities, is that type of attitude to things which will enable one not only to preserve one's own identity and uniqueness, but to reveal all of one's capabilities, manifest all one's creative powers, and develop one's imagination. In the language of philosophy, the

human attitude towards things should represent the unity of *materialisation* and *dematerialisation*.

#### 4. The Stranger

Among the types of alienated consciousnesses, there is a man-protist, person-consumer, who tries to shelter his own individual existence by mounting a barrier of things, traditions, norms and ideals; and secondly, there's the no less frequent "stranger", a stranger to society, to his relatives, and even himself—a kind of social outcast. He cannot come to terms with society. Somerset Maugham wrote: "...Each one of us is alone in the world... We seek pitifully to convey to others the treasures of our heart, but they have not the power to accept them, and so we go lonely, side by side but not together, unable to know our fellows and unknown by them..."<sup>1</sup>

The spread of such attitudes in the consciousness of the contemporary person in the West is not a random phenomenon. The appearance of the "ethics of non-participation", and a passive rejection of behavioural norms and values imposed by an official ideology, are the result of the following: firstly, as business becomes more monopolised the sphere of free enterprise is narrowing

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<sup>1</sup> Somerset W. Maugham, *The Moon and Sixpence*, Penguin Books, in association with William Heinemann Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1960, pp. 149-50.

down, and secondly, people are losing faith in the possibility of achieving success in their business endeavours. In the existing capitalist society, to be "built in" and at the same time to realise one's individuality and hold an independent life style, is impossible. In the opinion of a French sociologist, the standardisation of all areas of life and the simultaneous "mixing up" of various social standards, their disorderliness and the mosaic character observed in present-day society, deprive the individual of the right to free choice. Hence the conclusion about the need to deny a social, cultural principle in general, the need for a person to reject everything society offers. The totality of these alienation processes has brought about a situation in which society is viewed as a threat to the individual.

In actual fact, such an absolute opposition of the individual to society, and the proclamation of the individual as an absolute value was not a protest against individual alienation and a consumerist psychology—it was just another form of alienation. Indeed, any thing can be used as a means, but the personality is always an end in itself, it cannot be a means—this is the main postulate in the ideology of the inherent value of the individual. Everything which is not individual—anything which really exists except the human individual is interpreted as a "thing"; i. e. lumped together in this category are recognised

social values, natural resources, and the whole of material culture; all of these are declared an object of utilitarian attitude. However, the material world, the "world of things", i.e. everything which has been created by humankind, has an imprint of human desires and capabilities; it is in fact a clot of human knowledge, skills and will power, and has the human essence embodied, materialised in it. Therefore, to take a pragmatic, utilitarian attitude towards everything which is not a "person", in fact amounts to ignoring the social nature of the individual.

In *The Executioner's Block*, a novel by Chingiz Aitmatov, one of the heroes, in trying to overtake a she-wolf who stole his little son, kills him by mistake. This is the meaning of the episode: by killing Nature (the she-wolf is the symbol thereof), a Nature which seems wild and hostile to us, we actually kill ourselves and our own future ... though we do not realise it at the time.

In the opinion of supporters of the view exposed above, what are the "inalienable" features of humankind which we should retain and counterpose to the repressive impact of society? We know that language, an ability to cognise the world in a rational way, morality and traditions are all products of social evolution. Herbert Marcuse asserts that while following generally accepted social patterns, people destroy themselves as personalities and become "one-dimensional". Society

in his opinion is a totality of alienated anonymous forces in various aspects. Having freed himself from the "repressive" impact of society, a person retains certain vital requirements which have been suppressed for a long time as they had to pass a kind of "censorship of society" or "censorship of reason". Yet, it is precisely reason that is capable of sensing the demands society makes on each of its members; these demands are common for all people. Genuine, inalienable "human qualities" cannot be represented in a rationalised form since they are "fused" with the individual, are inherent in him, are inborn, and are in no way connected with our human, social existence. We see here that the summation of alienation processes can result in the negation of the social principle in humankind in general.<sup>1</sup>

What, in the opinion of supporters of such "total non-conformism", should a person strive for? What kind of society can ensure that the individual is not suppressed by general norms, traditions and rules? First of all, one should remodel oneself to prepare one's consciousness for a creatively critical view of the world. At first glance, such an approach, reminding us of the Enlighteners, differs but little from the interpretation of humankind from traditionally-anthropological

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<sup>1</sup> See: Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964, pp. 10, 11, 12.

positions. Philosophers of the past times also thought that the shaping of humanity should be begun by "preparing" their own consciousnesses, by "putting into question" all recognised authorities and generally accepted truths, as well as the reasonableness of all existing traditions and customs. In the words of Francis Bacon, the famous materialist philosopher of the 17th-18th centuries, we should destroy, firstly, the "Phantoms and false conceptions which have hitherto preoccupied our intellect, and are deeply rooted in it";<sup>1</sup> and secondly, the blind faith, inertness of thinking and habitual use of words — only then will the road to truth be open.

However, while the 18th-century philosophers needed "universal doubt" to blaze the way to the "bright light of Reason" which would illuminate the path along which the creature-creator and transformer of the world advances, contemporary Western thinkers are mostly infatuated with the destructive part of the programme of shaping humanity. In the opinion of Maurice Dufré — who made it public in his report to the 3rd International Esthetics Congress, convened in Boulaignou — a sort of mass performance should be staged, in which the alienated individual, freed from strict rules of behaviour and all cultural val-

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<sup>1</sup> Francis Bacon, *The Novum Organon or a True Guide to The Interpretation of Nature*, Oxford, the University Press, MDCCCLV, pp. 18-19.



ues, will be able to resurrect himself; as a result, new relationships between humankind and the world will be established. Having scored a victory over the diktat of general concepts and norms within, such a "resurrected" person would subsequently need to change society as well.

How, as supporters of non-conformism see it, should the new human interact with society? Evidently, the "emancipated" individual can not be achieved by a protracted and hard revolutionary struggle which presupposes a strict discipline and organisation of fighters, as well as a clear-cut programme of action. Pascal Lainé, a French author, wrote in his essay-novel *L'Irrevolution* that any collectively organised activity is bound to destroy the uniqueness which the individual has succeeded in attaining. One of the characters in the book asserts that workers can speak only as a collective, through their representative; this is not the voice of one particular worker, and not even that of a certain group of workers, but of workers "in general". Therefore, a word which has been "frozen" and "overburdened" itself represents the repressive function of the general which suppresses the individual's uniqueness.<sup>1</sup> From this viewpoint, a "genuine individuality" must show no likeness to any other individual; in

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<sup>1</sup> Pascal Lainé, *L'Irrevolution*, Paris, Gallimard, 1971, pp. 49-50.

fact, he must bear no resemblance even "to himself", so the new, emancipated, multi-dimensional individual should not be engaged in organised struggle against society; he should refuse to submit to it; he should in fact assume an attitude of "total sabotage" thereto: the worker should rebuff the employer, the student — the teacher, and the priest — the bishop; the soldier should oppose the officer, the accused — the judges, and so on; the usual traditional relationships would as a result be eroded and fall apart, the mechanism would be jammed, and utterly unpredictable things and phenomena would take place.

Social coercion and the sense of duty as the foundation of the old society, should be replaced by the "principle of pleasure". The overcoming of the rift between the individual and society does not take place at the expense of the individual adjusting himself to society through the world of things, traditions and rules to be observed by him while taking into account his own, "selfish" interest in conformity with the principle: the wolves are fed up, and the sheep are safe. On the contrary, it is society that should change its own nature and adjust itself to the new individual requirements which do not fit into the Procrustean bed of reason, moral norms and esthetic rules — i. e. of the "general".

Let us see whether the positions held by the

consumer-individual and non-conformist are actually so very different. The concept formulated by Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud, which is an object of interest both for conformists and supporters of the non-conformist approach to the individual, will come in handy in our effort to understand both their similarity and difference.

Freud maintained that man's intrinsic foundation is made up by certain instinctive biological inclinations, which are heavily suppressed under the conditions of human co-existence. "...Every civilisation rests on a compulsion to work and a renunciation of instinct," he asserted.<sup>1</sup> While being necessary for humankind to survive, this compulsion is still hard to bear. Instinctive desires constantly come to the surface and are often expressed in aggressive, asocial actions, in crime and neuroses. The "mystery" of the relationship between the two positions, which are at first glance opposite, is resolved if we read the following abstract from Freud: "Whereas we might at first think that its essence lies in controlling nature for the purpose of acquiring wealth ... it now seems ... the decisive question is, whether and to what extent it is possible to lessen the burden of the instinctual sacrifices imposed on men, to re-

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<sup>1</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Future of an Illusion. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works*, London, the Hogarth Press, 1961, p. 10.

concile men to those which must necessarily remain and to provide a compensation for them..."<sup>1</sup>

Clearly, while the image of the consumer-person reflected that stage in the evolution of capitalist society when the most important thing was to get the good things of life, then the image of "the stranger"—an alien who breaks all ties with society, not wishing to comply with its demands—reflects the other stage, at which the "burden of the instinctual sacrifices imposed on humankind" proved to be too heavy. Supporters of non-conformism suggest certain illusory "compensations", which could help people to reconcile themselves to necessary sacrifices by abiding by social norms.

From this angle, the human being is essentially an asocial creature, the rift between the individual and society is inevitable, and all attempts to overcome it are futile, nothing else but wishful thinking, a kind of social myth, in which humankind can believe only because of its inborn inclinations. Now let us consider the illusory forms of the individual's unity with society suggested by "modern mythology".

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 7.

## 5. The Slumber of Reason

One of the ways to attain such unity is to awaken in people the "collective unconscious". It seems that, suddenly, consistent individualism begins to get transformed into an absolute collectivism, a complete coming-together of individuals and society, a realistic prototype of which can only be found in primitive-communal society.

The myth about humankind's intrinsic striving to such unity is quite necessary for the individual who has "freed" himself from society but who is afraid of the socially organised forms of revolutionary protest; he seeks isolation from society, yet is unable to bear that isolation for long and to fill in the vacuum by an active creative endeavour. The appearance of the new forms of integration of individuals in capitalist society logically stems from such "freedom". As a character in Dostoyevsky's *The Demons* said, "Having started with unlimited freedom, I end with unlimited despotism."

A mixture of individualism and "collectivism" of a sort, and the anarchist striving to destroy the existing norms and the fear of being deprived of them, have always been typical of petty-bourgeois consciousness. As Marx put it, a person "is free not through the negative power to avoid this or that, but through the positive power

to assert his true individuality".<sup>1</sup> People should not assert their individuality in spite of society, but should use all society gave them in the long course of human history: reason and will power, emotions and memory, skills, traditions, customs, rights and duties. Every kind of active-transformative endeavour requires clear-cut goals and a rational option for the means to be applied; furthermore, such endeavours rest upon a knowledge of the laws governing objective reality. Otherwise individuals, free from all rational forms of social being, deprive themselves of the possibility to occupy an independent position, to form their own individual attitude to the surrounding world, and to voice their own opinion.

The Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan proposed a type of society in which people could live happily and easily, having freed themselves from the shackles of reason and ethical norms. Appealing to the ancient sense of collectivism alive in all, he made a stake not on mass game actions, and not on the power of art that would set man free. The rift between the individual and society, between the individuality and the world of standards, is overcome ... of itself, thanks to the inexorable advance of technological progress.

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, "The Holy Family", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 4, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 131.

New society will give birth to a new person, for whom high tech will both replace all the habitual forms of communication with the world, and completely saturate his spiritual life, so that he will have no time left for meditations. We are no longer dealing with an egoistic philistine or a mere "stranger"; what we have here is a social outcast who has voluntarily withdrawn into himself, into his own "spiritual monastery". The individual of this type just cannot develop any "special" requirements that would be opposed to society, because in the age of electronic revolution it is society itself which, with the assistance of mass media, fully determines the content of the images of his perceptions. It in fact creates the whole world in which man has to live, shutting out of his sight the objective reality with all its contradictions: illnesses and death, poverty and social oppression and revolutionary struggle. Society delivers the people from tormenting thought, and from egoistic fear for their own Ego. Computerised society removes the shackles of responsibility for his own actions from the individual, and will eventually return him into the "childhood of humanity" with its subordination to tribal authorities.

In his short novel *Fahrenheit 451*, American science fiction writer Ray Bradbury offers a model of society which is seen as ideal by McLuhan; furthermore, Bradbury shows the logical result of

its development. He shows that a society, in which the gift of thinking is looked upon as a sign of dissension; in which people, even when at home, live in a specific world crammed with high-tech appliances; and in which a TV programme can serve as a means for turning everyone into police officers ..., such a society will inevitably come to disaster. There are no forces in it capable of opposing militarist propaganda, so it plunges humanity into a war, which is no longer waged on the TV screen but in real life.

It is clear that in the given case, the individual is identified not with society, but with an artificially created "habitat". As soon as it comes into contact with real social problems, the illusion of unity collapses.

Present-day Western society does not only need a single-dimensional man-protist, or man-locator who occupies a passive social stand; it also requires people who desperately aspire to get "to the top", as well as the tough guys capable of servicing modern military hardware; and furthermore, it needs people who believe in the ideals of that society and who persistently strive for their realisation. The objectively existing requirements of Western society give rise to yet another variety of man's unity with society: the *neo-conservative*.

This is how the main thrust of neo-conservatism is formulated by Roger Scruton,



one of its theorists: "I have argued for a view of legitimacy that places public before private, society before individual, privilege before right...."<sup>1</sup> People's oneness with society within the framework of this theory must be attained by means of a "quiet" revolution—i.e. through a radical change in the individual's consciousness, backed up by all the successes of scientific and technological progress, and the levers of genetic engineering. The ideal of neo-conservatism is not an amorphous person, a mere spectator ousted from all real activity by the mass media; rather, it is an active, persistent and convinced individual possessing a strong will power, well aware of the "niche" he occupies in society and who does not try to go out of it. "Organised" society, which points out to each the place he is entitled to, is a society alien to the idea of equality; instead, it sees as its ultimate goal the perpetuation of all social distinctions and the provision to everybody of the share they actually "deserve"; what's more, it represents a specific combination, both of a belief in human reason and scientific and technological progress, and a fear of critical attitudes which could eventually take someone out of their state of submissiveness. Hence attempts at combining opposites—firstly, the ra-

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<sup>1</sup> Roger Scruton, *The Meaning of Conservatism*, The Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1980, p. 189.

tional and the irrational; and secondly, the awakening of a sense of civil self-awareness and the revival of corporative morality, typical of the Middle Ages and the religious beliefs of our forefathers. This is finely pictured by Lewis Mumford in his *Utopia, The City and The Machine*, he says, the idea of total control has been given new opportunities for the realisation of a union between power and science, an alliance of Church and State, and a synthesis of science with religion. Never before has the town of Plato's philosophy been so close to its historical prototype.<sup>1</sup>

Quite logically, Western sociologists often speak about a revival of a traditional land-estate morality, the creation of a "new serf society" and a return to a way of life so suited to the existence of the individual, and so typical of feudalism. Indeed, they demand the act of absolute submission of the individual who has long been capable of understanding his relative autonomy from society, who can think in a critical way, and who can cope with mastering all the treasures created by human culture. René-Victor Pilhes, a French author, suggests in his novel *L'Imprécauteur* (The Exposer) that such a model of the individual is an anachronism; it has no historical perspective, and all attempts to build bridges between the

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<sup>1</sup> See Lewis Mumford, "Utopia, The City and the Machine", *Daedalus*, Spring 1965, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 271-92.

contemporary type of person and the "estate individual" of the Middle Ages are absurd. He depicts how, in a critical situation, relationships between top managers in a big transnational company begin to show signs of mysticism and rigid social hierarchy, reminding one of the Middle Ages. The company building collapses, and it is fully eradicated from the people's memory. The author's message is that society will inevitably come to its doom if it does not provide stimuli to creative activity, and if it does not find in its achievements of scientific and technological progress, a humane content.

There are diverse models of "alienated existence" current in the West today, all of them based on the violation of the system of links between the individual, the personality and society. In some cases, the individual is identified with those characteristic features which are outwardly unique but in fact random; in other cases, he is regarded just as a mouthpiece of general norms, ideas and rules, deprived of the right to hold his own point of view and to occupy an original, independent stand.

Both the isolation of the individual from society, and a complete identification of the already developed personality with society, are manifestations of the individual's alienated existence; for the individual is a unity of the particular and the general. He is linked to society in

countless ways, but at the same time is characterised by his own peculiar, inimitable traits.

To see how and in what forms the particular and the general, the national and international, the historical and eternal, are integrated in the individual, one should turn to the individual's spiritual world, to its chief components—a world outlook and emotions, imagination and memory, etc.

Before we begin to analyse the key components of the individual's spiritual world which mediates his social activity, let us turn to the question of whether it is at all legitimate to speak in general about *common* components of the human spiritual world, that would be typical of an individual living in the East and that who belongs to the Western world.

## 6. The Similarity of the Dissimilar

In the opinion of many Western theorists, all tragic collisions of contemporary humankind with its "disrupted" consciousness happen only in individuals living under the European civilisation, and not in those living elsewhere. This stand was in the main formulated by Rudyard Kipling, the British writer and poet: "... Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet." (*The Ballad of East and West.*) The East (interpreted as a symbol of another, differ-

ent way of life, a different culture and different personalities) lives according to its own laws; it has its own time categories, its own specific spiritual values, and its own style of communication. The individual living in this world therefore possesses features all his own. Thus, Jasunari Kawabata, a contemporary Japanese author, a Nobel Prize winner, asserts that the very foundations of Eastern and Western spiritual make-ups are different.

An interest in the East may be explained by the fact that Western theoreticians and artists see the Eastern type of individual as an actual alternative to the "society of alienation". There in the East we find an integral personality in which Truth, Good, Beauty, reason and emotions are harmoniously blended, though they are at loggerheads in the "disrupted" consciousness of Westerners. Numerous spiritual "pilgrimages to the East" (the German writer Hermann Hesse even named one of his short novels in this way) are typical of contemporary culture: suffice it to recall works authored by Jerome David Salinger and Hermann Hesse, Somerset Maugham, as well as the theoretical essays by Jean-Paul Sartre, Carl Gustav Jung, Erich Fromm, et al. Fromm, for one, makes a comparison between the attitude to Nature on the part of a Western thinker, who "kills all living things in his search of truth" and the Japanese poet Basho, who is inclined

"simply to observe" the beautiful without destroying it; the odds are of course in favour of the latter.<sup>1</sup>

As we can see, the *contemplative* stand differs from the active which destroys living things. No less attractive in the eyes of the West is the "Oriental individual's" reliance on intuition, as distinct from understanding truth through reason which takes apart and "puts to death" the world's integrity in the process. Jerome Salinger takes an Oriental Quiz as an epigraph to his collection of stories (We all know the sound produced by clapping our two hands; what is the sound produced by the clapping of one hand?). In fact, he points to the incomprehensibility of the essence of phenomena through logical means; everything that is available for the human mind and senses is as ephemeral as the sound of clapping with one hand.

For the Oriental individual, the chief way of developing his personality is "*the path of beauty*". Dzyunitiro Tanidzaki, another Japanese writer, says that for hundreds of thousands of years, Oriental people have acknowledged the same beauty, and from generation to generation, poets and narrators have been glorifying it, each in his own way.

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<sup>1</sup> See Erich Fromm, *Haben oder Sein*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 27.

