

WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

J.V. STALIN

**LAST WRITINGS
1946-1953**

Publisher's Note

This edition of Last Writings: 1946-1953 has been compiled from vol. 16 of J.V. Stalin's English edition *Works*, Red Star Press and vol. 16, 18 of J.V. Stalin's Russian edition *Works*, "Pisatel" Publishing House and "Soyuz" Information and Publishing Centre

THE NOVEMBER 8TH PUBLISHING HOUSE
OTTAWA 2024



J.V. STALIN

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CONVERSATION WITH CHIANG CHING-KUO, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

*Recording of the conversation with Chiang Ching-kuo,
personal representative of Chiang Kai-shek at 23:00*

January 3, 1946

Present: Molotov, Pavlov (People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs) and Fu Binchan, Ambassador of China.

Chiang Ching-kuo congratulates Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov on the New Year, expressing wishes for new victories in the coming year.

Comrade Stalin thanks him.

Comrade Molotov expresses gratitude and congratulates Chiang Ching-kuo on the New Year.

Comrade Stalin mentions that he spoke on the phone with Soviet military officials. They disagree with not declaring Japanese enterprises that served the Kwantung Army trophy property. Soviet military officials are offended that this property is not considered to be the trophy of the Red Army. They want this property to be treated the same way as German property in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other European countries liberated by the Red Army. China will not lose anything from this. Trophy enterprises will be jointly operated on equal terms by the Chinese and Soviet sides, and several companies may be created for their operation in various industrial sectors.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that the Chinese government proposes the same but in a different form.

Comrade Stalin notes that the form proposed by

the Chinese side offends Soviet military officials, who argue that they shed blood and therefore Japanese enterprises that served the Kwantung Army should be recognized as trophies of the Red Army.

Comrade Stalin says that it is necessary to specifically determine on the spot which enterprises the Japanese built and operated to serve the Kwantung Army.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks what Comrade Stalin thinks about allocating certain heavy industry enterprises to China. Marshal Malinovsky said that specialists should deal with this issue.

Comrade Stalin responds that specialists on the spot can certainly study this issue.

Chiang Ching-kuo states that the purpose of his trip to Moscow is to achieve a complete mutual understanding between Generalissimo Stalin and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek would like Generalissimo Stalin to openly and friendly express his opinion on the measures and policies that the national government of China has recently implemented. He would also like Generalissimo Stalin to voice his doubts and specify areas of disagreement. The statements of Generalissimo Stalin will be very useful in determining the policy of the government led by Chiang Kai-shek.

Comrade Stalin replies that he is not familiar with the main facts of the situation in China. He, Comrade Stalin, does not know everything that is happening in China. The Soviet government does not understand why there is a delay in the disarmament of the Japanese, why an agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong is impossible. Mao Zedong is a peculiar person and a peculiar communist. He travels to villages, avoids cities, and is not interested in them. Comrade Stalin does not have the facts and, therefore, only has questions. What advice can he give when he, Comrade Stalin, has little information?

Regarding the policy of the Soviet government towards Japan, Comrade Stalin says that, as he has already mentioned, the goal is to ensure that Japan cannot wage war. Japanese military personnel should be captured, and the military industry, which can work to meet military needs, should be disarmed.

As for the policy of the Soviet government towards China, it is a policy of friendship and support for the national government of China. This has been openly stated in the published communiques.

Comrade Stalin considers Chiang Kai-shek's policy of friendship with the United States, which he intends to pursue, to be correct. The Soviet Union cannot provide significant economic assistance to China. Chiang Kai-shek is expecting aid from the United States, and therefore, his policy of friendship with it is correct.

Comrade Stalin openly speaks about what he knows and asks about what he doesn't know, i.e., regarding the disarmament of the Japanese army and the agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. He, Comrade Stalin, does not know why there is a delay in the disarmament of the Japanese. The Soviet command quickly disarmed the Japanese, and if desired, they could be completely disarmed quickly.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that initially, the Chinese government did not have sufficient forces to disarm the Japanese.

Comrade Stalin remarks that almost no forces are needed to disarm the Japanese.

Chiang Ching-kuo states that the Chinese government now has these forces, and the matter with the Japanese will be settled. The Sino-Soviet treaty is directed against Japan, and Generalissimo Stalin can be assured that in its policy toward Japan, China will aim to prevent Japan from recovering. As for the disarmament of Japanese troops in China, resolving this task is complicated by geographical circumstances

and the fact that Chinese forces were pushed by the Japanese into southern regions.

Comrade Stalin asks why the Americans are not disarming the Japanese. The Japanese are not resisting, considering that the surrender of Japanese forces has already been announced.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that, in his opinion, the agreement between the Chinese communists and the government failed to materialize because the leaders on both sides do not trust each other. Comrade Stalin observes that some concessions are needed, but the specific nature of these should be decided by the parties themselves.

Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that he heard on the radio the proposals made by the national government to the Chinese communists.

Molotov presents the press release regarding the proposals of the national government and the proposals of the Chinese communists. Molotov points out that not everything is clear in these proposals, but according to the Chinese government, it appears that it will not agree to cease military actions against the communists until a procedure is established for an agreement between the communists and the national government.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that the Chinese people are extremely interested in reaching an agreement, as civil war is a dreadful thing.

Comrade Stalin notes that in the Soviet Union, they know what civil war is.

Molotov mentions that the American General Wedemeyer made a statement about the intention of the American command to increase U.S. troops by 4,000 soldiers to facilitate the advance of Chinese forces into Manchuria and maintain order on the roads.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that this statement was made by Wedemeyer before Truman's statement on U.S. policy toward China, i.e., before General Mar-

shall's arrival in China.

Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that the main difficulty now is the lack of railway communication between Beijing and Nanjing because the railway has been cut by communist detachments. Even on the section between Beijing and Tianjin, trains run every other day. It is necessary to quickly reach an agreement, particularly to restore railway communication.

Comrade Stalin states that an agreement between the communists and the national government will improve the situation of the Chinese people and contribute to the development of trade.

Chiang Ching-kuo agrees with this and mentions that the Chinese have been fighting for many years and have suffered greatly from the war.

Comrade Molotov notes that the Chinese people are tired of war.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that poverty in China is especially weighty. He believes that in the current war, the Soviet Union and China have suffered more than any other countries.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if Comrade Stalin has any doubts about Chiang Kai-shek's policy.

Comrade Stalin responds that he is not familiar with the facts, and it is difficult for him to say anything. He, Comrade Stalin, has no doubts. He had some questions, which he conveyed to Chiang Ching-kuo.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that in China, everyone stands for the necessity of democratizing the country.

Comrade Stalin asks if China is now a republic and if there are any monarchical tendencies.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that China is a republic, and currently, there are no monarchical tendencies.

Comrade Stalin says that a republic is closer to democracy. In the Soviet Union, there are no hostile classes, therefore a one-party system is possible. In China, besides the Kuomintang and the Communist Party,

there should be other parties. Are there such parties in China?

Chiang Ching-kuo replies that there are very few. Comrade Stalin says that electoral principles should be introduced in China. The government should be accountable to the parliament and the president. He, Comrade Stalin, does not know which parliamentary system is considered correct for China: unicameral or bicameral.

Comrade Stalin asks if provincial governments remain in China.

Chiang Ching-kuo confirms.

Comrade Stalin says that he does not know what trends exist in China — whether for a unicameral or bicameral system. However, it is necessary to introduce electoral principles in China, similar to France, Poland, Yugoslavia, England and America. The parliament should be elected, and the government should be appointed by the parliament and approved by the president. In the United States, the president is simultaneously the prime minister. In France, it is different. There, the lower and upper houses elect the president, and he is not the prime minister, although he can participate in government meetings as the chairman. However, the French and American systems adhere to democratic principles.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if Comrade Stalin finds the forms existing in Yugoslavia and Poland acceptable for China.

Comrade Stalin says that in Yugoslavia and Poland, as in France, a bicameral system operates. In the Soviet Union, there are also two chambers with equal rights. For example, the Soviet of the Union can reject a decision made by the Soviet of Nationalities, and vice versa. In England, it is different. There are lower and upper houses, but the House of Lords has more rights than the House of Commons. In America, there is the Senate

and the House of Representatives, where the Senate has more rights. He, Comrade Stalin, does not know which system exists in China.

Comrade Stalin asks what the “yuan”* represents.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that it is something like a chamber.

Comrade Stalin says that the name of chambers can be anything, depending on national peculiarities, but they must be elected bodies.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks how decisions are made in the USSR in cases where there are disagreements between the chambers.

Comrade Molotov responds that in such cases, a joint session of both chambers is convened and the decision is made by a majority vote.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks what the proportion between the communists and the Kuomintang should be, according to Stalin, in the future Chinese government.

Comrade Stalin responds that in Europe, the number of portfolios a party holds in the government usually corresponds to the number of its deputies in parliament. In America and England, governments are formed from members of the party that has a majority. For instance, in the recent elections in England, the Labour Party won the majority and formed a government consisting solely of Labour members. However, the English and Americans demand that in other countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria and Poland, opposition parties should be represented in the government. When he, Comrade Stalin, asks the English and Americans why they don't include representatives of the opposition in their governments, they shrug their shoulders.

In France, things are different. The existing system for forming the government is closer to democracy, as representatives of parties that receive the minority also

* Chinese word meaning chamber, council — *Ed.*

participate in the government. If representatives of the opposition are not allowed into the government, they resort to illegal struggle. If they are allowed, the opposition becomes loyal. This is the advantage of allowing representatives of the opposition into the government.

Comrade Stalin gives the example of Hungary, where the Smallholders' Party received over half of the votes and yet allowed representatives of the social-democrats, communists and liberals into the government, retaining the majority of portfolios.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that, in his opinion, China should not adopt the forms of democracy that exist in England. He, Chiang Ching-kuo, thinks that representatives of all democratic parties should participate in the Chinese government at this stage.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks how Comrade Stalin currently assesses the power balance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Comrade Stalin says that it is very difficult to answer this question. During the Potsdam Conference, Churchill and Eden believed that the Conservatives would gain the majority. Attlee said he did not expect a majority. Comrade Stalin himself thought the Conservatives would win the majority in the elections, but the Labour Party won. In China, there were no elections, making it challenging to gauge public opinion. Most likely, the Kuomintang should win the majority, but he, Comrade Stalin, finds it difficult to specify.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if Comrade Stalin considers coexistence between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party possible and under what conditions.

Comrade Stalin responds that if there were free elections, both the communists and the Kuomintang would coexist. For example, the Soviet Union coexists with American and English capitalists without fighting them. Therefore, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China should coexist even more. Certainly,

there would be competition between the parties, but both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party would continue to exist.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks for Comrade Stalin's opinion on the Kuomintang since many people are dissatisfied with it.

Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet government is also dissatisfied with the Kuomintang. Leaflets bearing the Kuomintang's signature are still being distributed in Manchuria. These leaflets contain calls to cut up the Russians. Naturally, this causes dissatisfaction with the Soviet government.

Chiang Ching-kuo suggests that this could be a Japanese provocation in Manchuria.

Comrade Stalin responds that when they arrest Chinese people distributing these leaflets, they claim to be members of units affiliated with the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang has two faces: one legal and the other illegal. Kuomintang members operating illegally in Manchuria use leaflets to call for the expulsion of Soviet forces. Such actions by the Kuomintang cause dissatisfaction with the Soviet government. The Soviet government will not tolerate actions against Chiang Kai-shek in its country since it signed an agreement with him, and one's political line must be consistent. Perhaps there are different groups within the Kuomintang.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that indeed there are various groups within the Kuomintang. Representatives of both capitalists and landlords are present in it. However, concerning the organization of the Kuomintang in Manchuria, he, Chiang Ching-kuo, distinctly remembers that Chiang Kai-shek gave directives to disband Kuomintang organizations engaged in anti-Soviet agitation and even to arrest members of such organizations.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that it is essential to consid-

er that the situation in Manchuria is very complex.

Comrade Stalin says he is aware of this and that there might be self-proclaimed individuals in Manchuria calling themselves Kuomintang members. However, the Kuomintang has not officially distanced itself from the actions of those organizations spreading leaflets against the Soviet Union.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that many Kuomintang organizations were disbanded in Manchuria, reiterating that the situation in Manchuria is highly complex.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks what else Comrade Stalin can say about the Kuomintang.

Comrade Stalin responds that in China, it is necessary to establish a system of tolerance where, alongside the Kuomintang, other parties can coexist.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that the conditions in China are very peculiar. Without sufficient strength, Chiang Kai-shek has adopted a zig-zag policy.

Comrade Stalin says that such a policy is challenging to maintain over an extended period.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that Chiang Kai-shek still lacks sufficient strength.

Comrade Stalin asks if the communists are stronger than Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Zedong claims to have 1.5 million troops, while the Americans believe he has 600,000. Chiang Ching-kuo says that these figures are undoubtedly exaggerated.

Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that many believed Chiang Kai-shek supported Japan. In reality, he was preparing for war against Japan. Chiang Ching-kuo wants Generalissimo Stalin to understand that Chiang Kai-shek is striving for something new.

Comrade Stalin says he knows that Chiang Kai-shek is facing difficulties and asks if any new leaders emerged during the war.

Chiang Ching-kuo responds that the new Minister of Defence in China is from the younger generation.

Chiang Ching-kuo notes that, as he believes, Comrade Stalin should be interested in the Kuomintang since it was created with Lenin's assistance.

Comrade Stalin responds that the Kuomintang will exist as a national liberal party. Those who think that the communists will eliminate the Kuomintang are mistaken. The Kuomintang is undoubtedly a broader and more influential party than the Communist Party.

Chiang Ching-kuo says he finds it beneficial for the Kuomintang if the Communist Party coexists because the existence of the Communist Party will prevent the Kuomintang from decay.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that it is necessary to rebuild the Kuomintang. Comrade Stalin says that elections will improve it because the selection of people takes place during elections: the best ones stay, and the worst ones leave.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that many new leaders emerged during the war.

Comrade Stalin says that if that is the case, it is good because old leaders still have influence in China.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that, finally, he would like to discuss with Generalissimo Stalin the question of China's economy, which has suffered greatly during eight years of war. China wants to emerge from its position as a semi-colonial country.

Comrade Stalin responds that to achieve that, China needs to have its own industry. Relying solely on trade is not advisable. If the Soviet Union didn't have industry, the Germans would have defeated it. Thanks to the presence of industry, the Soviet Union was able to produce 3,000 planes, 3,000 tanks, 5,000 guns, 400,000 rifles and 200,000 machine guns monthly during the war. China needs to have its own industry, and it has the raw materials and a hard-working population for that.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that there is a current de-

bate in China about whether to pay more attention to agriculture or industry. He believes that the main reason for the Soviet Union's success in the war against Germany is the absence of private property.

Comrade Stalin says that although private property exists in America, its industry is very powerful.

Comrade Stalin says that to develop agriculture, it is necessary to create industry, build railways, establish fertilizer factories, construct automobile plants, etc. China does not produce oil, but it should be available in Xinjiang and the south. Exploration and oil extraction need to be organized.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if Comrade Stalin considers it possible for China to develop its industry with the help of foreign capital.

Comrade Stalin responds that with the help of foreign capital, China can develop its industry more quickly. In the Soviet Union, creating industry was facilitated by everything being in the hands of the state. Industrialization in China will be more challenging, so China needs to get loans from foreign states; otherwise, industrialization will be prolonged for many years.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that the Chinese fear ending up in the position of a semi-colonial state again.

Comrade Stalin says that it is necessary to fight. China represents a large market, and foreign states will seek to import their goods there. The import of goods should be allowed, but foreign nations should not impose any conditions on China. For example, the Americans recently offered Poland a loan of 200 million dollars but conditioned it to be spent as the Americans wanted. Of course, foreign nations will demand that China does not develop its heavy industry. To avoid falling into a cabal, it is necessary to fight, and China has the means to wage this struggle.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks how Comrade Stalin views the open door policy.

Comrade Stalin notes that foreign nations wanted the Soviet Union to open its doors, but the Soviet government told them to go to hell. However, China, as a weak country, will have to formally agree to the open door policy. Typically, semi-colonial countries are asked for open doors.

Comrade Stalin says that the Americans addressed the Soviet government regarding the application of the open door policy in Manchuria. The Soviet government told the Americans that it was not in charge of Manchuria and advised them to refer this matter to China. The Americans were very surprised by this response but reconciled with it.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if the question of the open door policy was discussed at the Yalta Conference.

Comrade Stalin confirms and adds that the Soviet representatives at the Yalta Conference stated that it was China's matter.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that Truman informed the Chinese government that the Soviet government had no objection to the open door policy in China.

Comrade Stalin says that the Soviet government has no objection to the open door policy if China agrees, but the Soviet Union itself does not require any open doors. What advice can be given to China on this matter? At this stage, it is challenging for China to reject the open door policy since China suffered greatly during the war and is devastated. But later, China will have to close its doors to create its own industry.

Chiang Ching-kuo states that China is currently in a very difficult economic situation. He believes that, apart from the USSR, no one else wants to see the revival of China.

Comrade Stalin says he understands this. The Japanese devastated China. And the Soviet government knows what kind of robbers the Germans are.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks how the Soviet Union and

China can help each other.

Comrade Stalin responds that the Soviet Union will assist China in developing its industry and engage in trade with China, purchasing soy, rice (if abundant in China), cotton, some raw materials, a bit of tungsten, etc. In return, the Soviet Union could provide China with some machinery, equipment and aid from specialists.

Manchuria is a relatively developed industrial country with an advanced railway network. The Japanese wanted to turn Manchuria into their industrial base on the continent.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that there is a lack of qualified personnel among the Chinese population in Manchuria.

Comrade Stalin replies that the Chinese are a capable people, and they will learn.

Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that many Chinese youth were sent to study in America.

Comrade Stalin says that this is good and states that China needs its engineers, technicians, mechanics, financiers, economists and agriculture specialists.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that a lot of qualified personnel among the Chinese will be needed to work on the Changchun Railway. In connection with this, he would like to ask Generalissimo Stalin how he views sending Chinese youth to educational institutions in the Soviet Union, especially in transportation.

Comrade Stalin says that although there are difficulties, it can be done.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if Comrade Stalin considers it advisable for a Chinese economic delegation to visit the USSR.

Comrade Stalin replies that a Chinese economic delegation can come to the Soviet Union and visit factories and plants.

Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that he would like to

draw Generalissimo Stalin's attention to the situation in Xinjiang. At one time, there were many Soviet specialists there. Chiang Ching-kuo believes that it is necessary to restore the previous situation.

Comrade Stalin responds that Sheng Shicai started arresting Soviet specialists, and the Soviet government recalled them from Xinjiang. If Soviet specialists are treated well, they can be sent back there. Comrade Stalin will clarify this in the coming days.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that Sheng Shicai is no longer in Xinjiang.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks if China's economy can develop on the same basis as the economy of the Mongolian People's Republic. After all, the Mongolian People's Republic has remnants of feudalism, capitalist relations, and, alongside this, collective farms.

Comrade Stalin says that there are no collective farms in the Mongolian People's Republic.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that, as he was told, the Mongolian People's Republic has developed industry, and the people there live well.

Comrade Stalin says that the Mongolian People's Republic has a tannery, a railway has been built and some steps have been taken in mineral extraction, but there is no other industry. Of course, now the Mongols are not as wild as before. However, China cannot be compared to Mongolia, an underdeveloped country. China can become a first-class power. Regarding economic forms, unlike Mongolia, China is not a pastoral country. In China, agriculture is highly developed in terms of intensity. They value every piece of land in China. Everything is available in China to create its own industry. In Mongolia, they do not value the land. The Mongols engage in animal husbandry, and they are low-culture herders. They do not provide winter feed for their livestock. Mongolia is a nomadic country and, therefore, backward. Therefore, one cannot equate

China and Mongolia, neither in social nor economic terms. The basis in the Mongolian People's Republic is animal husbandry, while in China, it is agriculture.

Chiang Ching-kuo asks what wishes Comrade Stalin has regarding the policy of the Chinese government in Manchuria.

Comrade Stalin says that the Chinese government should have its own, not someone else's policy in Manchuria. It should not be oriented towards anyone or dictated by other states. Chiang Kai-shek knows this. Comrade Stalin asks if the British intend to return Hong Kong to the Chinese.

Chiang Ching-kuo replies in the negative.

Comrade Stalin says that Roosevelt was a strong supporter of returning Hong Kong to China, and he once argued fiercely with Churchill about it.

Chiang Ching-kuo says that the British are not planning to transfer Hong Kong to the Chinese yet. Chiang Ching-kuo mentions that the day after tomorrow, he will fly back to China and asks if Comrade Stalin wishes to convey anything to Chiang Kai-shek through him.

Comrade Stalin replies that he will send a letter to Chiang Kai-shek.

The conversation lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes.

Recorded by V. Pavlov.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Affairs of China*, pp. 29-39)

**TO MR. GENERALISSIMO
CHIANG KAI-SHEK**

January 4, 1946

Chongqing

Mr. Generalissimo,

I thank you for your kind letter delivered to me by your son, Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo, on December 30, 1945.

In the conversations I had with him, several issues related to Sino-Soviet relations and some other problems of interest to China and the Soviet Union were touched upon. I hope that relations between our countries will develop in accordance with the Sino-Soviet treaty, to which I will continue to pay constant attention.

The recently concluded conference of the foreign ministers of three states in Moscow has yielded valuable results and, notably, has contributed to the resolution of postwar problems in the Far East, which are of great importance to both China and the USSR.

Accept, Mr. Generalissimo, the assurances of my highest respect and best wishes.

J. Stalin

Moscow,
January 4, 1946

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Affairs of China*, p. 40)

SPEECH AT AN ELECTION MEETING

Stalin Election District, Moscow

February 9, 1946

Comrades!

Eight years have passed since the last elections to the Supreme Soviet. This has been a period replete with events of a decisive nature. The first four years were years of intense labour on the part of Soviet people in carrying out the Third Five-Year Plan. The second four years covered the events of the war against the German and Japanese aggressors — the events of the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the war was the major event during the past period.

It would be wrong to think that the Second World War broke out accidentally, or as a result of blunders committed by certain statesmen, although blunders were certainly committed. As a matter of fact, the war broke out as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism. Marxists have more than once stated that the capitalist system of world economy contains the elements of universal crises and military conflicts, that, in view of this, the development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and war catastrophes. The point is that the uneven development of capitalist countries usually leads, in the course of time, to a sharp disturbance of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that group of capitalist countries which regards itself as being less securely provided with raw materials and markets usually attempts to change the situation and to redistribute “spheres of influence” in its own favour — by employing armed force. As a re-

sult of this, the capitalist world is split into two hostile camps, and war breaks out between them.

Perhaps war catastrophes could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight — by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis of the capitalist system of world economy, the First World War broke out; and as a result of the second crisis, the Second World War broke out.

This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War differed substantially in character from the first. It must be borne in mind that before attacking the Allied countries the major fascist states — Germany, Japan and Italy — destroyed the last vestiges of bourgeois-democratic liberties at home and established there a cruel, terroristic regime, trampled upon the principle of sovereignty and free development of small countries, proclaimed as their own the policy of seizing foreign territory and publicly stated that they were aiming at world domination and the spreading of the fascist regime all over the world; and by seizing Czechoslovakia and the central regions of China, the Axis Powers showed that they were ready to carry out their threat to enslave all the peace-loving peoples. In view of this, the Second World War against the Axis Powers, unlike the First World War, assumed from the very outset the character of an anti-fascist war, a war of liberation, one of the tasks of which was to restore democratic liberties. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against the Axis Powers could only augment — and really did augment — the anti-fascist and liberating character of the Second World War.

It was on this basis that the anti-fascist coalition of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Great Britain and other freedom-loving countries came into being and later played the decisive role in defeating the armed forces of the Axis Powers.

That is how it stands with the question of the origin and character of the Second World War.

Everybody, probably, now admits that the war was not nor could have been an accident in the lives of the peoples, that it actually became a war of the peoples for their existence, and that for that very reason could not have been a swift or lightning war.

As far as our country is concerned, for her this war was the fiercest and most arduous war in the history of our Motherland.

But the war was not only a curse. It was also a great school in which all the forces of the people were examined and tested. The war laid bare all facts and events in the rear and at the front, it ruthlessly tore down all the veils and coverings that concealed the actual features of states, governments and parties, and brought them onto the stage without masks and without make-up, with all their defects and merits. The war was something in the nature of an examination of our Soviet system, of our state, of our government and of our Communist Party; and it summed up their work and said, as it were: Here they are, your people and organizations, their life and work — scrutinize them carefully and treat them according to their deserts.

This is one of the positive sides of the war.

For us, for the voters, this is of immense importance, for it helps us quickly and impartially to appraise the activities of the Party and its men, and to draw correct conclusions. At another time we would have had to study the speeches and reports of the representatives of the Party, analyse them, compare their words with their deeds, sum up the results, and so forth. This is a

complicated and laborious job, and there is no guarantee against mistakes. It is different now, when the war is over, when the war itself has verified the work of our organizations and leaders and has summed it up. It is now much easier to analyse matters and arrive at correct conclusions.

And so, what are the results of the war?

There is one principal result upon which all the others rest. This is, that at the end of the war the enemies sustained defeat and we and our Allies proved to be the victors. We terminated the war with complete victory over our enemies — this is the principal result of the war. But this is too general, and we cannot put a full stop here. Of course, to defeat the enemies in a war such as the Second World War, the like of which has never been witnessed in the history of mankind before, means achieving a victory of world historical importance. All this is true. But still, it is a general result, and we cannot rest content with it. To appreciate the great historical importance of our victory we must analyse the matter more concretely.

And so, how should our victory over the enemies be interpreted? What can this victory signify from the point of view of the state and the development of the internal forces of our country?

Our victory signifies, first of all, that our Soviet social system was victorious, that the Soviet social system successfully passed the test of fire in the war and proved that it is fully viable.

As we know, the foreign press on more than one occasion asserted that the Soviet social system was a “risky experiment” that was doomed to failure, that the Soviet system was a “house of cards” having no foundations in life and imposed upon the people by the Cheka, and that a slight shock from without was sufficient to cause this “house of cards” to collapse.

Now we can say that the war has refuted all these

assertions of the foreign press and has proved them to have been groundless. The war proved that the Soviet social system is a genuinely people's system, which grew up from the ranks of the people and enjoys their powerful support; that the Soviet social system is a fully viable and stable form of organization of society.

More than that. The issue now is not whether the Soviet social system is viable or not, because after the object lessons of the war, no sceptic now dares to express doubt concerning the viability of the Soviet social system. Now the issue is that the Soviet social system has proved to be more viable and stable than the non-Soviet social system, that the Soviet social system is a better form of organization of society than any non-Soviet social system.

Secondly, our victory signifies that our Soviet state system was victorious, that our multinational Soviet state passed all the tests of the war and proved its viability.

As we know, prominent foreign journalists have more than once expressed themselves to the effect that the Soviet multinational state is an "artificial and short-lived structure," that in the event of any complications arising, the collapse of the Soviet Union would be inevitable, that the Soviet Union would share the fate of Austria-Hungary.

Now we can say that the war refuted these statements of the foreign press and proved them to have been devoid of all foundation. The war proved that the Soviet multinational state system successfully passed the test, grew stronger than ever during the war and turned out to be quite a viable state system. These gentlemen failed to realize that the analogy of Austria-Hungary was unsound because our multinational state grew up not on the bourgeois basis, which stimulates sentiments of national distrust and enmity, but on the Soviet basis, which, on the contrary, cultivates sentiments of friend-

ship and fraternal cooperation among the peoples of our state.

Incidentally, after the lessons of the war, these gentlemen no longer dare to come out and deny the viability of the Soviet state system. The issue now is no longer the viability of the Soviet state system because there can be no doubt about its viability. Now the issue is that the Soviet state system has proved to be a model multinational state, that the Soviet state system is such a system of state organization in which the national problem and the problem of the cooperation of nations have found a better solution than in any other multinational state.

Thirdly, our victory signifies that the Soviet Armed Forces were victorious, that our Red Army was victorious, that the Red Army heroically withstood all the hardships of the war, utterly routed the armies of our enemies, and emerged from the war the victor. (*A voice: "Under Comrade Stalin's leadership!" All rise. Loud and prolonged applause, rising to an ovation.*)

Now, everybody, friends and enemies alike, admit that the Red Army proved equal to its tremendous task. But this was not the case six years ago, in the period before the war. As we know, prominent foreign journalists, and many recognized authorities on military affairs abroad, repeatedly stated that the condition of the Red Army raised grave doubts, that the Red Army was poorly armed and lacked a proper commanding staff, that its morale was beneath criticism, that while it might be fit for defence, it was unfit for attack, and that, if struck by the German troops, the Red Army would collapse like "a colossus with feet of clay." Such statements were made not only in Germany, but also in France, Great Britain and America.

Now we can say that the war refuted all these statements and proved them to have been groundless and ridiculous. The war proved that the Red Army is not

“a colossus with feet of clay,” but a first-class modern army, equipped with the most up-to-date armaments, led by most experienced commanders and possessed of high morale and fighting qualities. It must not be forgotten that the Red Army is the army which utterly routed the German army, the army which only yesterday struck terror in the hearts of the armies of the European states.

It must be noted that the “critics” of the Red Army are becoming fewer and fewer. More than that. Comments are more and more frequently appearing in the foreign press noting the high qualities of the Red Army, the skill of its men and commanders, and the flawlessness of its strategy and tactics. This is understandable. After the brilliant victories the Red Army achieved at Moscow and Stalingrad, at Kursk and Belgorod, at Kiev and Kirovograd, at Minsk and Bobruisk, at Leningrad and Tallinn, at Jassy and Lvov, on the Vistula and the Niemen, on the Danube and the Oder and at Vienna and Berlin — after all this, it is impossible not to admit that the Red Army is a first-class army, from which much can be learned. (*Loud applause.*)

This is how we concretely understand the victory our country achieved over her enemies.

Such, in the main, are the results of the war.

It would be wrong to think that such an historical victory could have been achieved without preliminary preparation of the whole country for active defence. It would be no less wrong to assume that such preparation could have been made in a short space of time, in a matter of three or four years. It would be still more wrong to assert that our victory was entirely due to the bravery of our troops. Without bravery it is, of course, impossible to achieve victory. But bravery alone is not enough to overpower an enemy who possesses a vast army, first-class armaments, well-trained officers and fairly well-organized supplies. To withstand the blow

of such an enemy, to resist him and then to inflict utter defeat upon him it was necessary to have, in addition to the unexampled bravery of our troops, fully up-to-date armaments, and in sufficient quantities, and well-organized supplies, also in sufficient quantities. But for this it was necessary to have, and in sufficient quantities, elementary things such as: metals — for the production of armaments, equipment and industrial machinery; fuel — to ensure the operation of industry and transport; cotton — to manufacture army clothing; grain — to supply the army with food.

Can it be maintained that before entering the Second World War our country already possessed the necessary minimum of the material potentialities needed to satisfy these main requirements? I think it can. To prepare for this immense task we had to carry out three Five-Year Plans of national economic development. It was precisely these three Five-Year Plans that enabled us to create these material potentialities. At all events, the situation in our country in this respect was ever so much better before the Second World War in 1940, than it was before the First World War in 1913.

What were the material potentialities at our country's disposal before the Second World War?

To help you to understand this I shall have to make you a brief report on the activities of the Communist Party in the matter of preparing our country for active defence.

If we take the data for 1940 — the eve of the Second World War — and compare it with the data for 1913 — the eve of the First World War — we shall get the following picture.

In 1913 there was produced in our country 4,220,000 tons of pig iron, 4,230,000 tons of steel, 29,000,000 tons of coal, 9,000,000 tons of oil, 21,600,000 tons of marketable grain and 740,000 tons of raw cotton.

Such were the material potentialities of our country

when she entered the First World War.

This was the economic basis old Russia could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

As regards 1940, in that year the following was produced in our country: 15,000,000 tons of pig iron, i.e., nearly four times as much as in 1913; 18,300,000 tons of steel, i.e., four and a half times as much as in 1913; 166,000,000 tons of coal, i.e., five and a half times as much as in 1913; 31,000,000 tons of oil, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913; 38,300,000 tons of marketable grain, i.e., 17,000,000 tons more than in 1913; 2,700,000 tons of raw cotton, i.e., three and a half times as much as in 1913.

Such were the material potentialities of our country when she entered the Second World War.

This was the economic basis the Soviet Union could utilize for the purpose of prosecuting the war.

The difference, as you see, is colossal.

This unprecedented growth of production cannot be regarded as the simple and ordinary development of a country from backwardness to progress. It was a leap by which our Motherland became transformed from a backward country into an advanced country, from an agrarian into an industrial country.

This historic transformation was brought about in the course of three Five-Year Plans, beginning with 1928 — with the first year of the first Five-Year Plan period. Up to that time we had to restore our ruined industries and heal the wounds inflicted upon us by the First World War and the Civil War. If we take into consideration the fact that the first Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years, and that the execution of the third Five-Year Plan was interrupted by the war in the fourth year, it works out that the transformation of our country from an agrarian into an industrial country took only about 13 years.

It cannot but be admitted that 13 years is an incred-

ibly short period for the execution of such a gigantic task.

It is this that explains the storm of controversy that broke out in the foreign press at the time these figures were published. Our friends decided that a “miracle” had happened; those who were ill-disposed towards us proclaimed that the Five-Year Plans were “Bolshevik propaganda” and “tricks of the Cheka.” But as miracles do not happen and the Cheka is not so powerful as to be able to annul the laws of social development, “public opinion” abroad was obliged to resign itself to the facts.

By what policy was the Communist Party able to create these material potentialities in so short a time?

First of all by the Soviet policy of industrializing the country.

The Soviet method of industrializing the country differs radically from the capitalist method of industrialization. In capitalist countries, industrialization usually starts with light industry. In view of the fact that light industry requires less investments, that capital turnover is faster and profits are made more easily than in heavy industry, light industry becomes the first object of industrialization in those countries. Only after the passage of a long period of time, during which light industry accumulates profits and concentrates them in banks, only after this does the turn of heavy industry come and accumulation begin gradually to be transferred to heavy industry for the purpose of creating conditions for its development. But this is a long process, which takes a long time, running into several decades, during which you have to wait while the light industry develops and do without heavy industry. Naturally, the Communist Party could not take this path. The Party knew that war was approaching, that it would be impossible to defend our country without heavy industry, that it was necessary to set to work to develop heavy industry as quickly as possible, and that to be belated in this

matter meant courting defeat. The Party remembered what Lenin said about it being impossible to protect the independence of our country without heavy industry, and about the likelihood of the Soviet system perishing without heavy industry. The Communist Party of our country therefore rejected the “ordinary” path of industrialization and commenced the industrialization of the country by developing heavy industry. This was a very difficult task, but one that could be accomplished. It was greatly facilitated by the nationalization of industry and the banks, which made it possible quickly to collect funds and transfer them to heavy industry.

There can be no doubt that without this it would have been impossible to transform our country into an industrial country in so short a time.

Secondly, by the policy of collectivizing agriculture.

To put an end to our backwardness in agriculture and to provide the country with the largest possible amount of marketable grain, cotton, and so forth, it was necessary to pass from small peasant farming to large-scale farming, for only large-scale farming can employ modern machinery, utilize all the achievements of agricultural science and provide the largest possible quantity of marketable produce. But there are two kinds of large-scale farming — capitalist and collective. The Communist Party could not take the capitalist path of developing agriculture not only on grounds of principle, but also because that path presupposes an exceedingly long process of development and calls for the ruination of the peasants and their transformation into agricultural labourers. The Communist Party therefore took the path of collectivizing agriculture, the path of organizing large farms by uniting the peasant farms into collective farms. The collective method proved to be an exceedingly progressive method not only because it did not call for the ruination of the peasants, but also, and particularly, because it enabled us in the course of

several years to cover the entire country with large collective farms capable of employing modern machinery, of utilizing all the achievements of agricultural science and of providing the country with the largest possible quantity of marketable produce.

There is no doubt that without the policy of collectivization we would not have been able to put an end to the age-long backwardness of our agriculture in so short a time.

It cannot be said that the Party's policy met with no resistance. Not only backward people, who always refuse to listen to anything that is new, but even many prominent members of our Party persistently tried to pull our Party back, and by every possible means tried to drag it onto the "ordinary" capitalist path of development. All the anti-Party machinations of the Trotskyites and Rights, all their "activities" in sabotaging the measures of our government, pursued the one object of frustrating the Party's policy and of hindering industrialization and collectivization. But the Party yielded neither to the threats of some nor to the howling of others and confidently marched forward in spite of everything. It is to the Party's credit that it did not adjust itself to the backward, that it was not afraid to swim against the current, and that all the time it held onto its position of the leading force. There can be no doubt that if the Communist Party had not displayed this staunchness and perseverance it would have been unable to uphold the policy of industrializing the country and of collectivizing agriculture.

Was the Communist Party able to make proper use of the material potentialities created in this way for the purpose of developing war production and of supplying the Red Army with the armaments it needed?

I think it was, and that it did so with the utmost success.

Leaving out of account the first year of the war,

when the evacuation of industry to the East hindered the work of developing war production, we can say that during the three succeeding years of the war the Party achieved such successes as enabled it not only to supply the front with sufficient quantities of artillery, machine-guns, rifles, airplanes, tanks and ammunition, but also to accumulate reserves. Moreover, as is well known, the quality of our armaments was not only not inferior but, in general, even superior to the German.

It is well known that during the last three years of the war our tank industry produced annually an average of over 30,000 tanks, self-propelled guns and armoured cars. (*Loud applause.*)

It is well known, further, that in the same period our aircraft industry produced annually up to 40,000 aeroplanes. (*Loud applause.*)

It is also well known that our artillery industry in the same period produced annually up to 120,000 guns of all calibres (*loud applause*), up to 450,000 light and heavy machine-guns (*loud applause*), over 3,000,000 rifles (*applause*) and about 2,000,000 automatic rifles. (*Applause.*)

Lastly, it is well known that our mortar industry in the period of 1942-44 produced annually an average of up to 100,000 mortars. (*Loud applause.*)

It goes without saying that simultaneously we produced corresponding quantities of artillery shells, mines of various kinds, air bombs, and rifle and machine-gun cartridges.

It is well known, for example, that in 1944 alone we produced over 240,000,000 shells, bombs and mines (*applause*) and 7,400,000,000 cartridges. (*Loud applause.*)

Such is the general picture of the way the Red Army was supplied with arms and ammunition.

As you see, it does not resemble the picture of the way our army was supplied during the First World War, when the front suffered a chronic shortage of artillery

and shells, when the army fought without tanks and aircraft, and when one rifle was issued for every three men.

As regards supplying the Red Army with food and clothing, it is common knowledge that the front not only felt no shortage whatever in this respect, but even, had the necessary reserves.

This is how the matter stands as regards the activities of the Communist Party of our country in the period up to the beginning of the war and during the war.

Now a few words about the Communist Party's plans of work for the immediate future. As you know, these plans are formulated in the new Five-Year Plan, which is to be adopted in the very near future. The main tasks of the new Five-Year Plan are to rehabilitate the devastated regions of our country, to restore industry and agriculture to the pre-war level, and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable extent. Apart from the fact that the rationing system is to be abolished in the very near future (*loud and prolonged applause*), special attention will be devoted to the expansion of the production of consumer goods, to raising the standard of living of the working people by steadily reducing the prices of all commodities (*loud and prolonged applause*), and to the extensive organization of scientific research institutes of every kind (*applause*) capable of giving the fullest scope to our scientific forces. (*Loud applause.*)

I have no doubt that if we give our scientists proper assistance they will be able in the very near future not only to overtake but even outstrip the achievements of science beyond the borders of our country. (*Prolonged applause.*)

As regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful uplift of our national economy that will enable us to raise our industry to a level, say, three times as high as that of pre-war industry. We must see to it that our industry shall be able to produce annually up to 50,000,000 tons of pig iron (*prolonged*

applause), up to 60,000,000 tons of steel (*prolonged applause*), up to 500,000,000 tons of coal (*prolonged applause*) and up to 60,000,000 tons of oil (*prolonged applause*). Only when we succeed in doing that can we be sure that our Motherland will be insured against all contingencies. (*Loud applause.*) This will need, perhaps, another three Five-Year Plans, if not more. But it can be done, and we must do it.

This, then, is my brief report on the activities of the Communist Party during the recent past and on its plans of work for the future. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

It is for you to judge to what extent the Party has been and is working on the proper lines (*applause*), and whether it could not have worked better. (*Laughter and applause.*)

It is said that victors are not judged (*laughter and applause*), that they must not be criticized, that they must not be inquired into. This is not true. Victors may and should be judged (*laughter and applause*), they may and should be criticized and inquired into. This is beneficial not only for the cause, but also for the victors (*laughter and applause*); there will be less swelled-headedness, and there will be more modesty. (*Laughter and applause.*) I regard the election campaign as a court of the voters sitting in judgement over the Communist Party as the ruling party. The result of the election will be the voters' verdict. (*Laughter and applause.*) The Communist Party of our country would not be worth much if it feared criticism and investigation. The Communist Party is ready to receive the verdict of the voters. (*Loud applause.*)

In this election contest the Communist Party does not stand alone. It is going to the polls in a bloc with the non-Party people. In the past communists were somewhat distrustful of non-Party people and of non-Partyism. This was due to the fact that various bourgeois

groups, who thought it was not to their advantage to come before the voters without a mask, not infrequently used the non-Party flag as a screen. This was the case in the past. Times are different now. Non-Party people are now separated from the bourgeoisie by a barrier called the Soviet social system. And on this side of the barrier the non-Party people are united with the communists in one, common, collective body of Soviet people. Within this collective body they fought side by side to consolidate the might of our country, they fought side by side and shed their blood on the various fronts for the sake of freedom and greatness of our Motherland, and side by side they hammered out and forged our country's victory over her enemies. The only difference between them is that some belong to the Party and some don't. But this difference is only a formal one. The important thing is that all are engaged in one common cause. That is why the communist and non-Party bloc is a natural and vital thing. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In conclusion, permit me to express my thanks for the confidence which you have shown me (*loud and prolonged applause. A voice: "Cheers for the great leader of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!"*) by nominating me as a candidate for the Supreme Soviet. You need have no doubt that I will do my best to justify your confidence. (*All rise. Loud and prolonged applause rising to an ovation. Voices in different parts of the hall: "Long live great Stalin, Hurrah!" "Cheers for the great leader of the peoples!" "Glory to the great Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin, the candidate of the entire people!" "Glory to the creator of all our victories, Comrade Stalin!"*)

(*Soviet Calendar 1917-1947*)

ANSWER TO A LETTER OF 30 JANUARY, FROM COL.- PROFESSOR RASIN

On Clausewitz and the questions of war and the art of war

February 23, 1946

Dear Comrade Rasin,

I have received your letter of 30 January on Clausewitz and your short thesis on war and the art of war.

1. You ask if Lenin's standpoint on the judgement of Clausewitz is no longer valid.

In my opinion the question is wrongly put.

By putting the question in such a way one could believe that Lenin had analysed the science of war and the works of Clausewitz, judged them from a military viewpoint, and had left us a number of guidelines on military questions. Putting the question in such a way is wrong because there are no such "Theses" of Lenin on Clausewitz's teachings on the art of war.

Unlike Engels, Lenin did not believe himself to be an expert on military matters, — neither before the October Revolution, nor in the period up to the end of the Civil War.

During the Civil War, Lenin abjured us young comrades on the Central Committee to study the art of war thoroughly. He unhesitatingly declared that it was too late for him to become a military expert. This explains why Lenin, in his judgement on Clausewitz and his remarks on Clausewitz's works, does not touch upon solely military aspects such as questions of military strategy and tactics and their relation to each other, the relation between attack and retreat, defence and counter-offensive and so on.

What was Lenin's interest in Clausewitz and why

did he acknowledge him?

Lenin acknowledged Clausewitz who was not a Marxist, and who was recognized as an authority in the field of military theory because in his works he confirmed the known Marxist theory that there is a direct relation between war and politics, that politics can engender war and that war is the continuation of politics by force. Here, Lenin needed Clausewitz to prove that Plekhanov, Kautsky and others had fallen once more into social-chauvinism and social-imperialism. He further acknowledged Clausewitz in that he confirmed the Marxist viewpoint in his works that under certain unfavourable conditions, — retreat is as justifiable a military action as is attack. Lenin needed Clausewitz to disprove the theory of the “left” communists who denied that retreat could be a justifiable military action.

In this way, not as a military expert, but as a politician, Lenin used the works of Clausewitz, and was mainly interested in those questions in the works of Clausewitz which showed the relation between war and politics.

Thus, as successors of Lenin, there are no restrictions on us in the criticism of the military doctrine of Clausewitz, as there are no remarks of Lenin that could hinder us in our free criticism.

Thus, your judgement, on the article of Comrade Meshtsherjakov (in *Wojennaja Mysl*, No. 6-7, 1945), which criticizes the military doctrine of Clausewitz, regarding it as a “revision” of Lenin’s judgement is completely unjustified.

2. Do we have reason at all to criticize the military doctrine of Clausewitz? Yes, we have. In the interests of our cause and the modern science of war, we are obliged not only to criticize Clausewitz, but also Moltke, Schlieffen, Ludendorff, Keitel and other exponents of German military ideology. During the last 30 years Germany has twice forced a bloody war on the rest of

the world and twice has suffered defeat. Was this accidental? Of course not. Does this not mean that not only Germany as a whole, but also its military ideology has not stood the test? Obviously. It is well known that the military of the whole world, also our Russian military, looked up to the German military authorities. Is it not time to put an end to this undeserved respect? Absolutely. So, this can only be done by criticism, especially from our side, especially from the side of those who have won the victory over Germany.

Concerning Clausewitz, as an authority in the field of military authority, he is of course out of date. On the whole, Clausewitz was a representative of the time of manufacture in war, but now we are in the machine age of war. Undoubtedly the machine age of war requires new military ideologies. Thus, it would be ridiculous to follow the teachings of Clausewitz today. One cannot make progress and further science without a critical analysis of the antiquated theories of well-known authorities. This applies not only to the authorities in war theory but also to the Marxist classics. Engels once said of the Russian commanders of 1812, that Gen. Barclay de Tolley was the only one of any relevance. Engels was of course wrong, as Kutusov was of greater importance by far. Nevertheless, there are people in our time who did not hesitate to defend this wrong judgement of Engels.

In our criticism we must not be guided by single remarks and judgements from the classics, but must be guided by Lenin's well-known guideline:

“We do not regard the theory of Marx as something final and untouchable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has laid the foundations of that science that the socialists must develop in every direction if they do not want to fall bad behind the times. We are of the opinion that the Russian socialists

must find their own interpretation of Marxism, as this theory gives only general guidelines, the application of which in detail is different in England than in France; in France, different than in Germany; in Germany, different than in Russia.”*

Such an attitude is for us even more necessary concerning the authorities of war theory.

3. Concerning your short thesis on war and the art of war, I have to restrict myself to general remarks because of their surface character. The thesis contains too much philosophy and abstract statements. The terminology taken from Clausewitz, talking of the grammar and logic of war, hurts one’s ears. The question of the factional character of war theory is primitively posed. The hymns of praise to Stalin also pain the ears, it hurts to read them. Also, the chapter on counter-offensive (not to be confused with counter-attack) is missing. I am talking of the counter-offensive after a successful but indecisive enemy offensive, during which the defenders assemble their forces to turn to a counter-offensive and strike a decisive blow to the enemy and inflict defeat upon him. I am of the opinion that a well-organized counter-offensive is a very interesting method of offensive. You, as an historian should be interested in this. The old Parthens were already acquainted with such a counter-offensive when they lured the Roman Commander Crassus and his army into the interior of their country and, turning to counter-offensive, destroyed him and his troops. Our brilliant Commander, Kutusov, executed this when he destroyed Napoleon and his army by a well-prepared counter-offensive.

J. Stalin

(New World, No. 7, April 1947, pp. 23-25)

* V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 4, pp. 191-192, Russ. ed.

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE COMMISSAR OF DEFENCE OF THE USSR NO. 8

February 23, 1946

Comrade soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals!

Today we are celebrating the 28th anniversary of the existence of the Red Army. The Red Army commemorates its 28th anniversary in the glow of the glorious victory over the German and Japanese imperialists. Engaged in a prolonged and arduous war, the Red Army has emerged as a first-class army of the highest morale and fighting force, equipped with modern armaments and cadres of great experience, tempered by battle. In the war against the fascist invaders the Red Army has shown its high quality, and it has shown that it is able to defend the interests of the Soviet state effectively, faithfully and staunchly.

Our soldiers, officers and generals have justified the confidence of the people and have shown their great devotion towards our Motherland. The Red Army has proved to the Soviet people that they can have confidence in it. The people of our country have great trust in their army and its victories, and will keep the sacred memory of their heroes who fell in the battles for the Motherland.

The remarkable victories of the Red Army are explained, above all, by the fact that it is a truly popular army that defends the interests of its people. The Soviet people love their army ardently, and are a constant source of its reinforcement and of its strength. This has been shown especially in the time of the Great Patriotic War. All our people have worked unhesitatingly,

day and night, for victory. Without this work, without this self-sacrificing of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, without their material and moral support, the Red Army would not have defeated the enemy.

The victories of the Red Army are also explained by the fact that it was led and educated by the Communist Party. Furthermore, the behests of the great Lenin helped the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party, to transform our country from a backward land to a land of progress, from an agrarian to an industrial country. On this basis was founded all the material possibilities for the victorious struggle of the Red Army against its enemies. During the Great Patriotic War, the Communist Party united all the countries of the Soviet Union into a single military camp, and has orientated all the efforts of the people and the army towards a single aim — the destruction of the enemy. The Communist Party has educated the Soviet soldier in the sense and aims of the war, it has cultivated love for the Motherland, constantly reinforced their fighting spirit and inspired their staunchness and discipline. All this has created the conditions for our victory.

After victory over the enemies, the Soviet Union has entered into a new period, into a peaceful period of economic development. The present task of the Soviet people is to assure the conquered positions and to go forward in a new economic effort. We cannot only assure our position as this would mean stagnation; we have to go forward and create the conditions for a new and powerful effort of the national economy. To put it in a word, we have to heal the wounds inflicted on our country by the enemy and reach the pre-war level of the national economy before we can make considerable progress; we have to raise the material well-being of our people and we have to raise the economic and military ability of the Soviet state.

Under these new conditions, the Red Army must

vigilantly protect the creative work of the Soviet people, must solidly guarantee the interests of 'the Soviet Union and protect the borders of our Motherland and make them inaccessible to any enemy.

During the war the main task of the soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army consisted of attaining the victory, to concentrate all their knowledge and efforts on the total annihilation of the enemy. In these peaceful times the prime task of our soldiers, officers and generals, without exception, consists of perfecting their military and political abilities. All our soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the Red Army have to study military art intensively, have to know their weapons well and perform their duty irreproachably. Now, more than ever, the officers have to be able to educate and instruct their subordinates.

During the war the officers and generals of the Red Army knew well how to lead their troops in battle. Now these officers and generals have to become perfect masters in the education and instruction of their troops in present times.

The Great Patriotic War has introduced much that is new in the military art. The combat experience represents a rich treasure for the instruction and education of the troops. That is why all the instruction of the army should be based on the intelligent application of the experiences of the war. It is also necessary to utilize this experience in all fields for the theoretical instruction of the cadres and officers, for the enriching of Soviet military science. One must ensure that the military art develops constantly and swiftly. The Red Army is obliged not only to follow the development of the military art but to further progress it. The Red Army is equipped with first-class military material which constitutes the basis for its ability in combat. It knows how to handle this equipment perfectly and it treats it as the apple of its eye.

Any successes in the instruction and education of its troops is impossible without discipline and a strict military order, because the effectiveness of an army depends on this. This applies especially to the adjutants and sergeants who are the immediate superiors and direct teachers of the soldiers of the Red Army. The soldiers, officers and generals of the Red Army have great merit with the people and the Motherland. But they must not become complacent and vain about this, they must not rest upon their laurels, — but they must conscientiously carry out their duties and they must devote all their strength and knowledge to the service of the Red Army. That is what is demanded of all Soviet soldiers.

Comrades, soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy, non-commissioned officers, officers and generals! In the name of the Soviet government and our Communist Party, I greet and congratulate you on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the Red Army. To celebrate the day of the Red Army, today, February 23, I order: A salute of 20 artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

Long live our victorious Red Army!
Long live our victorious sailors of the war!
Long live our glorious Communist Party!
Long live the great Soviet people!
Long live our powerful Motherland!

J. Stalin

People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union

(*Pravda*, No. 7, February 23, 1946)

DECLARATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE USSR

March 15, 1946

In relation to the question of the formation of the government of the USSR, which was submitted to the examination of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars regards its obligations as terminated and hands over its power to the Supreme Soviet.

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is at the disposal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

J. Stalin
President of the Council of
People's Commissars of the USSR

(Zasedanie Verkhovogo Sovieta SSSR, p. 82)

INTERVIEW WITH A “PRAVDA” CORRESPONDENT

On Churchill's speech at Fulton

March 13, 1946

The other day a *Pravda* correspondent asked Comrade Stalin to clarify a number of questions connected with Mr. Churchill's speech. Below are given Comrade Stalin's replies to the questions put by the correspondent.

Q. How do you appraise the latest speech Mr. Churchill delivered in the United States of America?

A. I appraise it as a dangerous act calculated to sow the seeds of discord between the Allied states and hamper their cooperation.

Q. Can Mr. Churchill's speech be regarded as harmful to the cause of peace and security?

A. Unquestionably, yes. As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill's position is now that of the incendiaries of war. And Mr. Churchill is not alone in this — he has friends not only in England but in the United States of America as well.

It should be noted that in this respect Mr. Churchill and his friends strikingly resemble Hitler and his friends. Hitler set out to unleash war by proclaiming the race theory, declaring that the German-speaking people constituted a superior nation. Mr. Churchill sets out to unleash war also with a race theory, by asserting that the English-speaking nations are superior nations called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world. The German race theory led Hitler and his friends to the conclusion that the Germans as the only superior nation must dominate other nations. The English race theory leads Mr. Churchill and his friends to the conclusion that the English-speaking nations, as the only

superior nations, must dominate the other nations of the world.

As a matter of fact, Mr. Churchill and his friends in England and the USA are presenting something in the nature of an ultimatum to nations which do not speak English: recognize our domination voluntarily, and then everything will be in order — otherwise war is inevitable.

But the nations shed their blood during five years of fierce war for the sake of the freedom and independence of their countries, and not for the sake of replacing the domination of the Hitlers by the domination of the Churchills. Therefore, it is quite probable that the nations which do not speak English and at the same time constitute the vast majority of the world's population will not agree to submit to the new slavery.

Mr. Churchill's tragedy is that he, as an inveterate Tory, does not understand this simple and obvious truth.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Churchill's line is that of war, a call to war against the USSR. It is also clear that this line of Mr. Churchill's is incompatible with the existing treaty of alliance between Britain and the USSR. True, in order to confuse the readers, Mr. Churchill states in passing that the term of the Soviet-British treaty of mutual assistance and cooperation could perfectly well be extended to fifty years. But how can such a statement by Mr. Churchill be reconciled with his line of war against the USSR, with his preaching of war against the USSR? Clearly these things cannot be reconciled by any means. And if Mr. Churchill, who is calling for war against the Soviet Union, at the same time believes it possible to extend the term of the Anglo-Soviet treaty to fifty years, that means that he regards this treaty as a mere scrap of paper which he needs only to cover up and camouflage his anti-Soviet line. Therefore we cannot treat seriously the hypocritical statement of Mr. Churchill's friends

in England concerning the extension of the term of the Soviet-British treaty to fifty years or more. The extension of the term of the treaty is meaningless if one of the parties violates the treaty and turns it into a mere scrap of paper.

Q. How do you appraise that part of Mr. Churchill's speech in which he attacks the democratic systems in the European states neighbouring with us and in which he criticizes the good-neighbourly relations established between these states and the Soviet Union?

A. This part of Mr. Churchill's speech represents a mixture of elements of slander with elements of rudeness and tactlessness.

Mr. Churchill asserts that "Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia — all these famous cities and populations around them lie within the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow." Mr. Churchill describes all this as boundless "expansionist tendencies" of the Soviet Union.

No special effort is necessary to prove that in this case Mr. Churchill is rudely and shamelessly slandering both Moscow and the above-mentioned states neighbouring with the USSR.

Firstly, it is utterly absurd to speak of exclusive control of the USSR in Vienna and Berlin, where there are Allied Control Councils composed of representatives of the four states and where the USSR has only one-fourth of the votes. It does happen that some people cannot help slandering, but even then there should be a limit.

Secondly, one must not forget the following fact. The Germans invaded the USSR through Finland, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Germans were able to effect their invasion by way of these countries because at that time governments hostile to the

Soviet Union existed in these countries. Owing to the German invasion, the Soviet Union irrevocably lost in battles with the Germans and also as a result of German occupation and the driving off of Soviet people to German penal servitude, some 7,000,000 persons. In other words the Soviet Union lost several times more people than Britain and the United States of America taken together. Possibly some quarters are inclined to consign to oblivion these colossal sacrifices of the Soviet people which secured the liberation of Europe from the Hitlerite yoke. But the Soviet Union cannot forget them. The question arises, what can there be surprising about the fact that the Soviet Union, desiring to insure its security in the future, seeks to achieve a situation when those countries will have governments maintaining a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union? How can anyone who has not gone mad describe these peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union as expansionist tendencies of our state?

Mr. Churchill further states that “the Russian-dominated Polish government has been encouraged to make enormous wrongful inroads upon Germany.”

Here every word is rude and offensive slander. Present-day democratic Poland is guided by outstanding men. They have proved by deeds that they are capable of defending the interests and dignity of their homeland in a manner of which their predecessors were not capable. What grounds has Mr. Churchill to assert that the leaders of present-day Poland can permit the “domination” of representatives of any foreign states whatever in their country? Is it not because Mr. Churchill intends to sow the seeds of discord in the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union that he slanders “the Russians” here?...

Mr. Churchill is displeased with the fact that Poland has effected a turn in her policy towards friendship and alliance with the USSR. There was a time when ele-

ments of conflict and contradiction prevailed in the relations between Poland and the USSR. That furnished statesmen of Mr. Churchill's kind with an opportunity to play on these contradictions, to lay their hands on Poland under the guise of protecting her from the Russians, to intimidate Russia with the spectre of war between her and Poland, and to reserve the position of arbitrators for themselves. But that time is past, for the enmity between Poland and Russia has yielded place to friendship between them, while Poland, present-day democratic Poland, does not want to be tossed around like a ball by foreigners any longer. It seems to me that it is this very circumstance that irritates Mr. Churchill and impels him to rude, tactless sallies against Poland. It is no joke: he is not allowed to play his game at someone else's expense....

As regards Mr. Churchill's attack on the Soviet Union in connection with Poland's extending her western frontier into Polish territories seized by the Germans in the past, here, it seems to me, he is obviously sharpening. It is well known that the decision on Poland's western frontier was adopted at the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the basis of Poland's demands. The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it regards Poland's demands correct and just. It is quite probable that Mr. Churchill is displeased with that decision. But why does Mr. Churchill, while sparing no arrows against the position of the Russians in this matter, conceal from his readers the fact that the decision was adopted at the Berlin Conference unanimously, that not the Russians alone but the British and the Americans too voted for this decision? Why did Mr. Churchill need to mislead people?

Mr. Churchill further asserts that "the communist parties, which were previously very small in all these eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers, and seek

everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police governments prevail in nearly every case, and thus far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy.”

It is well known that in Britain the state is now governed by one party, the Labour Party, while the opposition parties are devoid of the right to participate in the government of Britain. This is what Mr. Churchill calls true democracy. Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary are governed by blocs of several parties — from four to six parties — while the opposition, if it is more or less loyal, is secured the right of participating in the government. That is what Mr. Churchill calls totalitarianism, tyranny and police rule. Why and on what grounds — do not expect an answer from Mr. Churchill. Mr. Churchill does not understand in what a ridiculous position he places himself by his vociferous speeches about totalitarianism, tyranny and police rule.

Mr. Churchill would like Poland to be governed by Sosnkowski and Anders; Yugoslavia by Mihailović and Pavelić; Romania by Prince Stirbey and Radescu; Hungary and Austria by some king of the house of Hapsburg, and so forth. Mr. Churchill wants to convince us that these gentlemen from the fascist backyard are capable of securing “true democracy.” Such is Mr. Churchill’s “democracy.”

Mr. Churchill is wandering about the truth when he speaks of the growth of the influence of the communist parties in Eastern Europe. It should be noted, however, that he is not quite accurate. The influence of the communist parties has grown not only in Eastern Europe but in almost all the countries of Europe where fascism ruled before (Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Finland), or where German, Italian or Hungarian occupation took place (France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union and so forth).

The growth of the influence of the communists cannot be regarded as fortuitous. It is a perfectly legitimate phenomenon. The influence of the communists has grown because in the hard years of fascist domination in Europe, the communists proved reliable, courageous and self-sacrificing fighters against the fascist regime, for the freedom of the peoples. Mr. Churchill sometimes mentions in his speeches "the simple people of cottages," patting them on the back in a lordly manner and posing as their friend. But these people are not so simple as they may seem at first glance. They, these "simple people," have their own views, their own policy, and they are able to stand up for themselves. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who voted down Mr. Churchill and his party in England by casting their votes for the Labourites. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who isolated the reactionaries in Europe, the adherents of collaboration with fascism, and gave preference to the left democratic parties. It is they, the millions of these "simple people," who tested the communists in the fire of struggle and resistance to fascism and decided that the communists fully deserved the people's trust. That is how the influence of the communists has grown in Europe. Such is the law of historical development.

Naturally, Mr. Churchill does not like such a course of development and he sounds the alarm, appealing to force. But he similarly did not like the birth of the Soviet regime in Russia after the First World War. Then too he sounded the alarm and organized the military campaign of "14 states" against Russia, setting himself the goal of turning the wheel of history back. But history proved stronger than Churchillian intervention, and Mr. Churchill's quixotic ways brought about his utter defeat. I do not know whether Mr. Churchill and his friends will succeed in organizing after the Second World War a new military campaign against "Eastern

Europe.” But should they succeed — which is hardly probable, since millions of “simple people” are guarding the cause of peace — one can confidently say that they will be beaten just as they were beaten in the past, 26 years ago.

(Soviet Calendar 1917-1947)

INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPONDENT OF ASSOCIATED PRESS, GILMORE

March 22, 1946

Q. What significance do you believe the United Nations Organization has as a means of maintaining international peace?

A. I think the United Nations Organization is of great importance because it is an important instrument for the maintaining of peace and international security. The strength of this international Organization lies in the principle of the equality of states and not on the domination of some over the rest. If the United Nations Organization manages to maintain the principle of equality it will definitely play a great and positive role in ensuring general peace and security.

Q. In your opinion, what is causing the present general fear of war in many people and countries?

A. I am convinced that neither nations nor their armies want a new war — they want peace and are trying to maintain it. Thus, “the present fear of war” is not caused from this side. I am of the opinion that “the present fear of war” is caused by the actions of some political groups that engage in propaganda for a new war and in this way sow the seeds of distrust and insecurity.

Q. What must the governments of the freedom-loving countries do to secure peace and calm in the whole world?

A. It is necessary for the public and the government circles of the states to organize counter-propaganda on a broad basis against the propagandists of a new war, for the securing of peace; so that the campaign of the propagandists of a new war meets adequate resistance

from the public and the press, so that the arsonists of war are unmasked in time and denied the possibility of using freedom of speech against the interests of peace.

(*Daily Review*, No. 70, March 24, 1946)

REPLY TO A TELEGRAM FROM MR. HUGH BAILLIE

March 25, 1946

Telegram from Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press Agency, to Generalissimo Stalin, Kremlin, Moscow:

I would like to draw your attention to the declaration made by Winston Churchill to the United Press, which was transmitted by press and radio all over the world.

On this occasion I would like to renew my proposition on behalf of the United Press, that you make a declaration on the international situation. If you want to reply to Churchill's argument on the necessity of rapid action of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization on the Iranian question, the United Press would be pleased to transmit your views to the whole world. In the case of you wishing to put other questions concerning Iran or international peace and security, I beg you to utilize our possibilities which we place at your disposal with great pleasure.

Reply to Mr. Hugh Baillie of the United Press, New York:

Thank you for your friendly offer. I do not find Mr. Churchill's argument convincing. On the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran, that will be decided in a positive way by an agreement between the Soviet government and the government of Iran.

J. Stalin

President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

(*Pravda*, March 27, 1946)

REPLY TO A MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN

April 1946

I thank Your Excellence for the friendly sentiments expressed in your telegram on the occasion of the successful conclusion of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty, in which you have played an active part personally. I am persuaded that the agreement realized between the USSR and Iran in the form of this treaty will serve to develop and deeply strengthen the cooperation and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

Generalissimo Stalin

President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

(*Pravda*, April 8, 1946)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR NO. 7

May 1, 1946

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy, Sergeants and Mates!

Comrade Officers, Generals and Admirals!

Working people of the Soviet Union!

For the first time since the victory in the Great Patriotic War we celebrate the First of May, the international holiday of the working people, under peaceful conditions, which we have reached after hard struggle against the enemy and at the price of great sacrifices and sufferings.

A year ago the Red Army raised the banner of victory over Berlin and finished off the smashing of fascist Germany. Four months after the victory over Germany, imperialist Japan capitulated. The Second World War, prepared by the forces of international reaction and started by the main fascist states, ended in complete victory for the freedom-loving peoples.

The smashing and liquidation of the centres of fascism and world aggression led to a profound change in the political life of the peoples of the world and to a profound growth of the democratic movement of the people. Ripened by the experiences of war, the masses learned that they should not leave the fate of their states in the hands of reactionary leaders who follow limited, self-seeking class interests against the people. Thus, the people who want to change their lives take the fate of their state into their own hands and erect a democratic order and lead an active struggle against the reactionary powers, against the arsonists of a new war.

The peoples of the whole world do not want another

war. They struggle desperately for the ensuring of peace and security.

In the vanguard of the struggle for peace and security marches the Soviet Union, which has played a leading role in the smashing of fascism and has fulfilled her high mission of liberation.

The peoples who were liberated by the Soviet Union from the fascist yoke were given the possibility of founding their states on democratic principles and to realize their historical hopes. On this path they receive the fraternal help of the Soviet Union.

The whole world was able to convince itself not only of the power of the Soviet state, but also of the just character of its politics, based on the recognition of the equality of all peoples, based on respect for their freedom and self-determination. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union will, in the future, continue these politics which are the politics of peace and security, equality and friendship of the peoples.

Since the ending of the war, the Soviet Union is progressing in peaceful socialist construction. With great enthusiasm the Soviet people are continuing the peaceful constructive work that was interrupted by the war.

The Five-Year Plan for the reconstruction and development of the people's economy of the USSR, for the years 1946-1950, that has been approved by the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union, opens new perspectives for the further growth of the productive forces of our Motherland, the strengthening of its economic power, the raising of its material wealth and its culture.

The Five-Year Plan was accepted by the workers, peasants and intelligentsia of our country as a program entirely meeting their interests. It can be expected that the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, will spare no effort not only to fulfil this Five-Year Plan, but also to over-fulfil it by their endeavours.

While we develop this peaceful socialist construc-

tion we must not at any moment forget the machinations of international reaction, its plans for a new war. One must not forget the guidelines of the great Lenin that during the transition to peaceful work one must constantly be alert, and constantly keep an eye on the strength of the armed forces and their ability to defend our country.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union, our army, our airforce and our navy have fulfilled their duty towards our Motherland in the Great Patriotic War. The new task for our armed forces is to be on guard, to protect the peace and the constructive work of the Soviet people, and to safeguard the interests of the Soviet Union.

The successful fulfilment of this honourable task is possible only under the conditions of further development of the military culture and art of war of the fighters and commanders of our army, navy and airforce.

The armed forces of the Soviet Union have to raise their standards in the art of war, based on the experiences of war, based on the development of the science and technique of war.

There is no doubt that our army, fleet and airforce will honourably fulfil their task.

Comrades of the Red Army and Red Navy,
Sergeants and Mates! Comrade Officers, Mates and Generals!

Comrade working men and women, men and women peasants, intellectuals!

Demobilized fighters of the Red Army!

In the name of the government and the Communist Party, I greet you and congratulate you on the occasion of the First of May, on the occasion of the international holiday of the working people, and I order:

Today, May 1, in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the Union Republics as well

as in Lvov, Königsberg, Chabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes.

Long live our brave armed forces!

Long live our glorious Communist Party!

Long live the great Soviet people!

Long live our powerful Soviet Motherland!

J. Stalin

Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union

(Pravda, May 1, 1946)

TELEGRAM TO W.W. LANCASTER

May 4, 1946

New York
American-Russian Institute
To William W. Lancaster

I can only welcome the noble initiative of the American-Russian Institute in commemorating the late President Roosevelt. Humanity must be grateful to this great statesman for his outstanding merits in defeating the German-Japanese aggression, and the peoples of our countries, in addition, for the development of friendly relations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

Joseph Stalin

May 4, 1946

(RGASPI, F. 558, Op. 11, D. 1161, L. 61)

ORDER OF THE DAY OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR NO. 11

May 9, 1946

Comrade soldiers and sailors of the Red Army and Red Navy! Comrade officers, generals and admirals! Workers of the Soviet Union!

Today we celebrate the first anniversary of the great victory won by our people over fascist Germany, which attacked the liberty and independence of our Motherland.

In the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party, I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the national celebration, the day of victory over the German fascists.

To celebrate the victory feast, I order: today, May 9, a salute of 30 artillery salvos in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow and in the capitals of the federal republics, Lvov, Konigsberg, and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

Glory to our armed forces who kept the honour and independence of our Motherland and who won victory over Hitler Germany!

Glory to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, inspirer and organizer of our victory!

Glory to our great people, the victorious people!

Eternal glory to the heroes who fell in the fight for the freedom and independence of our Motherland!

J. Stalin

(Pravda, May 9, 1946)

TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONVERSATION WITH J. BROZ- TITO

May 27, 1946

Top Secret. 23:00.

Present: from the USSR side — V.M. Molotov, USSR Ambassador to Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrentyev; from the Yugoslav side — Minister of Internal Affairs A. Ranković, Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General K. Popović, Prime Minister of Serbia Nešković, Prime Minister of Slovenia Kidrič, Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR V. Popović.

At the beginning of the conversation, Comrade Stalin asked Tito that if a free city status were established for Trieste, would it only concern the city or the surrounding areas of the city, and which status is better — like Memel or like Danzig.

Tito replied that Slovenians live in the surrounding areas of the city. The discussion might only concern the city. However, he would like to continue insisting on including Trieste in Yugoslavia. Tito then, on behalf of the Yugoslav government, expressed his gratitude to Comrade V.M. Molotov for the support provided by the Soviet delegation in considering the issue of the Italo-Yugoslav border at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris.

Comrade Molotov gave information on the difference between the Memel and Danzig statutes, pointing out that the Memel-type statute is more favourable.

Comrade Stalin asked Tito about the situation in the industry and agriculture of Yugoslavia.

Tito replied that all lands are sown, an average harvest is expected and the industry is working well.

Then Comrade Stalin suggested that Tito outline the range of issues on which the Yugoslav delegation would like to speak this evening. Tito named the following questions: economic cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, military cooperation and Yugoslavia's relations with Albania.

Regarding economic cooperation, Tito said that if America agreed to provide a loan, it would be linked to political concessions from Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia lacks funds for further industrial development. The Yugoslav government would like to receive help from the Soviet Union, particularly through the creation of Soviet-Yugoslav joint enterprises. Yugoslavia has sufficient mineral and ore resources, but it cannot organize production because it lacks the necessary machinery. In particular, Yugoslavia has oil but lacks drilling rigs.

Comrade Stalin said, "We will help."

When asked if Yugoslavia produces aluminum, copper, and lead, Tito answered affirmatively, noting that in Yugoslavia "there are many bauxites and ores for the production of these metals."

Comrade Stalin remarked that the Ministry of Foreign Trade had declared to the Yugoslavs its readiness to negotiate the organization of joint enterprises, but there had been no definite response from the Yugoslavs. Therefore, it created the impression that Yugoslavia did not want to create these enterprises.

Tito objected, stating that he had repeatedly informed Comrade Sadchikov about the Yugoslav government's desire to create Soviet-Yugoslav joint enterprises.

In response to Comrade Stalin's comment that after the creation of Soviet-Yugoslav joint enterprises, wouldn't it be necessary to admit other states into Yugoslavia's economy, Tito replied that the Yugoslav government did not intend to allow the capital of other states into its economy.

Then, as a summary, Comrade Stalin said that Soviet-Yugoslav economic cooperation is envisaged based on the creation of joint enterprises.

Tito confirmed this, stating that he intended to submit his proposals on this matter in writing the next day.

Regarding military cooperation, Tito said that the Yugoslav government would like to receive supplies from the Soviet Union for Yugoslavia's military needs not through trade settlements but in the form of credit. Yugoslavia has a small military industry, capable of producing mortars and mines. In some places, there are qualified personnel, but there is no corresponding equipment, as the Germans took it away. The Yugoslav government wants to receive machinery from Germany as reparations to restore some military plants. However, Yugoslavia cannot meet its military needs on its own, and in this regard, the Yugoslav government relies on the assistance of the Soviet Union.

Comrade Stalin said that Yugoslavia should have some military plants, such as aviation since the Yugoslavs can produce aluminum with rich bauxite deposits. It is also necessary to have plants for the production of artillery guns.

Tito noted that it would be possible to cast gun barrels in the Soviet Union and process them in Yugoslavia.

Touching upon the issue of the Yugoslav maritime border, Comrade Stalin stated that to safeguard it, a good fleet is needed. Torpedo boats, patrol boats and armoured boats are required. Although the Soviet Union is weak in this area, as Comrade Stalin said, "we will help."

Regarding Albania, Comrade Stalin pointed out that the internal political situation there is unclear. There is information suggesting that something is happening between the Political Bureau of the Party and Enver Hoxha. There is a report that Koçi Xoxe wishes

to come to Moscow to discuss certain issues. Before the Congress of the Party, Enver Hoxha also expressed a desire to come to Moscow along with Xoxe.

Comrade Stalin asked Tito if he knew anything about the state of the Communist Party in Albania.

Tito, being uninformed about these matters, replied that Hoxha is expected to come to Belgrade soon.

Therefore, Tito believes that the Albanians should be informed that the question of the arrival of Xoxe and Hoxha in Moscow will be considered after Hoxha's trip to Belgrade.

Comrade Molotov noted that we restrained the Albanians' desire to come, but the Albanians insist on this.

Comrade Stalin pointed out that the arrival of the Albanians in Moscow may cause an unfavourable reaction from the British and Americans, and it will additionally complicate Albania's foreign policy situation.

Furthermore, Comrade Stalin asked Tito if Enver Hoxha agrees to include Albania in the composition of the Yugoslav Federation. Tito answered in the affirmative.

Comrade Stalin said that at present, it would be challenging for Yugoslavia to simultaneously address two such issues as the question of including Albania in Yugoslavia and the issue of Trieste. Tito agreed with this remark.

Therefore, Comrade Stalin further noted that it would be advisable to first discuss the question of friendship and mutual assistance between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Tito said that in its main part, this treaty should provide for the protection of the territorial integrity and national independence of Albania.

Comrade Stalin said that it is necessary to find the formula for this treaty and bring Albania closer to Yugoslavia.

Comrade Stalin touched on the question of incorporating Bulgaria into the federation.

Tito stated that it won't work with the federation. Comrade Stalin retorted, "It must be done."

Tito declared that it won't work with the federation because, in reality, they are two different regimes. Moreover, in Bulgaria, the influence of other parties is strong, whereas in Yugoslavia, despite the presence of other parties, all power is effectively in the hands of the Communist Party.

In response, Stalin noted that there is no need to fear that. Initially, they can limit themselves to a pact of friendship and mutual assistance, but essentially, more needs to be done.

Tito agreed with this.

Comrade Molotov remarked that there might be difficulties at the moment because a peace treaty with Bulgaria has not yet been concluded. Bulgaria is still considered a former enemy state.

Comrade Stalin pointed out that this should not be of significant importance. It is known that the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with Poland when Poland had not yet been recognized by other states.

Furthermore, Comrade Stalin summarized the conversation: what the Yugoslav government wants in economic matters and military affairs can be arranged. Committees should now be established to discuss these issues.

Tito informed Comrade Stalin about Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary, mentioning the arrival of Rakosi in Belgrade. Tito stated that the Yugoslav government had decided not to raise the issue of territorial demands by Yugoslavia on Hungary (demands regarding the Banovina Triangle) at the Council of Ministers. Tito expressed satisfaction that Yugoslavia had signed an agreement with Hungary on reparations.

Comrade Stalin remarked that if Hungary wants

peaceful relations with Yugoslavia, then Yugoslavia should support these aspirations, keeping in mind that the main difficulties for Yugoslavia lie in its relations with Greece and Italy.

Recorded by Lavrentiev.

(S.A. Lavrenov, *Soviet Union in Local Wars and Conflicts*, pp. 707-710)

ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR NO. 009

June 9, 1946

By the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated June 3 of this year, the proposal of the Supreme Military Council dated June 1 regarding the release of Marshal Zhukov¹ from the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces was approved, and by the same resolution, Marshal Zhukov was relieved of the duties of the Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces.

The circumstances of the case are as follows.

Former Commander of the Air Forces Novikov recently submitted a statement to the government regarding Marshal Zhukov, reporting on instances of unworthy and harmful behavior by Marshal Zhukov towards the government and the Supreme High Command.

The Supreme Military Council, at its meeting on June 1 of this year, considered Novikov's statement and established that Marshal Zhukov, despite the high position granted to him by the government and the Supreme High Command, considered himself offended, expressed dissatisfaction with the government's decisions and spoke hostilely about it among subordinates.

Marshal Zhukov, having lost all modesty and being carried away by a sense of personal ambition, believed that his merits were insufficiently appreciated, attributing to himself in conversations with subordinates the development and conduct of all major operations of the Great Patriotic War, including those operations to which he had no relation.

Moreover, Marshal Zhukov, being embittered him-

self, attempted to group dissatisfied, failed and suspended men around him, taking them under his protection, thereby opposing the government and the Supreme High Command.

Having been appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Marshal Zhukov continued to express his disagreement with the government's decisions among his close associates. He viewed some government measures aimed at strengthening the combat readiness of the ground forces not from the standpoint of the interests of the defence of the Motherland but as measures aimed at encroaching on his, Zhukov's, personality.

Contrary to the statements made by Marshal Zhukov, the session of the Supreme Military Council established that all plans for every significant operation of the Great Patriotic War, as well as plans for their support, were discussed and approved at joint meetings of the State Defence Committee and members of the General Staff in the presence of corresponding front commanders and chief staff officers. Often, chiefs of arms of service were also involved in the process.

It was further established that Marshal Zhukov had no connection to the plan for the liquidation of the Stalingrad group of German forces and the execution of this plan, which he attributes to himself. As known, the plan for the liquidation of German forces was developed and the liquidation itself was initiated in the winter of 1942 when Marshal Zhukov was on a different front, far from Stalingrad.

Additionally, it was established that Marshal Zhukov was also not involved in the plan for the liquidation of the Crimean group of German forces, nor its execution, although he claimed credit for them in conversations with subordinates.

Further investigation revealed that the liquidation of the Korsun-Shevchenkov group of German forces

was planned and executed not by Marshal Zhukov, as he claimed, but by Marshal Konev. The liberation of Kiev did not occur with a southern strike from the Bukrinsky bridgehead, as Zhukov proposed, but with a northern strike because the General Staff deemed the Bukrinsky bridgehead unsuitable for such a large-scale operation.

Finally, it was established that while recognizing Marshal Zhukov's merits in the capture of Berlin, one cannot deny, as Zhukov does, that without the southern strike of Marshal Konev's forces and the northern strike of Marshal Rokossovsky's forces, Berlin would not have been surrounded and taken in the timeframe it was.

Towards the end, Marshal Zhukov admitted at the session of the Supreme Military Council that he indeed made serious mistakes, developed arrogance and acknowledged that he could not continue in the position of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces. He expressed his intention to rectify his mistakes in another position.

The Supreme Military Council, after reviewing Marshal Zhukov's conduct, unanimously deemed his behaviour harmful and incompatible with his position. Based on this, they decided to request the Council of Ministers of the USSR to relieve Marshal Zhukov of his position as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces.

The Council of Ministers of the USSR, based on the above, made the decision to relieve Marshal Zhukov of his current positions and appointed him as the commander of the troops of the Odessa Military District.

This order is to be announced to the Supreme Commanders, members of the military councils and chiefs of staff of the groups of forces, as well as to the commanders, members of the military councils, and chiefs of staff of the military districts and fleets.

J. Stalin
Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR
Generalissimo of the Soviet Union

(Y.I. Mukhin, *War and Us*, Book 1, pp. 239-241)

SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF THE ORGANIZING BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU(B) ON THE FILM “BIG LIFE”

August 9, 1946

The first series is better, although it also received criticism. Right now, by association, I am comparing this film with Eisenstein's film *Ivan the Terrible* (the second series)* and Pudovkin's film *Admiral Nakhimov*. The overall impression is that directors and filmmakers put very little effort into the subjects they want to demonstrate; they treat their duties very lightly. I would say that sometimes this lightness reaches the level of a crime. People don't study the subject, don't understand the matter, but they write the script. This is an irresponsible attitude.

Take good directors, filmmakers, like the American Charlie Chaplin. A person keeps silent for two or three years, works intensively, conscientiously studies the technique, the details of the matter because no business can be studied without details, and a good film cannot be made without details. Details must be studied. So, good directors and filmmakers work on a film for years, two, three, four years, because they are very meticulous and conscientious about their work. We have poets, for example, who can write two poems in a month. But take Goethe; he worked on *Faust* for 30 years, diligently and conscientiously devoted himself to his work. A casual attitude towards work on the part of the authors

* See Record of the conversation with S.M. Eisenstein and N.K. Cherkasov about the film *Ivan the Terrible* on February 26, 1947, p. 110 of this book.

of some works is the main vice that leads directors and filmmakers to produce such films. Take, for example, the film *Admiral Nakhimov*. Pudovkin is a talented director and filmmaker, he knows the business, but this time he didn't bother to study the matter thoroughly. He decided: I am Pudovkin, I am known, I will write and the audience will "swallow" it, people will watch any film. People have become hungry; there is a lot of curiosity and interest, and, of course, they will watch. Meanwhile, people's tastes have become more qualified, and they don't "swallow" every product. People start to distinguish between good and bad and present new requirements. If this trend continues, and we, the Bolsheviks, attempt to develop the tastes of the audience, I am afraid that some of the scriptwriters, directors and filmmakers will be put out of circulation.

In the film *Nakhimov*, there are also elements of an unscrupulous approach by the directors to the study of the subject they wanted to portray. They play on trivialities, showing two or three paper ships, while the rest consists of dances, various dates and episodes to engage the audience. Essentially, it is not a film about Nakhimov but a film about anything, with some episodes about Nakhimov. We returned the film and told Pudovkin that he did not study the matter, does not even know the history and doesn't know that the Russians were in Sinop. It is portrayed as if the Russians were not there. The Russians captured a whole bunch of Turkish generals, and this is not conveyed in the film. Why? This is unknown. Perhaps because it requires a lot of effort, and it is much easier to show dances. In short, an unscrupulous attitude toward the task at hand, which a person has undertaken, to a matter that will be demonstrated worldwide. If a person respected himself, he would not have done this; he would have approached the film differently. But apparently, Pudovkin is not interested in how viewers and public opinion will

respond to him.

Or another film — Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible*, the second series. I don't know if anyone has seen it; I have watched it — a disgusting thing! The man completely deviated from history. He depicted the *oprichniks** as the last scoundrels, degenerates, something like the American Ku Klux Klan. Eisenstein did not understand that the oprichnina troops were progressive troops on which Ivan the Terrible relied to unite Russia into a centralized state against feudal princes who wanted to divide and weaken it. Eisenstein has an outdated attitude towards the oprichnina. The attitude of old historians towards the oprichnina was grossly negative because they interpreted Grozny's repression as the repression of Nicholas II and completely ignored the historical context in which it occurred. In our time, there is a different view of the oprichnina. Russia, fragmented into feudal principalities, i.e., several states, had to unite if it did not want to fall under the Tatar yoke for the second time. This is clear to anyone, and it should have been clear to Eisenstein. Eisenstein cannot be unaware of this because there is relevant literature, and he depicted some degenerates. Ivan the Terrible was a man with will, with character, and in Eisenstein's portrayal, he is some weak Hamlet. This is already formalism. What do we care about formalism — just give us historical truth. Studying requires patience, and some directors lack patience, so they combine everything and present the film: here you go, "swallow," especially since it bears Eisenstein's mark. How can we teach people to approach their duties and the interests of viewers and the state conscientiously? After all, we want to educate the youth with truth, not with distortions of it. Finally, the third film — *Big Life*. What is depicted there is certainly not a big life. Everything is taken to interest undemanding viewers.

* Ivan the Terrible's bodyguard corps — *Ed*.

One likes the accordion with Gypsy songs. It is there. Another likes restaurant songs. Also there. The third likes some reflections on various topics. And they are there. The fourth likes drinking — and in the film, there is a worker who cannot be made to wake up unless he smells vodka and hears the clinking of glasses, and then he quickly gets up. That is there. Love affairs are also there. Various tastes for the viewers. About the restoration, there is a bit, but although it is a film about the restoration of Donbass, the process of restoring Donbass takes only one-eighth, and all of this is presented in a toy-like, ridiculous form. It hurts when you watch; can our directors, living among the golden people, among the heroes, not portray them properly and always have to tarnish them? We have good workers, damn it! They showed themselves in the war, returned from the war and especially they should show themselves during the restoration. This film smells like antiquity when, instead of an engineer, they put up a labourer, saying, “You are one of us, a worker; you will lead us, we don’t need an engineer.” The engineer is pushed aside, and a common labourer is made a professor. The same happens in this film. They put an old worker as a professor. Such sentiments were present among the workers in the early years of Soviet power when the working class took power for the first time. It happened, but it was wrong. How much time has passed since then! The country has been raised to an unprecedented height through mechanization. Coal is now produced 7-8 times more than in the old days. Why? Because all labour has been mechanized; the belt machines do all the work. All the mechanisms together constitute a system of mechanization. If it weren’t for mechanization, we would have simply perished. All this has been achieved with the help of machines.

What kind of restoration is shown in the film where not a single machine is featured? Everything is done in

an old-fashioned way. People simply haven't studied the matter and don't know what restoration means in our conditions. They confused what happened after the Civil War in 1918-19 with what is happening, let's say, in 1945-46. They mixed up one with the other.

Now they say that the film needs to be corrected. I don't know how to do that. If it's technically possible, it should be done, but what will remain there? The Gypsy theme must be thrown out. The tale that eight girls who happened to appear restored everything in Donbass is a fairy tale, an unthinkable thing. This also needs to be corrected. The fact that people live in terrible conditions, almost under the sky, that an engineer, the head of a mine, doesn't know where to sleep, all of this will have to be thrown out. It may happen somewhere, but it is atypical. We built entire cities in Donbass, not everything was blown up. If you call this film the first attempt at restoration, then interest will be lost, but this, in any case, is not a big life after the Second World War. If you call the film *Big Life*, then it will have to be radically reworked. You will have to introduce new actors (although the actors are not bad). The whole spirit of partisanship, that we educated people are not needed, that we don't need engineers — these stupidities need to be thrown out. What will remain there? The film cannot be released like this; 4,700,000 rubles have been wasted. If it can be corrected, please correct it. But it will be very difficult; everything needs to be overturned. Essentially, it will be a new film. Look, we suggested to Pudovkin to fix the film *Admiral Nakhimov*, he demanded 6 months, but apparently, he won't make it, as he will have to overturn everything. He approached such a big problem easily, and now his film is not ready yet, and essentially, he is redoing it. Here too, everything will have to be overturned. Let them try; maybe it will work.

(Power and the Artistic Intelligentsia: Documents 1917-

1953, pp. 581-584)

NOTE TO L.P. BERIA

September 12, 1946

Comrade Beria,

As you are aware, we have removed the last item on allowances from the appeal of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, deciding to issue the contents of this item in the form of a separate resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers.² I request you to send a draft of such a resolution, ensuring that the provisions contained therein are in no way softened, but, on the contrary, are possibly made more stringent.

Stalin

(Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR: 1945-1953, p. 210)

NOTE TO A.A. ZHDANOV

September 19, 1946

Comrade Zhdanov!

I read your report.* I think it turned out excellent. It is necessary to submit it for publication as soon as possible and then release it as a pamphlet.

See my corrections in the text.

Greetings!

J. Stalin

(Power and the Artistic Intelligentsia: 1917-1953, p. 606)

* This refers to the report on the journals *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*.

**ANSWERS TO THE
QUESTIONS OF THE MOSCOW
CORRESPONDENT OF THE
“SUNDAY TIMES,” MR.
ALEXANDER WERTH, IN A
LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 17, 1946**

September 24, 1946

Q. Do you think there is a real danger of a “new war,” which is being so irresponsibly talked about in the whole world at the moment? What steps should be taken to prevent this war, if such a danger exists?

A. I do not believe in the actual danger of a new war. The clamour about a new war now comes mainly from military-political secret agents and the people behind them in the administration. They need this alarm, if only for the purpose of spreading it in the areas of their opposition.

(a) Certain naive politicians try to get as many concessions as possible out of the opposition and help their own governments by frightening people with the spectre of war;

(b) to hinder the reduction of military budgets in their own countries for a certain time;

(c) to block the demobilization of their troops and thereby guard against a swift rise in unemployment numbers in their countries.

One must differentiate between the present clamour and outcry about a “new war,” and the real danger of a “new war,” which does not exist at the present time.

Q. Do you think that Great Britain and the United States of America are deliberately carrying out a “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union?

A. I am not of the opinion that Great Britain and

the United States of America could carry out a “capitalist encirclement” of the Soviet Union even if they wanted to, which, in any case, I do not maintain.

Q. To quote Mr. Wallace in his last speech, can England, Western Europe and the United States be sure that Soviet politics in Germany will not be turned into a Russian instrument against Western Europe?

A. I believe that the possibility of Germany making profitable moves through the Soviet Union, against Western Europe and the United States can be excluded. I think that it can be excluded also, not only because the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France are bound by their joint and mutual support against German aggression and through the decisions of the Potsdam Conference which bind these three powers to the United States of America, but also because Germany’s political exploitation against Western Europe and the United States of America would mean a deviation on the part of the Soviet Union from its fundamental national interests. To put it in a nutshell, the politics of the Soviet Union in relation to the German problem is restricted by itself to the demilitarization and democratization of Germany. I believe that the demilitarization and democratization of Germany to be the most meaningful guarantee for the building of a stable and lasting peace.

Q. What is your opinion about the accusation that the politics of the communist parties of Western Europe are “directed by Moscow”?

A. I regard this accusation as an absurdity that people have borrowed from the bankrupt arsenal of Hitler and Goebbels.

Q. Do you believe in the possibility of a friendly and lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies, despite the existing ideological differences, and in “friendly competition” between the two systems, as Wallace mentioned in his speech?

A. I firmly believe in that.

Q. During the stay of the deputation from the Labour Party in the Soviet Union, you have, as I have been informed, expressed certainty regarding the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. What would help to establish these relations which the majority of the English people obviously desire?

A. I am really certain of the possibility of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The strengthening of the political, economic and cultural ties between these countries would contribute enormously to the construction of such relations.

Q. Do you believe the earliest possible withdrawal of all American troops from China would be of the greatest significance for future peace?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Do you believe that the actual monopoly of the United States on the atom bomb is one of the greatest threats to peace?

A. I do not think that the atom bomb is such a power as certain politicians are disposed to state. The atom bomb is intended to frighten people with weak nerves, but it cannot decide the fate of war, and would under no circumstance suffice for this purpose. Certainly, the monopoly on the secrets of the atom bomb poses a threat, but against that there are at least two things:

(a) the monopoly on the possession of the atom bomb cannot last long;

(b) the use of the atom bomb will be forbidden.

Q. Do you believe that with the further progress of communism in the Soviet Union, the possibilities of friendly cooperation with the outside world as far as the Soviet Union is concerned will not be reduced? Is "communism in one country" possible?

A. I do not doubt that the possibility of peaceful cooperation will not be reduced, far from it, but could even be stronger. "Communism in one country" is ab-

olutely possible, especially in a country like the Soviet Union.

(*Pravda*, September 25, 1946)

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS PUT BY MR. HUGH BAILLIE, PRESIDENT OF THE UP OF AMERICA

October 28, 1946

The following answers were given by J.V. Stalin to questions put to him on October 23, 1946, by Mr. Hugh Baillie, President of the United Press of America:

Q. Do you agree with Secretary Byrnes' feeling, as expressed in his radio speech last Friday (October 18), that there is growing tension between the USSR and the United States?

A. No.

Q. If such an increasing tension exists, could you indicate the reason, or reasons for it, and what are the most essential bases for eliminating it?

A. The question does not arise in view of my answer to the preceding question.

Q. Do you foresee that the present negotiations will result in peace treaties which will establish amicable relations among the nations which were allies in the war against fascism, and remove the danger of war on the part of former fascist sources?

A. I hope so.

Q. If not, what are the principal obstacles to the establishment of such amicable relations among the nations which were allies in the Great War?

A. The question does not arise in view of the answer to the preceding question.

Q. What is Russia's attitude with regard to Yugoslavia's decision not to sign the Peace Treaty with Italy?

A. Yugoslavia has grounds to be dissatisfied.

Q. What, in your opinion, is today the worst threat to world peace?

A. The instigators of a new war, in the first place

Churchill and people of like mind in Britain and the USA.

Q. If such a threat should arise, what steps should be taken by the nations of the world to avoid a new war?

A. The instigators of a new war should be exposed and curbed.

Q. Is the United Nations Organization a guarantee of the integrity of the small nations?

A. It is hard to say so far.

Q. Do you think that the four zones of occupation in Germany should in the near future be thrown together, so far as economic administration is concerned, with a view to restoring Germany as a peaceful economic unit and thus lessening the burden of occupation to the four powers?

A. Not only the economic but also the political unity of Germany should be restored.

Q. Do you feel that it is feasible at this time to create some sort of central administration to be placed in the hands of the Germans themselves, but under Allied control, which will make it possible for the Council of Foreign Ministers to draft a peace treaty for Germany?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Do you feel confident, in the light of elections which have been held in the various zones this summer and fall that Germany is developing politically along democratic lines which give hope for its future as a peaceful nation?

A. So far I am not certain of it.

Q. Do you feel that, as has been suggested in some quarters, the level of permitted industry should be increased above the agreed level, to permit Germany to pay her own way more fully?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. What should be done beyond the present four-power program to prevent Germany from again becoming a world military menace?

A. The remnants of fascism in Germany should be extirpated in fact and she should be democratized to the end.

Q. Should the German people be allowed to reconstruct their industry and trade and become self-supporting?

A. Yes, they should.

Q. Have the provisions of Potsdam, in your opinion, been adhered to? If not, what is needed to make the Potsdam Declaration an effective instrument?

A. They are not always adhered to, especially in the sphere of the democratization of Germany.

Q. Do you feel the veto power has been used to excess during the discussions among the four Foreign Ministers and in meetings of the United Nations Council?

A. No, I do not.

Q. How far does the Kremlin feel the Allied Powers should go hunting down and trying minor war criminals in Germany? Does it feel that the Nuremberg decisions created a sufficiently strong basis for such action?

A. The farther they go the better.

Q. Does Russia consider the Western frontiers of Poland permanent?

A. Yes, she does.

Q. How does the USSR regard the presence of British troops in Greece? Does it feel that Britain should supply more arms to the present Greek government?

A. It is unnecessary.

Q. What is the extent of Russian military contingents in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Austria, and how long do you feel that, in the interests of securing peace, these contingents must be maintained?

A. In the West, that is in Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland, the Soviet Union has at present in all 60 divisions (infantry and ar-

mour together). Most of them are below full complement. There are no Soviet troops in Yugoslavia. In two months, when the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of October 22 of this year on the last stage of demobilisation is put into effect, 40 Soviet divisions will remain in the above-mentioned countries.

Q. What is the attitude of the Government of the USSR towards the presence of American warships in the Mediterranean?

A. Indifferent.

Q. What is the present outlook for a commercial agreement between Russia and Norway?

A. It is hard to tell, so far.

Q. Is it possible for Finland again to become a self-sufficient nation after reparations have been paid, and is there any idea in contemplation of revising the reparations program so far as to expedite Finland's recovery?

A. The question has been put in the wrong way. Finland has been and remains an entirely self-sufficient nation.

Q. What will trade agreements with Sweden and other countries mean with regard to reconstruction in the USSR? What outside aid do you consider desirable in accomplishing this great task?

A. The agreement with Sweden constitutes a contribution to the cause of economic cooperation among the nations.

Q. Is Russia still interested in obtaining a loan from the United States?

A. She is interested.

Q. Has Russia developed its own atom bomb or any similar weapon?

A. No.

Q. What is your opinion of the atom bomb or similar weapon as an instrument of warfare?

A. I have already given my appraisal of the atom

bomb in my well-known answer to Mr. Worth.

Q. How, in your opinion, can atomic power best be controlled? Should this control be created on an international basis, and to what extent should the powers sacrifice their sovereignty in the interest of making the control effective?

A. Strict international control is necessary.

Q. How long will it require to rebuild the devastated areas of Western Russia?

A. Six to seven years, if not more.

Q. Will Russia permit commercial airlines to operate across the Soviet Union? Does Russia intend to extend her own airlines to other continents on a reciprocal basis?

A. Under certain conditions this is not excluded.

Q. How does your government view the occupation of Japan? Do you feel it has been a success on the present basis?

A. There are some successes, but better successes could have been obtained.

(Soviet News, 1947)

NOTE TO V.M. MOLOTOV

November 1946

I do not remember signing any agreement with Roosevelt on these matters.* However, it is possible that in separate speeches at the Big Three Conference, something like this was promised by Roosevelt, and it is possible that this promise or statement is recorded in the transcript or even in some protocol.

(A.V. Pyzhikov, *The Birth of a Superpower: 1945-1953*, pp. 20-22)

* The occasion for writing the note was Molotov's response, in turn prompted by the request of the Chief Director of the European office of the *International News Service of America* Kingsbury Smith to comment on the publication in the French newspaper *Cavalcade*. The article, which seriously stirred Western society, claimed that there was a secret agreement between Stalin and Roosevelt, reached during the meetings in Tehran and Yalta. *Cavalcade* reported on the essence of the agreements: the President of the United States recognized that the Soviet Union needed access to the Mediterranean Sea, as well as the need for an effective guarantee of its security in the Black Sea region and straits; the United States did not object to the USSR entering into bilateral agreements with Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, provided their independence was preserved; the United States recognized the need for the removal of German industrial equipment (dismantling 75 per cent of everything remaining in the Soviet occupation zone).

On November 9, Molotov and Vyshinsky reported to Stalin that there were no written agreements or mentions in the conference protocols about this.

TELEGRAM TO THE SLAVIC CONGRESS REUNION IN BELGRADE

December 8, 1946

I greet the participants of the first Slavic Congress since the war, the representatives of the peace-loving Slavic peoples. I am sure that the Slavic Congress will contribute to and deeply strengthen the friendship and fraternal solidarity of the Slavic peoples and will serve the cause of the development of democracy and the consolidation of peace between the peoples.

J. Stalin

(*Slaviane*, January 1, 1946, Moscow)

INTERVIEW WITH ELLIOT ROOSEVELT

December 21, 1946

Q. Do you believe it is possible for a democracy such as the United States to live peaceably side by side in this world with a communistic form of government like the Soviet Union's and with no attempt on the part of either to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other?

A. Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realization. In the most strenuous times during the war the differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace.

Q. Do you believe that the success of the United Nations depends upon agreement as to fundamental policies and aims between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States?

A. Yes, I think so. In many respects the fate of the United Nations as an organization depends upon a state of harmony being reached by those three powers.

Q. Do you believe, Generalissimo Stalin, that an important step toward world peace would be the attainment of economic agreement of broader scope for the interchange of manufactured and raw materials between our two countries?

A. Yes, I believe that it would be an important step for the establishment of world peace. Of course, I agree. The expansion of world trade would benefit in many respects the development of good relations between our two countries.

Q. Is the Soviet Union in favour of the immediate creation by the United Nations Security Council of an

international police force composed of all the United Nations, which would step in immediately wherever armed warfare threatens peace?

A. Of course.

Q. If you believe that the atomic bomb should be controlled by the United Nations, should not they, through inspection, control all research and manufacturing facilities for armaments of any nature and the peace-time use and development of atomic energy?

(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: "Stalin shot back at me a quick question: 'In general?' I said, 'Yes, but, especially as to agreement on principle by Russia to such a plan.'")

A. Of course. To the principle of equality no exception should be made in the case of Russia. Russia should be subject to the same rules of inspection and control as any other nation must.

(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: "There was no hesitancy in his answer. And no question of reserving the right of veto was even mentioned.")

Q. Do you think it would serve a useful purpose if another Big Three meeting was held for discussion of all international problems at present threatening peace in the world?

A. I think there should not be one meeting, but several; they would serve a useful purpose.

(Here Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: "At this point my wife asked whether he thought that such meetings would help towards achieving closer relations at lower levels among officials of the respective governments. She also asked whether such a result was achieved by the wartime conferences. His answer came with a smile in her direction: 'There is no doubt of that the wartime meetings and the results achieved greatly helped cooperation at lower levels.'")

Q. Sir, I know you are a student of many other pol-

itical and social problems existing in other countries. And so I should like to ask whether you feel that the elections in the United States last November indicate a swing away, on the part of the people, from belief in the policies of Roosevelt and towards the isolationist policies of his political adversaries?

A. I am not so well acquainted with the internal life of the people of the United States, but I would think the election indicated that the present government was wasting the moral and political capital created by the late President, and thus it facilitated the victory of the Republicans.

(At this point Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: "In answering my next question Generalissimo Stalin became very emphatic.")

Q. To what do you ascribe the lessening of friendly relations and understanding between our two countries since the death of Roosevelt?

A. I feel that if this question relates to the relations and understanding between the American and Russian peoples, no deterioration has taken place, but on the contrary relations have improved. As to the relations between the two governments, there have been misunderstandings. A certain deterioration has taken place, and then great noise has been raised that their relations would even deteriorate still further. But I see nothing frightful about this in the sense of violation of peace or military conflict.

Not a single Great Power, even if its government is anxious to do so, could at present raise a large army to fight another Allied Power, another Great Power, because at present one cannot possibly fight without one's people — and the people are unwilling to fight. They are tired of war.

Moreover, there are no understandable objectives to justify a new war. One would not know for what he had to fight, and therefore I see nothing frightful in the

fact that some representatives of the United States government are talking about deterioration of relations between us.

In view of all these considerations I think the danger of a new war is unreal.

Q. Do you favour a broad exchange of cultural and scientific information between our two nations? Also, do you favour exchange of students, artists, scientists and professors?

A. of course.

Q. Should the United States and the Soviet Union form a common long-term policy of aid to the peoples of the Far East?

A. I feel it will be useful if it is possible. In any case our government is ready to pursue a common policy with the United States in Far Eastern questions.

Q. If a system of loans or credits is arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union, would such agreements have lasting benefit to the United States economy?

A. A system of such credits is of course mutually advantageous both to the United States and to the Soviet Union

(Here Mr. Elliott Roosevelt parenthetically says: "I then asked the question that is creating obvious concern in many countries of Europe.")

Q. Does the failure in the American and British zones of occupied Germany to carry out denazification give serious cause for alarm to the Soviet government?

A. No, it has not been a cause for serious alarm, but of course it is unpleasant for the Soviet Union that part of our common program is not being put into effect.

(*Soviet News*, 1947)

DISCUSSION IN THE MEETING WITH THE CREATIVE INTELLECTUALS

n, 1946

Stalin: What do you want to tell me Comrade Fadeyev?

Fadeyev:* Comrade Stalin, we have come to you for advice. Many think that our literature and art have reached a dead end and we do not know how to develop it further. Today in every cinema hall, films are being shown where the hero is endlessly fighting with the enemy and where human blood is flowing like a river. Everywhere scarcity and difficulties are being shown. People are tired of struggle and blood. We want your advice on how to project a different life in our works: the future life, where there will be no blood nor force, where all the innumerable difficulties which our country is facing will be absent. In one word, the time has come to narrate a happy, cloudless future.

Stalin: The main thing is missing from your reasoning. The Marxist-Leninist analysis of the task is missing. And this is what life is bringing before literary workers and artists. Once Peter I opened the window to Europe. But after 1917, the imperialists boarded it up for a long time out of the fear of socialism spreading in their countries. Before the Great Patriotic War through radio, films, newspapers and journals, we were presented before the world as northern barbarians who had a blood dripping knife in our teeth. This is how they painted the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our people were shown dressed in threadbare shirts, drinking vodka from the samovar. All of a sudden, this backward

* A.A. Fadeyev — General Secretary of the Writer's Union of the USSR from 1946 to 1954.

Russia, these primitive cave dwellers as represented by the world bourgeoisie, defeated two great world powers — the fascists in Germany and the imperialists in Japan — before whom the whole world was trembling in fear. Today the world wants to know — who are these people who accomplished such a heroic deed and saved mankind? Mankind was saved by simple Soviet people, who without any fuss under the most difficult situation achieved their industrialization and collectivization. They fortified their defence system and at the cost of their own lives, under the leadership of the communists, and destroyed the enemy. In only the first six months of the war more than 500 thousand communists died on the front line and in total more than three million fell. They were the best of us — noble, pure, dedicated and selfless fighters for socialism, for the happiness of our people. Now we miss them. If they were alive many of our problems would have been solved. The main task of our creative Soviet intellectuals today is to reflect in their works, all the aspects of this simple Soviet man, to reveal and show the best traits of his character. Today this is the general line for the development of literature and art.

Why is the literary hero Pavel Korchagin in Nikolai Ostrovski's *How the Steel was Tempered* dear to us?

This is so because of his limitless dedication to the revolution, to the people, to socialism and his selflessness.

The artistic image of the great pilot of our time, Valeri Chkalova, in film greatly contributed to the training of thousands of fearless Soviet falcons — fighters with undying fame during the Great Patriotic War. Colonel Sergei Lukonim — tankist from the film *Young Man From Our City* — is the distinctive hero of thousands of tankists.

It is necessary to continue with this tradition. Create such literary heroes, fighters for communism with

whom the Soviet people would equate to and whom they would imitate. I have a list of questions, which I think would be interesting for the Soviet creative intellectuals. If there is no objection I will answer them.

Shouts from the hall: We request you to answer them please.

Q. What, according to you, are the main shortcomings in the work of modern Soviet writers, dramatists and film directors.

A. Unfortunately, they are extremely substantial. In recent times a dangerous tendency is apparently discerned in a number of literary works emanating under the pernicious influence of the decaying West and brought into life by the subversive activity of foreign intelligence. Frequently in the pages of Soviet literary journals, works are found where the Soviet people, the builders of communism, are shown in a pathetic and ludicrous form. The positive hero is derided and inferiority before all things foreign, and cosmopolitanism, so characteristic of our political leftovers, is applauded. In the theatre repertoire Soviet plays are being pushed aside in favour of disgraceful plays of foreign bourgeois authors.

In films petty themes dominate and they distort the heroic history of the valiant Russian people.

Q. How dangerous ideologically are the *avantgarde* tendencies in music and the *abstract school* in art and sculpture?

A. Today, under the guise of innovation, formalism and abstraction are being induced in Soviet music and paintings. Once in a while a question can be heard such as: "Is it necessary for such great people as Bolsheviks and Leninists to be engaged in such petty things and spend time criticizing abstract paintings and formalism? Let the psychiatrists deal with it."

In these types of questions lie a misunderstanding of the role of ideological sabotage against our country

and especially against our youth. It is with their help that attempts are being made against socialist realism in art and literature. It is impossible to do so openly. In these so-called abstract paintings, there is no real face of the people, whom our people would have liked to imitate in the fight for their happiness, for communism and for the path on which they want to progress. This portrayal is substituted by an abstract mysticism clouding the issue of socialist class struggle against capitalism. During the war how many people came to the statue of Minin and Pozharsky on the Red Square to instill in us the feelings of victory? To what can a bust of twisted iron representing “innovation” as an art inspire us? To what can an abstract painting inspire?

This is the reason why modern American financial magnates are propagating modernism, paying for this type of work huge royalties which the great masters of realism may not ever see.

There is an underlying idea of class struggle in the so-called western popular music, in the so-called formalist tendencies. This music, if one can call it such, is created from the sect of “shakers” — dance that induces people to ecstasy, trance and makes them into wild animals ready for any wild action. This type of music is created with the help of psychiatrists so as to influence the brain and psychology of the people. This is one type of musical narcotics under whose influence a person cannot think of fresh ideas and are turned into a herd. It is useless to invite such people for revolution, for building communism. As you see music can also fight.

In 1944, I had an opportunity to read an instruction written by an officer of the British intelligence, with the title: “How to Use Formalist Music to Corrupt the Enemy Army.”

Q. What concretely are the subversive activities of the agents of foreign intelligence in the sphere of art and literature?

A. While talking about the future development of Soviet art and literature it must be taken into consideration that it is developing in a condition of an unprecedented discreet war, a war that has been unleashed on us and our art and literature by the world imperialist circles. The job of foreign agents in our country is to penetrate Soviet organizations dealing with culture, to capture the editorships of major newspapers and journals, to decisively influence the repertoire of theatres and movies and in the publication of fiction and poetry, to stop by any means the publication of revolutionary works which awaken patriotism and lead the Soviet people towards creating communism. They support and publish works where the failure of communism is preached. They are ecstatic in their support and propaganda of the capitalist method of production and the bourgeois lifestyle.

At the same time foreign agents are asked to popularize the feelings of pessimism, decadence and demoralization in art and literature.

One popular American senator said, "If we were able to show Bolshevik Russia our horror films it most probably would be able to destroy communist construction." Not for nothing did Lev Tolstoi say that art and literature is a strong form of indoctrination.

We must seriously ponder over who and what is inspiring us today in literature and art so that we can put an end to ideological subversion. We must understand and accept that culture is one of the integral parts of social ideology, of class and is used for safeguarding the interest of the ruling class. For us it is to safeguard the interest of the working class, of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is no art for art's sake. There are no, and cannot be, "free" artists, writers, poets, dramatists, directors and journalists, standing above the society. Nobody needs them. Such people don't and can't exist.

For those who don't want to serve the Soviet people as a result of old traditions of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, or are antagonistic towards the power of the working class which is dedicated to serving the Soviet people, we give the permission to leave the country and stay abroad. Let them be convinced of the meaning of "free creativity" in the notorious bourgeois society, where everything can be brought and sold, and the creative intelligentsia is completely dependent on the monetary support of the financial magnates in their creative endeavours.

Unfortunately, friends, because of a lack of time we must finish our discussion.

I hope that to some extent I have answered your questions. I think that the position of the CC of the CPSU(B) and that of the Soviet government on the question of the further development of Soviet literature is clear to all.

(V. Zhukhrai, *Stalin: Truth and Lies*, pp. 245-251)

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR “ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI-STOREY BUILDINGS IN MOSCOW”

January 13, 1947

Moscow, Kremlin
January 13, 1947
No. 53

The Council of Ministers of the USSR resolves to:

1. Accept Comrade Stalin's proposal to construct multi-storey buildings in Moscow during 1947-1952: one 32-storey building, two 26-storey buildings and five 16-storey buildings.

2. Construct a 32-storey building on Lenin Hills in the centre of the Moscow River's radius, accommodating a hotel and housing.

3. Construct a 26-storey administrative building in Zaryadye, in the location intended for the construction of the Council of People's Commissars House.

4. Build a 26-storey building on Leningradsky Prospekt in the area near the Dynamo Stadium, accommodating a hotel and housing.

5. Approve the following locations for the construction of 16-storey buildings in Moscow:

— Residential building to be constructed near the Red Gate on the vacant plot of the Ministry of Communications;

— Residential building on Vosstaniya Square;

— Residential building on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment on the vacant plot near the Ustinsky Bridge;

— Administrative building on Smolenskaya Square;

— Administrative building in the area near Kalanchevskaya Square on a vacant plot.

6. Entrust the design and construction of the 32-storey and one 26-storey buildings to the Construction Management of the Palace of Soviets under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and another 26-storey building to the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises.

7. Instruct the Committee on Architectural Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Comrade Mordvinov) to conduct an examination of the projects for the 32-storey and 26-storey buildings, followed by the submission of the projects for approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

8. Entrust the design and construction of 16-storey buildings to the following organizations: the building on Smolenskaya Square — to the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises (Comrade Yudin), the residential building on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment — to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov), the administrative building in the Kalanchevskaya Square area — to the Ministry of Construction of Military and Naval Enterprises (Comrade Ginzburg), the building near the Red Gate — to the Ministry of Communications (Comrade Kovalev), the building on Vosstaniya Square — to the Ministry of Aviation Industry (Comrade Khrunichev).

9. Assign the Architecture Department of the Moscow City Executive Committee (Comrade Mordvinov) to conduct an examination of the projects for 16-storey buildings, followed by the submission of projects for approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

10. Establish that when designing multi-storey buildings, the following provisions must be taken into account:

a) The proportions and silhouettes of these buildings should be original, and their architectural and

artistic composition should be harmonized with the historically developed architecture of the city and the silhouette of the future Palace of Soviets. Accordingly, the designed buildings should not replicate the patterns of well-known multi-storey buildings abroad;

b) The internal layout of the buildings should provide maximum convenience for work and movement within the building. For these purposes, the design of the buildings should involve the use of all the most modern technical means in terms of elevator systems, water supply, daylighting, telephony, heating, air conditioning, etc.;

c) The basis of the building structures, especially 32- and 26-storey buildings, should be a system of assembling a steel frame using lightweight materials to fill the walls, ensuring the widespread use of industrial and high-speed construction methods;

d) The exterior finishing (cladding) of the buildings should be made of durable and resistant materials;

11. Oblige the organizations responsible for designing and constructing multi-storey buildings to involve the country's leading architects in the design work.

12. Oblige the Committee on Architectural Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Comrade Mordvinov), the Construction Management of the Palace of Soviets under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Comrade Prokofiev), and the chief architect of Moscow, Comrade Chechulin, together with the ministries and departments responsible for construction, to submit to the Council of Ministers of the USSR within a 2-month period tasks for the design of multi-storey buildings.

13. Instruct the State Staff Commission under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Comrade Mekhlis) to review the staffing schedule and salaries of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets under the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Architecture

Department of Moscow City Executive Committee in order to strengthen the design organizations of these institutions to ensure design and survey work related to the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow.

14. Propose to the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Comrade Prokofiev), the Ministry of Communications (Comrade Kovalev), the Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises (Comrade Yudin), the Ministry of Aviation Industry (Comrade Ginzburg) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov) to submit proposals to the Council of Ministers of the USSR within a 2-month period for strengthening construction organizations and their material and technical base so that all necessary preparatory work can be carried out in 1947.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

Y. Chadayev
Manager of Affairs of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(*Historical Archive*, 2004, No. 1, pp. 32-34)

EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN MR. E. BEVIN AND J.V. STALIN, CONCERNING THE ANGLO-SOVIET TREATY

January 19 and January 22, 1947

On January 18, 1947, Mr. Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, through the medium of the British Ambassador in the USSR, Sir M. Peterson, conveyed the following message to J.V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR:

I am gratified at the friendly reception which was given to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in Moscow and am studying with interest the account which he has given me of his conversations with you.

We are however disturbed at the suggestion which you made to him that the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Post-War Collaboration might be regarded in London as "suspended in the air" since it might be regarded as superseded by the United Nations Organization. This view has been attributed to me personally in the most misleading manner by *Pravda* in an article of January 15, which takes out of its context and misinterprets one sentence in my broadcast of December 22. In fact, I said what all the other major Allies have said, namely, that they based their policy on the United Nations Organization.

I cannot understand what is behind this line of reasoning, and I am more amazed at the *Pravda* article since I understand from Field-Marshal Montgomery that you said this was not your own view regarding the Treaty. It is certainly not my view either.

Since *Pravda* has published this misleading article, I have no alternative but to issue a statement which I should like you to see in advance, making the views

of His Majesty's Government clear once again on this subject. I propose to publish it on the morning of January 20.

On January 23, 1947, J.V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, sent to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain the following message in reply, which was handed to Mr. Bevin by the Soviet Ambassador in London, G.N. Zarubin, on January 23:

I have received your message of January 18. I must admit that your statement that Great Britain is not tied to anybody except in regard to her obligations arising from the Charter caused me some perplexity.

It seems to me that such a statement without a corresponding explanation can be used by the enemies of Anglo-Soviet friendship. For one it is clear that no matter what reservations there are in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, and no matter how these reservations weaken the significance of the Treaty in the postwar period, the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty imposes obligations on our countries.

It was just these circumstances that I had in mind when I stated on September 17, 1946, in my interview with Mr. Alexander Werth, that "the Soviet Union is bound with Great Britain by the Treaty of Mutual Assistance against German Aggression" and, that means, has obligations with regard to Great Britain, not counting the obligations arising from the Charter.

However, your message and the statement of the British Government completely explain the affair and do not leave any room for misunderstandings. It is now clear that you and I share the same viewpoint with regard to the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As regards the extension of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, to which special reference is made in the British government's statement, I must say that if one is to speak seriously of such an extension, then, before extending

this Treaty, it is necessary to change it, freeing it from the reservations which weaken this Treaty. Only after such a procedure would it be possible to talk seriously of an extension of the Treaty.

(Soviet News, 1947)

ORDER OF THE DAY ON THE OCCASION OF THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET ARMY NO. 10

February 23, 1947

Comrade soldiers, sailors, officers, generals and admirals! Today our country is celebrating the 29th anniversary of the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Army, founded by the great Lenin, has trodden a glorious path. Its entire history is a living example of heroism, undeviating attachment to the Motherland and valorous achievements in the military field, which found expression particularly in the magnificent victories won by the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War.

The Motherland will never forget the high heroic deeds of its army.

The Soviet Army celebrates its 29th anniversary at the moment when our people are untiringly accomplishing the tasks set by the devastation of the war, in the re-establishment and development of the national economy.

The workers, peasants and intellectuals of our country, who have successfully fulfilled the quotas of the first year of the new Five-Year Plan, struggle heroically for the rapid acceleration of economic activity, for the supplementation of production of consumer goods, for the rapid progress of Soviet science and technology.

The elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Federal Republics, which were held, have resulted in the complete victory of the bloc of communists and their Party. It shows that the unity of Soviet society is indestructible, that all the Soviet citizens are firmly grouped behind their government and the Communist Party, and are

firmly assuring the development of their Motherland.

In times of peace, the Soviet Army must accomplish the task of military preparation which they have been set, march in advance and win new and more important successes in military preparation and political education. The work of consolidating peace and the security of our country is required.

The essential principle of the military preparation of the Soviet armed forces has always consisted, and still consists today, of educating the troops in war conditions. The experience of the last war has proved the high morale and combat quality of the troops, a good military and political preparation, a great mastery of the techniques of combat, coordination and great physical endurance.

The task that now faces our army, navy and airforce is to untiringly perfect, day by day, their military formation, to profitably pursue profound study based on their experience of war.

The generals, admirals and officers must continue to broaden their knowledge of military theory and politics and equally learn the methods of military preparation, which are necessary for training in peace time .

The non-commissioned officers must energetically apply the process of command to become the prime aides of officers in the observance of military discipline and in the instruction and education of soldiers and sailors.

The soldiers and sailors must, with all their might, perfect in detail their preparation from the point of view of mastery of weapons, of special military tactics and political formations; they must acquire the necessary physical strength to take part in combat and be able to surmount all difficulties of battles and combat.

In the instruction and education of their subordinates, all the commanders and chiefs must take it upon themselves to care for their conditions of life, their

physical well-being and their equipment, in accordance with the regulations.

Strong military discipline is primarily based on the high conscience and political education of the military and is the preliminary condition of most importance for the combat strength of our armed forces. Also, all the commanders and chiefs must untiringly affirm military discipline and, very necessary, encourage the spirit of patriotism unceasingly in their subordinates, the sense of personal responsibility of every soldier for the defence of the Motherland.

Comrade soldiers, sailors and non-commissioned officers!

Comrade officers, generals and admirals!

I salute and congratulate you on the occasion of the 29th anniversary of our Soviet Army, in the name of the Soviet government and of our Communist Party.

In honour of the 29th anniversary of the Soviet Army, I order: today, February 23, a salute of 20 artillery salvoes in the capital of our Motherland, Moscow, in the capitals of the federative republics, in Kalinin-grad, Lvov, Khabarovsk, Vladivostok, Port Arthur and in the heroic cities of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Sevastopol and Odessa.

Long live the Soviet Army and the military sailors!

Long live our Soviet government!

Long live our great Communist Party!

Long live our great Soviet people!

(*Pravda*, February 23, 1947)

CONVERSATION WITH S.M. EISENSTEIN AND N.K. CHERKASOV REGARDING THE FILM “IVAN THE TERRIBLE”

February 26, 1947

We* were summoned to the Kremlin at 11 o'clock.

At 10:50, we entered the reception room. Exactly at 11, Poskrebyshev came to escort us to the office.

In the depth of the office — Stalin, Molotov and Zhdanov. We enter, greet and sit down at the table.

Stalin: You wrote a letter. The response was a bit delayed. We're meeting late. I thought about replying in writing but decided it was better to talk. Since I am very busy and have no time, I decided, very late, to meet you here... I received your letter in November.

Zhdanov: You received it in Sochi.

Stalin: Yes, in Sochi. What do you plan to do with the film?

We are talking about how we split the second part into two, omitting the Livonian Campaign, resulting in a disproportion between its parts, and the need to correct the film by shortening the existing material and shooting additional scenes, mainly for the Livonian Campaign.

Stalin: Have you studied history?

Eisenstein: More or less...

Stalin: More or less?... I am somewhat familiar with history too. You incorrectly depict the Oprichnina. The Oprichnina is the royal army. Unlike the feudal army which could fold its banners and leave the war at any moment, a regular army was formed, a progressive

* S.M. Eisenstein and N.K. Cherkasov — *Ed.*

army. In your film, the *oprichniks* are shown as the Ku Klux Klan.

Eisenstein said they are dressed in white hoods, while in our film, they are dressed in black.

Molotov: It doesn't make a fundamental difference.

Stalin: Your Tsar turned out to be indecisive, resembling Hamlet. Everyone advises him on what to do, and he himself doesn't make decisions... Tsar Ivan was a great and wise ruler. If you compare him with Louis XI (have you read about Louis XI, who prepared absolutism for Louis XIV?), Ivan the Terrible is on the tenth heaven. The wisdom of Ivan the Terrible was that he stood on a national perspective and didn't let foreigners into his country, protecting the country from foreign influence. In the portrayal of Ivan the Terrible, there were deviations and inaccuracies in that direction. Peter I was also a great ruler, but he treated foreigners too liberally, opened the gates too wide, allowing foreign influence into the country and contributing to the Germanization of Russia. Catherine allowed even more. And so on. Was the court of Alexander I Russian? Was the court of Nicholas I Russian? No. These were German courts.

A remarkable achievement of Ivan the Terrible was that he was the first to introduce the state monopoly on foreign trade. Ivan the Terrible was the first to introduce it, Lenin was the second.

Zhdanov: Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible turned out to be neurotic.

Molotov: Overall, there is an emphasis on psychologism, on excessive highlighting of internal psychological contradictions and personal experiences.

Stalin: Historical figures should be portrayed accurately in terms of style. For example, in the first part, it is incorrect that Ivan the Terrible kisses his wife for so long. In those times, this was not allowed.

Zhdanov: The film has a Byzantine bias, and it was

not practised there either.

Molotov: The second part is very cramped with vaults, basements, no fresh air, no breadth of Moscow, no portrayal of the people. You can show conversations, you can show repression, but not just that.

Stalin: Ivan the Terrible was very cruel. It's possible to show that he was cruel, but it is necessary to show why it was necessary to be cruel.

One of Ivan the Terrible's mistakes was that he did not eliminate the five major feudal families. If he had destroyed these five boyar families, there would have been no Time of Troubles at all. Ivan the Terrible would execute someone and then repent and pray for a long time. God interfered with him in this matter... He should have been more decisive.

Molotov: Historical events need to be shown in the right context. For example, there was a case with the play *Bogatyr*s by Dmitry Bedny. Dmitry Bedny mocked the baptism of Rus, but the fact is that the adoption of Christianity for its historical stage was a progressive phenomenon.

Stalin: Of course, we are not very good Christians, but one cannot deny the progressive role of Christianity at a certain stage. This event was of great significance because it marked a turning point for the Russian state towards aligning with the West, rather than orienting towards the East.

Regarding relations with the East, Stalin explains that having just liberated themselves from the Tatar yoke, Ivan the Terrible hurried to unite Russia to serve as a bulwark against possible Tatar raids. Astrakhan was conquered, but it could have attacked Moscow at any moment. The Crimean Tatars could also have done the same.

Stalin: Dmitry Bedny envisioned historical perspectives incorrectly. When we moved the monument to Minin and Pozharsky closer to the St. Basil's Cathedral,

Dmitry Bedny protested and wrote that the monument should be thrown away altogether, and we should forget about Minin and Pozharsky. In response to this letter, I called him "Ivan who does not remember his kinship." We cannot discard history...

Stalin then makes a series of comments about the interpretation of the character of Ivan the Terrible and mentions that Malyuta Skuratov was a significant military leader who heroically died in the war with Livonia.

In response to the idea that criticism helps and that Pudovkin made a good film *Admiral Nakhimov* after criticism, Cherkasov said: "We are confident that we will do no worse because I am working on the image of Ivan the Terrible not only in cinema but also in the theater. I have grown fond of this character and believe that our script revision may turn out to be correct and truthful."

To this, Stalin replied (addressing Molotov and Zhdanov): "Well, let's try."

Cherkasov: I am confident that the revision will succeed.

Stalin: May God give you a new year every day. (Laughs.)

Eisenstein: We say that several moments were successful in the first part, and this gives us confidence that we will succeed in the second part.

Stalin: What was successful and good, we are not discussing now; we are currently only talking about the shortcomings.

Eisenstein asks whether there will be any additional instructions regarding the film.

Stalin: I am not giving you instructions; I am expressing the observations of a viewer. Historical figures need to be portrayed truthfully. Well, what did Glinka show us? Who is this Glinka? This is Maxim, not Glinka. The actor Chirkov cannot reincarnate, and for an actor, the most important quality is the ability to

reincarnate. (Addressing Cherkasov.) You, on the other hand, can reincarnate.

Zhdanov says that Cherkasov was not lucky with Ivan the Terrible. There was also a panic with *Spring*, and he started playing janitors — in the film *In the Name of Life*, he plays a janitor.

Cherkasov says that he played most of the Tsars and even played Peter the Great and Alexei.

Zhdanov: Through the hereditary line. They passed through inheritance...

Stalin: It is necessary to portray historical figures correctly and powerfully. (To Eisenstein.) For example, Alexander Nevsky — did you compose that? It turned out beautifully. The most important thing is to observe the style of the historical epoch. A director can deviate from history; it is wrong if he merely copies details from historical material. He should work with his imagination but stay within the style. The director can vary within the style of the historical epoch.

Zhdanov mentions that Eisenstein is fascinated with shadows (which distracts the audience from the action) and Grozny's beard, saying that Grozny raises his head too often to show his beard.

Eisenstein promises to shorten Grozny's beard in the future.

Stalin (remembering individual performers from the first part of *Ivan the Terrible*): Kurbsky — excellent. Staritsky (actor Kadochnikov) is very good. He catches flies very well. Also the future king, and catches flies with his hands!

Such details should be given. They reveal the essence of a person.

...The conversation shifts to the situation in Czechoslovakia in connection with Cherkasov's trip for shooting and his participation in a Soviet film festival. Cherkasov talks about the popularity of the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia.

The discussion turns to the destruction caused by the Americans in Czechoslovakian cities.

Stalin: Our task was to enter Prague before the Americans. The Americans were in a hurry, but thanks to Koniev's raid, we managed to bypass them and get there before the fall of Prague. The Americans bombed Czechoslovakian industry. They held everywhere in Europe to this line. It was important for them to destroy competing industries. They bombed with relish!

Cherkasov talks about an album with photos of Franco and Goebbels, which was in Ambassador Zorin's villa.

Stalin: It's good that we finished off those bastards. If those scoundrels had won, one can only imagine what would have happened.

Cherkasov talks about the release of a Soviet school in the Soviet colony in Prague. He describes the children of emigrants studying there. It's very sad for the children who consider Russia their homeland, their home, but were born there and have never been to Russia.

Stalin: It's unfortunate for the children because they are not to blame for anything.

Molotov: We are now giving wide opportunities for children to return to Russia.

Stalin points out to Cherkasov that he knows how to reincarnate, and he recalls another actor, Khmelev, who was also skilled at reincarnation.

Cherkasov says he learned a lot working as an extra at the Mariinsky Theatre in Leningrad when Shalyapin, a great master of reincarnation, performed there.

Stalin: He was a great actor.

Zhdanov asks about the filming of *Spring*.

Cherkasov: We're finishing soon. *Spring* will be released in the spring.

Zhdanov says he liked the material of *Spring*. He praised the performance of the actress Orlova.

Cherkasov: The actor Plyatt plays very well.

Zhdanov: And how does Ranevskaya play! (Waving his hands.)

Cherkasov: For the first time in my life, I allowed myself to appear in a film without a beard, mustache, cloak or makeup. Playing the director, I feel a bit ashamed of my appearance and I want to hide behind my character. It's a very responsible role because I have to portray a Soviet director, and all our directors are worried about how the Soviet director will be portrayed.

Molotov: And here Cherkasov will settle scores with all the directors!

When the film *Spring* faced significant doubts, Cherkasov, having read an editorial article about *Spring* in the newspaper *Soviet Art*, concluded that the film was already banned. Zhdanov then said: Cherkasov sees that the preparation for *Spring* has failed and starts playing janitors! Zhdanov disapprovingly talks about the critical noise surrounding *Spring*.

Stalin is interested in how the actress Orlova performs. He speaks favourably about her as an actress.

Cherkasov says she is a hard-working and talented actress.

Zhdanov: Orlova plays well.

Everyone recalls *Volga-Volga* and Orlova's role as Postman Strelka.

Cherkasov: Have you seen *In the Name of Life*?

Stalin: No, I haven't watched it, but we have a good review from Klement Yefremovich. Voroshilov liked the film.

Well then, it seems the question is settled. What do you think, comrades (addressing Molotov and Zhdanov), should we give the opportunity to finish the film to comrades Cherkasov and Eisenstein? Then he adds: convey this to Comrade Bolshakov.

Cherkasov asks about certain details of the film and the external appearance of Ivan the Terrible.

Stalin: The appearance is correct, no need to change it. Good external portrayal of Ivan the Terrible.

Cherkasov: Can we keep the scene of Staritsky's murder in the script?

Stalin: You can leave it. Murders happened.

Cherkasov: We have a scene in the script where Malyuta Skuratov strangles Metropolitan Philip.

Zhdanov: Was it in the Tver Otroch Monastery?

Cherkasov: Yes. Should we keep this scene?

Stalin said that this scene should be kept; it would be historically accurate.

Molotov says that showing repression is generally possible and necessary, but it should be shown why they were done, in the name of what. For this, it is necessary to show a range of public activities, not confine it to scenes in basements and closed rooms but depict a broad range of public activities.

Cherkasov expresses his considerations regarding the future revised script, the future second episode.

Stalin: How will the film end? How can we make two more films, that is, the second and third episodes? How do we plan to do this?

Eisenstein says it's better to combine the material shot for the second episode with what remains in the script into one large film. Everyone agrees.

Stalin: How will our film end?

Cherkasov says that the film will end with the defeat of Livonia, the tragic death of Malyuta Skuratov, a campaign to the sea, where Ivan the Terrible stands by the sea surrounded by his army and says, "We stand by the sea and will continue to stand!"

Stalin: That's how it turned out, and even a little more.

Cherkasov asks if it's necessary to present a draft of the future screenplay for approval by the Political Bureau.

Stalin: No need to present the screenplay; figure it

out yourselves. Judging the script is difficult; it's easier to discuss the finished work. (To Molotov.) You probably really want to read the script?

Molotov: No, I work in a slightly different field. Let Bolshakov read it.

Eisenstein suggests that it would be good if the production of this film is not rushed.

This remark receives a lively response from everyone.

Stalin: In any case, do not rush, and, in general, we will close and not release hastily made films. Repin worked on *Zaporozhtsy* for 11 years.

Molotov: 13 years.

Stalin (insistently): 11 years.

Everyone concludes that only through prolonged work can truly good films be produced.

Regarding the film *Ivan the Terrible*, Stalin mentioned that if it takes one and a half to two years, even three years, to produce a film, then take that time, but let the film be well-made, let it be made "sculpturally." Overall, we must now raise the quality. There may be fewer films, but of higher quality. Our audience has grown, and we must show them good productions.

It was said that Tselikovskaya is good in other roles. She acts well, but she is a ballerina.

We explain that we couldn't bring in another actress to Alma-Ata.

Stalin says that a director should be inflexible and demand what he needs, but our directors give in too easily in their demands. Sometimes, a big actor is needed, but he plays an unsuitable role because he demands it, and they agree to let him play that role.

Eisenstein: The actress Gosheva couldn't be released from the Moscow Art Theatre to Alma-Ata for filming. We searched for Anastasia for two years.

Stalin: The actor Zharov took his role in the film *Ivan the Terrible* incorrectly, unseriously. He is not a ser-

ious military commander.

Zhdanov: He's not Malyuta Skuratov; he's some kind of *shapoklyak* !*

Stalin: Ivan the Terrible was a more nationalistic Tsar, more cautious; he didn't allow foreign influence into Russia. However, Peter opened the gates to Europe and let in too many foreigners.

Cherkasov mentions that, unfortunately, and to his shame, he hasn't seen the second part of the film *Ivan the Terrible*. When the film was edited and shown, he was in Leningrad at that time.

Eisenstein adds that he also hasn't seen the final version of the film because he fell ill right after its completion.

This causes great surprise and lively discussion.

The conversation ends with Stalin wishing success and saying, "God help us!"

They shake hands and leave. At 0:10 minutes, the conversation ends.

Addendum to the record by B.N. Agapov, made by S.M. Eisenstein and N.K. Cherkasov:

Zhdanov also said that "the film has too much abuse of religious rites."

Molotov said that this "adds a touch of mysticism that shouldn't be emphasized so strongly."

Zhdanov mentions that "the scene in the cathedral, where the 'oven scene' takes place, is shown too broadly and distracts attention."

Stalin says that the *oprichniks* during the dance resemble cannibals and remind him of some Phoenicians and Babylonians.

When Cherkasov mentioned that he has been work-

* A type of hat similar to a top hat. In this case, it is meant to refer to "fashionable people." — *Ed.*

ing on the image of Ivan the Terrible for a long time, both in cinema and theatre, Zhdanov said, “For six years now, I have been reigning peacefully.”

As they part, Stalin inquires about Eisenstein’s health.

Recorded by B.N. Agapov from the words of S.M. Eisenstein and N.K. Cherkasov.

(Stalin Watches Cinema, pp. 84-92)

**RESOLUTION OF THE
POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS)
“ON COURTS OF HONOUR IN
THE MINISTRIES OF THE USSR
AND CENTRAL DEPARTMENTS”**

March 28, 1947

1. Approve with amendments the draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) “On Courts of Honour in the Ministries of the USSR and Central Departments.”

2. Organize, in the first place within two weeks, courts of honour in the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Finance.*

*On the Courts of Honour in the Ministries of the USSR and
Central Departments*

*Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (Bolsheviks)*

1. In order to contribute to the cause of educating employees of state bodies in the spirit of Soviet patriotism and dedication to the interests of the Soviet state and a high sense of their state and social duty, to com-

* The elections of the Courts of Honour in central ministries and agencies took place in 1947-48. The Courts of Honour existed until the end of 1949.

bat offences that undermine the honour and dignity of a Soviet worker, courts of honour are established in the Ministries of the USSR and central departments.

2. Courts of honour are entrusted with the consideration of unpatriotic, anti-state and anti-social actions and deeds committed by leading, operational and scientific workers of the Ministries of the USSR and central departments if these offences and actions are not subject to punishment under criminal law.

3. The Court of Honour consists of 5-7 people. The members of the Court include employees of the ministry or department, elected by secret ballot at a meeting of leading, operational and scientific workers of the ministry or department, as well as representatives of the party organization of the ministry or department and a representative of the Central Committee of the trade union.

4. The right to nominate candidates for members of the Court at a meeting of employees of the ministry and department is granted both to the party and trade union organizations and to the participants of the meeting. The question of inclusion in the list of candidates for members of the Court of Honour or withdrawal from the list is decided by open voting.

The candidates who receive an absolute majority of votes are considered elected.

The minister and the head of the department are not included in the composition of the Court of Honour.

5. Members of the Court elect the chairperson of the Court of Honour from among themselves by open vote.

6. Courts of Honour are elected for a term of one year.*

* By the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the CC of the CPSU(B) dated July 7, 1948, the term of authority of the courts of honour was extended for an additional year — *Ed.*

7. The decision to refer a case to the Court of Honour belongs either to the minister or the head of the department, the trade union organization, or the party organization of the ministry or the respective department.

8. The consideration of cases in the Court of Honour should be preceded by a fact-checking conducted by the members of the Court at the request of the chairperson. The chairperson of the Court determines who should be called as a witness.

The accused is presented with the results of the conducted check, and the right is given to request the chairperson of the Court to call new witnesses or to demand documents and references.

9. The consideration of cases in the Court of Honour is usually conducted in an open session.

The case review in the Court of Honour consists of examining the materials collected on the case, hearing explanations from the individual brought before the Court of Honour and witnesses, and verifying the presented evidence.

During the consideration of the case in the Court of Honour, employees of the ministry or department present at the hearing may address the substance of the case.

10. The decision of the Court of Honour is made by a simple majority of the votes of the members of the Court. The decision specifies the nature of the offence and the specific measure of punishment determined by the Court.

11. The Court of Honour may decide to:

a) issue a public reprimand to the accused;

b) issue a public censure;

c) transfer the case to investigative authorities for referral to criminal court.

12. The decision of the Court of Honour is publicly announced to the employee brought before the Court.

A copy of the decision of the Court of Honour is attached to the employee's personnel file.

13. The decision of the Court of Honour is not subject to appeal.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

A. Zhdanov
Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)

(RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 3, D. 1064, L. 49-51)

INTERVIEW WITH THE AMERICAN REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, HAROLD STASSEN

Protocol of the Interview

April 9, 1947

Stassen declared that he was grateful to Stalin for receiving him. He, Stassen, had wanted an interview with Stalin as the state leader, to show his respect. He, Stassen, had undergone an interesting journey through the European countries, and during this journey was particularly interested in the economic situation of different countries after the war. It was his opinion that the living standards of the people was of great significance for their prosperity. The relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were of great significance during the war and would also be of further great significance. He was aware that that the economic systems of the USSR and the United States of America were different. The economy of the USSR was on the principle of planning, was built on socialist principles and its development led by the Communist Party. In the United States there was a free economy with private capital. It would interest him to know if Stalin was of the opinion that these two economic systems could live side by side in one and the same world, and if they could cooperate together after the war.

Stalin answered that of course the two systems could cooperate together. The difference between them was of no great essential significance as far as their cooperation was concerned. The economic systems in Germany and the United States of America were the same, nevertheless it had come to war between them.

The economic systems of the United States of America and the USSR were different, but it had not led them to war with one another, but rather led them to cooperate during the war. If two different systems could cooperate during the war, why should they not be able to cooperate in peace time? Of course, he meant by that, that cooperation between two different economic systems was possible if the wish to cooperate existed. But if the wish to cooperate did not exist, then the states and people even of similar economic systems could come into conflict.

Stassen declared that the wish to cooperate was, of course, of great importance. However, earlier, before the war, in both countries, different declarations of the impossibility of cooperation had been made. Before the war, Stalin too, had himself declared this. He, Stassen, would like to know whether Stalin was of the opinion that the events of the war, the defeat of the fascist Axis of Germany and Japan, had changed the situation, and one could now, if the wish existed, hope for cooperation between the USSR and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that he could in no case have said that the two different systems could not cooperate. Lenin was the first to express the idea on the cooperation of two systems. "Lenin is our teacher," said Stalin, "and we Soviet people are Lenin's pupils. We have never deviated from Lenin's directives and we never will deviate." It was possible that he, Stalin, had said that a system, for example the capitalist system, was not willing to cooperate, but this remark concerned the wish to cooperate, but not the possibility of cooperation. But where the possibility of cooperation was concerned, he, Stalin, stood on Lenin's standpoint that cooperation between two economic systems was possible and desirable. It was also the wish of the people and the Communist Party of the USSR concerning cooperation; they had this wish. Such a cooperation could only be

useful for both countries.

Stassen answered that that was clear. It reminded him of the explanation Stalin had given to the 18th Party Congress and the Plenary Session in 1937. In this declaration he had spoken of “the capitalist environment,” and of “monopoly and imperialist development.” From the explanation that Stalin had made today, he, Stassen, had inferred that now, after the defeat of Japan and Germany, the situation had changed.

Stalin declared that at no Party Congress and at no Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party had he spoken, nor could he have, of the impossibility of the cooperation of two systems. He, Stalin, had said that in a capitalist environment there existed the danger of an attack on the USSR. If one of the parts did not want to cooperate, that signified that the danger of an attack existed. And, in fact, Germany did not want to cooperate with the USSR, and had attacked the USSR. Had the USSR been able to cooperate with Germany? Yes, — the USSR had been able to cooperate with Germany, but the Germans had not wanted this. Otherwise the USSR would have cooperated with Germany as they had with other countries. “As you see, the wish for cooperation existed, but not the possibility. One must distinguish between the possibility of cooperation and the wish to cooperate. The possibility of cooperation is always there, but the wish to cooperate is not always there. If one part does not want to cooperate, it results in conflict, in war.”

Stassen declared that the wish must be present on both sides. Stalin replied that he wanted to attest to the fact that Russia had the wish to cooperate.

Stassen said that he was pleased to hear that, and that he would like to go into Stalin’s declaration about the similarity of the economic systems of the United States of America and Germany. He must say that the economic systems of the United States of America and

Germany had been different from one another when it was Germany that began the war.

Stalin was not in agreement with that and explained that there was a difference between the regimes of the United States of America and Germany, but no difference between the economic systems. The regime is transient, a political factor.

Stassen said that many articles had been written saying that the capitalist system had produced the menace of monopolies, imperialism and the oppression of the workers. In his, Stassen's, opinion, the United States of America had succeeded in preventing the development of the monopolist and imperialist tendencies of capitalism, had led to prosperity and through this the workers in the United States of America had a larger say in many matters than Marx and Engels had thought possible. Therein lay the difference between the economic system of the United States of America and the economic system that existed in Hitler's Germany.

Stalin said that one must not allow oneself to be carried away by the criticism of the system of the other. Every people holds firmly to the system that it wants. History will show which system is better. One must respect the system that the people choose and approve. Whether the system in the United States of America is bad or good is a matter for the American people. For cooperation, it is not necessary for the peoples to have the same system. One must respect the system approved by the people. Only on these terms is cooperation possible.

Concerning Marx and Engels, they of course, could not predict what would happen forty years after their deaths.

The Soviet system was called a totalitarian or a dictatorship system, but the Soviet people call the American system monopoly capitalism. If the two sides begin to insult each other as monopolist or totalitarian they

would not come to cooperation. One must take note of the historical fact that there exist two systems which have been approved by the people. Only on this basis is cooperation possible.

Where the passion for the criticism of monopolism and totalitarianism was concerned, it was propaganda — but he, Stalin, was not a propagandist — rather a man of deeds. We may not be sectarian, Stalin said. If the people wish to change a system, they will do so. As he, Stalin, had met Roosevelt and discussed military questions, he and Roosevelt had not insulted each other as monopolists and totalitarianists. They had considered it more essential that he and Roosevelt had established cooperation with one another and had achieved victory over the enemy.

Stassen said that this manner of criticism of both sides had been one of the causes of the misunderstandings that had arisen since the end of the war. He, Stassen, wished to know whether Stalin hoped in the future to raise to a higher degree the exchange of ideas, students, teachers, actors and tourists, if cooperation was established between the USSR and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that it was inevitable, if cooperation was established. The exchange of goods led to the exchange of people.

Stassen said that in the past there had been misunderstandings between the USSR and the United States of America, that the Soviet side did not wish to exchange ideas, as was seen in the introduction of censorship of reports sent out by foreign reporters from Moscow. So that in the circumstances, that the newspaper *New York Herald Tribune* was refused permission to have a reporter of their own in Moscow, that this mistake was one of the causes of the mutual misunderstandings between the peoples of the USSR and the United States of America.

Stalin answered that the case of the refusal of a visa for a correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* had, as a matter of fact, happened. That this misunderstanding, however, was an accidental phenomenon and had no relation to the politics of the Soviet government. He, Stalin, knew that the *New York Herald Tribune* was a respectable newspaper. In this respect, it was of great significance that some American correspondents were unfavourably disposed towards the USSR.

Stassen answered that it was a fact that there were such reporters. The reporter of the *New York Herald Tribune* was given permission to stay in Moscow, however, only for the duration of the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Now this newspaper posed the question of sending a permanent reporter to Moscow. The "New York Herald Tribune" was a leading organ of the Republicans, that was gaining more importance now that the Republicans had gained a majority in Congress.

Stalin answered: "That is of no importance to us, we see no great difference between the Republicans and the Democrats." Concerning the question of the reporters, he, Stalin, remembered an incident. In Tehran, the three Great Powers held a conference in which they worked efficiently and in a friendly atmosphere. An American reporter whose name he could not remember at the moment had sent a report that Marshal Timoshenko was present at the Tehran Conference, although in reality he was not there, and that he, Stalin, had violently attacked Timoshenko during the dinner. But that was a big and slanderous lie. And now? Should one praise such a reporter? At that dinner, where the participants celebrated Churchill's 69th birthday, he Churchill, Brook, Leahy and others were present, in total about 30 people could attest that no such thing had taken place. Nevertheless this reporter had sent his false report to the newspaper, and it was published in

the press of the United States of America. "Can one trust such a reporter? We," said Stalin, "are not of the opinion that the United States of America or its politicians are to blame for this. Such incidents do happen. That caused bad feelings among the Soviet people."

Stassen said that cases of irresponsible reporters sending false reports did happen, but other reporters corrected the mistake of the first, and after a while the people knew which reporters they could trust and which they could not.

Stalin answered that this was correct.

Stassen said that any time a reporter gave an intentional and obviously false report, his paper would recall him, and thus our newspapers would create a team of honest and capable reporters.

Stalin said that these reporters write only sensational news which newspapers will publish to earn money and then dismiss these reporters afterwards.

Stassen said that in the spheres of the press, trade and culture, the two systems must find ways and means to build up good relations with one another.

Stalin said that he was right.

Stassen declared that he believed that if the reports of reporters did not undergo censorship, this would be a better basis for cooperation and mutual understanding between our people and each other.

Stalin said in the USSR it would be difficult to do away with censorship. Molotov had tried more than once, but had been unable to get away with it. Each time the Soviet government had tried to do without censorship they had regretted it and re-introduced it. In the autumn of the previous year they had done away with censorship. He, Stalin, had been on holiday and the reporters had begun to write that Molotov had forced Stalin to go on holiday, and then they wrote that Stalin, on returning, would drive out Molotov. Thereby these reporters had presented the Soviet government to some

extent as a wild animal house. Of course, the Soviet people were indignant about this and thus, censorship had to be re-introduced.

Stassen said that he now understood that Stalin held cooperation to be possible if the wish and the intention to cooperate existed.

Stalin answered that he was completely right.

Stassen said that for the raising of living standards the mechanization and electrification was of great importance, and the application of atomic energy in industry was of great importance for all the peoples as well as for the peoples of the USSR and the United States of America. He, Stassen, was of the opinion that the creating of an inspection and control system and that the use of atomic energy for military purposes should be declared illegal, was of great importance for all the peoples of the world. Was Stalin of the opinion that in the future, they should come to terms over the control and regulation of the production of atomic energy and over its peaceful application?

Stalin answered that he hoped so. Between the USSR and the United States of America there stood great differences of opinion on this question, but finally both sides — so he, Stalin, hoped — would come to terms. In his, Stalin's, view there would need to be international control and inspection and this would be of great importance. The application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes would cause a great revolution in production procedure. Where the application of atomic energy for military purposes was concerned, it possibly would be forbidden. The desires and the conscience of the peoples demanded it so.

Stassen answered that it was one of the most important problems. If it was solved, atomic energy could be a great blessing for the peoples of all the world, but if not, then a great curse.

Stalin said that he believed it would be possible to

establish international control and inspection. The development moved towards that. Stassen thanked Stalin for the interview. Stalin answered that he was at Stassen's disposal and that the Russians respected their guests.

Stassen said that during the San Francisco Conference he had had an unofficial talk with Molotov. In the course of this conversation he had been invited to visit Russia.

Stalin said that he believed the situation in Europe was very bad now. What did Mr. Stassen think about it?

Stassen answered that this was right in general — that some countries had not suffered so much from the war and were not in such a difficult position, for example Czechoslovakia and Switzerland.

Stalin said that Switzerland and Czechoslovakia were small countries.

Stassen answered that the large countries found themselves in a very difficult situation. The problems they were facing were of a financial, raw materials and nutritional nature.

Stalin explained that Europe was a part of the world in which there were many factories and works, but where there was a perceptible lack of raw materials and food. That was tragic.

Stassen thought that the poor level of the output of the coal production in the Ruhr area had led to a coal shortage in Europe.

Stalin said that a coal shortage had also been felt in England and that this was most strange.

Stassen explained that the coal production in the United States of America fortunately stood at a high level. In the United States of America, two million tons of bituminous coal was mined daily. Consequently, the United States of America was in the position of being able to supply Europe with large amounts of coal.

Stalin declared that the situation was not so bad in

the United States of America. America was protected by two oceans. On the northern border of the United States of America was the weak country of Canada, and in the south the weak country of Mexico. The United States of America did not need to be afraid of them. After the War of Independence the people had not been involved in war for 60 years and had enjoyed peace. All that had contributed to the swift development of the United States of America. In addition, the population of the United States of America consisted of people that had liberated themselves long ago from the yoke of kings and land aristocracy. All these circumstances had also favoured the rapid development of the United States of America.

Stassen declared that his great-grandfather had fled from Czechoslovakia because of imperialism. Of course, the geographical situation of the United States of America was a great help. "We are lucky," said Stassen, "that the enemy was defeated far away from our coasts. The United States of America was in the position to adapt itself completely, and after the war to resurrect production in great volume. Now the task is to avoid a depression and economic crisis."

Stalin asked if an economic crisis was expected in the United States of America.

Stassen answered that no economic crisis was expected. He believed that it was possible to regulate capitalism in the United States of America, to raise the level of employment to a high standard and to avoid any serious crisis. The main task lay, however, in avoiding a crisis in the economic system of the United States of America. But if the government followed a wise policy and if one took account of the lessons of the years 1929-30, there would be established regulated capitalism and not monopoly capitalism in the United States of America, which would help to avoid a crisis.

Stalin said that to achieve this a very strong gov-

ernment would be needed, which was also inspired by great determination.

Stassen said that he was right, besides which the people must understand the measures, that the stabilizing and preservation of the economic system is aimed at. That is a new task for which there is no parallel in any economic system of the world.

Stalin declared that there were favourable circumstances for the United States of America, that the two rivals of the United States of America in the world market — Japan and Germany, had been removed. Consequently, the demand for American goods had increased and that had created favourable conditions for the development of the United States of America. The markets of China and Japan were open to the United States of America, like Europe. This would help the United States of America. Such favourable conditions had never before existed.

Stassen said that on the other hand no means of payment existed in these markets, so that it would be a burden and not a profitable business for the United States of America. But of course the removal of Germany and Japan, two carriers of the imperialist danger, was a great blessing for the United States of America and for the other countries from the point of view of peace. Earlier, world trade had, of course, not been a factor of great importance for the United States of America. Their market had been confined to the area of the United States of America or the western hemisphere.

Stalin said that before the war about 10 per cent of American produce was exported to other countries. As far as purchasing power was concerned, he, Stalin, believed the merchants would find a means of payment, so as to buy American goods and sell them to the peasants of these countries. The merchants in China, Japan, Europe and South America had saved money. Now the

United States of America will probably raise its exports to 20 per cent. Was that correct?

Stassen said that he did not believe so.

Stalin asked: "Seriously?"

Stassen answered in the affirmative and said that if the United States of America's exports increased to 15 per cent they would be lucky, in his opinion. Most of the merchants had saved money in their country's currency, which was all tied up and not suitable for transfer. Thus, in Stassen's opinion, the exports of the United States of America would not exceed 15 per cent.

Stalin thought that if one considered the level of production in the United States of America, then 15 per cent was no small figure.

Stassen agreed with that.

Stalin declared that American industry, it was said, had many orders. Was that correct? It was said that the works of the United States of America were not in the position of being able to fulfil all these orders, and that all works were functioning at 100 per cent. Was that correct?

Stassen answered that that was correct, but that they handled the inland orders.

Stalin remarked that that was very important.

Stassen said that they succeeded in meeting the demand for food, women's clothing and shoes; the production of machinery, motor vehicles and locomotives was still lagging behind.

Stalin said that reports had appeared in the American press that an economic crisis would soon occur.

Stassen said that the press had reported that the unemployment figure in the United States of America would rise to eight million in November of last year. This report, however, had been false. The task therein was to raise production to a high level and to increase stabilization, and so avoid an economic crisis.

Stalin remarked that Stassen obviously had the

regulation of production in mind.

Stassen answered that that was right and explained that there were people in America who asserted that there would be a depression. But he, Stassen, was optimistic and believed and maintained that the Americans could avoid a depression; he, Stassen, knew that the people had a deeper understanding of stronger regulation than earlier.

Stalin asked: "And the businesspeople? Would they understand, allow such regulation and submit to restrictions?"

Stassen said that the businesspeople would oppose such a rule.

Stalin remarked that of course they would oppose it.

Stassen thought that they had, however, understood that the depression of 1929 must not repeat itself, and they could now see better the necessity of regulation. Of course, to be a far-reaching regulation, the government would need to make many decisions and to proceed sensibly.

Stalin remarked that he was right.

Stassen declared that it was necessary for all systems and forms of government. Under any form of government it was bad for the people if they made mistakes.

Stalin agreed to that.

Stassen said that Japan and Germany had proved this to be correct.

Stalin said that in these countries the economy had been under the control of the military, which did not understand economy. So, in Japan, for example, the economy was led by Toto, who only knew how to conduct war.

Stassen said that that was right. He thanked Stalin for giving him the possibility of speaking to him and for the time Stalin had spared him.

Stalin asked how long Stassen meant to stay in the

USSR.

Stassen answered that he would be going to Kiev the next day. Upon that he wanted to express his admiration for the heroic defenders of Stalingrad and he thought after that, to leave the USSR by way of Leningrad. During the defence of Stalingrad he had been with the American fleet in the Pacific, where he had followed the Epopée of Stalingrad with anxious attention.

Stalin said that Admiral Niemitz was clearly a very important marine commander. Stalin asked whether Stassen had been to Leningrad yet.

Stassen said that he had not yet been to Leningrad and had the intention of leaving the USSR by way of Leningrad.

Stalin said that the talk with Stassen had given him much.

Stassen said that the talk with Stalin had also been very useful to him for his work in the study of economic problems.

Stalin said that he had also been occupied very much with economic problems before the war and only through the compulsion of necessity was he a military specialist.

Stassen asked whether he could get and keep the protocol of the interview from Pavlov and whether he had permission to speak to reporters about the interview if he came together with one.

Stalin said that of course Stassen could keep the protocol and talk to reporters about it, — there was nothing secret about it.