Here is yet another feature of the "individual of the Orient": contrary to the European, the Easterner, is not engulfed by a desperate search of the new: the *past* is infinitely dear to him. "Instead of looking for new roads, the Oriental people set themselves the goal of attaining the spiritual state of those of the past ages.

Prevalence of intuitive over the discursive, of emotions over reason, of contemplation over activity; the leading role of beauty in the spiritual life and a concentration on the inner world rather than on the material one; not a striving for the new, but a resurrection of the perfection typical of the past times — these are the traits characteristic of the Eastern model of humanity which is so attractive for the contemporary person of Western culture.

Yet we find, in the *Discovery of India* by Jawaharlal Nehru, who may hardly be suspected of ignoring the interests of "the Oriental", a much more critical view of the Eastern type of individual. While seeing in the "individual of the East" both the source of the masterpieces of fine arts and of high ethical ideas, he at the same time showed that "individualism" gradually turned into a factor of weakness, "into a prison of the mind", thus sapping the creative potential of the Indian people.<sup>1</sup> The idea of society as an integ-

<sup>1</sup> See: Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, New Delhi, 1976, pp. 52-53.

ral whole, of the individual's duty to society and of national solidarity so necessary today for India, Nehru wrote, is "perhaps largely a modern development and cannot be found in any ancient society".<sup>1</sup>

The life of each man is confined to a close set of obligations and duties locked within the framework of a given social group or caste. The sense of solidarity is manifested only in respect of "one's own kin". But among "one's own kin", too, there are many hierarchical relationships. The complexity of human relationships in Oriental society is well illustrated in the Arab saying: "I am opposed to my brother, my brother and I are opposed to our cousin, and my cousin, my brother and I are opposed to strangers."

The thinkers who epitomise and reflect the special Oriental ideology, are aware of all the contradictions typical of Oriental existence under present-day conditions—the insufficiency, the limited nature and even the lack of harmony in that type of individual. D. Tanidzaki, for one, says in his short story "The Tattoo" that the "road of beauty" by no means leads to harmony with truth and good. On the contrary, it is the road of evil. The tattoo of extraordinary beauty made out in the shape of a huge spider

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<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.



with its legs spread on the spine of a young inexperienced girl turns her into an image of evil who destroys everybody coming her way. Another Japanese writer, Akutagawa Ryunoske, more clearly demonstrates in his short story, "The Hell's Torture", that the ideals of beauty and good are being driven more and more apart. An artist who devoted his whole life to the service of art, experiences artistic pleasure from the sight of his own daughter who has caught fire and who is dying before his very eyes. His ethical nature, however, is unable to stand the burden of this evil beauty, and so he commits suicide. The road of beauty is not always righteous, is the author's conclusion. Thus traditional Oriental values are thrown into doubt.

The striving to change the way of life and take a different view of the world, typical of the West, is paralleled by an equally strong desire in the East, to master the wealth of Western culture. Abdul Kalam Azad, a close friend and collaborator of Jawaharlal Nehru, said, "the synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures" is extremely important for the future of humankind.<sup>1</sup> Such a synthesis of Eastern and Western cultures will help man to avoid the fatalism typical of the East, and will stimulate his creativity.

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<sup>1</sup> *The Educational Ideas of Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad*. Sterling Publishers, Ltd., New Delhi, 1973, p. 4.

Yet it is hardly possible to agree with all the conclusions arrived at by the supporters of such a synthesis. As he analyses the similarities and distinctions between the mode of thinking and the system of feelings intrinsic to people in the East and West, Azad essentially demonstrated that many positions, which are usually regarded as typical of the Oriental world view, have been found, in various forms and in different epochs, in European culture as well. For instance, the ideas of Pantheism, of the link between the micro- and macro-cosm, and also the idea that man has the whole Universe contained in himself, have been present in European philosophy, too. Humankind's connection with God, and in fact its similarity to God — though in forms differing from those prevalent in the East — was one of the basic ideas of philosophy in medieval Europe. The view of humanity and the individual's spiritual evolution as the goal, rather than the means, is also characteristic of European humanism. And, though there are no two absolutely identical historical situations, and though similar issues have been raised in different cultures in different, "asimilar" forms, still many parallel lines can be drawn between East and West as the evolution of their cultures is traced. This parallelism becomes still more apparent if we recall certain specific "common" features of the "primitive-communal" individual of ancient times and of

the "estate" individual of the Middle Ages, of which we have spoken in the first section of this book.

We should constantly bear in mind that those who are regarded today as bearers of the Oriental spirit, in many ways rely on the spiritual culture of the West. Thus, it is no secret that European philosophy, in particular that of romanticism and existentialism, have exerted a considerable influence on the creative activity of Akutagawa. Another example is the spiritual kinship of Leo Tolstoy and Mahatma Gandhi; it is a graphical illustration of how barriers between East and West are overcome.

No doubt, the specific nature of the economic, political and spiritual life of the East — which over the individual centuries and to our present day has brought and fused into a single whole separate elements of the characteristic of pre-capitalist conditions — enables us to speak about the specific world outlook, emotional sphere and way of life of people in the Orient.

Still, a certain synthesis of the two different cultures can hardly result in the elimination of alienation of processes in modern capitalist society. It is rather more possible that "new misfortunes" may befall the "old Gods". The Oriental type of individual cannot be fused in a new synthesis with the energy of Western man, but ends in self-destruction; so relates Rabindranath Tagore's parable, "New Misfortunes that Befell Old

Gods", in allegorical form. The "Old Gods", who symbolise the spirit of Oriental culture, "retired" and were turned into a myth through the efforts of the new generation: by the hands of learned men there appeared a happiness, the like of which would not be found in any other place, neither in the heavens nor on the earth. There is a new form of alienation — the alienation of national identities and of original characteristics of personality which continue to be expressed only on the pages of scientific tracts and artistic creative works — and it is this new alienation, and not that synthesis, which awaits the representative of traditional societies in conditions of bourgeois development.

It is not the coming together of heterogeneous elements of different cultures separated from each other by time and space, by different historical events and great distances, but rather the creation of new socio-economic prerequisites for the liquidation of the processes of alienation that will cause the emergence of a new type of personality, devoid of egoism and hate, and of the desire to possess ... a personality, instead, trying to achieve the insuperable requirements of a broad social creation — and that's the road of a socialist society.

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### III. THE UNIVERSE INSIDE US

#### 1. The Individual and His World Outlook

Everyone of course, has, at some time or other pondered over the meaning of life. This is one of the "eternal" questions, of interest to all people, no matter how far removed they are from politics, science or the arts. The answer to this question largely determines both people's attitudes to the world in which they live and work, and the principles by which they are guided in their activity. In tackling the question about the meaning of life, the individual is confronted by a choice. The fairy-tale image of a knight standing at the crossroads, there to decide which road to take, can also serve as a symbol of option for a world outlook, Giordano Bruno and Galileo.

leo Galilei, Caesar and Napoleon, Patrice Lumumba and Che Guevara all had to make their choice. It is not an easy matter and often requires a lot of civil courage, firmness of spirit and will power.

So what is that view of the world, in the name of which so many gave their lives, waged fierce struggles and scored great victories?

A world outlook is a multidimensional phenomenon. We can speak of a world outlook of the scholar and the writer, of the artist and the worker, of an everyday world outlook, a philosophical and a religious ones. Scientists point out different forms of the individual's view of the world such as its perception, interpretation and understanding.

There is no "general" world outlook; but various concrete, real people, who live in this or that particular country, and in this or that historical time, each have their own. A person's world outlook is closely connected with his or her activity; it is invariably a feature of a definite individual. To give a strictly scientific definition of this concept: a world outlook is the sum of a person's ideas about the world and his own place in it; it is a totality of his scientific, philosophical, ethical, religious and esthetic convictions and ideals. It is the core, the nucleus of the human personality, which embraces a person's principles, ideals and goals. A world outlook largely determines the in-

dividual's life road. It is not just a list of all the individual's views and concepts of the surrounding world, but their generalised totality.

Everyone distinguishes between themselves and all others in their activities: each is aware of himself and his activity in the world. For the individual, the world is as it were, "split" into two parts: "I" and "Not I". While exerting an influence over, and changing, Nature, people themselves also undergo changes. In this process, a subject-object relationship arises, as does the need for a world outlook, a search for the answer to the fundamental question of philosophy.

The *object of a world outlook* is that which surrounds humankind, i. e. Nature and society, the world as a whole.

The *subject* of a world outlook is the individual or a social group.

The *subject-matter* of the world outlook is the relationship between the world of Nature and the world of humankind, or, to use the expression of the ancient Greeks, between the macrocosm and the microcosm or again, to use contemporary language, between the concept of the world and the concept of the human being.

The *fundamental question of the world outlook* is that of human attitudes towards the world, a world not given to the individual as an independent entity, but connected with him

through his activity. It embraces much: the issues of the world's origin, its essence and future prospects as the basis of human existence; the issues of the meaning of human life, of human cognition of the world and self-cognition; and the issues of truth and delusion, social justice, good and evil, and so on.

What is a scientific world outlook and what is its relationship with an everyday one. An everyday world outlook, the attitude to and perception of the world, is connected with the perception of an everyday standard of human existence. It emerges on the basis of a person's empirical, personal experience; it is his convictions, concepts and emotions, as well as his spontaneous judgements about the surrounding world. An everyday world outlook presupposes that people are guided by their everyday requirements and interests; they do not proceed from some well thought-out principles, nor do they set themselves any lofty goals or ideals.

A scientific world outlook, an understanding of the world, requires a certain knowledge, a cultural standard and erudition, and a conviction in the correctness of one's ideals and goals. If a world outlook, generally speaking, can be described as an individual's 'core' then a scientific world outlook could be defined as his 'inner core'. It is a system of dialectic-materialist views of the world and of our place in it, of the most gen-



eral laws guiding the development of Nature, society and thinking.

Philosophy occupies a special place in the shaping of a world outlook. Why is it so? Because philosophy is intimately connected with various phenomena of social life. It has an impact on political struggle and scientific activities, on religious movements and artistic creativity, and it leaves its imprint on both the epoch and the individual. It is sometimes defined as "humankind's spiritual image". Trying to explain in theoretical terms the origins of the universe and humankind's place in it, philosophy forms the groundwork of a world outlook as an interpretation of the world. Philosophy is an ideological science, since its basic question concerns the world, its finiteness and its infinity, the place humankind is assigned in it, and its cognoscibility.

It should be stressed that in some historical epochs, fundamental ideological significance was attached to issues, on the solution of which an understanding of the world depended. Such was, for example, the theory of Copernicus on the structure of the solar system in the 16th-17th centuries, the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin on the origin of species and Marx's historical materialism in the 19th century, and the discovery of the microworld and Einstein's theory of relativity in the 20th century. Expansion of knowledge serves to increase and deepen our concepts of the

world; it modifies our understanding of the world and provides us with new orientations in our activity. There's no one particular science which in itself is a world outlook; but every science draws on the world outlook as it develops. In all epochs, the mode of production and social relationships, i. e. the economic and spiritual life of society, has been definitive in the development of a world outlook. A world outlook in class society is always of a class nature, since everyone is a representative of a certain class. A world outlook reflects in generalised form the specific pattern of an individual's social being, and the place he occupies in the historically concrete system of social relationships. The slave-holders and slaves, the feudal lords and bonded peasants, the capitalists and proletarians, all take a different view of the world, i. e. they have different world outlooks.

An individual's world outlook is the measure of that person's awareness of his own attitude towards Nature and society, his awareness of his own place in society. A world outlook always implies the "presence" of the subject with his stance in life, which is inseparable from his activity, his moral code, emotions and sensations.

A world outlook can be everyday (spontaneous and naïve), or theoretically based on definite philosophical principles. However, people are not born possessing a certain world outlook: it is

acquired and moulded. The spiritual culture the individual assimilates in the process of his social education turns from an aggregate of knowledge about the world into a programme of his social and hence his personal behaviour. Or, in a word, a person's upbringing turns his knowledge into his convictions. As a result of this, world outlooks exert a powerful influence over people's lives, over all spheres of their cognitive and practical activities.

A world outlook is not an individual's passive companion; it is rather his spiritual leader, his guide. If the world outlook proceeds from the correct understanding of the world, it can serve as a firm groundwork for a rational transformation of the world. If, on the other hand, it is erroneous, it becomes a serious obstacle in the life of the individual.

Knowledge turns into a world outlook if it serves to shape an individual's socio-political, moral and esthetic stands, if it becomes his inner conviction, i. e. the basis of his way of life. Marx thought that convictions "are chains from which one cannot free oneself without a broken heart; they are demons which human beings can vanquish only by submitting to them".<sup>1</sup>

People who are firmly convinced of the cor-

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Communism and the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 221.

rectness of their views are capable of withstanding any suffering and may even give up their very lives for their particular cause. Every one of such people could repeat the words pronounced by Martin Luther: "I can do no other."<sup>1</sup> The strength of one's convictions is an essential condition for achieving success in one's practical and theoretical work.

*Ideals* comprise an important component of a world outlook, since they, in fact, are much-cherished and decisive life goals. The character of one's concepts about the world determines the nature of the goals one sets oneself; these then merge to make one's overall life programme, and form one's ideals, so to render actual power to one's world outlook.

Any world outlook is an estimate of the surrounding reality from the point of view of the activity of the individual or of society as a whole. We can speak about the value of an ideal, an object of art, a thing, or an action. All objects possess a certain value in that extent to which they can satisfy a requirement of an individual, a social group, or a class. Is water or bread valuable? In themselves, no; but for the thirsty and the starving, they are the most precious things. For the inhabitants of blockaded Leningrad, for

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<sup>1</sup> Speech at the Diet of Worms, 18 April 1521, *The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations*, London, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 321.

example, bread was synonymous with life. The range of things and phenomena which may become valuable in the eyes of the individual is very wide.

What is value and how are people, their actions, their views and life stands to be assessed? In fact, all the various products of human activities, social relationships and natural phenomena included in their sphere may be regarded as "material values", as objects of value estimation, i. e. all of them can be assessed in terms of good and evil, truth or non-truth, beauty or ugliness, justice or injustice.

Value orientations of the individual are the most important element of his internalised personality structure. The value orientations of each are confirmed by his life experiences, and the entire aggregate of his sensations. What is important and essential for one person, may be unimportant and inessential for another. The stable and fully-developed value orientations of the individual determine his behaviour and activity, as expressed in the certain thrust of his requirements and interests.

The totality of value orientations of the individual define such traits as integrity, dependability, loyalty to certain principles and ideals, an ability to stand up for these ideals and values, and a determination in trying to achieve one's goals. Developed value orientations are a sign of

the individual's maturity, an indicator of his social maturity.

The world of human values is by no means confined to the sphere of emotional thrust, goals and beliefs. To understand the nature of such values, it is necessary to bring to light their link with the individual's practical activity, with his view of the world. Things, phenomena, individuals and social groups become valuable only if they reflect social interests and meet social needs and goals.

## 2. On Human Needs

An individual's needs are closely connected with his interests, value orientations, goals and ideals. Such needs are those things necessary in part or in full for the vital activity of any organism or the individual; they are an internal stimulus to activity. People require knowledge and culture, rest and communication. They always lack something; and their needs haunt them, so to say, during their whole lives.

Human needs are a product of the evolution of society and social relationships. While the needs and behaviour of animals are based directly or indirectly on biological usefulness, and while animals act in order to consume, human needs are basically different; people consume in order to act and create, their needs are shaped in the

course of their communication with other people, they are "socialised" in the course of their collective life. People's needs are influenced by their milieu—their work, family and friends, their conditions of labour and rest, their wages and educational standard, their age, state of health and habits—indeed, each has his own concept of what is necessary or desirable for him. All assess their own needs and choose the ways and means through which they can satisfy them, and consider the possibility of so doing; they can give up some of their needs in favour of others; they also compare their own needs with those of other people and sacrifice certain of their personal requirements for the common good.

The specific nature of human needs is determined by the social nature of human activity, and first of all by labour. Society as a concrete historical system provides the basis for the formation and evolution of diverse needs, as well as the content and the forms in which they are met. The needs of the individual and society as a whole depend on the level of development of a given society, and on the specific conditions under which human activities take place.

Scientists classify human needs into several levels:

- a) physiological—in food, mobility, housing, rest and security; b) in labour activity and communication; c) in the realisation of his abilities

and talents; d) in explaining the world; and e) in beauty, harmony, and so on.

Of general human needs the material ones are the most important; on their foundation develop spiritual needs — cognitive, esthetic and moral. For example, the need for labour activity is regarded as a material need of an individual, while the need for beauty is considered a spiritual one. But can the need for work be regarded only as a material one? Indeed, as he is working to earn his daily bread, a person does not only obtain the means of existence, does not only develop his physical abilities, but also satisfies his striving for creativity, for social contacts with other people, and his personal spiritual development. Labour in which a person cannot reveal and develop his capabilities would hardly turn into a need, or bring him joy and pleasure. At the same time, an individual realises his need for beauty not only in a purely spiritual sphere; in fact, he is always being guided by his thirst for harmony and beauty. That is why division of the individual's needs into material and spiritual is rather relative. People are not born with their needs ready-made — they are formed in the process of education in the broad sense of the word, i. e. they emerge when people assimilate human culture, both material and spiritual.

French Enlighteners of the 19th century — Diderot, Helvetius and Holbach — counted



among man's reasonable needs the striving to attain the general good, the common weal. They saw the criteria of reasonable needs in the individual's self-imposed restrictions on his needs in accordance with the principle of rational egoism. Ludwig Feuerbach shared their ideas, too. But what does the criterion of reasonable needs amount to? After all, we know that needs change as society develops: that which was one day regarded as a luxury has today become a vital necessity. The criterion of reasonable needs has been found by general human morality which holds as reasonable that which is not detrimental to humankind and complies with the principles of justice and honesty. Yet we should not overestimate the significance of general human morality as a regulator of reasonableness in needs, since in a class society needs differ widely due to its social heterogeneity and the existence of manifold distinctions in the economic, socio-political and cultural positions of different classes, social groups and sections.

Socialist society creates prerequisites for a harmonious combination of public and personal interests and for overcoming antagonisms between the needs of various classes and social groups. Under socialism, the individual's requirements are met in conformity with the principle: a society for people, and people for society.

Needs are closely connected with interests. An interest is a need of which the individual is aware. The word "interest" in Latin (*interesse*) means to be important, or meaningful. People assess their own and other people's actions from the angle of their own interests.

Interests are either personal or public. A personal interest is as a rule limited, but sometimes it assumes a social meaning and thus turns into an interest of society. The chief personal interests of Charles Darwin and Albert Einstein lay in their scientific pursuits, of Beethoven and Tchaikovsky — in music, of Goya and Matisse — in painting, and of Le Corbusier and Niemeyer in architecture. For Robespierre and Che Guevara, the main interests lay in their revolutionary activities. For all these people, their personal interests turned into social ones.

The satisfaction of needs presupposes certain action, but an action or a deed is not performed until an ideal plan, scheme or model of some future action or deed, i. e. until a goal is formed in the individual's consciousness. What is a goal? It is an ideal, an image, notion or concept anticipated in the consciousness, of the desired result of the individual's activity. It is that which has not yet been attained but to which person strives. A person's goal is consciously directed at the satisfaction of a certain need. It is only through practical activity that the individual can achieve

the goal he has set himself—and, in the end, meet his needs.