(Pravda, May 8, 1947)

TELEGRAM TO A.Y. ORLOV*

June 15, 1947

Convey to Mao Zedong that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) considers his arrival in Moscow desirable without any disclosure. If Mao Zedong also deems it necessary, we believe it is better to do this through Harbin. If necessary, we will send an airplane. Telegraph the results of the conversation with Mao Zedong and his wishes.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, p. 50)

* A.Y. Orlov (operational code name in encrypted correspondence — “Terebin”), Major General of the Medical Service of the Red Army and surgeon. Along with another officer from the General Staff (Melnikov), he was sent to Yan’an in January 1942, to the headquarters of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. His tasks included treating Mao Zedong and his family and providing encrypted communication between Mao Zedong and Stalin through a specially delivered radio station from Moscow.

**TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA, GEORGI DIMITROV**

June 20, 1947

Sofia

I request you to accept my heartfelt congratulations on the occasion of your birthday. I wish you good health and further success in your activities for the benefit of the fraternal Bulgarian people.

Joseph Stalin

(Rabotnichesko Delo, June 20, 1947)

TELEGRAM TO A.Y. ORLOV

July 1, 1947

In view of the upcoming* operations and considering that Mao Zedong's absence may adversely affect these operations, we consider it advisable to temporarily postpone Mao Zedong's trip.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, p. 50)

* Military — *Ed.*

CONVERSATION WITH THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

*Conversation record with the Czechoslovak government
delegation*

July 9, 1947

Secret
Moscow

Present: Comrade J.V. Stalin, Comrade V.M. Molotov, Prime Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic Gottwald, Minister of Foreign Affairs Masaryk, Minister of Justice Drtina, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic Hendrich and Ambassador of Czechoslovakia Horak.

Comrade Stalin asks Gottwald about their questions for us.

Gottwald replies that they would like to discuss three main issues:

1. Participation in the Paris Conference on July 12, 1947;
2. The treaty between the Czechoslovak Republic and France;
3. Trade negotiations of the Czechoslovak delegation with the Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR.

Comrade Stalin clarifies with Gottwald which question they would like to start the discussion with.

Gottwald replies that it would be better to start with the first one.

Comrade Stalin says that approximately 2-3 days after Comrade V.M. Molotov's return from Paris, the Yugoslavs asked us how to proceed, whether to par-

ticipate in the conference on July 12 in Paris or not. They expressed their opinion that they were thinking of refusing to participate in this conference. Later, Romania and Bulgaria also approached us with the same question. At first, we thought it would be better to advise them to go to this conference and then disrupt it on the spot. Later, based on the information received from our ambassadors, we became convinced that, under the guise of providing credit assistance to Europe, something like a Western bloc against the Soviet Union was being organized. Then we firmly decided and stated our opinion to everyone that we are against participating in this conference on July 12, 1947.

We were surprised that you decided to participate in this conference. For us, this issue is a question of the friendship of the Soviet Union with the Czechoslovak Republic. Objectively, whether you want it or not, you are helping to isolate the Soviet Union. Look at what is happening. All the countries that have friendly relations with us are not participating in this conference, and Czechoslovakia, which also has friendly relations with us, is participating. This means they will decide that the friendship between the Czechoslovak Republic and the Soviet Union is not so strong if it was so easily pulled to the side of isolating the Soviet Union, against the Soviet Union. This will be seen as a victory against the Soviet Union. We and our people will not understand this. You need to cancel your decision; you must refuse to participate in this conference, and the sooner you do it, the better.

Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin to take into account that the Czechoslovak government was aware of the dependence of Czechoslovak industry on the West. Representatives of industry considered it expedient to participate in the conference so as not to miss the opportunity to obtain credit. At the same time, the Polish delegation arrived in Prague and informed us that they

had decided to participate in the Paris conference. As a result, the decision of the Czechoslovak government to participate in the conference in Paris on July 12, 1947 was unanimous among all political parties.

Masaryk continued, stating that he did not intend to absolve himself of responsibility for supporting participation in this conference. However, he asks to consider that by this decision, neither he nor the government of the Czechoslovak Republic wanted to do anything harmful against the Soviet Union. In conclusion, Masaryk asks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to alleviate their situation.

Comrade Molotov notes to Masaryk that his participation in the conference itself will be against the Soviet Union.

Masaryk responds that he, the government, all parties and the entire Czechoslovak people do not want to nor will they do anything against the Soviet Union.

Comrade Stalin states that we did not doubt and do not doubt your friendship towards us, but objectively, it turns out the opposite.

Dršina says that on his behalf and on behalf of the party to which he belongs, he declares that if our decision goes against the Soviet Union, then his party does not want this and will not do it. His party will not do anything that would give reason to interpret our actions as against the Soviet Union. At the same time, Dršina asks to consider that the Czechoslovak Republic differs from all other Slavic countries, except the USSR, in that its exports and imports depend on Western countries by 60 per cent.

Comrade Stalin notes that Czechoslovakia has a passive trade balance with the West, and Czechoslovakia has to export currency to the West.

Dršina says that he refers to the volume of exports and imports and that the people of the Czechoslovak Republic believe that if they do not participate in this

conference, it means they will not receive credit. Consequently, they will lower the standard of living of their population because Czechoslovak trade with the Soviet Union sharply declined in 1947. Drtina concludes his speech by requesting assistance to help them overcome the current situation and increase trade with Czechoslovakia.

Comrade Stalin states that there are certain products we need that can be obtained from Czechoslovakia, such as pipes for the oil industry, narrow-gauge railway tracks, wagons, etc. We can help Czechoslovakia by concluding a trade agreement beneficial to both parties.

Gottwald says that Czechoslovakia exports many products from the light and textile industries to the West, and the Soviet Union does not buy them yet.

Comrade Stalin says, "Why not? We will buy them."

Gottwald asks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to show in the communique what the Soviet Union is providing as a result of the arrival of the Czechoslovak delegation.

Masaryk and *Drtina* ask Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov to help them formulate a refusal to participate in the Paris conference.

Comrade Stalin says that they should see how the Bulgarians formulated their refusal, consult among themselves and provide the necessary wording for the reasons for refusal.

On the second question, about the treaty with France, Comrade Stalin says that according to Benes' statement, it seems as if we, the Soviet Union, are against the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and France. This is not true. We want Czechoslovakia to conclude a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with France, but we also want this treaty to be no worse than the ones Czechoslovakia has with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Poland. That is what we want. Regarding immediate

assistance in case of aggression, Comrade Stalin says that Czechoslovakia needs immediate help because it is a small country.

Comrade Stalin further says that he does not understand why Germany's satellites — such as Austria, Hungary, etc. — as aggressors can be better than Germany itself. History teaches us that Germany does not necessarily have to become an aggressor on its own; it can do so with the help of its satellites. Therefore, the Soviet Union wants only one thing: for the treaty between Czechoslovakia and France to be no worse than the treaties Czechoslovakia has with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Poland.

Masaryk says that during a reception with French Ambassador Dejean concerning the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance between Czechoslovakia and France, Dejean directly stated that Czechoslovakia demands more from France than what is stipulated in the treaty between the Soviet Union and France.

Comrade Stalin confirms that indeed the treaty between the Soviet Union and France does not include provisions for immediate assistance in case of aggression, an oversight on our part, but we plan to correct this aspect of the treaty. Simultaneously, it should be noted that the treaty with England does include provisions for immediate assistance in case of aggression.

Gottwald says he has a few more minor questions and that he will write to Comrade Stalin about them.

Comrade Stalin agrees.

In conclusion, Comrade Stalin reminds Gottwald and all members of the Czechoslovak delegation that it is necessary to refuse participation in the conference in Paris today, i.e., on July 10, 1947.

Masaryk says they will discuss this issue tomorrow, and only by evening will they be able to send their government's opinion.

Comrade Stalin says that it needs to be done im-

mediately.

The delegation thanks Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov for the reception and the necessary advice, promising to act as agreed.

Recorded by Bodrov

(Eastern Europe in Documents from Russian Archives: 1944-1953, Vol. 1: 1944-1948, pp. 672-675)

FIRST MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA

From Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin"

July 1947

The external situation of the PRA. Its relations with the neighbouring states and the Anglo-Americans. The Corfu Channel incident and the Hague Court. The political, economic and social-class situation in Albania. Stalin's all-round interest in and high estimation of our country, people and Party. "For a party to be in power and remain illegal doesn't make sense." "Your Communist Party can call itself the Party of Labour."

On July 14, 1947, I arrived in Moscow at the head of the first official delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania and the Communist Party of Albania on a friendly visit to the Soviet Union.

The joy of my comrades and I, that we were appointed by the Central Committee of the Party to go to Moscow where we would meet the great Stalin, was indescribable. Since the time when we first became acquainted with Marxist-Leninist theory, we had always dreamed, night and day, of meeting Stalin. During the period of the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War this desire had grown even stronger. Next to the outstanding figures of Marx, Engels and Lenin, Comrade Stalin was extremely respected and dear to us, because his teachings led us to the founding of the Communist Party of Albania as a party of the Leninist type, inspired us during the National Liberation War and were helping us in the construction of socialism.

The talks with Stalin and his advice would be a guide in the great and arduous work which we were do-

ing to consolidate the victories achieved.

For all these reasons, our first visit to the Soviet Union was a cause for indescribable joy and great satisfaction not only for the communists and for us, the members of the delegation, but also for the entire Albanian people, who had been eagerly awaiting this visit and hailed it with great enthusiasm.

As we saw with our own eyes and felt in our hearts, Stalin and the Soviet Government welcomed our delegation in a very cordial and warm manner, with sincere affection. During the twelve days of our stay in Moscow we met Comrade Stalin several times, and the talks which we held with him, his sincere, comradely advice and instructions, have remained and will remain forever dear to us.

The day of my first meeting with Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin will remain unforgettable. It was the 16th of July 1947, the third day of our stay in Moscow. It was an extraordinary day from the outset: in the morning we went to the Mausoleum of the great Lenin where we bowed our heads in deep respect before the body of the brilliant leader of the revolution, before that man whose name and colossal work was deeply engraved in our minds and hearts, and had enlightened us on the glorious road of our struggle for freedom, the revolution and socialism. On this occasion, in the name of the Albanian people, our Communist Party and in my own name personally, I laid a wreath of many-coloured flowers at the entrance to the Mausoleum of the immortal Lenin. From there, after visiting the graves of the valiant fighters of the October Socialist Revolution, the outstanding militants of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet state, buried in the walls of the Kremlin, we went to the Central Museum of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. For more than two hours we went from one hall to the other, acquainting ourselves at first-hand with docu-

ments and exhibits which reflected in detail the life and outstanding work of the great Lenin. Before we left, in the Visitors' Book of the Museum, among others, I also wrote these words: "The cause of Lenin will live on forever in the future generations. The memory of him will live forever in the hearts of the Albanian people."

That same day, full of indelible impressions and emotions, we were received by the disciple and loyal continuer of the work of Lenin, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, who talked with us at length.

From the beginning he created such a comradely atmosphere that we were very quickly relieved of that natural emotion which we felt when we entered his office, a large room, with a long table for meetings, close to his writing desk. Only a few minutes after exchanging the initial courtesies, we felt as though we were not talking to the great Stalin, but sitting with a comrade, whom we had met before and with whom we had talked many times. I was still young then, and the representative of a small party and country, therefore, in order to create the warmest and most comradely atmosphere for me, Stalin cracked some jokes and then began to speak with affection and great respect about our people, about their militant traditions of the past and their heroism in the National Liberation War. He spoke quietly, calmly and with a characteristic warmth which put me at ease.

Among other things, Comrade Stalin told us that he felt deep admiration for our people as a very ancient people of the Balkan region and with a long and valorous history.

"I have acquainted myself, especially, with the heroism displayed by the Albanian people during the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War," he continued, "but, of course, this knowledge of mine cannot be broad and deep enough. Therefore, I would like you to tell us a little about your country, your people and the problems which are worrying you today."

After this, I began to speak and gave Comrade Stalin a description of the long and glorious historic road of our people, of their ceaseless wars for freedom and independence. I dwelt in particular on the period of the years of our National Liberation War, spoke about the founding of our Communist Party as a party of the Leninist type, about the decisive role it played and was playing as the only leading force in the war and the efforts of the Albanian people to win the freedom and independence of the Homeland, to overthrow the old feudal-bourgeois power, to set up the new people's power and to lead the country successfully towards profound socialist transformations. Availing myself of this opportunity, I thanked Comrade Stalin once again and expressed to him the deep gratitude of the Albanian communists and the entire Albanian people for the ardent support which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and he personally had given our people and Party during the years of the war and were giving after the liberation of the Homeland.

I went on to describe to Comrade Stalin the deep-going political, economic and social transformations which had been carried out and were being consolidated, step by step, in Albania in the first years of the people's power. "The internal political and economic situation of Albania," I told him among other things, "has improved appreciably. These improvements have their base in the correct understanding of the need to overcome the difficulties and in the great efforts of the people and the Party to overcome these difficulties with toil and sweat. Our people are convinced of the correctness of their road and have unshakeable confidence in the Communist Party, the Government of our People's Republic, in their own constructive forces, and in their sincere friends, and day by day are carrying out the tasks set to them, with a high level of mobilization, self-denial and enthusiasm."

Comrade Stalin expressed his joy over the successes of our people and Party in their work of construction and was interested to learn something more about the situation of classes in our country. He was especially interested in our working class and peasantry. He asked a lot of questions about these two classes of our society, about which we exchanged many ideas that were to serve us later in organizing a sound work in the ranks of the working class and the poor and middle peasantry, and were to help us, also, in defining the stands that should be maintained towards the wealthy elements of the city and the kulaks in the countryside.

“The overwhelming majority of our people,” I told Comrade Stalin, among other things, in reply to his questions, “is comprised of poor peasants, and next come the middle peasants. We have a working class small in numbers, then we have quite a large number of craftsmen and townspeople engaged in petty commerce, and a minority of intellectuals. All these masses of working people responded to the call of our Communist Party, were mobilized in the war for the liberation of the Homeland and now are closely linked with the Party and the people’s power.”

“Has the working class of Albania any tradition of class struggle?” Comrade Stalin asked.

“Before the liberation of the country,” I told him, “this class was very small. It had just been created and was made up of a number of wage earners, apprentices or artisans dispersed among small enterprises and workshops. In the past, the workers in some towns of our country came out in strikes, but these were small and uncoordinated, due both to the small number of the workers and to the lack of organization in trade-unions. Irrespective of this,” I told Comrade Stalin, “our Communist Party was founded as a party of the working class, which would be led by the Marxist-Leninist ideology and would express and defend the inter-

ests of the proletariat and the broad working masses, in the first place, of the Albanian peasantry, which constituted the majority of our population.”

Comrade Stalin asked us in detail about the situation of the middle and poor peasants in our country.

In reply to his questions, I told Comrade Stalin about the policy which our Party had followed, and the great, all-round work it had done since its founding in order to find support among the peasantry and to win it over to its side.

“We acted in that way,” I said, “proceeding not only from the Marxist-Leninist principle that the peasantry is the closest and most natural ally of the proletariat in the revolution, but also from the fact that the peasantry in Albania constitutes the overwhelming majority of the population and through the centuries has been characterized by great patriotic and revolutionary traditions.” Continuing our talk, I tried to describe the economic situation of the peasants after the liberation of the country, as well as their cultural and technical level. Besides affirming the lofty virtues of our peasantry as patriotic, hard-working, closely linked with the soil and the Homeland, and thirsting for freedom, development and progress, I also spoke of the pronounced hangovers of the past and the economic and cultural backwardness of our peasantry, as well as of its deeply implanted petty-bourgeois mentality. “Our Party,” I stressed, “has had to fight with all its strength against this situation and we have achieved some successes, but we are aware that we must fight harder and more persistently in order to make the peasantry conscious, so that it will embrace and implement the line of the Party at every step.”

Comrade Stalin replied: “In general, the peasants are afraid of communism at first because they imagine that the communists will take the land and everything they have. The enemies,” he continued, “talk a great

deal to the peasants in this direction with the aim of detaching them from the alliance with the working class and turning them away from the policy of the party and the road of socialism. Therefore the careful and far-sighted work of the Communist Party is very important, as you also said, to ensure that the peasantry links itself indissolubly with the party and the working class.”

On this occasion, I also gave Comrade Stalin a general outline of the social-class structure of our Party and explained that this structure faithfully reflected the very social structure of our people. “This is the reason,” I said, “why communists of peasant social status at present comprise the largest number of the members of our Party. The policy of our Party in this direction is that, step by step, parallel with the growth of the working class, the number of worker communists should increase respectively.”

While assessing the policy which our Party had followed towards the masses in general and the peasantry in particular as correct, Comrade Stalin gave us some valuable, comradely advice about our work in the future. Apart from other things, he expressed the opinion that since the biggest percentage of its members were peasants, our Communist Party should call itself the “Party of Labour of Albania.” “However,” he stressed, “this is only an idea of mine, because it is you, your Party, that must decide.”

After thanking Comrade Stalin for this valuable idea, I said:

“We shall put forward your proposal at the 1st Congress of the Party for which we are preparing, and I am confident that both the rank-and-file of the Party and its leadership will find it appropriate and endorse it.” Then I went on to expound to Comrade Stalin our idea about making our Party completely legal at the congress which we were preparing.

“In reality,” I said among other things, “our Communist Party has been and is the only force which plays the leading role in the entire life of the country but formally it still retains its semi-illegal status. It seems to us incorrect that this situation should continue any longer.”*

“Quite right, quite right,” replied Comrade Stalin. “For a party to be in power and remain illegal or consider itself illegal doesn’t make sense.”

Going on to other questions, in connection with our armed forces, I explained to Comrade Stalin that the overwhelming majority of our army, which had emerged from the war, was made up of poor peasants, young workers and city intellectuals. The cadres of the army, the commanding officers had emerged from the war and had gained their experience of leadership in the course of the war.

I also spoke about the Soviet instructors we already had and asked him to send us some more. “Having insufficient experience,” I said, “the political work we carry out in the ranks of the army is weak, therefore I requested that they examined this question in order to help us raise the political work in the army to a higher level. It is true that we also have Yugoslav instructors,” I said, “and I cannot say that they have no experience

* The 11th Plenum of the CC of the CPA which met from September 13-24, 1948 and the 1st Congress of the CPA decided on the complete and immediate legalization of the CPA. Both the Plenum and the Congress considered the keeping of the Party until that time in a semi-illegal status a mistake which had come about as a result of the pressure and influence of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership, which, for ulterior motives, while considering the Front the main leading force of the country, demanded that the Party should be merged with the Front, hence underrating and negating the Communist Party itself and its leading role both in the Front and in the whole life of the country.

at all, but, in fact their experience is limited. They, too, have emerged from a great national liberation war, nevertheless, they cannot be compared with the Soviet officers.”

After speaking about the high morale of our army, about its discipline, as well as a series of other problems, I asked Comrade Stalin to assign me a Soviet comrade with whom I would talk at greater length about the problems of our army and its needs for the future in more detail.

And then I raised the problem of strengthening our coastal defences.

“In particular, we need to strengthen the defences of Sazan Island and the coast of Vlora and Durrës,” I said, “because these are very delicate positions. The enemy has attacked us there on two occasions. Later we could be attacked there by the Anglo-Americans or the Italians.”

“As for the strengthening of your coastal defences,” said Comrade Stalin among other things, “I agree with you. For our part, we shall help you, but the arms and other means of defence must be used by Albanians and not by Soviet forces. True, the mechanism of some of them is a bit complicated but you must send your people here to learn how to use them.”

In connection with my request about sending political instructors for the army to Albania, Comrade Stalin said that they could not send us any more, because in order to work well, they must know the Albanian language and should also have a good knowledge of the situation and life of the Albanian people. “Therefore,” he advised us, “it would be better for us to send people to the Soviet Union to learn from the Soviet experience and apply this experience themselves in the ranks of the Albanian People’s Army.”

Then, Comrade Stalin inquired about the attempts of internal reaction in Albania and our stand towards

it.

“We have struck and continue to strike hard at internal reaction,” I told him. “We have had successes in our struggle to expose and defeat it. As for the physical liquidation of enemies, this has been done either in the direct clashes of our forces with the bands of armed criminals, or according to verdicts of people’s courts in the trials of traitors and the closest collaborators of the occupiers. Despite the successes achieved, we still cannot say that internal reaction is no longer active. It is not capable of organizing any really dangerous attack upon us. but still it is making propaganda against us.

“The external enemy supports the internal enemy for its own purposes. External reaction tries to assist, encourage and organize the internal enemy by means of agents, whom it has sent in by land or by air. Faced with the endeavours of the enemy, we have raised the revolutionary vigilance of the working masses. The people have captured these agents and a number of trials have been held against them. The public trials and sentences have had a great educational effect among the people and have aroused their confidence in the strength of our people’s state power and their respect for its justice. At the same time, these trials have exposed and demoralized the reactionary forces, both internal and external.”

In the talks that followed with Comrade Stalin we devoted an important place to problems of the external situation, especially the relations of our state with the neighbouring countries. First, I outlined the situation on our borders, spoke of the good relations we had with the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, while I dwelt in particular on our relations with Greece, in order to explain the situation on our southern border. I stressed that the Greek monarcho-fascists, who failed to realize their dream of “Greater Greece” that is, of seizing Southern Albania, were still committing

innumerable border provocations. "Their aim," I told Comrade Stalin, "is to create a conflagration on our border, and in the wake of the war, to create a tense situation in the relations between Greece and us." I explained that we were trying, as far as we were able, to avert the provocations of the Greek monarcho-fascists and not respond to them. "Only when they go too far from time to time and kill our people," I went on, "we take retaliatory measures to make the monarcho-fascists understand that Albania and its borders are inviolable. If they think of embarking on dangerous activities against the independence of Albania, they must know that we are in a position to defend our Homeland.

"All the aims of the monarcho-fascists and their efforts to blame Albania for the civil war which has broken out in Greece, in order to discredit our people's power at the meetings of the Security Council and at all international meetings, are instigated and supported by the imperialist powers." After dwelling extensively and at length on this situation, I gave Comrade Stalin a general outline of what stands we maintained at the Investigating Commission and the sub-commissions which had been created to clear up the tense situation in the relations between Albania and Greece.

I told Comrade Stalin everything we knew about the situation of the Greek democrats and also spoke of the support we gave their just struggle. I did not fail to inform him openly also of our opinion in connection with a series of views of the comrades of the Greek Communist Party which seemed to us to be wrong. Likewise, I also expressed my own opinion on the prospects of the struggle of the Greek democrats.

Although Comrade Stalin must undoubtedly have been informed by Comrades Molotov, Vyshinsky and others, I mentioned the savage and despicable stands of the British and American imperialists towards Albania, stressing the brutal, unscrupulous and hostile stands

they maintained towards us at the Paris Conference. I emphasized also that the situation between us and the Anglo-Americans had not altered in the least, that we considered their stand a constant threat. Not only were the Anglo-Americans continuing their very hostile propaganda against Albania in the international arena, but via Italy and Greece, they were committing land and air provocations, using as their subversive agents Albanian fugitives, Zogites, Ballists and fascists, whom they had assembled, organized and trained against us in the concentration camps which they had set up in Italy and elsewhere.

Likewise, I spoke about the British imperialists' raising the so-called Corfu Channel incident at the Security Council of the UNO and its investigation by the International Court at the Hague. "The Corfu Channel incident," I told Comrade Stalin, "is a concoction of the British from start to finish in order to provoke our country and to find a pretext for military intervention in the town of Saranda. We have never planted mines in the Ionian Sea. The mines that exploded had either been laid by the Germans in the time of war, or were deliberately laid by the British, later, so that they could explode them when some ships of theirs were in our territorial waters heading for Saranda. There was no reason for these ships to be sailing along our coast, they had not notified us about such a movement. After the mines went off, the British claimed that they had suffered material damage and loss of life. They wanted to enlarge the incident. We do not know the British suffered the damage they claimed and do not believe that they did, however, even if they did, we are in no way to blame.

"We are defending our rights at the International Court at the Hague, but this court is being manipulated by the Anglo-American imperialists, who are trumping up all sorts of charges in order to cover up their provo-

cation and force us pay the British an indemnity.”

I spoke with Comrade Stalin also about the Moscow Conference,* argued in support of our opinion about the Truman Doctrine in connection with Greece and the interference of the Anglo-Americans in the internal affairs of the People’s Republic of Albania and explained our stand towards the “Marshall Plan,” saying that we would not accept “aid” under this ill-famed plan.

I also discussed with Comrade Stalin the problem of the extradition of war criminals who had fled our country. In all justice, we demanded that the governments of the countries which had given asylum to the war criminals should hand them over to us, to render account for their crimes before the people, though we knew that they would not do this because they were contingents of the Anglo-Americans and fascism in general.

I also put forward to Comrade Stalin the opinion of our Party about our relations with Italy. Italy had attacked us twice. It had burned our homes and killed our citizens, but we were Marxists, internationalists and wanted to have friendly relations with the Italian people. “The present government of Italy,” I told Comrade Stalin, “maintains a reactionary stand towards us; its aims towards our country are no different from those of former Italian governments. This government, under the influence of the Anglo-Americans, wants Al-

* The Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, Britain and France was held in Moscow from March 10 to April 24, 1947. The Conference discussed questions related to the Peace Treaty with Germany. At this Conference the representatives of the Soviet Union, Molotov and Vyshinsky, defended Albania’s right to take part in the Peace Conference with Germany. This stand was also supported by the French representative, but was opposed by the representatives of Britain and the United States of America.

bania to be dependent on it in one way or another, a thing which will never occur. To this end," I continued, "the Anglo-Americans, together with the government in Rome, are maintaining and training on Italian soil contingents of fugitives whom they parachute into Albania as wreckers. They are making many attempts against our country, casting the stone and hiding the hand, but we are aware of all their aims. We want to have diplomatic relations with Italy, but the mentality of the Italian statesmen is negative in this direction."

After listening to me attentively, Stalin said: "Despite all the difficulties and obstacles they are creating for you, the Americans and the British cannot attack you in this situation. Faced with your resolute stand, they cannot land on your territory, therefore do not worry. However, you must defend your Homeland, must take all measures to strengthen your army and your borders, because the danger of war from the imperialists exists.

"The Greek monarcho-fascists," Stalin continued, "abetted and supported by the American and British imperialists, will continue to provoke you just to harass you and to disturb your peace. The men in the government in Athens today have trouble on their hand," he said, "because the civil war, which has broken out there, is directed against them and their patrons — the British and the Americans.

"As for Italy," Comrade Stalin continued, "the question is as you present it. The Anglo-Americans will try to create bases there, to organize reaction and strengthen the De Gasperi Government. In this direction you must be vigilant and watch what the Albanian fugitives are up to there. Since the treaties have not been concluded," said Comrade Stalin, "the situation cannot be regarded as normalized. I think that, for the time being, you cannot establish relations with that country, therefore don't rush things."

"We agree," I said to Comrade Stalin, "that we

should not be hasty in our relations with Italy, and in general we shall take measures to strengthen our borders.”

“We have proposed to the Yugoslavs,” I continued my exposition to Comrade Stalin, “that we establish contacts with each other and collaborate on the future defence of our borders from some eventual attack from Greece and Italy, but they have not replied to our proposal, claiming that they can discuss the matter with us only after studying the question. The collaboration we propose consists in the exchange of information with the Yugoslavs on the dangers that may threaten us from the external enemies, so that each country, within its own borders and with its own armies, is in a position to take appropriate measures to cope with any eventuality.” I also informed Comrade Stalin that we had two divisions of our army on our southern border.

During the conversation I underlined the fact that some Yugoslav aircraft had landed in Tirana contrary to the recognized and accepted rules of relations among states. “From time to time,” I said, “without informing us, the Yugoslav comrades do some condemnable things, as in this concrete case. It is not right that the Yugoslav aircraft should fly over Albanian territory without the knowledge of the Albanian Government. We have pointed out this violation to the Yugoslav comrades and they have replied that they made a mistake. Although we are friends, we cannot permit them to infringe our territorial integrity. We are independent states, and without damaging our friendly relations, each must protect its sovereignty and rights, while at the same time, respecting the sovereignty and rights of the other.”

“Are your people not happy about the relations with Yugoslavia?” Comrade Stalin asked me, and added, “It is a very good thing that you have friendly Yugoslavia on your border, because Albania is a small country and

as such needs strong support from its friends.”

I replied that it was true that every country, small or big, needed friends and allies and that we considered Yugoslavia a friendly country.

With Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov we talked in detail about the problems of the re-construction of our country ravaged by the war and the construction of the new Albania. I gave them a description of the state of our economy, the first socialist transformations in the economy and the great prospects which were opening up to us, the successes which we had achieved and the problems and great difficulties we were facing.

Stalin expressed his satisfaction over the victories we had achieved and, time after time, put various questions to me. He was particularly interested in the state of our agriculture, the climatic conditions in Albania, the agricultural crops traditional to our people, etc.

“What cereals do you cultivate most?” he asked me among other things.

“Maize, first of all,” I said. “Then wheat, rye...” “Isn’t the maize worried by drought?” “It is true,” I said, “that drought often causes us great damage, but because of the very backward state of our agriculture and the great needs we have for bread grain, our peasant has learned to get a bit more from maize than from wheat. Meanwhile we are working to set up a drainage and irrigation system, to drain the marshes and swamps.”

He listened to my answers, asked for more detail and often spoke himself giving very valuable advice. I recall that during those talks, Stalin inquired about the basis on which the Land Reform had been carried out in Albania, about the percentage of the land distributed to the poor and middle peasants, whether this Reform had affected the religious institutions, etc., etc.

Speaking of the assistance that the state of people's democracy gave the peasantry and the links of the working class with the peasantry, Stalin asked us about tractors, wanted to know whether we had machine and tractor stations in Albania and how we had organized them. After listening to my answer, he began to speak about this question and gave us a whole lot of valuable advice.

"You must set up the machine and tractor stations," he said among other things, "and strengthen them so that they work the land well, both for the state and the co-operatives and for the individual peasants. The tractor drivers must always be in the service of the peasantry, must know all about agriculture, the crops, the soils and must apply all this knowledge in practice to ensure that production increases without fail. This has great importance," he continued, "otherwise all-round damage is caused. When we set up the first machine and tractor stations, it often occurred that we tilled the fields of the peasants, but production did not increase. This happened because it is not enough for a tractor driver to know only how to drive his tractor. He must also be a good farmer, must know when and how the land should be worked.

"Tractor drivers," Stalin continued, "are elements of the working class who work in continuous direct daily contact with the peasantry. Therefore, they must work conscientiously in order to strengthen the alliance between the working class and the labouring peasantry."

The attention with which he followed my explanations about our new economy and its course of development made a very deep impression on us. Both during the talk about these problems, and in all the other talks with him, one wonderful feature of his, among others, made an indelible impression on my mind: he never gave orders or sought to impose his opinion. He spoke,

gave advice, made various proposals, but always added: "This is my opinion," "this is what we think. You, comrades, must judge and decide for yourselves, according to the concrete situation on the basis of your conditions." His interest extended to every problem.

While I was speaking about the state of our transport and the great difficulties we had to cope with, Stalin asked:

"Do you build small ships in Albania?"

"No," I said.

"Do you have pine-trees?"

"Yes, we do," I answered, "whole forests of them."

"Then you have a good basis," he said, "for building simple means of sea transport in the future."

In the course of our talk he asked me about the situation of railway transport in Albania, what currency we had, what mines we had and whether the Albanian mines had been exploited by the Italians, etc.

I answered the questions Comrade Stalin asked. Concluding the talk, he said:

"At present, the Albanian economy is in a backward state. You, comrades, are starting everything from scratch. Therefore, besides your own struggle and efforts, we, too, will help you, to the best of our ability, to restore your economy and strengthen your army. We have studied your requests for aid," Comrade Stalin told me, "and we have agreed to fulfil all of them. We shall help you to equip your industry and agriculture with the necessary machinery, to strengthen your army and to develop education and culture. The factories and other machinery we shall supply on credits and you will pay for them when you can, while the armaments will be given to you gratis, you'll never have to pay for them. We know that you need even more, but for the time being this is all we can do as we ourselves are still poor, because the war caused us great destruction.

"At the same time," Comrade Stalin continued, "we

shall help you with specialists in order to speed up the process of the development of the Albanian economy and culture. As for oil, I think we'll send you Azerbaijani specialists, because they are masters of their profession. For its part, Albania should send the sons and daughters of workers and peasants to the Soviet Union, to learn and develop, so that they can help the advancement of their Homeland.”

During the days we stayed in Moscow, after each meeting and talk with Comrade Stalin, we had an even clearer and more intimate view of the real man — the modest, kindly, wise man, in this outstanding revolutionary, in this great Marxist. He loved the Soviet people whole-heartedly. To them, he had dedicated all his strength and energies, his heart and mind worked for them. And in every talk with him, in every activity he carried out, from the most important down to the most ordinary, these qualities distinguished him.

A few days after our arrival in Moscow, together with Comrade Stalin and other leaders of the Party and Soviet state I attended an all-Soviet physical-culture display at the Central Stadium of Moscow. With what keen interest Stalin watched this activity! For over two hours he followed the activities of the participants with rapt attention, and although it began to rain near the end of the display and Molotov entreated him several times to leave the stadium, he continued to watch the activities attentively to the end, to make jokes, to wave his hand. I remember that a mass race had been organized as the final exercise. The runners made several circuits of the stadium. At the finish, a very tall, thin runner who had lagged behind, appeared before the tribune. He could hardly drag one leg after the other and his arms were flapping aimlessly, nevertheless he was trying to run. He was drenched by the rain. Stalin

was watching this runner from a distance with a smile which expressed both pity and fatherly affection.

“Mily moy,”* he said as if talking to himself, “go home, go home, have a little rest, have something to eat and come back again! There will be other races to run...”

Stalin’s great respect and affection for our people, his eagerness to learn as much as possible about the history and customs of the Albanian people remain indelible in our memory. At one of the meetings we had those days, during a dinner which Stalin put on for our delegation in the Kremlin, we had a very interesting conversation with him about the origin and language of the Albanian people.

“What is the origin and language of your people?” he asked me, among other things. “Are your people akin to the Basques?” And he continued, “I do not believe that the Albanian people came from the interior of Asia, nor are they of Turkish origin, because the Albanians are of a more ancient stock than the Turks. Perhaps, your people have common roots with those Etruscans who remained in your mountains, because the rest went to Italy, some were assimilated by the Romans and some crossed over to the Iberian Peninsula.”

I replied to Comrade Stalin that the origin of our people was very ancient, that their language was Indo-European. “There are many theories on this question,” I continued, “but the truth is that our origin is Illyrian. We are a people of Illyrian descent. There is also a theory which defends the thesis that the Albanian people are the most ancient people of the Balkans and that the Pelasgians were the ancient pre-Homeric forefathers of the Albanians.”

I went on to explain that the Pelasgian theory was upheld for a time by many scholars, especially German

* My dear (Russ.).

scholars. "There is also an Albanian scholar," I told him, "who is known as an expert on Homer, who has reached the same conclusion, basing himself on some words used in the Iliad and the Odyssey, and which are in use today among the Albanian people, as for example, the word 'gur' (stone) which means 'kamenj' in Russian. Homer uses this word as a prefix to the Greek word, saying 'guri-petra.' Thus, on the basis of a few such words, bearing in mind the Oracle of Dodona, and some documents or etymologies of words, which have undergone changes, according to many philological interpretations, the scientists conclude that our ancient forefathers were the Pelasgians, who lived on the Balkan Peninsula before the Greeks.

"However, I have not heard that the Albanians are of the same origin as the Basques," I said to Comrade Stalin. "Such a theory may well exist, like the theory you mentioned, that some of the Etruscans remained in Albania, while the rest branched off to settle in Italy, with some of them crossing over to the Iberian Peninsula, to Spain. It is possible that this theory, too, may have its supporters, but I have no knowledge of it."

"In the Caucasus we have a place called Albania," Stalin told me on one occasion. "Could it have any connection with Albania?"

"I don't know," I said, "but it is a fact that during the centuries, many Albanians, forced by the savage Ottoman occupation, the wars and ferocious persecution of the Ottoman Sultans and Padishahs, were obliged to leave the land of their birth and settle in foreign lands where they have formed whole villages. This is what happened with thousands of Albanians who settled in Southern Italy back in the 15th century, after the death of our National Hero, Scanderbeg, and now there are whole areas inhabited by the Arbëreshi of Italy, who still retain their language and the old customs of the Homeland of their forefathers although they have

been living in a foreign land for 4-5 centuries. Likewise,” I told Comrade Stalin, “many Albanians settled in Greece, where entire regions are inhabited by the Arbëreshi of Greece, others settled in Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria, America and elsewhere... However, as to the place in your country called ‘Albania,’” I said, “I know nothing concrete.”

Then Stalin asked me about a number of words of our language. He wanted to know the names of some work tools, household utensils, etc. I told him the Albanian words, and after listening to them carefully he repeated them, made comparisons between the Albanian name for the tool and its equivalent in the language of the Albanians of the Caucasus. Now and then he turned to Molotov and Mikoyan and sought their opinion. It turned out that the roots of the words compared had no similarity.

At this moment, Stalin pressed a button, and after a few seconds the general who was Stalin’s aide-de-camp, a tall, very attentive man, who behaved towards us with great kindness and sympathy, came in.

“Comrade Enver Hoxha and I are trying to solve a problem, but we cannot,” said Stalin, smiling at the general. “Please get in touch with professor (and he mentioned an outstanding Soviet linguist and historian, whose name has escaped my memory) and ask him on my behalf whether there is any connection between the Albanians of the Caucasus and those of Albania.”

When the general left, Stalin picked up an orange, and said:

“In Russian this is called ‘apyelsin.’ What is it in Albanian?”

“Portokall,” I replied.

Again he made the comparison, pronouncing the words of the two languages and shrugged his shoulders. Hardly ten minutes had passed when the general came in again.

“I have the professor’s answer,” he announced. “He says there is no evidence at all of any connection between the Albanians of the Caucasus and those of Albania. However, he added that in the Ukraine, in the region of Odessa, there were several villages (about 7) inhabited by Albanians. The professor has precise information about this.”

For my part, I instructed our ambassador in Moscow, there and then, to see to it that some of our students, who were studying history in the Soviet Union should do their practice in these villages and study how and when these Albanians had settled in Odessa, whether they still preserved the language and customs of their forefathers, etc.

Stalin listened very attentively, as always, and said to me:

“Very good, that will be very good. Let your students do their practice there, and moreover, together with some of ours.”

Continuing this free conversation with Comrade Stalin, I said: “In the past the Albanological sciences were not properly developed and those engaged in them were mostly foreign scholars. Apart from other things, this has led to the emergence of all sorts of theories about the origin of our people, language, etc. Nevertheless, they are almost all in agreement on one thing — the fact that the Albanian people and their language are of very ancient origin. However, it will be our own Albanologists, whom our Party and state will train carefully and provide with all the conditions necessary for their work, who will give the precise answer to these problems.”

“Albania must march on its own feet,” Stalin said, “because it has all the possibilities to do so.”

“Without fail we shall forge ahead,” I replied.

“For our part, we shall help the Albanian people whole-heartedly,” said Comrade Stalin in the kindest

tone, “because the Albanians are fine people.”

The whole dinner which Comrade Stalin put on in honour of our delegation passed in a very warm, cordial and intimate atmosphere. Stalin proposed the first toast to our people, to the further progress and prosperity of our country, to the Communist Party of Albania. Then he proposed a toast to me, Hysni* and all the members of the Albanian delegation. I recall that later during the dinner, when I spoke to him about the great resistance our people had put up through the centuries against foreign invasions, Comrade Stalin described our people as an **heroic people** and again proposed a toast to them. Apart from the free chat we had together, from time to time he talked to the others, made jokes and proposed toasts. He did not eat much, but kept his glass of red wine close at hand and clinked it with ours with a smile at every toast.

After the dinner, Comrade Stalin invited us to go to the Kremlin cinema where, apart from some Soviet newsreels, we saw the Soviet feature film “The Tractor Driver.” We sat together on a sofa, and I was impressed by the attention with which Stalin followed this new Soviet film. Frequently he would raise his warm voice to comment on various moments of the events treated in the film. He was especially pleased with the way in which the main character in the film, a vanguard tractor driver, in order to win the confidence of his comrades and the farmers, struggled to become well acquainted with the customs and the behaviour of the people in the countryside, their ideas and aspirations. By working and living among the people, this tractor driver succeeded in becoming a leader honoured and respected

* Comrade Hysni Kapo, then Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the PRA, was a member of the delegation which went to Moscow in July 1947.

by the peasants. At this moment Stalin said:

“To be able to lead, you must know the masses, and in order to know them, you must go down among the masses.”

It was past midnight when we rose to leave. At that moment Stalin invited us once again to take our glasses of wine and for the third time proposed a toast to “the heroic Albanian people.”

After this he shook hands with us one by one and, when he gave me his hand, said:

“Give my cordial regards to the heroic Albanian people, whom I wish success!”

On July 26, 1947, our delegation, very satisfied with the meetings and talks with Comrade Stalin, set off to return to the Homeland.

(E. Hoxha, *With Stalin*, pp. 53-86)

TELEGRAM TO J. BROZ-TITO

before August 12, 1947

To Comrade Tito from Stalin.

The Soviet government considers it its duty to inform the fraternal republics, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, about its attitude toward the indefinite pact between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.*

* From July 30 to August 1, 1947, Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations took place in the city of Bled (Yugoslavia), during which the text of the future Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria was coordinated. During a conversation with E. Kardelj on April 19, 1947, Stalin approved of Yugoslavia's intention to sign a treaty with Bulgaria similar to the one it had with Albania after the ratification of the peace treaty. Meanwhile, the Soviet government officially informed the Yugoslav and Bulgarian governments of its desire to refrain from concluding the Yugoslav-Bulgarian treaty until the restrictions associated with the peace treaty were lifted. Taking this into account and not wanting to give Western powers a reason to sabotage the ratification of this treaty, G. Dimitrov and J.B. Tito chose not to disclose the text of the document they had coordinated. However, in the official protocol on the results of the negotiations published on August 2, the fact of drafting the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries was announced. At the same time, Dimitrov declared that this treaty would be indefinite. Learning about this, on August 12, 1947, Stalin instructed the USSR Ambassador to the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia A.I. Lavrentyev to visit Tito and deliver this telegram.

After reviewing Stalin's telegram on August 16, Tito said that the Yugoslav government had no intention of presenting the Soviet government with a *fait accompli*. Acknowledging that he and Dimitrov had rushed with this pact, Tito stated that "procedural considerations dominated in this matter. The Yugoslav government wanted such a treaty to be signed in Yugoslavia, not in Bulgaria... Yugoslavia did not particu-

The Soviet government believes that both governments made a mistake by concluding a pact, especially an indefinite one, before the entry into force of a peace treaty, despite the warning from the Soviet government. The Soviet government believes that, by their haste, both governments facilitated the efforts of reactionary Anglo-American elements, giving them an additional pretext to strengthen military intervention in Greek and Turkish affairs against Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.

Certainly, the Soviet Union is bound in alliance with Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, as it has a formal treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia, which is equivalent to a formal alliance treaty. However, the Soviet government must warn that it cannot take responsibility for pacts of great importance in the field of foreign policy that are concluded without consultation with the Soviet government.

(Y.S. Girenko, *Stalin-Tito*, pp. 326-327)

larly want to sign the treaty at this moment.”

GREETINGS MESSAGE TO MOSCOW

September 8, 1947

Greetings to Moscow, the capital of our country, on its 800th anniversary.

The entire country is today celebrating this significant day. It is celebrating it not formally, but with feelings of love and reverence, because of the great services Moscow has rendered our country.

The services which Moscow has rendered are not only that it thrice in the course of the history of our country liberated her from foreign oppression — from the Mongolian yoke, from Polish-Lithuanian invasion and from French incursion. The service Moscow rendered is primarily that it became the basis for uniting disunited Russia into a single state, with a single government and a single leadership. No country in the world can count on preserving its independence, on real economic and cultural growth, if it has not succeeded in liberating itself from feudal disunity and strife among princes. Only a country which is united in a single, centralized state can count on the possibility of real cultural and economic growth, on the possibility of firmly establishing its independence. The historic service which Moscow rendered is that it has been and remains the basis and initiator in the creation of a centralized state in Russia.

But this is not the only service that Moscow has rendered our country. After Moscow, by the will of our great Lenin, was again proclaimed the capital of our country, it became the banner bearer of the new, Soviet epoch.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet social and economic order, which substituted the rule of labour for the rule of capital and

rejected the exploitation of man by man. Moscow is also the herald of the movement for the liberation of toiling mankind from capitalist slavery.

Moscow is today not only the inspirer in the building of the new, Soviet democracy, which rejects all, direct or indirect, inequality of citizens, sexes, races and nations, and ensures the right to work and the right to equal pay for equal work. Moscow is also the banner of the struggle which all the working people in the world, all the oppressed races and nations, are waging to liberate themselves from the rule of plutocracy and imperialism. There can be no doubt that without this policy Moscow could not have become the centre of organization of the friendship of nations and of their fraternal cooperation in our multinational state.

Moscow is today not only the initiator in the building of the new way of life of the working people of the capital, a life free from want and wretchedness suffered by millions of poor and unemployed. Moscow is also a model for all the capitals in the world in this respect. One of the gravest sores of the large capitals of countries in Europe, Asia and America are the slums in which millions of impoverished working people are doomed to wretchedness and a slow and painful death. The service which Moscow has rendered is that it completely abolished these slums and gave the working people the opportunity to move out of their cellars and hovels into the apartments and houses of the bourgeoisie and into the new comfortable houses which have been built by the Soviet authorities.

Lastly, the service Moscow renders is that it is the herald of the struggle for durable peace and friendship among the nations, the herald of the struggle against the incendiaries of a new war. For the imperialists, war is the most profitable undertaking. It is not surprising that the agents of imperialism are trying, in one way or another, to provoke a new war. The service which Mos-

cow renders is that it unceasingly exposes the incendiaries of a new war and rallies around the banner of peace all the peace-loving nations. It is common knowledge that the peace-loving nations look with hope to Moscow as the capital of the great peace-loving power and as a mighty bulwark of peace.

It is because of these services that our country is today celebrating the 800th anniversary of Moscow with such love and reverence for her capital.

Long live our mighty, beloved, Soviet, socialist Moscow!

J. Stalin

(Soviet Calendar 1917-1947)

FROM A CONVERSATION WITH Y.A. ZHDANOV³

October 18, 1947

In the field of biological science, there have long been two views on life. Some claim that there is an immutable hereditary substance that is not subject to the influence of external nature. Essentially, this point of view (which represents Weismann's view) is identical to the belief that life did not evolve from inanimate matter.

The other opinion is held by the followers of neo-Lamarckism. According to this doctrine, external influences change the characteristics of an organism, and these acquired traits are inherited.

If, during an experimental planting, 95 per cent of plants perish, the scientist says: nothing can be done, the matter is hopeless.

That's what the books teach. But attention should be paid not to these 95 per cent that perished but to the 5 per cent that survived, which, therefore, acquired new traits. Here are your scientists.

Lysenko is an empiricist; he doesn't get along well with theory. That's his weak point. I tell him: what kind of organizer are you if, being the president of the Agricultural Academy, you can't organize a majority behind you?

The majority of representatives of biological science are against Lysenko. They support the trends that are fashionable in the West. This is a vestige of the time when Russian scientists, considering themselves disciples of European science, believed that they should blindly follow Western science and servilely accept every word from the West.

Morganist-Mendelists are bought-out people. They consciously support their science as theology.

(Y.A. Zhdanov, *A Look into the Past*, pp. 251-252)

FROM A CONVERSATION WITH Y.A. ZHDANOV

November 10, 1947

...Our universities went through three periods after the revolution.

In the first period, they played the same role as in the Tsarist era. They were the main forge of personnel. Alongside them, only workers' faculties developed to a very small extent.

Then, with the development of the economy and trade, a large number of practitioners and business-people were needed. Universities were dealt a blow. Many technical schools and industry-specific institutes emerged. Industrialists provided themselves with personnel, but they were not interested in training theorists. Institutes devoured universities.

Now we have too many universities. Instead of promoting new ones, we should improve the existing ones.

The question should not be posed as follows: universities prepare either teachers or researchers. One cannot teach without engaging in and knowing scientific work.

A person who knows theory well will better understand practical issues than a narrow practitioner. A person with a university education, possessing broad knowledge, will be more useful for practice than, for example, a chemist who knows nothing but his chemistry.

Universities should not only admit fresh graduates from school but also practitioners who have gained certain industrial experience. They already have questions and problems in their minds but lack theoretical knowledge to solve them.

For the immediate period, it is necessary to leave a significant portion of graduates at universities. Saturate universities with teachers.

About Moscow University. There is a weak leadership there. Perhaps it is worth dividing Moscow University into two universities: concentrate natural sciences (physical, physico-technical, mathematical, chemical, biological and soil-geographical faculties) in one, and social sciences (historical, philological, legal and philosophical faculties) in the other.

Renovate the old building and allocate it to social sciences, and for natural sciences, build a new one somewhere on the Leninsky Gory. Adapt one of the large buildings under construction in Moscow for this purpose. Make it not 16 but 10 or 8 floors, equipped according to all the requirements of modern science.

Our scientific level has declined. Essentially, we are not making serious discoveries now. Before the war, something was happening; there was a stimulus. And now we often hear: give us a sample from abroad, we'll analyse it, and then build it ourselves. Are we less inquisitive? No. It is about organization.

Given our capabilities, we should have I.G. Farbenindustrie beaten, but it doesn't exist. Chemistry now is a crucial science with enormous potential. Shouldn't we create a university of chemistry?

We have too few restless people in leadership... There are people who, if they are doing well, think that everyone is doing well...

(Y.A. Zhdanov, *A Look into the Past*, pp. 182-183)

SPEECH AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE SOVIET-HUNGARIAN TREATY AT THE RECEPTION IN THE KREMLIN

February 20, 1948

...We have always sought to create good neighbourly relations with Hungary, regardless of the political system prevailing there. You probably remember that a few months before the war, the Soviet and Hungarian governments exchanged greetings. At that time, we returned to Hungary the banners that were captured as trophies by Tsarist troops in 1848. But shortly thereafter, the Hungarian government declared war on the Soviet Union. They attacked us, and we could do nothing but defend ourselves. Near Voronezh, we faced Hungarian corps.

Our attitude towards Hungary was not guided by a sense of revenge and hostility. Feelings of revenge and hostility are not the basis of policy. Foreign policy should be built on reality. When there was a turning point in the course of the war, when the star of the Germans began to decline, the head of Hungary at that time, Horthy, requested a truce from us. We granted this request. If we had been guided by a sense of revenge and enmity towards Hungary, we would not have responded to this request.

Horthy did not carry the matter to the end, retreated and surrendered himself to the Germans. And new people came to Hungary, representing the people. Hungary's happiness is that these new people appeared because it owes them its independence.

We are not guilty before Hungary. The Russia of the Tsars was guilty. The Russian Tsar in 1848 helped the Habsburg monarchy suppress the Hungarian Revo-

lution. We remember this. But we are not responsible, because we executed the last Tsar in 1918 in the Urals, thus putting an end to the past regime.

Now we are talking about friendship between the Soviet Union and Hungary. And this word “friendship” is not an empty phrase, not propaganda!

What is the reason that small nations trust the Soviet Union and its policy?

The reason for this, above all, lies in the ideology of our state, the foundations of which were laid by Lenin. Every nation, large and small, has some features that are unique to it, and every nation contributes its share to the task of increasing the common wealth of humanity. In every nation, there is something that is absent among Russians, Ukrainians and other peoples. In the Soviet Union, there are nations that had already started to decline, but now they have revived and have received from us, for example, even an alphabet.

If we did not treat small nations with respect, if we did not honour their rights and national independence, if we interfered in the internal affairs of small states, we would oppose our own ideology, disorganize our party. Can we do that? No! We cannot do that. If we did, we would cut the branch from under ourselves.

Another reason that compels us to respect the independence of small states is the composition of our state. Look at the Soviet Union! Here, there are not only large nations but also small ones, there are nationalities, ethnic groups. Can we disregard the opinions of our nationalities when it comes to our relationship with small nations living outside our country? No! We cannot do that, or else we would undermine the foundations of our multinational state.

These are the reasons that explain why genuine friendship is possible between such a large power as the Soviet Union and a small state like Hungary.

When we talk about friendship, we take it seriously.

By this, we mean that we are ready to make sacrifices for this friendship, even if someone tries to violate it.

Based on all this, I have said that the friendship between the great Soviet Union and small Hungary is not an empty phrase, not propaganda. Therefore, with a clear conscience, I raise a toast to the friendship between the Soviet Union and Hungary.

Long live the friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the people of the democratic Hungarian Republic.

(Uk Vilag, May 14, 1948)

LETTER TO THE STATE PRESIDENT OF FINLAND, PAASIKIVI

*Proposal of the Soviet government on the conclusion of
a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Cooperation and Support
Treaty*

February 22, 1948

Mr. President!

As you know, two out of three of the countries bordering the USSR, that stood on the side of Germany against the USSR during the war, namely Hungary and Romania, have signed a support treaty against an eventual German aggression with the USSR.

As is also known, our two countries stood together strongly in sympathy throughout this aggression, in which we, together with you, bear the responsibility before our peoples if we allow the repetition of such an aggression.

I am of the opinion that a support treaty with the USSR, against an eventual German aggression is of no less interest for Finland than for Romania and Hungary.

Out of these considerations and from the wish to create better relations between our countries for the strengthening of peace and security, the Soviet government offers the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish Friendship, Cooperation and Support Treaty like the Hungarian-Soviet and Romanian-Soviet treaties.

Should there be no objections from the Finnish side, I would propose that a Finnish delegation be sent to the USSR to conclude such a treaty.

Should it be more convenient for you to carry through the negotiations and the conclusion of the

treaty in Finland, the Soviet government offers to send their delegation to Helsinki.

Yours respectfully,

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(*Daily Review*, No. 52, March 2, 1948)

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR “ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW BUILDING FOR THE MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY”

March 15, 1948

Moscow, Kremlin
March 15, 1948
M80Z

The Council of Ministers of the USSR notes that the educational and residential buildings occupied by the Lomonosov Moscow State University, due to the organization of new faculties and the increase in the number of students, are overloaded and do not provide normal conditions for the education of students and graduate students, as well as for the scientific work of the faculty.

In order to significantly improve the conditions for educational, pedagogical and scientific work at Moscow State University, as well as the living conditions of students, graduate students and the faculty, the Council of Ministers of the USSR resolves:

1. To build a new building for Moscow State University on Leninsky Gory during 1948-1952 with a volume of 1,700,000 cubic metres, with a height in the central part of not less than 20 floors, instead of the 32-storey building provided for construction by the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated January 13, 1947, No. 53.

2. In the new building, accommodate the faculties: physical, chemical, biological, mechanical-mathematical, geological-soil and geographical.

In the buildings currently occupied by Moscow State University place the faculties of humanities: historical, philological, philosophical, economic and legal.

3. In the project of the new building, provide for:

a) educational and scientific premises, including:

23 general lecture halls for 150-600 people each;

125 group classrooms for 25-50 people each;

350 classrooms for 5-40 people each;

350 scientific laboratories for the faculty, specialized laboratories with a total area of 11,000 square metres, an assembly hall for 1,500 people;

scientific and educational libraries with 1,200,000 volumes;

museums: geological, paleontological, useful minerals, mineralogical, soil, geographical, zoological and anthropological;

b) residential premises for 5,250 students and 750 graduate students, so that each of them has a separate room with amenities;

c) apartments for the faculty, including 90 two-room, 60 three-room and 50 four-room apartments, for a total of 200 apartments.

Provide a botanical garden for the biological faculty on the site of the new university building.

4. Entrust the design and construction of the new building for Moscow State University to the Construction Management of the Palace of Soviets (Comrades Prokofiev and Iofan).

5. Approve the task for the design of the new building for Moscow State University submitted by the Ministry of Higher Education (Comrade Kaftanov), Moscow State University (Comrade Nesmeyanov) and the Construction Management of the Palace of Soviets (Comrades Prokofiev and Iofan) according to the attached document.*

* Not published — *Ed.*

6. Instruct the Construction Management of the Palace of Soviets (Comrade Prokofiev) to carry out the necessary preparatory work and commence the construction of the new building for Moscow State University in 1948.

7. Instruct the Moscow City Executive Committee (Comrade Popov) to allocate the land for the construction of the new building for Moscow University on Leninsky Gory in the centre of the Moscow River's radiance on Leninsky Avenue, covering an area of 100 hectares, within two weeks.

8. Set the deadlines for the design of the new building for Moscow State University at 4 months for the schematic design and 10 months for the technical design.

Set the design costs at 4 per cent of the construction cost.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

Y. Chadaev
Managing Affairs of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR

(*Historical Archive*, 2004, No. 1, pp. 34-36)

**TELEGRAM TO AMBASSADOR
TO YUGOSLAVIA A.I.
LAVRENTYEV FOR J. BROZ-TITO
AND E. KARDELJ**

March 18, 1948

A message has been received stating that Kidrič's assistant, Srzentić, informed the Soviet trade representative Lebedev that, according to the decision of the Yugoslav government, it is forbidden to provide information on economic issues to Soviet authorities. We were surprised by this message, as there is an agreement on the unimpeded provision of such information to the Soviet government. This is especially surprising to us since the Yugoslav government is taking this measure unilaterally, without any warning or explanation of its reasons. The Soviet government considers such actions by the Yugoslav government as an act of distrust towards Soviet workers in Yugoslavia and as a manifestation of unfriendliness towards the USSR.

It is evident that with such distrust towards Soviet workers in Yugoslavia, the latter cannot consider themselves immune from similar acts of unfriendliness on the part of Yugoslav authorities.

Therefore, the Soviet government has instructed the Ministries of Ferrous Metallurgy, Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, Chemical Industry, Power Plants, Communications and Health Care to immediately recall all their specialists and workers.

(Y.S. Girenko, *Stalin-Tito*, pp. 356-357)

LETTER TO COMRADE TITO AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

March 27, 1948

Your answers of 18 and 20 March have been received.

We regard your answer as incorrect and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov* can be considered closed, since you have withdrawn your accusations against him, although we still consider that they were slanderous.

The statement attributed to Comrade Krutikov** that the Soviet government has allegedly refused to enter into trade negotiations this year, does not, as can be seen, correspond to the facts, as Krutikov has categorically denied it.

2. In regard to the withdrawal of military advisers, the sources of our information are the statements of the representatives of the Ministry of Armed Forces and of the advisers themselves. As is known, our military advisers were sent to Yugoslavia upon the repeated request of the Yugoslav government, and far fewer advisers were sent than had been requested. It is therefore obvious that the Soviet government had no desire to force its advisers on Yugoslavia.

Later, however, the Yugoslav military leaders, among them Koča Popović, thought it possible to an-

* Member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Yugoslavia.

** Aleksei D. Krutikov, Soviet Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade.

nounce that it was essential to reduce the number of advisers by 60 per cent. They gave various reasons for this; some maintained that the Soviet advisers were too great an expense for Yugoslavia; others held that the Yugoslav army was in no need of the experience of the Soviet army; some said that the rules of the Soviet army were hidebound, stereotyped and without value to the Yugoslav army, and that there was no point in paying the Soviet advisers since there was no benefit to be derived from them.

In the light of these facts we can understand the well-known and insulting statement made by Djilas about the Soviet army, at a session of the CC of the CPY, namely that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army. As is known, this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the CC of the CPY.

So, instead of seeking a friendly agreement with the Soviet government on the question of Soviet military advisers, the Yugoslav military leaders began to abuse the Soviet military advisers and to discredit the Soviet army.

It is clear that this situation was bound to create an atmosphere of hostility around the Soviet military advisers. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet government would consent to leave its advisers in Yugoslavia under such conditions. Since the Yugoslav government took no measures to counteract these attempts to discredit the Soviet army, it bears the responsibility for the situation created,

3. The sources of our information leading to the withdrawal of Soviet civilian specialists are, for the most part, the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Lavrentiev, as also the statements of the specialists themselves. Your statement, that Srzentić allegedly told the trade representative, Lebedev, that the

Soviet specialists seeking economic information should direct their requests to higher authorities, namely to the CC of the CPY and the Yugoslav government, does not correspond to the truth. Here is the report made by Lavrentiev on March 9:

“Srzentić, Kidrič’s assistant in the Economic Council, informed Lebedev, the trade representative, of a government decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to anyone at all. Therefore, regardless of earlier promises, he could not give Lebedev the particulars required. It was one of the duties of the state security organs to exercise control in this matter. Srzentić also said that Kidrič himself intended to speak about this with Lebedev.”

From Lavrentiev’s report it can be seen, firstly, that Srzentić did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC of the CPY or the Yugoslav government. In any case, it would be ridiculous to think that it would be necessary to approach the CC of the CPY for all economic information while there still existed the appropriate ministries from which Soviet specialists had previously obtained the necessary economic information direct.

Secondly, it is clear from Lavrentiev’s report that the reverse of what you write is true, namely that the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.

One might well mention that we have come across a similar practice of secret supervision over Soviet representatives in bourgeois states, although not in all of them. It should also be emphasized that the Yugoslav security agents not only follow representatives of the Soviet government, but also the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet government would agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia in such circumstances. As can be seen in this case, too,

the responsibility for the conditions created rests with the Yugoslav government.

4. In your letter you express the desire to be informed of the other facts which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the straining of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts actually exist, although they are not connected with the withdrawal of the civilian and military advisers. We consider it necessary to inform you of them.

(a) We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that "the CPSU(B) is degenerate," "great-power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR," "the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically" and "the Cominform is a means of controlling the other parties by the CPSU(B)," etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as "socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary" and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of "revolutionary socialism." It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU(B) from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanović, Kidrič, Ranković and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU(B) and the CPY.

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU(B), even as the CPSU(B) has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of a hypocritical

nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU(B) behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU(B) and to blacken the Soviet system.

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.

Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU(B), Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU(B) as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU(B) and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(b) We are disturbed by the present condition of the CPY. We are amazed by the fact that the CPY, which is the leading party, is still not completely legalized and still has a semi-legal status. Decisions of the Party organs are never published in the press, neither are the reports of Party assemblies.

Democracy is not evident within the CPY itself. The Central Committee, in its majority, was not elected but co-opted. Criticism and self-criticism within the Party does not exist or barely exists. It is characteristic that the Personnel Secretary of the Party is also the Minister of State Security. In other words, the Party cadres are under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the state organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security, while in Yugoslavia we have

just the opposite: the Ministry of State Security actually controlling the Party. This probably explains the fact that the initiative of the Party masses in Yugoslavia is not on the required level.

It is understandable that we cannot consider such an organization of a Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

The spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY. The increase in the capitalist elements in the villages and cities is in full swing, and the leadership of the Party is taking no measures to check these capitalist elements. The CPY is being hoodwinked by the degenerate and opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements by a socialist system, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.*

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the Party is considered as the leading force in the country, which has its specific program and which cannot merge with the non-party masses. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the chief leading force and there was an attempt to get the Party submerged within the Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front, Comrade Tito said: "Does the CPY have any other program but that of the People's Front? No, the CPY has no other program. The program of the People's Front is its program."

It thus appears that in Yugoslavia this amazing theory of Party organization is considered a new theory. Actually, it is far from new. In Russia 40 years ago a part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party workers' mass organization and that the second should supplant the first; the other part of the Mensheviks proposed that

* Eduard Bernstein and Georg Vollmar were revisionist leaders of the German Social-Democratic Party; Nikolai Bukharin was a rightist, pro-kulak member of the bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, executed in 1936.

the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party mass organization of workers and peasants, with the latter again supplanting the former. As is known, Lenin described these Mensheviks as malicious opportunists and liquidators of the Party.

(c) We cannot understand why the English spy, Velebit, still remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia as the First Assistant Minister. The Yugoslav comrades know that Velebit is an English spy. They also know that the representatives of the Soviet government consider Velebit a spy. Nevertheless, Velebit remains in the position of First Assistant Foreign Minister of Yugoslavia. It is possible that the Yugoslav government intends to use Velebit precisely as an English spy. As is known, bourgeois governments think it permissible to have spies of great imperialist states on their staffs with a view to insuring their goodwill, and would even agree to placing their peoples under the tutelage of these states for this purpose. We consider this practice as entirely impermissible for Marxists. Be it as it may, the Soviet government cannot place its correspondence with the Yugoslav government under the censorship of an English spy. It is understandable that as long as Velebit remains in the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry, the Soviet government considers itself placed in a difficult situation and deprived of the possibility of carrying on open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

These are the facts which are causing the dissatisfaction of the Soviet government and the CC of the CPSU(B) and which are endangering relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia.

These facts, as has already been mentioned, are not related to the question of the withdrawal of the military and civilian specialists. However, they are an important factor in the worsening of relations between our coun-

tries.

CC of the CPSU(B)

Moscow
March 27, 1948

(The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, pp. 12-17)

SPEECH GIVEN AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF THE FINISH GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

April 7, 1948

I would like to say a few words about the significance of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Help between the Soviet Union and Finland, which was signed yesterday.

This treaty signifies a change in the relations between our countries. As it is known, in the course of 150 years of relations between Russia and Finland there has been mutual distrust. The Finns distrusted the Russians, the Russians distrusted the Finns. From the Soviet side there resulted an attempt in the past to break the distrust that stood between the Russians and the Finns. That was at the time that Lenin, in 1917, proclaimed the independence of Finland. From an historical point of view, that was an outstanding act. But sadly the distrust was not thereby broken — the distrust stayed distrust. The result was two wars between us.

I would like us to go over from the long period of mutual distrust in the course of which we went to war with each other twice, to a new period in our relations: the period of mutual trust.

It is necessary that the conclusion of this treaty breaks this distrust and builds a new basis for relations between our peoples and that it signifies a great change in the relations between our countries towards trust and friendship.

We want this acknowledged not only by those present in this hall, but also by those outside this hall, as much in Finland as in the Soviet Union.

One must not believe that the distrust between our peoples can be removed all at once. That is not done so

quickly. For a long time there will be remnants of this distrust, for the abolition of which one must work and struggle hard, and to build and strengthen a tradition of mutual friendship between the USSR and Finland.

There are treaties that are based upon equality and some that are not. The Soviet-Finnish treaty is a treaty that is based upon equality, it has been concluded on the basis of full equality of the partners.

Many believe that between a big and little nation there cannot be relations which are based on equality. But we Soviet people are of the opinion that such relations can and should exist. We Soviet people are of the opinion that every nation, great or small, has special qualities that only they have and no other nation possesses. These peculiarities are their contribution, that every nation should contribute, to the common treasure of the culture of the world. In this sense, all nations, big and small, are in the same situation, and every nation is as equally important as the next nation.

So the Soviet people are of the opinion that Finland, although a small country, is in this treaty as equal a partner as the Soviet Union.

You do not find many politicians of the Great Powers that would regard the small nations as the equals of the larger nations. Most of them look down upon the small nations. They are not disinclined, occasionally, to make a one-sided guarantee for a small nation. These politicians do not, in general, conclude treaties which depend on equality, with small nations, as they do not regard small nations as their partners.

I propose a toast to the Soviet-Finnish treaty, and to the change for the better in the relations between our countries that this treaty signifies.

(Pravda, April 13, 1948)

FROM THE TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

April 20, 1948

...We disagree with this.* We believe that various opposition political parties in China, representing the middle layers of the Chinese population and standing against the Kuomintang clique, will continue to exist for a long time. The Communist Party of China will be forced to engage them in cooperation against Chinese reaction and the imperialist powers, while maintaining its hegemony, that is, its leading position. It is possible that representatives of these parties will need to be brought into the Chinese People's Democratic Government, and the government itself declared a coalition, thereby expanding the base of this government among the population and isolating the imperialists and their Kuomintang agents.

...It should be borne in mind that the Chinese government, after the victory of the People's Liberation Army of China, will, at least in the post-victory period, which is currently difficult to determine, pursue a policy as a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one.

This means that the nationalization of all land and the abolition of private land ownership, the confiscation of the property of the entire bourgeoisie from small to large, the confiscation of the property not only

* This refers to the position of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, reflected in a telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on November 30, 1947: "In the period of the final victory of the Chinese revolution, following the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CPC will have to leave the political arena, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese revolution."

of large landowners but also of middle and small ones living by hired labour, will not be implemented for a certain period.

...For your information, in Yugoslavia, in addition to the Communist Party, there are other parties that are part of the People's Front.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, pp. 56, 75)

TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

April 29, 1948

Your letter of April 26 has been received.* You can take whoever you consider necessary and as many as you think fit. Both Russian doctors should travel together with you. We agree to leave one radio station in Harbin. We will discuss the rest when we meet.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, p. 51)

* Response to Mao Zedong's telegram: "I have decided to depart for the USSR ahead of schedule (previously the trip was planned for mid-July 1948. — *Ed.*). It is planned to leave in the first days from Fuping County (100 kilometres north of Shijiazhuang), Hebei Province, and under the cover of troops, cross the Beijing-Baotou railway... It is possible that in the first or middle of June, we can arrive in Harbin. Then, from Harbin, to you... I will consult and seek guidance from comrades of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) on political, military, economic and other important issues... In addition, if possible, I would like to visit the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe to study the work of the People's Front and other types of activities." Along with him, Mao Zedong planned to bring members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Ren Bishi and Chen Yun, as well as two secretaries and several other staff members — cryptographers, radio operators, etc.

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

May 4, 1948

Your answer and the announcement of the decision of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia of April 13, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received.

Unfortunately, these documents, and especially the document signed by Tito and Kardelj, do not improve on the earlier Yugoslav documents; on the contrary, they further complicate matters and sharpen the conflict.

Our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, and to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors. The Yugoslav comrades do not accept criticism in a Marxist manner, but in a bourgeois manner, i.e. they regard it as an insult to the prestige of the CC of the CPY and as undermining the ambitions of the Yugoslav leaders.

So in order to extricate themselves from the difficult situation for which they are themselves to blame, the Yugoslav leaders are using a "new" method, a method of complete denial of their errors regardless of their obvious existence. The facts and the documents mentioned in the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) of March 27, 1948 are denied. Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it seems, do not understand that this childish method of groundless denial of facts and documents can never be convincing, but merely laughable.

1. THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISERS FROM YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet military advisers, and said that the information of the CC of the CPSU(B) was based on the complaints of these advisers of the unfriendly attitude of the responsible Yugoslav officials towards the Soviet army and its representatives in Yugoslavia. Comrades Tito and Kardelj denounce these complaints as unsubstantiated. Why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe the unfounded statements of Tito and Kardelj rather than the numerous complaints of the Soviet military advisers? On what grounds? The USSR has its military advisers in almost all the countries of people's democracy. We must emphasize that until now we have had no complaints from our advisers in these countries. This explains the fact that we have had no misunderstandings in these countries arising from the work of the Soviet military advisers. Complaints and misunderstandings, in this field, exist only in Yugoslavia. Is it not clear that this can be explained only by the special unfriendly atmosphere which has been created in Yugoslavia around these military advisers?

Comrades Tito and Kardelj refer to the large expenses in connection with the salaries of the Soviet military advisers, emphasizing that the Soviet generals receive three to four times as much, in dinars, as Yugoslav generals, and that such conditions may give rise to discontent on the part of Yugoslav military personnel. But the Yugoslav generals, apart from drawing salaries, are provided with apartments, servants, food, etc. Secondly, the pay of the Soviet generals in Yugoslavia corresponds to the pay of Soviet generals in the USSR. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not consider reducing the salaries of Soviet generals who

are in Yugoslavia on official duty.

Perhaps the expense of the Soviet generals was too great a burden for the Yugoslav budget. In that case the Yugoslav government should have approached the Soviet government and proposed that it take over part of the expenses. There is no doubt that the Soviet government would have done this. However, the Yugoslavs took another course; instead of solving this question in an amicable manner, they began to abuse our military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army. Only after a hostile atmosphere had been created around the Soviet military advisers did the Yugoslav government approach the Soviet government. It is understandable that the Soviet government could not accept this situation.

2. CONCERNING THE SOVIET CIVILIAN SPECIALISTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

In its letter of March 27, the CC of the CPSU(B) stated the reasons for the withdrawal of the Soviet civilian specialists from Yugoslavia. In the given case the CC of the CPSU(B) relied on the complaints of the civilian specialists and on the statements of the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia. From these statements it can be seen that the Soviet civilian specialists, as well as the representative of the CPSU(B) in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin, were placed under the supervision of the UDB.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj in their letter deny the truth of these complaints and reports, stating that the UDB does not supervise Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia. But why should the CC of the CPSU(B) believe the unfounded assertions of Comrades Tito and Kardelj and not the complaints of Soviet men, among them Comrade Yudin?

The Soviet government has many of its civilian spe-

cialists in all the countries of people's democracy but it does not receive any complaints from them and there are no disagreements with the governments of these countries. Why have these disagreements and conflicts arisen only in Yugoslavia? Is it not because the Yugoslav government has created a special unfriendly atmosphere around the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, among them Comrade Yudin himself?

It is understandable that the Soviet government could not tolerate such a situation and was forced to withdraw its civilian specialists from Yugoslavia.

3. REGARDING VELEBIT AND OTHER SPIES IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF YUGOSLAVIA

It is not true, as Tito and Kardelj say, that Comrades Kardelj and Djilas, on the occasion of a meeting with Molotov, confined their doubts regarding Velebit to the remark "that all was not clear about Velebit" to them. Actually, in their meeting with Molotov there was talk that Velebit was suspected of spying for England. It was very strange that Tito and Kardelj identified the removal of Velebit from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with his ruin. Why could not Velebit be removed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without being ruined?

Also strange was the statement by Tito and Kardelj of the reasons for leaving Velebit in his position of First Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs; it appears that Velebit was not removed from his position because he was under supervision. Would it not be better to remove Velebit just because he was under supervision? Why so much consideration for an English spy, who at the same time is so uncompromisingly hostile towards the Soviet Union?

However, Velebit is not the only spy in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet representatives have

many times told the Yugoslav leaders that the Yugoslav Ambassador in London, Ljubo Leontić, is an English spy. It is not known why this old and trusted English spy remains in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet government is aware that besides Leontić three other members of the Yugoslav Embassy in London, whose names are not yet disclosed, are in the English Intelligence Service. The Soviet government makes this statement with full responsibility. It is also hard to understand why the United States Ambassador in Belgrade behaves as if he owns the place and why his "intelligence agents," whose number is increasing, move about freely, or why the friends and relations of the executioner of the Yugoslav people, Nedić, so easily obtain positions in the state and Party apparatus in Yugoslavia.

It is clear that since the Yugoslav government persistently refuses to purge its Ministry of Foreign Affairs of spies, the Soviet government is forced to refrain from open correspondence with the Yugoslav government through the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

4. CONCERNING THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SOVIET STATE

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj wrote: "We consider that he (the Soviet Ambassador), as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business."

We feel that this statement by Tito and Kardelj is essentially incorrect and anti-Soviet. They identify the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist who represents the communist government of the USSR, with an ordinary bourgeois ambassador, a simple official of a bourgeois state, who is called upon to undermine the foundations of the Yugoslav state. It is difficult to under-

stand how Tito and Kardelj could sink so low. Do these comrades understand that such an attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador means the negation of all friendly relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia? Do these comrades understand that the Soviet Ambassador, a responsible communist, who represents a friendly power which liberated Yugoslavia from the German occupation, not only has the right but is obliged, from time to time, to discuss with the communists in Yugoslavia all questions which interest them? How can they be suspicious of these simple elementary matters if they intend to remain in friendly relation with the Soviet Union?

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, it is necessary to mention that, unlike the Yugoslavs, we do not consider the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow as a simple official; we do not treat him as a mere bourgeois ambassador and we do not deny his "right to seek information about the work of our Party from anyone he chooses." Because he became an ambassador, he did not stop being a communist. We consider him as a comrade and a high-ranking communist. He has friends and acquaintances among the Soviet people. Is he "acquiring" information about the work of our Party? Most likely he is. Let him "acquire" it. We have no reason to hide from comrades the shortcomings in our Party. We expose them ourselves in order to eliminate them.

We consider that this attitude of the Yugoslav comrades towards the Soviet Ambassador cannot be regarded as accidental. It arises from the general attitude of the Yugoslav government, which is also the cause of the inability of the Yugoslav leaders to see the difference between the foreign policy of the USSR and the foreign policy of the Anglo-Americans; they, therefore, put the foreign policy of the USSR on a par with the foreign policy of the English and Americans and feel that they should follow the same policy towards the Soviet

Union as towards the imperialist states, Great Britain and the United States.

In this respect, the speech by Comrade Tito in Ljubljana in May 1945 is very characteristic. He said:

“It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.”

This was said in connection with the question of Trieste. As is well known, after a series of territorial concessions for the benefit of Yugoslavia, which the Soviet Union extracted from the Anglo-Americans, the latter, together with the French, rejected the Soviet proposal to hand Trieste over to Yugoslavia and occupied Trieste with their own forces, which were then in Italy. Since all other means were exhausted, the Soviet Union had only one other method left for gaining Trieste for Yugoslavia — to start war with the Anglo-Americans over Trieste and take it by force. The Yugoslav comrades could not fail to realize that after such a hard war the USSR could not enter another. However, this fact caused dissatisfaction among the Yugoslav leaders, whose attitude was described by Comrade Tito. The statement by Tito in Ljubljana that “Yugoslavia would not pay for others,” “would not be used as a bribe,” “would not be involved in any policy of spheres of interest,” was directed not only against the imperialist states but also against the USSR, and in the given circumstances the relations of Tito towards the USSR are no different from his relations towards the imperialist states, as he does not recognize any difference between the USSR and the imperialist states.

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito, which

met no resistance in the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY, pursued in the narrow circles of the Yugoslav Party cadres, regarding the “degeneration” of the USSR into an imperialist state, its desire to “dominate Yugoslavia economically,” also the basis for the slanderous propaganda of the leaders of the CPY regarding the “degeneration” of the CPSU(B) and its desire “through the Cominform, to control the other parties” and the “socialism in the USSR, which has ceased being revolutionary.”

The Soviet government was obliged to draw the attention of the Yugoslav government to the fact that this statement could not be tolerated, and since the explanations given by Tito and Kardelj were unfounded, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, Comrade Sadchikov, was instructed by the Soviet government to make the following statement to the Yugoslav government, which he did on June 5, 1945:

“We regard Comrade Tito’s speech as an unfriendly attack on the Soviet Union, and the explanation by Comrade Kardelj as unsatisfactory. Our readers understood Comrade Tito’s speech in this way, and it cannot be understood in any other. Tell Comrade Tito that if he should once again permit such an attack on the Soviet Union we shall be forced to reply with open criticism in the press and disavow him.”

From this anti-Soviet attitude of Comrade Tito to the USSR arises the attitude of the Yugoslav leaders towards the Soviet Ambassador, by which the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade is put on a level with bourgeois ambassadors.

It seems that the Yugoslav leaders intend to retain this anti-Soviet attitude in future. The Yugoslav leaders should bear in mind that retaining this attitude means

renouncing all friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and betraying the united socialist front of the Soviet Union and the people's democratic republics. They should also bear in mind that retaining this attitude means depriving themselves of the right to demand material and any other assistance from the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union can only offer aid to friends.

For the information of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, we emphasize that this anti-Soviet attitude towards the Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet state is only found in Yugoslavia; in other countries of people's democracy the relations were and remain friendly and perfectly correct.

It is interesting to note that Comrade Kardelj, who is now in complete agreement with Comrade Tito, three years ago had a completely different opinion of Tito's speech in Ljubljana. Here is what the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Sadchikov, reported about his conversation with Kardelj on June 5, 1945:

“Today, 5 June, I spoke to Kardelj as you suggested. (Tito has not yet returned.) The communication made a serious impression on him. After some thought he said he regarded our opinion of Tito's speech as correct. He also agreed that the Soviet Union could no longer tolerate similar statements. Naturally, in such difficult times for Yugoslavia, Kardelj said, open criticism of Tito's statement would have serious consequences for them, and for this reason they would try to avoid similar statements. However, the Soviet Union would have the right to make open criticism should similar statements be made. Such criticism would benefit them. Kardelj asked me to convey to you his gratitude for this well-timed criticism. He said it would help to improve their work. The criticism of the political mistakes made in the government declaration in

March had been of great benefit, Kardelj was sure that this criticism would also help improve the political leadership.

“In an attempt to analyse (very carefully) the causes of the mistakes, Kardelj said that Tito had done great work in liquidating factionalism in the CP and in organizing the people’s liberation struggle, but he was inclined to regard Yugoslavia as a self-sufficient unit outside the general development of the proletarian revolution and socialism. Secondly, such a situation had arisen in the Party that the Central Committee does not exist as an organizational and political centre. We meet by chance, and we make decisions by chance. In practice every one of us is left to himself. The style of work is bad, and there is not enough coordination in our work. Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them, not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet Republics, and the CPY as a part of the All-Union Communist Party, that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the USSR. For this reason they would like us to criticize them frankly and openly and to give them advice which would direct the internal and foreign policy of Yugoslavia along the right path.

“I told Kardelj it was necessary to recognize the facts as they are at present, namely to treat Yugoslavia as an independent state and the Yugoslav Communist Party as an independent Party. You can and must, I said, present and solve your problems independently, while we would never refuse advice should you ask for it.

“As regards Yugoslavia we have obligations, undertaken by our treaties, and still more, we have

moral obligations. As far as possible we have never refused advice and assistance, when these were needed. Whenever I pass Marshal Tito's communications on to Moscow, I receive replies immediately. However, such advice is possible and beneficial only if we are approached in time, prior to any decision being reached or any statement being made."

We leave aside the primitive and fallacious reasoning of Comrade Kardelj about Yugoslavia as a future constituent part of the USSR and the CPY as a part of the CPSU(B). However, we would like to draw attention to Kardelj's criticisms of Tito's anti-Soviet declaration in Ljubljana and the bad conditions in the CC of the CPY.

5. REGARDING THE ANTI-SOVIET STATEMENT BY COMRADE DJILAS ABOUT THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

In our letter of March 27, we mentioned the anti-Soviet statement by Comrade Djilas made at a session of the CC of the CPY, in which he said that the Soviet officers, from a moral standpoint, were inferior to the officers in the English army. This statement by Djilas was made in connection with the fact that a few officers of the Soviet army in Yugoslavia indulged in actions of an immoral nature. We described this statement by Djilas as anti-Soviet because in referring to the behaviour of Soviet officers this pitiful Marxist, Comrade Djilas, did not recall the main differences between the socialist Soviet army, which liberated the peoples of Europe, and the bourgeois English army, whose function is to oppress and not to liberate the peoples of the world.

In their letter of April 13, 1948, Tito and Kardelj

state “that Djilas never made such a statement in such a form,” and that “Tito explained this in writing and orally in 1945” and that “Comrade Stalin and other members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B)” accepted this explanation.

We feel it necessary to emphasize that this statement by Tito and Kardelj does not correspond with the facts. This is how Stalin reacted to the statement by Djilas in a telegram to Tito:

“I understand the difficulty of your situation after the liberation of Belgrade. However, you must know that the Soviet government, in spite of colossal sacrifices and losses, is doing all in its power and beyond its power to help you. However, I am surprised at the fact that a few incidents and offences committed by individual officers and soldiers of the Red Army in Yugoslavia are generalized and extended to the whole Red Army. You should not so offend an army which is helping you to get rid of the Germans and which is shedding its blood in the battle against the German invader. It is not difficult to understand that there are black sheep in every family, but it would be strange to condemn the whole family because of one black sheep.

“If the soldiers of the Red Army find out that Comrade Djilas, and those who did not challenge him, consider the English officers, from a moral standpoint, superior to the Soviet officers, they would cry out in pain at such undeserved insults.”

In this anti-Soviet attitude of Djilas, which passed unchallenged among the other members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, we see the basis for the slanderous campaign conducted by the leaders of the CPY against the representatives of the Red Army in Yugoslavia, which was the reason for the withdrawal of our military advisers.

How did the matter with Djilas end? It ended with Comrade Djilas arriving in Moscow, together with the Yugoslav delegation, where he apologized to Stalin and begged that this unpleasant error, which he committed at the session of the CC of the CPY, be forgotten. As can be seen, the matter appears entirely different when presented in the letter of Tito and Kardelj. Unfortunately, Djilas's error was not an accident.

* * *

Comrades Tito and Kardelj accuse the Soviet representatives of recruiting Yugoslavs for their intelligence service. They write:

“We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet intelligence service to recruit, in our country, which is going towards socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service. We cannot consider this as anything else but detrimental to the interests of our country. This is done in spite of the fact that our leaders and the UDB have protested against this and made it known that it cannot be tolerated. Those being recruited include officers, various leaders, and those who are negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.”

We declare that this statement by Tito and Kardelj, which is full of hostile attacks against the Soviet officials in Yugoslavia, does not at all correspond to the facts.

It would be monstrous to demand that the Soviet people who are working in Yugoslavia should fill their mouths with water and talk with no one. Soviet workers are politically mature people and not simple hired labourers, who have no right to be interested in what is happening in Yugoslavia. It is only natural for them to talk with Yugoslav citizens, to ask them questions and to gain information, etc. One would have to be an

incorrigible anti-Soviet to consider these talks as attempts to recruit people for the intelligence service, especially such people who are “negatively disposed towards the new Yugoslavia.” Only anti-Soviet people can think that the leaders of the Soviet Union care less for the welfare of new Yugoslavia than do the members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY.

It is significant that these strange accusations against the Soviet representatives are met only in Yugoslavia. To us it appears that this accusation against the Soviet workers is made solely for the purpose of justifying the actions of the UDB in placing the Soviet workers in Yugoslavia under surveillance.

It must be emphasized that Yugoslav comrades visiting Moscow frequently visit other cities in the USSR, meet our people and freely talk with them. In no case did the Soviet government place any restrictions on them. During his last visit to Moscow, Djilas went to Leningrad for a few days to talk with Soviet comrades.

According to the Yugoslav scheme, information about the Party and state work can only be obtained from the leading organs of the CC of the CPY or from the government. Comrade Djilas did not obtain information from these organs of the USSR but from the local organs of the Leningrad organizations. We did not consider it necessary to inquire into what he did there, and what facts he picked up. We think he did not collect material for the Anglo-American or French intelligence service but for the leading organs of Yugoslavia. Since this was correct we did not see any harm in it because this information might have contained instructive material for the Yugoslav comrades. Comrade Djilas cannot say that he met with any restrictions.

It may be asked now: Why should Soviet communists in Yugoslavia have fewer rights than Yugoslavs in the USSR?

* * *

In their letter of April 13, Tito and Kardelj again refer to the question of trade relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, namely the alleged refusal of Comrade Krutikov to continue trade negotiations with the Yugoslav representatives. We have already explained to the Yugoslav comrades that Krutikov has denied the statements attributed to him. We have already explained that the Soviet government never raised the question of suspending trade agreements and trade operations with Yugoslavia. Consequently, we consider this question closed and have no intention of returning to it.

6. ON THE INCORRECT POLITICAL LINE OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPY IN REGARD TO THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA

In our letter we wrote that the spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY, that the capitalist elements are increasing in the cities and the villages and that the leaders of the Party are not undertaking any measures to check the capitalist elements.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all this and consider our statements, which are a matter of principle, as insults to the CPY, avoiding an answer to the essential question. Their proofs are based only on the fact that consistent social reforms are being undertaken in Yugoslavia. However, this is almost negligible. The denial on the part of these comrades of the strengthening of the capitalist elements, and in connection with this, the sharpening of the class struggle in the village under the conditions of contemporary Yugoslavia, arises from the opportunist contention that, in the transition period between capitalism and socialism, the class struggle does not become sharper, as taught by Marxism-Lenin-

ism, but dies out, as averred by opportunists of the type of Bukharin, who postulated a decadent theory of the peaceful absorption of the capitalist elements into the socialist structure.

No one will deny that the social reforms which occurred in the USSR after the October Revolution were all-embracing and consistent with our teaching. However, this did not cause the CPSU(B) to conclude that the class struggle in our country was weakening, nor that there was no danger of the strengthening of the capitalist elements. In 1920-21 Lenin stated that "while we live in a country of smallholders there is a stronger economic basis for capitalism in Russia than there is for communism," since "small-scale individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale." It is known that for 15 years after the October Revolution, the question of measures for checking capitalist elements and later the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the daily agenda of our Party. To underestimate the experiences of the CPSU(B) in matters relating to the development of socialism in Yugoslavia is a great political danger and cannot be allowed for Marxists, because socialism cannot be developed only in the cities and in industry, but must also be developed in the villages and in agriculture.

It is no accident that the leaders of the CPY are avoiding the question of the class struggle and the checking of the capitalist elements in the village. What is more, in the speeches of the Yugoslav leaders there is no mention of the question of class differentiation in the village; the peasantry are considered as an organic whole, and the Party does not mobilize its forces in an effort to overcome the difficulties arising from the increase of the exploiting elements in the village.

However, the political situation in the village gives

no cause for complacency. Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the development of socialism. This means that the CPY is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.

Nor is it by accident that some of the most prominent leaders of the CPY are deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road on the question of the leading role of the working class. While Marxism-Leninism starts by recognizing the leading role of the working class in the process of liquidating capitalism and developing a socialist society, the leaders of the CPY have an entirely different opinion. It is enough to quote the following speech by Comrade Tito in Zagreb on November 2, 1946 (*Borba*, 2 November 1946): "We do not tell the peasants that they are the strongest pillar of our state in order that, eventually, we may get their votes, but because we know that that is what they are, and because they should be aware of what they are."

This attitude is in complete contradiction to Marxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe and in the countries of people's democracy, the working class and not the peasantry is the most progressive, the most revolutionary class. As regards the peasantry, or rather its majority — the poor and middle peasants — they can be or are in a union with the working class, while the leading role in this union still belongs to the working class. However, the passage quoted not only denies the leading role to the working class,

but proclaims that the entire peasantry, including that is the kulaks, is the strongest pillar in the new Yugoslavia. As can be seen this attitude expresses opinions which are natural to petty-bourgeois politicians but not to Marxist-Leninists.

7. ON THE INCORRECT POLICY OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CC OF THE CPY ON THE QUESTION OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTY AND THE PEOPLE'S FRONT

In our previous letter we wrote that in Yugoslavia the CPY is not considered as the main leading force, but rather the People's Front; that the Yugoslav leaders diminish the role of the Party and are in fact dissolving the Party into a non-party People's Front, allowing in this way the same cardinal error committed by the Mensheviks in Russia forty years ago.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny this, stating that all decisions of the People's Front are decisions of the Party, but that they do not consider it necessary to state at what Party conference these decisions were approved.

In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the CP is the highest form of organization of workers, which stands over all other organizations of workers, among others over the Soviet in the USSR, over the People's Front in Yugoslavia. The Party stands above all these organizations of working men not only because it has drawn in all the best elements of the workers, but because it has its own special program, its special policy, on the basis of which it leads all the organizations of the workers. But

the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY is afraid to admit this openly and proclaim it at the top of its voice to the working class and all the people of Yugoslavia. The Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY feels that if it does not emphasize this factor, the other parties will not have occasion to develop their strength in their struggle. It also appears that Tito and Kardelj think that by this cheap cunning they can abolish the laws of historical development, fool the classes, fool history. But this is an illusion and self-deception. As long as there are antagonistic classes there will be a struggle between them, and as long as there is a struggle it will be expressed in the work of various groups and parties, legally or illegally.

Lenin said that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the leaders is to keep this weapon in readiness. However, since the Yugoslav leaders are hiding the banner of their Party and will not emphasize the role of the Party before the masses, they are blunting this weapon, diminishing the role of the Party and disarming the working class. It is ridiculous to think that because of the cheap cunning of the Yugoslav leaders the enemies will relinquish the fight. Because of this the Party should be kept fighting fit and ever-ready for the struggle against the enemy. Its banner should not be hidden and it should not be lulled to sleep by the thought that the enemy will relinquish the struggle. The Party should not stop organizing its forces, legally or illegally.

We feel that this limiting of the role of the CPY has gone too far. We refer here to the relations between the CPY and the People's Front, which we consider incorrect in principle. It must be borne in mind that in the People's Front a variety of classes are admitted: kulaks, merchants, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, various political groups, including some bourgeois parties. The fact that, in Yugoslavia, only the People's

Front enters the political arena and that the Party and its organizations do not take part in political life openly under their own name, not only diminishes the role of the Party in the political life of the country but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, called upon to gain the confidence of the people and to spread its influence over ever broader masses of workers through open political work, through open propaganda of its opinions and its program. Comrades Tito and Kardelj forget that the Party develops and that it can develop only in an open struggle with the enemy; that cheap cunning and machinations of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY cannot replace this struggle as a school for educating Party cadres. Their determined lack of desire to admit the error of their statements — namely that the CPY has no other program than the program of the People's Front — shows how far the Yugoslav leaders have deviated from Marxist-Leninist views on the Party. This might start liquidation tendencies regarding the CPY which would be a danger to the CPY itself and lead eventually to the degeneration of the Yugoslav People's Republic.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj state that the errors of the Mensheviks regarding the merging of the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization were committed forty years ago and therefore can have no connection with the present mistakes of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY. Comrades Tito and Kardelj are profoundly mistaken. There can be no doubt of the theoretical and political connections between these two events, because like the Mensheviks in 1907, so, today, Tito and Kardelj, forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stands over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party mass organization. The difference lies in the fact that the Menshe-

viks committed their errors in 1906-07, and, after being tried by the Marxist Party in Russia at the London Conference, did not return to these errors, whereas the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, in spite of this instructive lesson, are bringing the same error back to life after forty years, and are passing it off as their own Party theory. This circumstance does not lessen but, on the contrary, aggravates the error of the Yugoslav comrades.

8. REGARDING THE ALARMING SITUATION IN THE CPY

In our previous letter we wrote that the CPY retains a semi-legal status, in spite of the fact that it came into power more than three and a half years ago; that there is no democracy in the Party; there is no system of elections; there is no criticism or self-criticism, that the CPY Central Committee is not composed of elected persons but of co-opted persons.

Comrades Tito and Kardelj deny all these charges.

They write that “the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY are not co-opted,” that “in December 1940, when the CPY was completely illegal... at the Fifth Conference, which by the decision of the Comintern, had all the powers of a congress, a CC of the CPY was elected consisting of 31 members and 10 candidates...” that “of this number 10 members and six candidates died during the war” that besides this “two members were expelled from the CC,” that the CC of the CPY now has “19 members elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members,” that now “the CC of the CPY is composed of 26 members.”

This statement does not correspond to the facts. As can be seen from the archives of the Comintern, at the Fifth Conference, which was held in October and not in December of 1940, 31 members of the CC of the CPY and

10 candidates were not elected, but 22 from Belgrade at the end of October 1940: "To Comrade Dimitrov: The Fifth Conference of the CPY was held from 19-23 October. One hundred and one delegates from all over the country participated. A CC of 22 members was elected, among them two women, and sixteen candidates. Complete unity was manifested. Walter."

If, out of 22 elected members of the CC, 10 died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are 26 members of the CC of the CPY — therefore, if from this number we subtract 10, this leaves 16 co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. It cannot be tolerated that Party meetings should not be held or held secretly; this must undermine the influence of the Party among the masses; nor can it be tolerated that acceptance into the Party is concealed from the workers; acceptance into the Party should play an important educational role in linking the Party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY had regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such con-

ditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres or, as Tito and Kardelj say, the organizational secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are left to the supervision of the Ministry of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient for Žujović, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU(B), to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to fulfil all the desires of the “chief” without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU(B), but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him; militarist measures were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious danger to the life and development of the Party. The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic regime within the Party is put an end to, the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav Democratic

Republic.

9. ON THE ARROGANCE OF THE LEADERS OF THE CC OF THE CPY AND THEIR INCORRECT ATTITUDE TOWARDS THEIR MISTAKES

As can be seen from the letter by Tito and Kardelj, they completely deny the existence of any mistake in the work of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY, as well as the slander and propaganda being conducted among the inner circles of Party cadres in Yugoslavia about the “degeneration” of the USSR into an imperialist state and so forth. They consider that this arises entirely from the inaccurate information received by the CPSU(B) regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. They consider that the CC of the CPSU(B) has been a “victim” of the slanderous and inaccurate information spread by Žujović and Hebrang, and maintain that if there had been no such false information regarding conditions in Yugoslavia there would have been no disagreements between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Because of this they came to the conclusion that it is not a matter of mistakes of the CC of the CPY and the criticism of these mistakes by the CC of the CPSU(B), but of the inaccurate information of Žujović and Hebrang who “fooled” the CPSU(B) with their information. They feel that everything would be put right if they punished Hebrang and Žujović. In this way a scapegoat has been found for their sins. We doubt whether Comrades Tito and Kardelj themselves believe the truth of this version, even though they seize on it as if it were true. They do this because they feel it is the easiest way out of the difficult situation, in which the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY finds itself. In emphasizing this false and apparently naive version they desire, not only to clear themselves of the responsibility for strained Yugoslav-Soviet relations by throwing the blame on

the USSR, but also to blacken the CC of the CPSU(B) by representing it as being greedy for all “tendentious” and “anti-Party” information.

We feel that this attitude of Tito and Kardelj towards the CC of the CPSU(B) and their critical remarks regarding the errors of the Yugoslav comrades is not only dangerously unwise and false, but also deeply anti-Party.

If Tito and Kardelj were interested in discovering the truth and if the truth were not painful to them, they should think seriously about the following:

(a) Why should the CPSU(B)’s information about the affairs in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania appear correct, and not cause any misunderstanding with the communist parties of those countries, while the information about Yugoslavia appears, according to the Yugoslav comrades, tendentious and anti-Party, and causes from their side anti-Soviet attacks and an unfriendly attitude towards the CPSU(B)?

(b) Why do friendly relations between the USSR and the countries of people’s democracies develop and strengthen while Soviet-Yugoslav relations deteriorate?

(c) Why did the CPs of the people’s democracies support the CPSU(B)’s letter of March 27 and condemn the mistakes of the CPY, while the Political Bureau of the CPY, which would not admit its errors, remained isolated?

Was all this accidental?

In order to reveal the errors of the Political Bureau of the CPY it is not necessary to obtain information from individual comrades such as, for example, Hebrang and Žujović. More than enough can be found in the official statements of the leaders of the CPY, such as Tito, Djilas, Kardelj and others, which appeared in the press.

We declare that Soviet citizens did not obtain any

information from Hebrang. We declare that the talk between Žujović and the Soviet Ambassador in Yugoslavia, Lavrentiev, did not reveal a tenth of what was contained in the erroneous and anti-Soviet speeches of Yugoslav leaders. The reprisals taken against these comrades are not only an impermissible settling of private accounts incompatible with the principles of internal Party democracy, but also bear witness to the anti-Soviet attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, who consider talk between a Yugoslav communist and the Soviet Ambassador a crime.

We feel that behind the attempts of the Yugoslav leaders to clear themselves of the responsibility for straining Soviet-Yugoslav relations, lies the lack of desire by these comrades to admit their mistakes and their intention to continue an unfriendly policy towards the USSR.

Lenin says:

“The attitude of a political party towards its mistakes is one of the most important and most significant criteria of the seriousness of the party and the fulfilment of its obligations toward its class and towards the working masses. To admit errors frankly, to discover their cause, to analyse the situation which has been created by these errors, to discuss measures for correcting them — that is the sign of a serious party, that is the fulfilment of its obligations, that is the education of the class and the masses.”

Unfortunately, we must state that the leaders of the CPY, who will not admit and correct their errors, are crudely destroying this principal directive of Lenin.

We must also emphasize that, in contrast to the Yugoslav leaders, the leaders of the French and Italian communist parties honourably admitted their errors at the Conference of Nine Parties, conscientiously corrected them and thus enabled their parties to strength-

en their ranks and to educate their cadres.

We feel that underlying the unwillingness of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY honourably to admit their errors and to correct them is the unbounded arrogance of the Yugoslav leaders. Their heads were turned by the successes achieved. They became arrogant and now feel that the depth of the sea reaches only up to their knees. Not only have they become arrogant, but they even preach arrogance, not understanding that arrogance can be their own ruin.

Lenin says: "All revolutionary parties, which have existed in the past, perished because they were arrogant and because they did not see where their strength lay and were afraid to speak of their weaknesses. We will not perish because we are not afraid to speak of our weaknesses and we will learn to overcome them."

Unfortunately we must state that the Yugoslav leaders, who do not suffer from undue modesty and who are still intoxicated with their successes, which are not so very great, have forgotten Lenin's teaching.

Tito and Kardelj, in their letter, speak of the merits and successes of the CPY, saying that the CC of the CPSU(B) earlier acknowledged these services and successes, but is now supposedly silent about them. This, naturally, is not true. No one can deny the services and successes of the CPY. There is no doubt about this. However, we must also say that the services of the communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are not less than those of the CPY. However, the leaders of these parties behave modestly and do not boast about their successes, as do the Yugoslav leaders, who have pierced everyone's ears by their unlimited self-praises. It is also necessary to emphasize that the services of the French and Italian CPs to the revolution were not less but greater than those of Yugoslavia. Even though the French and Italian CPs have so far achieved less success than the

CPY, this is not due to any special qualities of the CPY, but mainly because after the destruction of the Yugoslav Partisan Headquarters by German paratroopers, at a moment when the people's liberation movement in Yugoslavia was passing through a serious crisis, the Soviet army came to the aid of the Yugoslav people, crushed the German invader, liberated Belgrade and in this way created the conditions which were necessary for the CPY to achieve power. Unfortunately the Soviet army did not and could not render such assistance to the French and Italian CPs. If Comrade Tito and Comrade Kardelj bore this fact in mind they would be less boastful about their merits and successes and would behave with greater propriety and modesty.

The conceit of the Yugoslav leaders goes so far that they even attribute to themselves such merits as can in no way be justified. Take, for example, the question of military science, The Yugoslav leaders claim that they have improved on the Marxist science of war with a new theory according to which war is regarded as a combined operation by regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections. However, this so-called theory is as old as the world and is not new to Marxism. As is known, the Bolsheviks applied combined action of regular troops, partisan units and popular insurrections for the entire period of the civil war in Russia (1918-21), and applied it on a much wider scale than was done in Yugoslavia. However, the Bolsheviks did not say that by applying this method of military activity, they produced anything new in the science of war, because the same method was successfully applied long before the Bolsheviks by Field-Marshal Kutuzov in the war against Napoleon's troops in Russia in 1812.

However, even Field-Marshal Kutuzov did not claim to be the innovator in applying this method because the Spaniards in 1808 applied it in the war against Napoleon's troops. It thus appears that this science of war is

actually 140 years old and this which they claim as their own service is actually the service of the Spaniards.

Besides this, we should bear in mind that the services of any leader in the past do not exclude the possibility of his committing serious errors later. We must not close our eyes to present errors because of past services. In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary services, but this does not mean that the CPSU(B) could close its eyes to his crude opportunist mistakes which followed later, making him an enemy of the Soviet Union.

* * *

Tito and Kardelj in their letter proposed that the CPSU(B) should send representatives to Yugoslavia to study the Soviet-Yugoslav differences. We feel this course would be incorrect, since it is not a matter of verifying individual facts but of differences of principle.

As is known, the question of Soviet-Yugoslav differences has already become the property of the CC of the nine communist parties who have their Cominform. It would be highly irregular to exclude them from this matter. Therefore, we propose that this question be discussed at the next session of the Cominform.

(The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, pp. 31-52)

FROM THE TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

May 10, 1948

In connection with the possible developments in the areas of your stay, particularly with the ongoing offensive of Fu Zuoyi on Yuxian, i.e., in the direction of the three regions through which you intend to travel to us, we are concerned whether your absence will affect the course of events and how safe your move will be.

Considering this, should you not postpone your trip to us for a while? In case you decide not to delay your departure... please inform us where to send the plane and when. We await your response.*

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, p. 51)

* On the same day, Mao Zedong replied with a telegram: "Comrade Stalin. Today received your letter. Very grateful to you. In the current situation, it is advisable to postpone my trip to you for a short time... I need a short rest, after which I can fly by plane. I will inform you of the location of the airfield and port after clarification."

ANSWER TO THE OPEN LETTER OF HENRY WALLACE

May 17, 1948

I believe that among the political documents of recent times, that have the strengthening of peace, the furthering of international cooperation and the securing of democracy as their aims, the open letter of Henry Wallace, the presidential candidate of the Third Party in the USA, is the most important.

The open letter of Wallace cannot be regarded as a mere exposition of the wish to improve the international situation, as an exposition of the wish for a peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the USA, and the wish to find a way towards such a settlement. The declaration of the government of the USA on May 4, and the answer of the Soviet government of May 9 are, therefore, insufficient, because they do not go so far as to declare that the settlement of the Soviet-American differences of opinion is desirable.

The great importance of the open letter lies in the fact that it is not limited just to that, to giving a declaration, but rather exceeds that — a more important step, an advance — and proposes a concrete program for the peaceful settlement of the differences of opinion between the Soviet Union and the USA.

One cannot say that the open letter of Wallace invariably deals with all the differences. One also cannot say that none of the formulas and opinions in the open letter need to be improved. But that is not the important thing at the moment. The important thing is that Wallace, in his letter, makes an open and honest attempt to work out a peaceful program for a peaceful settlement and gives concrete proposals on all the points of difference between the Soviet Union and the USA.

These proposals are generally known:

General limitation of armaments and the forbidding of atomic weapons. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and Japan and the withdrawal of the troops from these countries.

Withdrawal of the troops from China and Korea.

Consideration for the right of nations to self-determination and non-interference in their internal affairs.

Forbidding the building of military bases in the countries that belong to the United Nations.

Development of international trade in every area, with the elimination of all discrimination.

Help and rebuilding within the framework of the United Nations for countries that suffered from the war.

Defence of democracy and the securing of civil rights in all countries, etc.

One can be for or against these proposals; but no statesman that has anything to do with the matter of peace and cooperation of nations can ignore this program, which reflects the hopes and longing of the peoples for the strengthening of peace, and which, without doubt, will find the support of millions of common people.

I do not know whether the government of the USA acknowledges the program of Wallace as a basis for understanding between the USSR and the USA. As far as the government of the USSR is concerned, we believe that the program of Wallace could be a good and fruitful foundation for such understanding and for the development of international cooperation, because the government of the USSR is of the opinion that despite the differences in their economic systems and ideologies, these systems can live side by side and that peaceful settlement of the differences between the USSR and the USA is not only possible, but also absolutely necessary in the interests of general peace.

(*Pravda*, May 18, 1948)

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

May 22, 1948

Your letters of May 17, 1948 and May 20, 1948, signed by Comrades Tito and Kardelj, have been received. The CPSU(B) considers that in these letters the leaders of the CPY have gone a step further in aggravating their crude mistakes in matters of principle, the harmfulness and danger of which the CPSU(B) indicated in its letter of May 4, 1948.

1. Comrades Tito and Kardelj write that they feel "so unequal that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Information Bureau," and further they allowed themselves the allusion that the Yugoslav leaders had allegedly been placed in that position by the CPSU(B). The CC of the CPSU(B) considers that there is not a scrap of truth in this assertion. There is no inequality for the Yugoslav Communist Party nor can there be in the Information Bureau of nine parties. All know that during the organization of the Information Bureau of nine communist parties, all communist parties started from the indisputable position that every Party should submit a report to the Information Bureau, just as every Party has the right to criticize other parties. From this point the conference of nine Parties started when, at its meetings in September 1947, it listened to the reports of the central committees of all parties without exception. The conference of nine communist parties initiated the right that each Party has the right to criticize any other Party. The Italian and French comrades did not dispute the right of other parties to criticize their mistakes, and they ac-

cepted harshness of criticism in a Bolshevik manner.

It is a known fact that the Italian and French comrades did not oppose the right of other parties to criticize their mistakes. They have, on the contrary, borne the brunt of Bolshevik criticism and benefited from its conclusions. Moreover, the Yugoslav comrades took advantage of the opportunity to criticize the mistakes of the Italian and French comrades and did not consider that by so doing they were infringing on the equality of those parties.

Why are the Yugoslav comrades making this radical change and demanding the liquidation of already established precedents in the Information Bureau? Because they believe that the Yugoslav Party and its leadership ought to be placed in a privileged position, and that the statute of the Information Bureau does not apply to them; that, having the privilege of criticizing other parties, they should not themselves submit to the criticism of other parties. However, if we may say so, beliefs of that kind have nothing in common with equality. In fact this is nothing but a request from the Yugoslav leaders for a privileged position for the CPY (in the Cominform), a position which does not exist and cannot exist for any Party. We have taken and continue to take this stand, for without it the work of the Information Bureau could not continue. Each Communist Party is obliged to submit reports to the Information Bureau, each Communist Party has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. The refusal of the Yugoslavs to submit reports on their actions to the Cominform, and to hear criticisms from other communist parties, means a violation of the equality of communist parties.

2. In their letter of May 17, Comrades Tito and Karelj repeat the claim made in their previous letter, alleging that the CPSU(B)'s criticism of Yugoslav Communist Party leadership is based on incorrect information.

But the Yugoslav comrades do not produce any evidence to prove this statement. The statement remains without substantiation and the CPSU(B)'s criticism remains unanswered, even though Comrades Tito and Kardelj state in their letter that they do not seek to avoid criticism on questions of principle. Maybe the Yugoslav leaders simply have nothing to say to justify themselves?

It is one of two things: either the Political Bureau of the CPY, deep in its soul, is aware of the seriousness of the mistakes committed, but wishing to conceal this from the CPY and to deceive it, declares that the mistakes do not exist, in the meantime laying the blame on innocent men who were supposed to have misinformed the CPSU(B); or it really does not understand that by its mistakes it is deviating from Marxism-Leninism. However, in that case it must be admitted that the Political Bureau's ignorance of the principles of Marxism is extremely great.

3. Although they refuse to answer the direct questions of the CPSU(B) and aggravate their mistakes by their stubborn unwillingness to admit and correct them, Comrades Tito and Kardelj assure us with words that they will show with deeds that they will remain true to the Soviet Union and the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. After what has happened we have no reason to believe in these verbal assurances. Comrades Tito and Kardelj have on many occasions given promises to the CPSU(B) which have not been fulfilled. From their letters and especially from their last letter we are becoming ever more certain of this. The Political Bureau of the CPY, and especially Comrade Tito, should understand that the anti-Soviet and anti-Russian policy which they have recently pursued in their everyday work has done all that was needed to undermine faith in them on the part of the CPSU(B) and the government of the USSR.

4. Comrades Tito and Kardelj complain that they have got into a difficult position and that the consequences of this are very serious for Yugoslavia. This of course is true, but the blame for this lies exclusively with Comrades Tito and Kardelj and with other members of the Political Bureau of the CPY, who have put their own prestige and ambition above the interests of the Yugoslav people, and, instead of admitting and correcting their mistakes in the interests of the people, have stubbornly denied their mistakes, which are fatal for the Yugoslav people.

5. Comrades Tito and Kardelj claim that the CC of the CPY refuses to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau to discuss the question of the Yugoslav Communist Party. If this is their final decision, then it means that they have nothing to tell the Information Bureau in their defence, and that they are tacitly admitting their guilt and are afraid to appear before their fraternal communist parties. Moreover, refusal to report to the Information Bureau means that the CPY has taken the path of cutting itself off from the united socialist people's front of people's democracies headed by the Soviet Union, and that it is now preparing the Yugoslav Party and people for a betrayal of the united front of people's democracies and the USSR. Since the Information Bureau is a Party foundation of the united front, such a policy leads to the betrayal of the work done for international solidarity of the workers and to the adoption of an attitude of nationalism which is hostile to the cause of the working class.

Irrespective of whether the representatives of the CC of the CPY attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the CPSU(B) insists upon the discussion of the situation in the CPY at the next meeting of the Information Bureau.

In view of the request of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian comrades that the meeting of the Informa-

tion Bureau take place in the second half of June, the CPSU(B) expresses its agreement with this proposal.

CC of the CPSU(B)

Moscow
May 22, 1948

(The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, pp. 54-57)

TELEGRAM TO J. BROZ-TITO

June 9, 1948

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has learned that the Yugoslav government has declared Hebrang and Žujović traitors and betrayers of the homeland. We interpret this as meaning that the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia intends to eliminate them physically. The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) declares that if the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY carries out this intention, the CC of the CPSU(B) will consider the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY to be criminal killers. The CC of the CPSU(B) demands that the investigation of the case of Hebrang and Žujović on so-called incorrect information from the CC of the CPSU(B) be conducted with the participation of representatives of the CC of the CPSU(B). We await an immediate response.

(Y.S. Girenko, *Stalin-Tito*, p. 382)

**TELEGRAM OF GREETINGS
FROM STALIN AND MOLOTOV
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC,
KLEMENT GOTTWALD**

*On the occasion of the election of Klement Gottwald as
President of the Czechoslovakian Republic*

June 17, 1948

Accept our sincere good wishes on the victory of
people's democracy and on your election as President
of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

*J. Stalin
V. Molotov*

(Daily Review, Berlin ed., No. 139, June 17, 1948)

LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

June 19, 1948

In response to the letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in its resolution of April 13, declared that comrades Žujović and Hebrang were excluded from the CC of the CPY and subjected to party investigation for providing false and slanderous information to Soviet authorities about the situation in Yugoslavia with the aim of deteriorating relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR.

After some time, comrades Žujović and Hebrang were arrested and subsequently declared enemies of the working class.

Based on this, the CC of the CPSU(B) concluded that the Yugoslav authorities intend to subject Žujović and Hebrang to the death penalty as enemies of the working class. In connection with this, the CC of the CPSU(B) sent a statement on June 9 to the CC of the CPY, in which the CPSU(B) insisted on the participation of its representatives in the investigation into the incorrect information provided by Žujović and Hebrang to Soviet representatives. The CPSU(B) stated that if the proposal of the CPSU(B) for the participation of its representatives in the investigation and punishment of Žujović and Hebrang is rejected, the CPSU(B) will consider the members of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY to be criminal killers.

In response to this, Comrade Kardelj, after consulting with Comrade Tito, stated the following on June 10

in Ljubljana:

“We are surprised by such a request from the CPSU(B). Please be informed that the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPY has no intention of physically liquidating Hebrang and Žujović, and no investigation is being conducted regarding the information provided by Hebrang and Žujović to Soviet representatives.”

This was the second response of the CPY regarding the fate of comrades Žujović and Hebrang, in complete contradiction with the first response given by the CPY on April 13.

On June 17 of this year, the Central Committee of the CPY received a new response, the third in order, regarding the case of Žujović and Hebrang. The response stated that Hebrang and Žujović are under investigation by the state authorities, expressing indignation at the CPSU(B)'s request and rejecting the proposal of the CPSU(B) for the participation of its representatives in the investigation into the case of Žujović and Hebrang.

It is clear that this response cannot be considered an honest answer but is more likely to be regarded as an evasion of the answer.

It is also clear that this response is in complete contradiction with the two previous responses.

Undoubtedly, the Yugoslav leaders have become entangled in the matter of Žujović and Hebrang, and at different times, they provide different explanations, depending on the conjuncture of political needs, only to conceal the true situation with the hastily concocted case of Žujović and Hebrang.

Only by this circumstance can it be explained that the CC of the CPY rejects the proposal for the participation of the representatives of the CPSU(B) in the investigation into the case of Žujović and Hebrang.

From this response, it follows further that since the

case of Hebrang and Žujović has been handed over to the state authorities, the entire responsibility for the fate of Žujović and Hebrang now rests with the chief representative of state power in Yugoslavia — Prime Minister Tito.

(Y.S. Girenko, *Stalin-Tito*, pp. 383-384)

CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA

*Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist and
Workers' Parties*

June 1948

The Information Bureau, composed of the representatives of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Romanian Workers' Party, Hungarian Workers' Party, Polish Workers' Party, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), French Communist Party and Italian Communist Party, upon discussing the situation on the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and announcing that the representatives of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had refused to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, unanimously reached the following conclusions:

1. The Information Bureau notes that recently the leadership of the CPY has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of home and foreign policy, a line which represents a departure from Marxism-Leninism. In this connection the Information Bureau approves the action of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), which took the initiative in exposing this incorrect policy of the Central Committee of the CPY, particularly the incorrect policy of Comrades Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Ranković.

2. The Information Bureau declares that the leadership of the CPY is pursuing an unfriendly policy of defaming Soviet military experts and discrediting the Soviet Union, which has been carried out in Yugoslavia. A special regime was instituted for Soviet civilian experts in Yugoslavia, whereby they were under surveil-

lance of Yugoslav state security organs and were continually followed. The representative of the CPSU(B), in the Information Bureau, Comrade Yudin, and a number of official representatives of the Soviet Union in Yugoslavia were followed and kept under observation by Yugoslav state security organs.

All these and similar facts show that the leaders of the CPY have taken a stand unworthy of communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the “degeneration” of the CPSU(B), about the “degeneration” of the USSR, and so on borrowed from arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the CC of the CPY.

The Information Bureau denounces this anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the CPY as being incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and only appropriate to nationalists.

3. In home policy the leaders of the CPY are departing from the positions of the working class and are breaking with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. They deny that there is a growth of capitalist elements in their country and, consequently, a sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside. This denial is the direct result of the opportunist tenet that the class struggle does not become sharper during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, as Marxism-Leninism teaches, but dies down, as was claimed by opportunists of the Bukharin type, who propagated the theory of the peaceful growing of capitalism into socialism.

The Yugoslav leaders are pursuing an incorrect policy in the countryside by ignoring the class differentiation and by regarding the individual peasantry as a single entity, contrary to the Marxist-Leninist doc-

trine of classes and class struggle, contrary to Lenin's well-known thesis that small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie continually, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale. Moreover, the political situation in the Yugoslav countryside gives no grounds for smugness and complacency. In the conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia, individual peasant farming predominates, the land can be bought and sold, and much of the land is concentrated in the hands of kulaks. Hired labour is also employed. In such conditions, there can be no question of educating the Party in the spirit of glossing over the class struggle and of reconciling class contradictions without by so doing disarming the Party itself in face of the difficulties connected with the construction of socialism.

Concerning the leading role of the working class. The leaders of the CPY, by affirming that the peasantry is the "most stable foundation of the Yugoslav state" are departing from the Marxist-Leninist path and are taking the path of a populist, kulak party. Lenin taught that the proletariat as the "only class in contemporary society which is revolutionary to the end... must be the leader in the struggle of the entire people for a thorough democratic transformation, in the struggle of all working people and the exploited against the oppressors and exploiters."

The Yugoslav leaders are violating this thesis of Marxism-Leninism.

As far as the peasantry is concerned it may be that the majority, that is, the poor and medium peasants, are already in alliance with the working class, with the working class having the leading role in this alliance.

The attitude of the Yugoslav leaders disregards these theses of Marxism-Leninism.

As can be seen, this attitude also reflects views appropriate to petty-bourgeois nationalism, but not Marxism-Leninism.

4. The Information Bureau considers that the leadership of the CPY is revising the Marxist-Leninist teachings on the Party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the Party is the main guiding and leading force in the country, which has its own, specific program and does not dissolve itself among the non-Party masses. The Party is the highest form of organization and the most important weapon of the working class.

In Yugoslavia, however, the People's Front, and not the Communist Party, is considered to be the main leading force in the country. The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party in the non-Party People's Front, which is composed of the most varied class elements (workers, peasants engaged in individual farming, kulaks, traders, small manufacturers, bourgeois intelligentsia, etc.) as well as mixed political groups which include certain bourgeois parties. The Yugoslav leaders stubbornly refuse to recognize the falseness of their tenet that the CPY allegedly cannot and should not have its own specific program and that it should be satisfied with the program of the People's Front.

The fact that in Yugoslavia it is only the People's Front which figures in the political arena, while the Party and its organizations does not appear openly before the people in its own name, not only belittles the role of the Party in the political life of the country, but also undermines the Party as an independent political force, which has the task of winning the growing confidence of the people and of influencing ever broader masses of the working people by open political activity and open propaganda of its views and program. The leaders of the CPY are repeating the mistakes of the Russian Mensheviks regarding the dissolution of the Marxist party into a non-party, mass organization. All this reveals the existence of liquidationist tendencies in

the CPY.

The Information Bureau believes that this policy of the CC of the CPY threatens the very existence of the Communist Party and, ultimately, carries the danger of the degeneration of the People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the CPY. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the CC of the CPY is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all or meet in secret — a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the CPY cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky.

State affairs are completely intolerable when the most elementary rights of members in the CPY are suppressed, when the slightest criticism of incorrect measures in the Party are brutally repressed.

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the CC members comrades Žujović and Hebrang because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the CPY and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The Information Bureau considers that such a disgraceful, purely Turkish, terrorist regime cannot be tolerated alongside the Communist Party. The interests of the very existence and development of the CPY demand

that an end be put to this regime.

6. The Information Bureau considers that the criticism made by the CC of the CPSU(B) and central committees of the other communist parties of the mistakes of the CC of the CPY, and who in this way rendered fraternal assistance to the CPY, provides the CPY with all the conditions necessary to speedily correct the mistakes committed.

However, instead of honestly accepting this criticism and taking the Bolshevik path of correcting these mistakes, the leaders of the CPY, suffering from boundless ambition, arrogance and conceit, met this criticism with belligerence and hostility. They took the anti-Party path of indiscriminately denying all their mistakes, violated the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism regarding the attitude of a political party to its mistakes and thus aggravated their anti-Party mistakes.

Unable to face the criticism of the CC of the CPSU(B) and the central committees of the other fraternal parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the CPY the criticism of the CC's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against comrades Žujović and Hebrang.

Recently, even after the CC of the CPSU(B) and fraternal parties had criticized the mistakes of the Yugoslav leaders, the latter tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared. In view of such haste the new decision only hampers the supply of goods to the population. In a similar hurried manner they brought in a new grain tax for which the way is also not prepared and which can, therefore, only dislocate grain supplies to the urban population. Finally, only recently the Yugoslav leaders in loud declarations declared their love for,

and devotion to, the Soviet Union, although it is known that in practice they are pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union.

Nor is this all. Of late the leaders of the CPY have, with perfect aplomb, been declaiming a policy of liquidating the capitalist elements in Yugoslavia. In a letter to the CC of the CPSU(B), dated April 13, Tito and Kardelj wrote that “the Plenum of the Central Committee approved the measures proposed by the Political Bureau of the CC to liquidate the remnants of capitalism in the country.”

In accordance with this line, Kardelj, speaking in the Skupština on April 25, declared: “In our country the days of the last remnants of the exploitation of man by man are numbered.”

In the conditions prevailing in Yugoslavia this position of the leaders of the Communist Party in regard to the liquidation of the capitalist elements, and hence, the kulaks as a class, cannot be qualified as other than adventurous and non-Marxist. For it is impossible to solve this task as long as the individual peasant economy predominates in the country, which inevitably gives birth to capitalism; as long as conditions have not been created for the large-scale collectivization of agriculture; and as long as the majority of the working peasantry is not convinced of the advantages of collective methods of farming. The experience of the CPSU(B) shows that the elimination of the last and biggest exploiting class — the kulak class— is possible only on the basis of the mass collectivization of agriculture, that the elimination of the kulaks as a class is an organic and integral part of the collectivization of agriculture.

In order to eliminate the kulaks as a class, and hence, to eliminate the capitalist elements in the countryside, it is necessary for the Party to engage in detailed preparatory work to restrict the capitalist elements in the countryside, to strengthen the alliance of

the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class, to make socialist industry capable of producing machinery for the collective administration of agriculture. Haste in this matter can only lead to irreparable harm.

Only on the basis of these measures, carefully prepared and consistently carried out, is it possible to go over from restriction of the capitalist elements in the countryside to their liquidation.

All attempts by the Yugoslav leaders to solve this problem hastily and by means of decrees signify either that the venture is foredoomed to failure or that it is a boastful and empty demagogic declaration.

The Information Bureau considers that by means of these false and demagogic tactics, the Yugoslav leaders are endeavouring to demonstrate that they are not only for class struggle, but that they go even further, beyond those demands which — taking into account the real possibilities — could be advanced by the CPY in the matter of restricting the capitalist elements.

The Information Bureau considers that since these leftist decrees and declarations of the Yugoslav leadership are demagogic and impracticable in the present conditions, they can but compromise the banner of socialist construction in Yugoslavia.

That is why the Information Bureau considers such adventurist tactics as an undignified manoeuvre and an impermissible political gamble.

As we see, these leftist demagogic measures and declarations on the part of the Yugoslav leaders are designed to cover up their refusal to recognize mistakes and honestly correct them.

7. Taking into the account the situation in the CPY, and seeking to show the leaders of the Party the way out of this situation, the CC of the CPSU(B) and the central committees of other fraternal parties suggested that the matter of the CPY should be discussed at a meeting

of the Information Bureau, on the same, normal party fooling as that on which the activities of other communist parties were discussed at the first meeting of the Information Bureau.

However, the Yugoslav leaders rejected the repeated suggestions of the fraternal communist parties to discuss the situation in the Yugoslav Party at a meeting of the Information Bureau.

Attempting to avoid the just criticism of the fraternal parties in the Information Bureau, the Yugoslav leaders invented the fable of their allegedly "unequal position." There is not a grain of truth in this story. It is generally known that when the Information Bureau was set up, the communist parties based their work on the indisputable principle that any party could report to the Information Bureau in the same way that any party had the right to criticize other parties.

At the first meeting of the nine communist parties, the CPY took full advantage of this right.

The refusal of the Yugoslav Party to report to the Information Bureau on its actions and to listen to criticism by other communist parties means, in practice, a violation of the equality of the communist parties and is in fact tantamount to a demand for a privileged position for the CPY in the Information Bureau.

8. In view of this, the Information Bureau expresses complete agreement with the estimation of the situation in the CPY, with the criticism of the mistakes of the CC of the Party and with the political analysis of these mistakes contained in letters from the CC of the CPSU(B) to the CC of the CPY between March and May 1948.

The Information Bureau unanimously concludes that by their anti-Party and anti-Soviet views, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, by their whole attitude and their refusal to attend the meeting of the Information Bureau, the leaders of the CPY have placed themselves in opposition to the communist parties af-

filiated to the Information Bureau and have taken the path of seceding from the united socialist front against imperialism, have taken the path of betraying the cause of international solidarity of the working people and have taken up a position of nationalism.

The Information Bureau condemns this anti-party policy and attitude of the CC of the CPY.

The Information Bureau considers that in view of all this, the CC of the CPY has placed itself and the Yugoslav Party outside the family of fraternal communist parties, outside the ranks of the Information Bureau.

* * *

The Information Bureau considers that the basis of these mistakes made by the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia lies in the undoubted fact that nationalist elements, which previously existed in a disguised form, managed in the course of the past five or six months to reach a dominant position in the leadership of the CPY and that consequently, the leadership of the CPY has broken with the international traditions of the CPY and taken the road of nationalism.

Considerably overestimating the internal, national forces of Yugoslavia and their influence, the Yugoslav leaders think that they can maintain Yugoslavia's independence and build socialism without the support of the communist parties of other countries, without the support of the Soviet Union. They think that the new Yugoslavia can do without the help of these revolutionary forces.

Showing their poor understanding of the international situation and their intimidation by the blackmailing threats of the imperialists, the Yugoslav leaders think that by making concessions they can curry favour with the imperialist states. They think they will be able

to bargain with them for Yugoslavia's independence and gradually, get the people of Yugoslavia orientated on these states, that is, on capitalism. In this they proceed tacitly from the well-known bourgeois-nationalist thesis that "capitalist states are a lesser danger to the independence of Yugoslavia than the Soviet Union."

The Yugoslav leaders evidently do not understand or, probably, pretend they do not understand, that such a nationalist line can only lead to Yugoslavia's degeneration into an ordinary bourgeois republic, to the loss of its independence and to its transformation into a colony of the imperialist countries.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that inside the CPY there are sufficient healthy elements, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the international traditions of the CPY and to the united socialist front.

Their task is to compel their present leaders to recognize their mistakes openly and honestly and to rectify them; to break with nationalism, return to internationalism; and in every way to consolidate the united socialist front against imperialism.

Should the present leaders of the CPY prove to be incapable of doing this, their job is to replace them and to advance a new internationalist leadership of the Party.

The Information Bureau does not doubt that the CPY will be able to fulfil this honourable task.

(For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, No. 13, July 1, 1948)

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR “ON THE DESIGN AND PLACEMENT OF THE NEW BUILDING OF MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY”

July 3, 1948

Moscow, Kremlin
July 3, 1948
No. 2409

The Council of Ministers of the USSR⁴ decrees:

1. Assign the design of the new building of Moscow State University on the Lenin Hills to a group of architects consisting of comrades L.V. Rudnev (head), S.E. Chernyshev, P.V. Abrosimov and A.F. Khryakov, releasing Comrade B.M. Iofan from this work.

The design should be carried out based on the design workshop of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets.

Task the Chief of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets, Comrade Prokofiev, and Comrade Rudnev to submit the sketch project of the new university building for approval by the Council of Ministers of the USSR by October 1, 1948.

2. Place the building of Moscow State University on the Leninsky Gory in the area in the centre of the Moscow River bend, 700 metres from the existing Rublevskoe Highway in the direction of the southwest region.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

Y. Chadaev
Managing Affairs of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR

(Historical Archive, 2004, No. 1, pp. 42-43)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

*On the occasion of the criminal attempt on the life of
Comrade Togliatti*

July 14, 1948

To the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) is shocked over the criminal attempt by worthless elements on the life of the leader of the working class and all the Italian working people, our beloved Comrade Togliatti.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) is grieved that the friends of Comrade Togliatti were unsuccessful in protecting him from the treacherous ambush.

In the name of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, July 15, 1948)

FROM THE TELEGRAM TO K. GOTTWALD*

July 14, 1948

I received a message from Silin** about his conversation with you on the Yugoslav issue. I got the impression that you are counting on the defeat of Tito and his group at the congress of the CPY. With these plans, apparently, you intend to publish material compromising the Yugoslav leaders in their relations with the USSR. I must tell you that we, Muscovites, did not expect such a quick defeat of Tito's group. We know for sure that the congress of the CPY has been carefully selected, all dissenters are deprived of positions or arrested, and only those who have pledged to vote against the Cominform are allowed to attend. We assume that Tito will gather a majority at the upcoming congress. However, this circumstance does not in any way disturb us Muscovites. Our goal was, in the first stage, to isolate the Yugoslav leaders in the eyes of the other communist parties and expose their fraudulent machinations. We have achieved this goal successfully. In the future, there will be a gradual detachment of Marxist parties from Tito and his group.

(T.V. Volokitina, *The Formation of Soviet-Type Political Regimes (1949-1953)*, p. 584)

* Copies of this letter were sent as "guidance" to the leaders of all communist parties participating in the Information Bureau. Only K. Gottwald's reaction to this letter is known. M.A. Silin, who conveyed Stalin's letter to the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, informed the Soviet leadership on the same day: "Comrade Gottwald said that he agrees with Comrade Stalin's letter, then added: 'I have enough patience.'"

** The Soviet ambassador in Prague — *Ed.*

TELEGRAM TO A.Y. ORLOV FOR MAO ZEDONG

July 14, 1948

To Terebin: Convey to Mao Zedong the following:⁵
“Due to the commencement of grain procurement, leading comrades have been dispersing to locations where they will stay until November. Therefore, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) requests Comrade Mao Zedong to schedule his visit to Moscow by the end of November to have the opportunity to meet with all leading comrades.”

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, p. 52)

**TO COMRADES A.M.
KIRHENSTEIN, V.T. LATSIS AND
Y.E. KALNBERZIN**

July 17, 1948

Thank you very much for the invitation.* However, unfortunately, I will not be able to attend the celebration due to my busy schedule.

My greetings to the workers of Latvia!

J. Stalin

July 17, 1948.

(RGASPI, F. 558, Op. 11, D. 1161, L. 82-83)

* A response regarding an invitation to the national holiday of Latvia. A.M. Kirhenstein was the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR; V.T. Latsis was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Y.E. Kalnberzin was the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party (Bolsheviks).

Vilis Tenisovich Latsis was not only a statesman but also a well-known writer (see Letter to the Editor of *Pravda* regarding the novel *To the New Shore* by V. Latsis, p. 589 of this book).

**ANSWERING LETTER TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CABINET OF
MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, KIM IL SUNG**

*On the question of the establishment of diplomatic and
economic relations between the USSR and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea*

October 12, 1948

To Mr. Kim Il Sung, Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

I confirm that I have received your letter of October 8, in which you inform us that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea steps towards exercising its duty, and proposes to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR, to exchange ambassadors which also comply with the establishment of economic relations between the two states.

The Soviet government that is unchangeably for the right of the Korean people to commence the building of an united, independent state, greets the establishment of the Korean government and wishes them success in their work for the national rebirth and the democratic development of Korea. The Soviet government declares its readiness to establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to exchange ambassadors and to immediately establish complementary economic relations.

J. Stalin

(*Pravda*, October 13, 1948)

**RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
“ON STRENGTHENING THE
CONSTRUCTION OF MOSCOW
STATE UNIVERSITY AND THE
32-STOREY ADMINISTRATIVE
BUILDING IN ZARYADYE”**

October 14, 1948

Moscow, Kremlin
No. 3880

The Council of Ministers of the USSR notes that, despite the continuous assistance provided by the Administration of the Palace of Soviets in the construction of Moscow State University on Leninsky Gory and the 32-storey administrative building in Zaryadye, the preparatory work for these constructions is proceeding extremely slowly.

The execution of the annual plan for construction and installation works on objects related to the construction of the university and the building in Zaryadye for the third quarter of 1948 is only 35 per cent.

Attaching great importance to the timely development of work on the construction of Moscow State University and the 32-storey building in Zaryadye, the Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees:

3. In order to strengthen the leadership of the administration of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets and improve its work:

— appoint A.N. Komarovskiy as the head of the administration of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets concurrently with the position of the head of the Main Construction Directorate of the Min-

istry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

— release A.N. Prokofiev from the position of the head of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets;

— appoint T. V. Yushchenko as the deputy head of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets and the head of the construction of Moscow State University. A. P. Lepilova, is to leave him until January 1, 1949 as a part-time head of construction department No. 833 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR;

— appoint A.V. Voronkov as the deputy head of the construction of Moscow State University.

4. Instruct comrade A.N. Komarovsky to concentrate the main resources of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets on the construction of Moscow State University, ensuring the construction of auxiliary enterprises, a workers' settlement and commencing earthworks for the main structures by February 1, 1949, on the construction site.

5. Approve measures to provide assistance to the constructions of Moscow State University and the 32-storey building in Zaryadye, according to the Appendix*.

6. Entrust the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Comrade S.N. Krukov, with daily monitoring and supervision of the construction works of Moscow State University and the 32-storey building in Zaryadye, obliging him to provide comprehensive support to these constructions through the efforts and resources of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

7. Instruct Comrade A.N. Prokofiev to hand over, within the next 10 days, the affairs of the Construction Department of the Palace of Soviets, and Comrade A.N. Komarovsky to accept them, with the participation of the commission composed of the following members:

* Not published — *Ed.*

V.F. Mosolov (chairman), V.Y. Grossman, A.D. Sergeyev and V.F. Promyslov.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

Y. Chadaev
Managing Affairs of the Council
of Ministers of the USSR

(*Historical Archive*, 2004, No. 1, pp. 43-44)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS FROM THE "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On Berlin and the world situation

October 28, 1948

Q. How do you evaluate the results of the discussion of the Security Council on the situation in Berlin and the stand of the Anglo-American and French representatives in this affair?

A. I evaluate it as an expression of the aggressive politics of the Anglo-American and French government circles.

Q. Is it true that in August of this year there was already an agreement reached by the four powers on the question of Berlin?

A. Yes, it is true. As it is known, on August 30 of this year, in Moscow, an agreement was reached between the representatives of the USSR, the USA, England and France, that planned simultaneous steps to repeal the limitation of traffic on the one hand, and the decision to introduce the German Mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin as the only currency on the other hand. This agreement did not violate the interests of anyone; it considered the interests of the partners and guaranteed the possibility of further cooperation. But the governments of the USA and England over-ruled their representatives in Moscow and declared this agreement invalid, that is, they violated it by the decision to hand the question to the Security Council, where the Anglo-Americans had a sure majority.

Q. Is it true that recently in Paris, during the discussion of the question in the Security council, an agreement on the situation in Berlin was reached in unof-

ficial conversations, even before the Security Council had discussed this question?

A. Yes, it is true. The Argentinian representative, Mr. Brumiglia, who also functions as the Chairman of the Security Council, and who negotiated with Vyshinsky unofficially in the name of other interested powers, had in his hands a joint draft for the solution of the problems of the situation in Berlin. The representatives of the USA and England, however, again declared this agreement invalid.

Q. What is happening here? Can you not explain it?

A. What is happening is that the inspirers of the aggressive politics of the USA and England are not interested in agreement and cooperation with the USSR. They do not need an agreement or cooperation, but talk about agreement and cooperation and after they have broken the agreement, they shift the blame onto the USSR, and thereby “prove” that cooperation with the USSR is impossible. The warmongers that strive to unleash a new war are afraid above all of agreement and cooperation with the USSR, of political agreement with the USSR, as it undermines the position of the warmongers and renders the aggressive politics of these gentlemen obsolete.

Therefore they even break agreements that already exist, over-rule their representatives that have worked out these agreements jointly with the USSR, and convey the question, in violation of the statutes of the United Nations Organization, to the Security Council, where they have a sure majority at their disposal and where they all can “prove” everything they like. All this is done to “prove” that cooperation with the USSR is impossible, to “prove” that a new war is necessary, and therefore create the conditions for the unleashing of war. The politics of the present leaders of the USA and England are the politics of aggression and politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. And how are the negotiations of the representatives of the six states in the Security Council, China, Canada, Belgium, Argentina, Columbia and Syria, evaluated?

A. It is clear that these gentlemen support the politics of aggression, the politics for the unleashing of a new war.

Q. Where can all this end?

A. It can only end in an ignominious fiasco for the warmongers. Churchill, the arch-arsonist of a new war has already reached the point where he has lost the trust of his nation and the democratic powers of the whole world. The same fate awaits all the other warmongers. The horrors of the last war still live in the minds of the peoples, and the powers that intercede for peace are so great that the supporters of Churchill's aggression cannot overcome them and lead them in the direction of a new war.

(*Pravda*, October 29, 1948)

WHERE IS THE NATIONALISM OF THE TITO GROUP IN YUGOSLAVIA LEADING TO?

December 8, 1948

In a well-known resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties adopted in June 1948, titled "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia," it was indicated that nationalist elements had gained prominence in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in recent months, which had previously existed in a concealed form. The leadership of the Yugoslav Party broke away from the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and embarked on the path of nationalism.

All communist parties and the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism unanimously approved the resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." All communist parties in the world recognized that the current Yugoslav leadership, i.e., the Tito group, with its nationalist policies, was playing into the hands of the imperialists. It isolated Yugoslavia and weakened it.

Did the Tito group draw the proper lessons from these facts?

Did the Tito group understand that nationalist policies lead to the loss of Yugoslavia's most loyal allies, namely the communist parties of the world, and that this circumstance has already led to the isolation and weakening of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia both externally and internally?

Did the Tito group understand that the only way out of this difficult situation in which it has put the Party and the country is to acknowledge its mistakes, break

away from nationalism and return to the family of communist parties?

No, the Tito group did not draw the proper lessons, and it is not apparent that they understood these simple and clear matters.

On the contrary, in response to fair comradely criticism of the Tito group's mistakes from fraternal communist parties, as well as from the entire camp of people's democracy and socialism, they respond through the mouthpiece of the Belgrade press with slanderous attacks, incitement of national hostility towards the peoples of neighbouring democratic countries, widespread repression, arrests and the killing of both communist and non-communist individuals who dare to express doubt about the correctness of the Tito group's nationalist policy. Just recently, the deputy of Tito, the notorious Ranković, had the Yugoslav Army's Colonel-General, Comrade Arso Jovanović, who was a hero of the Yugoslav liberation war, former chief of the General Staff of Yugoslavia during the liberation movement and the head of the Yugoslav Military School, assassinated by agents. He was killed because he doubted the correctness of the nationalist and terrorist policy of the Tito group. In connection with this, it is openly said in Yugoslavia that "the Tito group is degenerating into a clique of political assassins."

As it can be seen, the Tito group is not willing to acknowledge and rectify its mistakes. Rather, it is afraid and lacks the courage to admit them because acknowledging one's mistakes and rectifying them requires courage. What's worse is that out of fear, they resort to repression and persecute anyone who dares to mention their mistakes.

Lenin says:

"A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways

of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils in practice its obligations towards its class and the working people. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of its rectification — that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate and train its class, and then the masses.”

It is evident that the Tito group cannot be classified among those courageous and honest leaders who love their party, as mentioned by Lenin.

The main nationalist deviation of the Tito group occurred prior to the meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties in the spring of 1948. The open nationalist position of the Tito group began with their refusal to participate in the Meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties and discuss the situation within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia together with the fraternal parties. Despite repeated offers for the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to send a delegation to the meeting and present their point of view, as had been done in previous meetings regarding other communist parties, the Tito group categorically refused to participate in the proceedings. It became clear that the Tito group did not value their friendship with the communist parties, including the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This was an open rupture with the internationalist united front of communist parties. It was a break from internationalism and a shift towards nationalism.

The Belgrade newspaper *Borba* assures that Tito and his like-minded individuals stand for a united anti-imperialist front. This, of course, is untrue and aimed at deceiving the “common people.” In reality, how can we speak of an anti-imperialist position of the Tito group

when they cannot even maintain unity with communist parties of neighbouring countries close to Yugoslavia?

The second significant fact demonstrating the nationalist deviation of the Tito group is their unworthy, hypocritical and anti-Leninist behaviour at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Naive people expected that the congress would work under the banner of friendship with the communist parties and the strengthening of the anti-imperialist front of the countries of people's democracy and the USSR. However, in reality, the opposite occurred. In reality, the Tito group turned the Congress into an arena for fighting against the communist parties of neighbouring countries, a battle against the united anti-imperialist front of the countries of people's democracy. It was a congress that went against the countries of people's democracy and their communist parties, against the USSR and its Communist Party.

Of course, it is not entirely safe to openly discuss the campaign against the USSR and the countries of people's democracy in Yugoslavia because the Yugoslav peoples firmly stand for the alliance with the USSR and the countries of people's democracy. Therefore, the Tito group resorted to a cheap trick and decided to disguise this reactionary campaign with grandiose phrases about their love for the USSR, friendship with the USSR, the great role of the USSR in the liberation movement, and so on. They even went so far as to propose to Stalin that he join this dishonourable campaign and take up the defence of the nationalist Tito group against criticism from communist parties in the USSR and other democratic countries. The employees of the Belgrade press employed all sorts of tricks and manipulations, performing the most unexpected and ridiculous acrobatic jumps and somersaults in order to convince the Yugoslav people that black is white and white is black, that the Tito group's campaign against socialism

and democracy is a secondary matter, while the “alliance” with the USSR and the “united front” with them are the group’s top priorities. In reality, however, the Tito group ended up aligning itself with the imperialists, smearing the communist parties of the countries of people’s democracy and the USSR to the delight of the imperialists from all nations. Instead of a united front with the communist parties, they formed a united front with the imperialists. The Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia approved and cemented the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* demand that communist parties cease exposing the mistakes of the Tito group and instead place their trust and support in this group. Otherwise, they claim that such a “campaign” against the Tito group could cause serious damage to Yugoslavia.

No, gentlemen! Communist parties cannot place their trust or support in the nationalist policy of the Tito group. It is entirely possible that this circumstance may harm Yugoslavia. However, the blame for this should not be placed on the communist parties but on the nationalist Tito group, which severed ties with the communist parties and declared war on them.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* must realize that Marxism and nationalism are incompatible, that nationalism, as an ideology of the bourgeoisie, is an enemy of Marxism. They must recognize that Marxism-Leninism cannot be reconciled with nationalism or any inclination towards nationalism within communist parties, and that it is obliged to dismantle nationalism in whatever form it may take in the name of the interests of the working class, freedom and the friendship of nations, in the name of the victorious construction of socialism.

Lenin says:

“Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism — these are the two irreconcilably hostile slogans that correspond to the two great class camps throughout the capitalist world, and express the two policies (nay, the two world outlooks)...”

In the conditions when the bourgeoisie’s power has been overthrown, the exploiting classes and their agents try to use the poisoned weapon of nationalism to restore the old order.

In connection with this, Stalin says:

“The deviation towards nationalism is the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts of ‘one’s own,’ ‘national’ bourgeoisie... to restore capitalism.”

Nationalism within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia strikes a blow not only to the general anti-imperialist front but, above all, to the interests of Yugoslavia itself, both in foreign and domestic policy.

The nationalism of the Tito group in foreign policy leads to a rupture with the united front of the global revolutionary movement of the working class, the loss of Yugoslavia’s most loyal allies and the self-isolation of Yugoslavia. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms Yugoslavia in the face of its external enemies.

The nationalism of the Tito group in domestic policy leads to a policy of peace between exploiters and the exploited, a policy of “uniting” exploiters and the exploited into a single “national” front, a policy of departing from class struggle and towards the possibility of peaceful integration of exploiters into socialism — leading to the demobilization of the fighting spirit of the Yugoslav working class. The nationalism of the Tito group disarms the Yugoslav workers in the face of their

internal enemies.

A year ago, when the Tito group had not yet displayed nationalist aspirations and cooperated with fraternal parties, Yugoslavia felt confident and boldly moved forward, relying on its closest allies in the form of foreign communist parties. That was the situation in the recent past. However, after the Tito group embraced the rails of nationalism, the situation changed drastically. After the Tito group broke away from the united front of communist parties and started to arrogantly disregard the countries of people's democracy, Yugoslavia began to lose its most loyal allies and found itself isolated in the face of its external and internal enemies.

These are the sad results of the nationalist policy of the Tito group.

The Tito group did not understand what is perfectly clear and obvious to every communist. They failed to grasp the simple truth that in the current international situation, fraternal solidarity among communist parties, mutual cooperation and friendship with countries of people's democracy, and cooperation and friendship with the USSR are the main conditions for the rise and flourishing of countries of people's democracy in the construction of socialism. They are the main guarantee of their national freedom and independence against imperialism's encroachments.

The political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* further claim that the criticism of the Tito group's mistakes has turned into a campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the peoples of Yugoslavia.

This, of course, is incorrect. There has been no campaign and there is no campaign against the peoples of Yugoslavia. It would be criminal to launch any campaign against the Yugoslav peoples, whose heroic deeds are well known. It is also known that the peoples of Yugoslavia firmly stand behind the united front with countries of people's democracy and the USSR. They

bear no responsibility for the nationalist policy of the Tito group. We consider the Yugoslav peoples as our loyal allies.

There has also been no campaign against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a whole. It is well known to us that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia firmly stands for friendship with communists from other countries, for friendship with the USSR and its Communist Party. The presence of internationalist traditions within the ranks of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is beyond doubt. It is also known to us that the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not approve of the nationalist policy of the Tito group. It is known that it is precisely for this reason that it faces harsh repression from the Tito group and its agents.

The "campaign" is not conducted against the peoples of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as a whole, but against the nationalist group of Tito. It is conducted in order to help the Communist Party of Yugoslavia understand the mistakes of the Tito group and eliminate the nationalist policy of the Yugoslav leadership.

Finally, the political acrobats from the newspaper *Borba* claim that the Tito group is inseparable from the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, that it represents the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

That is also incorrect. A year ago, the Tito group may have represented the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But that was a year ago. Now, after breaking ties with the communist parties, after severing relations with all neighbouring republics, after shifting towards nationalism, the Tito group no longer represents the majority of the Party. Now, the Tito group is a faction, trusted only by a minority of the Party, and it uses the state apparatus to suppress the will of the internationalist majority of the Party. The Tito faction

itself has separated from the Party, as it handed over the Party to the supervision of the executioner Ranković and established a cruel terrorist regime within the Party with its repressions, mass arrests and killings. In reality, the Tito faction is now at war with its own party. Only the blind cannot see this. If the Tito faction has proven incapable of maintaining order within the Party through regular democratic methods and has resorted to mass repressions, it means that it has long lost the trust of the majority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Tito faction represents only a minority of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, relying not on the Party's trust but on the administrative-police apparatus of Yugoslavia.

(Pravda, September 8, 1948)

**TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC,
MR. ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY**

December 14, 1948

On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, I send my fraternal congratulations to the fraternal peoples of the Czechoslovak Republic, the government of Czechoslovakia, and to you personally, Mr. Prime Minister.

I wish further success in strengthening the alliance and friendship between our countries and the steadfast progress and prosperity of the Czechoslovak People's Democratic Republic.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, December 14, 1948)

TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

January 10, 1949

Comrade Mao Zedong,

On January 9, we received a note from the Nanking government proposing to the Soviet government to mediate between the Nanking government and the Communist Party of China for the cessation of war and the conclusion of peace. A similar proposal was simultaneously sent to the governments of the USA, England and France. The Nanking government has not yet received responses from these three governments. The Soviet government has also not yet provided a response. It is evident that the proposal of the government is dictated by the Americans. The purpose of this proposal is to declare the Nanking government as a supporter of ending the war and establishing peace, and to label the Communist Party of China as a supporter of continuing the war if it directly refuses peaceful negotiations with the Nanking authorities.

We are considering responding as follows: the Soviet government has stood and continues to stand for the cessation of war and the establishment of peace in China. However, before agreeing to mediate, it would like to know if the other party — the Communist Party of China — is willing to accept the mediation of the USSR. Therefore, the USSR would like the other party — the Communist Party of China — to be informed about the peaceful actions of the Chinese government, and the consent of the other party to the mediation of the USSR should be sought. We intend to respond in this way and ask if you agree with this. If you do not agree, please advise us on a more practical response.

We also believe that your response, if requested, should be approximately as follows:

The Communist Party of China has always advocated

peace in China, as the civil war in China was initiated not by them but by the Nanking government, which should bear responsibility for the consequences of the war. The Communist Party of China supports negotiations with the Kuomintang, but without the participation of those war criminals who unleashed the civil war in China. The Communist Party of China advocates direct negotiations with the Kuomintang without any foreign intermediaries. The Communist Party of China especially considers the mediation of a foreign power impossible, which, with its armed forces and fleet, actively participates in the civil war against the Chinese people's liberation forces, as such a power cannot be recognized as neutral and objective in the matter of ending the war in China. We think your response should be approximately like this.

If you disagree, please let us know your opinion.

As for your trip to Moscow, we believe that given the circumstances mentioned above, you should unfortunately postpone your departure for some time, as your trip to Moscow under these conditions will be used by enemies to discredit the Communist Party of China as a force supposedly not independent and dependent on Moscow, which is certainly not beneficial for both the Communist Party of China and the USSR.

Waiting for your response,

*Filippov**

(New and Recent History, No. 4-5, 1994, pp. 133-134)

* Herein, Filippov is Stalin's pseudonym in correspondence with Mao Zedong

TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

Continuation and conclusion of the previous telegram

January 11, 1949

As seen from the above, our draft of your response to the Kuomintang's proposal is aimed at the failure of the peace negotiations. It is evident that the Kuomintang will not agree to peace talks without the mediation of foreign powers, especially without the mediation of the United States. It is also clear that the Kuomintang will not want to engage in negotiations without the participation of Chiang Kai-shek and other war criminals. Therefore, we expect that the Kuomintang will reject peace talks under the conditions set by the Communist Party of China. As a result, it will appear that the CPC is willing to engage in peace talks, making it impossible to accuse it of wanting to continue the civil war. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang will be responsible for the breakdown of peace talks. Thus, the peaceful manoeuvre of the Kuomintang and the United States will be disrupted, and you can continue your victorious liberation war.

Awaiting your response,

Filippov

(New and Recent History, No. 4-5, 1994, pp. 134-135)

TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

January 14, 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong,

We received your extensive telegram regarding the Nanking peace proposal.

1. Of course, it would be better if there were no Nanking government's peace proposal, if there were not this peaceful manoeuvre by the United States. Clearly, this manoeuvre is undesirable as it can cause troubles to our common cause. Unfortunately, however, this manoeuvre exists. It is a fact, and we cannot close our eyes to this fact; we must take it into account.

2. Undoubtedly, the Nanking and U.S. peace proposal is a manifestation of a deceitful policy. Firstly, because the Nanking authorities do not genuinely desire peace with the Communist Party, as peace with the Communist Party would mean the Kuomintang's abandonment of its main policy of eliminating the Communist Party and its forces, and such an abandonment would lead to the political death of the Kuomintang leaders and the complete collapse of the Kuomintang forces. Secondly, because they know that the Communist Party will not agree to peace with the Kuomintang, as it cannot renounce its fundamental policy of eliminating the Kuomintang and its forces.

What do the Nanking authorities ultimately want? They want not peace with the Communist Party but a truce with it, a temporary cessation of hostilities, to use the truce as a respite, to organize the Kuomintang forces, fortify the southern bank of the Yangtze River, receive arms from the U.S., accumulate strength, and then break the truce and strike at the People's Liberation Army, blaming the Communist Party for the breakdown of negotiations. At a minimum, what they want is to obstruct the Communist Party from defeating the

Kuomintang forces.

This is the basis of the current deceitful policy pursued by the Nanking authorities and the United States.

3. How can one respond to such manoeuvring by the Nanking authorities and the United States? Two responses are possible. The first response: outright and undisguised rejection of the Nanking authorities' peace proposals, thereby proclaiming the necessity of continuing the civil war. But what will this mean? It means, firstly, that you have laid your main trump card on the table and handed the Kuomintang such an important weapon as the banner of peace. Secondly, it means that you are helping your enemies in China and beyond China to portray the Communist Party as a supporter of continuing the civil war and to praise the Kuomintang as a defender of peace. Thirdly, it means that you give the United States the opportunity to manipulate public opinion in Europe and America in such a way that peace with the Communist Party is impossible because it does not want peace, and that the only means to achieve peace in China is to organize armed intervention by states, similar to the intervention that took place in Russia during the four years from 1918 to 1921.

We believe that a direct and undisguised response is good when dealing with honest people. However, when dealing with political tricksters, such as the Nanking authorities, a direct and undisguised response can become dangerous.

But another response is possible. Namely: a) to acknowledge the desirability of establishing peace in China; b) to conduct negotiations between the parties without foreign intermediaries because China is an independent country and does not need foreign mediators; c) to conduct negotiations between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang as parties, not with the Nanking government, which is responsible for

the civil war and has lost the trust of the people; d) as soon as the parties reach an agreement on peace and the governance of China, military actions cease.

Can the Kuomintang accept these conditions? We think it cannot. But if the Kuomintang does not accept these conditions, the people will understand that the perpetrator of the continuation of the civil war is the Kuomintang, not the Communist Party. The banner of peace remains in the hands of the Communist Party in this case. This circumstance is especially important now when many people in China are tired of the civil war and ready to support advocates of peace.

But let's consider the unlikely scenario that the Kuomintang accepts these conditions. What should be the plans of action for the Communist Party?

Firstly, it will be necessary not to cease military actions, to create coalition central government bodies with the calculation that approximately three-fifths of the seats in the Consultative Council and two-thirds of the portfolios in the government remain with the communists, and distribute the remaining seats and portfolios among other democratic parties and the Kuomintang.

Secondly, the positions of the Prime Minister, the Commander-in-Chief and, if possible, the President, should remain with the communists.

Thirdly, the Consultative Council should declare the coalition government formed in this way as the sole government of China, and any other government claiming to be the government of China should be declared rebellious and self-appointed, subject to abolition.

Finally, the coalition government should issue an order to both your forces and the Kuomintang forces, instructing them to pledge allegiance to the coalition government and immediately cease hostilities against those forces that have sworn allegiance. Military actions

will continue against those forces that refuse to take the oath.

The Kuomintang is unlikely to agree to these measures, and if they do not, it is worse for them because they will be completely isolated, and these measures will be implemented without the Kuomintang.

4. This is how we understand the matter, and these are our suggestions to you. It is possible that in the previous telegram, we did not express our suggestions very clearly.