When a goal is defined, it requires an effort of will power to achieve it. Will power is a conscious and purposeful regulation by the individual of his actions; it is an active section of his consciousness. The individual's will power is expressed in his desire to perform certain actions, in the choice of these actions, and in taking the decision to act. Yet there is a distance to be covered in order to achieve what is desired. In realising what he has conceived, the individual turns his will power into action. Albert Schweitzer, who devoted his life to work in the hospital he founded in Lambaréné (Gabon) said he decided to turn his life into a convincing argument in favour of the active Good, by doing good deeds instead of calling others to do them. For humankind, it is not only important to set goals, but also to be able to attain them; without that, a real goal may turn into an illusion. It is not enough to wish to do good—one should actually know how to do it; it is not enough to wish to become a good person—one should be able to become such. To know, to wish for and to be able—these three elements must be fused by the individual into a single action.

### 3. From Each According to His Abilities

An ability to work is the most important human endowment. When our ancestors made the world's first implements of labour, it was the greatest creative act; therein, human capabilities were revealed. Capabilities are determined not by intrinsic, innate human traits, but by objective social needs and conditions society creates for their development.

What are human capabilities? They are an aggregate of the individual's traits, gifts and skills, which serve to ensure his successful activity. People's capabilities are as multifarious as their activities. When someone does not do anything, his capabilities are dormant, they exist as potentials and are only revealed when he begins to act. Natural gifts are believed to be connected with inborn inclinations, which render special features to the personal development of the individual. Human capabilities are divided into *general human* (generic) ones, such as an ability to percept, think, feel, communicate, work, learn, and so on; and *individual* ones, such as a talent for music, painting, sports, mathematics, etc. An individual's gifts for work, communication, thinking, are shaped during the entire course of his life.

The individual's talents can also be divided into *reproductive* and *productive (creative)* ones. The

former are connected with an ability to learn, master and perform an activity; they are based on the ability to repeat and reproduce certain actions so as the skill may acquire a stable nature. To produce and transform are creative talents which facilitate the creation of something which is new in principle.

Can everyone become a creative individual, or is it the prerogative of the select? Scholars of different epochs have provided different answers to this question. Thus, in Antiquity, the gift of creativity was ascribed only to Gods or to those people who were given to passions of extraordinary power, who were actually possessed to the point of madness. The myth about Daedalus and Icarus became a symbol of a creative impulse, of a readiness to take risks, and of a daring flight of thought. Attempts to explain human capabilities rationally, as a process which can be studied and cognised were made by Democritus and Plato. The former regarded human endowments as a manifestation of overflowing spiritual powers, as a state of inspiration, while Plato referred to them as the imitation of Nature, and thought that all rational activities were underlied by creativity. Hegel developed Plato's tradition and showed that creativity (as a realisation of the individual's capabilities) has thinking as its basis, which has been developed by many human generations. Idealist scholars thought that conscious-

ness, the Spirit, Idea, World Reason or self-awareness, are all the subjects of creativity, that is, that the world was created by the free Ego.

Materialists, on the other hand, held that an individual's creative powers are provided by Nature or, as Helvetius said, are determined by that person's milieu and education. In the 19th century, the theory of inherited talent enjoyed much popularity. Scholars enthusiastically delved into family chronicles, looking for proofs of the talent's hereditary nature. In 1875, the British anthropologist and psychologist Francis Galton published *Hereditary Genius*, a book in which he traced family ties of many hundreds of talented individuals. To accomplish that, he studied the parish records in which all birth dates were registered, and so revealed blood ties in the generations of outstanding figures in German culture—the poets Schiller and Hölderlin, and the philosophers Schelling and Hegel. He discovered a whole pleiad of musicians in several generations of the Bach family, some of whom were really famous. And there were musicians in the family trees of Mozart and Haydn. Karl Marx and Heinrich Heine, Alexander Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy were proved to be relatives, though distant ones. In the 20th century, Galton's views on the hereditary nature of talent were shared in by the psychologist Cotes, who thought that the talent of an individual can be judged by the number of en-

tries on him in encyclopaedias. Both Galton and Cotes maintained that the majority of people endowed with hereditary talent came of privileged classes.

However, the opponents of the theory of inherited talent offered many arguments to disprove any connection between heredity and talent. In fact, practically all people have some inborn creative powers, only their manifestations differ. Any profession or trade contains certain elements of creativity. A gifted person can be born into any family, they may be of peasant or worker origin, and may belong to any nationality.

It was ancient thinkers who noticed that an individual's gifts depend on the development of his intellect. Thus Aristotle held that creative powers depend on a person's ability to be surprised, to see the extraordinary in the ordinary. René Descartes in his *Passions de l'âme* also accorded prime of place among an individual's traits to his ability to be surprised, regarding doubt to be the Mother of Truth.

Today, psychology studies the mechanism through which capabilities are activated; sociology deals with the conditions which stimulate their development; cybernetics is engaged in studying them within the processes relaying information; the pedagogical science analyses the ways in which capabilities can be shaped; and ethics is interested in how moral stimuli influence

the development of talents. Philosophy tries to reveal the prerequisites and social conditions which help to form the capabilities of an individual, and it provides methodological guidelines and a knowledge of the principles underlying an individual's activities.

One's creative abilities are an alloy of many qualities: an ability to understand the task, quickness and flexibility of the mind, independence of judgement, an inventiveness, an ability to draw analogies and make conclusions, etc. Many psychologists connect an individual's creativity with a vivid imagination, an open mind and an ability to produce "wild" ideas. An ability to see the unusual in the usual is one of the most important traits of a talented person. Another very important feature is his capability to find a solution by using information that is not directly related to the object of research, i. e. an ability for "lateral thinking".

The talent of thinking in analogies is also a component of an individual's creativity. An analogy is a suppositional judgement about an object or phenomenon based on its similarity with other objects or phenomena. By drawing analogies one can trace the hidden ties between objects. Thus, Archimedes discovered an analogy between his own body, which displaced water from the bath tub, and a cow, whose weight he had to estimate. Ernest Rutherford formulated



his hypothesis on the planetary structure of the atom by drawing an analogy with the concept of the Solar system: he saw the atom as a minute Solar system, with the Sun as the nucleus of the atom, and the planets as electrons racing along the elliptic orbits around it.

Yet another significant feature of the creative individual is his ability to produce, or generate, ideas. The American psychologist A. Osborn proposed the heuristic method of "brain storming" to stimulate creative thinking. He suggested several "heuristics", or procedures which could facilitate more fruitful discussions, such as, for example, abstention from any critical remarks, and stimulation of unrestrained imaginations, of the most absurd analogies and of "crazy" ideas. This method proved to be really productive, especially in tackling some concrete technological problems.

An individual's creativity can also be manifest in his ability to pose a problem and to formulate a scientific hypothesis.

This by no means implies, though, that inspiration and work are poles apart in a person's creative activity; otherwise, the individual's ability to succumb to an impulse, a fit of joy, a flight of fancy or sudden inspiration would look like some sort of "mystification", like a call to genius. Rather, an individual relies on his will power to call forth a state of inspiration, an outburst of

creativity. There are numerous instances in art and science when inspiration was not passively waited for, but conditions conducive to arousing it were consciously created. The Russian composer of the world fame, Pyotr Tchaikovsky, wrote to this effect: "The secret is that I have sat down to work punctually every day of my life. I have an iron will power in this respect, and if I have no particular wish to work, I can always make myself overcome this unwillingness and then actually get inspired." The sculptor Rodin and the artist Degas also thought that one should not rely on inspiration coming of itself, but that it should be called forth by work. Thomas Edison, the author of more than a thousand inventions, said that a genius is one per cent inspiration and ninety-nine per cent perspiration. It is no accident that capacity for work, perseverance and patience are named among the qualities indispensable for genius. Indeed, folk are not born geniuses — they become such.

#### 4. *Homo Sum; Humani Nihil a Me Alienum Puto*<sup>1</sup>

Can an individual who is deprived of any emotions, become a personality? People live not only

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<sup>1</sup> "I am human; nothing which is human is alien to me" (Latin).— *Ed.*

in order to act and think; they must also enjoy life, suffer, fall in love and feel hatred... The partiality of the human mind and its emotionality were described by Gottfried Leibnitz in his famous aphorism: "If geometry were ... opposed to our passions and ... interests..., we should contest it and violate it ..., notwithstanding all the demonstrations of Euclid and Archimedes." <sup>1</sup>

The word "emotion" (from the Latin *emotio*) means agitation of the passions, a strong feeling. Emotion is an immediate intimate state of the individual. The range of human emotions is very wide. There are the simple, elementary emotions, such as those of hunger, pain, fear or thirst; there are also feelings, or social emotions — those of love and hatred, of conscientiousness, and shame, of duty and honour. There are passions (profound feelings) such as those of rage and fury, of despair and horror. All emotions and feelings can be divided into pleasant and unpleasant, the satisfying ones which bring joy and cause smiles and laughter, and the dissatisfying which bring sorrow, depression, misery, despair, and tears. The French doctor of the 16th century, Ambroise Paré noted that positive emotions are beneficial to humankind; he said that the arrival of the

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<sup>1</sup> G.W. Leibnitz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Chicago-London, 1916, p. 93.

circus is of much more benefit to the townsfolk than that of the chemist's.

A person is naturally attracted by that which he likes and tries to avoid that which is unpleasant. A true connoisseur collects pictures, coins or postage stamps not because they are valuable, but because the process of collecting them gives him genuine pleasure. People read a detective story or watch a horror film in order to stir up their emotions; they enjoy looking at fine paintings, and they mourn their departed while listening to music.

A person's emotional life is unique and infinite. It consists of innumerable feelings, moods and emotional states; there are lots of expressions in all languages to reflect this rich gamut of emotions: one can be "gnawed" by pangs of conscience or "devoured" by anxiety, one can wish the earth could swallow one up from shame, be "stricken" by horror, or "turned into stone" by fear. Love may bring joy and sorrow, happiness and despair, it may either oppress or inspire one. Dante and Pushkin, Byron and Shakespeare, Goethe and Petrarka were all inspired by love to create their immortal poems. Emotions may often be conflicting, as was told by Plutarch in one of his parables. A soldier saved the life of his king during battle and, instead of fleeing from the spot immediately, as he was advised to do by a sage, he stayed there, counting on the king's gratitude,

and that cost him his head. Sometimes emotions stir us into performing amazing deeds. Thus, the French physician Alain Bombard, moved by compassion for and wishing to help those who have been shipwrecked, crossed the ocean in an inflatable rubber dinghy without any provisions in order to prove that one can survive in an extreme situation.

The mood of an individual is his emotional background, a state of relatively insignificant strain, caused by certain life circumstances, feelings, etc. Passion is a deep and strong feeling, which someone may feel for another person, for science, art, labour or sport. We can say that the desire to score a victory can be a real passion for soldiers and political leaders, for sportsmen and scientists.

A fit of passion is a special state of the individual when he can no longer control his actions by reason. Immanuel Kant compared a fit of passion with a wild torrent of water which bursts the dam, while passion reminded him of a river which incessantly deepens its channel as it flows. Aristotle was the one who warned those who were in the habit of taking decisions when in a rage or fit of passion; he asserted that the decision made in such circumstances can hardly be expected to be correct.

Sometimes it is said that, in our "pragmatic" age, there is no place for emotions, that only ra-

tionalism is needed. Yet psychologists and physicians maintain that a person showing practically no emotional reactions cannot be regarded as mentally sound. Emotions are an inborn and constantly developing requirement. It has been established that a person's emotionally rich activity is much more successful than an activity which is dominated exclusively by cold, logical reason. Those devoid of any emotions do not arise sympathy in others. An emotional "hunger", a symbol of loneliness, despair and hopelessness, is often experienced by people lacking emotional social interactions — like, for example, winterers in the Arctic and Antarctic, the crews of atomic-powered submarines, and spacemen. There is a widely spread concept of a "dry" and rational nature of scholars, yet this concept is far from correct. "... There has never been, nor can there be, any human *search* for truth without 'human emotions'," Lenin once wrote.<sup>1</sup>

An ability to perceive beauty serves to form esthetical taste, and is a stimulus for the individual's creativity. The "poetry of scientific pursuit" generates esthetical emotions of pleasure, excitement, delight and harmony. "By its immeasurable size, infinite diversity and beauty which are shining from all sides," Immanuel

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<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, "Book Review", *Collected Works*, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, p. 260.

Kant wrote, "the Universe leaves the Spirit in speechless amazement. Yet, while the concept of that perfection excites our imagination, our mind is nevertheless plunged into ecstasy at the thought that this grandeur is the result of a single general law of the eternal and perfect order."<sup>1</sup>

## 5. Isolation and Involvement

Let us turn to still another emotional state of the individual — empathy, i. e. mentally sharing the feeling or spirit of a person or thing, appreciating perception or understanding, joining in the feelings, a sort of impersonification. To share someone's feelings means to see the world through his eyes, to feel, together with him, his anxiety or joy, to share his pain and despair. To join mentally in the life of another individual is the same as actually living in his world. Our own Ego is on the lookout for some point at which our world may come into contact with an alien Ego, thus starting a dialogue of emotions. Our life is dull if it has no emotional contacts, we feel lonely and deserted, of no use to anybody. It is really true to say that a shared joy is of double worth, and a shared sorrow is halved.

Impersonification is an indispensable element

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<sup>1</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin, 1955, p. 141.

in children's games, too: children so often pretend to be grown-ups, playing "mothers and daughters", "spacemen", etc. The role of empathy is also great in scholarly activity, since it helps scientists to "see" the situation under study from inside, as if identifying themselves with the thing or phenomenon they are engaged in studying. When a writer describes his heroes, he, as it were, lives their lives and experiences their feelings. As Gustave Flaubert recalled, he actually had the taste of arsenic in his mouth when he was writing the scene in which Emma Bovary poisons herself; he actually felt as if he, too, was poisoned. It is a well-known fact that Alexander Dumas talked with his characters: he argued with them, threatened or encouraged them, and heartily laughed at "their" witticisms.

At the same time, genuine art affects the individual only if the latter's emotions and life experience are consonant with the situation created by the imagination of the writer, artist or poet, as the case may be. The reality of art becomes in a certain sense an objective reality in the eyes of the beholder. Without this feeling, the individual cannot perceive the beautiful, nor ponder eternal human values, the sense of human existence, or the complexity of relationships between people.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were past masters in the genre of psychological portrait.



The images of historical figures they have left us are as good as alive. In "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" Marx parodied Louis Bonaparte who, having donned the mask of Napoleon thought himself to be the real Emperor. Engels, in "The Peasant War in Germany", provided comparative portrayals of two political leaders—a plebeian revolutionary, Thomas Müntzer, and the leader of the Protestant Reformation, Martin Luther.

However, the author is always a representative of the epoch he lives in, so identification of his own personality with the historical past cannot but be partial; his actions are determined by the realities of his own life. The individual is, as it were, split into two persons in the process of empathy; as he enters the body and spirit of a character from the past, he is still a subject of the present. The most important thing in this process is that, while "living in the past", the individual nevertheless assesses it from the angle of the present.

## 6. The Human Memory at Our Service

Memory is the process of remembering facts, of storing information, of recalling and re-creating personal and social experiences. It is a repository of information, where the latter is classified and reproduced. Memory is based on all kinds of

links and associations — established according to their complexity, similarity or contrast. Human memory may be short-lived (sometimes it is called a “working memory”) and long-term. People as a rule readily recall an event, fact or incident that has happened in the recent past, and have difficulty in remembering that which happened a long time ago. Our memory is selective: we like to keep in our memory things pleasant and interesting, but try to erase everything unpleasant. Memory may be in images — then it creates visual, audible and motive concepts, or it may be emotional ones — connected with re-creation and recalling of certain emotions and sensations. The memory of emotions, “of the heart”, is often stronger than one’s logical memory.

It has been established that memory is influenced by professional forms of human activity: musicians possess an excellent auditory memory, artists have a fine visual memory, philosophers easily commit to memory phrases and logical constructions, historians have a good memory for dates, tasters — for the taste and scent of things, etc.

Memory is relatively stable and is “activated” only when the need arises; it is as if there is a “feedback” connection linking the memorised images, (i. e. the known), with the “recognized”, (i. e. with an ability to commit to memory something new). The task memory faces is to repro-

duce facts and events which have been perceived some time ago; in this "reproduction", memory's blank spaces and errors are all brought to light. Memory is characterised by a paradoxical feature: if it is poor, the person's activity becomes impoverished; but if it is good the sheer volume of memorised material could cause some difficulty. Recollections link a person's past with the present. In the opinion of William James, a 19th-century psychologist, recollections are an ability to think about something experienced in the past, and about which we did not think before that moment. Recollections bring the past back to life.

Recollections may be intentional or involuntary; pleasant or unpleasant, episodic and or systematic. They may become really valuable for the individual. Thus Leo Tolstoy noted in his Diary that he enjoys his recollections not less, and sometimes even more, than he enjoyed the reality.

Why is it, then, that the human being, whose lifespan is so short, is capable of learning and memorising so much? Why is it that the individual's inner world is richer and more diversified in each new generation as compared with the previous one? This is due to the fact that the human being, because of his social nature, from his very cradle learns and commits to his memory the skills and knowledge gleaned by the past and present gener-

ations, and assimilates the culture which has been created by the entire humanity. Russian historian V. O. Kliuchevsky wrote that, though he could not say for certain what will become of humankind in a thousand years, he was firmly convinced of the fact that, if humanity is deprived of all its inherited historical experiences, it will forget everything, will lose all its knowledge and skills, and will have to begin all over again.

## 7. The Mystery of Imagination

An ability to imagine things is a gift characteristic of people. Neither everyday life nor revolutionary struggle, nor creative activity is possible without imagination. This has been noted by public figures, scholars, philosophers and poets. Karl Marx said imagination was a great gift which facilitated human kind's evolution.<sup>1</sup> It is imagination that has given birth to the universal law of gravitation, to Newton's famous Binomial Theorem, to the heart-strength love story of Tristan and Isolt, to the Marseillaise, to atomic fission and electricity, to Prince Hamlet and the theory of relativity. In fact, no activity is at all possible if imagination is lacking. The individual

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<sup>1</sup> See, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 45, Moscow, 1975, p. 261 (in Russian).

is capable of transforming the whole world in his imagination. But how is imagination aroused?

A person's creative activity is first of all manifested in practice, in his activity aimed at transforming the world, primarily through his labour. Human labour is impossible without imagination — indeed, one cannot tackle a single task without first “imagining” the expected result of that labour activity. Labour encourages human creativity, including his gift of imagination. As was mentioned earlier, primitive man was interested in a tree, a stone and a piece of metal only in so far as he could utilise these for making a bow, an axe or a primitive wooden plough. So human creative abilities, and in the first place the gift of imagination, emerged gradually, as our forebears learned to imagine the result of their future activity. The first act of humankind's creative activity was the making of labour tools.

The human imagination is boundless in nature: an artist first “paints” his picture in imagination, a producer “stages” a *mise en scène*, and an inventor “builds” a machine of the future. Imagination creates adequate images if the tasks and goals set in the activities correctly reflect reality and its development trends. In imagining the result determined by a certain requirement, a person links up in his imagination the existing things and those he is looking for, thus realising the requirements of his activity in ideal form. If,

however, imagination leads him astray from reality, substituting the imaginary for the real, the imagination may lead him to empty daydreaming.