We ask you to consider our suggestions precisely as advice that does not obligate you to anything and that you can either accept or reject. You can be assured that rejecting our advice will not affect our relationship, and we will remain your friends as we have always been.

5. Regarding our response to the Nanking authorities' proposal for mediation, our answer will be in line with your wishes.

6. Nevertheless, we insist that you temporarily postpone your trip to Moscow because your presence in China is crucial at this time. If you wish, we can immediately send a responsible member of the Political Bureau to Harbin or another location for negotiations on the matters of your interest.

Filippov

January 14, 1949

(New and Recent History, No. 4-5, 1994, pp. 136-138)

TELEGRAM TO MAO ZEDONG

January 15, 1949

To Comrade Mao Zedong,

We have just received your recent brief telegram, from which it is evident that there is unity of views between us on the issue of the Nanking authorities' peace proposal and that the Communist Party of China has already initiated a "peaceful" campaign.* Thus, the matter should be considered closed.

Filippov

(New and Recent History, No. 4-5, 1994, p. 139)

* As expected, the Kuomintang considered all compromise proposals from the Communist Party of China unacceptable and rejected them. Mao Zedong ordered the armed forces to cross the Yangtze River and go on the offensive. On April 24, 1949, the People's Liberation Army under the command of Marshal Liu Bocheng entered the capital of Kuomintang China — the city of Nanjing. The Kuomintang government had already moved to the south of the country, to Guangzhou, in February, and then fled to the island of Taiwan with the remnants of its loyal troops. By the end of the year, the People's Liberation Army of China had destroyed all major military formations of the Kuomintang on the mainland, successfully concluding the third civil war in China.

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Beijing. On the very next day, the Soviet Union recognized the PRC and soon concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with it.

**ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS
FROM THE EUROPEAN
GENERAL DIRECTOR OF THE
AMERICAN NEWS AGENCY
“INTERNATIONAL NEWS
SERVICE,” KINGSBURY SMITH**

January 27, 1949

Q. Would the government of the USSR be prepared to consider a joint publication with the government of the United States of America to discuss a declaration which confirms that neither the one nor the other government intends to allow a war between them?

A. The Soviet government would be prepared to discuss the question of the publication of such a document.

Q. Would the government of the USSR be prepared, jointly with the government of the United States of America, to take steps towards the realization of this peace treaty, for example, gradual disarmament?

A. Of course the government of the USSR would cooperate with the government of the United States of America in the carrying through of steps for the realization of the peace treaty and gradual disarmament.

Q. If the governments of the United States of America, Great Britain and France give their consent to the postponement of the founding of a separate West German state until the next convocation of Foreign Ministers on the subject of the German problem as a whole, would the government of the USSR then be prepared to lift the sanctions which the Soviet administration has introduced concerning the corridors between Berlin and the western zones of Germany?

A. In the case of the United States of America,

Great Britain and France observing the conditions that are stated in the third question, the Soviet government would make no obstacles for the repeal of the transport restrictions, but under the conditions that the transport and trade restrictions that the three powers have introduced are simultaneously repealed.

Q. Would you, your Excellency, be prepared to meet President Truman at some acceptable place to discuss the possibility of concluding such a peace treaty?

A. I have already said earlier that there are no objections to such a meeting.

(Pravda, January 31, 1949)

ANSWER TO KINGSBURY SMITH

On the question of a meeting with Truman

February 2, 1949

To Mr. Kingsbury Smith, European General Director of the *International News Service Agency*.

I have received your telegram of February 1.

I thank President Truman for the invitation to Washington. It has long been my wish to travel to Washington, as I formerly said to President Roosevelt in Yalta and to President Truman in Potsdam. Sadly, I do not have the possibility of realizing my wish at present, as the doctor has decided against my making a long journey, especially by sea or air.

The government of the Soviet Union would greet a visit from the President to the USSR. One could hold a conference in Moscow, Leningrad or in Kaliningrad, Odessa or Yalta, whichever the President chooses — of course, in so far as it presents no inconvenience.

However, if this proposal meets with objections, one could hold a meeting in Poland or in Czechoslovakia, at the President's convenience.

Respectfully,

J. Stalin

(New World, February 1949, p. 4)

**ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO
THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, MARSHAL
CHOIBALSAN**

*On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of
the Friendship and Support Treaty between the USSR and
the Mongolian People's Republic*

March 1, 1949

To the Prime Minister of the Mongolian People's Republic, Marshal Choibalsan.

I thank you, and in your person, the government of the Mongolian People's Republic for their warm congratulations on the third anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship and Support concluded between our countries.

I am convinced that because of this treaty the further development of cooperation between our countries will broaden and strengthen the basis of friendship between our peoples and will promote their prosperity.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Berlin ed., No. 51, March 2, 1949)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, JOSEF
CYRANKIEWICZ**

*On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-
Polish Treaty of Friendship*

April 21, 1949

On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation after the war, I send you, Mr. Prime Minister, my sincere best wishes.

Accept my wishes for the further success of the Polish people and for the thriving of the Polish People's Republic, for the strengthening of the friendship and alliance between our countries.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Berlin ed., No. 93, April 22, 1949)

SECOND MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA

From Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin"

March-April 1949

Our stand towards the Yugoslav leadership from the years of the war. The 1st Congress of the CPA. Policy of terror in Kosova. On the Yugoslav divisions which were to be deployed in Albania. The Titoites aimed to overturn the situation in Albania. On the war of the fraternal Greek people. Erroneous views of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party. The British want naval bases in our ports as a condition for recognition. The road of the economic and cultural development of Albania. On the situation of our peasantry. On the history, culture, language and customs of the Albanian people.

I went to Moscow again on March 21, 1949, at the head of an official delegation of the Government of the People's Republic of Albania and stayed there until April 11 that year.

Mikoyan, Vyshinsky, etc., as well as all the diplomatic representatives of the countries of people's democracy had come out to welcome us at the Moscow airport.

We had the first official meeting with Vyshinsky the day after our arrival and on March 23, at 22.05 hours I was received by Comrade Stalin in the Kremlin, in the presence of Vyshinsky and the ambassador of the USSR to Albania, Chuvakhin. I went to this meeting with Spiro Koleka and Mihal Prifti who, at that time, was our ambassador in Moscow.

Comrade Stalin received us very warmly in his office. After shaking hands with each of us in turn, he

stopped in front of me:

“You look thin in the face,” he said, “have you been ill? Or are you tired?”

“I feel very glad and happy to meet you again,” I replied and, after we sat down, I told him that I wanted to raise several questions with him.

“Take all the time you need,” he said with great goodwill, so that I would talk about anything I considered necessary.

I gave Comrade Stalin an exposition on a series of problems. I spoke in general about the situation in our Party and country, the recent events, the mistakes recognized, as well as about our stand in connection with the Yugoslav question. I told him that, as a result of the influence of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership on our leadership and the excessive trust of some of our leaders in the treacherous Yugoslav leadership, grave mistakes had been made, especially in the organizational line of the Party, as noted by the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, the proceedings of which had been held in the light of the Letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Resolution of the Information Bureau “On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.”

“The Central Committee of our Party,” I told Comrade Stalin, “fully endorsed the Resolution of the Information Bureau and we condemned the treacherous anti-Albanian and anti-Soviet course of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership in a special communique. The leadership of our Party,” I pointed out, “for many years had encountered the hostile conspiratorial activity of the Titoites, the arrogance and intrigues of Tito’s envoys — Vukmanović-Tempo and Dušan Mugoša.” Among other things, I mentioned that on the eve of

the liberation of Albania, Tito, seeking to achieve his anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist aims, sent us a delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, headed by its special envoy, Velimir Stojnić. At Berat, he and his secret collaborators, the traitors Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others, behind the scenes, prepared their harmful and dangerous moves which constituted a serious plot against the correct line followed by the Party during the whole period of the war, against the independence of the Party and our country, against the General Secretary of the Party personally, etc. Although it knew nothing about the plot that was being concocted, the healthy section of the leadership of our Party there and then energetically opposed the accusations made against it and the line followed during the war. Convinced that grave anti-Marxist mistakes had been made at Berat, among other things, I subsequently presented to our Political Bureau the theses for the re-examination of the Berat Plenum, but, as a result of the feverish subversive activity of the Yugoslav leadership and its agents in our ranks, these theses were not accepted. "The further development of events, the Letters of the Central Committee of your Party as well as the Resolution of the Information Bureau," I told Comrade Stalin, "made the situation completely clear to us, the hostile activity of the Yugoslav leadership with Tito at the head was uncovered and proved and the plotters in the ranks of our Party were thoroughly exposed at the 11th Plenum of the CC of the Party. The 1st Congress of the CPA endorsed the turn taken by the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee and made it more thorough-going. It appraised the political line followed by the Party since its founding as correct, and found that the peculiar distortions which became apparent after Liberation, especially in the organizational line of the Party, were the result of the Yugoslav interference and

the treacherous Trotskyite activity of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and Kristo Themelko.”

I mentioned that both Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo were dangerous agents of the Yugoslav Trotskyites in the ranks of the leadership of our Party, that with the guidance, support and backing of the Yugoslav Titoites they had made every effort to usurp the key positions in our Party and our state of people’s democracy. In all their treacherous activity they had put themselves in the service of the national-chauvinist and colonialist policy of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership towards the People’s Republic of Albania. I added that Kristo Themelko was one of those most influenced by the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership and had implemented its directives in the sector of the army unreservedly. “However,” I went on, “after the betrayal of the Yugoslav leadership was fully uncovered, he admitted his mistakes and made self-criticism before the Party.”

Stalin, who was listening attentively, asked:

“What are these three? Are they Slavs, Albanians or what are they?”

“Kristo Themelko,” I said, “is of Macedonian origin, whereas Koçi Xoxe is of Albanian origin, although his parents lived in Macedonia.”

I went on to tell him about the exceptionally great importance which the Letters of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union addressed to the Yugoslav leadership and the Resolution of the Information Bureau had for our Party. “In the light of these documents, which came out at very crucial moments for our Party and people,” I told Comrade Stalin, “the character and the aims of Yugoslav interference in Albania became completely clear to the Central Committee of our Party.” After giving a general outline of the many radical measures our Party had taken to put an end to the ferocious anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian activity of these agents, I told him that, although we en-

countered and opposed their crooked activities as early as the war years, still we were conscious of our responsibility, because we should have proved more vigilant.

Here Comrade Stalin interrupted me with these words:

“Our letters addressed to the Yugoslav leadership do not contain everything, because there are many matters that emerged later. We did not know that the Yugoslavs, under the pretext of ‘defending’ your country against an attack from the Greek fascists, wanted to bring units of their army into the PRA. They tried to do this in a very secret manner. In reality, their aim in this direction was utterly hostile, for they intended to overturn the situation in Albania. Your report to us on this question was of value, otherwise we would have known nothing about these divisions which they wanted to station on your territory. They implied that they were taking this action allegedly with the approval of the Soviet Union! As for what you said, that you ought to have shown greater vigilance, the truth is that in the relations with Yugoslavia there has been lack of vigilance not only by you but also by others.”

Continuing my discourse, I told Comrade Stalin that the difficult moments created by the Titoites and by the monarcho-fascists who were acting against our country under orders of the American and British imperialists, were overcome successfully thanks to the correct line of the Party, the patriotism of our people and the assistance of the CP of the Soviet Union. This was a major test from which we learned a great deal to correct our mistakes, to consolidate the victories achieved up till now, and to fight to strengthen and develop them further. Our army accomplished its tasks with courage and lofty patriotism.

During the difficult period we went through, the patriotism of the masses was very great. Their trust in our Party, in its correct line and in the Soviet Union was un-

shakeable. The activity of the internal enemy was short-lived. I told Comrade Stalin that we had neutralized the hostile activity of those who had put themselves in the service of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership. We adopted differentiated stands towards those who, in one way or another, were implicated in the anti-Albanian activity of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership. Some of them made self-criticism over the mistakes they had committed in good faith, while those who were gravely compromised were already rendering account before the people's court.

"Protect your Homeland and the Party," Comrade Stalin said. "The enemy must be exposed thoroughly, with convincing arguments, so that the people can see what this enemy has done and be convinced of the menace he represents. Even if such an enemy, utterly discredited in the eyes of the people, is not shot, he is automatically shot, morally and politically, because without the people he can do nothing at all."

"The trial which is now going on in Tirana," I told Comrade Stalin, "is being held with open doors and everything that is said in the court room is published in the newspapers.

"At the same time." I added, "those who have thoroughly understood their mistakes, who have made sincere and convincing self-criticism, we have treated patiently and magnanimously, and have given them the possibility to make amends for their mistakes and faults through work, through loyalty to the Party and the people. We have even thought we should send one of them to study in the Soviet Union," and I mentioned one name.

"Really?" Stalin asked me and looked me right in the eye. "Have you requested that this person should come here to study? Do you still have political trust in him?"

"We do," I said, "his self-criticism has become

more and more profound and we hope that he will correct himself.”

“But does he want to come here?”

“He has expressed the wish to come,” I said.

At this point Chuvakhin added some explanations in support of my opinion.

“Well, then, since you have weighed this matter well, Comrade Enver, let him come...”

Continuing the conversation, I told Comrade Stalin that during the same period the Americans, from Italy had parachuted groups of saboteurs into the south and north of Albania. We killed some of these saboteurs and captured the remainder. Foreseeing the difficulties on our southern border and wanting to have the forces available for any eventuality, we first had to undertake a mopping-up operation in North Albania against the groups of political and common bandits who operated within our borders under the direction of agents sent in by Ranković, and we did this. These bands in the service of the Yugoslavs carried out a number of assassinations. Our mopping-up operation ended successfully: we wiped out some of them and all the others crossed over into Yugoslav territory, where they remain to this day.

“Do they continue to send in other saboteurs?” Stalin asked.

“We think that they have not given up. The policy of Tito and Ranković to lure Albanians into their territories in order to organize groups of saboteurs and wreckers with them, met defeat, and at present there are very few defections. Our government has taken economic measures and the political and organizational work of the Party has been strengthened. The imperialists are training groups of wreckers abroad, just as the monarcho-fascists and the Titoites are doing on their part. The Italians are not lagging behind. Our present plan is to rout the remnants of the bandits at large in our

mountains for whom we have already made things very difficult, and to destroy their bases, which are among the kulaks, especially. Most of the reactionary groupings in the cities have been smashed by the State Security Forces which have scored many successes. Our Party put things in order in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a former centre of the Titoites, and the State Security has become a very powerful and much beloved weapon of the Party and our people. They enjoy the continuous aid of the Party and the people in their difficult and delicate task. The Party has set itself the task of strengthening its positions more and more each day in order to cope with and smash all the attempts and attacks our many enemies may make.

“The Party is growing stronger from day to day,” I went on to tell Comrade Stalin. “In the ranks of our young Party there is great courage and great will. The ideological and cultural level of our party workers is low, but there is great eagerness to learn. We are working in this direction to improve the situation. We still have many shortcomings in the work of our Party, but with persistent efforts, with confidence in the future and with the experience of the Bolshevik Party, we shall eliminate these shortcomings.”

In continuation of the talk, I gave Comrade Stalin a general outline of the economic situation in Albania, the results achieved and the big struggle the Party and the people had waged and were waging to cope with the difficulties created in the economy by the hostile work of the Yugoslav Trotskyites and their agents. I told him that our people were unpretentious and hard-working, and they had mobilized themselves under the leadership of the Party to overcome the backwardness and the difficulties created and to carry out the tasks set by the 1st Congress of the Party.

I told him that the 1st Congress of the Party, along

with the socialist industrialization, had laid down the guidelines for the strengthening of the socialist sector in agriculture by increasing the state farms and stepping up the gradual collectivization in the form of agricultural co-operatives, which the state would support politically, economically and organizationally.

“Have you set up many such co-operatives? What criteria do you follow?” Comrade Stalin asked.

Here I explained to him that the Congress had given the orientation that the collectivization of agriculture should be carried out gradually, patiently and on a voluntary basis. On this road we would neither rush things nor mark time.

“In my opinion,” said Comrade Stalin, “you must not rush things in the collectivization of agriculture. Yours is a mountainous country with a relief that differs from one region to another. In our country, too, in mountain areas similar to those of your country, the kolkhozes were set up much later.”

Then I went on to speak about the work that was being done in our country to strengthen the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry, about the assistance the state gave the individual peasant, the increase of agricultural production and the policy of procurement of agricultural and livestock products.

“This has very great importance,” Comrade Stalin said, “and you are right to devote attention to it. If the Albanian peasants need tractors, other farm machines, draft animals, seeds or anything else, you must help them. Moreover,” he continued, “you must also dig canals for the peasantry, then you will see what it will be able to do. In my opinion, it is better that the peasant pays his obligations to the state for the above aid in kind.”

“The state must set up machine and tractor stations,” continued Comrade Stalin, “you should not give the tractors to the co-operatives, but the state should

help the individual peasants plough their land, too, if they seek this help. Thus, little by little, the poor peasant will begin to feel the need for the collectivization.

“As for surpluses of agricultural products,” Comrade Stalin went on, “these the peasants must dispose of as they like, for, if you act otherwise, the peasants will not collaborate with the government. If the peasantry does not see the aid of the state concretely, it will not assist the state.

“I do not know the history and characteristics of the bourgeoisie of your country,” said Comrade Stalin and then asked: “Have you had a merchant bourgeoisie?”

“We have had a merchant bourgeoisie in the process of formation,” I said, “but now it has no power.”

“Have you expropriated it entirely?” he asked me.

In answering this question, I told Comrade Stalin about the policy the Party had followed as early as the war years in regard to the well-to-do classes, about the great differentiation which had taken place as a result of the stand of the elements of these classes towards the foreign invaders, about the fact that most of them had become collaborators with fascism and, after staining their hands with the blood of the people, had either fled together with the invaders or, those who did not manage to get away, had been captured by the people and handed over to the court. “In regard to those elements, mainly of the patriotic middle and petty bourgeoisie, who were linked with the people during the war and opposed the foreign invaders,” I went on, “the Party supported them, kept close to them and showed them the true road to serve the development of the country and the strengthening of the independence of the Homeland. As a result of the hostile activity of Koçi Xoxe and company, unjust stands and harsh measures were taken in the recent years towards some of these elements, as well as towards some patriotic intellectuals,” I told Comrade Stalin, “but the Party has now

forcefully denounced these errors and will not allow them to occur again.”

Comrade Stalin said that on this, as on any other problem, everything depended on the concrete conditions and situations of each country. “But I think,” he stressed, “that in the first phase of the revolution, the policy followed towards the patriotic bourgeoisie which truly wants the independence of its country should be such as to enable it to help in this phase with the means and assets it possesses.

“Lenin teaches us,” he continued, “that in the first period of the revolution, where this revolution has an anti-imperialist character, the communists can use the assistance of the patriotic bourgeoisie. Of course, this depends on the concrete conditions, on the stand of this bourgeoisie towards the most acute problems the country is faced with, etc.

“In the countries of people’s democracy, for example, the big bourgeoisie had compromised itself with the German invaders and had assisted them. When the Soviet army liberated these countries, the sold-out bourgeoisie took the road of exile.”

He thought for a moment and added:

“It seems to me the Soviet army did not come to help in Albania. But did the Yugoslav army come to help your country during the National Liberation War?”

“No,” I replied. “Our National Liberation Army, with two partisan divisions, went and fought in Yugoslav territory to assist in the liberation of the peoples of Yugoslavia.”

Continuing his theme, Comrade Stalin emphasized that every communist party and socialist state should be particularly careful also in their relations with the intellectuals. A great deal of careful far-sighted work must be done with them with the aim of bringing the honest, patriotic intellectuals as close as possible to the people’s power.

Mentioning some specific features of the Russian revolution, Comrade Stalin stressed that at that time, Russia had not been under the yoke of any foreign imperialist power, hence they had risen only against the exploiters within the country, and the Russian national bourgeoisie, as the exploiter it was, had not reconciled itself to the revolution. A fierce struggle had been waged for several years in that country and the Russian bourgeoisie had sought the aid and intervention of the imperialists.

“Hence, there is a clear difference between the Russian revolution and the struggle that is going on in those countries which have fallen victims to imperialist aggressors.

“I mention this,” Stalin continued, “to show how important it is to bear in mind the concrete conditions of each country, because the conditions of one country are not always identical with those of other countries. That is why no one should copy our experience or that of others, but should only study it and profit from it by applying it according to the concrete conditions of his own country.”

Time had slipped away unnoticed during this meeting with Stalin. I took up the thread of my discourse again and began to expound the problems of the plan for strengthening the defences and developing the economy and culture in the PRA.

“The chief of your General Staff,” Comrade Stalin told me, “has sent us some requests for your army. We ordered that all of them should be met. Have you received what you wanted?”

“We have not yet received any information about this,” I said.

At this moment Stalin called in a general and charged him with gathering precise information about this question. After a few minutes the telephone rang. Stalin took up the receiver and, after listening to what

was said, informed me that the matériel was en route.

“Did you get the rails?” he asked. “Is the railway completed?”

“We got them,” I told him, “and we have inaugurated the railway,” and continued to outline the main tasks of the plan for the economic and cultural development of the country and the strengthening of its defences. On this occasion I also presented our requests for aid from the Soviet Union.

Just as previously, Comrade Stalin received our requests sympathetically and said to us quite openly:

“Comrades, we are a big country, but you know that we have not yet eliminated all the grave consequences of the war. However, we shall help you today and in the future, perhaps not all that much, but with those possibilities we have. We understand that you have to set up and develop the sector of socialist industry, and in this direction we agree to fulfil all the requests you have presented to us, as well as those for agriculture.”

Then, smiling, he added:

“But will the Albanians themselves work?”

I understood why he asked me this question. It was the result of the evil-intended information of the Armenian huckster, Mikoyan, who, at a meeting I had with him, not only spoke to me in a language quite unlike that of Stalin, but also used harsh terms in his criticisms about the realization of plans in our country, alleging that our people did not work, etc. His intention was to reduce the rate and amount of aid. This was always Mikoyan’s stand. But Stalin accorded us everything we sought.

“We shall also send you the cadres you asked for,” he said, “and they will spare no effort to help you but, of course, they will not stay in Albania forever. Therefore, comrades, you must train your own cadres, your own specialists, to replace ours. This is an important matter. However many foreign cadres come to your

country, you will still need your own cadres. Therefore, comrades,” he advised us, “you must open your university, which will be a great centre for training your future cadres.”

“We have opened the first institutes,” I told Comrade Stalin, “and work is going ahead in them, but we are still only at the beginning. Apart from experience and textbooks, we also lack the cadres necessary for opening the university.”

“The important thing is to get started,” he said. “Then step by step, everything will be achieved. For our part, we shall assist you both with literature and with specialists, in order to help increase the number of higher institutes which are the basis for the creation of the university in the future.”

“The Soviet specialists,” Comrade Stalin went on, “will be paid by the Albanian government the same salaries as the Albanian specialists. Don’t grant them any favour more than your specialists enjoy.”

“The Soviet specialists come from far away,” I replied, “and we cannot treat them the same as ours.”

Comrade Stalin objected at once:

“No, no, whether they come from Azerbaijan or any other part of the Soviet Union, we have our rules for the treatment of the specialists we send to the assistance of the fraternal peoples. It is their duty to work with all their strength as internationalist revolutionaries, to work for the good of Albania just as for the good of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government undertakes to make up the necessary difference in their salaries.”

After I thanked Comrade Stalin, I raised the question of the teams that were needed for geological and hydro-electric studies, for the construction of railways and a series of problems of the future of our industrial development. After giving a positive answer to the matters I raised, he asked me a series of questions: “Do you have many large rivers for the construction of hydro-

power stations? Is there much coal in Albania?" etc.

I answered Comrade Stalin and then asked whether we could send a number of cadres to the Soviet Union to be trained as specialists for some essential urgent needs of the country. "If this is impossible," I said "then let some specialists be sent from the Soviet Union to Albania to train our cadres on the spot."

Comrade Stalin said:

"In this direction we would rather send some instructors to Albania, because were your men to come to the Soviet Union a longer time will be needed for their training, as they will have to learn Russian," etc.

Comrade Stalin recommended that we address this request to the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union and added:

"Comrade Vyshinsky has been charged with conducting all the talks from our side, therefore you must address any request to him."

I told Comrade Stalin that, in general, those were the questions that I wanted to discuss with him in regard to the internal situation in Albania and expressed the desire to give a brief outline of the political position of Albania in regard to the international situation. He looked at his watch and asked:

"Would twenty minutes be enough?"

"A little longer, if possible, Comrade Stalin," I replied.

After speaking about the tense situation in our relations with Yugoslavia, and the hostile activity of the Yugoslav traitors, the bands of criminals they had organized and smuggled into Albanian territory to carry out disruption and sabotage against our country, I spoke to Comrade Stalin about the policy of savage terror followed by the Tito clique against the Albanians of Kosova, Macedonia and Montenegro.

"Are there many Albanians in Yugoslavia?" Stalin

asked me. "And what religion do they profess?"

"There are more than a million of them," I said (here Vyshinsky expressed his astonishment at such a large number which, it seemed, he had never heard of before), and continued: "Almost all of them are Muslims."

"How is it possible that they have not been assimilated by the Slavs? What links do the Albanians living in Yugoslavia maintain with those in Albania?" asked Stalin again.

"At all periods, the Albanians living in Yugoslavia have been outstanding for their ardent patriotism and their strong links with their Homeland and their compatriots," I told Comrade Stalin in reply to his question. "They have always forcibly opposed the feverish expansionist efforts of the great-Serbian and great-Slav reactionary chauvinists and their attempts to assimilate them and have preserved their Albanian national identity in every respect, with fanaticism.

"At present the Tito clique is following the same line and the same methods in Kosova and the Albanian-inhabited territories of Montenegro and Macedonia, as those used by their counterparts — King Alexander and others in the past. Kosova is a very weak spot for the Belgrade clique, hence it is using large-scale terror there, with mass deportations, arrests and forced labour, conscription to the army as well as expropriation of a large number of people. The Albanian element is particularly persecuted in Titoite Yugoslavia, because the present Yugoslav leaders are well aware of the patriotic and revolutionary qualities of the Albanian population there, well aware that for this population the national problem has been and still is an open wound which needs to be healed. Apart from this, the Titoites have turned Kosova and the other Yugoslav regions inhabited by the Albanians into important centres for assembling Albanian quislings, bandits and

spies who, instructed by the men of the UDB, prepare acts of terrorism, subversion, sabotage and armed attacks against our country. The Belgrade clique has set in motion former Serbian, British and American agents, as well as Italian and German agents, in order to mobilize the Albanian reaction of Kosova and, from this reaction, to organize detachments which, together with the other Albanian bandits, enter our territory and cause disturbances.”

Then I went on to give Comrade Stalin a brief account of the Greek people’s war against the monarcho-fascists and the Anglo-Americans, about the political support we gave this just war of the fraternal Greek people and, among other things, pointed out that the Greek Democratic Army stood aloof from the people.

Comrade Stalin was astonished when he heard these words and asked:

“What, what did you say?!”

I gave him complete explanations, both about this problem and about the mistaken views of Nicos Zachariades and company on the role of the party and the commissar in the army, in the government, etc.

“We think,” I told Comrade Stalin among other things, “that the leadership of the Greek Communist Party made grave mistakes in regard to the strengthening and expansion of the party in the countryside and the town during the war against the Hitlerites, and that these errors manifested themselves again during the war against internal reaction and Anglo-American intervention.

“Mistakenly believing that the city would play the decisive role in the victory over the Hitlerites and internal reaction, in the years of the anti-fascist war the Siantos* leadership ordered the Greek proletariat to

* Former General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party, an opportunist and capitulator to Anglo-American re-

stay in the cities. This brought about that the more revolutionary part of the Greek people remained exposed to the savage blows of the internal Hitlerites, while the Greek National Liberation Partisan Army was deprived of the proletariat, which should have been the motor and the leadership of the Greek people's revolution." Then I pointed out that despite the savage terror and the heavy blows the Hitlerites and internal reaction had struck at the proletariat and the revolutionary elements in the cities, the latter, in general, still remained in the cities, where they were killed, tortured, arrested and interned on islands, and had not taken to the mountains en masse, because such had been the directive of the Greek Communist Party. "Of course, even then there were important fighting actions, such as sabotage, executions of enemies, etc., carried out in the cities, but these actions were of second-rate importance in the general context of the fight of the Greek people.

"The same weaknesses," I stressed further, "were observed in the countryside, too, where the extension of the party was limited, and its organization weak and lax, with the organizations of the party frequently confounded with those of EAM. There was opportunism both in the organization and in the political line of the national liberation councils at the village level, there was duality of power and coexistence with the Zervist reactionary organizations, etc., in the liberated areas and elsewhere. We told the Greek comrades that their putting the Command of the National Liberation Army under the orders of the Mediterranean Command, their talks and agreements of an opportunist and capitulationist character with Zervas and the reactionary Greek government in exile, the predominance of peasant elements and of the old career officers in the leadership of the Greek National Liberation Army, and so on, were

action.

grave errors which would lead the heroic struggle of the Greek people to defeat. The Varkiza agreement was the logical conclusion to all these wrong actions and views — it brought about the capitulation to British and local reaction.

“However, we think that even after the capitulationist Varkiza agreement and the period of ‘legality’ of the Greek Communist Party, the leadership of the Greek Communist Party did not go deeply enough into its former mistakes in order to correct them in a radical manner,” I told Comrade Stalin. “The strengthening of the party in the city and the countryside, sound links with the broad masses of the people should have been the prime concern of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, for it was in this that it made some of its gravest errors in the past. It did not do this, because it did not have a correct appreciation of the new situation created after the defeat of fascism, underrated the internal enemy and Anglo-American reaction and was unable to foresee the great danger that would threaten it from these forces of reaction, as it should have done. It had great hopes in ‘legal’ activity and parliamentarianism. As a result, the party was disarmed before the enemy, lost its sound ties with the people, the people’s revolution in Greece went through a grave crisis, and the people were given the impression that the revolution would triumph on the parliamentary road and through elections, and when reaction struck, the people were confused, taken by surprise, and in despair. The Greek people fought heroically against the Hitlerites to win their freedom, but the victory slipped from their hands because of the mistakes of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party. All these mistakes had grave consequences in the subsequent development of events, when any illusion about victory on the legal road was over, and the party had to go underground and decided to resume the war.

“It is a fact,” I told Comrade Stalin, “that before it went underground the party managed to regroup part of the partisan forces, sent them to the mountains and recommenced the war. This was a very good thing. But we think that precisely at this point, the mistaken views of the comrades of the Greek leadership on the strategy and tactics they had to employ, the organization of the party in the city and the countryside, the organization of the party in the army, and in the first place, the links with the masses and the leading role of the party, crop up again.

“The comrades of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party underestimated the strength of the enemy and thought that they would easily seize power, that they would easily liberate Greece from the Anglo-Americans and the monarcho-fascists. The result of this mistaken view was that they failed to prepare themselves for a protracted, difficult war, underrated the partisan war and described the partisan forces they succeeded in regrouping as a ‘regular army.’ They pinned all their hopes of victory on this ‘regular army’, in this way neglecting the main factor — the people, and the Marxist-Leninist principle that ‘the army and the people are one.’ The comrades of the Greek leadership did not make a correct appraisal of the moments Greece was passing through. As a result of the defeat, the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses had been dampened, hence this revolutionary enthusiasm had to be revived by reorganizing the party and making it strong both in the city and in the countryside, while radically correcting the old errors, and extending the partisan war over the whole of the country.

“Monarcho-fascism was terrified of two things: its great enemy — the people, and the partisan war,” I went on with the exposition of my idea. “Both these factors were underrated by the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, and the enemy was able to profit from this

mistake. The enemy was afraid of a partisan war, which would be extended from day to day, would gradually draw in the masses of the people of city and countryside and would assume ever larger proportions up to the general armed uprising and the seizure of power. The enemy was spared this because of the wrong tactic of the Greek leadership which thought and still thinks that it should always station its main forces facing the enemy in a frontal war and a passive defence. That was precisely what the enemy wanted—to nail down the main forces of the Greek Democratic Army at a few points and to smash and annihilate them there by means of its superiority in men and armaments.

“Taking advantage of this grave error of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, the monarcho-fascists deprived the Greek Democratic Army of the support of the people, parted the Greek Communist Party from its mother base. With terror and killings, monarcho-fascism drove the population from all the areas where the major and the more active part of the Greek Democratic Army was stationed, not for attack, but to defend itself. We consider this a fatal mistake. In our country, too,” I told Comrade Stalin, “during the National Liberation War, fascism killed and massacred the population, and put entire regions to the torch, however the people did not go into camps behind barbed wire, but took to the mountains, fought and returned to their ruined homes and there put up resolute resistance, because the Party had told them to fight and resist. Our National Liberation Army was never apart from the people, because our Party itself had its sound bases among the people. We think that the enemy succeeded in isolating the Greek partisans among the barren mountains, because the Greek Communist Party did not have sound bases among the people. That is why I said that the leadership of the Greek Communist Party deprived itself and the Democratic Army of its mother

base — the people.”

In conclusion, I mentioned to Comrade Stalin the threats the external enemies were making towards Albania.

He listened to me attentively and, on the problems I had raised, expressed the opinion:

“As for the Greek people’s war,” he said among other things, “we, too, have always considered it a just war, have supported and backed it whole-heartedly. Any people’s war is not waged by the communists alone, but by the people, and the important thing is that the communists should lead it. Things are not going well for Tsaldaris and he is trying to save himself by means of the Anglo-Americans.

“As for the screams of the external enemies about partitioning Albania,” he went on, “they are just to intimidate you, because I do not think there is any danger in this direction at present. This comes about not from the ‘goodwill’ of the enemies, but for a whole series of reasons. In the first place, Albania is a free and independent country, the people have seized power there and they will know how to defend their independence, just as they knew how to win it. Second, the external enemies themselves have contradictions with one another over Albania. None of them wants Albania to belong only to the one or the other. If Greece wants to have Albania for itself, this would not be advantageous to Italy or Yugoslavia, which would raise obstacles to this, and so on in turn. On the other hand,” Comrade Stalin pointed out, “the independence of Albania has been recognized and confirmed by the declaration of the big three — the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States of America. This declaration may be violated, but that is not so easy to do. Hence, come what may, Albania has its independence protected.”

Comrade Stalin repeated several times that if the Albanian Government pursued a cautious, intelligent

and far-sighted policy, then its affairs would go well.

Continuing, Comrade Stalin advised me:

“You must consider the possibilities of establishing relations with Italy, because it is your neighbour, but first you should take measures to protect yourselves against the activity of the Italian fascists.”

Speaking of the importance of the recognition of our country in the international arena, he asked:

“Which other state is knocking at your door in order to establish diplomatic relations with you? How are your relations with the French?”

“With the French,” I explained, “we have diplomatic relations. They have their representatives in Tirana and we have ours in Paris.”

“And what about with the United States of America and Britain?”

“We have no diplomatic relations with them,” I replied. “The United States of America, in 1945, made the establishment of relations with us conditional on our recognition of the validity of all the agreements it had signed with the anti-popular government of Zog. We cannot accept these agreements as lawful, because they have an enslaving character, and because the Congress of Përmet has explicitly prohibited this. For their part.” I went on, “the British want naval bases in our ports, and only then will they recognize us. They have long been trying to realize these aims.

“At the time when we had wiped out the nazi forces and liberated almost the entire country, the British, through some military missions they had in our country and under the guise of allies in the anti-fascist war, insistently demanded that as ‘allies’, we, together with one of their commandos, should wipe out a German garrison that remained in Saranda, our southernmost port. We accepted their request on condition that, once the operation was over, they should return immediately to where they had come from, to the sea. The operation

was completed and the British not only wanted to stay there, but also intended to penetrate into the interior of the country.

“The General Staff of the National Liberation Army presented them with an ultimatum, which demanded their immediate withdrawal, otherwise we would fight and drive them into the sea. After our ultimatum the British boarded their ships and returned to Greece. But they have not given up their aims.”

“You must see what is best in the interests of your country,” Comrade Stalin said, and he added:

“As for the bases the British want to have in your ports, in no way should you agree to this. Guard your ports well.”

“We will never relinquish them to anybody!” I said. “If the worst comes to the worst we shall die rather than relinquish them.”

“You must guard them and not die,” said Comrade Stalin, laughing. “Here diplomacy is needed.”

Then he rose, shook hands with each of us in turn and went away.

We met again some days later at a dinner which was put on in the Kremlin in honour of our delegation. Comrade Stalin, I and the others were seated round the table. At this dinner, just as in all other meetings we had with him, we were impressed and moved by Stalin’s great love for our country and people, his interest to learn as much as possible about the history, culture, language and customs of our people.

He started the conversation by asking me about some words of the Albanian language:

“I want to hear,” he told me, “how the words: **people, man, bread, gift, wife, husband and land**, sound in Albanian.”

I began pronouncing these Albanian words and he

listened to me with great concentration. I remember that a funny situation arose over one of these words. He had asked me what was the Albanian equivalent of the Russian word “dar.”*

“Peshqesh!” I was quick to reply.

“No, no!” he said, “Peshqesh is not Albanian, but Turkish.” And he laughed. He had a very frank and sincere laugh, a laugh which came straight from the heart.

Listening to my pronunciation of Albanian words, Comrade Stalin said:

“Your language is very old and has been handed down in spoken form from one generation to the other. This, too, is a fact which proves the endurance of your people, the great strength of their resistance to assimilation despite the storms that have swept over them.”

In connection with these problems, he asked me:

“What is the national composition of the Albanian people? Are there Serbian or Croatian national minorities in Albania?”

“The overwhelming majority of our people,” I told him, “is made up of Albanians, but there is a Greek national minority (about 28,000 people) and a very few Macedonians (five small villages all told), while there are no Serbs or Croats.”

“How many religious beliefs are there in Albania,” Comrade Stalin inquired, “and what language is spoken?”

“In Albania,” I replied, “there are three religions: Muslim, Orthodox and Catholic. The population which professes these three faiths is of the same nationality — Albanian, therefore the only language used is Albanian, with the exception of the Greek national minority which speak their mother tongue.”

From time to time, while I was speaking, Stalin took out his pipe and filled it with tobacco. I noticed

* Gift (Russ.).

that he did not use any special tobacco, but took “Kazbek” cigarettes, tore them open, discarded the paper and filled his pipe with the tobacco. After listening to my answer, he said:

“You are a separate people, just like the Persians and the Arabs, who have the same religion as the Turks. Your ancestors existed before the Romans and the Turks. Religion has nothing to do with nationality and statehood.”

And in the course of our conversation, he asked me: “Do you eat pork, Comrade Enver?”

“Yes, I do!” I said.

“The Muslim religion prohibits this among its believers,” he said, “this is an old, outdated custom. Nevertheless,” he went on, “the question of religious beliefs must be kept well in mind, must be handled with great care, because the religious feelings of the people must not be offended. These feelings have been cultivated in the people for many centuries, and great patience is called for on this question, because the stand towards it is important for the compactness and unity of the people.”

The dinner passed in a very warm and comradely atmosphere. After proposing a toast to the Albanian army and the Soviet army, Comrade Stalin again mentioned the question of the struggle of the Greek people. He spoke with deep sympathy about the brave and freedom-loving Greek people, about their heroism, their sacrifices and the blood they had shed in their just war.

“Both we and you, all the revolutionaries and peoples are with the just struggle of the Greek people, with their demands for freedom and democracy. They will never lack our ideological and political support and backing,” said Comrade Stalin among other things. “You,” he went on, “who border on Greece, must be particularly careful and vigilant in order to cope with any provocation of the monarcho-fascists against your

country.”

In the course of the dinner toasts were drunk to all the comrades in turn. A toast was drunk to Omer Nis-hani,* too.

Raising his glass time and again, Molotov urged me to drink more and, when he saw that I was not fulfilling his desire, asked:

“Why so little?! Last night you drank more!”

“Ah, last night! Last night was another matter,” I said, laughing.

Then Molotov turned to Comrade Stalin:

“Last night,” he said, “I dined with Comrade En-
ver at Vyshinsky’s. The news reached us that yesterday,
March 31, a son was born to Enver Hoxha in Tirana. In
our rejoicing, we drank a bit more.”

“Congratulations!” said Stalin immediately, raising
his glass to me: “Let us drink this to the health of your
little son and your wife!”

I thanked Comrade Stalin wishing him good health
and a long life for the good of the Bolshevik Party and
the Soviet State, for the good of the revolution and
Marxism-Leninism.

Several hours passed in this warm and friendly
homely atmosphere. Both my comrades and I retain
indelible memories of the behaviour and features of
the glorious Stalin, of that man whose name and work
struck terror into the hearts of the enemies — imperial-
ists, fascists, Trotskyites and reactionaries of every hue,
while they aroused joy and enthusiasm in the hearts of
the communists, proletarians and peoples, and gave
them added strength and confidence in the future.

All through the dinner he was in the best of spir-
its, happy, laughing, extremely attentive in the conver-

* At that time President of the Presidium of the People’s
Assembly of the PRA.

sation between us, and trying to make all present feel completely at ease. At about 23 hours Stalin suggested:

“What about some coffee?”

We all rose and went to the adjacent room. While coffee was being served, at a table nearby two Soviet comrades were laughing and trying to persuade Xhafer Spahiu to drink a bit more. Xhafer was resisting and said something to them. This scene did not escape the ever attentive Stalin who said jokingly to the Soviet comrades:

“Oh, this is not fair! You are not on an equal footing with the guest — you are two to one!”

We all laughed and continued talking and joking just as in a circle of intimate friends. Then Stalin rose again:

“Comrades,” he said, “now I invite you to the cinema.”

We all rose and Stalin led us to the Kremlin cinema, where he personally chose the films our delegation would see. They were some documentary colour films with scenes from various parts of the Soviet Union, as well as the film “The Faraway Bride.”

This brought our second visit to Stalin to a close.

(E. Hoxha, *With Stalin*, pp. 87-126)

PROTOCOL RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF THE DELEGATION FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

June 28, 1949

Moscow

Top Secret

The reception took place on June 27 and lasted from 23:00 to 24:00.

Present at the reception: *Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Liu Shaoqi* — Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), *Gao Gang* — member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPC, also Secretary of the Bureau of the CPC and Chairman of the government of Manchuria, *Wang Jiaxiang* — member of the CC of the CPC, *Karsky (Shi Zhe)* — interpreter, and *I.V. Kovalev*.*

After mutual greetings and handshakes with the delegation, Comrade *Stalin* inquired about the health of Comrade *Mao Zedong*.

Comrade *Liu Shaoqi* thanked Comrade *Stalin* for his attention to Comrade *Mao Zedong* and presented him with a letter from Comrade *Mao Zedong* expressing gratitude to Comrade *Stalin* for the immense assistance provided to China by the Soviet Union. He asked Comrade *Stalin* to receive the delegation.

* This record was made by I.V. Kovalev (1901-1993), the head of the group of Soviet specialists on economic issues, the representative of the CC of the CPSU(B) at the CC of the CPC. Stalin later worked on the document: the numbering of questions and italicization in the text were done by him.

Afterwards, Comrade *Stalin* moved on to the discussion of the issues raised by the delegation.

1. *ON THE CREDIT.* Comrade *Stalin* said that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) had decided to provide the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China with a credit of 300 million dollars. He noted that such an agreement between the two parties was concluded for the first time in history.

The credit of 300 million dollars, with an annual interest rate of one per cent, will be provided to China in the form of equipment, machinery and various materials and goods, in equal parts of 60 million dollars per year, for a period of 5 years.

Repayment of the credit by China will take place within 10 years after the complete realization of the credit. Comrade *Stalin* mentioned that Comrade *Mao Zedong*, in a telegram sent to him, expressed the opinion that 1 per cent per annum is low for such a credit and suggested increasing it.

Comrade *Stalin* explained to the delegation that the Soviet Union provided credits to the countries of Western democracy* with an interest rate of 2 per cent per annum. However, in the case of China, one per cent is taken because, unlike the countries of Western democracy, where there is no war and their economy has already strengthened, China is at war, destruction is ongoing, and due to this, China requires greater assistance on more favourable terms.

Then, Comrade *Stalin*, laughing, said, "Well, if you insist on a higher annual percentage, that's your business; we can accept a higher percentage."

Regarding the signing of the credit agreement, Comrade *Stalin* said that there are two options: the first is to sign the agreement with representatives of the CC

* Countries of Eastern Europe — *Ed.*

of the CPSU(B) and the CC of the CPC, and the second is to authorize representatives of the Soviet government and the government of Manchuria, which already exists. Later, when a national democratic coalition government is established, this agreement can be formalized by treaties between the governments of the Soviet Union and China.

2. *ON SPECIALISTS.* We will provide specialists, said Comrade *Stalin*. We are ready to send the first group you requested in the near future. But we need to agree on the conditions for the maintenance of specialists. We believe that payment can be made in food if you provide it to your specialists. They should be paid at the level of the highest pay for your best specialists, not lower but not higher. Since our specialists have high rates, if necessary, we will supplement them at the expense of the Soviet state.

We ask you, said Comrade *Stalin*, to report to us any misconduct by some of our specialists, if it occurs, because, as they say, there are no perfect families, and among the good, there may be a bad one.

Bad behaviour will disgrace the honoyr of the Soviet state, so we will take measures of prevention, education, and if necessary, punishment.

We will not allow Soviet specialists to look down on Chinese specialists and the Chinese people, nor should they treat them with contempt.

In response to these words from Comrade *Stalin*, Comrade *Liu Shaoqi* said that there are foreign specialists in China not associated with the activities of the imperialists and they receive rates much higher than Chinese specialists. To this, Comrade *Stalin* replied: In the Soviet state, we have our own judgements and procedures, different from capitalist countries, and we want to adhere to them.

3. *ON SENDING SPECIALISTS TO SHANGHAI.* Comrade *Stalin* said that we have selected 15 specialists

and can send them at any time upon your request. Discuss this and let us know. Overall, you should keep in mind that in large cities, especially in Shanghai, there are many of your specialists and qualified workers who can provide you with no less, but even greater assistance than Soviet specialists. Therefore, you need to engage them actively in your work.

4. We are also, said Comrade *Stalin*, ready to assist you in de-mining the waters near Shanghai, both with specialists, of whom we have many, and with mine-sweepers.

For example, we could sell a few minesweepers to the government of Manchuria, train Chinese sailors in Dalny, Port Arthur or Vladivostok in de-mining, and the Manchurian government, jokingly, said Comrade *Stalin*, can “sell” them to the central government.

5. *ON XINJIANG.* Comrade *Stalin* said that we should not delay the occupation of Xinjiang because procrastination may lead to British intervention in Xinjiang’s affairs. They can activate Muslims, including Indians, to continue the civil war against the communists, which is undesirable because Xinjiang has large reserves of oil and cotton, which China urgently needs.

The Chinese population in Xinjiang is not more than 5 per cent; after the occupation of Xinjiang, the Chinese population should be increased to 30 per cent by resettling Chinese for the comprehensive development of such a vast and rich region and to strengthen the defence of China’s borders.

In general, for the strengthening of China’s defence, it is in the interest to settle all border areas with Chinese.

You, said Comrade *Stalin*, overestimate the strength of *Ma Bufang* (commander of the Kuomintang troops in northwest China). He has cavalry, which, in the presence of artillery, is very easy to defeat. If you want, we can provide you with 40 fighters that will help quickly

defeat and disperse this cavalry.

6. *ON THE NAVY*. China does not have its own navy, said Comrade *Stalin*, and immediately added: it seems you already have some ships captured from the Koumintang?

China must have a navy, and we are ready to help you in creating a navy. Right now, for example, we can raise sunken military and commercial ships and help repair them.

As for your request to strengthen the defence of Qingdao, we can send our squadron to the port of Qingdao, after the creation of a national government, for a visit.

7. Comrade *Liu Shaoqi* thanked Comrade *Stalin* for the tremendous assistance that is currently being provided in all areas of China's life and activities, on exceptionally favourable terms unprecedented in history.

He immediately emphasized that the CC of the CPC had developed instructions that would be distributed to party organizations on creating working conditions for Soviet specialists to ensure they are not mistreated.

8. Comrade *Stalin* said that *we would also develop similar instructions for Soviet specialists to ensure that they do not mistreat by Chinese specialists* either.

9. In response to the Chinese comrades' request to establish *air connection between Moscow and Beijing*, Comrade *Stalin* said that we are ready to organize this air route now.

We can help you build an assembly and repair *aviation plants, and we can provide you the most fighters*,* whether you prefer Czechoslovak or Russian, so that you can train your aviation personnel on them.

10. Comrade *Stalin* agreed to the delegation's request to *present their reports on China's military-political and economic situation at the Political Bureau* and ex-

* The word "most" was crossed out by Stalin — *Ed.*

change views on several crucial issues when they are ready, in three or four days.

11. Comrade *Stalin* said that *we are ready to comprehensively help you study the state apparatus, industry and anything else you wish*, but for this purpose, it would be necessary to *legalize you* by calling you a trade delegation from Manchuria.

12. If this suits you, we will publish a statement in the press that a trade delegation headed by Comrade *Gao Gang* has arrived in Moscow, and then you will be given ample opportunity to inspect everything, including any spectacular enterprises.

The Chinese comrades asked for the opportunity to respond after consulting with Comrade *Mao Zedong*.

(A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China*, pp. 85-88)

FROM A CONVERSATION WITH THE DELEGATION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN MOSCOW*

July 11, 1949

The Chinese delegation states that the Communist Party of China will subordinate itself to the decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).⁶ This seems strange to us. The party of one state subordinating itself to the party of another state. This has never happened, and it is unacceptable. Both parties must be accountable to their own peoples, consult with each other on certain issues, mutually assist each other, and, in times of difficulties, closely unite both parties — that is correct. Today's Political Bureau meeting with your participation served as one of the forms of communication between our parties. This is how it should be.

...We are very grateful for such respect, but some of the thoughts we express should not be perceived as directives. It can be said that these are kind of fraternal advices. And this is not only in words but also in action. We can advise you, but not dictate, as we are not sufficiently informed about the situation in China, cannot compare with you in knowledge of the details of this situation, and most importantly, we cannot dictate because Chinese affairs must be entirely resolved by you. We cannot solve them for you.

You must understand, continued J.V. Stalin, the importance of the position you hold and that the mission entrusted to you has historical, unprecedented signifi-

* Recorded by I.V. Kovalev.

cance. And this is by no means a compliment. It only speaks to the extent of your great responsibility and historical mission.

There must be an exchange of opinions between our two parties, but our opinion should by no means be taken as an order. Communist parties of other countries may reject our proposal. And, of course, we may also disagree with the proposals of the communist parties of other countries.

(O.B. Rakhmanin, *Stalin and Mao*, No. 3, p. 10)

OBITUARY OF G.M. DIMITROV

July 1949

Georgi Mikhailovich Dimitrov was born on June 18, 1882, in the town of Radomir, of a proletarian revolutionary family. When he was only 15 years old, the young Dimitrov, working as a compositor in a printshop, joined the revolutionary movement and took an active part in the work of the oldest Bulgarian trade union of printers.

In 1902, Dimitrov joined the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party. He actively combatted revisionism on the side of the revolutionary Marxist wing of Tesnyaki led by Dimitri Blagoev.

The self-sacrificing revolutionary struggle of Dimitrov earned him the warm love of the revolutionary workers of Bulgaria, who, in 1905, elected him secretary of the Alliance of Revolutionary Trade Associations of Bulgaria. In that post he remained right up to 1923, when that alliance was disbanded by the fascists.

While leading the struggle of the Bulgarian proletariat, Dimitrov displayed courage and staunchness in the revolutionary struggles, and was repeatedly arrested and persecuted. In the September armed uprising of 1923 in Bulgaria he headed the Central Revolutionary Committee, set an example of revolutionary fearlessness, unflinching staunchness and devotion to the cause of the working class. For his leadership of the armed uprising in 1923 the fascist court sentenced Dimitrov in his absence to death. In 1926, after the provocative trial, engineered by the fascists against the leadership of the Communist Party, Dimitrov was again sentenced to death in his absence.

Compelled in 1923 to emigrate from Bulgaria, Dimitrov led the life of a professional revolutionary. He worked actively in the Executive Committee of the

Communist International.

In 1933, he was arrested in Berlin for revolutionary activity. During the Leipzig Trial, Dimitrov became the standard-bearer of the struggle against fascism and imperialist war. His heroic conduct in the court, the words of wrath which he flung in the face of the fascists, exposing their infamous provocation in connection with the Reichstag fire, unmasked the fascist provocateurs and roused new millions of workers throughout the world to the struggle against fascism.

In 1935, Dimitrov was elected General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. He waged a persistent struggle for the creation and consolidation of the united proletarian and popular front for the struggle against fascism, against the war which the fascist rulers of Germany, Japan and Italy were preparing. He called untiringly on the masses of the working people of all countries to rally around the communist parties in order to bar the way to the fascist aggressors.

Dimitrov did great work in the ranks of the international communist movement in forging the leading cadres of communist parties loyal to the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, to the cause of the defence of the interests of the people's masses in their respective countries.

During the Second World War, Georgi Dimitrov called on the communists to head the national liberation anti-fascist movement and tirelessly worked at organizing all patriotic forces for the rout of the fascist invaders. He led the struggle of the Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists) and all Bulgarian patriots who rose in arms against the German fascist invaders.

For his outstanding services in the struggle against fascism, he was awarded the Order of Lenin by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1945.

After the defeat of fascist Germany, Georgi Mikhailovich Dimitrov led the building of the new People's Democratic Republic of Bulgaria, and laid the foundation for the eternal friendship between the Bulgarian people and the peoples of the Soviet Union. Untiringly working for the consolidation of the united anti-imperialist camp and the rallying of all democratic forces, Georgi Mikhailovich Dimitrov mercilessly exposed the betrayal of the cause of socialism and the united anti-imperialist front by Tito's nationalist clique.

In the person of Dimitrov, the working people of the whole world have lost an ardent fighter, who gave all his heroic life to the supreme service of the cause of the working class, the cause of communism. The death of Dimitrov is a great loss to the whole international working class and communist movement, to all fighters for a lasting peace and a people's democracy. By his self-sacrificing struggle in the ranks of the working-class movement, by his boundless devotion to the great teachings of Lenin and Stalin, Dimitrov earned the warm love of the working people of the whole world.

The life of Dimitrov, the loyal comrade-in-arms of Lenin and Stalin, staunch revolutionary and anti-fascist champion, will serve as an inspiring example to all fighters for the cause of peace and democracy, for communism.

Farewell, our dear friend and comrade-in-arms!

(*Signed*) Andreyev, Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov,
Kaganovich, Kosygin, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov,
Ponomarenko, Popov, Pospelov, Stalin, Suslov,
Khrushchev, Shvernik, Shkiriyatov

(*World News and Views*, No. 28, July 1949)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
BULGARIA, VASIL KOLAROV**

*On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of
Bulgaria*

September 1949

I greet the government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, and you personally, on the national holiday celebrating the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Bulgaria. I send best wishes to the fraternal Bulgarian people.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 213, September 10, 1949)

GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MARCEL CACHIN

On the occasion of his 80th Birthday

September 20, 1949

To Comrade Cachin,

Dear Comrade Cachin,

Permit me, on your 80th birthday, to congratulate you, as the founder of the French Communist Party, as the faithful son of the French people and as the eminent leader of the international workers movement.

I wish you health and long life, for the well-being of the French people and the people of all the world.

With fraternal greetings.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, September 24, 1949)

LETTER TO COMRADE Y.A. ZHDANOV

October 6, 1949

Comrade Y.A. Zhdanov,

I received your letter about Academician Pavlov and his scientific legacy.⁷

I am glad that you have taken up the matter of Academician Pavlov. I have no disagreements with you on any of the questions raised in your letter. Your assessment of the theory of the great Russian scientist, as well as the assessment of his opponents, is entirely correct.

In my opinion, the greatest harm to the teaching of Academician Pavlov was done by Academician Orbeli. Pharisaically calling himself the main disciple of Pavlov, Orbeli did everything possible and impossible to debunk Pavlov and slander him with his reservations, ambiguities, dishonest silence about Pavlov and cowardly masked attacks against him. The sooner Orbeli is exposed and the more thoroughly his monopoly is eliminated, the better.

Beritov and Stern are not as dangerous, as they openly oppose Pavlov, making it easier for science to deal with these amateurs.

The most faithful and sensible follower of Pavlov should be considered Academician Bykov. True, he seems somewhat timid and does not like to "get into a fight." But he needs comprehensive support, and if he has the courage, we should arrange things so that he gets into the fight, explaining to him that without a general fight, it is impossible to defend the great cause of Pavlov.

I agree with your conclusions and am even ready to elevate them further.

Now, something about the tactics of fighting against the opponents of the theory of Academician Pavlov. It

is necessary first to quietly gather supporters of Academician Pavlov, organize them, distribute roles and only after that convene the very conference of physiologists you are talking about, where it will be necessary to give opponents a general battle. Without this, the case can be a failure. Remember: the enemy must be hit for sure, counting on complete success.

It would be good to secure the support of Vavilov and other academicians. It would also be good to have on our side the Minister of Health Smirnov. Two weeks ago, I had a conversation with Smirnov, and it seems to me that he will support this cause.

Greetings (*J. Stalin*)

October 6, 1949

(Y.A. Zhdanov, *A Look into the Past*, pp. 279-280)

NOTE TO G.M. MALENKOV

after October 6, 1949

Sending you a copy of my letter to Y.A. Zhdanov,* as well as Zhdanov's note on the issue of Academician Pavlov and his theory. I believe that the Central Committee should fully support this matter.

(Y.N. Zhukov, *Stalin: Secrets of Power*, p. 521)

* See the letter to Y.A. Zhdanov on October 6, 1949, p. 336 of this book.

TELEGRAM TO G.M. MALENKOV

October 7, 1949

Comrade Malenkov,

I consider your draft response to Yugoslavia regarding the refusal to pay debts completely incorrect. Protests are usually written for minor offences.

As for refusing to pay debts, in this case, it is impossible to limit ourselves to a protest. A protest in this case implies reconciliation with non-payment of debts, not to mention that confining ourselves to a protest means demonstrating our weakness. Today, I will talk to you over the phone about what response should be given to the Yugoslavs.

J. Stalin

(Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR: 1945-1953, pp. 327-328)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, WILHELM PIECK
AND TO THE PRIME MINISTER
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTHOHL**

*On the occasion of the founding of the German Democratic
Republic*

October 13, 1949

To the President of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Wilhelm Pieck.

To the Prime Minister of the government of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotwohl.

Permit me to congratulate you, and through you, the German people, on the foundation of the German Democratic Republic and on your elections as President and Prime Minister.

The founding of a German democratic, peace-loving republic is a turning point in European history. There can be no doubt that the existence of a peace-loving, democratic Germany standing next to a peace-loving Soviet Union excludes the possibility of new wars in Europe, puts an end to bloodshed in Europe and makes it impossible for the European countries to become the slaves of world imperialism.

The experiences of the last war have shown that the German and Soviet peoples have suffered most in this war, that both these peoples have the greatest potential in Europe to accomplish great deeds of world significance. If these two peoples fight for peace now, with the same determination as they fought in the war, peace in Europe will certainly be secure.

If this is the foundation for a united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, you can, at the same time, accomplish a great work for all of Europe by guaranteeing a strong peace.

You need have no doubts that if you take this road and strengthen peace, you will find great sympathy and active support from the peoples of the whole world, including also the American, English, French, Polish, Czechoslovakian and Italian people, not to speak of the peace-loving Soviet people.

I wish you success on this new, glorious path.

May the united, independent, democratic, peace-loving Germany live and prosper!

J. Stalin

(*Pravda*, October 14, 1949)

INSERTION IN THE REPORT AT THE SOLEMN MEETING DEDICATED TO THE 32ND ANNIVERSARY OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

after October 13, 1949

For the last 30 years, Germany twice emerged on the world stage as an aggressive force and twice unleashed a bloodier war; first — the First World War, and then — the Second World War. This happened because German imperialists, aggressors and invaders were at the forefront of German politics. If, with the formation of the German Democratic Republic, the forces in Germany supporting people's democracy prevail, standing for a stable peace and the aggressors and invaders are isolated, then this will mean a radical turning point in the history of Europe. Undoubtedly, with the presence of a peaceful policy of the German Democratic Republic, along with the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, which has the sympathy and support of the peoples of Europe, peace in Europe can be considered secured.⁸

(Y.N. Zhukov, *Stalin: Secrets of Power*, p. 514)

**ANSWERING TELEGRAM
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CABINET OF MINISTERS OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, KIM IL
SUNG**

*On the occasion of the establishment of diplomatic
relations between the USSR and the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea*

October 14, 1949

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendship and good wishes on the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the USSR.

I wish the Korean people further success in the building of their Democratic People's Republic.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 234, October 16, 1949)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC,
ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY**

*On the occasion of the 31st anniversary of the founding of
the Czechoslovakian Republic*

October 28, 1949

I send the government of the Czechoslovakian Republic and the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia friendly greetings and also wishes for their further success.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, No. 254, October 29, 1949)

NOTE TO G.M. MALENKOV

October 29, 1949

Comrade Malenkov,

Recently, I received a letter signed by communist engineers from the Stalin Factory, Maretsky, Sokolova and Klimenko, about shortcomings in the work of the Moscow Committee Secretary Comrade Popov.

I do not know the comrades who signed this letter. It is possible that these names are fictitious (this needs to be verified). But that is not the point. The point is that the facts mentioned in the letter are well known to me; I have received several letters about them from individual comrades in the Moscow organization. Perhaps I am to blame for not paying due attention to these signals. I did not pay due attention because I believed Comrade Popov. But now, after the inappropriate actions of Comrade Popov in connection with the electric combine, which revealed anti-party and anti-state aspects in Comrade Popov's work, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee cannot ignore the aforementioned letter.

Even now, before the verification of Comrade Popov's activities is carried out, I consider it my duty to note two absolutely clear and serious facts for me in the life of the Moscow organization, revealing deeply negative aspects in Comrade Popov's work.

For me, it is clear, firstly, that in the practice of the Moscow Party leadership, not only is self-criticism hushed up, but it is directly and openly persecuted. What does it mean to persecute self-criticism? It means to kill any self-activity of the party organization, undermine the leadership's authority in the party masses, disintegrate the party and establish anti-party habits of bureaucrats, sworn enemies of the party, in the life of the party organization.

For me, it is clear, secondly, that the party leadership of the Moscow organization constantly replaces ministers, the government, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B), giving direct instructions to enterprises and ministers. And those ministers who disagree with such substitution, Comrade Popov mocks and beats at meetings. What does this mean? It means to destroy party and state discipline.

What other shortcomings will be revealed during the verification, I do not know, but the main shortcomings mentioned above are already obvious to me.

My proposal:

a) Appoint a commission of the Political Bureau to investigate Comrade Popov's activities based on the facts highlighted in the letter from the three engineers.

b) Establish that not only the secretaries of the regional committees for the Moscow (and Leningrad) regional and city organizations but also the pre-executive committees are approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).

c) Distribute the letter from the three comrades, as well as this letter of mine, to the members of the Political Bureau and the secretaries of the Central Committee.

J. Stalin

(Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR: 1945-1953, pp. 321-322)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the Great
Socialist October Revolution*

November 1949

I thank you and, through you, the provisional government of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of the Soviet government and myself, for the congratulations on the anniversary of the October Socialist Revolution.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, No. 275, November 24, 1949)

THIRD MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA

From Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin"

November 1949

A five-hour meeting at Sukhumi. A tête-à-tête talk with Comrade Stalin. Once again about the Greek problem. About the situation in Yugoslavia after Tito's betrayal. The problem of Kosova and other parts of Yugoslavia inhabited by Albanians. "To attack Albania is not easy." "If Albania is strong internally it has no danger from abroad." An unforgettable dinner. Again about the economic and cultural development of Albania. Stand towards religion and the clergy. "The Vatican is a centre of reaction, a tool in the service of capital and world reaction."

In November 1949 I went to Moscow for the third time. On the way to the Soviet Union I stopped over at Budapest where I met Rakosi, who welcomed me very warmly and wanted to know about the economic situation of Albania, about the hostile work of the Titoites and the war of the Greek democratic forces. We had a comradely talk, exchanged a series of opinions and, as I recall, he informed me about the situation in Hungary.

Before I reached Moscow, I stopped briefly at Kiev. There I received an exceptionally warm welcome.

At Moscow Lavrentyev, Marshal Sokolovsky, Orlov and other military and civilian personalities had come out to meet me. Later I met Malenkov with whom I had the first short talk.

Malenkov suggested to me that if I wished and had the possibility, I should write out the questions which I had in mind to raise in the talks so that it would be

easier for him to transmit them to Comrade Stalin.

“Then,” he told me, “we shall await Comrade Stalin’s reply whether you, Comrade Enver, are to go to talk personally with him in the city of Sukhumi, where he is on holiday, or are to talk with some other comrade of the Soviet leadership whom Joseph Vissarionovich will recommend.”

That evening I wrote out the questions we intended to discuss and handed them to Malenkov.

After he was informed about this, Stalin instructed that I should go to Sukhumi so that we could talk together. And this is what we did.

I met Comrade Stalin in the garden of the house where he was spending his holidays; a marvellous garden full of trees and beds of multicoloured flowers bordering the roads and paths. I saw him from a distance strolling at his usual slow pace, a little bent and with his hands behind his back.

As always he welcomed me very warmly and behaved in a very comradely way. He seemed to be in very good health.

“I stay outside all day,” he told me, “and only go inside to eat.”

Very happy to see him again and to find him so well, I wished him:

“May you live another hundred years, Comrade Stalin!”

“A hundred?” he said with a laugh, narrowing his eyes a little. “That’s not much. In Georgia we’ve old people of 145 years of age and still going strong.”

“Another hundred Comrade Stalin, this is what our people say, another hundred above the age you have!” I told him.

“Tak harasho!*” he said in the best of humour. “That’s fine, I agree.” We laughed.

* Very good (Russ.).

Our talk in which only Comrade Stalin and I took part (as well as our interpreter, Sterjo Gjokoreci) was held outside on the balcony. It was nine o'clock in the evening, Moscow time. Stalin was wearing a cap in his head, a brown scarf round his neck and a brown woolen suit. When we were about to sit down to begin the talk, out of respect I took off my hat and hung it on the rack, but he said to me:

“Don't take your hat off, keep it on, too.”

I protested but he insisted, being concerned that I should not get a cold because it was damp outside, and told his aide-de-camp to bring it to me.

During this unforgettable meeting I discussed a series of problems with Comrade Stalin.

Among other things, I raised with him our views about the incorrect stands of leading comrades of the Greek Communist Party and the unjust accusations they had made against us. Amongst other things, I said that the Central Committee of our Party had always had close relations with the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party, that our Party and people had always openly supported the just and heroic struggle of the Greek people for freedom and democracy, and against the Anglo-American foreign interference. “Precisely because of the special links we have had with the Greek comrades,” I continued, “especially during 1949 we have seen mistakes and defects in the leadership of the Greek Communist Party and several times we have expressed our views about these mistakes to them openly, in a comradely way and in a sound internationalist spirit. We told them of our views once again after the blows which the Greek democratic forces suffered at Vitsi and Gramos. However, the leading comrades of the Greek Communist Party did not accept our comradely criticisms as correct, this time either, but considering themselves offended, went so far as to send a let-

ter from their Political Bureau to the Political Bureau of our Party, in which they accused our leading comrades of being 'Trotskyite' and 'Titoite' in regard to our judgement about the line followed by the Greek leaders during their war.

"Our Political Bureau," I told Comrade Stalin, "analysed the letter of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party signed by Nicos Zachariades and arrived at the conclusion that with its mistaken views and stands, the Zachariades group had not only gravely damaged the new line which the Greek Communist Party adopted after the end of the anti-Hitlerite war, but was now trying to put the responsibility on to others for the defeats and the sabotage which it had inflicted on this line itself."

"When did you first meet Zachariades?" Stalin asked me.

After I replied he said to me:

"Comrade Zachariades has never said anything against you Albanians to our comrades," and at this time he opened a letter which the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party had sent to the Political Bureau of the PLA and read it in silence. Then looking at me he added:

"Here I don't see the accusations which you mention, but I read only that they accuse you of having hindered them in some technical matters."

"At first," I said to Comrade Stalin, "they made the accusations I mentioned orally and later in writing, in their last letter. We have sent you a copy of this letter and our reply through Ambassador Chuvakhin."

After asking about the dates of these letters which he had not seen, Stalin gave the order to look them up. In a little while they brought them to him. When he had read them he said to me:

"I have been on holiday and I have not read these materials. I have read all your other letters." Then he

added:

“The Greeks have sought to talk and reach agreement with you.”

“In the opinions and criticisms which we have made of the Greek comrades,” I told Comrade Stalin, “we have always set out from sincere comradely aims, considering this an internationalist duty, irrespective of whether or not our opinions would be pleasing to them. We have wanted and have always tried to resolve these problems with the Greek comrades in a comradely way and a healthy communist spirit, while they for their part, have not only failed to display a similar spirit of understanding but also make accusations against us and are trying to lay the blame on others. Such views and stands are unacceptable to us,” I said and added that Comrade Zachariades should bear in mind and not forget that we ourselves were responsible to the Albanian Party and people for the affairs of our Party, people and Homeland just as he was responsible to his party and people.

Listening to me attentively, Comrade Stalin asked:

“Are any of the Greek democrats who were given temporary asylum in Albania still there? How do you intend to act from now on?”

In connection with these questions, I gave Comrade Stalin a detailed explanation of our stand. Amongst other things, I said that the imperialists, the monarcho-fascists and reaction, for ulterior motives, had long been making accusations against us alleging that we were to blame for what had occurred in Greece and were interfering in the internal affairs of Greece, and so on. “However the whole world knows,” I said, “that we have not interfered and never will interfere in the internal affairs of Greece.

“In regard to the support which we have expressed and still express for the struggle of the Greek people, this we consider a legitimate right and a duty which

every people ought to carry out in regard to the just fight of a fraternal country. But the fact that we are neighbours with Greece brought about that many innocent Greek men, women and children, maimed, terrified and hotly pursued by the monarcho-fascists, came over our border as refugees. Towards all of them we adopted a just and very careful stand: we gave them aid and shelter and established them in allocated centres far from the border with Greece.”

Continuing my explanation of this problem, I told Comrade Stalin that the influx of these refugees had created many acute difficulties for us and, apart from carrying out our humanitarian duty, we were being careful to avoid allowing the presence of Greek democratic refugees on our territory to serve as an opportunity for the further incitement of the anti-Albania psychosis of people in the Greek government. This was one of the main reasons why we welcomed the request of Comrade Zachariades and the Greek refugees themselves to leave Albania for asylum in other countries. “At present,” I added, “following the incorrect stands towards us by leading comrades of the Greek Communist Party and the grave accusations they are making against us, our Political Bureau thinks that the departure of those few Greek refugees who still remain in our country has become even more urgent.” I told him that not only the democratic soldiers, but also those Greek leaders who had also been given asylum in Albania recently, ought to leave.

Continuing my presentation of our views in connection with the Greek problem, I also told Comrade Stalin about some other mistakes of the Greek comrades, such as their underestimating of protracted partisan war spread over the whole country and their reliance solely on “frontal war” with a “regular army”;

their elimination of the role of the political commissar in the partisan units, etc. "The pressure of mistaken, petty-bourgeois views of career officers who did not want or tolerate trusted party people beside them," I told Comrade Stalin, "brought about that the role of the commissar in command in the Greek Democratic Army was diminished, considered of second-rate importance, and even totally eliminated. These and other such mistakes make us think that there is confusion, opportunism and false modesty in the leadership of the Greek Communist Party and hiding of the leading role of the party."

After listening attentively to all I put forward, Comrade Stalin, amongst other things, said to me:

"Like you, we too, agreed to the request of Zachariades for the departure of the Greek democratic refugees from Albania and have interested ourselves in assisting them to be settled where they wanted to go. We did this because such a stand is humanitarian. Aid for this number of people was a burden even for us, but they had to go somewhere, because they could not stay in a country bordering on Greece.

"The stand which you have adopted towards the democratic soldiers who crossed your border seems to me correct," added Comrade Stalin. "As for their weapons which have been left in Albania, I am of the opinion that you Albanians should keep them, because you deserve them.

"It appears," continued Comrade Stalin, "that the leaders of the Greek Communist Party have not evaluated the situation properly. They have underestimated the strength of the enemy, thinking they had to do only with Tsaldaris and not with the British and Americans. As to the final withdrawal by the Greek comrades, there are people who say that they should not have retreated, but I think that, after what had occurred, the democratic soldiers absolutely had to retreat, otherwise

they would have all been wiped out.

“On the other questions the Greek comrades are not right. They could not wage a frontal war with a regular army, because they did not have either an army capable of this kind of war or a sufficient breadth of territory for this. Overestimating their strength and possibilities, they did everything openly, making it possible for the enemy to discover all their positions and their arsenal.

“Nevertheless, I think you should reach agreement with the Greek comrades. This is my view. What they say about you Albanians having adopted a ‘Trotskyite’ and ‘Titoite’ stand towards them are baseless accusations.”

At dinner Stalin asked me where and when I thought we could meet together with the Greek leaders to clear up the disagreements over principles which had arisen between us.

“We are ready to meet whenever you like,” I said. “Possibly even in January next year and we should hold the meeting in Moscow.”

Continuing the talk with Comrade Stalin, we spoke about the grave situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia following Tito’s betrayal, about the anti-Marxist, nationalist, chauvinist policy which the Titoite clique pursued against Albania and the other countries of people’s democracy. In particular I spoke about the situation of the Albanian population in Kosova and some other parts of Yugoslavia.

“The line of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in regard to Kosova and other regions in Yugoslavia with an Albanian population,” I told Comrade Stalin, “from the beginning of the anti-fascist war to Liberation, and even more after Liberation, was and is chauvinist and nationalist. If it were in a sound Marxist-Leninist position, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia should have devoted special attention during the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War to the question of the Albanian

population in Yugoslavia, because it is a minority large in numbers and right on the Albanian border. In the first years of the war, our view was that the question of the future of Kosova and other Albanian regions in Yugoslavia should not be raised during the war, but the Albanians of Kosova and other Albanian regions should fight against fascism within the framework of Yugoslavia, and this problem would be resolved by the two sister parties, by the people's democratic regimes which would be established in Albania and Yugoslavia, and by the Albanian population there itself, after the war.

“The main question was that the Albanians of Kosova and other parts of Yugoslavia had to be persuaded and convinced that by fighting fascism, shoulder to shoulder with the peoples of Yugoslavia, after the victory they would be free and the possibilities would be provided for them to decide their future for themselves, that is, that they themselves would decide whether they would be united with Albania or remain within the framework of Yugoslavia as an entity with a special status.

“A correct and principled policy in this direction would have brought about that the Albanian population of Kosova and of other regions would have been mobilized with all their strength in the great anti-fascist war, irrespective of the savage reaction and the demagogic fascist propaganda. Right from the start of the war we told the Yugoslav leaders of our opinion that they should mobilize the Albanian population in a patriotic spirit, should allow them to fly the Albanian flag along with the Yugoslav flag, should think about the participation of a bigger number from the Albanian element in the new state power to be created in the course of the war, should support and develop among the Albanians both the feeling of great love for Albania, their Homeland, and the feeling of fraternity in the just war of the

peoples of Yugoslavia, that very close collaboration should be created and strengthened between the Albanian fighting units of Kosova and the National Liberation War of our country, while these fighting units of Kosova and other regions should be linked with and guided by the General Staff of the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, etc. But, as the reality showed," I continued presenting my ideas to Comrade Stalin, "these just and essential demands were not to the liking of the Yugoslav leadership, therefore, not only was it obscure on statements of principle, but Tito made accusations of 'nationalist deviations' against us and those Yugoslav comrades who considered these demands correct.

"The nationalist and chauvinist policy on the part of the Yugoslav leadership in Kosova and the other regions inhabited by Albanians was further intensified after the war, irrespective of the demagoguery and some partial measures which the Tito-Ranković clique took at first, such as the opening of an occasional Albanian school.

"Nevertheless, in the first post-war years we still considered the Communist Party of Yugoslavia a sister party and hoped that the question of Kosova and the other Albanian regions would be resolved correctly as soon as the appropriate moment arrived.

"We thought that this moment had been reached at the time of the signing of the treaty* with Yugoslavia and I raised this problem with Tito then. Tito asked me what I thought about Kosova. 'Kosova and the other regions of Yugoslavia with an Albanian population,' I replied, 'are Albanian territory which the great powers unjustly tore away from Albania; they belong to Albania and should be returned to Albania. Now that

* The reference is to the Treaty of Friendship, Collaboration and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of Albania and Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, signed in July 1946.

we are two socialist countries the conditions exist for this problem to be solved correctly.' Tito said to me: 'I agree, this is what we desire, but for the moment we are unable to do anything because the Serbs do not understand such a thing.' 'If they don't understand it today,' I said, 'they will have to understand it tomorrow.'"

At this moment Comrade Stalin asked me when I first met Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders. After telling him that I met them after the war, on the first visit I made to Belgrade in 1946, I continued:

"The problem of Kosova and of the Albanian population living in other regions of Yugoslavia, and its future, remains a problem which is up to the people of Kosova and the other regions to decide for themselves. However, we for our part, without ever interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, will never cease supporting the rights of our brothers of one blood, living in Yugoslavia and will raise our voice against the terror, the policy of extermination, which the Tito-Ranković clique is pursuing towards them." Finally I told Comrade Stalin that we had written him a letter about this problem.

"I have read your letter," Comrade Stalin replied. "I agree with you that the people of Kosova themselves should decide the question of their future."

"Apart from the anti-Marxist policy Tito has pursued towards Kosova," Stalin continued, "he also wanted to annex Albania itself. This became obvious when Tito tried to send his divisions into Albania. We prevented such an action. Both of us know that the units of the Yugoslav army were to be dispatched to Albania to assist Koçi Xoxe, so that, by means of these Yugoslav forces, he would liquidate free Albania and the Albanian Government."