Yet the possibilities of imagination are restricted in social terms. At each stage of historical development, humankind can only achieve definite results. Thus, though the hypothesis about the world's atomistic structure was first worded in Antiquity, it could be scientifically proved only in the 20th century. The person's imagination creates ideal images of the future he desires, and sets concrete goals for his activity.

What is the relationship between imagination and phantasy? Both these terms are often used as synonyms. Some people regard fantasy as the human ability to detach himself from reality, and others consider it to be a higher form of the imagination, characterised by vivid, unique images. Yet imagination and phantasy are of the same nature, representing different aspects of human activity. In phantasy, links between images may assume unrealistic character, and the images themselves may have no analogies in reality. On the other hand, while "breaking away" from reality, in his imagination, he still tries, in order to cognise an object, to reflect it as fully as possible, even if in a modified form. The most imaginative science-fiction writer does not take his images out of the blue; he combines and synthesises them

from certain elements existing in reality. Phantasy and reality both serve to determine the meaning of new images created by the imagination. It is as if two moments, a positive and a negative, are present in the process: the positive moment helps one to choose the correct decision from among the possible and imagined situations. And the negative moment amounts to creating unacceptable situations and unrealistic images.

It is noteworthy that sometimes science-fiction writers anticipated discoveries which were actually made many years later. It has been calculated that Jules Verne suggested over a hundred ideas altogether, and only ten of them were erroneous; out of 86 phantastic ideas formulated by Herbert Wells, only nine proved to be unrealisable. In *The Time Machine*, written in 1895, he advanced the idea that time is a relative category — exactly ten years before Albert Einstein formulated his theory of relativity. Konstantin Tsiolkovsky said that it was Jules Verne's novel about a journey to the moon, *De la terre à la lune*, that made him think about the possibility of building a space rocket. Human imagination is capable of creating fantastic images, born of fairy-tale or myth, such as those of the devil and siren, of Tom-Thumb and Cyclops, and of other well-known personages. The imagination and talent of a painter or writer enable us to see the gen-

eral and specific in one singular form, and to discover a type of people in one particular person. Thus, in ancient Greek art, Hercules symbolised physical power, Penelope matrimonial fidelity, Perseus courage, and Narcissus beauty.

The role of imagination is great indeed in our creation of images of those objects and phenomena which we have not seen in reality before. For instance, rock carvings done by primitive people, objects from their everyday life, remains of their dwellings, etc., having aroused the imagination of an historian, writer or architect, help them in their attempts to recreate the life of our ancestors. Thus imagination is indispensable for the historical sciences—palaeontology, anthropology and archaeology, where there is a need to reconstruct the past.

Imagination also creates images of the objects which exist in reality but cannot be perceived or observed because of the limitations of our sense organs. For example, people have always been interested in the Moon; however, all scientific hypotheses on the structure of this planet have only been based on the observation of the visible side of the Moon. Now that American astronauts have visited it and information is sent to us by Sputniks, mere suppositions have been replaced by genuine, trustworthy knowledge. Instruments assist us in fathoming the secrets of the



world, providing us with an opportunity to see that which we have only imagined before.

In the individual's creative activity, the imagination breaks the barriers of our limited knowledge and projects itself into the unknown. It also organises a creative search, since it helps the individual to draw on the experience and knowledge in his search of the new.

The heuristic function of imagination is manifested in visual modelling, which is often referred to as the imagination in scientific cognition. A person may substitute an imaginary model for the object under study, and project the properties established in the model onto that object (natural or social) by force of their similarity; thus new knowledge is obtained. As he models phenomena, the individual "builds a bridge", as it were, from the already formulated theory to a new one. A person can even create in his imagination models of abstract ideal objects, which are non-existent in reality but have their prototypes. Thus Galilei discovered the principle of inertia by imagining that an absolutely round heavy ball had been pushed into motion on an absolutely smooth surface. Thus, by idealisation, i. e. by mentally eliminating the friction of the moving body with the surrounding surfaces, he succeeded in formulating an important law of mechanics.

Human imagination has another specific fea-

ture, the possibility to stage a mental experiment. This method was employed by Galilei and Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and Konstantin Tsiolkovsky. The mental experiment is often called imaginary, because in its course the thinker reproduces "in his mind", in his imagination, the process of a real experiment. The imaginary experiment has certain advantages over the real one for the individual, if the experiment cannot be actually staged due to some economic, technical or other reason. It allows the scientist to investigate situations which do not occur in reality, though they are possible in principle. This kind of experiment, however, should not be regarded as absolutely trustworthy, since its results can not always be checked in real conditions.

## 8. Imagination and Reality

The main thing for the imagination is to orientate the individual towards the future. Drawing on past and present experiences, the individual in his imagination is thus able to see the future. The creative individual, whether he is a scholar, politician or artist, foresees trends in future development, while relying on the present.

Having an insight into the future, a person can, as it were, live therein. The continuity of time in creative activities means the link between

generations, cultures and traditions. The past acquires "civil rights" in architectural monuments, paintings and music, literature and the entire human culture. Thus one may enter a spiritual dialogue with the thinkers, scholars and artists; a spiritual dialogue, said Plato, can be held between oneself and one's contemporaries, as well as with those who are separated from one by time and space.

Dreams, which are a real or abstract hope for something coveted, occupy a significant place in the human life.

Dmitry Pissarev, a Russian critic of the 19th century, wrote: "If someone was completely deprived of an ability to dream..., if he were unable sometimes to anticipate events and to imagine the object, which is only beginning to take shape in his hands, in all its final, perfect beauty, then I am simply unable to conceive of an impulse that could make him undertake and bring to consummation any extensive and painstaking efforts in the sphere of art, science or practical life."

No-one can live without an imagination, because one does not just imagine his future but strives to attain it, desires it, and fears that his dreams will not come true. The realisation of a dream may turn into that individual's requirement, into his life programme. In this case, the thrust of his interests and value orientations come

to the fore. A dream may turn into a stimulus to action, an aspiration directed at attaining an ideal; it may serve a certain idea or a general human goal. Thus, since his youth and till his last breath, Maximilien Robespierre was dedicated to his dream of the Golden Age, equality and justice. A passionate, stubborn and energetic person, he tried to translate his dream into reality and gave his life in so doing.

For ages, people dreamed of a better life, of doing away with poverty and misfortunes, exploitation and human-rights deprivation. These dreams were reflected in a search of earthly paradise, of the Promised Land. Hesiod and Plato, Virgil and Ovid, Lucretius and Seneca, they all dreamed and wrote about it. Thomas More in his *Utopia*, Tommaso Campanella in his *City of the Sun*, Etienne Cabet in his *Voyage and Adventures of Lord William Garisdall in Icaria*, and Edward Bellamy in his *Looking Backward*, created, each in his own way, ideal concepts of an ideal social system.

If people were deprived of the possibility of dreaming one of the important stimuli for developing culture, art, and science would be destroyed, as would the desire to fight for a better future. But dreams should not be too far removed from reality, they must anticipate future events. In times of sharp changes in history, of social storms and revolutionary upheavals, the emerg-

ence of the new demands that people should overcome the old, both in the material and spiritual spheres. This is a condition for activating the consciousness of the popular masses, who are being drawn into the revolutionary movement, into the steadily accelerating process of social development. The imagination in its revolutionary-critical function — in its “purification” of the individual’s consciousness — plays a great role as it rejects obsolete values. The “purgatory storm” of negation is a necessary element in an individual’s creativity, since the strength of traditions, clichés and habits turn into “shackles” and “chains” for that individual; if he cannot break away from these, he will not be able to create anything new to replace the old.

The extent of the individual’s active involvement, the extent of his freedom as a manifestation of creativity is also determined by the development level of the social system within the framework of which he has to act, and by the spiritual and practical significance of social movements in which he participates. The individual’s social maturity is also measured by the scope of the tasks he tackles. The more vividly he imagines and the more resolutely he turns into reality the collective, i. e. common goals, the greater his own significance.

## 9. On Intuition

From times immemorial, intuition was regarded as the Alpha and Omega of an individual's giftedness, talent and genius, as a mark of God. Intuition is a capability of direct perception and intellectual vision — i. e. the vision of the mind. To fathom by intuition means to anticipate, guess, comprehend and see. Folks tend to say: "it dawned upon me", "the idea entered my mind", etc. As a rule, intuition is connected with the concepts of penetrating the essence of things, of simplicity, harmony, refinement, and artistic "flair". Thus Ernst Haeckel once theoretically predicted the existence of the *Pithecanthropus* (many years before Eugene Dubois actually made his discovery on the Island of Java).

There is a concept of intuition as a "demoniac" power, calling forth inspiration and creative outbursts, giving a perception of beauty and bringing a sense of delight. For example, Friedrich Nietzsche interpreted intuition as a state of inspiration. However, intuition has a real, earthly foundation to it, which, in the end, is mediated by past experiences. The suddenness of intuition is only imaginary; in fact, it is the result of the unseen work of consciousness. Indeed, the resolution of any problem comes as a result of long and painstaking work, the accumulation and sorting out of available material — the so-called

"incubation period". People, though, are not always fully aware of all this, so it seems to them that the decision just came "all of a sudden", that it "dawned upon them", that it was an un-called-for insight. The French mathematician Jules Henri Poincaré pointed out this specific feature of intuition: "What is the most amazing thing here is those moments of sudden revelation, which are in fact the signs of a previous long unconscious labour... It [the intuition] is possible and in any case productive only when, on the one hand, it is preceded, and on the other followed, by a period of conscious work."<sup>1</sup> Yet, many scientists were convinced that the solution of a problem or a brilliant idea just "descended" upon them out of the blue. Thus Charles Darwin said one day that the idea of studying the struggle for existence in Nature occurred to him of a sudden, while he was reading *An Essay on the Principle of Population* by Thomas Malthus. No doubt, the gift of intuition in many ways depends on the individual's capabilities, on an ability to combine and synthesise, and to make decisions, etc.

Sometimes sleep can play a heuristic role in an individual's creative activity. During sleep, the person's capabilities are manifested on the level of the unconscious. There are quite a few cases known in history when discoveries were made

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<sup>1</sup> H. Poincaré, *Science et Méthode*, Ernest Flammarion, Paris, 1908, pp. 53, 54.

while their authors were fast asleep. The fact is that, while the individual is immersed in an effort to resolve some problem, he mentally looks through numerous variants of a possible decision. The processes enter the innermost spheres of his psyche, and the tenseness does not lessen even when the individual is asleep. Sleep in this case interrupts the active mental activity, but does not stop it entirely. The individual is engulfed by the activity to such an extent that it goes on even when he is sound asleep. This is why he may "see" in his sleep the way a problem can be solved. When the Russian chemist Dmitri Mendeleev was asked how he made his discovery of the Periodical System (the idea actually came to him in his sleep), he gave the right answer: "Why, I have been working on it for thirty years!"

The human being is a unique phenomenon in the world of living matter. His spiritual world, his "microcosm", in which reason and emotions, needs and ideals, the ethical and the emotional are fused together into an integral whole, is unfathomable indeed. "It is not by bread alone" that man lives. The individual's spiritual life is a special sphere of his activity; it is connected with his option of life goals and ideals. Reflected in this activity are his requirements, interests and desires, his talents and moral traits as well as his involvement in social life.



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## IV. NOT AN IDEAL BUT A REAL MOTION

### 1. Without Fixing the Scale Beforehand

So we have learned that the personality is the product of a long historical development and that it is a social phenomenon; we also know that, while actively interacting with the world, the individual relies on his world outlook, realises his requirements in the course of his own activities, develops his capabilities, sharpens his memory and enriches his imagination. We also know that a world outlook does not appear of itself, that human capabilities need certain efforts to be developed, and that the memory should be specially trained. The personality does not emerge like Athena from Zeus' head; it is born in the course of activity and shaped over a long time,

in the process of personal evolution. Each age offers its own means and prescribes its own "recipes" for shaping a personality. As Charles Montesquieu wrote, "the laws of education are the first laws a person faces in his life."<sup>1</sup> We can assess the development standard of education by the general level of historical and cultural development of society, and vice versa.

Prior to analysing how the personality should be shaped, we must find out what kind of a personality do we wish to produce. Each age and each thinker have a specific ideal concept of personality. Speaking about an ideal personality thinkers of all ages have used the concepts of "harmony", "all-roundedness" and "perfection"; yet they interpreted these concepts each in his own way, sometimes filling them even with a contradictory content. The concept of a fine personality is a logical continuation of general concepts about man, his essence and place in Nature and society. This goes to explain why the thinkers of feudal society gave long lists of "virtues" indispensable for the "perfect" person, alongside detailed descriptions of the Universe and the social system. Thus, al-Farabi, a famous Moslem thinker said in his *The Book of the Ideal City, the Ignorant City, the Unrighteous City, the Altered City and the Delud-*

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<sup>1</sup> *Oeuvres complètes de Charles de Montesquieu*, Vol. I, *Esprit des lois*, Paris, J.-B. Garnery, 1820, p. 57.

*ed City* that only an ideal person, possessing at least twelve virtues, can be a ruler: he should be wise, moderate in his food, be committed to justice, have a thirst for knowledge, possess a fine memory, etc. If we recall that in medieval society man occupied a strictly fixed place in the system of social relationships, the wish to provide a detailed description of the ideal for each social group would seem quite understandable. Another thing becomes clear, too: there was no single ideal of a fine personality for the medieval "estate" society. We find the explanation of this fact in the works of thinkers of that epoch: Averroës (Ibn Rushd), for one, formulated the reason for this as follows: "it is ... impossible for one person to be distinguished in all these virtues" ...; if "every individual were (by nature) capable (of attaining) all human perfections", then he would simultaneously both serve and rule, both obey and be obeyed; thus, "nature would have done something absurd".<sup>1</sup>

The Middle Ages have gone never to return, but the image of the fine personality which that age created did not die along with it. The modern epoch "revises", as it were, in new historical conditions and tests in practice those diverse ideal images of an ideal personality which have

<sup>1</sup> *Averroës' Commentary on Plato's "Republic"*, University of Cambridge Oriented Publications, No. 1, Cambridge University Press, 1956, pp. 112-13.

been suggested by the thinkers of past ages. Which of them will suit a socialist society, we wonder; which features should be possessed by the builder of a society of the future?

Indeed, there might be a rational kernel in the idea put forward by the thinkers of the Arab East who accorded each individual a strictly definite place in society which determined his type of activity. Everyone knows that it is impossible to "embrace infinity", so already way back in the 19th century Friedrich Adolf Diesterweg, a German educationalist, asserted that to become a component part in the harmony of the Universe, a person should develop in himself only one of his qualities. "Every single person is one-sided with respect to all humankind and is meant for a one-sided development. If certain of his natural instincts are given preferential development, he will attain his predestination; he will be happy himself and will make others happy, too. If everybody becomes a complete personality of his own type, then the whole of human society will become a harmonious, perfect unity."<sup>1</sup> Many of those who wholeheartedly support scientific and technological progress today would gladly put their names to these words. The age of dilettante geniuses has gone, they would say;

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. F. W. Diesterweg, *Wegweiser zur Bildung für deutsche Lehrer*, Essen Druck und Verlag von G. D. Baedeker, 1844, p. 134.

now our ideal is the individual who is an expert in his own field of activity, in his own profession or trade.

Yet in this tempestuous age of ours, life does not only put forward ideals; it also finds time to test them in practice over a short lifespan of one or two generations. It was the "experts" who created the atom bomb, who invented sophisticated and highly "rational" means of mass destruction that were applied in concentration camps during the Second World War; it was the "experts" who thought up napalm and plastic bombs and who are today engaged in preparations for Star Wars. So it is evident that such one-sidedness, such complete dedication to a single purpose, if brought to an absolute conclusion, may prove disastrous not only for society but for the individual himself, too.

The British author G. K. Chesterton used the genre of a psychological detective story to show the utter tragedy of a man doomed to occupy "his own place", and no other. The hero of one of his stories, Warren Wind, and outstanding social reformer and philanthropist, possessed a rare gift "for being a judge of men". It would seem humanity should be infinitely grateful to him, but ... one day he was found murdered. It was found out that the three men who killed him "were the tramps that once stood before him and were dismissed rapidly right and left to one place

or another; as if for them there were no cloak of courtesy, no stages of intimacy, no free-will in friendship. And twenty years have not exhausted the indignation born of that unfathomable insult in that moment when he dared to know them at a glance..."<sup>1</sup>

If someone fully gives himself up to a single field of activity, while forgetting all about the existence of diversified, multiform human relationships and highly varied forms of activity, he may in the end exhaust his own creative potential. The complicated brain work that involves his memory and imagination, emotions and will-power needs a large range of knowledge; furthermore it requires that the individual go beyond the framework of traditional views and turn to an entirely new sphere of human activities. The more significant a scholar's results, the more courageous and revolutionary his ideas, the more extensive and diverse his interests. No matter how paradoxical the utterance by Dr. Ludwig Boltzmann, a famous physicist of the 19th century, may seem, it contains a very profound idea: "I owe all I have become to Schiller," he wrote. "If it were not for him, there could of course be a person with the same beard and the same shape of nose but it would not be me... Another man

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<sup>1</sup> G. K. Chesterton, *The Father Brown Stories. The Miracle of Moon Crescent*, Cassel and Company, Ltd., London, 1956, p. 386.

who has exerted an equally strong influence upon me is Beethoven.”<sup>1</sup>

It would seem that we should place on a pedestal the ideal, not of a person perfect in a single way, but of one who is equally capable of any kind of activity. Understandably, the historically conditioned division of labour into agricultural and industrial, into mental and physical, inevitably results in a dream about an individual who would be capable of overcoming these barriers. But as humankind advances along the road of progress, labour activities become ever more complex and diversified. The time of dilettantes, equally able to perform different jobs, is gone for ever. It is already clear now that the naïve dream about the future human being, endowed with an almost supernatural ability to engage in any kind of work, reflects an objective need for the individual to be able to freely choose for himself the sphere of application of his abilities according to his inclinations and needs. The well-known myth about someone gladly selling his very soul to the devil in exchange for superhuman power on Earth symbolises the fact that one need not and cannot naturally attain such “superknowledge” and “superskills”. In his novel *Danilov the Viola-Player*, Vladimir Orlov

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<sup>1</sup> Dr. Ludwig Boltzmann, *Populäre Schriften*, Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth, Leipzig, 1925, Vorwort, pp. V-VI.

deals with the same topic in a roundabout manner. A certain musician is endowed with a supernatural, demoniac talent and is actually a "superman", yet he gives it up for a genuinely human way of attaining perfection — by painstaking work, love and self-denial; thus he wins back his human soul.

We cannot be satisfied with an abstract ideal of the perfect individual equally capable of performing any kind of activity. By accepting that ideal, we would have to draw a clear line separating the non-ideal person of the present time from the perfect person of the future. If we did this, then present-day people would look abhorrent because of their one-sided development and lack of harmony; they would in fact be entitled to play only one role — that of caryatids who have to support the building of the future, in which other people, endowed with many gifts, will live.

But how can we attain this perfect state of human society with the imperfect, contradictory and limited people of today, people who still bear the imprint of the old division of labour? Indeed, it is nobody else but these non-ideal people of the present who are erecting the splendid building of the future, though they are full of contradictions and are apt to commit errors!