"Tito," I said, "took advantage of the fact that Greece at that period was committing provocations on our borders at every opportunity and he hatched

up the intrigue that we would allegedly be subjected to ‘a large-scale attack from Greece’, that ‘the attack was imminent’ and ‘constituted a threat to Albania,’ etc. After this, in collaboration with the traitors Koçi Xoxe and company, with whom he had secret links, Tito suggested to us that he should send his armed forces to Albania, precisely to Korça, and later also to Gjirokastra, ‘to defend us from the Greek attack.’ We strongly opposed this suggestion and immediately informed you about it. We were convinced that under cover of these divisions to help us, he aimed to occupy Albania, and this was also the view expressed in the reply you sent us in connection with our report.”

With a chuckle expressing both anger and deep irony, Stalin said:

“And now Tito is accusing us, the Soviet Union, of allegedly interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, of allegedly wanting to attack Yugoslavia! No, we have never wanted to do such a thing and it has never even crossed our minds because we are Marxist-Leninists, we are a socialist country, and we cannot act as Tito thinks and acts.

“I think,” continued Comrade Stalin, “that as Marxist-Leninists, in the future too, we must attack the anti-Marxist views and actions of Tito and the Yugoslav leadership, but I stress that in no way should we ever interfere in their internal affairs. That would not be Marxist. The Yugoslav communists and the Yugoslav people must attend to that matter; it is up to them to solve the problems of the present and the future of their country. It is in this context, also, that I see the problem of Kosova and the Albanian population living in other parts of Yugoslavia. We must not leave any way for the Titoite enemy to accuse us later of allegedly waging our fight to break up the Yugoslav Federation. This is a delicate moment and needs very careful handling, because by saying, ‘See, they want to break

up Yugoslavia,' Tito not only gathers reaction around him, but also tries to win the patriotic elements over to his side.

"As for Albania's international position," Comrade Stalin went on, "this has been defined by the meeting of the three foreign ministers of the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. You know of the declarations of Hull, Eden and Molotov on this question. A big noise is being made alleging that Yugoslavia, Greece, etc., are going to attack Albania but this is no light matter, either for them or for any other enemy," said Comrade Stalin and he asked me:

"Are the Greeks continuing their provocations on the border?"

"After the lessons we have given them, especially this summer, they have ceased their armed attacks," I said, "nevertheless we are always vigilant and remain on the alert."

"Tsaldaris is very busy with his internal troubles," Comrade Stalin went on, "he has no time now to engage in provocations, as the monarcho-fascists are quarrelling amongst themselves. I think also, that the Anglo-Americans cannot attack you from outside, but will try to attack you from within, by attempting to organize insurrections and movements, by infiltrating agents and assassins to kill the Albanian leaders, etc. The enemies will try to stir up troubles and conflicts inside Albania, but if Albania is strong internally, it need fear no danger from abroad. This is the main thing. If Albania pursues a wise and principled policy, it has no reason to fear anything.

"As for the documents of the three foreign ministers," Comrade Stalin said, "these you should keep in mind and from time to time, at opportune moments, you should mention them to remind the 'friends' of them.

"However, the internal situation must be strength-

ened continuously in all directions; it must always be strengthened. This is the main thing," he said and asked me:

"Do you have defence forces under the Ministry of Internal Affairs to attack the counter-revolutionary bands and put down the attempts of internal reaction?"

"Yes," I said. "These forces, made up of the sons of the people, have done a commendable job, especially in the early years, in clearing the country of the gangs of criminals, enemies hiding in the mountains, and agents smuggled in from abroad. In close collaboration with the people, our military forces are ever better fulfilling their tasks and the Party and our state power have always seen to it that they are very well trained and equipped."

"You must keep these forces in constant readiness to settle accounts with the counter-revolutionary groups, as well as with the possible bandits," Comrade Stalin advised me in connection with the situation in Albania and asked me:

"Did Tito denounce the Treaty of Friendship with Albania?"

"Yes," I said. "And the way Tito denounced the Treaty was typically Titoite. On November 2 this year the Yugoslav leaders sent us an official note full of slanders and base accusations, in which they called on us, in the form of an ultimatum, to abandon our road and take their road of betrayal. Then, on November 12, without waiting for a reply to their first note, they sent us their second note in which they denounced the Treaty.

"However, we gave them our reply to both their notes, just as they deserved, and we are still living very well, even without their treaty of 'friendship'."

This meeting passed in a warm, happy and very intimate atmosphere. After the tête-à-tête talk I had with

Comrade Stalin, we went into the house for dinner. At the entrance to the dining-room there was a kind of an anteroom where we hung our coats and hats. In the dining-room itself, which was half-panelled in timber, there was a long table, and here and there other tables for serving dishes and drinks. Also present at the dinner were two Soviet generals, the one Stalin's aide-de-camp and the other my escort during my visit. Stalin talked, asked questions, cracked jokes with us and the two generals. When we sat at the table he made jokes about the dishes. The way the dinner was served was very interesting. There was no waiter to serve us. A girl brought in all the food in dishes covered to keep them hot; she put the dishes on the table and left. Stalin got up, took the dish himself and, standing there, carved the chicken, then sat down and resumed his jokes.

"Let us begin," he said addressing me. "What are you waiting for? Do you think the waiters will come to serve us? There you have the dishes, take them, lift the lids and start eating, or you'll go supperless."

He laughed again heartily, that exhilarating laugh of his that went right to one's heart. From time to time he raised his glass and drank a toast. At one moment, Stalin's aide-de-camp seeing that Stalin was taking another kind of drink from the table, made an attempt to stop him and told him not to mix his drinks. He did so as it was his duty to take care of Stalin. Stalin laughed and said that it would do no harm. But when the general insisted, Stalin replied to him in a tone half angry, half in fun:

"Leave me in peace, don't pester me like Tito!" and looked me right in the eye, laughing. We all laughed.

By the end of the dinner he showed me a fruit and said: "Have you ever tasted this kind of fruit?" "No," I said, "I've never seen it. How is it eaten?" He told me its name. It was an Indian or tropical fruit. He took it, peeled it and gave it to me. "Try it," he said, "my hands

are clean.” And I was reminded of the fine custom of our people who, while talking, peel the apple and give it to the guest to eat.

In this unforgettable meeting with Comrade Stalin, both during the conversation in the garden and during the dinner, we talked in a profoundly comradely spirit about problems of the economic and socio-cultural development of our country, too.

As in all the other meetings, after inquiring in detail about our economic situation and the overall development of the new Albania, Stalin gave me a lot of valuable advice which has always helped us in our work.

I gave Comrade Stalin a general outline of the state of affairs with us, told him about the successes achieved in the realization of plans, about the great mobilization of the people, as well as about a number of difficulties and shortcomings which we were aware of and were struggling to overcome.

“Besides the shortcomings in our work,” I told Comrade Stalin, “the systematic sabotage of our economy by the Yugoslavs has created very great difficulties in the realization of plans in industry and other sectors. Now we are making great and all-round efforts to eliminate the consequences of this work of sabotage and we are giving particular importance to the sector of socialist industry, which, although taking its first steps, has great prospects in our country. Along with the construction of new projects, our mineral resources constitute a major field of great value in this direction. There is unexploited mineral wealth in our country. The group of scientists and geologists which the Soviet Government will send to our country this year, will provide us with further information on where these resources occur and in what quantities. On the other hand, we are exploiting deposits of oil, chromium, copper and other minerals. According to expert information there are

big reserves of oil, chromium, copper and other minerals, not to mention natural bitumen, in our country. Through struggle and efforts, with the mobilization of all our forces and possibilities, as well as with the credits granted by the Soviet Government, we have improved the exploitation of these valuable products. But we feel that big investments are required in order to step up the extraction of these products to the maximum. For the time being it's impossible for us to do this with the forces and means we possess. We have used the bulk of the credits accorded by the Soviet Government and the countries of people's democracy," I went on, "in order to improve the exploitation of the existing mineral resources to a certain degree. This means that, on the one hand, we are unable to exploit the already discovered underground assets such as chromium, copper and oil and those which will be discovered in the future, as we would like to, and, on the other hand, we are unable to develop the other branches of industry at rapid rates.

"Our Political Bureau has studied this question, which has great importance for the future of our people, and has arrived at the conclusion that, for the time being, we lack the internal means and possibilities to carry out this work ourselves on a full scale. Because of this we should like to know your opinion about whether you consider it proper to form joint Albanian-Soviet companies for the oil, copper and chromium industries. This might be a problem which we could put before the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, but before doing this we want to know your opinion, Comrade Stalin."

In reply, after expressing his joy about our successes in the country's economic development, Comrade Stalin told me that he did not agree on the creation of joint Albanian-Soviet companies and explained to me that though some steps had initially been taken in this direction with some of the countries of people's democ-

racy, they had considered them wrong and given them up.

“We shall help you today and in the future, too,” he continued, “therefore we are going to give you more people and more of everything else than we have given you so far. We now have the practical possibilities to give you more because our current five-year plan is going on well.”

I thanked Comrade Stalin for the aid they had given and would give us in the future.

“Thank me when you receive the aid,” he said smiling, and then asked:

“What do your trains run on — oil or coal?”

“Coal, mainly,” I told him. “but the new types of locomotives we have received run on oil.”

“Do you process your oil? How is work going on with the refinery?” he asked, continuing the talk.

“We are building a new refinery with Soviet equipment.” I said. “Next year we shall install the machinery.”

“Do you have coal?”

“We do,” I told him, “and geological surveys show that our prospects in this direction are good.”

“You must work to discover and extract as much coal as possible,” Comrade Stalin advised me. “It is very necessary for the development of industry and the economy in general, therefore give it attention, because it will be difficult for you without it.”

As at all the other meetings, Comrade Stalin displayed special interest in and concern about the situation of our peasantry, the development of agriculture and the policy of our Party in this important field. He asked me how we were getting on with cereal production and what seeds we used for bread grain.

I told Comrade Stalin that we had tried to increase the production of grain from year to year, because this was a major problem of vital importance to our coun-

try, that we had achieved a number of successes in this direction, but that we had to do still more work and make even greater efforts to ensure the bread for our people.

“Your government must work with might and main for the development of agriculture,” Comrade Stalin told me among other things, “must assist the peasantry so that the peasant sees concretely that the government is taking an interest in him and in the continuous improvement of his life.” Then he asked:

“You have a good climate, don’t you?”

“Yes, we do,” I told him.

“Yes, yes,” he said. “Everything can be planted and grown in your country. But the important thing is what you sow. You must select good seeds,” he advised me, “and for this you should seek our assistance. You must train many agronomists of your own for the future because Albania is an agricultural country and agriculture advances with good work and thorough scientific knowledge. Send an agronomist here to select seeds,” he added.

Then he asked me:

“What about cotton? Is the peasant interested in cultivating it?”

I told Comrade Stalin that in the past we had no tradition in the cultivation of this crop, but now we were increasing the area planted to cotton from year to year. This was essential, because apart from anything else, the textile combine which we were building would be based on our own cotton.

“You must encourage the peasant to produce,” Comrade Stalin advised me, “by paying him higher prices for cotton. When the socialist ideology is still not implanted in his consciousness, the peasant does not readily give you anything without first looking to his own interest.”

Further on, he asked me:

“You still have virgin and unused lands?!” “Yes, we have,” I said, “both in the hills and mountains and on the plains. The swamps and marshes, in particular, have been a plague both for our agriculture and the health of the people.”

I added that in the years of people’s power we were carrying out a great deal of work to drain marshes and swamps, and had achieved a number of successes but we had big plans for this sector and we should realize them step by step.

“The peasantry,” Comrade Stalin told me, “must not leave an inch of land untilled. The peasants must be persuaded to increase the area of arable land.

“In order to avoid the evils of swamps and combat malaria,” he advised me, “you must plant eucalypts. This is a very good tree and it grows in many regions of our country. Mosquitoes keep well clear of this tree which grows quickly and absorbs the water of marshes.”

During dinner Comrade Stalin also asked me:

“What do the Albanian peasants who visited the Soviet Union say?”

I told him that they had returned to Albania with very good and indelible impressions. In their talks with comrades and friends, at meetings and open discussions with the people, they spoke with profound admiration about everything they saw in the Soviet Union, about its all-round successes and especially about the development of Soviet agriculture. Among other things, I told him how one of our peasants, who had been in the Soviet Union, described the sample of the Georgian maize.

This pleased Comrade Stalin greatly and the next day I learnt that he had told it to some Soviet comrades who came to visit me. On this occasion Stalin, personally, had instructed them to bring me some bags of seed-maize from Georgia. Also on his instructions, that same day they brought us eucalypt seeds, too.

During this meeting, Comrade Stalin talked, as always, quietly and calmly, asked questions and listened very attentively, expressed his opinion, gave us advice, but always in a thoroughly comradely spirit.

“There are no cut-and-dried prescriptions about how you should behave on this or that occasion, about how this or that problem should be solved,” he would repeat frequently, according to the various questions I raised.

During the talk with Stalin I pointed out to him the stand of the clergy, especially the catholic clergy in Albania, our position in relation to it, and asked how he judged our stand.

“The Vatican is a centre of reaction,” Comrade Stalin told me among other things, “it is a tool in the service of capital and world reaction, which supports this international organization of subversion and espionage. It is a fact that many catholic priests and missionaries of the Vatican are old-hands at espionage on a world scale. Imperialism has tried and is still trying to realize its aims by means of them.” Then he told me of what had happened once in Yalta with Roosevelt, the representative of the American catholic church and others.

During the talk with Roosevelt, Churchill and others on problems of the anti-Hitlerite war, they had said: “We must no longer fight the Pope in Rome. What have you against him that you attack him?!”

“I have nothing against him.” Stalin had replied.

“Then, let us make the Pope our ally,” they had said. “let us admit him to the coalition of the great allies.”

“All right,” Stalin had said, “but the anti-fascist alliance is an alliance to wipe out fascism and nazism. As you know, gentlemen, this war is waged with soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, tanks, aircraft. If the Pope or you can tell us what armies, artillery, machine-guns, tanks and other weapons of war he possesses, let him

become our ally. We don't need an ally for talk and incense."

After that, they had made no further mention of the question of the Pope and the Vatican.

"Were there catholic priests in Albania who betrayed the people?" Comrade Stalin asked me then.

"Yes," I told him. "Indeed the heads of the catholic church made common cause with the nazi-fascist foreign invaders right from the start, placed themselves completely in their service, and did everything within their power to disrupt our National Liberation War and perpetuate the foreign domination."

"What did you do with them?"

"After the victory," I told him, "we arrested them and put them on trial and they received the punishment they deserved."

"You have done well," he said.

"But were there others who maintained a good stand?" he asked.

"Yes," I replied, "especially clergymen of the Orthodox and Muslim religion."

"What have you done with them?" he asked me.

"We have kept them close to us. In its First Resolution our Party called on all the masses, including the clergymen, to unite for the sake of the great national cause, in the great war for freedom and independence. Many of them joined us, threw themselves into the war and made a valuable contribution to the liberation of the Homeland. After Liberation they embraced the policy of our Party and continued the work for the reconstruction of the country. We have always valued and honoured such clergymen, and some of them have now been elected deputies to the People's Assembly, or promoted to senior ranks in our army. In another case, a former clergyman linked himself so closely with the National Liberation Movement and the Party that in the course of the war he saw the futility of the re-

ligious dogma, abandoned his religion, embraced the communist ideology and thanks to his struggle, work and conviction we have admitted him to the ranks of the Party.”

“Very good,” Stalin said to me. “What more could I add? If you are clear about the fact that religion is opium for the people and that the Vatican is a centre of obscurantism, espionage and subversion against the cause of the peoples, then you know that you should act precisely as you have done.

“You should never put the struggle against the clergy, who carry out espionage and disruptive activities, on the religious plane,” Stalin said, “but always on the political plane. The clergy must obey the laws of the state, because these laws express the will of the working class and the working people. You must make the people quite clear about these laws and the hostility of the reactionary clergymen so that even that part of the population which believes in religion will clearly see that, under the guise of religion, the clergymen carry out activities hostile to the Homeland and the people themselves. Hence the people, convinced through facts and arguments, together with the Government, should struggle against the hostile clergy. You should isolate and condemn only those clergymen who do not obey the Government and commit grave crimes against the state. But, I insist, the people must be convinced about the crimes of these clergymen, and should also be convinced about the futility of the religious ideology and the evils that result from it.”

I remember that at the end of this unforgettable meeting Comrade Stalin gave us a piece of general advice: strengthen the internal situation well; strengthen the political work with the masses.

Stalin kept me a full 5 hours at this meeting. We had come at 9 o'clock in the evening and left at 2 after mid-

night. After we rose from the table, Stalin said to me:

“Go and put on your coat.”

We came out with the two generals and I was waiting to return to the room where we had our meeting in order to thank him for the warm reception and to say goodbye. We waited a little, looked into the room, but he was not there.

One of the generals told us:

“No doubt he has gone out into the garden.”

True enough, there we found him — modest, smiling, with his cap on his head and his brown scarf round his neck. He accompanied us to the car. I thanked him.

“Don’t mention it,” he replied. “I shall phone you tomorrow. We may have another meeting. You must stay another couple of days here to visit Sukhumi.”

Next evening, on November 25, I was waiting impatiently for the telephone to ring, but unfortunately, I did not meet Comrade Stalin again. At 1.00 a.m. of the 26th he had arrived in Sochi and sent to me his regards through the general who accompanied me. From Sukhumi, on the 25th of November 1949, I sent Mehmet Shehu this telegram:

“Finished work yesterday. They will help us in everything. All I requested was agreed to with very great cordiality. I am well. Can hardly be there for the celebrations. My best greetings for the celebrations. I leave by the first means available.”

On the 25th of November we visited the town of Sukhumi, which had 60,000 inhabitants. The Minister of the Interior of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia and another general accompanied me during the visit to Sukhumi. Sukhumi was a very beautiful, clean city, full of gardens and parks. There were many trees from tropical countries. Flowers everywhere. Among other things, I was struck by a wonderful park which had been built by the inhabitants of this city in just 50

days. The park was a little larger than the space in front of our “Dajti” Hotel. By night Sukhumi was ablaze with lights. Its inhabitants were handsome, smiling, looked happy and content. Not an inch of uncultivated ground to be seen. Stretching before our eyes were plantations of mandarins, lemons, grapefruit, oranges, and grapes, boundless plains sown with wheat, maize, etc. The hills were cultivated and covered with fruit-trees and forests. In the city and everywhere one saw tall eucalypt trees.

We went to see a state farm on the outskirts of the city. It was nothing but hills covered with mandarins, oranges, lemons and grapevines. The branches of the mandarin trees were breaking under the weight of the fruit. One tree produced 1,500, 1,600, 2,000 mandarins. “Sometimes we cannot manage to pick them all,” the director of the state farm told us. We visited the place where the mandarins, etc. were packed. Women were working there. A big machine graded the oranges and mandarins one by one, according to size.

We also visited an old bridge built back in the 15th century and preserved as a monument of antiquity as well as the botanical garden. It was a garden rich in trees and flowers of different varieties. We also saw a centre where they raised monkeys which get up to all sorts of amusing games. We were told that this centre had served Pavlov for his scientific experiments.

The Georgians were very kindly people. They welcomed and farewelled us in the friendliest way.

In the morning of November 26, the Soviet comrade who accompanied me came with the newspaper “Krasnaya Svezda” in his hand and told me the news of my promotion by the Presidium of the People’s Assembly of the PRA.*

* On November 21, 1949, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers of the PRA and the Political Bureau of the CC of the PLA, the Presidium of the People’s Assembly of the PRA issued the decree promoting Comrade Enver Hoxha to the

At 8.00 hours of November 27, we left for Moscow by plane. The flight lasted 5 and a half hours. A few days later I returned to the Homeland.

(E. Hoxha, *With Stalin*, pp. 127-162)

rank of Army General.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS AND SPIES

*Resolution of the Information Bureau of Communist and
Workers' Parties*

November 1949

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Romanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), French Communist Party, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies," unanimously reached the following conclusions:

In June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Ranković clique from democracy and socialism to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau, this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia.

Recent events show that the Yugoslav government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

The Central Committee of the Party and the government of Yugoslavia have merged completely with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy; against the communist parties of

the world; against the new democracies and the USSR.

The Belgrade clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk-Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war and by their treacherous deeds are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kowtowing to them.

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long.

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the people's democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism.

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American centre for espionage and anti-communist propaganda.

When all genuine friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the USSR a powerful fortress of socialism, a faithful and steadfast defender of the freedom and independence of nations and the principal bulwark of peace, the Tito-Ranković clique, having attained power under the mask of friendship with the USSR, began on the orders of the Anglo-American imperialists a campaign of slander and provocation against the Soviet Union, utilizing the most vile calumnies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler.

The transformation of the Tito-Ranković clique

into a direct agency of imperialism and accomplices of the warmongers culminated in the lining up of the Yugoslav government with the imperialist bloc at the UNO, where the Kardeljs, Djilases and Beblers joined in a united front with the American reactionaries on vital matters of international policy.

In the sphere of home policy, the chief outcome of the activity of the traitor Tito-Ranković clique is the actual liquidation of the people's democratic system in Yugoslavia.

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Ranković clique which usurped power in the Party and state, an anti-communist, police state — a fascist type regime — has been installed in Yugoslavia.

The social basis of this regime consists of kulaks in the countryside and capitalist elements in the towns.

In fact, power in Yugoslavia is in the hands of anti-popular and reactionary elements. Active members of the old bourgeois parties, kulaks and other enemies of people's democracy are active in central and local government bodies.

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people and trample on any free expression of opinion.

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging that they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to the Anglo-American imperialists.

The state sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property since state power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Ranković clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign capital into the economy of the country and has placed it under the control of capitalist monopolies.

The Anglo-American industrial-financial circles investing their capital in the Yugoslav economy are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever-growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to an intensified exploitation of the working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalist character.

The compulsory pseudo-cooperatives in the countryside are in the hands of kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the CPY, unloosed a campaign of terror against genuine communists loyal to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists.

Thousands of Yugoslav patriots devoted to communism have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or as was the case with the well-known communist, Arso Jovanović, dastardly assassinated.

The brutality with which staunch fighters for communism are being annihilated in Yugoslavia can be compared only with the atrocities of the Hitler fascists, the butcher Tsaldaris in Greece or Franco in Spain.

By expelling those communists loyal to proletarian

internationalism from the ranks of the Party and annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the fascist terror of the Tito gang against the healthy forces in the CPY, its leadership is wholly in the hands of spies and murderers, mercenaries of imperialism.

The CPY has been seized by counter-revolutionary forces, acting arbitrarily in the name of the Party. Recruiting spies and provocateurs in the ranks of the working class parties is, as is well-known, an old method of the bourgeoisie.

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realizing this aim in Yugoslavia.

The fascist ideology and domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy, of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Ranković clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

* * *

On the basis of irrefutable facts testifying to the complete change-over of the Tito clique to fascism and its desertion to the camp of world imperialism, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers, that:

1. The espionage group of Tito, Ranković, Kardelj, Djilas, Pijade, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Bebler, Mrazović,

Vukmanović, Koča Popović, Kidrič, Nešković, Zlatić, Velebit, Koliševski and others are enemies of the working class and peasantry and enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2. This espionage group expresses not the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia but the will of the Anglo-American imperialists, and has therefore betrayed the interests of the country and abolished the political sovereignty and economic independence of Yugoslavia.

3. The "Communist Party of Yugoslavia," as at present constituted, being in the hands of enemies of the people, murderers and spies, has forfeited the right to be called a communist party and is merely an apparatus for carrying out the espionage assignments of the clique of Tito-Kardelj-Ranković-Djilas.

The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers, therefore, that the struggle against the Tito clique — hired spies and murderers — is the international duty of all communist and workers' parties.

It is the duty of communist and workers' parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

A necessary condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle on the part of revolutionary elements both inside the CPY and outside its ranks, for the regeneration of the revolutionary genuine Communist Party of Yugoslavia, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism and fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

The loyal communist forces in Yugoslavia, who, in the present brutal conditions of fascist terror, are deprived of the possibility of engaging in open action against the Tito-Ranković clique, were compelled in the struggle for the cause of communism, to follow the

path taken by the communists in those countries where legal work is forbidden.

The Information Bureau expresses the firm conviction that among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia forces will be found capable ensuring victory over the espionage bourgeois restoration Tito-Ranković clique; that the toiling people of Yugoslavia led by the working class will succeed in restoring the historical gains of people's democracy won at the price of heavy sacrifice and heroic struggle by the people of Yugoslavia and that they will take the road of building socialism.

The Information Bureau considers one of the most important tasks of the communist and workers' parties to be an all-round heightening of revolutionary vigilance in Party ranks; exposing and rooting out bourgeois-nationalist elements and agents of imperialism no matter under what flag they conceal themselves.

The Information Bureau recognizes the need for more ideological work in the communist and workers' parties; more work to train communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism; irreconcilability to any departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and in the spirit of loyalty to people's democracy and socialism.

(For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, No. 28, November 29, 1949)

TO PRIME MINISTER CHOIBALSAN OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

November 28, 1949

On behalf of the government of the USSR and personally, I congratulate you and, through you, the friendly Mongolian people on the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of the Mongolian People's Republic. Over the years, the Mongolian people, through persistent toil, have eliminated the legacy of the past — a centuries-old backwardness — and have achieved significant success in improving the well-being and culture of their country.

I wish the friendly Mongolian people and their government continued success in economic and cultural development.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, November 28, 1949)

TO GENERAL ENVER HOXHA

December 2, 1949

Tirana

On the day of your national holiday — the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Albania — I personally send you, the Prime Minister, and the Albanian people my heartfelt congratulations. I wish the People's Republic of Albania new successes in its economic and cultural development.

J. Stalin

(Rabotnichesko Delo, December 2, 1949)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF MINISTERS OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC,
ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of
the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Support between the
USSR and the Czechoslovakian Republic*

December 13, 1949

To Mr. A. Zapotocky, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

On the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Czechoslovakian Republic, please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my friendly greetings to the people of the Czechoslovakian Republic, to your government and to you personally.

I wish the Czechoslovakian Republic well and the further strengthening of the alliance and friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovakian peoples.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 293, December 14, 1949)

FOURTH MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA

From Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin"

January 1950

Confrontation in Stalin's presence over disagreements of principle between the leadership of the Party of Labour of Albania and the leaders of the Greek Communist Party. Present were: Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov; Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu; Nicos Zachariades, Mitsos Partsalides. On the strategy and tactics of the Greek Democratic Army. Varkiza. The tactics of passive defence is the mother of defeat. Why the defeats at Vitsi and Gramos? On the leading role of the party in the army. The place and role of the commissar. Nicos Zachariades expresses his views. Stalin's evaluation.

During the talk I had with Comrade Stalin in Sukhumi, in November 1949, he asked me when we could meet the representatives of the Greek Communist Party to clear up the disagreements of principle between us and the leaders of that party. We were agreed on January, and after the Greek comrades agreed to this, the meeting took place in the beginning of January 1950 in Moscow, in the Kremlin. From the Soviet side the meeting was attended by Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov and a number of functionaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From our Party it was Mehmet Shehu and I, while from the Greek Communist Party Nicos Zachariades and Mitsos Partsalides. The meeting was held in Stalin's office.

Unpretentious and kindly as usual, Stalin welcomed us with a smile, rose from his desk and came to shake

hands with all of us in turn. He opened the talk by asking me:

“Comrade Hoxha, what have you to say about the comrades of the Greek Communist Party?”

At the same time he addressed the Greek comrades by saying:

“Let the Albanian comrades speak first, then comes your turn to put forward your opinions on what they will say.”

Taking the floor I said:

“Comrade Stalin, we have sent a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union about the disagreements over matters of principle we have with the Greek Communist Party, especially with its main leaders. We have requested this meeting in your presence in order for you to judge whether we are right or wrong in our views.”

“I am aware of the questions you have raised,” said Comrade Stalin, “but I would like you to repeat the problems you are concerned about here in the presence of the Greek comrades.”

“Of course I shall state here all the questions our Party has put forward in the letter we have sent you. We have discussed these questions with the Greek comrades, too, especially with Comrade Nicos Zachariades, with Comrade Ioannides, with General Vlantas, with Bardzotas, and other comrades of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party. I would like to begin by pointing out that we have had disagreements on a number of questions, but here I shall speak about the most important ones.”

“That is what we want, too,” stressed Stalin.

Then I began my expose:

“Our first disagreement with the Greek comrades was over the strategy and tactics of the war of the Greek Democratic Army. Both for us Albanians and for the Greek people, the war against Hitlerite and Italian

fascists was a liberation war, on which the fate of our peoples depended. We had to and did base this war on the heroic war of the Red Army of the Soviet Union. Right from the start, we Albanians were convinced that we would come out victorious, because our entire people had risen in a great liberation war, in which they had beside them the great Soviet Union, which would smash German nazism.

“Our Party supported the Soviet-British-American alliance, because, through to the end, it considered this an anti-fascist coalition to crush the German nazis. But at the same time we never created the illusion that the Anglo-American imperialists would be the loyal friends and allies of the Albanian people. On the contrary, while supporting the alliance in general, we made a radical distinction between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Americans from the beginning. With this I want to say that our Party, our army and the General Staff of our army not only never submitted to the dictate of the British and the Allied Mediterranean Headquarters, but even when we allowed them to give us advice, we took it with very great caution. We asked for weapons from the British but we saw they sent us very few. As you know, we waged partisan warfare, from which we went on later to big detachments up to the creation of the regular National Liberation Army.

“The Greek people fought under the same conditions as we. They rose against Italian fascist aggressors, drove them back, defeated them and even entered Albania. Although our Communist Party was not founded at that time, the communists and our people helped the Greeks in their war against fascist Italy, although they were under occupation themselves. However, with the intervention of the Hitlerite army in the war against Greece, the Greek monarchist army was forced to withdraw to its own territory and was defeated. After that period, the Greek people, led by the Greek Communist

Party, which created the EAM, organized the partisan units and other bigger units later, began the resistance and the National Liberation War.

“During the National Liberation War which they waged, our two peoples developed even closer fraternal relations. Friendly ties have existed between the Albanian and the Greek peoples from the past. As is known, many Albanians participated and played a very important role in the Greek revolution of the 20’s of the last century, led by Ypsilantes. However, this time the character of our war was the same and our communist parties were at the head of the peoples of our two countries. We established relations between ourselves, and even undertook military operations with combined fighting units against the German armies on Greek territory. Just as in our country, reaction in Greece, too, was strong and the occupiers were very well organized. This, too, was a phenomenon in common.

“On our part, we made efforts and achieved some results in isolating the heads of reaction and in winning over elements that had made mistakes from its ranks. I cannot say with precision how they acted in Greece, but we have criticized the comrades of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party because the EAM and they themselves committed a major political mistake of principle in subordinating the National Liberation War of the Greek people to the Anglo-American strategy and placing it virtually under the direction of the British and the Mediterranean Headquarters. We addressed our criticism to Comrade Nicos Zachariades personally.

“The person mainly to blame for this situation was Siantos, who in the absence of Zachariades — at that time imprisoned in German concentration camps, was acting General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party. When we pointed out this matter to Comrade Zachariades later, he did not give me a clear answer,

and leaned more to the view that mistakes had not been made. I persisted in the opinion of our Party, and in the end, I told Comrade Zachariades that Siantos was a provocateur, an agent of the British. Had Siantos been in our country,” I told Comrade Zachariades, “our Party would have put him on trial and sentenced him to the punishment he deserved, while you did not act that way. Of course, that is your business, but this is our opinion on this matter.

“As a conclusion, Comrade Nicos Zachariades agreed that ‘Siantos should not have acted as he did,’ that ‘the comrades had criticized him for this, however, they did not put him on trial, but only expelled him from the party,’ he said in the end.

“Pursuing this matter, I would like to point out that we have had a series of political, ideological and military talks with leading comrades of the Greek Communist Party, and this is understandable, because we were two communist parties and had the one strategic aim — the liberation of our countries from the nazi-fascist occupiers and the reactionary bourgeoisie of each country.

“We saw that, despite the outstanding bravery of the Greek partisans and their commanders, after Comrade Nicos Zachariades was released from the Hitlerite concentration camps, he occupied a leading position in ‘liberated’ Greece with the British army stationed there on the basis of the agreements signed earlier at Caserta and Cairo by representatives of the EAM, agreements which, in the end, led to the Varkiza agreement. Our Party did not agree with these actions of the Greek Communist Party, and considered them as a subordination of the Greek Democratic War, as a failure of its policy of liberation, and capitulation to Anglo-American reaction.

“What is more, at a mass rally in the Athens stadium, at which the chiefs of the Greek bourgeois parties

spoke in turn, Comrade Nicos Zachariades spoke, too, as leader of the Greek Communist Party, and declared among other things: 'If the other Greek democratic parties demand the autonomy of "Vorio-Epirus," the Greek Communist Party will associate itself with them'! Our Party immediately protested publicly and warned that it would combat such views mercilessly. Following this event, we invited Comrade Nicos Zachariades to a meeting, at which I criticized him severely, describing his statement as an anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian stand, and I made it very clear to him that "Vorio-Epirus" which was Albanian territory, would never become Greek territory. I want to say on this occasion that Comrade Nicos Zachariades acknowledged his mistake, admitted to us that he had made a grave error in this direction and promised to correct the mistake he had made.

"We may be wrong, but our opinion is that Marcos Vaphiades, whom they eliminated later, was a good communist and an able commander. Naturally, however, this is only an opinion of ours, which may be right or may be wrong, therefore we do not pretend to judge this, because, in the final analysis, this is a question which is not up to us, but to the Greek Communist Party, to judge.

"Our opposition to the leadership of the Greek Communist Party, with Comrade Zachariades at the head, is based, in the first place, on Varkiza, where the Greek Communist Party and the EAM signed the agreement which is nothing but a capitulation, a surrender of their arms. The Party of Labour of Albania described this act as a betrayal committed against the Greek Communist Party and the fraternal Greek people. Not only should Varkiza never have come to pass, but it should be sternly condemned. I have expressed this view long ago to Comrades Nicos Zachariades and Mitsos Partsalides, who was one of those who signed the agreement. We

have respect for these two Greek leading comrades, Zachariades and Partsalides, but this action, inspired and carried out by them, was absolutely wrong and caused the Greek people great harm.

“Nicos Zachariades has defended a thesis which is the opposite of ours on Varkiza. He has always insisted that it was not at all a capitulation, or a betrayal, but ‘an act which had to be done in order to gain time and allow them to seize power’.

“In connection with Varkiza, I asked Comrade Nicos Zachariades to explain the reasons for the condemnation and murder of Aris Velouchiotes, who, after the signing of the said agreement, set out to come to Albania in order to make contact with the Central Committee of our Party. Nicos Zachariades replied: ‘Although Aris Velouchiotes was a courageous general, he was a rebel, an anarchist, who did not accept the decision of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party on Varkiza, therefore we merely expelled him from the Central Committee of the Party. But what happened to him later, who killed him, etc.,’ Zachariades said, ‘we do not know. We assure you that we are not the authors of his assassination,’ he said. I have expressed to Comrade Nicos Zachariades our opinion that, without wanting in any way to interfere in their affairs and without knowing Aris personally, only judging from the fact that he was a valiant fighter of the Greek people, he should not have been condemned. ‘As for his assassination,’ I said, ‘we believe what you have told us, but on this score, too, we have some contradictions with you, because we are consistent on the Varkiza question.’

“As Marxist-Leninists, we were very sorry for the Greek people, with whom we had collaborated during the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War, therefore, later, at the moments when they were again faced with the question of liberation or slavery, we wanted to con-

tinue this collaboration.

“I do not want to speak here about the international support and backing which we gave the Greek Communist Party and the Greek National Liberation War, despite the very difficult conditions with which our country, just liberated from the occupiers, had to cope. Let the Greek comrades speak about this. Despite our great poverty, when the time came, we did everything we could to provide food and shelter to help the Greek refugees who had entered our territory. The fact that Albania was a friendly liberated country, where the people and the Party of Labour of Albania had come to power, a thing which enabled the Greek Democratic Army to feel secure and defended on its north-western flank, was of great assistance to the Greek Democratic Army.

“After the capitulation at Varkiza, the Greek National Liberation War was resumed. The Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party held its plenary meeting to which delegates from our Party were invited, and we sent Mehmet Shehu there. On this occasion, changes were made in the leadership, however all these were internal questions of the Greek Communist Party. We simply rejoiced over and encouraged the fierce attacks launched all over Greece against the monarcho-fascists, who, seeing the danger of the situation created, went over from reliance on the British to reliance on the Americans. The United States of America sent the notorious general Van Fleet, whom they considered a consummate strategist, to command its army in Greece.

“We have had contradictions with Zachariades, Bardzotas and Ioannides over the character of the war that the Greek Democratic Army should have waged against the numerous regular forces of Greek reaction, armed with most modern means of warfare by the American imperialists. Thus, there has been a contra-

diction over principles between our two parties on this question, too. On the basis of our National Liberation War, we think that the Greek Democratic War should not have been transformed into a frontal war, but should have retained the character of a partisan war, fought with small and large units. In this way, Van Fleet's superior forces would not have been able to liquidate the Greek Democratic Army, but, on the contrary, this army would have harassed and attacked these forces from all quarters with the tactics of partisan warfare, inflicted losses and gradually weakened them, until it had prepared the counter-offensive. We supported the thesis that the Greek partisan war should have been based on the people, while the weapons should have been captured from the enemy.

“Zachariades' views on strategy were in opposition to ours. The comrades of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party not only described the regrouping of the national liberation partisan forces, which they managed to carry out, as a 'regular' and 'modern' army in form, but they also claimed that they had equipped it with the strategy and tactics of the frontal war of a regular army. In our opinion, the forces which they regrouped were, in fact, just a partisan army, which they did not succeed in equipping either with the partisan tactics, or with the tactics of a regular army. On the other hand, in their military operations the Greek comrades followed the tactics of passive defence which is the mother of defeat. This, in our opinion, was a grave mistake of the leading comrades of the Greek Communist Party, who have proceeded from the incorrect principle that partisan warfare has no final objective, that is, does not lead to the seizure of power. From the talks we have had with them, we have formed the opinion that the Greek comrades conceive partisan war as a war of isolated guerilla units of 10-15 men, which, according to them, have no prospect of growth and develop-

ment into brigades, divisions, army corps, etc. This is not correct. As the experience of every such war has shown, and as our National Liberation War confirmed, provided it is well led, partisan warfare with small units grows gradually as the war develops, as the revolutionary drive of the masses gathers impetus, and thus reaches the stage of the general armed uprising and the creation of a regular people's army. But the comrades of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party stubbornly defended their views and categorically excluded the necessity for the expansion and strengthening of partisan war in Greece. We have not accepted and do not accept these views of theirs. Allow me to express our opinion about how the situation presented itself at the time when the Greek Communist Party went underground and had to begin the war anew: At that time, the ELAS* detachments had surrendered their arms, their bases had been destroyed, they lacked clothing, food, weapons; the morale of the ELAS fighters had declined, the movement was in retreat. From the outset, the Greek Communist Party described precisely these regrouped forces as a 'regular' and 'modern' army which, according to them, could fight with the strategy and tactics of a modern army and withstand open frontal war with an enemy ten times its strength. We think that this partisan army should have fought according to the partisan tactics, as our teachers — Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, teach us. How can this regrouping of partisan forces which the Greek Communist Party carried out, be called a regular army when it did not have the necessary cadres, tanks, aircraft, artillery, means of communication, clothing, food, or even the most necessary light weapons?! We think that these views of the Greek comrades are wrong.

“While calling this regrouping of partisan forces a

* The Greek National Liberation Army.

regular army equipped, according to them, with ‘the fighting strategy and tactics of a regular army’ (strategy and tactics which were never applied in reality), the leadership of the Greek Communist Party also did not think seriously, in a Marxist manner, about how this army would be supplied. The Greek comrades said: ‘There is no possibility of capturing our weapons from the enemy.’ But such views, in our opinion, are contrary to the teachings of Lenin, who said that in no instance should you wait for aid from abroad, or from on high, but you must secure everything for yourselves; that in no instance should the organization or re-organization of detachments be neglected on the pretext of lack of weapons, etc. The comrades of the Greek leadership, underrating the enemy, thought that the seizure of power was an easy thing and could be done without protracted and bloody battles, and without sound, all-round organization. These views of the Greek comrades brought other bitter consequences which caused their ultimate defeat, but the astonishing thing is that, even in the recent talks we have had with them, they consider their views correct.

“However, in our opinion based on facts, the tactics and strategy for the war which Comrade Nicos upholds are wrong. In the conversation I had with Comrade Zachariades, he claimed that the units of the Greek Democratic Army could not penetrate deep into Greek territory, because the monarcho-fascists and Van Fleet had burned the villages and had deported the population, so that, according to him, all the inhabited centres were deserted. I told him that such a thing could occur, but not to the proportions Zachariades claimed. This was my opinion based on the logic of facts, because obviously, the monarcho-fascists and the American army could not possibly clear the population from all the inhabited areas of Greece.

“Likewise we disagreed with the claims and views

expressed in a letter of the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party addressed to the Political Bureau of our Party, in which the Greek leaders, wanting to avoid going deeply into their mistakes and wanting to hide them, claim that their defeats stem from their not being supplied with weapons, ammunition and clothing in the necessary quantities and that the enemy had domination in the air and on the sea and was amply supplied by the Anglo-Americans. The truth is that the enemy was much better supplied and had superior strength in men and matériel. However, in such a case, when you are conducting a war against internal reaction and foreign military intervention, the best course is that the enemy should become the greatest source of supplies. The Greek Democratic Army ought to have captured its weapons from the enemy, but these weapons could not be captured by following the tactic of defensive warfare, of passive defence. Nevertheless, we think that the basic question is not one of supplies. We think that, in rejecting the tactics of partisan warfare and its development to the general armed uprising and the seizure of power, the leadership of the Greek Communist Party has applied a defensive and passive tactic which is unacceptable either in a partisan war or in a frontal war with regular armies. By pursuing such a tactic, the Greek Democratic Army, apart from other things, deprived itself of the possibility of extending to other areas of the country where it would certainly have found an inexhaustible source of supply of manpower in the sons and daughters of the people, and likewise deprived itself of the possibility of capturing its weapons from the enemy through ceaseless, rapid, well-thought actions, carried out where the enemy least expected them. Marxism-Leninism teaches us that there must be no playing at armed insurrection, and the history of so many wars has confirmed that the defensive spells death for any armed uprising. If it remains on the de-

fensive, the uprising is very quickly crushed by a more powerful and better equipped enemy.

“In our opinion, the very tactic the Greek comrades employed confirms this. The biggest active forces of the Greek Democratic Army were kept permanently within the fortified sectors of Vitsi and Gramos. These forces were trained for defensive trench warfare, and a frontal war with the enemy army was imposed on them at the wish of their leadership and they accepted it. The Greek comrades thought they would take power by means of defensive and passive war. In our opinion, power could not be taken by defending yourselves at Gramos. The only manoeuvre the Greek Communist Party made (and this was imposed on it by the circumstances) was that in the battle at Gramos in 1948, where the truly heroic Greek partisans resisted for seventy days on end, inflicted losses in men on the enemy, but in the end, in order to escape encirclement and annihilation, broke out from Gramos and went over to Vitsi. However, this was still far from the seizure of power. The Greek Democratic Army should have carried out attacks to capture cities. This was not achieved. At that time, too, the Greek comrades claimed that they lacked the forces. This may be true, but why did they lack forces and where should they have found them? The Greek comrades did not analyse this problem deeply and did not solve it, either at that time, or later, in the proper Marxist-Leninist way. The tactics of the Greek comrades, as they put it in the letter of their Political Bureau addressed to our Political Bureau, was to hold Vitsi and Gramos at any cost, as their base for the further development of the war, and they made success in war dependent exclusively on supplies, but without ever finding the correct way to secure those supplies by fighting.

“Thus, suffering defeat after defeat, the Greek Democratic Army was forced to retreat and entrenched

itself again in the zones of Vitsi and Gramos. This was a very critical phase, both for the Greek Democratic Army and for our country. During this period we followed the activities of the Greek comrades with great attention. Before the final offensive of the monarcho-fascists against the Greek Democratic Army, the comrades of the Greek leadership were of the opinion that their political and military situation was absolutely excellent, whereas that of the enemy, according to them, was utterly desperate. According to them, 'Vitsi is extremely well fortified and impregnable to the enemy; if the enemy attacks Vitsi, it has signed its death warrant. Vitsi will become the graveyard of the monarcho-fascists. The enemy has to launch this offensive because it has no other way out, it is on the brink of disaster. Let the monarcho-fascist army and the army of Van Fleet attack whenever they like, we shall smash them'.

"Comrade Vlantas held that the enemy would direct the main blow against Gramos and not against Vitsi, because 'Gramos is less fortified, as it is situated on the border with Albania, and the enemy, after defeating us there, will turn back to attack us at Vitsi, because it thinks it can annihilate us there, since it borders on Yugoslavia. After fighting at Gramos and inflicting great losses on the enemy, we shall manoeuvre with our forces from Gramos in order to attack the enemy forces at Vitsi from the rear'.

"But a little before the final attack, we informed the Greek comrades that the enemy would launch their attack on the 10th of August on Vitsi and not on Gramos. This information enabled the Greek comrades to avoid being caught by surprise, and to take measures in time. However, even after this, they still believed that the main blow would be directed against Gramos. According to them, the enemy attack on Vitsi, and not on Gramos, 'changes nothing for us. We have taken all measures both at Vitsi and at Gramos. Vitsi is impreg-

nable,' they thought, 'it is extremely well fortified. All the roads through which the enemy might attempt to pass have been made impassable. The enemy cannot bring his heavy weapons into the Vitsi zone, victory is ours.'

"These were the views of the Greek comrades two days before the enemy attack on Vitsi. Within one day the monarcho-fascists captured the third line of defence at Vitsi and Vitsi was reduced in a matter of two or three days. There was very little fighting and resistance. This came as a great surprise to us. However, we had taken all measures for defence against an eventual attack on our territory by the monarcho-fascists. The Greek comrades, and Comrade Partsalides, who is present here, were not really convinced about the need for the defensive measures we had taken, and called them hasty on our part. The Greek comrades were not realistic. Many refugees, among them democratic soldiers, who were routed, were forced to cross our border. What could we do?! We accepted them and accommodated them in allocated places.

"The analysis which the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party made of the defeat at Vitsi did not satisfy us. We think that a thorough analysis was required, because grave mistakes were made there. After the retreat from Vitsi, Comrade Zachariades based the prospect of victory on Gramos. 'Gramos,' he said, 'is more favourable to us than Vitsi. The tanks, which were the decisive factor in the victory of the monarcho-fascists at Vitsi, cannot manoeuvre at Gramos,' etc.

"It must be said that at that time Tito's betrayal had become known. Later Zachariades claimed, 'The only ones who gave the Greek refugees asylum were the Albanians, the Yugoslavs not only did not permit the refugees to cross into their territory, but even opened fire on them from behind.' Possibly this may have been so, we cannot say anything about it.

“In a talk with Comrade Zachariades about the retreat from Vitsi, I again raised the question of their mistakes and the inability of the Greek Communist Party, and in particular, of the commander of Vitsi, general Vlantas, to form an objective picture of the situation. ‘His ideas,’ I said to Nicos, ‘have been proved wrong. The fact that the Greek Democratic Army was unable to defend Vitsi, proved this.’

“Nicos Zachariades contradicted me, saying that Vitsi fell because of the mistake of a commander, who had not placed the battalion allocated at one part of the front and failed to appear himself at his position in the fighting. Thus, according to Nicos, this commander was the cause of the defeat at Vitsi, therefore, he told me, ‘We took measures and condemned him.’ This was a very simplistic explanation on the part of Comrade Nicos for such a major defeat.

“I told him frankly and in a comradely way that I could not believe such a thing.

‘Believe me or not, that’s how it is,’ Nicos said.

“Nevertheless, I continued: ‘What is to be done now?’

“Nicos answered: ‘We’ll fight.’

‘But where will you fight?’

‘At Gramos, which is an impregnable fortress.’

“I asked the question: ‘Do you intend to place the whole Greek Democratic Army there?’

‘Yes,’ replied Nicos Zachariades, ‘we shall send it all back to Gramos.’

“I said, ‘You know your own business and it is you who decide, but our opinion is that Gramos can resist no longer, therefore all those brave fighters of the Greek Democratic Army of whom you are the leader, should not be sacrificed in vain. You must handle your own affairs as seems best to you, however, as we are your comrades and friends, we would like you to summon Comrade Bardzotas, the commander of the Greek

troops at Gramos, and discuss this matter with him.' Nicos opposed this idea of mine and told me that this was impossible.

"We know what happened later. Gramos became the final defeat of the Greek Democratic Army.

"The forces at Gramos were routed in four days. In our opinion, the war was not organized there. A completely passive defence was maintained. We do not exclude that fierce fighting may have occurred at some places such as Polje and Kamenik, where some soldiers of the Greek Democratic Army resisted with heroism. With the exception of the Kamenik forces the whole retreat from Gramos was disorderly, like that from Vitsi. Among the officers and men of the Greek Democratic Army there was murmuring about the wrong defensive tactics employed at Gramos. Comrade Zachariades has confirmed this to us.

"We think that at the battles of Gramos and Vitsi the comrades of the Greek leadership did not keep in mind the Marxist-Leninist principles of people's war. The monarcho-fascist columns reached their predetermined positions with great speed and unmolested. They swept through the mountain crags and encircled the democratic forces, who stayed in their trenches and did not counter-attack; the enemy attacked, drove the partisans out of the trenches and occupied the fortifications. The command of the Greek Democratic Army had dispersed its forces in fortified positions and failed to use its reserves to counterattack and smash the enemy offensive by means of continual attacks and rapid manoeuvring. We think that their erroneous views on the tactic of the war brought about their defeat. The men were capable of what was required of them, they were old partisans, tested in battle, with high morale, who fought heroically.

"On the other hand, by applying its tactics of passive defence the leadership of the Greek Communist

Party allowed the monarcho-fascist army to regroup and reorganize, failed to attack in order to hinder the preparations of the enemy and bring about the failure, or at least, the weakening of its offensive, so as to allow the active forces of the Greek Democratic Army to manoeuvre on a large scale and strike incessantly at the enemy forces everywhere. These are some of the reasons which, in our opinion, caused the recent defeats at Gramos and Vitsi. In its analysis of the defeat at Vitsi, the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party says, 'the leadership has grave responsibility', but it says nothing about where this responsibility lies and, moreover, goes on to shed this responsibility in all directions. We think that this is not a Marxist-Leninist analysis.

"To achieve success in their war, the Greek comrades should not have followed the tactic of passive defence, but should have thoroughly applied the Marxist-Leninist principles on the armed uprising. The tactic that should have been followed, we believe, had to have the aim of damaging the enemy forces incessantly and in many directions, of making the situation insecure for the enemy at all times, obliging them to disperse their forces, striking panic and terror amongst them, and making it impossible for them to control the situation. Thus, the revolutionary war of the Greek people would have grown continuously, would have alarmed the enemy at first and then would have made it lose control of the situation, would have liberated whole regions and zones and subsequently gone over to the next objective, i.e., the general uprising and the liberation of the whole country. In this way, the partisan war in Greece had the prospect of development.

"In the talks we have had with them, we have frequently told the Greek comrades in a comradely manner that the Greek Partisan Army must try to capture its armaments from the enemy in battle; must fight with

the weapons of the enemy and secure its food and clothing from the people, together with whom and for whom it must fight.

“We have told our Greek comrades that, first of all, the Partisan Army must be linked with the people from whom it has become separated and without whom it cannot exist. The people must be taught to fight together with the army and to assist it and love it as their own liberator. This is an essential condition. The people must be taught that they must not surrender to the enemy, and the ranks of the army should be strengthened with men and women, the sons and daughters of the people, by Greece itself.

“Likewise, we have told the Greek comrades in a comradely manner that the leading role of the party in the Greek Partisan Army must be ensured more firmly; the political commissar of the company, battalion, brigade and division should be the true representative of the party, and as such should have the right to command, just the same as the commander. But we have noticed and have often pointed out to the Greek comrades that they have not taken a correct view of the leading role of the party in the army. On this problem I have expressed the opinion of our Party to Comrade Stalin previously and we deal with this again in the letter we have sent him. Failure to understand the leading role of the party in the army, we think, was one of the main reasons which led to the defeat of the Greek Democratic Army in the war. We always proceed from the Marxist-Leninist teaching that the commander and the political commissar form an entity which directs the military actions and the political education of the units, that they are equally responsible for the situation of their detachment from every viewpoint, that both of them, the commander and the commissar, lead their unit, their detachment in the fighting.

“Without the political commissar we would not

have had the Red Army, Lenin teaches us. We followed these principles in our National Liberation Army and follow them now in our People's Army. In the Greek National Liberation Army, ELAS, the joint command of the commander and the commissar existed, but this was not properly implemented in practice. The pressure of erroneous bourgeois views of career officers, who could not tolerate trusted people of the party in command alongside them, brought about that, at that time, the role of the commissar in command in the Greek Democratic Army was overshadowed and relegated to second place. This is a consequence of the views of the leaders of the Greek Communist Party on the 'regular army.' The comrades of the Greek leadership try to justify the elimination of the role of the political commissar by taking the army of some other country as an example, but we think that the Greek comrades are not realistic on this question.

"Such mistakes were noticed even after the Greek National Liberation Army resumed the war. Since the dismissal of General Marcos this army had not had a Commander-in-chief. We think that such a situation was not correct. With us, the General Secretary of the Party has been and is simultaneously Commander-in-chief of the Army. We think this is correct. In time of peace perhaps it may not be so, possibly the Minister of Defence might fill this position, but in the conditions of the Greek Democratic Army, when it was still at war, there should have been a Commander-in-chief of the army, and we thought and still think, on the basis of our experience, that this political and military function belongs to the General Secretary of the Party. We have frequently expressed this view of ours to the Greek comrades. The reasons which the Greek comrades have given us to show why they did not act in that way are unconvincing. The Greek comrades have told us, 'Comrade Zachariades is very modest', or

‘we had bitter experience with Tito who was General Secretary, Prime Minister and Supreme Commander of the army simultaneously.’ It seems to us that this is not a question of modesty; this has no connection, either, with what they say about Tito, behind which, it seems to us that something else is insinuated.

“We were astonished at a number of secret forms which the Greek comrades used, but we saw that the reality was quite different. We cannot explain these except with our impression that among the Greek comrades there was confusion, opportunism, false modesty and hiding of the leading role of the party. Perhaps, the General Secretary of the Party need not be Commander-in-chief of the army, but that an army at war should not have a Commander-in-chief, as was the case of the Greek Democratic Army after the dismissal of Marcos, has always seemed wrong to us.

“The Greek comrades make no one responsible for this situation and for the subsequent defeats. They divide the responsibility, attributing it to both the guilty and the innocent. They put the blame on all the party members of the Greek Communist Party who have fought and are fighting heroically. We think that the comrades of the Greek leadership are afraid to make a thorough analysis of these mistakes, which we consider grave ones, are afraid to put the finger on the sore spot. We also think that among some Greek comrades of the leadership there is lack of criticism and self-criticism, and that they protect one another in a ‘comradely way’ over the mistakes they have made.

“The comrades of the Greek leadership have been opposed to our opinions, which we have expressed to them in a comradely manner as internationalist communists who are fighting for the same cause, who have great common interests, and who were profoundly sympathetic to the cause of the Greek people’s war. They have not welcomed our criticisms.

“Comrade Nicos Zachariades has raised many unpleasant things against us, which, of course, we have rejected. His declaration over ‘Vorio-Epirus’, which I mentioned in the beginning, is already known. Apart from other things, he quarrelled with us, accusing us of allegedly having requisitioned the Greek trucks which were used to transport the Greek refugees and their belongings and demanded that we mobilized our trucks, too, for their needs. It is quite true that we used the Greek trucks to take the Greek refugees to the places allocated to them. We accepted the Greek refugees and sent them to Northern Albania, where, regardless of our own difficulties, we had to supply food for them, that is, to share the bread from our own mouths with them. As to our means of transport, our park of trucks was very small and we needed them to send supplies to all parts of Albania.

“The Greek comrades also criticize us for not giving priority to the unloading of the material aid, such as clothing, food, tents, blankets, etc., which came to our ports for the Greek refugees before they left Albania. This is not true. The aid which came on ships from abroad for the Greek refugees was sometimes stowed under the cargo that came for us. In such cases obviously we had to unload the goods on top first and then those below. It could not be done otherwise; we do not know of any method of unloading a ship beginning from the bottom.

“However, these were minor disagreements which could be overcome, as they were. The decisive questions were those relating to the political and military line of the Greek Communist Party during the years of the war, about which I spoke earlier.

“Not only have the Greek comrades not accepted our views and criticisms, but we have the impression that they have taken them amiss, and indeed, in their letter to our Political Bureau some time ago, they make

an impermissible and anti-Marxist comparison between our principled views and stands and the views of the Titoites. In their distortion of the views expressed by us about the battle of Vitsi and Gramos, in order to adapt them to their own incorrect reasoning, the Greek leading comrades, in our opinion, have the aim of hiding the mistakes made on their part. We understand the grave moments the leadership of the Greek Communist Party has gone through following the defeat at Vitsi and Gramos, and the sense of frustration and anger which exists among them, but such grave and unfounded charges are unacceptable to us, and they should have been considered and weighed up well before they were made, especially by the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Greece.

“Following these accusations, which our Political Bureau considered dispassionately, we thought that the departure of the few Greek democratic refugees who were still in Albania had become even more necessary.

“Whether we are right or wrong in these stands and views we have maintained, let Comrade Stalin tell us. We are ready to acknowledge any possible mistake and to make self-criticism.”

Comrade Stalin interrupted me saying:

“You must not reject a comrade when he is down.”

“You are right, Comrade Stalin,” I replied, “but I assure you that we have never rejected the Greek comrades. The questions which we raised for discussion had great importance both for the Greek army and for us. The Central Committee of our Party could not permit the Greek Communist Party to have the centre of its activities in Albania, nor could it permit their troops to be organized and trained in our country in order to resume the war in Greece. I have said this, in a comradely way, to Comrade Nicos Zachariades, who had previously asked that the Greek refugees should go to other countries, which in fact is what has happened with the

majority of the refugees. The reference was to a limited number of them who were still in our country. We have never raised the question of expelling the Greek refugees from our country. However, apart from the request made by Comrade Nicos himself, that the refugees go to other countries, logic forced us to the conclusion that, in the existing situation, even those who had remained absolutely must leave Albania.

“These were some of the problems which I wanted to raise, and which we have raised both with the Greek comrades and in the letter addressed to you earlier, Comrade Stalin.”

“Have you finished?” Comrade Stalin asked.

“I have finished,” I said.

Then he called on Comrade Zachariades to speak.

He began to defend Varkiza, stressing that the agreement signed there was not a mistake and expounded on this theme. He had expressed these same views to me previously.

In order to explain the reason for the defeat, amongst other things, Zachariades raised the question: “If we had known in 1946 that Tito was going to betray, we would not have started the war against the Greek monarcho-fascists.” Then he added some other “reasons” in order to explain the defeat, repeating that they lacked armaments, that though the Albanians had shared their own bread with the refugees, nevertheless they had raised obstacles, and so on. Zachariades raised some second-rate problems as questions of principle. Then he mentioned our request (which he himself had raised earlier) that those Greek democratic refugees who still remained should also leave Albania. According to him, this put an end to the Greek National Liberation War.

On this occasion, I want to express my impression that Comrade Nicos Zachariades was very intelligent and cultured, but, in my opinion, not sufficiently a Marxist. Despite the defeat they had suffered, he began

to speak in defence of the strategy and tactics followed by the Greek Democratic Army, insisting that this strategy and tactics had been correct, that they could not have acted otherwise. He dwelt at length on this question. Thus, each of us stuck to his own position.

This is what Nicos Zachariades said. He spoke at least as long as I did, if not longer.

Comrade Stalin and the other Soviet leading comrades listened to him attentively, too.

After Nicos, Comrade Stalin asked Mitsos Partsalides:

“Have you any opinion to express on what Comrade Enver Hoxha and Comrade Nicos Zachariades have said?”

“I have nothing apart from what Comrade Nicos put forward,” said Partsalides, adding that they were awaiting the judgement of the Soviet comrades and the Bolshevik Party on these questions.

Then Stalin began to speak in the familiar calm way, just as we have known him whenever we have met him. He spoke in simple, direct, and extremely clear terms. He said that the Greek people had waged a heroic war, during which they had displayed their courage, but that there had also been mistakes.

“As regards Varkiza, the Albanians are right,” Stalin pointed out, and after analysing this problem, added: “You Greek comrades must understand that Varkiza was a major mistake. You should not have signed it and should not have laid down your arms, because it has inflicted great harm on the Greek people’s war.

“As regards the assessment of the strategy and tactics you followed in the Greek Democratic War, although it was a heroic war, again I think that the Albanian comrades are right. You ought to have waged a partisan war, and then, from the phase of this war should have gone over to frontal war.

“I criticized Comrade Enver Hoxha, telling him that

he must not reject a comrade when he is down, however, from what we heard here, it turns out that the Albanian comrades have maintained a correct stand towards your views and actions. The circumstances which had been created and the conditions of Albania were such that you could not stay in that country, because in this way the independence of the People's Republic of Albania might have been placed in jeopardy.

"We complied with your request that all the Greek democratic refugees go to other countries and now all of them have been removed. Everything else, including the weapons, ammunition, etc., which the Albanian comrades took from those Greek democratic soldiers who crossed the border and entered Albania, belonged to Albania," Stalin emphasized. "Therefore, those weapons must remain in Albania," he said, "because, by accepting the Greek democratic soldiers, even though it disarmed them, still that country endangered its own independence.

"As regards your opinion, according to which, 'If we had known in 1946 that Tito was going to betray, we would not have started the war against the monarcho-fascists,' this is wrong," Stalin pointed out, "because you must fight for the freedom of the people, even when you are encircled. However, it must be recognized that you were not in a situation of encirclement, because on your northern flank you had Albania and Bulgaria; all supported your just war. This is what we think," concluded Comrade Stalin and added:

"What do you Albanian comrades, Hoxha and Shehu, think?"

"We accept all your views," we replied.

"And you Greek comrades, Zachariades and Partsalides, what do you say?"

Comrade Nicos said:

"You have helped us greatly. Now we understand that we have not acted correctly and will try to correct

our mistakes,” and so on.

“Very good,” Stalin said. “Then, this matter is considered closed.”

When we all were about to leave, Molotov intervened saying to Nicos Zachariades:

“I have something to say to you, Comrade Nicos. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has received a letter from a comrade of yours, in which he writes that ‘Nicos Zachariades is an agent of the British.’ It is not up to us to solve this question, but we cannot keep it a secret without informing you about its content, especially when accusations against a leading comrade of the Greek Communist Party are made in it. Here is the letter. What can you say about this?”

“I can explain this matter,” replied Nicos Zachariades, and said: “When the Soviet troops released us from the concentration camp, I reported to the Soviet command with a request to be sent to Athens as soon as possible, because my place was there. Those were decisive moments and I had to be in Greece. At that time, however, your command had no means to transport me. So I was obliged to go to the British command where I asked them to send me to my homeland. The British put me on an aircraft, and that is how I returned to Greece. This comrade considers my return home with the help of the British command as though I have become an agent of the British, which is untrue.”

Stalin intervened and said:

“That’s clear. This question is settled, too. The meeting is over!”

Stalin got up, shook hands with all of us in turn and we started to leave. The room was a long one and when we reached the exit door, Stalin called to us:

“Wait a moment, comrades! Embrace each other, Comrade Hoxha and Comrade Zachariades!”

We embraced.

When we were outside, Mitsos Partsalides remarked:

“There is no one like Stalin, he behaved like a father to us. Now everything is clear.”

Thus, the confrontation in the presence of Stalin was over.

(E. Hoxha, *With Stalin*, pp. 163-200)

OPEN LETTER FROM STALIN AND HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES TO THE DISTRICT ELECTION COMMISSIONS

*On the occasion of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of
the USSR of March 12, 1950*

February 17, 1950

Open letter to the District Election Commissions.

All of the undersigned have received telegrams from different works, kolkhozes and election councils of electors of the different areas and districts, about our nominations as deputy candidates to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in a whole series of election districts.

We thank all the electors that nominated us as candidates for giving us their trust.

We hold it necessary, however, to declare that, by law, each of us may stand for election in only one election district; we, as communists and members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), have got to follow the directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) has instructed us to withdraw our candidature in other districts and to stand for election in the following election districts:

Andreyev, A.A. — for the Union Soviet in the election district of Aschchabad, Turkmenian SSR.

Beria, L.P. — for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of the city of Tsibilisk, Georgian SSR.

Budyonny, S.M. — for the Union Soviet in the electoral district of Shepetovka, Ukrainian SSR.

Bulganin, N.A. — for the National Soviet in the Moscow city electoral district.

Voroshilov, K.E. — for the Union Soviet in the Minsk city electoral district, Byelorussian SSR.

Kaganovich, L.M. — for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district of the city of Tashkent, Usbek SSR.

Kosygin, A.N. — for the National Soviet in the Ivanovo election district.

Malenkov, G.M. — for the Union Soviet in the Leningrad election district of the city of Moscow.

Mikoyan, A.J. — for the National Soviet in the Stalin electoral district of Yerevan, Armenian SSR.

Mikhailov, N.A. — for the National Soviet in the Stavropoli electoral district.

Molotov, V.M. — for the Union Soviet in the Molotov electoral district in the city of Moscow.

Ponomarenko, P.K. — for the Union Soviet in the Minsk-Land electoral district, Byelorussian SSR.

Stalin, J.V. — for the Union Soviet in the Stalin electoral district in the city of Moscow,

Suslov, M.A. — for the Union Soviet in the Lenin electoral district in the city of Saratov.

Khrushchev, N.S. — for the Union Soviet in the Kalinin electoral district of the city of Moscow.

Shvernik, N.M. — for the National Soviet in the Sverdlovsk electoral district.

Shkiryatov, M.F. — for the National Soviet in the Tula-Ryasan electoral district.

We follow these directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

We ask the appropriate electoral districts to take notice of this declaration and to take it into consideration in their documents of registration of deputy candidates.

Andreyev, A.A., Beria, L.P., Budyonny, S.M., Bulgainin, N.A., Voroshilov, K.E., Kaganovich, L.M., Kosygin, A.N., Malenkov, G.M., Mikoyan, A.J., Mikhailov, N.A., Molotov, V.M., Ponomarenko, P.K., Stalin, J.V., Suslov, M.A., Khrushchev, N.S., Shvernik, N.M., Shkiryatov, M.F.

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 43, February 19, 1950)

CONVERSATION ON QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

February 22, 1950

There are two versions of the political economy textbook layout. However, there are no fundamental differences between the two versions in their approach to issues of political economy and in the interpretation of these issues. Therefore, there is no basis for having two versions. There is Leontiev's version, and this version should be taken as the basis.

The textbook should provide specific criticism of contemporary theories of American imperialism. Articles on this issue were published in *Bolshevik* and *Issues of Economics*.

People who are not literate in economic matters do not distinguish between the People's Republic of China and the people's democracies of Central and Southeastern Europe, for example, the Polish People's Democratic Republic. However, these are different things.

What does people's democracy mean? It includes, at least, such features: 1) political power in the hands of the proletariat, 2) nationalization of industry, 3) the leading role of communist and workers' parties, 4) the construction of socialism not only in the city but also in the countryside. In China, there is no need to talk about the construction of socialism in either the city or the countryside. Some enterprises are nationalized, but this is a drop in the ocean. The main mass of industrial goods for the population is produced by artisans. There are about 30 million artisans in China. There are serious differences between the countries of people's democracy and the People's Republic of China: 1) in China, there is a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, roughly what the Bolsheviks spoke about in 1904-05; 2) in China, there was the oppression of for-

eign bourgeoisie, so the national Chinese bourgeoisie is partly revolutionary; because of this, a coalition with the national bourgeoisie is permissible, the communists in China have a bloc with the bourgeoisie. This is not unnatural; Marx also had a bloc with the bourgeoisie in 1848 when he edited the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, but it didn't last long; 3) in China, there is still a task to deal with feudal relations; in this regard, the Chinese revolution resembles the French bourgeois revolution of 1789; 4) the peculiarity of the Chinese revolution is that the communist party is at the head of the state.

Therefore, it can be said that in China, there is a people's democratic republic, currently at the first stage of its development.

The confusion in this matter is explained by the fact that our cadres do not have a deep economic education.

A decision is made to instruct the commission, consisting of comrades Malenkov, Leontiev, Ostrovityanov and Yudin, to refine the textbook layout within one month.

(ARAN, F. 1705, On. 1, D. 166, L. 29-30)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE ROMANIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU
GROZA**

*On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing
of the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual
Assistance*

March 1950

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my thanks for your good wishes on the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance. I am convinced that this treaty will continue to strengthen the alliance and friendship between the peoples of our countries.

Please accept my best wishes for you and the Romanian government.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 59, March 10, 1950)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS'
PARTY AND THE HUNGARIAN
GOVERNMENT AND TO THE
PRESIDIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY**

April 1950

I ask the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the People's Republic of Hungary to accept my sincere thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Hungary by the Soviet army.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 86, April 13, 1950)

CONVERSATION ON QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

April 24, 1950

I would like to make some critical remarks about the new layout of the political economy textbook.*

I have read about 100 pages related to pre-capitalist formations and capitalism. I looked a bit into the “Socialism” section, but I will talk about socialism another time. Today I want to highlight some shortcomings related to the sections on capitalism and pre-capitalist formations. The work of the commission has gone in the wrong direction. I said that we need to take the first version of the textbook layout as the basis. However, it seems that they understood this as meaning that the textbook does not need any special corrections. This is incorrect. Serious corrections are required.

The first and main drawback of the textbook, revealing a complete misunderstanding of Marxism, is that the question of the manufacturing and machine periods of capitalism is incorrectly presented. The section on the manufacturing period of capitalism is inflated, dedicating 10 pages to it and placing it above the machine period. Essentially, there is no machine period of capitalism in the textbook; it has disappeared.

The machine period is not highlighted in a separate chapter; it is given only a few pages in the chapter “Capital and Surplus Value.” Take Marx’s *Capital*. In *Capital*, the manufacturing period of capitalism takes up 28 pages, while the machine period is given a significant

* The text of this conversation is compiled from the notes of L.A. Leontiev, K.V. Ostrovityanov, D.T. Shepilov and P.F. Yudin. There is another version recorded by K.V. Ostrovityanov, which is more concise and compositionally different from this version (See: ARAN. F. 1705. Op. 1. D. 166. L. 31-35).

chapter — 110 pages. In other chapters, Marx also talks a lot about the machine period of capitalism. A Marxist like Lenin, in his work *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, paid primary attention to the machine period. There is no capitalism without machines. Machines are the main revolutionary force that transformed society. The textbook does not show what the system of machines is; there is literally one word about the system of machines. Therefore, the entire picture of the development of capitalism received distorted coverage.

Manufacturing is based on handicraft, manual labour. The machine eliminates manual labour. Machine production is large-scale production based on the machine system.

It should be kept in mind that our cadres, our youth — these are people with 7 to 10 years of education. They are interested in everything. They can delve into Marx's *Capital*, into Lenin's works; they will ask: why is it not presented as in Marx and Lenin? This is the main drawback. The history of capitalism should be presented according to Marx and Lenin. The textbook needs a special chapter on the machine period, and the chapter on manufacturing should be condensed.

The second major drawback of the textbook is that it does not provide an analysis of wages. The main questions are not covered. Wages are presented in the section on monopoly capitalism only according to Marx. There is no analysis of wages in the conditions of monopoly capitalism. A lot of time has passed since Marx.

What are wages? They are the minimum subsistence plus some savings. We need to show what the subsistence minimum is, nominal and real wages, demonstrate it vividly and convincingly. We are currently in a battle with capitalism based on wages. Take real-life facts from modern life. In France, where the currency is falling, millions are earned, but you can't buy anything with them. The English boast about having the highest

wage levels and cheap goods. At the same time, they conceal that the wage may be high and still not provide even the minimum subsistence, let alone savings. In England, prices for some products, such as bread and meat, are low, but a worker gets these products in limited quantities according to the norm. Other products he buys on the market at inflated prices. There is a multitude of prices. The Americans boast about a high standard of living, but according to their own data, two-thirds of workers do not have a minimum subsistence. All these tricks of the capitalists need to be exposed. It is necessary to show the English workers with specific facts, who have long lived at the expense of superprofits and colonies, that the decline in real wages under capitalism is an axiom.

We could tell them that during the civil war, everyone was a millionaire. During the war, we had the lowest prices; bread was sold for one ruble per kilogram, but the products were rationed.

Our wage calculation is built differently. But we need to show the situation with real wages here using specific facts. This has great revolutionary and propaganda value.

It would be right in the section on monopoly capitalism to return to the question of wages and show it realistically.

In the textbook layout, a large chapter is dedicated to initial accumulation. This can be mentioned briefly in two pages. Here, they tell how some duchess drove peasants off the land. Who would be surprised by that now? More important things are missed. The era of imperialism provides much more vivid facts.

On the plan for the book. The section on capitalism should be divided into two parts: under letter A — pre-monopoly capitalism, and under letter B — monopoly capitalism.

Now about the subject of political economy. In the

textbook, it turns out not to be a definition of the subject of political economy but rather an introduction. There is a difference between defining the subject of political economy and introducing it. In this regard, the second option is closer to the topic, although it also turns out to be an introduction. Here, some economic terms of Marx are explained. This leads the reader to the assimilation of the economic works of Marx and Lenin.

They write that political economy studies production relations. But not everyone understands this. They say that political economy studies relations of production and exchange. This is incorrect. Take exchange. In the primitive communal system, there was no exchange. It was not developed even under the slave-owning system. The term “circulation” is also not suitable. All this is not entirely applicable even to socialism. It should be said: political economy examines the production and distribution of material goods. This is applicable to all periods. Production is the relationship of people to nature, and distribution is where the produced goods go; this is purely an economic aspect.

In the textbook, there is no transition from the subject of political economy to the primitive communal system. Marx begins *Capital* with a commodity. But why do you start with the primitive communal system? This needs to be explained.

There are two methods of exposition: one method is analytical, abstract. In this method, the exposition starts with general, abstract concepts with the involvement of historical material. Such a method of exposition (which Marx adhered to in *Capital*) is designed for more prepared people. Another method is historical. It provides coverage of the historical development of various economic systems and reveals general concepts on historical material. If you want people to understand the theory of surplus value, present the question from the very birth of surplus value. The historical method is

designed for less prepared people. It is more accessible because it gradually introduces the reader to the understanding of the laws of economic development. (*Reads the definition of analytical and historical methods*).

The textbook uses Engels' scheme of savagery and barbarism. It absolutely adds nothing. What nonsense! Engels did not want to disagree with Morgan* here, who was then approaching materialism. But that's Engels' business. What does it have to do with us? They will say that we are bad Marxists if we do not present the issue according to Engels? Nothing of the sort! It turns into a big jumble: the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, clan structure, matriarchy, patriarchy, and here also savagery and barbarism. This only confuses the reader. Savagery and barbarism are contemptuous terms from the perspective of the "civilized."

The textbook contains a lot of empty, unnecessary words, many historical excursions. I read 100 pages and crossed out 10, but more could be crossed out. There should not be a single unnecessary word in the textbook; the presentation should be sculpturally refined. And at the end of the sections, there are antics against the imperialists: here you are, imperialists are scoundrels, introducing slavery, serfdom. These are all like Komsomol tricks and posters. It takes time and clutters minds. But we need to influence people's minds.

About Thomas More** and Campanella*** it is said that they were loners, that they did not connect with the masses. It's just funny. So what? And if they had connected with the masses, what would have come of it? The level of development of productive forces re-

* Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881) — American historian and ethnographer.

** Thomas More (1478-1535) — English humanist, statesman and writer.

*** Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) — Italian philosopher, poet and political activist.

quired property inequality. This inequality could not be destroyed then. The utopians did not know the laws of social development. Here, an idealistic interpretation is given.

Our cadres need to know Marxist economic theory well.

The first, older generation of Bolsheviks was theoretically well-versed. We crammed *Capital*, took notes, argued and checked each other. That was our strength. It helped us a lot.

The second generation is less prepared. People were busy with practical work and construction. Marxism was studied through brochures.

The third generation is raised on satire and newspaper articles. They do not have deep knowledge. They need to be given food that will be digestible. Most of them were raised not on the study of the works of Marx and Lenin, but on quotations.

If things continue like this, people may degenerate. In America, they argue: the dollar decides everything, so why do we need theory, why do we need science? And here, we can argue the same: why do we need *Capital* when we are building socialism? This threatens degradation; this is death. To prevent this, we need to raise the level of economic knowledge.

The current volume of the textbook is not suitable; it has swollen to 766 pages. It should be no more than 500 pages, with about half devoted to pre-socialist formations and half to socialism.

The authors of the first version of the textbook do not care about explaining Marx's terms found in *Capital*. The most common terms of Marx and Lenin should be introduced from the very beginning to lead the reader to the perception of *Capital* and other works of Marx and Lenin.

It is unfortunate that there are no disputes, no fights over theoretical issues in the committee. Keep in mind

that you are doing an historic deed. Everyone will read the textbook. In the 33rd year of Soviet power, we still do not have a book on political economy. Everyone is waiting for it.

In literary terms, the textbook is very poorly crafted, containing a lot of verbosity and numerous excursions into civil history and cultural history. This is not a textbook on the history of culture. There should be fewer historical excursions; they should only be resorted to when necessary to illustrate theoretical positions.

Take Marx's *Capital*, Lenin's *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, and follow them in your work.

When the textbook is ready, we will submit it to public opinion.

One more note. In the textbook, the examination of capitalism is conducted only from the perspective of industry. However, one should keep in mind the national economy as a whole. In Marx's *Capital*, the main issues are also mainly presented in relation to industry. But we had a different task. He needed to expose capitalism, to reveal the sores of capitalism. Marx understood the significance of the national economy as a whole. This is evident from the importance he attributed to the *Tableau Économique* of Quesnay.* It is not enough to limit the presentation of agricultural issues only to the chapter on land rent.

We not only exposed capitalism — we overthrew it and are in power. We know the specific weight and significance that agriculture has in the national economy.

Both in Marx and in our program, not enough attention is paid to agriculture. This needs to be corrected.

We need to consider the laws of the national economy as a whole. Do not neglect agrarian relations under capitalism and socialism.

* François Quesnay (1694-1774) — French economist.

(ARAN, F. 1705, Op. 1, D. 166, L. 36-43)

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE MAURICE THOREZ

On the occasion of his 50th Birthday

April 28, 1950

To Comrade Maurice Thorez

Dear Comrade Thorez!

Allow me to greet and congratulate you on your 50th birthday.

All the peoples of the world, the workers of all countries know and treasure you as the tested and true leader of the French communists, as the leader of the French workers and working peasants in their mutual struggle for the strengthening of peace, the victory of democracy and socialism all over the world.

The Soviet people know and love you as their friend and as the steadfast fighter for the friendship and alliance of the peoples of France and the Soviet Union.

I wish you further success in your work for the well-being of the French people and for all the working people of the world.

Fraternal greetings,

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 100, April 29, 1950)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO
GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of
the German people from the fascist tyranny*

May 11, 1950

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I thank you and, through you, the government of the German Democratic Republic, for your message of greetings on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I am convinced that the friendly relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union will further develop successfully for the well-being of our peoples and in the interests of the peace and cooperation of all peace-loving countries.

J. Stalin

(New World, May 1950, p. 1)

LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

On the reduction of Germany's reparation payments

May 15, 1950

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

The Soviet government has examined the request of the government of the German Democratic Republic on the reduction of the reparation sum to be paid by Germany.

The Soviet government has, at the same time, borne in mind that the German Democratic Republic has been conscientious and regular in their fulfilment of their reparation obligation, which is charged as high as 10 billion dollars, and that by the end of 1950 an important part of this obligation, as much as 3,658 million dollars, will have been realized.

Led by the wish to ease the efforts of the German people in the reconstruction and development of the people's economy in Germany, and bearing in mind the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, the Soviet government has decided, with the agreement of the government of the Polish Republic, to reduce the remaining sum of the reparation bill by 50 per cent, to 3,171 million dollars.

In agreement with the declaration of the government of the USSR at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, and the settlement of a 20-year term for the payment of reparation, the Soviet government has further decided to accept payment of the remaining part of the reparation bill in German goods (as much as 3,171 million dollars) out of the pro-

duction of 15 years running, starting with the year 1951 up to the year 1965, inclusive.

With deep esteem,

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(Daily Review, No. 113, May 17, 1950)

CONVERSATION ON QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

May 30, 1950

The conversation began at 7:00 PM and ended at 8:00 PM.

How do you propose to present the text on monopoly capitalism? By chapters?

It won't work to present it chapter by chapter. We need a general picture. That's why I asked you to present all the chapters at once. It cannot be considered chapter by chapter. It is necessary to depict monopoly capitalism as a whole and immediately provide an overview of the corresponding economic views, outline the criticism that Marx gave to preceding political economy.

Regarding the plan for the section "Monopoly Capitalism": do you plan to present the initial accumulation as a separate chapter?

A. *No, it will be included in the chapter on the emergence of capitalism.*

In your section plan, you intend to cover the topic "Merchant Capital and Merchant Profit" only in Chapter 13, after characterizing industrial capital. Historically, this is incorrect. The analysis of merchant capital should be provided earlier. I would place the theme of merchant capital before the emergence of the capitalist mode of production. Merchant capital precedes industrial capital. Merchant capital stimulated the emergence of manufacturing.

Note: Here we plan to consider merchant capital and merchant profit in terms of the distribution of surplus value under capitalism, while the chapter on feudalism discusses the role of merchant capital in that period.

Then the title is unsuccessful; then name the chapter "Merchant Profit," otherwise, you may be understood as if merchant capital only appears in the period

of machine production, which is historically incorrect.

In general, you avoid historicism in the textbook. In the introduction, you mentioned that the presentation would be conducted using the historical method, but you are avoiding historicism. Historicism is necessary in this textbook; it cannot be done without it. No one will understand why merchant capital is placed after considering the machine period of capitalism.

The tone in the chapter on feudalism is taken incorrectly — too colloquial and popular, as if a grandfather is telling children a fairy tale. Everything here appears out of nowhere: the feudal lord appears, the merchant appears, the usurer, like dolls on a stage.

You must consider the audience for whom you are writing. Keep in mind not preschoolers but people who have completed 8-10 grades. Yet here you explain words like “regulation” as if you think they won’t understand without clarification. The tone is wrong; you present it as if telling stories.

In the chapter on feudalism, you write that the city is once again separated from the village. The first time the city separated from the village was in the slave-owning society, the second time was under feudalism. This is nonsense. It is as if cities perished along with slavery.

Cities emerged during slavery. During the period of feudalism, cities remained. Admittedly, cities developed slowly at first, but later they grew significantly. The separation of the city from the village persisted. With the discovery of America and the expansion of markets, trade flourished in cities, accumulating immense wealth.

In the chapter on feudalism, there is no mention of the discovery of America. Very little is said about Russia. You will need to say more about Russia, beginning from feudalism. In the chapter on feudalism, shed light on the feudal period in Russia, up to the abolition of serfdom.

During feudalism, there were very large cities for that time: Genoa, Venice, Florence. During feudalism, trade reached large scales. Florence could outdo Ancient Rome by three points.

In the slave-owning system, large cities and large-scale production emerged. As long as there was slave labour, cheap labour, large-scale production and large estates could exist. Once slave labour ceased, large-scale production and estates began to break up. The former lively urban life was no more. However, cities remained and thrived. Trade continued, with ships having up to 150 sails.

Some historians suggest that the Middle Ages represented a degradation compared to slavery, that there was no progress. But that is incorrect.

In the chapter on feudalism, you didn't even mention what labour forms the basis of feudal society. Yet, it should be shown that in the Ancient world, slave labour was the basis, and under feudalism, it was peasant labour.

When the large estates of the slave-owning system collapsed, slavery fell, and slaves disappeared, but peasants remained. Even under slavery, there were peasants, but they were few, and they were constantly under the threat of turning into slaves. The so-called "barbarian" tribes conquered the Roman Empire. Feudalism arose when two societies collided: on the one hand, the Roman Empire, and on the other hand, the "barbarian" tribes that fought against Rome. This issue is bypassed in your text; the "barbarian" tribes aren't even named. What tribes were they? There were Germans, Slavs, Gauls and others. By the time they conquered Rome, these tribes had a communal structure. It was particularly strong among the Germans with their "Mark." The rural community began to merge with what was left of the slave-owning Rome, the Roman Empire. The Roman Empire demonstrated great resilience. In-

initially, it split into two parts: the Western and Eastern Empires. It was only after the Western Roman Empire perished that the Eastern Roman Empire endured for a long time.

It must be stated clearly and distinctly that under feudalism, the main basis of society's existence became peasant labour.

We always say that capitalism originated within the depths of feudalism. This is entirely undisputed and needs to be historically demonstrated. The emergence of capitalism within the depths of feudalism is not apparent in your text. There is no mention of the discovery of America. However, the discovery of America occurred in the Middle Ages, before bourgeois revolutions. They were seeking a sea route to India and stumbled upon a new continent. But what is crucial is that trade grew tremendously and the market expanded. These conditions were created when the first capitalist manufacturers managed to break the guild structure. There was a significant demand for goods and manufacturing emerged to satisfy this demand. This is how capitalism arose. All of this is absent in the chapter on feudalism. Writing a textbook is not an easy task. One must delve deeper into history. The chapter on feudalism was approached hastily. Perhaps accustomed to delivering lectures in a hurried manner. People listen to you there, but no one criticizes.

The textbook is written for millions of people, and it will be read and studied not only here but all over the world. Americans, Chinese and people in all countries will read it. It is essential to consider a more knowledgeable audience.

Slave-owning society was the first class society. It is the most interesting society before capitalism. The wounds of class society are brought to the extreme in it. Now, when capitalism is facing difficulties, it turns to the methods of slave-owners. In the Ancient world,

wars were fought to acquire slaves. In our time, Hitler started a war to enslave other nations, especially the nations of the Soviet Union. It was also a campaign for enslavement. Hitler recruited slaves everywhere. He transported millions of foreign workers to Germany — Italians, Bulgarians, people from other countries. He wanted to restore slavery, but he failed. Thus, when capitalism goes downhill, it resorts to the old, most ruthless methods of slavery.

Bourgeois textbooks expound in every possible way on the democratic movement in the ancient world, praising the “Golden Age of Pericles.”* It is necessary to show that democracy in the slave-owning world was the democracy of slave-owners.

I sincerely ask you to take the textbook seriously. If you don't know the material, study it from books, from sources; ask whoever is necessary. Everyone will read the textbook. It will be a model for everyone. The chapter on feudalism needs to be revised. It is necessary to show how the feudal system arose. The top of the slave-owning structure was removed. Slavery fell away. Land remained, crafts remained, *coloni*** remained, serfs remained. Cities remained and flourished at the end of the Middle Ages.

The capitalist period should be started with bourgeois reforms — in England, in France, with the peasant reform in Russia. By this time, capitalism already had a foundation within the depths of feudalism.

It would be better to transfer part of the materials on the emergence of capitalism to the chapter on feudalism.

The role and significance of state power during the period of feudalism needs to be shown. When the

* Pericles (c. 490-429 BC) — Athenian strategist (commander-in-chief) (444/443-429, except for 430).

** Coloni — small land tenants in Ancient Rome.

Roman Empire ceased to exist, power began to decentralize, just like the economy. Feudals waged wars against each other. Small principalities were formed. State power became fictitious. Each landowner had their customs duties. It became necessary to centralize power. Later it gained real power when national states began to take shape based on the emergence of a national market. The development of trade required a national market. But you haven't said a word about the national market. The feudals obstructed trade. They fenced themselves off with various duties and tariffs. Briefly, at least a couple of words should be said about all this.

The feudal system is closer to us — it existed just yesterday. In the chapter, it is necessary to talk about Russia, about the peasant reform, how peasants were liberated — with land or without land. Landowners were afraid that peasant liberation would occur from below, so the state carried out the reform from above. In our country, the serfdom system ended by the time of the peasant reform; in France, it ended with the bourgeois revolution.

The chapter presents correct concepts, but everything is scattered and lacks coherence. There is no sequence. The most fundamental aspect is not addressed: the type of labour that formed the main basis of the feudal system.

A quote from Lenin is provided regarding the system of being upheld by the discipline of the stick.* This quote is taken out of context. Lenin paid significant attention to the economic aspect of the issue. People cannot be held under the stick for 600-700 years. The main issue is not the stick but the fact that the land belonged to the landowners. The land was the primary

* See: V.I. Lenin, "A Great Beginning," *Collected Works*, vol. 39, 5th ed., Moscow, pp. 1-29, Russ. ed.

factor, and the stick was secondary. You quote Marx and Lenin without delving into the context in which a particular idea was expressed.

Do not spare details regarding economic views. Introducing the reader to these views provides a more concrete understanding of the era. Mention the mercantilism of Colbert.* Within the country, Colbert removed tariffs, while the state imposed high tariffs to encourage the development of manufactories and capital. Mercantilism existed before the bourgeois revolution.

I had to include an insertion about the democratic movement in Greece and Rome in the chapter. There was not even criticism of bourgeois views on the democratic movement in Greece and Rome in the chapter on slavery. This movement is praised not only in bourgeois literature but also in some of our books. The French revolutionaries swore in the name of the Gracchis.**

The material should be presented using the historical method since you have undertaken this task.

Do not get carried away with the style of bazaar propaganda or popular language; otherwise, it sounds like a grandfather telling tales.

It seems that the separation of the city from the village is repeated. Separation occurred, remained, and there is no need to separate again. The old city, under the slave-owning system, was not detached from the village. The separation of the city from the village developed further in the late Middle Ages. Remember cities like Venice, Florence and the Hanseatic League. What trade they had, what ships! Commercial capital

* Jean-Baptiste Colbert (1619-1683) — Controller-General (Finance Minister) of France (from 1665).

** Tiberius Gracchus (162-133 BC) — Roman tribune of the people (133); Gaius Gracchus (153-121 BC) — Roman tribune of the people (123 and 122).

played a significant role. Kings depended on major merchants.

Venice occupied Constantinople. They hired warriors and conquered. The boundaries of trade expanded significantly. Within the depths of feudalism, a strong merchant class emerged.

They charged high interest rates. In the Ancient world, there were two major usurers — one Hittite (I don't remember the name), and one Phoenician named Hiram.* They had a lot of money and even lent money to states. But compared to the Fuggers,** neither of them was worth anything.

Q. Considering your instructions, should the question of commodities partially come alive in the section on feudalism, as it was in the draft?

A. Certainly, it is better to talk about commodities in the chapter on feudalism, about specific elements of commodities. The entire issue of commodities as a whole should be covered in the section on capitalism. After all, we agreed to follow the historical method.

Marx used a different method. He takes a commodity as an economic cell of capitalism and examines it from all sides, turning it upside down. But you are addressing the question of commodities in parts. The conclusions can be drawn in the chapters on capitalism. It will be easier for comprehension. The theory of commodities should be presented in separate elements as corresponding relations arise.

Q. Since we are presenting the economic doctrines of the pre-monopoly capitalist period, how should we address Lenin's works? Where should we place them?

In the chapter on pre-monopoly capitalism, we should analyse Lenin's works up to the appearance of

* Hiram the Great (c. 978-944 BC) — king of Tyre and Sidon (969-936 BC).

** Fuggers — the largest German (from Augsburg) trade and banking house of the 15th and 16th centuries.

his book on imperialism, or more precisely, until the publication of his article against Trotsky “On the Slogan of the United States of Europe.”* Here, we should cover the economic doctrines of the so-called free capitalism period, when individual countries gradually caught up with each other and occupied unclaimed lands. Then came a new period — the era of monopoly capitalism. Thus, Lenin’s views can be divided into two parts.

The ideology of capitalism in the pre-monopoly period is entirely different from that in the monopoly period. Back then, the bourgeoisie criticized feudalism, talked about freedom and extolled liberalism. It is entirely different with imperialism, where the ideology of capitalism discards all remnants of liberalism and embraces the most reactionary views of all previous epochs. Here, we find a different ideology.

Q. We have also encountered the issue of covering certain topics in the section on pre-monopoly capitalism, which we do not revisit in the imperialism section, such as land rent. Can we provide specific factual data related to modern capitalism here?

A. Certainly, we can because imperialism is still capitalism.

Q. In the chapter on the machine age, should we limit ourselves to the steam engine, as Marx did, or should we also show further developments — the internal combustion engine and electricity — without which there is no machine system?

A. Certainly, we should include the entire machine system. Marx wrote in the 1860s and technology has advanced significantly since then. It will be necessary to expand the chapter on feudalism by 15-20 pages.

Q. Should we consider creating two chapters: 1) the

* See: V.I. Lenin, “On the Slogan of the United States of Europe,” *Collected Works*, vol. 26, 5th ed., Moscow 1961, pp. 351-355, Russ. ed.

main features of the feudal mode of production and 2) the decay of the feudal mode of production?

A. You decide as you find necessary. The chapter on feudalism needs to be revised approximately following the pattern used for the chapter on slavery.

In the chapter on feudalism, it is necessary to mention the economic system of the “barbaric” tribes, demonstrating what happened when the so-called barbaric tribes met slave-owning Rome.

At the beginning of feudalism, peasants were not serfs, but later it happened. We need to show how serfdom developed. Perhaps feudalism should be divided into two periods: early and late.

Not much emphasis should be placed on the manufacturing period; it is not the most interesting period of capitalism. In manufacturing, the technology is old, essentially an expanded craft. The machine brought about qualitative changes. The manufacturing period can be condensed; do not delve too much into it. The machine age overturned everything.

For writing chapters on pre-monopoly capitalism, a one-month deadline is insufficient. I think working on the textbook will take the entire year. Perhaps some parts will spill over into the next year. It is a very serious matter.

We are considering putting the names of all Commission members in the textbook and writing “Approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B).”

(ARAN, F. 1705, Op. 1, D. 166, L. 44-53)

TELEGRAM TO THE CENTRAL COUNCIL OF THE FREE GERMAN YOUTH

June 2, 1950

To the Central Council of the Free German Youth.

I thank the young German peace fighters, members of the All-German Youth Conference, for their greetings.

I wish the German youth, the active builders of a united, democratic and peace-loving Germany, success in this great work.

J. Stalin

(*New Germany*, Berlin ed., No. 125, June 2, 1950)

**ANSWERING LETTER TO THE
INDIAN PRIME MINISTER,
PANDIT JAWAHARLAC NEHRU**

Concerning the peaceful settlement of the Korean question

July 15, 1950

To His Excellence, the Prime Minister of the Indian Republic, Mr. Pandit Jawaharlac Nehru.

I welcome your peace initiative. I fully share your opinion on the question of the suitability of a friendly settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council, with the unconditional participation of the representatives of the five Great Powers and including the People's Government of China. Further, for a quick settlement of the Korean question, it would be appropriate for a representative of the Korean people to be present at the Security Council.

Yours faithfully,

J. Stalin
Prime Minister of the Soviet Union

(New Germany, No. 165, July 1950)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, JOSEF
CYRANKIEWICZ**

On the occasion of the Polish National Holiday

July 22, 1950

On the occasion of the national holiday — the anniversary of the rebirth of the Polish Republic — please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my sincere greetings to the Polish people, to the government of the Polish Republic and to you personally.

The Soviet people wish the fraternal Polish people further success in their efforts to build a democratic people's Poland.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 169, July 23, 1950)

MARXISM AND PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS⁹

CONCERNING MARXISM IN LINGUISTICS

June-July 1950

A group of younger comrades have asked me to give my opinion in the press on problems relating to linguistics, particularly in reference to Marxism in linguistics. I am not a linguistic expert and, of course, cannot fully satisfy the request of the comrades. As to Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, this is something directly in my field. I have therefore consented to answer a number of questions put by the comrades.

Q. Is it true that language is a superstructure on the base?

A. No, it is not true.

The base is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.

Every base has its own corresponding superstructure. The base of the feudal system has its superstructure, its political, legal and other views, and the corresponding institutions; the capitalist base has its own superstructure, so has the socialist base. If the base changes or is eliminated, then, following this, its superstructure changes or is eliminated; if a new base arises, then, following this, a superstructure arises corresponding to it.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Take, for example, Russian society and the Russian language. In the course of the past 30 years the old, capitalist base has been eliminated in

Russia and a new, socialist base has been built. Correspondingly, the superstructure on the capitalist base has been eliminated and a new superstructure created corresponding to the socialist base. The old political, legal and other institutions, consequently, have been supplanted by new, socialist institutions. But in spite of this the Russian language has remained basically what it was before the October Revolution.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? To a certain extent the vocabulary of the Russian language has changed, in the sense that it has been replenished with a considerable number of new words and expressions, which have arisen in connection with the rise of the new socialist production, the appearance of a new state, a new socialist culture, new social relations and morals, and, lastly, in connection with the development of technology and science; a number of words and expressions have changed their meaning, have acquired a new signification; a number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary. As to the basic stock of words and the grammatical system of the Russian language, which constitute the foundation of a language, they, after the elimination of the capitalist base, far from having been eliminated and supplanted by a new basic word stock and a new grammatical system of the language, have been preserved in their entirety and have not undergone any serious changes — they have been preserved precisely as the foundation of the modern Russian language.

Further, the superstructure is a product of the base, but this by no means implies that it merely reflects the base, that it is passive, neutral, indifferent to the fate of its base, to the fate of the classes, to the character of the system. On the contrary, having come into being, it becomes an exceedingly active force, actively assisting its base to take shape and consolidate itself, and doing its utmost to help the new system to finish off and elim-

inate the old base and the old classes.

It cannot be otherwise. The superstructure is created by the base precisely in order to serve it, to actively help it to take shape and consolidate itself, to actively fight for the elimination of the old, moribund base together with its old superstructure. The superstructure has only to renounce this role of auxiliary, it has only to pass from a position of active defence of its base to one of indifference towards it, to adopt an equal attitude to all classes, and it loses its virtue and ceases to be a superstructure.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Language is not a product of one or another base, old or new, within the given society, but of the whole course of the history of the society and of the history of the bases for many centuries. It was created not by some one class, but by the entire society, by all the classes of the society, by the efforts of hundreds of generations. It was created for the satisfaction of the needs not of one particular class, but of the entire society, of all the classes of the society. Precisely for this reason it was created as a single language for the society, common to all members of that society, as the common language of the whole people. Hence the functional role of language, as a means of intercourse between people, consists not in serving one class to the detriment of other classes, but in equally serving the entire society, all the classes of society. This in fact explains why a language may equally serve both the old, moribund system and the new, rising system; both the old base and the new base; both the exploiters and the exploited.

It is no secret to anyone that the Russian language served Russian capitalism and Russian bourgeois culture before the October Revolution just as well as it now serves the socialist system and socialist culture of Russian society.

The same must be said of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Uzbek, Kazakh, Georgian, Armenian, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Moldavian, Tatar, Azerbaijanian, Bashkirian, Turkmenian and other languages of the Soviet nations; they served the old, bourgeois system of these nations just as well as they serve the new, socialist system.

It cannot be otherwise. Language exists, language has been created precisely in order to serve society as a whole, as a means of intercourse between people, in order to be common to the members of society and constitute the single language of society, serving members of society equally, irrespective of their class status. A language has only to depart from this position of being a language common to the whole people, it has only to give preference and support to some one social group to the detriment of other social groups of the society, and it loses its virtue, ceases to be a means of intercourse between the people of the society, and becomes the jargon of some social group, degenerates and is doomed to disappear.

In this respect, while it differs in principle from the superstructure, language does not differ from instruments of production, from machines, let us say, which are as indifferent to classes as is language and may, like it, equally serve a capitalist system and a socialist system.

Further, the superstructure is the product of one epoch, the epoch in which the given economic base exists and operates. The superstructure is therefore short-lived; it is eliminated and disappears with the elimination and disappearance of the given base.

Language, on the contrary, is the product of a whole number of epochs, in the course of which it takes shape, is enriched, develops and is smoothened. A language therefore lives immeasurably longer than any base or any superstructure. This in fact explains why the rise

and elimination not only of one base and its superstructure, but of several bases and their corresponding superstructures, have not led in history to the elimination of a given language, to the elimination of its structure and the rise of a new language with a new stock of words and a new grammatical system.

It is more than a hundred years since Pushkin died. In this period the feudal system and the capitalist system were eliminated in Russia, and a third, a socialist system has arisen. Hence two bases, with their superstructures, were eliminated, and a new, socialist base has arisen, with its new superstructure. Yet, if we take the Russian language, for example, it has not in this long span of time undergone any fundamental change, and the modern Russian language differs very little in structure from the language of Pushkin.

What has changed in the Russian language in this period? The Russian vocabulary has in this period been greatly replenished; a large number of obsolete words have dropped out of the vocabulary; the meaning of a great many words has changed; the grammatical system of the language has improved. As to the structure of Pushkin's language, with its grammatical system and its basic stock of words, in all essentials it has remained as the basis of modern Russian.

And this is quite understandable. Indeed, what necessity is there, after every revolution, for the existing structure of the language, its grammatical system and basic stock of words to be destroyed and supplanted by new ones, as is usually the case with the superstructure? What object would there be in calling "water," "earth," "mountain," "forest," "fish," "man," "to walk," "to do," "to produce," "to trade," etc., not water, earth, mountain, etc., but something else? What object would there be in having the modification of words in a language and the combination of words in sentences follow not the existing grammar, but some entirely different

grammar? What would the revolution gain from such an upheaval in language? History in general never does anything of any importance without some special necessity for it. What, one asks, can be the necessity for such a linguistic revolution, if it has been demonstrated that the existing language and its structure are fundamentally quite suited to the needs of the new system? The old superstructure can and should be destroyed and replaced by a new one in the course of a few years, in order to give free scope for the development of the productive forces of society; but how can an existing language be destroyed and a new one built in its place in the course of a few years without causing anarchy in social life and without creating the threat of the disintegration of society? Who but a Don Quixote could set himself such a task?

Lastly, one other radical distinction between the superstructure and language. The superstructure is not directly connected with production, with man's productive activity. It is connected with production only indirectly, through the economy, through the base. The superstructure therefore reflects changes in the level of development of the productive forces not immediately and not directly, but only after changes in the base, through the prism of the changes wrought in the base by the changes in production. This means that the sphere of action of the superstructure is narrow and restricted.

Language, on the contrary, is connected with man's productive activity directly, and not only with man's productive activity, but with all his other activity in all his spheres of work, from production to the base, and from the base to the superstructure. For this reason language reflects changes in production immediately and directly, without waiting for changes in the base. For this reason the sphere of action of language, which embraces all fields of man's activity, is far broader and more comprehensive than the sphere of action of the

superstructure. More, it is practically unlimited.

It is this that primarily explains why language, or rather its vocabulary, is in a state of almost constant change. The continuous development of industry and agriculture, of trade and transport, of technology and science, demands that language should replenish its vocabulary with new words and expressions needed for their functioning. And language, directly reflecting these needs, does replenish its vocabulary with new words, and perfects its grammatical system.

Hence:

a) A Marxist cannot regard language as a superstructure on the base;

b) To confuse language and superstructure is to commit a serious error.

Q. Is it true that language always was and is class language, that there is no such thing as language which is the single and common language of a society, a non-class language common to the whole people?

A. No, it is not true.

It is not difficult to understand that in a society which has no classes there can be no such thing as a class language. There were no classes in the primitive communal clan system, and consequently there could be no class language — the language was then the single and common language of the whole community. The objection that the concept class should be taken as covering every human community, including the primitive communal community, is not an objection but a playing with words that is not worth refuting.

As to the subsequent development from clan languages to tribal languages, from tribal languages to the languages of nationalities, and from the languages of nationalities to national languages — everywhere and at all stages of development, language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, was the common and single language of that society, serving its

members equally, irrespective of their social status.

I am not referring here to the empires of the slave and medieval periods, the empires of Cyrus or Alexander the Great, let us say, or of Caesar or Charles the Great, which had no economic foundations of their own and were transient and unstable military and administrative associations. Not only did these empires not have, they could not have had a single language common to the whole empire and understood by all the members of the empire. They were conglomerations of tribes and nationalities, each of which lived its own life and had its own language. Consequently, it is not these or similar empires I have in mind, but the tribes and nationalities composing them, which had their own economic foundations and their own languages, evolved in the distant past. History tells us that the languages of these tribes and nationalities were not class languages, but languages common to the whole of a tribe or nationality, and understood by all its people.

Side by side with this, there were, of course, dialects, local vernaculars, but they were dominated by and subordinated to the single and common language of the tribe or nationality.

Later, with the appearance of capitalism, the elimination of feudal division and the formation of national markets, nationalities developed into nations, and the languages of nationalities into national languages. History shows that national languages are not class, but common languages, common to all the members of each nation and constituting the single language of that nation.

It has been said above that language, as a means of intercourse between the people of a society, serves all classes of society equally, and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes. But people, the various social groups, the classes, are far from being indifferent to language. They strive to

utilize the language in their own interests, to impose their own special lingo, their own special terms, their own special expressions upon it. The upper strata of the propertied classes, who have divorced themselves from and detest the people — the aristocratic nobility, the upper strata of the bourgeoisie — particularly distinguish themselves in this respect. “Class” dialects, jargons, high-society “languages” are created. These dialects and jargons are often incorrectly referred to in literature as languages — the “aristocratic language” or the “bourgeois language” in contradistinction to the “proletarian language” or the “peasant language.” For this reason, strange as it may seem, some of our comrades have come to the conclusion that national language is a fiction, and that only class languages exist in reality.

There is nothing, I think, more erroneous than this conclusion. Can these dialects and jargons be regarded as languages? Certainly not. They cannot, firstly, because these dialects and jargons have no grammatical systems or basic word stocks of their own — they borrow them from the national language. They cannot, secondly, because these dialects and jargons are confined to a narrow sphere, are current only among the upper strata of a given class and are entirely unsuitable as a means of human intercourse for society as a whole. What, then, have they? They have a collection of specific words reflecting the specific tastes of the aristocracy or the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; a certain number of expressions and turns of phrase distinguished by refinement and gallantry and free of the “coarse” expressions and turns of phrase of the national language; lastly, a certain number of foreign words. But all the fundamentals, that is, the overwhelming majority of the words and the grammatical system, are borrowed from the common, national language. Dialects and jargons are therefore offshoots of the common national language, devoid of all linguistic independence

and doomed to stagnation. To believe that dialects and jargons can develop into independent languages capable of ousting and supplanting the national language means losing one's sense of historical perspective and abandoning the Marxist position.

References are made to Marx, and the passage from his article *St. Max* is quoted which says that the bourgeois have "their own language," that this language "is a product of the bourgeoisie"¹⁰ that it is permeated with the spirit of mercantilism and huckstering. Certain comrades cite this passage with the idea of proving that Marx believed in the "class character" of language and denied the existence of a single national language. If these comrades were impartial, they should have cited another passage from this same article *St. Max*, where Marx, touching on the ways single national languages arose, speaks of "the concentration of dialects into a single national language resulting from economic and political concentration."¹¹

Marx, consequently, did recognize the necessity of a *single* national language, as a higher form, to which dialects, as lower forms, are subordinate.

What, then, can this bourgeois language be which Marx says "is a product of the bourgeoisie"? Did Marx consider it as much a language as the national language, with a specific linguistic structure of its own? Could he have considered it such a language? Of course, not. Marx merely wanted to say that the bourgeois had polluted the single national language with their hucksters' lingo, that the bourgeois, in other words, have their hucksters' jargon.

It thus appears that these comrades have misrepresented Marx. And they misrepresented him because they quoted Marx not like Marxists but like dogmatists, without delving into the essence of the matter.

References are made to Engels, and the words from his *The Condition of the Working Class in England* are cited

where he says that in Britain "...the working class has gradually become a race wholly apart from the English bourgeoisie," that "the workers speak other dialects, have other thoughts and ideals, other customs and moral principles, a different religion and other politics than those of the bourgeoisie."¹² Certain comrades conclude from this passage that Engels denied the necessity of a common, national language, that he believed, consequently, in the "class character" of language. True, Engels speaks here of dialects, not languages, fully realizing that, being an offshoot of the national language, a dialect cannot supplant the national language. But apparently, these comrades regard the existence of a difference between a language and a dialect with no particular enthusiasm...

It is obvious that the quotation is inappropriate, because Engels here speaks not of "class languages" but chiefly of class thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion, politics. It is perfectly true that the thoughts, ideals, customs, moral principles, religion and politics of bourgeois and proletarians are directly antithetical. But what has this to do with national language, or the "class character" of language? Can the existence of class antagonisms in society serve as an argument in favour of the "class character" of language, or against the necessity of a single national language? Marxism says that a common language is one of the cardinal earmarks of a nation, although knowing very well that there are class antagonisms within the nation. Do the comrades referred to recognize this Marxist thesis?

References are made to Lafargue,¹³ and it is said that in his pamphlet *The French Language Before and After the Revolution* he recognizes the "class character" of language and denies the necessity of a national language common to the whole people. That is not true. Lafargue does indeed speak of a "noble" or "aristocrat-

ic language” and of the “jargons” of various strata of society. But these comrades forget that Lafargue, who was not interested in the difference between languages and jargons and referred to dialects now as “artificial languages,” now as “jargons,” definitely says in this pamphlet that “the artificial language which distinguished the aristocracy... arose out of the language common to the whole people, which was spoken both by bourgeois and artisan, by town and country.”

Consequently, Lafargue recognizes the existence and necessity of a common language of the whole people, and fully realizes that the “aristocratic language” and other dialects and jargons are subordinate to and dependent on the language common to the whole people.

It follows that the reference to Lafargue is wide of the mark.

References are made to the fact that at one time in England the feudal lords spoke “for centuries” in French, while the English people spoke English, and this is alleged to be an argument in favour of the “class character” of language and against the necessity of a language common to the whole people. But this is not an argument, it is rather an anecdote. Firstly, not all the feudal lords spoke French at that time, but only a small upper stratum of English feudal lords attached to the court and at county seats. Secondly, it was not some “class language” they spoke, but the ordinary language common to all the French people. Thirdly, we know that in the course of time this French language had disappeared without a trace, yielding place to the English language common to the whole people. Do these comrades think that the English feudal lords “for centuries” held intercourse with the English people through interpreters, that they did not use the English language, that there was no language common to all the English at that time, and that the French language in England

was then anything more than the language of high society, current only in the restricted circle of the upper English aristocracy? How can one possibly deny the existence and the necessity of a language common to the whole people on the basis of anecdotic “arguments” like these?

There was a time when Russian aristocrats at the Tsar’s court and in high society also made a fad of the French language. They prided themselves on the fact that when they spoke Russian they often lapsed into French, that they could only speak Russian with a French accent. Does this mean that there was no Russian language common to the whole people at that time in Russia, that a language common to the whole people was a fiction, and “class languages” a reality?

Our comrades are here committing at least two mistakes.

The first mistake is that they confuse language with superstructure. They think that since the superstructure has a class character, language too must be a class language, and not a language common to the whole people. But I have already said that language and superstructure are two different concepts, and that a Marxist must not confuse them.

The second mistake of these comrades is that they conceive the opposition of interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the fierce class struggle between them, as meaning the disintegration of society, as a break of all ties between the hostile classes. They believe that, since society has disintegrated and there is no longer a single society, but only classes, a single language of society, a national language, is unnecessary. If society has disintegrated and there is no longer a language common to the whole people, a national language, what remains? There remain classes and “class languages.” Naturally, every “class language” will have its “class” grammar — a “proletarian” grammar or a

“bourgeois” grammar. True, such grammars do not exist anywhere. But that does not worry these comrades: they believe that such grammars will appear in due course.

At one time there were “Marxists” in our country who asserted that the railways left to us after the October Revolution were bourgeois railways, that it would be unseemly for us Marxists to use them, that they should be torn up and new, “proletarian” railways built. For this they were nicknamed “trogloodytes.”

It goes without saying that such a primitive-anarchist view of society, of classes, of language has nothing in common with Marxism. But it undoubtedly exists and continues to prevail in the minds of certain of our muddled comrades.

It is of course wrong to say that, because of the existence of a fierce class struggle, society has split up into classes which are no longer economically connected with one another in one society. On the contrary, as long as capitalism exists, the bourgeois and the proletarians will be bound together by every economic thread as parts of a single capitalist society. The bourgeois cannot live and enrich themselves unless they have wage-labourers at their command; the proletarians cannot survive unless they hire themselves to the capitalists. If all economic ties between them were to cease, it would mean the cessation of all production, and the cessation of all production would mean the doom of society, the doom of the classes themselves. Naturally, no class wants to incur self-destruction. Consequently, however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society. Only ignorance of Marxism and complete failure to understand the nature of language could have suggested to some of our comrades the fairy tale about the disintegration of society, about “class” languages and “class” grammars.

Reference is further made to Lenin, and it is pointed

out that Lenin recognized the existence of two cultures under capitalism — bourgeois and proletarian — and that the slogan of national culture under capitalism is a nationalist slogan. All this is true and Lenin is absolutely right here. But what has this to do with the “class character” of language? When these comrades refer to what Lenin said about two cultures under capitalism, it is evidently with the idea of suggesting to the reader that the existence of two cultures, bourgeois and proletarian, in society means that there must also be two languages, inasmuch as language is linked with culture — and, consequently, that Lenin denies the necessity of a single national language, and, consequently, that Lenin believes in “class” languages. The mistake these comrades make here is that they identify and confuse language with culture. But culture and language are two different things. Culture may be bourgeois or socialist, but language, as a means of intercourse, is always a language common to the whole people and can serve both bourgeois and socialist culture. Is it not a fact that the Russian, the Ukrainian, the Uzbek languages are now serving the socialist culture of these nations just as well as they served their bourgeois cultures before the October Revolution? Consequently, these comrades are profoundly mistaken when they assert that the existence of two different cultures leads to the formation of two different languages and to the negation of the necessity of a single language.

When Lenin spoke of two cultures, he proceeded precisely from the thesis that the existence of two cultures cannot lead to the negation of a single language and to the formation of two languages, that there must be a single language. When the Bundists accused Lenin of denying the necessity of a national language and of regarding culture as “non-national,” Lenin, as we know, vigorously protested and declared that he was fighting against bourgeois culture, and not against na-

tional languages, the necessity of which he regarded as indisputable. It is strange that some of our comrades should be trailing in the footsteps of the Bundists.

As to a single language, the necessity of which Lenin is alleged to deny, it would be well to pay heed to the following words of Lenin:

“Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity of language and its unimpeded development form one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse appropriate to modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its separate classes.”¹⁴

It follows that our highly respected comrades have misrepresented the views of Lenin.

Reference, lastly, is made to Stalin. The passage from Stalin is quoted which says that “the bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were and remain in this period the chief directing force of such nations.”¹⁵ This is all true. The bourgeoisie and its nationalist party really do direct bourgeois culture, just as the proletariat and its internationalist party direct proletarian culture. But what has this to do with the “class character” of language? Do not these comrades know that national language is a form of national culture, that a national language may serve both bourgeois and socialist culture? Are our comrades unaware of the well-known formula of the Marxists that the present Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and other cultures are socialist in content and national in form, i.e., in language? Do they agree with this Marxist formula?

The mistake our comrades commit here is that they do not see the difference between culture and language, and do not understand that culture changes in content with every new period in the development of society, whereas language remains basically the same through

a number of periods, equally serving both the new culture and the old.

Hence:

a) Language, as a means of intercourse, always was and remains the single language of a society, common to all its members;

b) The existence of dialects and jargons does not negate but confirms the existence of a language common to the whole of the given people, of which they are offshoots and to which they are subordinate;

c) The "class character" of language formula is erroneous and non-Marxist.

Q. What are the characteristic features of language?

A. Language is one of those social phenomena which operate throughout the existence of a society. It arises and develops with the rise and development of a society. It dies when the society dies. Apart from society there is no language. Accordingly, language and its laws of development can be understood only if studied in inseparable connection with the history of society, with the history of the people to whom the language under study belongs, and who are its creators and repositories.

Language is a medium, an instrument with the help of which people communicate with one another, exchange thoughts and understand each other. Being directly connected with thinking, language registers and fixes in words, and in words combined into sentences, the results of the process of thinking and achievements of man's cognitive activity, and thus makes possible the exchange of thoughts in human society.

Exchange of thoughts is a constant and vital necessity, for without it, it is impossible to coordinate the joint actions of people in the struggle against the forces of nature, in the struggle to produce the necessary material values; without it, it is impossible to ensure the success of society's productive activity, and, hence, the

very existence of social production becomes impossible. Consequently, without a language understood by a society and common to all its members, that society must cease to produce, must disintegrate and cease to exist as a society. In this sense, language, while it is a medium of intercourse, is at the same time an instrument of struggle and development of society.

As we know, all the words in a language taken together constitute what is known as its vocabulary. The chief thing in the vocabulary of a language is its basic stock of words, which includes also all the root words, as its kernel. It is far less extensive than the language's vocabulary, but it persists for a very long time, for centuries, and provides the language with a basis for the formation of new words. The vocabulary reflects the state of the language: the richer and more diversified the vocabulary, the richer and more developed the language.

However, by itself, the vocabulary does not constitute the language — it is rather the building material of the language. Just as in construction work the building materials do not constitute the building, although the latter cannot be constructed without them, so too the vocabulary of a language does not constitute the language itself, although no language is conceivable without it. But the vocabulary of a language assumes tremendous importance when it comes under the control of grammar, which defines the rules governing the modification of words and the combination of words into sentences, and thus makes the language a coherent and significant function. Grammar (morphology, syntax) is the collection of rules governing the modification of words and their combination into sentences. It is therefore thanks to grammar that it becomes possible for language to invest man's thoughts in a material linguistic integument.

The distinguishing feature of grammar is that it

gives rules for the modification of words not in reference to concrete words, but to words in general, not taken concretely; that it gives rules for the formation of sentences not in reference to particular concrete sentences — with, let us say, a concrete subject, a concrete predicate, etc. — but to all sentences in general, irrespective of the concrete form of any sentence in particular. Hence, abstracting itself, as regards both words and sentences, from the particular and concrete, grammar takes that which is common and basic in the modification of words and their combination into sentences and builds it into grammatical rules, grammatical laws. Grammar is the outcome of a process of abstraction performed by the human mind over a long period of time; it is an indication of the tremendous achievement of thought.

In this respect grammar resembles geometry, which in giving its laws abstracts itself from concrete objects, regarding objects as bodies devoid of concreteness, and defining the relations between them not as the concrete relations of concrete objects but as the relations of bodies in general, devoid of all concreteness.

Unlike the superstructure, which is connected with production not directly, but through the economy, language is directly connected with man's productive activity, as well as with all his other activity in all his spheres of work without exception. That is why the vocabulary of a language, being the most sensitive to change, is in a state of almost constant change and, unlike the superstructure, language does not have to wait until the base is eliminated, but makes changes in its vocabulary before the base is eliminated and irrespective of the state of the base.

However, the vocabulary of a language does not change in the way the superstructure does, that is, by abolishing the old and building something new, but by replenishing the existing vocabulary with new words

which arise with changes in the social system, with the development of production, of culture, science, etc. Moreover, although a certain number of obsolete words usually drop out of the vocabulary of a language, a far larger number of new words are added. As to the basic word stock, it is preserved in all its fundamentals and is used as the basis for the vocabulary of the language.

This is quite understandable. There is no necessity to destroy the basic word stock when it can be effectively used through the course of several historical periods; not to speak of the fact that, it being impossible to create a new basic word stock in a short time, the destruction of the basic word stock accumulated in the course of centuries would result in paralysis of the language, in the complete disruption of intercourse between people.

The grammatical system of a language changes even more slowly than its basic word stock. Elaborated in the course of epochs, and having become part of the flesh and blood of the language, the grammatical system changes still more slowly than the basic word stock. With the lapse of time it, of course, undergoes changes, becomes more perfected, improves its rules, makes them more specific and acquires new rules; but the fundamentals of the grammatical system are preserved for a very long time, since, as history shows, they are able to serve society effectively through a succession of epochs.

Hence, grammatical system and basic word stock constitute the foundation of language, the essence of its specific character.

History shows that languages possess great stability and a tremendous power of resistance to forcible assimilation. Some historians, instead of explaining this phenomenon, confine themselves to expressing their surprise at it. But there is no reason for surprise whatsoever. Languages owe their stability to the stability of their grammatical systems and basic word stocks.

The Turkish assimilators strove for hundreds of years to mutilate, shatter and destroy the languages of the Balkan peoples. During this period the vocabulary of the Balkan languages underwent considerable change; quite a few Turkish words and expressions were absorbed; there were “convergencies” and “divergencies.” Nevertheless, the Balkan languages held their own and survived. Why? Because their grammatical systems and basic word stocks were in the main preserved.

It follows from all this that a language, its structure, cannot be regarded as the product of some one epoch. The structure of a language, its grammatical system and basic word stock, is the product of a number of epochs.

We may assume that the rudiments of modern language already existed in hoary antiquity, before the epoch of slavery. It was a rather simple language, with a very meagre stock of words, but with a grammatical system of its own — true, a primitive one, but a grammatical system nonetheless.

The further development of production, the appearance of classes, the introduction of writing, the rise of the state which needed a more or less well-regulated correspondence for its administration, the development of trade, which needed a well-regulated correspondence still more, the appearance of the printing press, the development of literature — all this caused big changes in the development of language. During this time, tribes and nationalities broke up and scattered, intermingled and intercrossed; later there arose national languages and states, revolutions took place, and old social systems were replaced by new ones. All this caused even greater changes in language and its development.

However, it would be a profound mistake to think that language developed in the way the superstructure developed — by the destruction of that which existed and the building of something new. In point of fact, languages did not develop by the destruction of exist-

ing languages and the creation of new ones, but by extending and perfecting the basic elements of existing languages. And the transition of the language from one quality to another did not take the form of an explosion, of the destruction at one blow of the old and the creation of the new, but of the gradual and long-continued accumulation of the elements of the new quality, of the new linguistic structure, and the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It is said that the theory that languages develop by stages is a Marxist theory, since it recognizes the necessity of sudden explosions as a condition for the transition of a language from an old quality to a new. This is of course untrue, for it is difficult to find anything resembling Marxism in this theory. And if the theory of stages really does recognize sudden explosions in the history of the development of languages, so much the worse for that theory. Marxism does not recognize sudden explosions in the development of languages, the sudden death of an existing language and the sudden erection of a new language. Lafargue was wrong when he spoke of a “sudden linguistic revolution which took place between 1789 and 1794” in France (see Lafargue’s pamphlet *The French Language Before and After the Revolution*). There was no linguistic revolution, let alone a sudden one, in France at that time. True enough, during that period the vocabulary of the French language was replenished with new words and expressions, a certain number of obsolete words dropped out of it and the meaning of certain words changed — but that was all. Changes of this nature, however, by no means determine the destiny of a language. The chief thing in a language is its grammatical system and basic word stock. But far from disappearing in the period of the French bourgeois revolution, the grammatical system and basic word stock of the French language were preserved without substantial change, and not only were

they preserved, but they continue to exist in the French language of today. I need hardly say that five or six years is a ridiculously small period for the elimination of an existing language and the building of a new national language (“a sudden linguistic revolution”!) — centuries are needed for this.

Marxism holds that the transition of a language from an old quality to a new does not take place by way of an explosion, of the destruction of an existing language and the creation of a new one, but by the gradual accumulation of the elements of the new quality, and hence by the gradual dying away of the elements of the old quality.

It should be said in general for the benefit of comrades who have an infatuation for explosions that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable not only to the history of the development of languages; it is not always applicable to other social phenomena of a basis or super-structural character. It applies of necessity to a society divided into hostile classes. But it does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes. In a period of eight to ten years we effected a transition in the agriculture of our country from the bourgeois, individual-peasant system to the socialist, collective-farm system. This was a revolution which eliminated the old bourgeois economic system in the countryside and created a new, socialist system. But that revolution did not take place by means of an explosion, that is, by the overthrow of the existing government power and the creation of a new power, but by a gradual transition from the old bourgeois system in the countryside to a new system. And it was possible to do that because it was a revolution from above, because the revolution was accomplished on the initiative of the existing power with the support of the bulk of the peasantry.

It is said that the numerous instances of linguistic

crossing in past history furnish reason to believe that when languages cross a new language is formed by means of an explosion, by a sudden transition from an old quality to a new. This is quite wrong.

Linguistic crossing cannot be regarded as the single impact of a decisive blow which produces its results within a few years. Linguistic crossing is a prolonged process which continues for hundreds of years. There can therefore be no question of explosion here.

Further, it would be quite wrong to think that the crossing of, say, two languages results in a new, third language which does not resemble either of the languages crossed and differs qualitatively from both of them. As a matter of fact one of the languages usually emerges victorious from the cross, retains its grammatical system and its basic word stock and continues to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development, while the other language gradually loses its quality and gradually dies away.

Consequently, a cross does not result in some new, third language; one of the languages persists, retains its grammatical system and basic word stock and is able to develop in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

True, in the process the vocabulary of the victorious language is somewhat enriched from the vanquished language, but this strengthens rather than weakens it.

Such was the case, for instance, with the Russian language, with which, in the course of historical development, the languages of a number of other peoples crossed and which always emerged the victor.

Of course, in the process the vocabulary of the Russian language was enlarged at the expense of the vocabularies of the other languages, but far from weakening, this enriched and strengthened the Russian language.

As to the specific national individuality of the Rus-

sian language, it did not suffer in the slightest, because the Russian language preserved its grammatical system and basic word stock and continued to advance and perfect itself in accordance with its inherent laws of development.

There can be no doubt that the crossing theory has little or no value for Soviet linguistics. If it is true that the chief task of linguistics is to study the inherent laws of language development, it has to be admitted that the crossing theory does not even set itself this task, let alone accomplish it — it simply does not notice it, or does not understand it.

Q. Did *Pravda* act rightly in starting an open discussion on problems of linguistics?

A. Yes, it did.

Along what lines the problems of linguistics will be settled, will become clear at the conclusion of the discussion. But it may be said already that the discussion has been very useful.

It has brought out, in the first place, that in linguistic bodies both in the centre and in the republics a regime has prevailed which is alien to science and men of science. The slightest criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet linguistics, even the most timid attempt to criticize the so-called “new doctrine” in linguistics, was persecuted and suppressed by the leading linguistic circles. Valuable workers and researchers in linguistics were dismissed from their posts or demoted for being critical of N.Y. Marr’s heritage or expressing the slightest disapproval of his teachings. Linguistic scholars were appointed to leading posts not on their merits, but because of their unqualified acceptance of N.Y. Marr’s theories.

It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism. But this generally recognized rule was ignored and flouted in the most unceremonious

fashion. There arose a close group of infallible leaders, who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, became a law unto themselves and did whatever they pleased.

To give one example: the so-called “Baku Course” (lectures delivered by N.Y. Marr in Baku), which the author himself had rejected and forbidden to be republished, was republished nevertheless by order of this leading caste (Comrade Meshchaninov calls them “disciples” of N.Y. Marr) and included without any reservations in the list of textbooks recommended to students. This means that the students were deceived, a rejected “Course” being suggested to them as a sound textbook. If I were not convinced of the integrity of Comrade Meshchaninov and the other linguistic leaders, I would say that such conduct is tantamount to sabotage.

How could this have happened? It happened because the Arakcheyev regime¹⁶ established in linguistics cultivates irresponsibility and encourages such arbitrary actions.

The discussion has proved to be very useful first of all because it brought this Arakcheyev regime into the light of day and smashed it to smithereens.

But the usefulness of the discussion does not end there. It not only smashed the old regime in linguistics but also brought out the incredible confusion of ideas on cardinal questions of linguistics which prevails among the leading circles in this branch of science. Until the discussion began the “disciples” of N.Y. Marr kept silence and glossed over the unsatisfactory state of affairs in linguistics. But when the discussion started silence became impossible, and they were compelled to express their opinion in the press. And what did we find? It turned out that in N.Y. Marr’s teachings there are a whole number of defects, errors, ill-defined problems and sketchy propositions. Why, one asks, have N.Y. Marr’s “disciples” begun to talk about this only

now, after the discussion opened? Why did they not see to it before? Why did they not speak about it in due time openly and honestly, as befits scientists?

Having admitted “some” errors of N.Y. Marr, his “disciples,” it appears, think that Soviet linguistics can only be advanced on the basis of a “rectified” version of N.Y. Marr’s theory, which they consider a Marxist one. No, save us from N.Y. Marr’s “Marxism”! N.Y. Marr did indeed want to be, and endeavoured to be, a Marxist, but he failed to become one. He was nothing but a simplifier and vulgarizer of Marxism, similar to the “proletcultists” or the “Rappists.”

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics another and also incorrect and non-Marxist formula, regarding the “class character” of language, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula which is contrary to the whole course of the history of peoples and languages.

N.Y. Marr introduced into linguistics an immodest, boastful, arrogant tone alien to Marxism and tending towards a bald and off-hand negation of everything done in linguistics prior to N.Y. Marr.

N.Y. Marr shrilly abused the comparative-historical method as “idealistic.” Yet it must be said that, despite its serious shortcomings, the comparative-historical method is nevertheless better than N.Y. Marr’s really idealistic four-element analysis,¹⁷ because the former gives a stimulus to work, to a study of languages, while the latter only gives a stimulus to loll in one’s armchair and tell fortunes in the tea cup of the celebrated four elements.

N.Y. Marr haughtily discountenanced every attempt to study groups (families) of languages on the grounds that it was a manifestation of the “proto-language” theory.¹⁸ Yet it cannot be denied that the linguistic affinity of nations like the Slav nations, say, is beyond question, and that a study of the linguistic affinity of these nations might be of great value to linguistics in the study of the laws of language development. The “proto-language” theory, I need hardly say, has nothing to do with it.

To listen to N.Y. Marr, and especially to his “disciples,” one might think that prior to N.Y. Marr there was no such thing as the science of language, that the science of language appeared with the “new doctrine” of N.Y. Marr. Marx and Engels were much more modest: they held that their dialectical materialism was a product of the development of the sciences, including philosophy, in earlier periods.

Thus, the discussion was useful also because it brought to light ideological shortcomings in Soviet linguistics.

I think that the sooner our linguistics rids itself of N.Y. Marr’s errors, the sooner will it be possible to extricate it from its present crisis.

Elimination of the Arakcheyev regime in linguistics, rejection of N.Y. Marr’s errors, and the introduction of Marxism into linguistics — that, in my opinion, is the way in which Soviet linguistics could be put on a sound basis.

June 20, 1950

CONCERNING CERTAIN PROBLEMS OF LINGUISTICS

(Reply to Comrade E. Krasheninnikova)

Comrade Krasheninnikova,
I am answering your questions.

Q. Your article convincingly shows that language is neither the base nor the superstructure. Would it be right to regard language as a phenomenon characteristic of both the base and the superstructure, or would it be more correct to regard language as an intermediate phenomenon?

A. Of course, characteristic of language, as a social phenomenon, is that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena, including the base and the superstructure, namely: it serves society just as society is served by all other social phenomena, including the base and the superstructure. But this, properly speaking, exhausts that common feature which is inherent in all social phenomena. Beyond this, important distinctions begin between social phenomena.

The point is that social phenomena have, in addition to this common feature, their own specific features which distinguish them from each other and which are of primary importance for science. The specific features of the base consist in that it serves society economically. The specific features of the superstructure consist in that it serves society by means of political, legal, aesthetic and other ideas and provides society with corresponding political, legal and other institutions. What then are the specific features of language, distinguishing it from other social phenomena? They consist in that language serves society as a means of intercourse between people, as a means for exchanging thoughts in society, as a means enabling people to understand one another and to coordinate joint work in all spheres of human activity, both in the sphere of production and in the sphere of economic relations, both in the sphere of politics and in the sphere of culture, both in social life and in everyday life. These specific features are char-

acteristic only of language, and precisely because they are characteristic only of language, language is the object of study by an independent science — linguistics. If there were no such specific features of language, linguistics would lose its right to independent existence.

In brief: language cannot be included either in the category of bases or in the category of superstructures.

Nor can it be included in the category of “intermediate” phenomena between the base and the superstructure, for such “intermediate” phenomena do not exist.

But perhaps language could be included in the category of the productive forces of society, in the category, say, of instruments of production? Indeed, there does exist a certain analogy between language and instruments of production: instruments of production manifest, just as language does, a kind of indifference towards classes and can serve equally different classes of society, both old and new. Does this circumstance provide ground for including language in the category of instruments of production? No, it does not.

At one time, N.Y. Marr, seeing that his formula — “language is a superstructure on the base” — encountered objections, decided to “reshape” it and announced that “language is an instrument of production.” Was N.Y. Marr right in including language in the category of instruments of production? No, he certainly was not.

The point is that the similarity between language and instruments of production ends with the analogy I have just mentioned. But, on the other hand, there is a radical difference between language and instruments of production. This difference lies in the fact that whereas instruments of production produce material wealth, language produces nothing or “produces” words only. To put it more plainly, people possessing instruments of production can produce material wealth, but those very same people, if they possess a language but not instruments of production, cannot produce material

wealth. It is not difficult to see that were language capable of producing material wealth, windbags would be the richest men on earth.

Q. Marx and Engels define language as “the immediate reality of thought,” as “practical,... actual consciousness.”¹⁹ “Ideas,” Marx says, “do not exist divorced from language.” In what measure, in your opinion, should linguistics occupy itself with the semantic aspect of language, semantics, historical semasiology and stylistics, or should form alone be the subject of linguistics?

A. Semantics (semasiology) is one of the important branches of linguistics. The semantic aspect of words and expressions is of serious importance in the study of language. Hence, semantics (semasiology) must be assured its due place in linguistics.

However, in working on problems of semantics and in utilizing its data, its significance must in no way be overestimated, and still less must it be abused. I have in mind certain philologists who, having an excessive passion for semantics, disregard language as “the immediate reality of thought” inseparably connected with thinking, divorce thinking from language and maintain that language is outliving its age and that it is possible to do without language.

Listen to what N.Y. Marr says:

“Language exists only inasmuch as it is expressed in sounds; the action of thinking occurs also without being expressed... Language (spoken) has already begun to surrender its functions to the latest inventions which are unreservedly conquering space, while thinking is on the up-grade, departing from its unutilized accumulations in the past and its new acquisitions, and is to oust and fully replace language. The language of the future is thinking which will be developing in technique free of natur-

al matter. No language, even the spoken language, which is all the same connected with the standards of nature, will be able to withstand it" (see *Selected Works* by N.Y. Marr).

If we interpret this "labour-magic" gibberish into simple human language, the conclusion may be drawn that:

a) N.Y. Marr divorces thinking from language;

b) N.Y. Marr considers that communication between people can be realized without language, with the help of thinking itself, which is free of the "natural matter" of language, free of the "standards of nature";

c) Divorcing thinking from language and "having freed" it from the "natural matter" of language, N.Y. Marr lands into the swamp of idealism.

It is said that thoughts arise in the mind of man prior to their being expressed in speech, that they arise without linguistic material, without linguistic integument, in, so to say, a naked form. But that is absolutely wrong. Whatever thoughts arise in the human mind and at whatever moment, they can arise and exist only on the basis of the linguistic material, on the basis of language terms and phrases. Bare thoughts, free of the linguistic material, free of the "natural matter" of language, do not exist. "Language is the immediate reality of thought" (*Marx*). The reality of thought is manifested in language. Only idealists can speak of thinking not being connected with "the natural matter" of language, of thinking without language.

In brief: overestimation of semantics and abuse of it led N.Y. Marr to idealism.

Consequently, if semantics (semasiology) is safeguarded against exaggerations and abuses of the kind committed by N.Y. Marr and some of his "disciples," semantics can be of great benefit to linguistics.

Q. You quite justly say that the ideas, concepts, cus-

toms and moral principles of the bourgeoisie and those of the proletariat are directly antithetical. The class character of these phenomena is certainly reflected in the semantic aspect of language (and sometimes in its form — in the vocabulary — as is correctly pointed out in your article). In analysing concrete linguistic material and, in the first place, the semantic aspect of language, can we speak of the class essence of the concepts expressed by language, particularly in those cases when language expresses not only the thought of man but also his attitude towards reality, where his class affinity manifests itself with especial clarity?

A. Putting it more briefly, you want to know whether classes influence language, whether they introduce into language their specific words and expressions, whether there are cases when people attach a different meaning to one and the same word or expression depending on their class affinity?

Yes, classes influence language, introduce into the language their own specific words and expressions and sometimes understand one and the same word or expression differently. There is no doubt about that.

However, it does not follow that specific words and expressions, as well as difference in semantics, can be of serious importance for the development of a single language common to the whole people, that they are capable of detracting from its significance or of changing its character.

Firstly, such specific words and expressions, as well as cases of difference in semantics, are so few in language that they hardly make up even one per cent of the entire linguistic material. Consequently, all the remaining overwhelming mass of words and expressions, as well as their semantics, are *common* to all classes of society.

Secondly, specific words and expressions with a class tinge are used in speech not according to rules

of some sort of “class” grammar, which does not exist, but according to the grammatical rules of the existing language common to the whole people.

Hence, the existence of specific words and expressions and the facts of differences in the semantics of language do not refute, but, on the contrary, confirm the existence and necessity of a single language common to the whole people.

Q. In your article you quite correctly appraise Marr as a vulgarizer of Marxism. Does this mean that the linguists, including us, the young linguists, should reject the *whole* linguistic heritage of Marr, who all the same has to his credit a number of valuable linguistic researches (Comrades Chikobava, Sanzheyev and others wrote about them during the discussion)? Approaching Marr critically, cannot we take from him what is useful and valuable?

A. Of course, the works of N.Y. Marr do not consist solely of errors. N.Y. Marr made very gross mistakes when he introduced into linguistics elements of Marxism in a distorted form, when he tried to create an independent theory of language. But N.Y. Marr has certain good and ably written works, in which he, forgetting his theoretical claims, conscientiously and, one must say, skilfully investigates individual languages. In these works one can find not a little that is valuable and instructive. Clearly, these valuable and instructive things should be taken from N.Y. Marr and utilized.

Q. Many linguists consider *formalism* one of the main causes of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics. We should very much like to know your opinion as to what formalism in linguistics consists in and how it should be overcome.

A. N.Y. Marr and his “disciples” accuse of “formalism” all linguists who do not accept the “new doctrine” of N.Y. Marr. This of course is not serious or clever.

N.Y. Marr considered that grammar is an empty

“formality,” and that people who regard the grammatical system as the foundation of language are formalists. This is altogether foolish.

I think that “formalism” was invented by the authors of the “new doctrine” to facilitate their struggle against their opponents in linguistics.

The cause of the stagnation in Soviet linguistics is not the “formalism” invented by N.Y. Marr and his “disciples,” but the Arakcheyev regime and the theoretical gaps in linguistics. The Arakcheyev regime was set up by the “disciples” of N.Y. Marr. Theoretical confusion was brought into linguistics by N.Y. Marr and his closest colleagues. To put an end to stagnation, both the one and the other must be eliminated. The removal of these plague spots will put Soviet linguistics on a sound basis, will lead it out on to the broad highway and enable Soviet linguistics to occupy first place in world linguistics.

June 29, 1950

REPLY TO COMRADES

TO COMRADE SANZHEYEV

Esteemed Comrade *Sanzheyev*,

I am replying to your letter with considerable delay, for it was only yesterday forwarded to me from the apparatus of the Central Committee.

Your interpretation of my standpoint on the question of dialects is absolutely correct.

“Class” dialects, which it would be more correct to call jargons, do not serve the mass of the people, but a narrow social upper crust. Moreover, they do not have a grammatical system or basic word stock of their own. In view of this, they cannot possibly develop into in-

dependent languages.

Local (“territorial”) dialects, on the other hand, serve the mass of the people and have a grammatical system and basic word stock of their own. In view of this, some local dialects, in the process of formation of nations, may become the basis of national languages and develop into independent national languages. This was the case, for instance, with the Kursk-Orel dialect (the Kursk-Orel “speech”) of the Russian language, which formed the basis of the Russian national language. The same must be said of the Poltava-Kiev dialect of the Ukrainian language, which formed the basis of the Ukrainian national language. As for the other dialects of such languages, they lose their originality, merge with those languages and disappear in them.

Reverse processes also occur, when the single language of a nationality, which has not yet become a nation owing to the absence of the necessary economic conditions of development, collapses as a result of the disintegration of the state of that nationality, and the local dialects, which have not yet had time to be fully uniformized in the single language, revive and give rise to the formation of separate independent languages. Possibly, this was the case, for example, with the single Mongolian language.

July n, 1950

TO COMRADES D. BELKIN AND S. FURER

I have received your letters.

Your mistake is that you have confused two different things and substituted another subject for that examined in my reply to Comrade Krashennikova.

1. In that reply I criticized N.Y. Marr who, dealing with language (spoken) and thought, divorces language from thought and thus lapses into idealism. Therefore,

I referred in my reply to normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech. I maintained, moreover, that with such human beings thoughts can arise only on the basis of linguistic material, that bare thoughts unconnected with linguistic material do not exist among people, who possess the faculty of speech.

Instead of accepting or rejecting this thesis, you introduce anomalous human beings, people without language, deaf-mutes, who have no language at their disposal and whose thoughts, of course, cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. As you see, this is an entirely different subject which I did not touch upon and could not have touched upon since linguistics concerns itself with normal human beings possessing the faculty of speech and not with anomalous deaf-mutes who do not possess the faculty of speech.

You have substituted for the subject under discussion another subject that was not discussed.

2. From Comrade Belkin's letter it is evident that he places on a par the "language of words" (spoken language) and "gesture language" ("hand" language, according to N.Y. Marr). He seems to think that gesture language and the language of words are of equal significance, that at one time human society had no language of words, that "hand" language at that time played the part of the language of words which appeared later.

But if Comrade Belkin really thinks so, he is committing a serious error. Spoken language or the language of words has always been the sole language of human society capable of serving as an adequate means of intercourse between people. History does not know of a single human society, be it the most backward, that did not have its own spoken language. Ethnography does not know of a single backward tribe, be it as primitive or even more primitive than, say, the Australians or the Tierra del Fuegians of the last century, which did not have its own spoken language. In the history of

mankind, spoken language has been one of the forces which helped human beings to emerge from the animal world, unite into communities, develop their faculty of thinking, organize social production, wage a successful struggle against the forces of nature and attain the stage of progress we have today.

In this respect, the significance of the so-called gesture language, in view of its extreme poverty and limitations, is negligible. Properly speaking, this is not a language, and not even a linguistic substitute that could in one way or another replace spoken language, but an auxiliary means of extremely limited possibilities to which man sometimes resorts to emphasize this or that point in his speech. Gesture language and spoken language are just as incomparable as are the primitive wooden hoe and the modern caterpillar tractor with its five-furrow plough or tractor row drill.

3. Apparently, you are primarily interested in the deaf-mutes, and only secondarily in problems of linguistics. Evidently, it was precisely this circumstance that prompted you to put a number of questions to me. Well, if you insist, I am not averse to granting your request. How do matters stand with regard to deaf-mutes? Do they possess the faculty of thinking? Do thoughts arise with them? Yes, they possess the faculty of thinking and thoughts arise with them. Clearly, since deaf-mutes are deprived of the faculty of speech, their thoughts cannot arise on the basis of linguistic material. Can this be taken to mean that the thoughts of deaf-mutes are naked, are not connected with the "standards of nature" (N.Y. Marr's expression)? No, it cannot. The thoughts of deaf-mutes arise and can exist only on the basis of the images, sensations and conceptions they form in everyday life on the objects of the outside world and their relations among themselves, thanks to the senses of sight, of touch, taste and smell. Apart from these images, sensations and conceptions, thought is

empty, is deprived of all content, that is, it does not exist.

July 22, 1950

TO COMRADE A. KHOLOPOV

I have received your letter.

Pressure of work has somewhat delayed my reply.

Your letter tacitly proceeds from two premises: from the premise that it is permissible to quote the work of this or that author *apart* from the historical period of which the quotation treats, and secondly, from the premise that this or that conclusion or formula of Marxism, derived as a result of studying one of the periods of historical development, holds good for all periods of development and therefore must remain *invariable*.

I must say that both these premises are deeply mistaken.

A few examples.

1. In the forties of the past century when there was no monopoly capitalism as yet, when capitalism was developing more or less smoothly along an ascending line, spreading to new territories it had not yet occupied, and the law of uneven development could not yet fully operate, Marx and Engels concluded that a socialist revolution could not be victorious in one particular country, that it could be victorious only as a result of a joint blow in all, or in most, civilized countries. This conclusion subsequently became a guiding principle for all Marxists.

However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially in the period of the first world war, when it became clear to everyone that pre-monopoly capitalism had definitely developed into monopoly capitalism, when rising capitalism had become dying capitalism, when the war had revealed the incurable weaknesses

of the world imperialist front, and the law of uneven development predetermined that the proletarian revolution would mature in different countries at different times, Lenin, proceeding from Marxist theory, came to the conclusion that in the new conditions of development, the socialist revolution could fully prove victorious in one country taken separately, that the simultaneous victory of the socialist revolution in all countries, or in a majority of civilized countries, was impossible owing to the uneven maturing of the revolution in those countries, that the old formula of Marx and Engels no longer corresponded to the new historical conditions.

It is evident that here we have two different conclusions on the question of the victory of socialism, which not only contradict, but exclude each other.

Some textualists and Talmudists who quote mechanically without delving into the essence of the matter, and apart from historical conditions, may say that one of these conclusions should be discarded as being absolutely incorrect, while the other conclusion, as the absolutely correct one, should be applied to all periods of development. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the textualists and Talmudists are mistaken; they cannot but know that both of these conclusions are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its own time: Marx's and Engels' conclusion — for the period of pre-monopoly capitalism; and Lenin's conclusion — for the period of monopoly capitalism.

2. Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* said that after the victory of the socialist revolution, the state is bound to wither away. On these grounds, after the victory of the socialist revolution in our country, textualists and Talmudists in our Party began demanding that the Party should take steps to ensure the speedy withering away of our state, to disband state organs, to give up a standing army.

However, the study of the world situation of our

time led Soviet Marxists to the conclusion that in the conditions of capitalist encirclement, when the socialist revolution has been victorious only in one country, and capitalism reigns in all other countries, the land of the victorious revolution should not weaken, but in every way strengthen its state, state organs, intelligence organs and army, if that land does not want to be crushed by the capitalist encirclement. Russian Marxists came to the conclusion that Engels' formula has in view the victory of socialism in all, or in most, countries, that it cannot be applied in the case where socialism is victorious in one country taken separately and capitalism reigns in all the other countries.

Evidently, we have here two different formulas regarding the destiny of the socialist state, each formula excluding the other.

The textualists and Talmudists may say that this circumstance creates an intolerable situation, that one of these formulas must be discarded as being absolutely erroneous, and the other — as the absolutely correct one — must be applied to all periods of development of the socialist state. Marxists, however, cannot but know that the textualists and Talmudists are mistaken, for both these formulas are correct, though not absolutely, each being correct for its time: the formula of Soviet Marxists — for the period of the victory of socialism in one or several countries; and the formula of Engels — for the period when the consecutive victory of socialism in separate countries will lead to the victory of socialism in the majority of countries and when the necessary conditions will thus have been created for the application of Engels' formula.

The number of such examples could be multiplied.

The same must be said of the two different formulas on the question of language, taken from various works of Stalin and cited by Comrade Kholopov in his letter.

Comrade Kholopov refers to Stalin's work *Con-*

cerning Marxism in Linguistics, where the conclusion is drawn that, as a result of the crossing, say, of two languages, one of them usually emerges victorious, while the other dies away, that, consequently, crossing does not produce some new, third language, but preserves one of the languages. He refers further to another conclusion, taken from Stalin's report to the 16th Congress of the CPSU(B), where it is said that in the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, when socialism is consolidated and becomes part of everyday life, national languages will inevitably merge into one common language which, of course, will be neither Great Russian nor German, but something new. Comparing these two formulas and seeing that, far from coinciding, they exclude each other, Comrade Kholopov falls into despair. "From your article," he writes in his letter, "I understood that the crossing of languages can *never* produce some new language, whereas prior to your article I was firmly convinced, in conformity with your speech at the 16th Congress of the CPSU(B), that under *communism*, languages would merge into one common language."

Evidently, having discovered a contradiction between these two formulas and being deeply convinced that the contradiction must be removed, Comrade Kholopov considers it necessary to get rid of one of these formulas as incorrect and to clutch at the other as being correct for all periods and countries; but which formula to clutch at — he does not know. The result is something in the nature of a hopeless situation. Comrade Kholopov does not even suspect that both formulas can be correct — each for its own time.

That is always the case with textualists and Talmudists who do not delve into the essence of the matter, quote mechanically and irrespective of the historical conditions of which the quotations treat, and invariably find themselves in a hopeless situation.

Yet if one examines the essence of the matter, there are no grounds for considering the situation hopeless. The fact is that Stalin's pamphlet *Concerning Marxism in Linguistics*, and Stalin's speech at the 16th Party Congress, refer to two entirely different epochs, owing to which the formulas, too, prove to be different.

The formula given by Stalin in his pamphlet, in the part where it speaks of the crossing of languages, refers to the epoch *prior to the victory of socialism* on a world scale, when the exploiting classes are the dominant power in the world; when national and colonial oppression remains in force; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations are consolidated by differences between states; when, as yet, there is no national equality of rights; when the crossing of languages takes place as a struggle for the domination of one of the languages; when the conditions necessary for the peaceful and friendly cooperation of nations and languages are as yet lacking; when it is not the cooperation and mutual enrichment of languages that are on the order of the day, but the assimilation of some and the victory of other languages. It is clear that in such conditions there can be only victorious and defeated languages. It is precisely these conditions that Stalin's formula has in view when it says that the crossing, say, of two languages, results not in the formation of a new language, but in the victory of one of the languages and the defeat of the other.

As regards the other formula by Stalin, taken from his speech at the 16th Party Congress, in the part that touches on the merging of languages into one common language, it has in view another epoch, namely, the epoch *after the victory of socialism* on a world scale, when world imperialism no longer exists; when the exploiting classes are overthrown and national and colonial oppression is eradicated; when national isolation and mutual distrust among nations is replaced by mutual

confidence and rapprochement between nations; when national equality has been put into practice; when the policy of suppressing and assimilating languages is abolished; when the cooperation of nations has been established, and it is possible for national languages freely to enrich one another through their cooperation. It is clear that in these conditions there can be no question of the suppression and defeat of some languages, and the victory of others. Here we shall have not two languages, one of which is to suffer defeat, while the other is to emerge from the struggle victorious, but hundreds of national languages, out of which, as a result of a prolonged economic, political and cultural cooperation of nations, there will first appear most enriched unified zonal languages, and subsequently the zonal languages will merge into a single international language, which, of course, will be neither German, nor Russian, nor English, but a new language that has absorbed the best elements of the national and zonal languages.

Consequently, the two different formulas correspond to two different epochs in the development of society, and precisely because they correspond to them, both formulas are correct — each for its epoch.

To demand that these formulas should not be at variance with each other, that they should not exclude each other, is just as absurd as it would be to demand that the epoch of the domination of capitalism should not be at variance with the epoch of the domination of socialism, that socialism and capitalism should not exclude each other.

The textualists and Talmudists regard Marxism and separate conclusions and formulas of Marxism as a collection of dogmas, which “never” change, notwithstanding changes in the conditions of the development of society. They believe that if they learn these conclusions and formulas by heart and start citing them at random, they will be able to solve any problem, reckon-

ing that the memorized conclusions and formulas will serve them for all times and countries, for all occasions in life. But this can be the conviction only of people who see the letter of Marxism, but not its essence, who learn by rote the texts of conclusions and formulas of Marxism, but do not understand their meaning.

Marxism is the science of the laws governing the development of nature and society, the science of the revolution of the oppressed and exploited masses, the science of the victory of socialism in all countries, the science of building communist society. As a science, Marxism cannot stand still, it develops and is perfected. In its development, Marxism cannot but be enriched by new experience, new knowledge — consequently some of its formulas and conclusions cannot but change in the course of time, cannot but be replaced by new formulas and conclusions, corresponding to the new historical tasks. Marxism does not recognize invariable conclusions and formulas, obligatory for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism.

July 28, 1950

(Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Peking 1972)

**GREETINGS MESSAGE TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of the People's
Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China*

August 1, 1950

Please accept my sincere greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 178, August 1, 1950)

REGARDING MR. MORRISON'S STATEMENT

August 1, 1950

Mr. Morrison* raises two sets of issues in his statement: questions of domestic policy and questions of foreign policy.

1. DOMESTIC POLICY

Mr. Morrison claims that there is no freedom of speech, freedom of the press or freedom of the person in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Morrison is profoundly mistaken. Nowhere else is there such freedom of speech, press and person, as well as organization for workers, peasants and intellectuals, as in the Soviet Union. Nowhere are there as many workers' and peasants' clubs, as many workers' and peasants' newspapers, as in the Soviet Union. Nowhere is the organization of the working class brought to such a degree as in the Soviet Union. It is not a secret to anyone that the entire working class, all workers of the USSR, are organized into professional unions, just as all peasants are organized into cooperatives.

Does Mr. Morrison know about this? Obviously, he does not. Moreover, he probably does not want to know about it. He prefers to draw material from complaints coming from the representatives of Russian capitalists and landlords expelled from the USSR by the will of the Soviet people.

In the USSR, there is no freedom of speech, press or organization for enemies of the people, for overthrown revolutionaries, landlords and capitalists. There is no

* G. Morrison — Since March 1951, the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.

freedom for irredeemable thieves, for saboteurs sent by foreign intelligence, terrorists, murderers and the criminals who shot Lenin, killed Volodarsky, Uritsky and Kirov, and poisoned Maxim Gorky and Kuibyshev. All these criminals, from landlords and capitalists to terrorists, thieves, murderers and subversive elements, seek to restore capitalism in the USSR, to reinstate exploitation of man by man and to drown the country in the blood of workers and peasants. Prisons and labour camps exist for these gentlemen, and only for them.

Does Mr. Morrison really think that he is advocating freedom of speech, press and person for these gentlemen? Does Mr. Morrison believe that the peoples of the USSR will agree to grant freedom of speech, press and person to these gentlemen, thereby granting them freedom to exploit the working people?

Mr. Morrison remains silent about other freedoms that hold a deeper significance than freedom of speech, press, etc., namely, he says nothing about the freedom of the people from exploitation, from economic crises, unemployment and poverty. Perhaps Mr. Morrison is unaware that all these freedoms have long existed in the Soviet Union? And yet, these freedoms are the foundation of all other freedoms. Could it be that Mr. Morrison shamefully omits these fundamental freedoms because, unfortunately, these freedoms do not exist in England, and English workers still remain under the yoke of capitalist exploitation, despite the fact that the Labour Party has been in power in England for six years?

Mr. Morrison claims that the Labour government is a socialist government, and radio broadcasts organized under the control of such a government should not encounter obstacles from the Soviets.

Unfortunately, we cannot agree with Mr. Morrison. Initially, after the Labour Party came to power, one might have thought that the Labour government would take the path of socialism. However, it turned

out later that the Labour government differs little from any bourgeois government seeking to preserve the capitalist system and ensure impressive profits for the capitalists.

Indeed, in England, capitalist profits grow from year to year, while workers' wages remain frozen, and the Labour government defends this anti-worker, exploitative regime through every measure, including the persecution and arrest of workers. Can such a government be called socialist?

One might have thought that with the advent of the Labour Party to power, capitalist exploitation would be eliminated, measures would be taken to systematically reduce prices for mass consumer goods and the material well-being of the working people would be fundamentally improved. Instead, in England, we see an increase in capitalist profits, a freeze on workers' wages, an increase in prices for mass consumer goods, etc. We cannot call such a policy socialist.

As for English radio broadcasts to the Soviet Union (BBC), they are, as is known, mostly aimed at encouraging the enemies of the Soviet people in their quest to restore capitalist exploitation. Clearly, the Soviets cannot support such anti-people propaganda, which also constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

Mr. Morrison asserts that the Soviet power in the USSR is a monopolistic power because it represents the power of one party, the Communist Party. If we reason in this way, we can conclude that the Labour government is also a monopolistic government because it represents the power of one party, the Labour Party.