Marxism, of course, rejects both the separation of the image of a human being as he should be,



from those of us living in today's reality, and the denigration of the ideal, fine personality, which would justify all the shortcomings typical of the present-day people. The images of a perfect individual we have discussed above can be called a *static* ideal of the personality. The perfect person is regarded as a stable set of specific qualities and skills; an individual who has attained such a standard of perfection has nothing left to strive for, since he has reached his limit and can further evolve only in "quantitative terms", maintaining the achieved level of knowledge and skills. Such "perfection" is unacceptable as far as the Marxist concept of the personality is concerned, since he who has no stimulus to develop any more and he who has been hypnotised by his own accomplishments, cannot be considered a fine personality.

The ideal, as Marxism-Leninism sees it, is not an absolute goal of the evolution of the individual. In Marxism, the ideal of the individual is a *dynamic* entity, it is attained not as a result of evolution but in its course. Personality has no limit in its evolution beyond which an absolute stillness would set in; it is constantly in motion, in an absolute motion of evolution.

The ideal of a perfect, harmoniously developed individual is not an idle dream of our contemporaries who are rent by contradictions and doubts, and who are far from being ideal them-

selves; the fact is that they translate this ideal into practice in their own activities to a greater, or lesser degree. The disturbed heroes of Leo Tolstoy's works and the tragic figure of Grigory Melekhov portrayed by Mikhail Sholokhov in his *Quiet Flows the Don...* are closer to the image of the future human being than an oversimplified image of an all-knowing never-mistaken person; regrettably, it is the latter image which is sometimes taken for a Marxist concept of the ideal man.

To delve further into the depths of the Marxist approach to the ideal personality, let us recall that the human essence is defined by Marxism as the entirety of all social relationships. Yet social relationships are reflected in the life and in the spiritual world of humankind differently, since they affect different aspects of human existence. Besides, there are many contradictory and conservative trends in society itself.

The personality who has imbibed the entire wealth of social relationships and who has not only cognised society in its present state but is well aware of the trends of its development, is considered a dynamically complete, or spiritually "rich" personality. What kind of "wealth" is implied in this case? The words of Karl Marx are relevant here: "... What is wealth if not the universality of the individual's needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive forces, etc. ...? What is

wealth if not the absolute unfolding of man's creative abilities...".<sup>1</sup>

In other words, the "rich" personality is characterised by the tendency of his generic human essence to correspond to his individual existence. This kind of personality regards society's objective needs and the possibilities of its progressive evolution as his own personal needs and possibilities. The "rich" personality is aware of his present limitations and incomplete nature, and of his unlimited potential; furthermore, he is constantly striving to overcome his own incompleteness. The conclusion is that the "rich" personality is a *developing* person who always seeks self-perfection and who is never satisfied with his present condition — indeed, this dissatisfaction with himself is the law of life for him. "The *rich* human being," Marx said, "is simultaneously the human being *in need of* a totality of human manifestations of life — the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as a *need*."<sup>2</sup> So there is no strict division between the "imperfect" human being of today and the future person. The latter, of course, will differ from the in-

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1986, p. 411.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 304.

dividual who is only being born in our day, both in the scope of his knowledge, and with the standards of his physical development. But he, too, will always be characterised by a striving to develop further and to improve his talents; he will also be searching for the new and will at each given moment be aware of his imperfections and of the boundless possibilities for his future evolution.

Finally, the "rich" personality is not only striving to overcome his own faults, but also the deficiencies in social relationships, which are an objective foundation of his own development. Therefore, he is necessarily a *socially-active* person. Indeed, were not the ardent revolutionaries of the past carriers of progressive social ideas? Were they not distinguished by the wealth of their inner world and their intensive spiritual life? Each epoch advances its own heroes, revolutionaries and thinkers, all of whom may well be called *new* for their time: they are prototypes, if as yet imperfect, of future human beings. For Marxism, therefore, the perfect personality is a *historical* phenomenon.

Hence the logical conclusion: since our contemporary can be a harmoniously developed personality, the moulding of an all-round personality is not only the chief purpose of the evolution of communist society, but an indispensable condition for its development and improvement.

Marxism rejects the simplified formula, "imperfect society — imperfect people" and "perfect society — perfect people". Socialist society is being built according to a consciously-devised plan; it requires enormous effort and even sacrifices. Only those people who are totally dedicated to the common cause and who live by tomorrow rather than by the present day, can succeed in building socialism.

The new human being is only now beginning to be shaped; the needed qualities are not always accumulated in a single person. Sometimes they are "scattered", as it were, among different individuals who, as a whole, by their joint effort, translate grandiose social tasks into real life. This is nothing to be surprised at, because the ideal of communism is much broader than the scale of a single individual. The inner world of the person living in socialist society may need improvement and be full of contradictions, yet typical of him is a dissatisfaction with himself, intense mental activity, deep interest in problems of fundamental philosophical importance which he sees as his own, personal problems, and an urge to act. The shaping of a "rich" personality is a vital task today, the one not to be postponed till tomorrow. As we have undertaken to restructure all aspects of life in Soviet society, we need such people more than ever before — those who are actually ahead of the present-day standard of social develop-

ment, who are capable of foreseeing what awaits us tomorrow and of finding the shortest route to it; those who can really bridle time and spur it on!

Such a personality is not, of course, a mere totality of certain indispensable skills, behavioural patterns and "qualities". Still, a question may arise whether the characteristics of the ideal personality we have provided are not much too vague and indefinite? No one, of course, expects us to give an "inventory" of the qualities the "rich" personality should possess; nevertheless, we may still say something definite on the subject. We regard the chief "wealth" of such personalities to be their world outlook. Indeed, people's goals are born of their view of the world, of their knowledge about their own potentials, and about good and evil, beauty and ugliness. We have already learnt that the world outlook is not a code of rules of behaviour meant to be complied with at every step; rather, it is a system of principles each single individual must comprehend and assess by himself, so that afterwards he can build his whole life according to them. The world outlook principles may be the same for all members of a socialist society, but they are embodied and reflected in the life style and behaviour of each single person differently.

Take, for example, the philosophical principle of occupying a vigorous, active position in life.

Some people will realise this principle through their passionate urge for scientific knowledge, others through their artistic creativity, and still others, through their struggle against social injustice. Some people express their active approach to the surrounding world by drastically changing their own life-style, or by introducing changes into the life of their work-collective; others conceive it as introducing changes into the whole of society. A world outlook based on Marxist philosophy does not make people behave in a uniform manner, and nor does it restrict the spiritual world of individuals to copying a certain single pattern.

The perfect individual — the prototype of the future human being — is always *unique*. The hero of Stanislaw Lem's science-fiction stories, Ijon Tichy (the Quiet), one day found himself on a planet on which a vulgar concept of socialism was materialised; it was a society of interchangeable persons who were completely devoid of any individuality, a society where a primitively interpreted collectivism prevailed. Individuality was treated by members of that society as the source of all social calamities. The most cruel punishment ever imposed on a person in that society characterised by absolute social interchangeability (i. e. consisting of perfectly identical people), was the bestowing upon him the "burden of individuality for life". Members of that society

changed their social, occupational and family duties every day. If a person was a doctor today, tomorrow he would be a gardener; an official one day would become a worker the next, and so on. Nobody could master any trade or profession during so short a term, but no one could bring any serious harm either; nobody was responsible for anything or interested in making a career; nobody sought any personal gain, and nobody tried to introduce any radical social changes, because everybody knew that tomorrow they would be assigned quite different functions to perform. Members of that society knew no personal attachments, since their "family" functions also changed to crown it all, constantly; they did not even understand death. "What is death anyway?" one of the supporters of such a "collective" reasoned. "It is a loss which is tragic because it cannot be replaced. But whom does the dying person lose? Is it himself? No, because the deceased does not exist, and the one who does not exist cannot sustain any loss."<sup>1</sup>

Well, the supporter of absolute interchangeability, the society in which each member can replace any other, asserted that the state organism remains as strong as rock as a result of the eradication of the ephemeral nature of individual

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<sup>1</sup> Stanislaw Lem, *Selected Works*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1976, p. 321 (Translated into Russian).



existence. Stanislaw Lem used his gift of biting irony to show that society which ignores the individual with all his unique manifestations inevitably loses the internal stimuli for development, and that this will lead to stagnation. It is not by chance that in Soviet society the greater emphasis is laid on the activation of the human factor, which is seen as one of the most important conditions for restructuring all aspects of social life with the purpose of accelerating the socio-economic development.

How does the personality emerge? Which conditions would be conducive to the formation of the personality? The Marxist is not satisfied either with subjective-idealist ideas about the personality being shaped "from the inside" through self-education alone, nor with the idea of the individual's lack of personal independence or incapacity for participating in shaping his own personality. The Marxist cannot recognise the third way of shaping the personality either—that of society providing everyone with an ideal model to imitate ... so that, as soon as someone realises what is expected of him, he must embark on the road of self-improvement in conformity with that model.

Contemporary non-Marxist philosophy suggests that the individual is rather apt to imitate such a model unconsciously, not in a rational way. The positive image falls into a multitude of

particular models of behaviour and life styles, beginning with moral norms and ending with a prestigious car. The Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset wrote in *La rebelión de las masas* (The Rebellion of the Masses) that most people are not able to meditate, that the masses are as a rule striving to passively imitate some model or other. Education is thus reduced to a kind of hypnosis and manipulation with the individual.

Marxism sees the process of moulding personality as one of the aspects of a more general problem of interrelationships between the individual and society. It presupposes, not that the individual will passively assimilate the ideas, standards and rules offered to him; rather, that he will master all the treasures of culture in the course of his activity. Human activity is multifarious, it includes fathoming the secrets of Nature, penetrating the most intimate corners of the human soul, and sharing the sufferings and joys of others. People stubbornly try to master the cultural wealth accumulated by humanity, they create some things and destroy others, they learn and play games, meditate and dream...

Let us consider the main types of human activity and see how — as they work, play, admire objects of art or acquire knowledge — people turn into personalities, thus becoming genuine representatives of the human race.

## 2. In the Beginning Was ... a Deed

We all know that labour activity was the real source of the emergence of humankind, because it is in labour that human consciousness is shaped, and human capabilities and requirements are developed. And it is in labour as a collective activity that human ethical traits are moulded, as well as philosophical views and aesthetic emotions.

The conclusion comes of itself: if labour has actually "created" humankind, bringing humanity out of the animal kingdom, then, evidently, it will also help create the new and perfect human being, the one who will build our future society. The only thing we have to do in this situation is to find the concrete type of labour activity which will become a "workshop" for moulding that new and perfect individual.

Is it the labour of a handicraftsman, requiring a great deal of imagination, fantasy, artistic flair and skill in performing many diverse operations? Every thing made by a handicraftsman bears an imprint of his personality, because he puts into it all his knowledge and skill, and in making it, he fully manifests himself as a personality. But modern production is of an industrial nature and there is no place in it for the individual handicraftsman. Could a man, brought up in the handicraft traditions, fit into modern production? Hard-

ly and finally, while the craftsman, in "making things", relies on his experience and common sense, drawing on the professional secrets passed on to him by his forefathers, the most important aspect of modern production and of social life as a whole is a wide-scale application of scientific knowledge. It is quite clear, therefore, that personalities shaped under conditions of individual labour activity will find it difficult to apply their fantasy, imagination and know-how in social production.

Is it agricultural labour, then, that may provide condition for moulding the perfect personality? It brings people into a direct contact with Nature, and this makes them aware of being a part of the real world, and endows them with a real sense of beauty. It is no secret, though, that up to the present day, agricultural labour is one of the most arduous and monotonous types of labour, so that the sense of harmony with Nature is more easily experienced by a towns dweller who observes this labour, as it were, "from the sidewalk".

It is clear that the hopes placed in handicrafts and agricultural labour are utopian. Still, in the West, attempts are sometimes made today to translate this Utopia into life via so-called "alternative programmes". The ideal of supporters of the "alternative" way of life is to live in a small commune, bring up their children together, work

together, spend their free time together, and live by the fruits of their own labour. But life itself belies the hopes of making such labour and such a life-style prevalent. The greater part of the communes existing in the West belong not to the sphere of production, where modern machinery holds sway, but to the services sphere. Besides, most of these "programmes" do not recoup themselves, but live on donations and their members' private incomes. In the FRG, for example, only one quarter of the commune members exist on the means of the communes themselves, the remaining three-quarters drawing on social assistance. Indeed, vegetable-growing or knitting sweaters and caps, or repairing home appliances can hardly be regarded as a universal recipe for moulding the perfect person, possessing a wide range of interests, a powerful creative potential, a fine artistic flair, and so on.

Well, it seems we must rely on modern industrial labour with its collective nature, broad scale, wide use of scientific advances, and division of labour. Industrial labour is a social type of labour. As it resolves the contradiction between the social character of labour and the private form of appropriation of the goods produced, socialism seems to turn industrial labour into the "cradle", out of which the new, harmoniously developed individual emerges. It is a type of labour that brings people together into a single

whole, it requires the activation of all our creative powers, and each element of it is part of the magnificent whole. The conclusion is readily arrived at: if the human essence is a totality of social relationships, and social relationships take shape under socialism in the conditions of free, advanced, scientifically-organised and creative labour then under socialism, each single individual, taking part in labour activities, must bear an imprint of overall social perfection. However, by drawing such a conclusion, we would commit a grave theoretical mistake.

Let us recall that the process of moulding the personality is that of *appropriating* by a person of the human essence in individualised form. Human essence does not emerge as soon as the individual arrives into the world; it exists as a possibility for him to acquire. The "appropriation" of social relationships by the individual takes place in the course of his activity. But even individual activity, that is, labour in which the worker of a modern industrial enterprise participates, does not automatically turn him into a fine personality. The actual place the worker occupies, say, at a conveyor belt, performing monotonous operations, does not always make him aware of the general picture of labour activities. That is to say, modern production and today's labour, with its typical narrow specialisation and co-operative divisions of labour does not only create prerequi-

sites for shaping the new man, but also mounts barriers in the way of this process.

While in theory identifying the human essence with a concrete individual and not fully realising that labour today is highly specialised and that it considerably restricts the creative powers of each and every worker, we may fall into a practical error as well, by placing the entire responsibility for the education of the new person on a concrete process of labour activity. Marx foresaw the possibility of such a "utopian" approach to the shaping of the new human being. He wrote that the "universality" of economic links in the society of his day did not make a universal person out of each individual. The factory only created "the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual".<sup>1</sup> Even labour equipped with the most up-to-date technology does not automatically render its universality to all its rank-and-file participants, who are all performing their own immediate professional duties.

The recipes for a "humanisation of labour" widely current in the West and concerned with improving labour conditions and making it more outwardly attractive for the worker in aesthetical terms, thus creating new stimuli to work, do not

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "The Poverty of Philosophy", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Moscow, 1976, p. 190.

resolve the problem either. The main thrust of labour humanisation concepts is to eliminate a person's desire to change the very essence of labour activities, labour conditions and the social meaning of labour. For the development of the individual, an absolute satisfaction with his work has negative results and this has been pointed out by Albert Schweitzer: "The normal sense of personal satisfaction, born of labour to which someone has devoted all his skill and his very soul, is replaced by a conceit which prevents him from seeing the general imperfection behind a screen of the perfection of just one part".<sup>1</sup> So it may be asserted that dissatisfaction with one's own labour and inadequate opportunities offered for creative endeavour can serve as a criterion for the maturity and perfection of the personality.

Labour in its historically-concrete manifestations is not the main form of human self-expression; it is an "extraneous necessity". Anton Makarenko, the famous Soviet pedagogue, wrote: "You can make a person work as much as you like, but if at the same time you do not educate him in social and political life, this labour will be just a neutral process which will not bring any positive results". As distinct from free activity, Marx noted, labour is "dominated by the

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<sup>1</sup> Albert Schweitzer, *Kultur und Ethik*, Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 1960, p. 27.



pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty".<sup>1</sup>

The process of education and self-education is necessary precisely because labour does not automatically make each Soviet person a perfect individual. The purpose of education is to help people to see in today's labour the image of a future of free and creative activities, and to bring that future closer, if but by a little.

Our Soviet country is now going through a specific period, oriented not to introducing partial economic improvements, but to changing the overall system of economic management; accordingly, the issue of the personality—the subject of *perestroika* and the chief goal of all social transformations—moves to the foreground.

The chief goal of the restructuring of the Soviet economy is to make the worker a genuine, and not only a nominal, master of the means of production, to teach him not only to bear full responsibility for the products of his labour, but to struggle to make labour more interesting and creative. Our complicated epoch which is characterised by unflagging efforts to fight the old, the period of general dissatisfaction with the state of our production, will be a better teacher for all

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, *Theories of Surplus-Value*, Part III, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978, p. 257.

of us than whole decades of self-complacency and stagnation.

### 3. To Live a Dozen Lives...

One of the means to bring out universal social relationships hidden in labour is games of all types. Labour always implies that its subject is aware of the end and the means to achieve it, and that his performance is controlled so as to comply with a planned result; in the game however, person seems to enjoy complete freedom. Labour is purposeful, while games are not oriented towards any special purpose; labour is an activity performed in conformity with certain normatives, models and standards, while the game is a means aimed at "shaking" all kinds of standards; labour is socially useful, but games, at first glance, are of no use whatever.

Games in which the pressure of extraneous necessity is lifted off a person, give free rein to his imagination and allows him to become whatever he likes — of course, only for the duration of that game. In games one may liken oneself to a tree or a bird, a cloud or a wind. For a certain time, one can "become" a great artist or a famous soldier, a thinker or even a head of state. Is it not the prototype of a personality that is capable of taking a universal view of the world, of performing any kind of creative endeavour, of penetrating

the essence of things and the human soul, and of ignoring his own selfish interests?

The answer can be both Yes and No. Yes — because while playing a part in a game a person vividly senses his consciousness to be open for an infinite number of opportunities, and feels himself capable of living a dozen different lives. And No — because while “turning”, say, into a great artist, a person cannot at once acquire the artist’s talents and skills, so he will only be playing the part of an artist; in fact, he can only become a “would-be” artist, a “would-be” scholar, a “would-be” politician. A “rich”, harmoniously developed individual perseveringly pondering over the solution to a complicated scientific problem, not only plays; working persistently, he acquires ever new knowledge. He is not only *Homo ludens*, but *Homo sapiens* and *Homo faber* as well. Human activity has, as it were, two aspects to it: it can be taken seriously or jokingly, i. e. it can be performed just for the pleasure derived from the very process. In the former case, the person concerned is occupied by work, communication and acquiring knowledge; in the latter, he only prolongs his lifetime in a game. He feels himself capable of taking sides with his opponent in a scholarly debate, to be both the hunter and the hunted, the actor and the spectator, like, for example, it is described in the story written by Julio Cortazar, “Instructions for John Howell”. Be-

cause of his ability to play games, a person can feel his connection with everything that surrounds him — with Nature, and with his kin. It is this gift that assists people to abide by the golden rule of ethics: don't do to others what you would not like to be done to yourself. The individual's ability to adopt a point of view different from his own helps a person in resolving scientific problems, in finding a common language with representatives of other cultures and other social strata.

So we can see that certain components which are indispensable for labour activity can be found in games, and vice versa. Labour and games are two mutually complementing spheres of activity. And it is quite understandable. Indeed, games emerge in the process of the "exchange of matter" between society and Nature, in the process of labour. Games in the full meaning of the word are born of labour. While playing and performing outwardly purposeless actions, our ancestors trained their capabilities, maintained their physical fitness, and put themselves to the test; they modelled various possible situations, and thus trained for the forthcoming hunt or war. After the hunt they once again reproduced the successive actions they had therein performed and made, in the form of a game, an analysis of the hunt and of their own performance in it, so confirming their successful moves.

Our children, who are no doubt quite up-to-date creatures, also like to play games in which they imitate the life of the grown-ups and anticipate some of their future activities. Thus, girls love to play Mothers and Daughters, and boys, on their part, like to make believe they perform heroic deeds in a "warfare", discover new lands, steer a plane or a spaceship, and so on.

Thus we can see that games are a necessary aspect of training for a life of labour; games were a part of work during the childhood of humanity, and they are a part of work in the childhood of each particular individual. The "grown-up" world, however, in facing production problems, does not turn today to games so as to tackle them, because it has at its disposal much more sophisticated means of labour training. The modern world has established a kind of "Society for the Prevention of Fantasy" — or so the American science-fiction writer Ray Bradbury says in metaphorical form in his story "Usher II". But the suppressed desire to engage in free games and fantasy can become a destructive force when breaking out of control. A society which has driven away from its life everything "irrational", collapses under its own onslaught; this is what happened to the members of the "society for the prevention of fantasy", who perished together with the castle built by an eccentric as an exact copy of the House of Usher from the

famous story by Edgar Allan Poe, "The Fall of the House of Usher". Not wishing to know anything about the unbridled play of imagination of the "banned" writer, they entered the House of Usher which was to collapse in conformity with the writer's logic, and ... it really did collapse.

But how can one dispense with the "seriousness" of everyday life and revive the lost capability of living through a dozen different lives? How can one return to the syncretism of games and labour? The way out seems to be clearly indicated — one should turn back to one's own childhood; there we would find everything we have lost — a free play of imagination, unbridled phantasy, and unfettered flourishing of creativity. Such travel to the land of childhood would enable us to cast away our "grown-up" notions and concepts, and to see the world as it is, i. e., through the eyes of a child. By preserving the precious material of our childhood, we shall, as it were, inject the principle of emotional creativity into our rationalised culture.

But can we, grown-up people, become children again, even for a short time? To answer this question, let us see what games do children play and why, and what games are needed by us grown-ups.

Children's games are extremely diverse. Now the child is busy breaking a beautiful, brightly painted toy and getting complete satisfaction

from this action; and now, having grabbed a paintbrush and paints, he is painting a piece of paper with colourful splotches and daubs; a child can be screaming out, hours on end, senseless word combinations, and then, all of a sudden, stop short in an absurd pose and, if asked by a grown-up what does it mean, say that he is a bird, or a house.... There are different kinds of games, too, which have a clearly-cut plan and strictly defined parts: they are usually played by children of an older age. There are also sports games, and those reminding one of a ritual, played in accordance with strict rules. All of these games have one element in common — none of them produces any tangible “product” or result; it is from the game itself, the process, that the child derives pleasure.

But what makes the child spend all his time playing games, and why is it that grown-ups have to be “taken back” to the world of games? There is a simple, but erroneous answer: there is a certain “theatrical” instinct, a passion for imitation in all people, which is vividly manifest in their childhood but is later suppressed by a wrong upbringing and socially-restricted activities. Here, we are again faced with a theory which holds that the human essence is inborn.

Great hopes were placed in the educational potential of games in the first few decades of Soviet power in our country. The discovery of the

“theatrical” instinct was likened to the discovery of a new kind of energy. Educators tried to introduce children into the world of harmony, beauty and orderliness with the assistance of dramatised games, based on the child’s innate urge to imitate. It was expected that in the real world, too, the individual brought up in this way, by force of his developed gift of imitation, would aspire to harmony and order. This was yet another universal, and therefore Utopian, way to create the new individual by following old anthropological recipes.

In order to understand the role of games and the approach to real things, people and ideas they instill, let us try to penetrate the world of a child, the world of his emerging requirements. Having a close look at the games we can see that there is no such thing as a game “in general”: there are only different types of game. Sometimes we use this term to denote a mere requirement of physical exercise, of mobile activities—such a kind of game is limited by the organism’s physical possibilities and could hardly become a foundation for “universal” human development. We also regard as games certain simple manipulations, when the child, as it were, takes stock of objects, tasting them, sniffing at them, or trying to break them or change their form. The child manipulates in just the same way with his voice, as if “trying it out”, without any definite pur-



pose. At the earliest stages of development, games are the chief teachers for the child. We can also mention imitative games, in which children simulate phenomena that have struck their imagination. Such modelling helps the child to cognise the object he tries to imitate. There are also more complicated games, so-called "artistic" games, or games played strictly in accordance with certain "rules". The world in itself does not yet exist for a child, it's out of his reach; it seems to be existing only through people. A grown-up person in the child's mind is a "ruler of things", so the chief motive behind the child's actions and the chief way of "appropriating" the surrounding world is "to become like a grown-up".

The child would not have the courage to undertake any action, were not humankind and the world merged into a single unity in his imagination; there would be no "I myself", no children's egocentrism, which trouble the parents so much. "To be like a grown-up" in a game, to imitate actions of the grown-ups is not just a waste of creative effort, but a purposeful activity in the child's eyes. It contains elements of certain magical notions, such as, for instance: "While imitating some aspects of the behaviour of grown-up people, I myself become part of the grown-up world, so things must obey me, too." In the course of games, which seem so phantastic and naïve to us grown-ups, the child gets his primary

bearings in the social norms which regulate the life of the grown-ups. To become like a grown-up, the child must learn to reproduce certain typical and constantly repeated details, characterising the life of grown-up people.

Consequently, the game is an initial stage of the individual's joining in the life of society. Gradually, as he comes into intensive contacts with the surrounding world, the child sheds his individual naïve notions about the anthropomorphism of the world around him, and games are replaced by educational and socially-useful activities. Thus the game is not actually an absolutely free creative activity for the child, or a "play of his essential powers"; it is rather a point of departure for the socialisation of the little person, for the formation of the requirement of "appropriating" by the individual of his social essence, though not yet a mature manifestation of that essence. Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky often said that the child's power of phantasy is poor. He engages in phantasy because his knowledge is limited. As he masters his native tongue, discovers how to control his own body, and learns basic social norms, a teenager passes from the sphere of games into that of productive activity. Therefore it is futile to look for a way to create a harmoniously developed individual in one's childhood; indeed, the child's play is only a way for him to join our

grown-up world, not a form of going away from it.

What place do games occupy in the world of the grown-ups? Of course, grown-up people also play games of their own, which have the function of filling up their free time and improving their health—sports games, for example. There are other kinds of games, too. Sometimes man puts on a social “mask” and acquires a “strange face”, as it was depicted in a novel by Kobo Abe, striving to achieve success in the world of business. In doing so, man “adopts” the “rules” of the game in which a career, money and success are at stake. We have already mentioned this kind of game as a form of self-alienation of the individual.

Thus, on the one hand, the game is a free, creative activity which complements labour performed under the pressure of extraneous necessity. On the other hand, the games of the grown-ups are sometimes a far cry from such kinds of activity.

The fact is that the game is an extremely complicated and contradictory phenomenon, so its thoughtless application may even produce a result opposite to what had been expected. Different kinds of games are based on their different aspects. There are always two moments and two motives present in a game: either to be absolutely carried away, to have a sense of absolute freedom

and complete spontaneity; or to be ready to strictly abide by the game's rules, even if they are quite absurd and arbitrary, i. e. "absolute non-freedom".

Absolutisation of the normative aspect may lead to passiveness and pessimism, while absolutisation of the spontaneity may cause extreme subjectivism, voluntarism and even amoral behaviour. Let us once more turn to William Golding's *Lord of the Flies*. The first sensation in children who found themselves on a desert island, was that of freedom and the possibility to play any game they liked for as long as they liked. The dual (normative and spontaneous) nature of the game as such suddenly materialised in the behaviour of two groups of children. For the first group, the game took the form of accurately and tediously complying with rules, such as were adopted in the grown-up world: to maintain fire, take care of the younger children, and preserve the social hierarchy of the grown-ups. For the other group, the game turned into a violation of all bans and rules accepted among the grown-ups. As a result, the small community faced the threat—and quite a real one at that—of self-destruction. The author attempted to show that the game, and in particular the game not guided by reason and not prevailed by the sense of duty, cannot become the foundation for the life of a genuinely free person.

Let us venture a paradox: the more mature in age the individual, the more serious are his "toys". When a child, the individual plays with objects surrounding him; as he grows up, he can turn the entire human culture into a playground for himself. Moral and esthetic values, good and evil, justice, truth and beauty, happiness and conscience — all knowledge he has obtained, all values and norms may become a plaything in such a game. The greater the temptation, though, the more terrifying the dangers awaiting the individual on this road. While trying to turn the most precious things and his whole life into a game, a person may suddenly find out that his whole life has become a game.

The individual carried away by a game confronts two kinds of danger: the first is that he may completely lose the sense of reality. Legend holds it that one day Chinese philosopher Chuang-tzu had a dream that he was a butterfly. Suddenly awakened, he could not immediately understand who he was: Chuang-tzu who had dreamed that he was a butterfly, or the butterfly who was dreaming of being Chuang-tzu.

In a short essay, "Everything and Nothing", by a contemporary Argentinian author Jorge Luis Borges, there is the image of a "playing man" portrayed as related to the "playing" Universe embodied in the image of God. People, says Borges, witness a natural and logical result of the

world view of he who sees the game as the meaning of his very existence: If I am capable of being everybody and nobody at the same time, why does the surrounding world seem stable and motionless? After all, in the "playing" Universe, my possibilities in the game will become infinite.

Yet such an extension of the "play ground" leads to the individual's losing his foothold in the world and, in fact, his own individuality; it deprives him of an opportunity to engage in any real activity and turns the game itself into a senseless pursuit. In Borges's story, William Shakespeare says as he stands before God: "I who has been so many people, now only wish to become a single man—myself". And the voice of God answered him out of the storm: "I am not myself either; I have thought up this world, much the same way as you have created your images, Oh Shakespeare, one of the ghosts of my dreams—you are like me indeed, who is everybody and nobody".<sup>1</sup>

Another danger stems from the vagueness of the border between game and life. If there are no criteria to separate imagined things from reality, then any old idea, even the most monstrous one, can become a reality. Julio Cortazar, another Argentinian author, in his story "The Continuity

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<sup>1</sup> Jorge Luis Borges, *El hacedor*, El Libro de Bolsillo, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1960, p. 61.

of the Parks", depicts a man sitting comfortably in a green velvet armchair, immersed in reading a novel in which lovers are planning to kill a third person. Here is how the story ends: "The lover went up the three steps of the porch and entered the house ... a knife in his hand, he opened the door of the study and saw the high back of the green velvet armchair, outlined against the dim light coming in from the window, and the head of a man sitting in the armchair and reading a novel."<sup>1</sup> Thus an imaginary situation has become a real one: the man sitting in the armchair is the hero of Cortazar's story, and his murderer is the hero of the novel he is reading.

Playing around with cultural values is playing on knife edge, playing with one's own human essence. The individual who is deprived of moral principles easily passes from the game as a spontaneous, creative and absolutely free process, to the game as a strict set of rules, the game as a ritual, dominating his whole life.

Should one refuse to take part in this sort of game which is full of danger? Here is an excerpt from the Holy Bible: "To son or wife, to brother or friend, do not give power over yourself, as long as you live; ... While you are still alive and have breath in you, do not let any one take your

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<sup>1</sup> Julio Cortazar, *Antologia*, EDHASA, Barcelona, 1978, p. 119.

place.”<sup>1</sup> Yet people are constantly putting themselves in another’s place as they commiserate, sympathise with somebody, share their emotions, learn and perform various actions. Marx wrote: “...man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species, and knows how to apply everywhere the inherent standard to the object”.<sup>2</sup>

To remain oneself and to become everybody else, “to be” and “to seem to be” are actually two aspects of the genuinely human attitude to the world. The balance between these two aspects of a world outlook is embodied in the specific esthetical mastering of the world which is most vividly manifested in art. It is precisely art that allows one to “try out” numerous roles, to have an insight into the future world and to look deep into the past; in so doing, one does not destroy one’s own inner world but, on the contrary, one develops and improves it.

#### 4. Development of Emotions

Art plays a great part in our “appropriation” of our own generic essence. In the most general form, art is one of the mediators between society

<sup>1</sup> *The Holy Bible*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1973, Sirach, 33, 19-21, p. 171.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844”, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1975, p. 277.



and the individual, assisting the latter to imbibe, comprehend and master the entire wealth of the world around him. This is the way art fulfils its chief function—by the “humanisation” of the surrounding world, to enrich people, to make them more humane. It is not by accident that Marx regarded art as a “practical-intellectual” type of activity,<sup>1</sup> aimed at spiritually assimilating this world and transforming it to conform with human requirements.

What are the means art employs to resolve the task of developing and enriching our spiritual world? Two trends have always been at loggerheads in interpreting art’s educational impact on humankind. One is the long-existing tradition to regard art as a definite form of cognising the world around us, as an encyclopaedia, a textbook of life. Art and science differ only in the means of cognition each of them applies: while the scientist proves, the artist just shows things and phenomena.... Of course, such a view of art is too narrow and may amount to a simplistic and distorted interpretation of art’s educational function. One-sided gnoseologism in interpreting art is alien to Marxism. Here is how Engels described his impressions from contemplating mon-

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<sup>1</sup> See: Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1857-58”, in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 28, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 38.

uments of architecture: "I passed through the echoing Gothic vaulted gateway and stood before the church. Greek architecture is clear, gay consciousness; Moorish is mourning; Gothic is holy ecstasy. Greek architecture is bright, sunny day; Moorish is star-spangled dusk; Gothic is dawn."<sup>1</sup> At times, an object of art may not contain any direct information about the world; it may just influence someone's mood.

Karl Marx wrote that it is impossible to explain the unfading charm of Ancient Greek art by its educational values alone: "An adult cannot become a child again, without becoming childish. But does the naïveté of the child not give him pleasure, and does not he himself endeavour to reproduce the child's veracity on a higher level? ... Why should not the historical childhood of humanity, where it attained its most beautiful form, exert an eternal charm because it is a stage that will never recur?"<sup>2</sup>

But can we assert that art simply reflects the artist's innermost moods and passes them over to the spectators? This point of view has many supporters. The view of art as just a *depiction* of reality essentially restricts its educational impact,

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Engels, "Siegfried's Native Town", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 2, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 133.

<sup>2</sup> Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, p. 217.

according it from the very start a secondary role in moulding personality. The concept of art as an *expression* of our inner emotions is no less one-sided: indeed, reflecting our innermost feelings without balancing them by our thoughts may be fraught with the threat of turning into a means of imposing ideas.

Certain non-Marxist conceptions of our day rely on concepts which reduce the total content of artistic works to reflecting people's emotional states at different moments. This idea finds its most complete expression in *emotivism*.

The mechanism of art's emotional impact on humankind may be described as a reflection in a specific form, *not of the world as it is, but of the complex interrelationships of humankind with the surrounding reality*. Art not only moves one to the quick; it causes an emotional reaction in one because what is portrayed in an artistic work concerns one deeply and is readily comprehensible. Art vividly models situations in which people can at any moment find themselves in real life. It would seem that such a nature of art's influence should restrict its educational function to "consolidating knowledge by repetition". In this case emotions called forth in a person by a work of art would not in any way differ from those he actually experiences in reality.

But art's impact on people, their spiritual world, emotions and mind is not to be reduced to

a simple doubling-up of ordinary human emotions: it does not only awaken, but transforms and develops them. To teach a person to feel is the most difficult educational task. People approach many phenomena in the surrounding world with a predetermined emotional assessment. Art enables them to admire themselves in their interaction with Nature, making the whole Universe a huge mirror in which their own emotions are reflected. Thus art helps people to enter into emotional contacts with the entire world. Art knows no bounds, so any phenomenon or event can become an object of artistic rendering.

The paradox of infecting others with emotions, and the educational mechanism of the art's impact on humanity consists of a conflict between a strong emotion and its *immaterial nature*. The fact is that emotions reflect not fragments of reality itself, but its human significance. The object of an emotional attitude goes, as it were, beyond the framework of a person's everyday interests even though they are the groundwork for his emotions.

Art does not require that its images be taken for reality. The spectator, as he perceives an object of art, realises at the same time that his feelings, which are usually aroused as a reaction to a complicated real-life situation, are in this particular case directed at thought-up images or events. Here it is relevant to mention that there

are no emotions that arise of themselves, that are not connected with human concerns, desires, and goals. Emotions are one of the most important elements of a person's psychic activity, an assessment of vitally important phenomena and events. "The specific nature of emotions," wrote Alexei Leontiev, a Soviet psychologist, "is that they reflect relationships between the motives (requirements) and the success or the possibility of successfully realising the corresponding activity of the subject." Why, then, can someone live through the lives of imaginary characters and be concerned with their fate? Is it not because the lives of these characters, their joys and sorrows, and their emotions, are very much like our own? Why is one moved by the fate of one's ancestors and descendants, and why is one worried about the life of animals and plants? Is it not because he feels himself to be a particle of a complex social and biological whole?

In other words, art's emotional impact is manifested in the fact that people begin to critically view themselves and their activities, and this, in turn, stimulates their search for an activity which would correspond to their "developed" feelings. Therefore there is no contradiction in the assertions that art serves to develop emotions and at the same time facilitates the formation and development of all aspects of human activities and orients people to new goals.

Through the mechanism of emotions, art helps people to discover those sides of their own activity that have been hidden from them before, and to plan their further actions. Art shows us that each is an indivisible part of the surrounding world. This, in turn, demands of all that they understand their requirements, goals and ideals, i. e. their overall attitude to the world. In other words, art raises people above their everyday existence and makes them face socio-historical realities, thus raising them to the level of interpreting reality in philosophical terms. So art is in fact a mediator between people's everyday existence and their socio-historical existence.

While considering art's creative power and its diverse functions, we should not forget, though, that art itself does not give us any complete knowledge of our social essence, and does not reveal the content of our links with the world. To clarify our attitudes to the world, it is not enough for us to feel ourselves a part of it and to be aware of the wealth of opportunities at our disposal, our *universality*. Indeed, the universality of human practice is not given to us directly, but requires an effort of all our capabilities, our use of the total wealth of our accumulated knowledge, cultured emotions and cultured thinking.

For all the reasons mentioned above, art cannot resolve all tasks involved in an individual's spiritual development. It can only help us to de-

velop our ability to coordinate reality and our own requirements, to see the greatness and beauty of humankind in everyday, insignificant things, and to discern its essence behind a multitude of various phenomena. Art's impact does not make us at once ready to engage in this or that specific activity. While not turning into a means of mass hypnosis, genuine art educates, and prepares us for engaging in social activities in general.

The education of human emotions through art, however, facilitates our realisation of our predestination, only if art is not the only means of influence; otherwise, the *immaterial nature* of those artistic emotions which are not followed by meditations, can lead to a reduction of the contents of actual human activities, and a shift of the individual's interests towards the world of illusions.

Why, then are ordinary human emotions and those called forth by artistic works often regarded as opposite? Can it be that ordinary human emotions and those of a spectator in the theatre are totally opposite? From this point of view, art does not serve to connect us with reality; on the contrary, it turns ordinary human emotions into steps of a staircase leading us into the kingdom of *disinterested delight*.

Let us recall that the "disinterestedness" of esthetic attitudes towards the world is just one particular form of a manifestation of general human

interest. "Disinterested" delight in art does not mean a rift with all human emotions and hence with human requirements and desires. The tears a theatre spectator sheds are not false; they come of quite real emotions. Esthetical emotions are the same human emotions, only "transformed". Here we have expanded and deepened feelings, their creative restructuring, emotions which accompany the emergence of personality, emotions which take a person out of the narrow-individual world into the social world. As distinct from common, everyday emotions, esthetical emotions presuppose a person to be aware of the scale of the object that has raised his feelings. So, essentially, he feels delight in his capability to take to heart not only things which affect his individual interests, but also those which concern general human interests. Thus, the sense of horror turns into a tragic view of the world in general; simple compassion and commiseration turn into a sense of being a part of everything alive; fear, astonishment and worship are transformed into a realisation of the greatness of current events, etc. So the process of developing emotions with the help of art, and art's carrying out its educational function prove to be important aspects and necessary stages of another, and more general task of art—that of shaping our view of the world.

When coming into contact with great works of art, people do not simply solve the problems of



"humankind and Nature", of "the individual and society", or of "the individual and the collective"; they ponder over the relationship between themselves and Nature, over what characterises them personally as members of the collective and as people in general. So they, as it were, constantly assess themselves from the social angle, and compare their own requirements with those of society. Art cannot replace a scientific, philosophical cognition of the world; on the contrary, it stimulates thinking. People's awareness of their live links with the world and the wealth of their cognitive and practical-transformative possibilities assist them in realising these possibilities.

Thus, we can see that art is not an external form which helps individuals to acquire a certain sum of general scientific-philosophical propositions, nor is it an integument or scaffolding which can be cast away as soon as the whole building of an ideological system has been erected. As Victor Shklovsky, an outstanding Soviet writer and literary theorist, aptly put it, art is a kind of a bow-string which ties up together two opposites—humankind and the surrounding world. The sense of their kinship with the world and at the same time of their alienation from it generates in people a striving to overcome their isolation, and this makes them set themselves concrete social tasks.

Delighting in great creations of art, people feel

themselves to be free, powerful and universal creatures only for a moment: art is but a "promise of joy", only a dream about freedom, only its image and not that genuine freedom which can be attained only as a result of socio-transformative activities. Sometimes the sense of unbounded opportunities, freedom and infinite creative potential rendered by art is taken for a person's genuine universality. In this case, art is understood as the chief means of providing an integral and harmonious development of a personality. But herein, a range of dangers awaits us. Nikolai Pirogov, a famous Russian surgeon, scientist and pedagogue, wrote: "Immoderate and uncontrolled communication with art, and in particular with theatrical art, may promote in children and teenagers conceit, vanity, and a striving 'to seem to be' rather than 'to be'."

Opinion is often voiced that art creates a kind of "second reality". For the unprepared individual, however, this second reality of art may replace, by force of its attraction, actual reality. Therefore, we must emphasise that the world of artistic images, or the "second reality", is not a goal in itself, but only a means to reveal new aspects and facets of objective reality.

Art's impact is indivisible from ideological and ethical education, from the entire complicated process of assimilating all the wealth of human culture. It enables the individual to take close to

heart and be personally concerned with historical and current events, to correlate his own requirements, goals and ideals with the ideals of humanity as a whole. While shaping a person's ethical attitude towards reality, art at the same time is shaping an "individual layer" of the world outlook, and this layer is in constant interaction with its ethical, scientific-philosophical and socio-political aspects. It is not to say, though, that art brings people immediately to a philosophical frame of mind.

Today, it is essential to take account of the close interaction between artistic creativity and a philosophical view of the world. Modern art in its best manifestations is ever more *saturated with ideology*, though this by no means testifies to the fact that it has lost its specific nature. On the contrary, human attitudes to the world in all their complexity and contradictoriness are the chief object of artistic creativity. Problems concerned with examining human nature and human relationships with the surrounding world have always been central in artistic creative endeavour, as well as in philosophical concepts, though specific accents were made and, besides, they were treated differently in different epochs. Closeness between objects of artistic and philosophical cognition is in our days the basis of their constant interaction. The scale of social events and the impact science exerts over all spheres of life make

the artist turn more and more to philosophical problems. Yet this does not mean that art should turn into a text-book of philosophy, because didactics are alien to it.

Close *interaction between philosophy and art* reveals itself in various ways, but art's primary purpose is to facilitate the human spirit in developing a person's philosophy. The best literary works typify such kind of art. As distinct from philosophy, art shows not the result of the process, rather the process itself, the process of a philosophical interpretation of life in its individual uniqueness, incompleteness and contradictoriness. This trait of art is graphically manifest in the best works of contemporary writers, such as, for example, in Max Frisch's *Stiller*.

Another manifestation of the great ideological load of art today is the fact that it raises serious philosophical, ethical and socio-political problems. Indeed, work of art sometimes presents in metaphorical form a complicated philosophical problem. Closeness between art and a theoretical world outlook is particularly clear in such cases, and the boundary line between art and philosophy becomes almost indistinguishable. Bertolt Brecht wrote that "the theatre of our age of science can transform dialectics into pleasure".<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bertolt Brecht, *Schriften zum Theater*, Band VII, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin und Weimar, 1964, p. 65.

Philosophy has never avoided vividness in presentation, it has always tried to embody its ideas into artistic images; suffice it to recall the *Great Dialogues* by Plato or philosophical works of Francis Bacon. Many works written by the founders of Marxism are also distinguished for their high artistic merit. So, the idea formulated by Friedrich Dürrenmatt that philosophy may be equalled to the best specimen of prose literature is, indeed, well-grounded.

There are, of course, certain limits to such closeness. The artist only presents the problem; at best he may suggest a way for it to be tackled, but the process of proving the correctness of his version is beyond the limits of an artistic work.

And finally, art itself—a creative process, the interrelations between art and life, and art and society—increasingly becomes an object of contemporary art. *Doctor Faustus* by Thomas Mann, like the works by Latin American author Julio Cortazar, exemplify the artists' reflections on the ways and forms of art's self-development.

The question logically arises whether the art's educative effect decreases due to an increasingly philosophical nature of art, at the expense of its deteriorating emotional impact on people? Indeed, such a kind of art, while activating to the extreme the rational function of mental activity, steadily destroys the illusion of its being the "second reality"; at the same time, this helps to put

an end to a naïve identification of art with reality. A complicated philosophical idea pronounced by a character in a work of fiction and the same idea expounded in a scientific paper exerts a different impact on the reader's mind and requires, in each case, that he possesses a certain background. A scientist tries to prove the validity of his idea by the strict logic of his argument, by drawing on relevant facts and referring to certain results obtained previously; in a work of art, on the other hand, links connecting it with objective reality are not pre-set, so the reader (spectator or listener) must establish them himself. Thus, a philosophical idea as an element of an artistic work requires that the reader independently compare it to his own ideals and also with objective reality. Involved in this process are all the "layers" of the individual's inner world: emotions and intelligence, the entire volume and depth of his knowledge, moral experience and value orientations, his standard of philosophical culture and his world outlook. A person is capable of "appropriating" the social wealth and of becoming a genuine bearer of the totality of social relationships, only by developing in himself all these qualities.

As a rule, art's moral effect is linked with the fact that it concentrates our attention on the preciousness of each individual, helping in this way to overcome materialist temptations. The moral

sense of art, however, is much deeper and much more variegated. A person's attitude to the material world and things should not be opposed to his attitude towards people. We should not forget that people's communication is not to be reduced to direct individual contacts. "Each of his *human* relations to the world," Marx wrote, "are in their *objective* orientation, or in their *orientation to the object*, the appropriation of the object."<sup>1</sup> Rather often, in our relationships with others either we reduce them to the level of an object, giving them only one-sided functional characteristics, or we see them only as projections, echoes of our own thoughts, desires and principles. In this case, anything else in other individuals does not arouse our interests or our wish to understand them, to come into immediate contact with them, or to share their points of view. So, in other people, we "see" only ourselves in all our narrow-mindedness, empiricism, finiteness and complete inclusion in present-day reality.

The interest of someone in other people and in himself is closely connected with his essence as the subject in object-directed activities. A person's generic essence is evident in his attitude to other people only if he sees in an object the efforts put into its making by past generations, and re-

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 1975, pp. 299, 300.

alises the possibility of further improving human skills — only if he is capable of seeing an object as materialised human abilities. So, if an artist calls on us in his work not to forget the person behind the thing, it does not mean that we should forfeit our interest in that thing, and pleasure in looking at it; nor that we should see it as just a functional thing, turning it into a mere object for satisfying certain utilitarian needs. It is just the opposite: art helps us to see the “human” content in objects, and that is not as simple as it may seem.

At the early stages of history, when the mythological way of appropriating reality prevailed, people took things in the entirety of their links with the world, without isolating these things from the surroundings. Today, however, this “primary” integrity of comprehension has gone, and the simple sense of satisfaction derived from doing one’s job no longer reflects the fullness of human activity; the sense of unity, of an inseverable link with the world, is fading. Science in itself cannot be a universal means for compensating this lack of integrity. It just “separates” various aspects from objects and processes, fixing them in the form of signs, generally accepted in science. At the surface of it, to be “practically” comprehended, the object appears as an aggregate of meanings, towards which a person may be oriented, depending on the concrete situation.



The object itself vanishes, as it were, being dissolved in its variegated functions.

Humanist thinkers and artists repeatedly warned people against the danger of losing the sense of integrity and profundity of the world which consequently turns into a "world of indicators and signatures". The problem loomed particularly large in the 20th century, an age characterised by intensive development of science and technology. Art appealing to irrational powers in the human soul, was regarded as the way to restore people's integrity and their inseparable ties with Nature. People's ability to free themselves from their "social fetters" and to fuse themselves with Nature results in something opposite to reason, to its clear "light of day": "At night, reason sleeps and things are left to themselves. That which is really important, assumes integrity after the devastating analysis of the day. The individual again connects parts of his world and again becomes like a calm tree."<sup>1</sup>

Amidst the whirlpool of vital activities, a person's interaction with a huge number of objects produces a specific effect of pragmatically leveling them out in his consciousness as a mass, the units of which are discernible only by their utility functions. The separation of that person's atti-

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<sup>1</sup> Antoine de Saint-Exupery, *Pilote de guerre*, Gallimard, Paris, 1942, p. 17.

tude to an object personified in art from his practical-transformative and cognitive approach to things narrows the world of things capable of stimulating esthetic feelings or emotions in general. It is as if a specific material medium appears which is illumined by human emotions and which is separated from the mass of materialised use-values consumed in the everyday activities of a contemporary person. This is the reason why old things, preserving the warmth of many generations and bearing an imprint of their habits, beliefs, etc. prove to be capable of arousing a sensation of being one with the world — a sensation typical of the past. "For our grandparents, a 'house', a 'well', a familiar tower still existed, as well as their own dress and their own coat; all those things were infinitely greater, infinitely closer to them; almost every thing was a vessel in which they found something human and in which they stored something human... The things which have their own spirit, which have entered our life and *participate in it* are gradually being reduced to nought and cannot be replaced with anything. *Perhaps we are the last people who still knew such things...*"<sup>1</sup>

However, as contemporary experience shows, it is not in everybody that an antique thing awak-

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<sup>1</sup> Rainer Maria Rilke, *Briefe*, Insel Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1950, pp. 898-99.

ens the sense of oneness with the world and with the past. An opinion is quite widely spread today that the *thing in itself* can render special importance to the individual who possesses it, as if everything which is contained in it automatically becomes the property of its owner. In certain conditions, such a conceited attitude to the thing gives rise to a situation when the thing with all its social concreteness disappears, and only the fact of its possession remains, as a sign of its owner's "belonging" to the world of art; to put it in simple language, what we are facing here is an open manifestation of turning the thing into a symbol of prestige, when the striving to possess the thing is substituted for the striving to penetrate its profound socio-historical meaning.

Such an attitude to the material world is typical of a consumerist consciousness and the primitive instinct of accumulating wealth, when "in the place of *all* physical and mental senses there has ... come the sheer estrangement of *all* these senses, the sense of *having*." <sup>1</sup> The boundary between a simple sense of possession and a striving to overcome it in an irrational feeling of the completeness and infinity of the surrounding world is very vague, however. Placing hopes in the "magic of things" and the notion that what is

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 3, p. 300.

“human” in things will invariably come to the fore and awaken the “human” in us through a special revelation and the intuition of “silence” — that hope will eventually bring us to utter callousness in our attitude to things, as it happened to the heroes of the novel by the French writer Georges Perec, *Les choses*. They started with approaching in a romantic way things which, they believed, can facilitate their inner perfection, spiritual growth; develop their individuality and help them find the road that would be different from that trodden by their friends, a road which was dominated by a lust for wealth, conformism and a striving to win prestige. But they are unwilling and unable to see either the long and arduous road passed by humankind on the way to that knowledge and the creativity which lay behind the façade of things; or their dilettantism and their work, which consists, as the author ironically remarks, precisely in “ideally adjusting” modern products to any taste, or to the unconscious desires and the educational standard of the consumers. This makes them realise in the end that even the unique things they possess are but a projection of themselves, their own petty wishes and emotions; and they fail to see that these things are creations of the human mind, talent and skill, of the labour of whole generations. As a result, they are overwhelmed by the things in their possession, the things they

have "tamed"; the halo of romanticism vanishes, and the rarities themselves turn into a symbol of the individual being deprived of his own spiritual world.

The possibility of elaborating his attitude to the thing so that he would be able to see some *social content* in it, and to assert his own Ego at each given moment of his interaction with the world, is connected with an awareness of the "human measure" of mastering the world and comprehending the great opportunities it offers and the grandiose tasks humankind is confronted with. In this case, it is not the thing as it is in its uniqueness and the totality of its separate functions; rather, it is the past, present and future of humankind behind the thing, which become a fact of the individual's existence and behaviour. However, the more human power, knowledge and skill contained in the thing, the more it represents the "knot of human activities", the greater and more necessary are efforts to bring out the thing's social essence. Art, of course, cannot provide a final solution to this problem; it can only prepare our consciousness and our senses for mastering the wealth of human culture.

## 5. The Human Image

As we can see, there is no universal means for educating a "rich" personality, who would be

capable of assimilating all the best that human-kind has created over the long course of its history. The more complicated, diverse and broad the activity in which people are involved, the greater the opportunities for their development. It is relevant here to call to mind the biblical legend about Jacob who fought in his sleep with an angel and was overwhelmed. As age-old wisdom teaches us, the setbacks and errors suffered when tackling difficult problems, sometimes give us more than the easy victories won in resolving trifling, insignificant tasks. Building a communist society is the kind of activity which opens up wide vistas for personal perfection and facilitates the "growing" of the future human beings; and they would be able to bring that much-coveted future nearer.

Labour helps people develop their ambition and will power, their collective spirit and creative abilities. Games develop the imagination, teach us to dream, and help us to share the viewpoint of others, of different cultures. Art develops a special mechanism in people, allowing us to share another person's feelings, to commiserate with others both near and far; furthermore, it stimulates independent thinking. Education provides material for reflection and gives to people the mode of thinking; it is a condition for successful labour activities, and an opportunity for manifesting their capabilities of playing games.

Education should not be interpreted in the narrow sense alone, as just overcoming one's ignorance. It is in fact the acquisition of the human image, the individual's participation in the cultural wealth and, at the same time, the ability to realise himself, to find his own way for increasing that cultural wealth.

We have mentioned above the Utopian ideal of professional versatility. No less Utopian are the ideals of universal knowledge. In the setting of differentiation of scientific knowledge which is very intense these days, it is impossible to be simultaneously a literary critic, a chemist and a physicist. There are exceptions, of course. For example, A. P. Borodin, a Russian composer of the 19th century, was also an outstanding figure in chemistry. The academician B. V. Raushenbach, a full member of the International Academy of Astronautics and Lenin Prize winner, has also won recognition as an author of many a scientific paper on ancient Russian culture. Versatility is a laudable feature, no doubt, but it is an exception to the general rule.

An educated person is not the one who has some knowledge of everything, "in general", the dilettante. He is the one who is well versed in his own field and is capable of creative activity within that domain. Yet, to make a scientific discovery in any one field, it is not enough to be an expert only in one's own branch of science.

Georg Mendel, for example, one of the creators of the study of genetics, said that his knowledge of statistics helped him greatly in discovering heredity laws. The new is, as a rule, discovered where the researcher is able to go beyond the boundaries of his own branch of science, his own theory. And this is only possible if he easily finds his bearings in the cultural wealth accumulated by humanity. Dilettantism and narrow specialisation are in fact Scylla and Charybdis on the way of people's striving to "educate" themselves. People should be capable of entering any field of knowledge, and all that is human, created or thought up by humankind, must be within reach for educated people.

Jan Amos Komenský, the famous 17th-century Czech pedagogue and thinker, left us a fine allegory of "scholarly ignorance" — of dilettantism and narrow specialisation, both equally disastrous for the individual. He described a traveller who suddenly found himself among some versatile scholars who had acquired knowledge in a newly-discovered way: knowledge was contained in pills preventing illnesses of thinking, so they assimilated knowledge in the same way as pills, i. e. through their stomach. As a result, one of them overstuffed himself with knowledge and suffered from indigestion; and another became very choosy about his knowledge, so he only ate the most "delicious titbits"



and rejected the simple bread of fundamental knowledge. Some of the scholars prepared their "meals" themselves out of the acquired knowledge-products, and others tried to steal the "meals" cooked by their neighbours. Some scholars were attracted by the beautiful labels stuck on outdated knowledge, rather than by the essence of knowledge-food. Still others did not even open the boxes with knowledge; they were busy collecting as many of these boxes as possible, so as to boast to their guests about them. In Komen-ský's opinion, versatility, dilettantism and ignorance are all of the same ilk. Versatility does not teach people to think. Education, however, is an ability to independently find one's bearings in culture, it is the ability of thinking; in fact, it is the *culture of thinking*.

Besides, education is a continuous *process*; it has no limits. It is an ever-present need; people must learn over the entire course of their lives. There is no roundabout way to culture. There is no magical golden key which could open the door to the realm of knowledge. Hokusai, the great Japanese artist of the 17th-18th centuries, said that when he was six, he tried to correctly reproduce the form of objects; by the age of 73, he had studied the structure of birds, animals and plants. By the age of 90 he hoped he would penetrate the essence of art.

Education is also an ability to feel—it is the

*culture of emotions*. For example, can we really enjoy a work of art if we do not know anything about its roots, about the socio-historical conditions in which it has been created? If we did not know anything about the specifics of the philosophies of past ages, we could not appreciate Sandro Boticelli's illustrations to Dante's *Divine Comedy*, where Dante and Vergil, gyrating in Hades, are depicted several times on one and the same picture. Being ignorant of the laws of medieval painting, its symbolism and reverse perspective, the viewer may experience only sniggering astonishment rather than delight when looking at the famous creations by Andrei Rublyov and Dionisius, the great Russian icon-painters. Ilya Ehrenburg, the Soviet fiction writer, poet and translator, recalls the following example on the pages of his memoirs, *People. Years. Life*. The Soviet film *Chapayev*, which was on in besieged Madrid, caused an unexpected reaction in the audience: at the moment when the film's heroes found themselves in an extremely dangerous situation, the viewers completely identified the events going on on the screen with those of real life and suddenly opened drum fire at the screen! After the film, many of the anarchist elements, who previously could not be made to stand guard, began to observe military discipline, since they had seen on the screen that violations of discipline caused Chapayev's death. Yet the film's

artistic merit, though acclaimed throughout the world, failed to be appreciated, because of the lack of *artistic and esthetical* culture among the audience.

The individual's *ethical culture* is of no less importance, and that, also, can only be acquired through knowledge. We are indignant, for example, when faced with an attempt to destroy the "holy of holies"—a person's life. But how should our ethics react when witnessing an interference either in the human organism, or even in the very process of life inception? We refer to the transplantation of certain organs, cryogenics, genetic engineering, etc. Only a person who is well-versed in the theoretical problem of correlation between the social and biological, the conscious and the unconscious, can answer whether these are moral or immoral. We face no less difficult problems when considering from the angle of ethics such a complicated object as society.

When one undertakes to assess social reality from the angle of ethical norms, one must first of all know how the relevant event, human action, or social phenomenon are estimated from the point of view of science. This is proved by the failure of numerous attempts, in the past, at criticising capitalism as an "unjust society" in which the Social Contract has been violated, from an ethical position. All these attempts were doomed to failure from the very start, because

the capitalist world is the world of economic, "non-personal" oppression. To understand why the capitalist tramples upon social justice, it is not sufficient to be a moralist; it is also necessary to know such parameters of society's material foundation as production, exchange and distribution, because the mechanism of social injustice lies precisely in the interaction of these elements ... and in this interaction emerges surplus value, the economic basis of class antagonism. Ethical consciousness is powerless in its attempts at assessing such a complicated object as society if it does not draw on Marxist social science.

How can one find his bearings in the complicated political life of society today? How can one understand the domestic and foreign policy of the state and find one's own place in political struggle? One cannot rely only on "class instinct" in this matter. How, then, can a Soviet worker, farmer or office employee assess the complex processes involved in democratising all aspects of the country's life? The policy of openness requires a high standard of the individual's *political culture*. "An illiterate person stands outside politics"; he has "rumours, gossip, fairy-tales and prejudices, but not politics."<sup>1</sup>

Hence education must provide people with

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<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, "The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments", *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 78.

a way of thinking, a criterion for the estimation of events, things and phenomena, and a basis for action. The possession of the ability to "enter" culture is the criterion for the philosophical culture of an individual. And such a *philosophical culture* integrating education is the person's ability to separate essential things from the inessential, the objective from the subjective; to take a historical approach to any phenomenon, to see both its roots and perspectives; to reveal the links tying up an object or process under examination with a broader circle of phenomena; an ability to take a critical view of himself and the surrounding world, while not plunging into nihilism.

An individual capable of all that will see the past as *his own* past; he will ponder over the goals humanity sets itself as if they were his own, personal goals. All the best that has been created by world culture must be available to such an individual. An overwhelming love for people and fidelity to one's duty; utter delight in works of art and a sense of responsibility for the destiny of his own people; a need for creative endeavour, an ability to prove one's point of view in an argument and a readiness to acknowledge one's own mistakes—only such an individual can rise to a full understanding of the grandiose tasks facing humanity, and of vigorously participating in their fulfilment.

## 6. History and Ourselves

History is in fact the history of those people who are its makers, the activity of those who pursued their own aims, the science about people and their times, the science about the past and future. What components make up the history of humankind — are they the actions of separate individuals or of the popular masses?

Gaius Julius Caesar, Chinghiz Khan and Oliver Cromwell — all of them are outstanding historical figures. But what could we say about Caesar were it not for his Legioners, about Chinghiz Khan without his soldiers, or about Cromwell without his Ironsides?

But even when the people supported their leaders and commanders, they were far from always successful. Why is it, indeed, that the Cuban patriots led by Fidel Castro won a victory, but the revolutionary detachment of Ernesto Che Guevara was destroyed in Bolivia?

Beginning with the ancient historians — the “fathers of history” Herodotus, Thucydides and Polybius, Livius and Nestor — and ending with their present-day counterparts, in the end, this question was habitually reduced to that of an outstanding personality. This opinion was most clearly reflected in the works by Thomas Carlyle, an English essayist and philosopher, writer and historian, who said that world history is essen-

tially the history of outstanding individuals. Carlyle held their activities in high esteem as the "soul" of world history, and thought that the "gap" between a brave leader and a blind cowardly mob was a natural phenomenon. He also thought that the situation in which some people ruled over others was a logical result of the moral and intellectual superiority of "heroes". He divided society into the ruling élite and the masses, masters and slaves, aristocrats and plebeians. His views were elaborated further by Friedrich Nietzsche, a German philosopher and poet who created the theory of "superman" and the cult of a strong personality, possessed by a thirst for power. Theoreticians of Russian Populism, such as Pyotr Lavrov, Pyotr Tkachev and Nikolai Mikhailovsky, also paid their tribute to the élite theory of the personality. Tkachev, for one, said it was fits of agitation, close to insanity, i.e. hardly realised and almost instinctive needs of the individual that were the "soul, the nerve of history". Lavrov in his turn maintained that the history of society hinged upon the will of "heroes" who led the crowds. Mikhailovsky, too, in his *The Heroes and the Mob* gave the primary role to the individual, the hero, the maker of history who by his example is capable of stirring the mob both into committing a feat and a crime. This position theoretically substantiates the tactics of individual terrorism. The eternal conflict be-

tween society and the individual in history, oppression and lack of rights on the one side and power on the other, in the opinion of the Russian mystical philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev, is what makes human life so tragic.

Russian revolutionary democrats Vissarion Belinsky, Alexander Herzen, Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Nikolai Dobrolyubov, on the contrary, opposed the élite theory of personality, considering that the personality-society alternative was erroneous. They held that the deeds performed by outstanding figures should not be put to oblivion, though the role of the popular masses in history should not be underestimated either. Dobrolyubov likened the role of the individual to a spark which serves to explode powder. The famous French historians Augustin Thierry, François Guizot and François Mignet in their works developed the issue of the historical roles of personality and people, and formulated the doctrine of the class struggle, thus laying the ground for a materialist interpretation of history.

The materialist view of history, elaborated by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, brought to light the genuine history-makers—the popular masses. Society is an agglomeration of separate personalities, who together make up the popular masses. It exists thanks to the labour of people who create material benefits indispensable for human existence—food and clothing, houses



and implements of production. The popular masses are a concrete-historical concept: in the slave-holding society it was the slaves or plebeians, in feudal society — the bondsmen or serfs and craftsmen, and in capitalist society — the proletariat and peasantry. In a society where exploitation has been done away with and man no longer exploits another, the entire population comprises the popular masses.

In their *Holy Family*, Marx and Engels formulated for the first time the law of the growing role of the masses in history and showed that the people are the makers of history, of the entire material culture of society; that the activity of each generation rests upon the shoulders of the previous one, and that it was by the labour of slaves that the ancient Greek and Roman cultures were created, just as feudal culture was created by serfs, and present-day civilisation, by the proletarians. Were it not for the daily work of the people, the activities of outstanding personalities — scholars, politicians and artists — would not have been possible.

The materialist view of history has eliminated the personality-popular masses alternative. However, recognition of the decisive role of the popular masses does not deny that personality can play a big role, too. Everything created by personalities belongs to history. Outstanding personalities do not appear by accident, but of necessity,

at the time and place when and where they are needed by society and history: "a man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc."<sup>1</sup> When speaking about the "giants" of the Renaissance, Engels wrote that outstanding personalities reflect the needs of society in a finite form; they live and act in the midst of the vested interests of their time, facilitating the resolution of socio-practical tasks, "one by speaking and writing, another with the sword, many with both".<sup>2</sup>

So the fact that the popular masses' historical creativity is decisive does not detract from the significance of actions performed by outstanding personalities. While incapable of changing the course of history, a "great" personality can nevertheless exert a certain influence on historical events.

The role of a personality is "measured" by the scale of its activity in history, the goals and tasks it undertakes. Georgi Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist revolutionary said that "the great man is great ... in his possession of traits which make him the most capable of serving his time's great

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<sup>1</sup> "Engels to W. Borgius in Breslau, *London, January 25, 1894*", in: Marx, Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 442.

<sup>2</sup> Frederick Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1972, p. 22.

social needs".<sup>1</sup> As a rule, great personalities appear in revolutionary historical periods. Thus the bourgeois revolution in England produced Cromwell, and the French Revolution produced Saint-Just and Mirabeau, Danton and Marat, Robespierre and Napoleon.

Still, human history is not the history of outstanding personalities; the history of society is the history of people. The personality is a product of society, which undergoes change as society advances. Society cannot be understood in isolation from the individuals who comprise that society; they are all closely bound into an integral whole.

The history of society began with the appearance on Earth of the human race and of a primitive human collective; from that moment on, it has been human history. The human being is the subject of history. As society came onto the scene, so began the historical creativity of people, of humankind; and this is the content of history. People create material and spiritual values, wage a struggle with Nature and overcome contradictions within society; they change themselves in the process, parallel with changes they work in their social relationships. The history of society is the totality of all the concrete and varied actions

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<sup>1</sup> G. V. Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, Vol. II, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 314.

of individual people, of human collectives, and of the entire human race.

The road covered by humankind over hundreds of thousands of years shows that the process of its historical development is objective and regular. The evolution of society is influenced by many factors which interact in a complex, dialectical way; among them are the development level of the productive forces, relations of production and the corresponding superstructures (the state, the legislature, etc.), the geographical environment, population density and growth rate, interactions among nations, etc. All of them together create the conditions necessary for society's existence and progressive development.

The chief factor in the whole aggregate is the production of material benefits, i. e. the means of subsistence indispensable for people to live and engage in their activities. Indeed, "mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc."<sup>1</sup>

The mode of production of material benefits determines the social, political and spiritual system of society, and the type of governing relationships prevailing in it. The social conscious-

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick Engels, "Speech at the Graveside of Karl Marx", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Works* in three volumes, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1973, p. 162.

ness of every given society, its social ideas and institutions are in fact a reflection of its social mode of existence and first of all, of the dominant mode of production.

Every new generation of people, as it enters life, is confronted with a certain objective social system of socio-economic relations conditioned by the attained level of productive forces. The character and general conditions for the activities of the new generation are determined by these inherited relationships. However, new social ideas, political institutions, etc., once they have made their appearance, become relatively independent from the material conditions which have given birth to them and hence begin to exert a strong impact on the course of social development by simulating people to action in a definite direction.

Changes in the development of material productive forces, which come into conflict with the existing production relations—i. e. changes in the form of social existence—are reflected in the social consciousness of people and lead to the inception of new ideas. This contradiction triggers a struggle within society between the classes and groups of people, some of which uphold the old, and others, the new social system; the conscious motives in actions performed by the people and outstanding historical figures reflect economic conditions.

In antagonistic societies, the lack of correspondence between society's material productive forces and the existing production relations is manifested in the class struggle. Changes in the form of property ownership and political institutions invariably affect class interests, so internal contradictions can only be resolved through the class struggle, the highest manifestation of which is social revolution carried out by the popular masses. The people are the chief makers of history, since they play the decisive role in the economic, political and spiritual development of human society.

This is why Marxism attaches such tremendous importance to the individual's social activity. So what is social activity?

Individual social activity differs from the individual capability of practical action, of which anybody is capable, and primarily that person who is pursuing his own selfish interests. Marx wrote about such people: "I laugh at the so-called 'practical' men with their wisdom. If one chose to be an ox, one could of course turn one's back on the sufferings of mankind and look after one's own skin."<sup>1</sup>

The activity of such a person is just as far removed from social activity as is passive contem-

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<sup>1</sup> "Marx to Sigfrid Meyer in New York. *Hanover, April 30, 1867*", in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982, p. 173.

plation. Genuine activity seeks to be of benefit to humankind, to be directed at fulfilling tasks which reflect progressive trends in social development. Social activity manifests itself in different ways. It may take on the form of a revolt by the slave who has been driven to despair by back-breaking toil, or the staunchness of a thinker upholding his views, or the heroism of a soldier defending his Motherland. But the highest form of class activity, in the opinion of Marxism, is conscientious struggle aimed at the revolutionary transformation of society and at the creation of a communist future for humanity.

Social activity is a sense of being involved in social changes, the unity of personal and social interests.

Harmony between personal and social interests does not prevent or hinder the activity of each particular member of socialist society. On the contrary, creative activity on the part of each of its members is the condition for achieving all society's objectives. The social activity of the socialist personality is indivisible from the social activity of the collective, the class, and the whole society, since the vast scale of problems tackled by socialist society demands joint organised effort.

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*Carlyle*, Thomas (1795-1881), British publicist, historian and philosopher. Formulated the idealist concept of the cult of heroes and history-makers— 266

*Descartes*, René (1596-1650), French philosopher, physicist and mathematician. His doctrine is based on the dualism of soul and body, the “thinking” and “extended” substances— 91, 170

*Diesterweg*, Friedrich Adolf Wilhelm (1790-1866), German Democrat pedagogue, author of textbooks on mathematics, geography, astronomy, natural science, etc.— 199

*Feuerbach*, Ludwig (1804-1872), German materialist philosopher and atheist, supporter of anthropology. Exerted a great influence over Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in the formation of their materialist views— 93, 164

*Freud*, Sigmund (1856-1939), Austrian psychiatrist and psychologist, founder of psychoanalysis— 134

*Fromm*, Erich (1900-1980), German-born American psychologist and sociologist, supporter of neo-Freudianism— 144

*Hegel*, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-

1831), German idealist philosopher, who created the theory of dialectics based on the objective-idealist principle— 168

*Helvetius*, Claude Adrien (1715-1771), French materialist philosopher, supporter of the theory of the decisive influence of the environment in the shaping of the personality— 98, 163, 169

*Hesiod*, (8th?-7th? cent. B. C.), the first ancient Greek poet whose name became known to us— 191

*Kant*, Immanuel (1724-1804), German idealist philosopher, founder of German classical philosophy— 178

*Komenský*, Jan Amos (Comenius, John Amos) (1592-1670), Czech humanist thinker and education reformer— 259

*Marcuse*, Herbert (1898-1979), German-born American philosopher and sociologist— 129

*Montesquieu*, Charles Louis (1689-1755), French Enlightenment, jurist, philosopher and sociologist— 197

*Nehru*, Jawaharlal (1889-1964), Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of India from 1947 till his death; an associate of Mahatma Gandhi in the struggle for na-

tional independence; one of the leaders of the Indian National Congress— 146, 148

*Nietzsche*, Friedrich Wilhelm (1844-1900), German idealist philosopher, one of the founders of the “philosophy of life” theory— 193, 266

*Pico della Mirandola*, Giovanni (1463-1494), Italian humanist thinker of the early Renaissance— 84

*Plato* (427?-347 B. C.), Greek idealist philosopher, pupil of Socrates— 61, 168, 190, 191, 248

*Rousseau*, Jean Jacques (1712-1778), French Enlightener, philosopher and author— 95, 98

*Schopenhauer*, Arthur (1788-1860), German irrationalist philosopher of the voluntarist trend— 9

*Schweitzer*, Albert (1875-1965), German-born French philosopher close to the “philosophy of life” school. Protestant theologian and missionary, physician, musicologist and organist, Nobel Peace Prize winner— 52, 166, 219

*Teilhard de Chardin*, Pierre (1881-1955), French paleontologist, philosopher and theologian. Developed the concept of “Christian evolutionism”— 27

*Vygotsky*, Lev Semyonovich (1896-1934), Soviet psychologist, one of the founders of the Soviet school of psychology— 229

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## GLOSSARY

**AFFECT**, emotional agitation, passion, a powerful and short-lived emotion, arising as a reaction to a strong irritant.

**ALIENATION**, a social process consisting in the transformation of human activity and its results into an independent force that then dominates that person and is hostile to him.

**ANTHROPOLOGY**, a philosophical concept explaining the human essence as that of an unchangeable phenomena of Nature, and reducing social relations to those between individuals.

**ANTHROPOMORPHISM**, the attribution of human motivations, characteristics or behaviour to inanimate objects, animals or natural phenomena.

**ASSESSMENT**, an attitude to social phenomena or behaviour, establishment of their social importance and conformity to the social values.

**AUTHORITARIANISM**, an anti-democratic system of political power, usually accompanied by elements of personal dictatorship and proclamation of the infallibility of the ruler.

**CAPABILITIES**, physical, mental or moral features characteristic of an individual, which make it possible for him to successfully perform a certain activity.

**CATHARSIS**, a term coined by Aristotle meaning purification of the spirit achieved through fear and compassion and conceived as the goal of tragic art.

**CLASSES**, large contingents of people, differing by their place in the historically conditioned system of social production, by their position with respect to the means of production, by their role in the organisation of labour, and by the mode of gaining income and the size of it.

**CREATIONISM**, a doctrine about the creation of the world by God out of nothing.

**EMOTIONS**, reactions of humans and animals to internal and external irritants, characterised by a strong subjective colouring and con-

nected with the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of certain needs.

**EMOTIVISM**, an ethical theory holding that moral judgements and concepts only serve to express and stimulate emotions, but are not statements of fact, true or false.

**EMPATHY**, projection of the self into the emotional state of another person.

**ESTATE**, a social group in pre-capitalist societies, enjoying hereditary rights and doing hereditary duties fixed in custom or law.

**FETISHISM**, the cult of inanimate objects, endowed in the imagination of believers with supernatural properties.

**GOAL**, an ideal, mental anticipation of a definite result of an activity.

**HYPOTHESIS**, a basis, a suggestion, a suppositional judgement on a cause-and-effect connection of phenomena.

**IDEAL**, the higher goal of aspirations, something perfect, a model.

**IMAGINATION**, psychic activity amounting to the formation of a mental image or concept of that which is not real or present.

**INDIVIDUALITY**, the aggregate of distinguishing attributes of a phenomenon, creature or human being.

**INTUITION**, a contemplation, the act or faculty of knowing without the use of rational processes.

**MEMORY**, an ability to reproduce a past experience, one of the basic properties of the nervous system expressed in the ability to keep in the mind for a long time certain information about events occurring in the external world and about reactions of the individual concerned to those events, and the ability to repeatedly reactivate this information in that person's consciousness and behaviour.

**MYTHS**, traditional stories about the deeds accomplished by Gods and Heroes, underlied by primitive, phantastic notions of the world.

**NEED**, a condition or situation in which it is objectively necessary to support the vital activity and development of an organism, human personality, an inner stimulus to activity.

**PEOPLE**, creators of material values, the leading force in radical social transformations.

**PERSONALITY**, the human being as a subject of social relations and activities; a stable set



of socially-significant features characterising the individual as a member of society.

**PERSONIFICATION**, a concept about natural phenomena, human traits and abstract notions presented in a human image.

**PHYLOGENY**, the process of historical evolution of the organic world; should be considered in unity with ontogeny—the individual development of organisms.

**SOCIALISATION**, the process of assimilation by people of a definite system of knowledge, norms and values, which allows him to function as a full member of society.

**SPONTANEITY**, an arbitrary, voluntary self-impulse or self-motion, caused by internal rather than external causes.

**SYNCRETISM**, indivisibility characteristic of an undeveloped state of a certain phenomenon.

**VALUE**, the positive significance to the human race, a class or society as a whole, of objects of the surrounding world, determined by the extent of their involvement in the sphere of human activity.

**WORLD OUTLOOK**, the system of generalised views on the objective world and human-

kind's place in it; human attitudes towards the surrounding real world and themselves, as well as the convictions, ideals and principles of cognition, and activities, guided by these attitudes.

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### REQUEST TO READERS

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