However, the matter is not about that. The point is that in the USSR, firstly, the communists act not in isolation but in a bloc with non-party members, and secondly, in the historical development of the USSR, the Communist Party emerged as the only anti-capitalist,

people's party.

Over the past 50 years, the peoples of the Soviet Union have experienced all the major parties that existed in Russia: the party of landlords (Black Hundreds), the party of capitalists (Cadets), the Menshevik party (right "socialists"), the Socialist-Revolutionary party (defenders of the kulaks) and the Communist Party. During the unfolding of revolutionary events in the USSR, the peoples of our country cast aside all bourgeois parties and chose the Communist Party, believing this party to be the only anti-landlord and anti-capitalist party. This is an historical fact. It is clear that the peoples of the USSR wholeheartedly support the battle-tested Communist Party.

What can Mr. Morrison oppose to this historical fact? Does Mr. Morrison not think that, for the sake of a dubious game of opposition, it would be necessary to turn back the wheel of history and resurrect these long-dead parties?

2. FOREIGN POLICY

Mr. Morrison claims that the Labour government stands for the preservation of peace, that it poses no threat to the Soviet Union, that the North Atlantic Pact is a defensive pact, not an aggressive one, that if England has embarked on an arms race, it is because it is forced to do so since, after the Second World War, the Soviet Union did not sufficiently demobilize its army.

In all these assertions of Mr. Morrison, there is not a drop of truth.

If the Labour government genuinely stands for the preservation of peace, then why does it reject the Peace Pact between the five great powers? Why does it speak out against the reduction of armaments by all great powers? Why does it oppose the prohibition of atomic weapons? Why does it persecute people advocating

for the cause of peace? Why does it not ban war propaganda in England?

Mr. Morrison wants people to take him at his word. However, the Soviet people cannot believe anyone based on words alone; they demand actions, not declarations.

Mr. Morrison's statements about the Soviet Union not sufficiently demobilizing its army after the Second World War are also unfounded. The Soviet government has officially announced that it demobilized those aged 32 and over. At present, its army is approximately the same size as it was in the peace-time period before the Second World War. In contrast, the armies of the British and Americans are now twice as large as before the Second World War. However, these irrefutable facts continue to be opposed by baseless assertions.

Perhaps Mr. Morrison would like the USSR to have an insufficiently defensive army? An army, in general, represents a significant burden on the state budget, and the Soviet people would gladly agree to the liquidation of a regular army if there were no external threats. However, the experience of 1918-20, when the British, Americans and French (together with the Japanese) attacked the Soviet Union, tried to detach the Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Far East and Arkhangelsk from the USSR, and tormented our country for three years, teaches us that the USSR must have a certain minimum regular army to defend its independence from imperialist invaders. There has never been a case in history where the Russians attacked English territory, but history knows several cases where the English attacked Russian territory and seized it.

Mr. Morrison claims that the Russians rejected cooperation with the English on the German question and the issue of rebuilding Europe. This is an utter falsehood. It is unlikely that Mr. Morrison himself believes this statement. In reality, as is known, it was not

the Russians who refused cooperation but the English and Americans because they knew that the Russians would not agree to the restoration of fascism in Germany or the transformation of West Germany into a base for aggression.

As for cooperation in the matter of economic recovery in Europe, the USSR not only did not reject such cooperation but, on the contrary, proposed to carry it out on the principles of equality and respect for the sovereignty of European countries without any dictate from outside, without the dictate of the United States, without the subordination of European countries to the United States.

Mr. Morrison's claims about communists coming to power in the people's democracies through violence and that the Cominform engages in propaganda of violent actions are equally groundless. Only those with the intent to slander the communists can make such assertions.

In reality, as is well known, communists came to power in the people's democracies through general elections. Certainly, the people of these countries ousted the exploiters and all sorts of agents of foreign intelligence. But this is the will of the people. The voice of the people is the voice of God.

As for Cominform, only those who have lost all sense of measure can claim that it engages in propaganda of violent actions. Cominform literature has been published and is available to everyone. It completely refutes these slanderous fabrications against the communists.

In general, it must be said that the method of violence and violent actions is not the method of the communists. On the contrary, history shows that it is the enemies of communism and various agents of foreign intelligence who practise the method of violence and violent actions. One does not have to go far to find ex-

amples. Quite recently, in a short period, they killed the Prime Minister of Iran, the Prime Minister of Lebanon and the King of Transjordan. All these murders were committed with the aim of forcibly changing the regime in these countries. Who killed them? Perhaps the communists, supporters of Cominform? Surely, it is absurd even to ask such a question. Maybe Mr. Morrison, being more informed, could help us understand this matter?

Mr. Morrison claims that the North Atlantic Treaty is a defensive pact, that it does not pursue aggressive goals, but rather, it is directed against aggression.

If this is true, why didn't the initiators of this pact offer for the Soviet Union to participate in it? Why did they isolate themselves from the Soviet Union? Why did they conclude it behind its back and in secret? Hasn't the USSR proven that it knows how and is willing to fight against aggression, for example, against Hitlerite and Japanese aggression? Did the USSR not fight against aggression more so than, say, Norway, which is a member of the pact? How can we explain this remarkable inconsistency, to say the least?

If the North Atlantic Treaty is a defensive pact, why did the British and Americans not agree to the Soviet government's proposal to discuss the nature of this pact at the Council of Foreign Ministers? As is known, the Soviet government proposed discussing all pacts it had concluded with other countries at the Council of Foreign Ministers. Why, then, are the British and Americans afraid to tell the truth about this pact and why did they refuse to subject the North Atlantic Treaty to discussion? Is it not because the North Atlantic Treaty contains provisions for aggression against the USSR, and the initiators of the pact are forced to keep this hidden from the public? Is it not the case that the Labour government agreed to turn England into a military aviation base for the United States for an attack against the Soviet Union?

That is why the Soviet people classify the North Atlantic Treaty as an aggressive pact directed against the USSR.

This is particularly evident from the aggressive actions of the Anglo-American ruling circles in Korea. It has been over a year since the Anglo-American forces began tormenting the freedom-loving and peaceful people of Korea, destroying Korean villages and cities, and killing women, children and the elderly. Can these bloody actions of the Anglo-American forces be called defence? Who can claim that English troops in Korea are defending England from the Korean people? Would it not be more honest to call these actions military aggression?

Let Mr. Morrison point out at least one Soviet soldier who has discharged his weapon against any peaceful people. There is no such soldier! But let Mr. Morrison explain thoroughly why English soldiers are killing the peaceful inhabitants of Korea. Why is the English soldier dying far from his homeland on foreign soil in the first place?

That is why the Soviet people consider contemporary Anglo-American politicians as instigators of a new world war.

(*Pravda*, August 1, 1951)

CONVERSATION WITH A.M. LAVROV AND A.M. DZHUGA

August 1950

Lavrov: The main task of the Anglo-American agency is to, after transforming strictly class-based communist parties of workers and laboring peasants into so-called “people’s parties,” achieve, under the false flag of fighting for human rights, the replacement of the socialist countries’ dictatorship of the proletariat with the so-called “people’s state.” This will paralyse the activities of our punitive organs and create a broad field of activity for anti-Soviet elements of all kinds and shades in their struggle for the restoration of capitalist orders. In their counter-revolutionary activities, the Anglo-American agency, infiltrated secretly into socialist countries, would, according to this plan, rely on the children whose parents represented exploitative classes in the past, and whose property was confiscated during the socialist revolution. Also, they would rely on the children whose parents were repressed during the years of Soviet power, as well as on various bourgeois-nationalist elements and blatant criminals who dream of a “sweet” life at the expense of robbing the Soviet peoples in case of a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

A program of sabotage in the economy of socialist countries has been developed, aimed at compromising the socialist mode of production. For this purpose, the Anglo-American agency in socialist countries, especially in the Soviet Union, is tasked with undermining centralized planning under the guise of imaginary economic reforms, dispersing capital investments across a multitude of unfinished projects, and, under the pretext of “innovative” proposals, to replace metal parts in machines and tools with plastic ones, undermine metal-

lurgy — the basis of the development of heavy industry, the foundation of the country's defence capability. To achieve the collapse of the Soviet socialist agriculture, efforts should be made to liquidate machine and tractor stations, which will immediately push collective farms to the brink of bankruptcy. The Anglo-American ruling circles place great hopes in their subversive activities against the USSR and countries of the socialist camp on provocative radio stations such as *Voice of America*, *BBC*, *German Wave*, *Radio Free Europe* and other similar radio broadcasts. The Anglo-American agency in socialist countries is tasked with seeking the cancellation of the jamming of broadcasts from these radio stations, as well as taking control of mass media, editorial offices of literary journals, and influencing filmmakers and playwrights to engage in anti-Soviet activities in the socialist countries. This plan will actively be put into action only after you, Comrade Stalin, step back from affairs, and representatives of the great generation of communists who defeated all enemies naturally pass away. To split the world communist movement and undermine communist parties from within, Anglo-American intelligence place their hopes on renegades like Josip Broz Tito, Togliatti and similar figures.

Dzhuga (Lieutenant General, Deputy to Lavrov): Tito is no renegade; he was never a communist. He is a typical agent of British intelligence, sent into the communist movement for a long-term stay. And he is not even a Serb by nationality. No wonder he was so friendly throughout the war with the chief resident of British intelligence in the Balkans, Churchill's son — Randolph Churchill, with whom he even lived in the same tent.

Stalin: Do you have a concrete proposal on how to neutralize Tito's activities?

Dzhuga: I don't understand why we've been so ceremonious with this scoundrel Tito, this "communist,"

for so long. His fingers are adorned with precious diamond rings, and he changes into dozens of expensive suits in a day. Tito moved to live on a small island in the Mediterranean — Brioni, building a magnificent palace there with the money of the impoverished Yugoslav people. One bomber without identification marks from the territory of Albania — and there will be no palace, no Anglo-American agent Tito. Where there is a man, there is a problem; where there is no man, there is no problem.

Stalin: Remember once and for all: we are not adventurers. Your proposal reeks of Socialist-Revolutionary tactics. Eliminating Tito won't solve the problem; someone else will take his place. Individual terror is not the way.

So, the Americans and the British have declared a large-scale secret war against us... However, starting from the victory of the October Revolution, they have never stopped it. Perhaps, frightened by Hitler, they slightly dampened its fire during the years of the Second World War. Well, if the Americans and the British want a secret war, they will get it. Do you have specific proposals on how best to thwart their plans?

Dzhuga: I have two proposals. The first one is to radically improve the work of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. Abakumov clearly cannot handle the position of the minister. In pursuit of “high-profile” cases, it seems he has allowed foreign intelligence to infiltrate important party and state positions in several cases. The leadership of this ministry needs serious strengthening. I have serious doubts about your associates in the Political Bureau as well, such as Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Khrushchev.

Stalin: If I were to listen to you, the entire Political Bureau is made up of renegades and traitors.

Dzhuga: Potential traitors, Comrade Stalin.

Stalin: What do you specifically propose?

Dzhuga: Convene a party congress, which hasn't been held for so many years, and freshen up the Political Bureau. It is time to officially nominate people to lead the party and the country who, under your wise leadership, created and defended the greatest state in history against all enemies. Without you in charge, as soon as you step back, we will all be lost if these puppets come to actual leadership.

Stalin: And the old members of the Political Bureau, who did so much during the Great Patriotic War for our victory, do you suggest eliminating them as potential betrayers of socialism?

Dzhuga: Why eliminate them, Comrade Stalin? Let them go on a well-deserved rest, a good pension — what more does an old person need? In any case, they are no longer capable of anything serious and will only undermine the state.

Stalin (To Lavrov): Are you of the same opinion?

Lavrov: This is the only correct decision, Comrade Stalin.

Stalin: Very well. We'll think about it. What else do you suggest?

Dzhuga: I suggest seriously engaging with the Chekists in Marxist-Leninist training. I enquired about how seminar sessions are conducted in the party education network in the Ministry of State Security. The party committee secretary, Rogov, who only knows how to insist that Comrade Abakumov is today's Dzerzhinsky, has completely messed up this crucial matter. A significant portion of the seminars in the party education network in the MGB are conducted formally. Chekist cadres, in their study of Marxist-Leninist theory, are not creatively engaged, leading to a lack of ideas in their environment, especially in the investigative department for particularly important cases and the Main Directorate of Government Security of the MGB. The cadre of seminar leaders is often simply illiterate.

Here is an example of how our respected Nikolai Sidorovich Vlasik, who received education only up to the fourth grade of the parish school, conducted one of such seminars.

One of the participants asked him, “Comrade General, what is the colossus on clay legs that Comrade Stalin mentioned in one of his speeches?” Vlasik, seasoning his response with his usual profanity, retorted, “You fool, don’t you know what a colossus on clay feet is? You take a wheat ear, stick it into clay, and there you have a colossus on clay feet.”

Another seminar participant, a security officer who was studying part-time at the historical faculty of Moscow University — a rare fact among MGB employees — asked Vlasik for permission to add to his answer. Vlasik graciously allowed it. “By the phrase ‘colossus on clay feet,’” the officer said, “Comrade Stalin meant the ancient empires of Alexander the Great and the Persian king Cyrus, in which the conquered countries had no economic commonality. Therefore, these empires were giants (colossi) on extremely fragile clay feet, immediately disintegrating into separate states after the deaths of Alexander and Cyrus.” Vlasik, satisfied, smirked and summed up the officer’s question: “There, do you understand now, fool? I explained it figuratively to you.”

Stalin: How do you know how seminars are conducted in the Security Directorate? I asked you not to get involved in that management.

Dzhuga: I didn’t get involved. But you can’t hide an awl in a bag. All the employees of the ministry laugh at such seminars.

Since the Americans and the British have declared a secret war against us, we should consider creating a special body that would allow us to quickly and reliably thwart their subversive activities in our country, physically eliminating their agents, as is done in any war.

What does it matter how the enemy soldier is dressed? And a foreign agent is such a soldier, whether in military uniform or civilian clothes. What matters is that he is a soldier fighting against our country. The threat to our country from Anglo-American intelligence should not be underestimated, although, based on my experience, I do not share Churchill's assertion that British intelligence is the best in the world. English professional spies, for the most part, are cowardly. When a real threat to their lives arises, they easily go over to recruitment and betray the government of Great Britain. At the same time, the many years of experience and cunning of English intelligence make it necessary to treat its machinations with the utmost seriousness. Ruthless physical elimination of Anglo-American agents is the most important task of our counter-intelligence work today.

Having come under the scrutiny of Soviet counter-intelligence, Anglo-American agents in our country, especially those in illegal positions, particularly foreign citizens, should be physically eliminated, preferably covertly, or recruited and sent back to England and the United States to work for us. If this is not done, the Soviet people will face significant troubles in the future.

Since your personal counter-intelligence, Comrade Stalin, does not deal with arrests or the physical elimination of foreign intelligence on its own and performs purely informational tasks, it is time to create a special body under the MGB that, based on the information provided by me and General Lavrov, would be engaged in the physical elimination of foreign intelligence in our country.* In war, as in war.

* On September 9, 1950, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) decided to create a special organization to combat foreign intelligence, which, on the order of the Minister of State Security dated October 28, was named Bureau No. 2 of the MGB of the USSR. However,

Stalin: Do you have specific proposals for the creation of such a body?

Dzhuga hands Stalin a typewritten text.

Stalin (to Lavrov): Have you read these proposals?

Lavrov answers affirmatively.

Stalin: Good. Leave them with me; I will review them.

(V. Zhukhray, *Stalin: Truth and Lies*, pp. 265-271)

Stalin soon changed his mind, and Bureau No. 2 was effectively abolished — *Ed.*

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, VALKO
CHERVENKOV**

On the occasion of his 50th birthday

September 6, 1950

I congratulate you wholeheartedly on your 50th birthday. I send you my best wishes for good health and wish you strength for your fruitful work for the well-being of the Bulgarian people and the fraternal alliance between our countries.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 208, September 6, 1950)

DIRECTIVE TO COMRADES MATVEEV AND SHTYKOV*

September 27, 1950

Pyongyang

Matveev

*Shtykov***

The serious situation that has developed in recent days on the front of the Korean People's Army, both in the Seoul area and in the southeast, is largely a consequence of major mistakes made by the front command, army group commanders and troop units in both the management of the troops and, especially, in the tactics of their combat use.

Our military advisors are even more to blame for these mistakes. Our military advisors failed to achieve precise and timely execution of the Supreme Commander's order to withdraw four divisions from the main front to the Seoul area, whereas there was a complete opportunity for this at the time the decision was made. Due to this, seven days were lost, which gave the Americans a significant tactical advantage under

* This document is a directive approved by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) on September 27, 1950.

** Matveev, presumably a pseudonym for V.N. Razuvaev, the chief military advisor to the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army (simultaneously, from November 29, 1950, the USSR ambassador to the DPRK, lieutenant general). T.F. Shtykov — from 1948 to November 1950, the USSR ambassador to the DPRK, colonel general. N.A. Vasiliev — from December 1949 to May 1951, the chief military advisor to the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, simultaneously from 1950 the military attaché at the USSR embassy in the DPRK, lieutenant general.

Seoul. Timely withdrawal of these divisions could have fundamentally changed the situation under Seoul.

The arriving scattered and not yet ready for battle battalions and separate regiments could not have an effect due to their fragmentation and lack of communication with the headquarters. The division arriving from the southeast was immediately and disorganizedly thrown into battle in parts, which made it easier for the enemy to disperse it. As we pointed out earlier, this division should have been deployed for battle to the northeast and east of Seoul, brought into order here, given at least a day of rest, prepared for battle, and only then systematically put into battle.

The incorrect and completely unacceptable tactic of using tanks in battle attracts serious attention. Tanks are currently being used by you in battle without preliminary artillery strikes to clear the field for tanks, which makes your tanks very easily set on fire by the enemy. Our military advisors, who have the experience of the Great Patriotic War behind them, should know that such illiterate use of tanks only leads to losses.

The strategic incompetence of our advisors and their blindness in reconnaissance are notable. They failed to understand the strategic importance of the enemy's landing at Inchon, denied the serious significance of the landing, and even suggested bringing the author of the article in *Pravda* about the American landing to court, with Shtykov going so far as to propose it. This blindness and lack of strategic experience led to questioning the necessity of transferring troops from the south to the Seoul area. The transfer itself was stretched and delayed, thus losing seven days to the joy of the enemy.

The assistance of our military advisors to the Korean command is exceptionally weak, especially in crucial matters such as communication, troop management, reconnaissance organization and combat con-

duct. As a result, the Korean Army is essentially almost uncontrollable, fighting blindly and unable to organize cooperation between branches of the military in battle. This may be tolerable during a successful offensive but becomes completely intolerable during complications on the front.

You need to explain all this to our military advisors, especially Vasiliev. In the current situation, to assist the Korean command, and particularly in organizing the withdrawal of the Korean People's Army from the southeast and the rapid organization of a new defence front to the east, south and north of Seoul, our advisors should strive for:

1. Withdrawal of main forces under the cover of strong rearguards formed from divisions capable of offering serious resistance to the enemy. Experienced combat commanders should lead the rearguards, which need to be reinforced with military and, above all, anti-tank artillery, sapper troops and tanks where possible.

2. Rearguards must fight from one defensive line to another, widely using obstacles, employing mines and makeshift means for this purpose.

The actions of the rearguards should be decisive and active to gain the time necessary for the withdrawal of the main forces.

3. The main forces of divisions, if possible, should advance not in scattered groups but compactly, ready to break through with combat. Strong vanguards with artillery, and if possible, tanks, should be detached from the main forces.

4. Use tanks only in conjunction with infantry and after artillery preliminary strikes.

5. Straits, bridges, crossings, mountain passes and important road junctions on the path of the main forces should be sought to occupy and hold them until the main forces pass through, with advance squads sent

forward.

6. Issues of organizing military intelligence, as well as securing flanks and maintaining communication between military columns, should be given special attention during the troop withdrawal.

7. When organizing defence on frontiers, avoid stretching all forces across the front; firmly cover the main directions and create strong reserves for active actions.

8. When organizing communication with troops along the line of Korean command, use radio equipment with encryption.

In organizing the work of our military advisors in the future, in accordance with this directive, you should take all measures to ensure that no military advisor, as previously indicated, falls into captivity.

Inform about the measures taken.

*Fung Si**

(*Vestnik*, 1996, No. 1, pp. 124-125)

* Fung Si — a conditional signature of Stalin.

TELEGRAM TO THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE PRC

October 1, 1950

Beijing, *Soviet Ambassador*

For immediate transmission to *Mao Zedong* or *Zhou Enlai*.

I am far from Moscow on vacation and somewhat detached from the events in Korea. However, based on the information received today from Moscow, I see that the situation for our Korean comrades is becoming desperate.

Moscow warned the Korean comrades on September 16 that the American landing in Inchon is of great significance and aims to cut off the first and second army groups of the north Koreans from their rear in the north. Moscow urged an immediate withdrawal of at least four divisions from the south, the creation of a front north and east of Seoul, gradually withdrawing most southern troops to the north, thus securing the 38th parallel. However, the command of the 1st and 2nd army groups did not execute Kim Il Sung's order to withdraw parts to the north, allowing the Americans to cut off and surround them. In the Seoul area, our Korean comrades have no forces capable of resistance, and the path towards the 38th parallel should be considered open.

I think that if, considering the current situation, you find it possible to assist the Koreans with troops, it would be advisable to immediately move at least five or six divisions towards the 38th parallel, giving the Korean comrades the opportunity to organize, under the cover of your troops, the military reserves north of the 38th parallel. Chinese divisions could be presented as volunteers, of course, with Chinese command in

charge.

I haven't informed and don't intend to inform the Korean comrades about this, but I have no doubt that they will be pleased when they learn about it.

Awaiting your response.²⁰

Greetings, *Filippov*.*

October 1, 1950

(*Vestnik*, 1996, No. 1, pp. 130-131)

* The signature "Filippov" conceals Stalin.

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of
the People's Republic of China*

October 1, 1950

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Mr. Mao Zedong.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, please accept, Mr. Chairman, my fraternal greetings. I wish the great Chinese people, and you personally, further success in the building of an independent people's democratic China.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 230, October 1, 1950)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO
GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the first anniversary of the foundation of
the German Democratic Republic*

October 7, 1950

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, on the occasion of the national holiday — Republic Day — my sincere good wishes for the German people, for the government of the Republic and for you personally, and my wishes for success in the building of an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 235, October 7, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO T.F. SHTYKOV

October 8, 1950

Pyongyang to *Shtykov*
For *Kim Il Sung*
Top Secret

Comrade Kim Il Sung!

My response was delayed due to consultations with Chinese comrades, which took several days. On October 1, I sent a request to Mao Zedong, asking if he could immediately send at least five or six Chinese divisions to Korea, under the cover of which Korean comrades could create reserves. Mao Zedong responded with a refusal, citing that he does not want to involve the USSR in the war, that the Chinese army is weak technically, and that the war could cause significant dissatisfaction in China. I replied to him with the following letter:

“I deemed it possible to address you with a question about five or six Chinese volunteer divisions because I was well aware of several statements by leading Chinese comrades regarding their readiness to move several armies to support the Korean comrades if the enemy crosses the 38th parallel. I explained the readiness of the Chinese comrades to send troops to Korea as China’s interest in preventing the danger of turning Korea into a springboard for the U.S. or a future militarist Japan against China.

“When I asked you to send troops to Korea, considering 5-6 divisions not as the maximum but as the minimum, I proceeded from the following considerations of an international nature:

“1) The U.S., as the Korean events showed, is not currently ready for a large war;

“2) Japan, whose militarist forces have not yet been restored, is unable to provide military assistance to

Americans;

“3) Due to this, the U.S., compelled by these circumstances, will yield in the Korean issue to China, supported by its ally, the USSR, and will agree to such conditions for settling the Korean issue that would be favourable for Korea and would not allow enemies to turn Korea into their springboard.

“4) For the same reasons, the USA will be forced not only to abandon Taiwan but also to renounce a separate peace with the Japanese reactionaries, reject the restoration of Japanese imperialism and prevent Japan from becoming their springboard in the Far East.

“I proceeded from the understanding that China cannot obtain these concessions through passive waiting. Without serious struggle and a new impressive demonstration of its strength, China will not only fail to secure these concessions but will not even get Taiwan, which the Americans hold in their hands as a springboard not for Chiang Kai-shek, who has no chance of success, but for themselves or for tomorrow’s militarist Japan.

“Of course, I also took into account that, despite their unwillingness for a major war, the U.S. might, for the sake of prestige, get involved in a large-scale conflict. Consequently, China would be drawn into the war, and along with it, the USSR, which is bound to China by the Pact of Mutual Assistance. Should we fear this? In my opinion, we shouldn’t, as together we would be stronger than the U.S. and England. Other capitalist European states, without Germany, which cannot currently provide any assistance to the U.S., do not represent a significant military force. If war is inevitable, let it happen now rather than in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as a U.S. ally, and the U.S. and Japan will have a ready-made springboard on the continent in the form of the Syngman Rhee’s Korea.

“These are the considerations and international

perspectives I based my request on, asking you for a minimum of five or six divisions.”

In response to this, on October 7, I received a letter from Mao, where he expressed solidarity with the main points of my letter. He declared that he would send not six but nine divisions to Korea, not immediately but after some time, and requested me to accept his representatives and discuss the detailed plan for military assistance to Korea. Of course, I agreed to meet with the representatives and discuss in detail the military aid plan for Korea.

From what has been said, it is evident that you need to firmly hold onto every piece of your land, strengthen your resistance against American occupiers in Korea and prepare reserves using military personnel coming out of the encirclement from the Korean People’s Army. It is also clear that you are entirely correct in proposing to transfer all Korean comrades studying in the USSR to aviation.

I will keep you informed about further negotiations with Chinese comrades.

Fung Si

October 8, 1950

Please, Comrade Shtykov, read this letter to Kim Il Sung. He can copy it in your presence, but due to the special secrecy of the letter, do not transmit it to him.

(*Vestnik*, 1996, No. 1, pp. 132-133)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS
OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, KIM IL SUNG**

*On the occasion of the second anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

October 12, 1950

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Mr. Kim Il Sung.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your expression of friendly feelings and good wishes on the second anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of Korea and the USSR.

I wish the Korean people, heroic defenders of the independence of their country, a successful termination of their years long fight for the creation of a united, independent, democratic Korea.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, October 12, 1950)

TELEGRAM TO T.F. SHTYKOV

October 13, 1950

Pyongyang
To *Shtykov*,
for *Comrade Kim Il Sung*

I just received a telegram from Mao Zedong, in which he informs that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has reconsidered the situation and decided to provide military assistance to Korean comrades despite the insufficient armament of Chinese troops. I am awaiting detailed information from Mao Zedong on this matter.

In connection with this new decision of the Chinese comrades, I request to temporarily postpone the execution of the telegram sent to you yesterday about the evacuation of north Korea and the withdrawal of Korean troops to the north.

Fung Si

October 13, 1950

(*Vestnik*, 1996, No. 1, p. 135)

TELEGRAM TO THE USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE DPRK

October 14, 1950

Top Secret

Pyongyang — *Deputy Ambassador*

Convey the following to Kim Il Sung:

After vacillations and a series of temporary decisions, the Chinese comrades have finally made a definitive decision to provide assistance to Korea with troops.

I am pleased that a final and favourable decision for Korea has been made.

In connection with this, the recommendations from the joint meeting of Chinese and Soviet leaders, which you are familiar with, should be considered cancelled. Specific issues related to the deployment of Chinese troops will have to be resolved jointly with the Chinese comrades.

The necessary equipment for the Chinese troops will be supplied from the USSR.

Wishing you success,

Fung Si

(*Vestnik*, 1996, No. 1, p. 135)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Great
Socialist October Revolution*

November 1950

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my thanks for your congratulation; and good wishes on the occasion of the 33rd anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, No. 272, November 19, 1950)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE
PRIME MINISTER AND GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE PARTY OF
LABOUR OF ALBANIA, ARMY-
GENERAL ENVER HOXHA**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of
Albania from fascist occupation*

November 1950

On the occasion of the national celebration of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Albania from the fascist occupation, I wish you, the Albanian government and the Albanian people, further success in the building of the new, people's democratic Albania.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, No. 280, November 30, 1950)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL**

January 1951

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Prime Minister, to accept my thanks for the congratulations and friendly good wishes on the occasion of my birthday.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 1, January 3, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
MAO ZEDONG**

On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support

February 14, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere good wishes on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support.

I do not doubt that our treaty, and the friendly alliance of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, will continue in the future to strengthen the peace of the entire world.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, February 14, 1951)

INTERVIEW WITH A “PRAVDA” CORRESPONDENT

February 17, 1951

Q. How do you evaluate the last declaration of the British Prime Minister Attlee, in the House of Commons, that since the end of the war, the Soviet Union has not disarmed; that is, they have not demobilized their troops; that the Soviet Union has since then even further increased their forces?

A. I evaluate this declaration of Prime Minister Attlee as a slander on the Soviet Union.

The whole world knows that the Soviet Union has demobilized its troops after the war. As it is known, the demobilization was carried out in three phases: the first and second phases in the year 1945, and the third phase from May to September 1946. In addition, in the years 1946 and 1947, the demobilization of older age groups of the Soviet army was carried through and, starting in 1948, the rest of the older age groups were demobilized.

That is a generally known fact.

If Prime Minister Attlee was conversant with finance and economy he would be able to understand, without difficulty, that no one state, also not the Soviet Union, is in the position to completely develop the volume of their peace industry — even more — dozens of billions of the state expenditure is required for the purpose of building, such as the hydro-power works on the Volga, Dnieper and Amu-Darya; to introduce the policy of a systematic reduction in the price of consumer goods. Likewise, dozens of billions of the state expenditure is needed to immediately add to the hundreds of billions for the reconstruction of the economy demolished by the German occupation, to expand the people's economy and at the same time to increase their military forces and develop their war industry. It is not

difficult to understand that such a foolish policy would lead to state bankruptcy. Prime Minister Attlee must, from his own experience as well as from the experience of the USA, know that the increasing of the military forces of countries and the development of the arms race would lead to a limitation of the peace industry, to a close-down of great civic building, to a raising of tax and to a raising of the price of consumer goods. It is understandable that, if the Soviet Union does not limit the peace industry but, on the contrary, furthers it, then new building, greater hydro-power works and water systems will not be suspended but, on the contrary, developed, the policy of reducing prices will not be suspended but, on the contrary, continued, they could not at the same time develop their war industry and increase their military strength without thereby taking the risk of bankruptcy.

And if Prime Minister Attlee, despite all these facts and economic considerations, nevertheless holds it possible to openly insult the Soviet Union and its peaceful politics, one can only declare that, by slandering the Soviet Union, the present Labour government in England wants to justify carrying on their own arms race.

Prime Minister Attlee needs to lie about the Soviet Union; he must represent the peaceful politics of the Soviet Union as aggressive, and the aggressive politics of the English government as peaceful politics to mislead the English people, to blindfold them with this lie about the Soviet Union, and in this way drag them towards a new world war that would be organized by the warmongering circles in the United States of America.

Prime Minister Attlee pretends to be a follower of peace. But if he really is for peace, why was he against the proposal of the Soviet Union in the United Nations Organization on the conclusion of a peace pact between the Soviet Union, England, the United States of America, China and France?

If he really is for peace, why is he against the proposals of the Soviet Union to immediately begin to limit armaments and to immediately forbid atomic weapons?

If he really is for peace, why does he persecute those that intercede for the defence of peace; why has he forbidden the peace congress in England? Could the campaign for the defence of peace possibly threaten the security of England?

It is clear that Prime Minister Attlee is not for the keeping of peace, but rather for the unleashing of a new world-encompassing war of aggression.

Q. What do you think about the intervention in Korea? How can that end?

A. If England and the United States of America finally decline the proposals of the people's government of China for peace, then the war in Korea can only end in defeat of the interventionists.

Q. Why? Are then the American and English generals and officers worse than the Chinese and Korean?

A. No, not worse. The American and English generals and officers are not worse than the generals and officers of any other country you like to name. Where the soldiers of the USA and England are concerned, in the war against Hitler Germany and militarist Japan, they proved to be the best side, as is known. Where, then, lies the difference? In that the soldiers in the war against Korea and China do not consider it as just, whereas in the war against Hitler Germany and militarist Japan, they considered it absolutely just. It also lies in that this war is extremely unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

In this case it is difficult to convince the soldiers that China, who threatened neither England nor America, from whom the Americans stole the island of Taiwan, are aggressors, and that the USA, having stolen the island of Taiwan and led their troops straight to the borders of China, is the defending side. It is therefore

difficult to convince the troops that the USA is right to defend its security on Korean territory and on the borders of China, and that China and Korea are not right to defend their security on their own territory or on the borders of their states. That is why the war is unpopular among the American and English soldiers.

It is understandable that experienced generals and officers will suffer a defeat if their soldiers are forced into a war which they consider totally unjust, and if they believe their duties at the front to be formal, without believing in the justice of their mission, without feeling enthusiasm.

Q. How do you evaluate the decision of the United Nations Organization to declare the People's Republic of China as the aggressors?

A. I regard it as a scandalous decision.

Really, one must have lost what was left of conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in Korea, is the defensive side; and on the other hand, to declare that the People's Republic of China, which has defended its borders and striven to take back the island of Taiwan, stolen by the Americans, is the aggressor.

The United Nations Organization, which was created as a bulwark for keeping peace, has been transformed into an instrument of war, a means to unleash a new world war. The aggressive core of the United Nations Organization have formed the aggressive North Atlantic Pact from 10 member states (the USA, England, France, Belgium, Canada, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway and Iceland) and 20 Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela). And the representatives of these countries

now make the decisions in the United Nations Organization about war and peace. It was these that have, in the United Nations Organizations, carried through the scandalous decision about the aggression of the People's Republic of China.

It is typical of the present situation in the United Nations Organization, that, for example, the little Dominican Republic in America that has a population figure of scarcely two million, has today the same weight in the United Nations Organization as India has, and a much greater weight than the People's Republic of China, which has been robbed of a voice in the United Nations Organization.

Thus, the United Nations Organization, from being a world organization of nations with equal rights, has changed into an instrument of a war of aggression. In reality, the United Nations Organization is now not so much a world organization as an organization for the Americans and treats American aggression as acceptable. Not only the United States of America and Canada are striving to unleash a new war, but on this path you also find the 20 Latin-American countries; their landowners and merchants long for a new war somewhere in Europe or Asia, to sell their goods to the countries at inflated prices, and to make millions out of this bloody business. The fact is not a secret to anybody that the representatives of the 20 Latin American countries represent the strongest supporters and the willing army of the United States of America in the United Nations Organization.

The United Nations Organization treads, in this manner, the inglorious path of the League of Nations. Thereby they bury their moral authority and fall into decay.

Q. Do you hold a new world war to be unavoidable?

A. No. At least, one can, at present, hold it to be not unavoidable.

Of course, in the United States of America, in England and also in France, there are aggressive powers that long for a new war. They need war to achieve superprofits and to plunder other countries. These are the billionaires and millionaires that regard war as a fountain of revenue that brings colossal profits.

They, the aggressive powers, hold the reactionary governments in their hands and guide them. But at the same time they are afraid of their people who do not want a new war and are for the keeping of peace. Therefore they take the trouble of using the reactionary governments to ensnare their people with lies, to deceive them, to represent a new war as a war of defence, and the peaceful politics of peace-loving countries as aggressive. They take the trouble to deceive the people, to force them and draw them into a new war with their aggressive plans.

They therefore even fear the campaign for the defence of peace, they fear that this campaign would expose the aggressive intentions of the reactionary governments.

They therefore even oppose the proposals of the Soviet Union on the conclusion of a peace treaty, on the limitation of armaments and on the forbidding of atomic weapons; they fear that the acceptance of these proposals would frustrate the aggressive measures of the reactionary governments and render the arms race unnecessary.

Where will all this struggle between the aggressive and peace-loving powers end?

Peace will be kept and strengthened if the people take the holding of peace into their own hands and defend it to the utmost. War could be unavoidable if the arsonists of war succeed in trapping the masses with their lies, in deceiving them and in drawing them into a new war.

Now, therefore, a broad campaign for the holding of

peace, as a way of exposing the criminal machinations of the arsonists of war, is of prime importance.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it will continue to carry through the politics of preventing war and keeping peace.

J. Stalin

(For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!, No. 8, February 23-March 1, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, ISTVAN
DOBI**

*On the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of
the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support*

February 1951

Please accept, Mr. Prime Minister, my greetings and best wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty of Friendship and Support.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, No. 44, February 21, 1951)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, VALKO
CHERVENKOV**

March 1951

Please accept my good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the signing of the Friendship and Support Treaty between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 67, March 20, 1951)

GREETINGS AND GOOD WISHES TELEGRAM TO THE KIROV WORKS COLLECTIVE

*On the occasion of the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov Works
and on its award of the Order of Lenin*

April 3, 1951

To the Director of the Works, Comrade Smirnov,
To the Chief Engineer of the Works, Comrade
Sacharyin,

To the Party Organizer of the CC, CPSU(B), Com-
rade Smirnov,

To the Chairman of the Management Committee,
Comrade Bogdanov,

To the Komsomol Organizer of the CC of the Kom-
somol, Comrade Korssakov.

I congratulate and greet the collective of men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees on the 150th Jubilee of the Kirov Works, formerly the Putilov Works, and on its award of the Order of Lenin.

As one of the oldest factories in the country, the Kirov-Works has played an historic role in the revolutionary struggle of the Russian working class to build Soviet power and in the strengthening of the economy and the defence of our Motherland.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Collective has achieved great successes in the reconstruction of the Works and the resumption of production for the economy.

I wish you, comrades Kirov workers, further success in your work and in the fulfilment of the task entrusted to you by the Party and the government.

J. Stalin

(*Pravda*, April 3, 1951)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF HUNGARY, ISTVAN
DOBI**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of
Hungary by the Soviet army*

April 1951

On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the People's Republic of Hungary, please accept my greetings and best wishes for the further success of the Hungarian people.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, No. 80, April 7, 1951)

**GREETINGS TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, JOSEF
CYRANKIEWICZ**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the signing of
the Soviet-Polish Treaty of friendship and Support*

April 1951

Please accept my sincere congratulations and best wishes on the sixth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Support between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Poland.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 95, April 24, 1951)

FIFTH MEETING WITH ENVER HOXHA

From Enver Hoxha's book "With Stalin"

April 1951

On the political, economic and social situation in Albania. External reaction aims to overthrow our people's state power. The verdict of the Court at the Hague. "The enemy's attempts are uncovered and defeated through a high vigilance and a resolute stand." "Along with the construction of industrial projects you must strengthen the working class and train cadres." On the collectivization of agriculture. "You need the Soviet specialists not to sit in offices, but help you in the field." Comrade Stalin severely criticizes a Soviet opera which paints the reality in rosy colours. At the 19th Congress of the CPSU(B) — for the last time with the unforgettable Stalin.

The last meeting I had with Comrade Stalin took place in Moscow, in the evening of April 2, 1951, at 10.30 Moscow time. Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin also took part in this meeting.

During the talk various problems were touched on about the internal situation in our Party and state, about the economic problems, especially in the sector of agriculture, about the economic agreements which could be concluded with various states, the strengthening of the work in our higher institutions, the problems of the international situation, etc.

First, I gave Comrade Stalin a general outline of the political situation in our country, the great work the Party had done and was doing for the inculcation of a lofty revolutionary spirit in the masses, the sound unity which had been created and was growing strong-

er day by day in the Party and among our people, and the great and unshakeable confidence the people had in the Party. I told Comrade Stalin, "We shall ceaselessly consolidate these achievements while always remaining vigilant and ready to defend the independence and freedom, the territorial integrity of our country and the victories of the people against any external or internal enemy who might attempt to threaten us. In particular," I told Comrade Stalin, "we follow with vigilance the ceaseless attempts of American imperialism, which through its lackeys, the nationalists of Belgrade, the monarcho-fascists of Athens and the neo-fascists of Rome, aims to overthrow our people's state power and to enslave and partition Albania."

I also informed Comrade Stalin of the verdict of the Court at the Hague.

"As I have told you earlier," I said among other things, "this court investigated the so-called Corfu Channel incident, and manipulated as it was by the Anglo-American imperialists, in the end unjustly condemned us and ordered us to pay the British an indemnity. We did not accept this arbitrary decision, but the British seized our gold which the German nazis had plundered from the former National Bank of Albania. When the gold plundered from the occupied countries and carried away to Germany by the nazis was discovered, at its Brussels meetings in 1948, the Tripartite Commission charged with its distribution allotted Albania a part of what belonged to it. Now the British have seized a part of our gold, have frozen it and do not allow us to withdraw it according to the decision taken in Brussels.

"Close links among the external enemies of our country are now being established quite openly," I told Comrade Stalin. "Their provocations against us from the Yugoslav border, as well as from the Greek and Italian borders, by land, sea and air, have been continuous.

Apart from the openly anti-Albanian policy pursued by the present rulers of these three countries, fascist traitors, Albanian emigrants, bandits, defectors and criminals of every description are being assembled there, too, and being trained by the foreigners to be smuggled in Albania for the purpose of organizing armed movements, of sabotaging the economy, making attempts on the lives of the leaders of the Party and state, setting up espionage centres for themselves and their bosses, etc.

“We have always been vigilant towards these attempts by external reaction and have always given all their attempts the reply they deserved. Our army and the State Security forces have made their major contribution in this direction. They have been ceaselessly strengthened, well educated and are gradually being modernized, while mastering the Marxist-Leninist military art.”

Continuing my outline, I told Comrade Stalin about a number of military problems and the main directions from which we thought an external attack might come.

“How do you know that you might be attacked from these directions?” Comrade Stalin was quick to ask me.

I gave him a detailed answer on this problem and, having heard me out, he said:

“Regarding the military problems you raised, we have assigned Comrade Bulganin to discuss matters in detail with you.”

Then he asked a series of other questions such as: With what weapons do you defend your borders? What have you done with the weapons you captured? How many people can you mobilize in case of war? What sort of army have you, today? etc.

I answered these questions of Comrade Stalin's in turn. Among other things, I spoke about the powerful links of our army with the people, saying to Comrade Stalin that the people wholeheartedly loved their army, and in case of an attack by foreigners, the whole of our

people were ready to rise to defend the freedom and independence of the country, the people's state power.

After listening to my answers on these problems, Comrade Stalin began to speak, expressing his joy over the strengthening of our army and its links with the people, and among other things he advised:

"I think that you have a sufficiently large standing army, therefore I would advise you not to increase it any more, because it is costly to maintain. However, you should increase the number of tanks and aircraft a little.

"In the present situation, you should guard against any danger from Yugoslavia. The Titoites have their agents in your country, indeed they will smuggle in others. They want to attack you, but cannot, because they fear the consequences. You should not be afraid, but must set to work to strengthen the economy, to train the cadres, to strengthen the Party, and to train the army, and must always be vigilant. With a strong Party, economy and army, you need fear nobody.

"The Greek monarcho-fascists," he said among other things, "are afraid that the Bulgarians may attack them. The Yugoslavs, too, in order to secure aid from the Americans, clamour that allegedly Bulgaria will attack them. But Bulgaria has no such aims either towards the Greeks or towards the Yugoslavs."

In the course of the talk I told Comrade Stalin of the great work being done in our country to strengthen the unity among the people and between the people and the Party, and of the blows we had dealt at the traitor and enemy elements within the country. I told him that we had shown no vacillation or opportunism in dealing with such elements, but had taken the necessary measures to avert any consequences of their hostile activity. "Those who have filled the cup with their criminal and hostile activity," I told Comrade Stalin, "have been handed over to our courts where they have received the

punishment they deserved.”

“You have done well,” Stalin said. “The enemy,” he continued, “will even try to worm his way into the Party, indeed into its Central Committee, but his attempts are uncovered and defeated through high vigilance and a resolute stand.”

On this occasion, too, we had an extensive discussion with Comrade Stalin about our economic situation, about the achievements and prospects of the economic and cultural development of our country. Amongst other things I told Comrade Stalin of the successes of the policy of the Party in the socialist industrialization of the country and the development of agriculture and of some of our forecasts for the first five-year Plan, 1951-1955.

As always, Comrade Stalin showed keen interest in our economic situation and the policy of the Party in this direction. He asked a series of questions about when the textile combine, the sugar plant, and other industrial projects that were being built in our country, would be finished.

I answered Comrade Stalin’s questions and pointed out that along with the successes achieved in the construction of these and other industrial and social projects, as well as in agriculture, we also had a series of failures. We had analysed the causes of the failures in the Central Committee of the Party in a spirit of criticism and self-criticism, and defined who was responsible for each of them. “In particular, we are attaching importance to strengthening the leading role of the Party, the continuous bolshevization of its life, the closest possible links with the masses of the people,” I told Comrade Stalin, and went on to a summary of the internal situation in our Party.

“Why do you tell us of these problems which, you, Comrade Enver, know better than we do?” Comrade

Stalin broke in, and continued: "We are happy to hear that you are building a series of industrial projects in your country. But I want to stress that along with the construction of industrial projects you must give great importance to the strengthening of the working class and the training of cadres. The Party should take particular care of the working class, which will increase and grow stronger day by day, parallel with the development of industry in Albania."

"The question of the development and progress of agriculture has particular importance for us," I told Comrade Stalin, continuing my discourse. "You know that ours is an agricultural country which has inherited great backwardness from the past. Our aim has always been to increase the agricultural products and, bearing in mind that the greatest part of our agriculture consists of small private holdings, we have had and still have to take many steps in order to encourage and help the peasant to work better and produce more. Results have been achieved, production has increased, but we are aware that the present level of the development of agriculture does not respond as it should to the increased needs of the country for food products for the population, raw materials for industry or for expanding export resources. We know that the only way to finally pull our agriculture out of its backwardness and put it on a sound basis for large-scale production is that of collectivization. But in this direction we have been and are cautious."

"Have you many co-operatives now in Albania?" Comrade Stalin asked.

"About 90," I replied.

"What is their situation? How do the peasants live in these co-operatives?" he asked next.

"Most of these co-operatives," I told Comrade Stalin in reply to his question, "are not more than one or two years old. Nevertheless, some of them are already

displaying their superiority over small fragmented individual holdings. The organized joint work, the continuous state aid for these co-operatives with seeds, machinery, cadres, etc., has enabled them to put production on a sounder basis and to increase it. Nevertheless, much remains to be done to ensure that the agricultural co-operatives become an example and model for the individual peasant. Therefore, our main aim in the organization of agriculture is that, along with the strengthening of the existing co-operatives, greater aid and care for them, cautious steps should be taken also for the setting up of new co-operatives.”

Stalin listened to me and advised:

“You should not rush things in setting up other agricultural co-operatives. Try to strengthen the co-operatives you have, but you must see to it that the yields of crops in these co-operatives are high,” he said. “In this way,” he went on, “the members will be satisfied with the good results of the production in the co-operative, and the other peasants will see this and will want to become collectivized, too.

“As long as the peasants are not convinced of the superiority of the collective property you have no way to increase the number of co-operatives. If the existing co-operatives prove beneficial to the peasants, then the other peasants will also follow you, too.”

The talk with Comrade Stalin on the problems of our agriculture, on the state of our peasantry, on its traditions and mentality took up most of the time of this meeting. Comrade Stalin was eager to get as much information as possible, he was interested right down to the last detail, rejoiced over the successes but did not fail to make comradely criticism of us and give us valuable advice about how we should improve our work in the future.

“Is maize still the main crop in Albania?” Comrade

Stalin asked.

“Yes,” I answered, “maize and then wheat. However, in recent years, cotton, sunflower, vegetables, sugar beet, etc., are being grown more and more.”

“Do you plant much cotton? What yield do you get?”

“We are continuously increasing the area planted to this industrial crop and our farmers have now gained no small experience. This year we plan to plant nearly 20,000 hectares,” I told him, “but as to the yield of cotton and its quality we are still backward. Up till now we have reached an average of about 5 quintals of cotton per hectare. We must improve this situation. Many times we have discussed and analysed this problem which is of great importance to us, because it is connected with the clothing of the people. We have taken and are taking many measures, but, as yet, we have not achieved the required results. Cotton needs sunshine and water. We have the sunshine,” I told Comrade Stalin, “and our soil and climate are suitable for the cultivation of this crop, but we are still backward as to irrigation. We must set up a good irrigation system so that this crop, too, can go ahead.”

“To which do your peasants give more water, the maize or the cotton?” Stalin asked me.

“The maize,” I replied.

“This means that your peasants still do not love cotton and underrate it,” he said.

Continuing the talk, I told Comrade Stalin that recently we had discussed the weaknesses that had manifested themselves and the tasks arising for the further development of cotton-growing. I pointed out that from consultations in the field it turned out that, apart from other things, in some cases seed unsuitable for our conditions had been used, and I presented some requests for assistance so that work would proceed normally, both in the textile combine and in the cotton ginning plant.

“I think that some specialist may have made a mistake on this question,” he said. “But the main thing is the work of the farmer. As to your requests regarding cotton, we shall comply with all of them, if they are necessary. However, we shall see.”

Several times in succession during this meeting Comrade Stalin inquired about our agricultural co-operatives, their present situation and their prospects for development. I remember that, among others, he asked me these questions:

“What sort of machinery have your agricultural co-operatives? How are MTS working? Do you have instructors for the co-operatives?” etc.

I answered all his questions, but he was not completely satisfied with the organization of our work in this direction, so he asked me:

“This work is not going as it should. Thus, you run the risk of harming those agricultural co-operatives you have created. Along with the continuous qualification of your cadres, it would be as well for you to have some Soviet advisers for your agricultural co-operatives. You need them not to sit in offices, but to help you in the field.

“If the main directors of your agriculture have not seen how agricultural co-operatives are run and organized elsewhere,” continued Comrade Stalin, “it must be difficult for them to guide this work properly, therefore let them come and see it here, in the Soviet Union, to learn from our experience and take it back to the Albanian farmers.”

In what I said, I also told Comrade Stalin about the need to establish economic relations with other countries. After hearing me out, Comrade Stalin addressed these words to me:

“Who has hindered you from establishing relations with others? You have concluded treaties with the

people's democracies, which have accorded you credits. Please, try to establish agreements like that you have with Bulgaria with the others too. We are not opposed to this, on the contrary, we consider it a very good thing."

In the course of the talk I also raised with Comrade Stalin some problems concerning aid from the Soviet state for the development of our economy and culture. As on all other occasions, Comrade Stalin received our requests with generosity and said that I must talk with Mikoyan over the details and decisions on these requests, and I met him three times during those days.

Comrade Stalin accepted my request for some Soviet university teachers whom we needed for our higher institutions, there and then, but he asked:

"How will these teachers manage without knowing Albanian?"

Then, looking me straight in the eye, Comrade Stalin said:

"We understand your situation correctly, that is why we have helped and will help you even more. But I have a criticism of you, Albanian comrades: I have studied your requests and have noted that you have not made many requests for agriculture. You want more aid for industry, but industry cannot stand on its feet and make progress without agriculture. With this, comrades. I mean that you must devote greater attention to the development of agriculture. We have sent you advisers to help you in your economic problems," he added, "but it seems to me they are no good."

"They have assisted us," I intervened, but Stalin, unconvinced about what I said concerning the Soviet advisers, repeated his opinion. Then, with a smile he asked me:

"What did you do with the seed of the Georgian maize I gave you, did you plant it or did you throw it out of the window?"

I felt I was blushing because he had me in a fix, and I told him that we had distributed it to some zones, but I had not inquired about the results. This was a good lesson to me. When I returned to Tirana, I inquired and the comrades told me that it had given amazingly good results, that farmers who had sown it had taken in 70 or even 80 quintals per hectare, and everywhere there was talk of the Georgian maize which our peasants call "Stalin's gift."

"What about eucalypts? Have you sown the seeds I gave you?"

"We have sent them to the Myzeqe zone where there are more swamps," I said, "and have given our specialists all your instructions."

"Good," said Comrade Stalin. "They must take care that they sprout and grow. It is a tree that grows very fast and has a great effect on moisture."

"The seed of maize I gave you can be increased rapidly and you can spread it all over Albania," Comrade Stalin said and asked:

"Have you special institutions for seed selection?"

"Yes," I said, "we have set up a sector for seeds attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and shall strengthen and extend it in the future."

"You will do well!" Comrade Stalin said. "The people of that sector must have a thorough knowledge of what kinds of plants and seeds are most suitable for the various zones of the country and must see to getting them. From us, too, you should ask for and get seeds which produce two or three times the yield. I have told you before that we shall help you with all our possibilities, but the main thing is your own work, comrades, the great and ceaseless work for the all-round development of your country, industry, agriculture, culture and defence."

"We shall certainly carry out your instructions, Comrade Stalin!" I said and expressed my heartfelt

thanks for the warm and friendly reception, and the valuable advice and instructions he gave us.

This time I stayed in the Soviet Union for the whole of the April.

Some days after this meeting, on April 6, I went to the “Bolshoi Theatre” to see the new opera “From the Depths of Heart” which, as I was told before the performance, dealt with the new life in the collective farm village. That same evening Comrade Stalin, too, had come to see this opera. He sat in the box of the first floor closest to the stage, whereas I, together with two of our comrades and two Soviet comrades who accompanied us, was in the box in the second floor, on the opposite side.

The next day I was told that Stalin had made a very severe criticism of this opera, which had already been extolled by some critics as a musical work of value.

I was told that Comrade Stalin had criticized the opera, because it did not reflect the life in the collectivized village correctly and objectively. Comrade Stalin had said that in this work life in the collective farm had been idealized, truthfulness has suffered, the struggle of the masses against various shortcomings and difficulties was not reflected, and everything was covered with a false lustre and the dangerous idea that “everything is going smoothly and well.”

Later this opera was criticized in the central party organ also and I understood Stalin’s deep concern over such phenomena which bore in themselves the seeds of great danger in the future.

From the unforgettable visits of these days, what I did at Stalingrad remains firmly fixed in my mind. There, amongst other things, I went to the Mamayev Kurgan Hill. The fighters of the Red Army, with the name of Stalin on their lips, defended the hill not inch

by inch but millimetre by millimetre, in the years of the anti-Hitlerite war. The soil of Mamayev Kurgan was literally ploughed, and its configuration was changed many times over by the terrible bombardment. From the hill covered with flowers and grass it was before the famous battle of Stalingrad, it turned into a place covered with iron and steel, with the remains of tanks which had crashed into one another. I stopped and respectfully took a handful of earth from this hill, which is the symbol of Stalin's soldier, and later, when I returned to Albania, I donated it to the Museum of the National Liberation War in Tirana.

From Mamayev Kurgan, the city of Stalingrad, with the broad Volga River winding its way through it, was spread before my eyes. In this legendary city, on the basis of Stalin's plan for the attack on the Hitlerite hordes, the Soviet soldiers wrote glorious pages of history. They triumphed over the nazi aggressors, and this marked the beginning of the change of direction of the entire development of World War II. This city, which bears the name of the great Stalin, was devastated, razed to the ground, turned into a heap of ruins, but did not surrender.

Quite another picture was spread before me now. The city ravaged by the war had been rebuilt from its foundations with amazing speed. The new multi-storied blocks of flats, social-cultural institutions, schools, universities, cinemas, hospitals, modern factories and plants, the beautiful new broad avenues had entirely changed the appearance of the city. The streets were lined with green-leafed trees, the parks and gardens were filled with flowers and children. I also visited the tractor plant of this city and met many workers. "...We love the Albanian people very much and now in peace time we are working for them, too," a worker of this plant told me. "We shall send the Albanian peasants even more tractors, this is what Stalin wants and has

ordered.”

Everywhere we were aware of the love and respect the great Stalin, the dear and unforgettable friend of the Albanian people and the Party of Labour of Albania, had inculcated in the ordinary Soviet people.

Thus ended this visit to the Soviet Union, during which I had my last direct meeting with the great Stalin, of whom, as I have said at other times, I retain indelible memories and impressions which will remain with me all my life.

In October 1952, I went to Moscow again at the head of the delegation of the Party of Labour of Albania to take part in the 19th Congress of the CPSU(B). There I saw the unforgettable Stalin for the last time, there, for the last time I heard his voice, so warm and inspiring. There, after showing that the bourgeoisie had openly spurned the banner of democratic freedoms, sovereignty and independence, from the tribune of the Congress, he addressed the communist and democratic parties which still had not taken power, in the historic words: **“I think it is you that must raise this banner, ...and carry it forward if you want to rally around yourselves the majority of the population, ...if you want to be the patriots of your country, if you want to become the leading force of the nation. There is nobody else who can raise it.”**

I shall always retain fresh and vivid in my mind and heart how he looked at that moment when from the tribune of the Congress he enthused our hearts when he called the communist parties of the socialist countries “shock brigades of the world revolutionary movement.”

From those days we pledged that the Party of Labour of Albania would hold high the title of “shock brigade” and that it would guard the teachings and instructions of Stalin as the apple of its eye, as an historic behest, and would carry them all out consistently. We repeated this

solemn pledge in the days of the great grief, when the immortal Stalin was taken from us, and we are proud that our Party, as the Stalin's shock brigade, has never gone back on its word, has never been and never will be guided by anything other than the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and the disciple and consistent continuer of their work, our beloved friend, the glorious leader, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin.

(E. Hoxha, *With Stalin*, pp. 201-220)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC,
ANTONIN ZAPOTOCKY**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of
Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation*

May 1951

Please accept my congratulations to the Czechoslovakian government and to you personally on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Czechoslovakia from the fascist occupation, and also my wishes for the further success in the political, economic and cultural building of the Czechoslovakian Republic.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 105, May 10, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER OF THE
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, WALTER ULBRICHT**

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of
Germany from the fascist yoke*

May 17, 1951

To the Representative of the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I sincerely thank the government of the German Democratic Republic, and you personally, for the friendly letter on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the liberation of Germany from the fascist yoke. I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic further success in uniting the democratic forces of Germany and in the securing of peace.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 111, May 18, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE STATE
PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, BOLESŁAW
BIERUT**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of Poland*

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade President, the sincere greetings and best wishes of the Presidium of the USSR, and myself, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Poland.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 169, July 24, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, JOSEF
CYRANKIEWICZ**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of Poland*

July 1951

Please accept, Comrade Prime Minister, on the occasion of the national day of celebration of the Polish Republic, my friendly greetings to the Polish people, to the government of the Republic of Poland and to you personally, and also my wishes for new success in the further development of the democratic people's Poland.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 169, July 24, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE ROMANIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, PETRU
GROZA**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of Romania*

August 1951

On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of Romania, the government of the USSR and I myself, congratulate the government of the Romanian People's Republic and wish further success to the Romanian people.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 195, August 24, 1951)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO ZEDONG

*On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of victory over the
Japanese imperialists*

September 2, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

I thank you, Comrade Chairman, for the high estimation of the role which the Soviet Union and its fighting power played in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The Chinese people and their liberation army have played a great role, despite the machinations of the Kuomintang, in the liquidation of Japanese imperialism. The struggle of the Chinese people and their liberation army has helped the smashing of the Japanese aggression profoundly.

It cannot be doubted that the unbreakable friendship of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China serves and will serve to guarantee peace in the Far East against all and every aggressor and arsonist of war.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, the good wishes of the Soviet Union and its fighting forces on the sixth anniversary of the liberation of East Asia from the yoke of Japanese imperialism.

Long live the great friendship of the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union!

Long live the Chinese People's Liberation Army!

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(New Times, No. 36, September 5, 1951, p. 1)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the second anniversary of the founding
of the People's Republic of China*

October 1, 1951

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

On the second anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations.

I send the great Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China and you personally, my sincere wishes for further success in the building people's democratic China.

I would like to see the strengthening of the great friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union as a safe guarantee of peace and security in the Far East.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 229, October 2, 1951)

ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF A "PRAVDA" CORRESPONDENT

On the atomic weapon

October 6, 1951

Q. What do you think of the clamour in the foreign press these days in connection with the atom bomb test in the Soviet Union?

A. As a matter of fact, we have carried out a test of a certain kind of atom bomb. Tests with atom bombs of different calibres will also continue, in accordance with the plans for the defence of our country against an attack carried out by the Anglo-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the atom bomb test, various well-known personalities in the USA pretend to be alarmed and shout that the security of the USA is threatened. Is there any ground for such excitement?

A. There is no ground whatsoever for such excitement.

These well-known personalities in the USA cannot be unaware that the Soviet Union is not only against the application of atomic weapons, but also for their forbidding, for the cessation of their production. As it is known, the Soviet Union has repeatedly demanded the forbidding of atomic weapons, but each time they were refused by the powers of the Atlantic bloc. That signifies that in the case of an attack by the USA on our country, the ruling circles of the USA would use the atom bomb. This circumstance has forced the Soviet Union to also own atomic weapons to meet the aggressors well armed.

Of course, it would please the aggressors if the

Soviet Union was unarmed in the case of them undertaking an attack. But the Soviet Union is not in agreement with that, and believes that one must meet the aggressor well-armed.

Consequently, if the USA does not have the intention of attacking the Soviet Union, one must hold the excitement of well-known personalities of the USA as purposeless howling, as the Soviet Union is not thinking of attacking, at any time, the USA or any other country.

Well-known personalities of the USA are dissatisfied that not only the USA, but also other countries and, above all, the Soviet Union, possess the secret of atomic weapons. They would rather that the USA, had the monopoly on atom bomb production, that the USA had unlimited possibilities to frighten and blackmail other countries. What grounds do they have for really thinking so, what right do they have? Do the interests of safeguarding peace demand such a monopoly, perhaps? Would it not be more correct to say that it is exactly the opposite case, that the safeguarding of peace demands, above all, the liquidation of such monopolies and the unconditional forbidding of atomic weapons? I think that the adherents of the atom bomb would only agree to forbid atomic weapons in the case of them seeing that they do not have the monopoly anymore.

Q. What do you think of international control of the supply of atomic weapons?

A. The Soviet Union is for the forbidding of atomic weapons and for the suspension of the production of atomic weapons. The Soviet Union is for the establishment of international control, for a decision on the forbidding of atomic weapons, on the suspension of production of atomic weapons and on the use of already manufactured atom bombs for civilian purposes exclusively and conscientiously. The Soviet Union for such an international control.

Well-known American personalities likewise speak of “control,” but their “control” is based not on the suspension of the production of atomic weapons, but rather on the continuation of such production, and this to such an extent that corresponds to the available sources of raw materials available to this or that country. Consequently, the American “control” is not for the forbidding of atomic weapons, but rather for their legalization and sanctioning. That would sanction the right of the arsonists of war, with the help of atomic weapons, to annihilate tens of thousands, no — hundreds of thousands of peaceful people. It is not difficult to understand that this is not control, but rather a mockery of control, a deception of the peace-desiring people. Of course, such a “control” will not satisfy the peace-loving people, who demand the forbidding of atomic weapons and the suspension of their production.

(*Unity*, October 18, 1951, p. 13)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO
GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the second anniversary of the foundation
of the German Democratic Republic*

October 7, 1951

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the national day of celebration — the second anniversary of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic — please accept, Comrade Prime Minister, my congratulations. I wish the German people, the government and you personally, further success in the building of a united, independent, democratic and peace-loving German state.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 234, October 7, 1951)

**ANSWERING TELEGRAM
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CABINET OF MINISTERS OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, KIM IL
SUNG**

*On the occasion of the third anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic and economic relations
between the USSR and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea*

October 20, 1951

Comrade Chairman, in the name of the government of the Soviet Union and myself, please accept our thanks for your greetings and good wishes on the occasion of the third anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries.

I wish the brave Korean people success in their heroic struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 246, October 21, 1951)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO
GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Great
October Socialist Revolution*

November 1951

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

Please accept, Comrade Prime Minister, the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your congratulations and good wishes on the 34th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 270, November 20, 1951)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE
CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REPUBLIC,
KLEMENT GOTTWALD**

On the occasion of his 55th birthday

November 23, 1951

Dear Comrade Gottwald,

I send you sincere congratulations on your birthday and wish you success in your work for the well-being of the fraternal Czechoslovakian people.

J. Stalin

(Daily Review, Vol. 2, No. 275, November 25, 1951)

NEW YEAR MESSAGE TO THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

December 31, 1951

To the Chief Editor of the Kyodo Agency, Mr. Kiishi Iwamoto.

Dear Mr. Iwamoto! I have received your request to send the Japanese people a message for the New Year.

It is not a tradition of Soviet statesmen to send greetings to the people of another state. But the great sympathy that the people of the Soviet Union have for the Japanese people, who have suffered misery through foreign occupation, leads me to make an exception to the rule and to accede to your request.

I ask you to convey to the Japanese people my wishes for their freedom and happiness, as well as success in their courageous struggle for the independence of their homeland.

The people of the Soviet Union have in the past, learnt to know themselves, the terror of foreign occupation, in which the Japanese imperialists took part. Therefore, they fully understand the sorrow of the Japanese people, have great sympathy for them and believe that the rebirth and independence of their homeland will be achieved, even as it was by the people of the Soviet Union.

I wish the Japanese workers liberation from unemployment, from poor wages, the abolition of high prices for consumer goods and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the Japanese peasants liberation from landlessness and poverty, the abolition of high taxes and success in the struggle for keeping peace.

I wish the entire Japanese people and their intelligentsia complete victory of the democratic forces of Japan, the revival and prosperity of the economic life

of the country, a blossoming of national culture, knowledge and art as well as success in the struggle for keeping peace.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 2, January 3, 1952)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO THE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF
GERMANY**

January 3, 1952

To the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Wilhelm Pieck, Otto Grotewohl, Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you and, through you, the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. Stalin

(*New Germany*, Berlin ed., No. 2, January 3, 1952)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PRIME MINISTER OF
THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC, WALTER ULBRICHT**

January 3, 1952

To the Representative of the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Walter Ulbricht.

I thank you, Comrade Deputy of the Prime Minister, for your congratulations on my birthday.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 2, January 3, 1952)

**TELEGRAM OF THANKS TO
THE PARTY DIRECTOR OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
GERMANY**

January 1952

To the Party Director of the Communist Party of Germany, Max Reimann.

I sincerely thank you and, through you, the Party Directorate of the Communist Party of Germany, for your congratulations and good wishes.

J. Stalin

(Socialist People's Newspaper, January 7, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE WORKERS OF THE MAGNITOGORSK STEELWORKS COMBINE

*On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the opening of
the Combine*

January 31, 1952

To the Magnitogorsk Steelworks Combine.

To the Director of the Combine, Comrade Borissov.

To the Chief Engineer of the Combine, Comrade Voronov.

To the Party Organizer of the CC, CPSU(B), Comrade Svetiov.

To the Chairman of the Trade Union, Comrade Pliskanos.

To the Komsomol Organizer of the CC of the Komsomol, Comrade Pankov.

I greet and congratulate the men and women workers, engineers, technicians and employees of the Magnitogorsk Steelworks Combine and the "Magnitostroj" Trust on the twentieth anniversary of the opening of the Combine, the mighty metallurgic basis of the country.

The steel workers of Magnitogorsk have, as upright sons and daughters of our Motherland, throughout the years, honestly and devotedly worked for the development of the production capacity of the Combine, successfully applied the new technology, continued the unbroken production of metal and honourably fulfilled the task set by the Party and the government to supply our country with metal.

I wholeheartedly wish you, comrades, new success in your work.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, January 31, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA**

*On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the signing of
the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and
Support*

February 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Romanian People's Republic, Petru Groza.

On the fourth anniversary of the signing of the
Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support between
the Soviet Union and the Romanian People's Repub-
lic, I send you, Comrade Chairman, the government
of the Romanian People's Republic and the Romanian
people, my congratulations.

J. Stalin

(New Way, No. 884, February 5, 1952)

CONVERSATION WITH K.V. OSTROVITYANOV

February 7, 1952

J.V. Stalin: Comrades, about 20 people approached me regarding the textbook issue. I wrote 50 pages of comments on the textbook. It's hardly advisable to convene all the participants of the discussion. Should we send it to the comrades who signed the letter or the sections?

K.V. Ostrovityanov: *The entire meeting was broken down into sections: pre-capitalist formations, capitalism, socialism, hence, it's extensive.*

J.V. Stalin: Then it's better to send it to the comrades who signed the letter. That would probably be more correct.

K.V. Ostrovityanov: *Yes, probably right. Should we publish your comments?*

J.V. Stalin: No, these are not for publication; publication would not be in your favour. The comments are not approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) to avoid tying the authors' team. It is necessary to replenish the authors' team, increasing it to 10-15 people, including a lawyer for precision in formulations and a statistician.

K.V. Ostrovityanov: *Better fewer, about 10 people.*

J.V. Stalin: Also include some critics for debates. What do you think?

K.V. Ostrovityanov: *It depends on the kind of critics.*

J.V. Stalin: It is felt in the textbook that different chapters were written by different authors, a difference in style. It is necessary to create an editorial committee consisting of 3-5 people.

K.V. Ostrovityanov: *Better with 3.*

J.V. Stalin: Revision period — 1 year. The comments go to print, they will be ready tomorrow. Keep in mind,

creating a textbook is a major world-historical task.

K.V. Ostrovityanov: Joseph Vissarionovich, I am being sent to Copenhagen due to an international economic meeting. What should I do?

J.V. Stalin: Do you want to go?

K.V. Ostrovityanov: I would prefer to work on the textbook.

J.V. Stalin: You can send someone else. We will decide tomorrow.

(ARAN, F. 1705, Op. 1, D. 166, L. 55-56)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing
of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and
Support*

February 14, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

On the occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Support, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations and wishes for the further strengthening of the alliance and cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 39, February 15, 1952)

CONVERSATION ON QUESTIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY²¹

February 15, 1952

Q. Can your “Remarks on Economic Issues” be published? Can your “Remarks” be used in pedagogical and literary work?

A. My “Remarks” should not be published in the press. The draft textbook on political economy is not known to a wide range of readers; it has been distributed to a limited circle of individuals. The discussion on issues of political economy was closed, our people are also unaware of it and its course was not covered in the press. Under these conditions, it would be unclear if I were to present my “Remarks.”

Moreover, publishing my “Remarks” in the press is not in your interest. I am concerned about the authority of the textbook. The textbook has global significance, and its authority must be very high. It will be correct if some new points, which are present in my “Remarks,” are first learned by the reader from the textbook.

For these same reasons, it is not advisable to refer to the “Remarks” in the press. How can one refer to a document that has not been published? But if someone among you likes a certain position in my “Remarks,” let them present it in their article as their opinion and I will not object (*General laughter*).

In lectures, at departments, the “Remarks” can be widely used. If only a few copies have been printed, more can be added, but they should not be published in the press for now. When the textbook is released, and another year or two passes, then my “Remarks” can be published. They can be included in the next volume of Works.

Q. Are our means of production commodities? If not, how can the use of economic accounting be ex-

plained in industries that produce means of production?

A. Our means of production cannot be considered commodities in essence. They are not items of consumption, food (such as bread, meat, etc.) that enter the market, which anyone can buy. We actually distribute the means of production. This is not a commodity in the generally accepted sense, not the commodity that exists in capitalist conditions. There, means of production are commodities.

Our economic accounting is not the same as the economic accounting that operates in capitalist enterprises. Economic accounting under capitalism operates in such a way that unprofitable enterprises are closed. Our enterprises can be very profitable or completely unprofitable. However, the latter are not closed in our case. If an enterprise cannot pay for the acquired means of production, it covers the expenses from the budget. Our economic accounting is for control, accounting, calculation and balance. It is applied to control economic managers. The means of production are formally treated as commodities. In our sphere of turnover, items of consumption are considered commodities, not means of production.

Q. Is it correct to call the means of production “commodities of a special kind”?

A. No. If something is a commodity, it should be bought and sold by everyone; it is bought by whoever wants it. The expression “commodities of a special kind” is not suitable. The law of value is used here for calculation, balance, calculation and checking the feasibility of actions.

Q. Is the general crisis of capitalism and the crisis of the world capitalist system the same concept?

A. It is the same thing. I emphasize the crisis of the capitalist system as a whole because we often consider one country. Now, for the assessment of the state of capitalism, one should not take one country but consid-

er the capitalist system as a whole. Previously, the state of the capitalist economy was considered based on the position of one country — England. Now it cannot be done because the economies of all capitalist countries are closely intertwined. Some countries go up at the expense of others. It is necessary to consider the limitation of the modern world capitalist market. For example, the United States found itself in a good position by eliminating its main competitors — Germany and Japan. The United States hoped to double production due to its monopolistic position. However, the doubling of production did not work out; the calculation did not justify itself. One country — the U.S. advanced, others went backward. But the situation is unstable, and the relationship will change in the future. One country cannot be typical for determining the fate of capitalism. It is wrong to take one country; one must consider capitalism as a whole. I emphasize: the global system, as we are used to taking one country.

Q. Can the scheme of the section “The Socialist Mode of Production” presented in the “Proposals” for the textbook project be considered correct?

A. I agree with the scheme presented in the “Proposals.”

Q. What names should be given to those parts of the national income of the USSR that were referred to as “necessary product” and “surplus product”?

A. The concepts of “necessary and surplus labour” and “necessary and surplus product” are not suitable for our economy. In relation to the socialist economy, it would be more appropriate to distinguish roughly as follows: labour for oneself and labour for society, product for oneself and product for society. Then, what was previously called necessary labour in relation to the socialist economy corresponds to labour for oneself. And what was previously called surplus labour in relation to our economy is labour for society.

Q. Is it correct to use the term “restriction of the operation” of the law of value in the USSR instead of the concept of “transformation” of the law of value?

A. Laws of science cannot be created, destroyed, annulled, changed or transformed. Laws must be reckoned with. If we violate laws, we will suffer. There is a widespread belief that the time of laws has passed. This view is often encountered not only among economists but also among practitioners and politicians. This does not correspond to the spirit of laws. The idea of transforming laws is a departure from science, something from the realm of laymen. Laws of nature and society cannot be transformed. If a law can be transformed, then it can be cancelled. If the laws of science can be transformed and cancelled, it means “we don’t care about anything.” Laws must be reckoned with, mastered and used. The scope of their action can be limited. This applies to all of science. We should not talk about the transformation of laws but about limiting the scope of their actions. This will be more accurate and scientific.

No inaccuracies can be allowed in the textbook. We present ourselves to the whole world with a textbook on political economy. It will be used by us and abroad.

We do not limit laws; existing objective conditions do. When the scope of laws are limited, they appear differently. The scope of the law of value is limited for us. The law of value is not exactly the same as it was under capitalism. It is not transformed but limited due to objective conditions.

The main thing is that we have eliminated private ownership and labour power is not considered a commodity. These are objective conditions that led to limiting the sphere of action of the law of value. The limitation of the law of value in our case occurs not because we wanted it that way but because it is a necessity, and there are favourable conditions for this limitation.

These objective conditions push us to limit the sphere of action of the law of value.

Laws are reflections of objective processes. A law is a correlation between objective forces, and it shows the correlation between causes and results. If there are a certain correlation of forces, if certain conditions are given, certain results inevitably follow. These are objective conditions that cannot be ignored. If some conditions are absent, the corresponding results change. Objectively, our conditions have changed compared to capitalism (no private ownership, labour power is not a commodity), and therefore, the results are different. The law of value has not been transformed in our case; its sphere of action is limited.

Q. How should the category of profit be understood in the USSR?

A. We need a certain profit. Without profit, we cannot create reserves, accumulate, meet defence needs or satisfy public needs. Here we can see that there is labour for oneself and labour for society.

The term “profit” itself is very tainted. It would be good to have some other concept. But what? Perhaps “net income.” The category of profit in our case conceals a completely different content. We do not have a spontaneous flow of capital, there is no law of competition. We do not have the capitalist law of maximum profit, nor do we have the capitalist law of average profit. But without profit, it is impossible to develop our economy. For our enterprises, even a minimum profit is sufficient, and sometimes they can operate without profit, relying on the profit of other enterprises. We distribute our funds ourselves. Under capitalism, only profitable enterprises can exist. We have highly profitable, less profitable and completely unprofitable enterprises. In the early years, our heavy industry did not generate a profit, but later it began to. In the early years, enterprises themselves needed funds.

Q. Is the position of the majority of participants in the economic discussion regarding the connection of Soviet money with gold, as outlined in the "Proposals" for the textbook project, correct? Some supporters of the minority, denying this connection, claim that there is no answer to this question in the "Remarks on Economic Issues Related to the November 1951 Discussion."

A. Have you read the "Proposals"? In my remarks, I stated that I have no comments on the other issues raised in the "Proposals." Therefore, I agree with the "Proposals" regarding the connection of our money with gold.

Q. Is it correct that the state should completely take away the differential rent in the USSR, as some participants in the discussion asserted?

A. Regarding the issue of differential rent, I agree with the majority opinion.

Q. Does the connection of Soviet money with gold mean that gold in the USSR is a commodity?

A. We had problems with gold before. Then it got better. We transitioned to the gold standard. We are committed to making gold a commodity, and we will achieve that. Currently, the costs of gold extraction are still high. But we are gradually reducing these costs. We will achieve a point where gold will be treated as a commodity. This certainly does not mean that we will exchange banknotes for gold. This does not happen even in capitalist countries now.

Q. Do Soviet state finances belong to the base or the state-political superstructure?

A. Is it a superstructure or a base? (*Laughs*) In general, there are many abstract disputes about the base and superstructure. There are people who even consider Soviet power as part of the base.

If we move away from an abstract characterization of the base and superstructure, we need to consider

this issue based on socialist ownership. Therefore, our budget fundamentally differs from the capitalist one. There, each enterprise has its budget, and the state budget covers a much narrower range than our state budget. Our budget encompasses all the income and expenses of the national economy. It reflects the state of the entire national economy, not only the state property directly. This is the budget of the entire national economy. Therefore, our finances have elements of the base. But there are also elements of the superstructure, for example, managerial expenses belong to the superstructure. Our state is the leader of the national economy, our budget includes not only expenses for the managerial apparatus but also expenses for the entire national economy. The budget has elements of the superstructure, but the elements of the economy predominate.

Q. Is it correct that the agricultural artel will exist throughout the entire period of the gradual transition from socialism to communism, while the agricultural commune belongs only to the second phase of communism?

A. The question is idle. It is clear that the artel is moving toward the commune. The commune will emerge when the functions of the peasant household in servicing personal needs cease. There is no need to rush with the agricultural commune. The transition to the commune requires solving a multitude of issues, creating good canteens, laundries, etc. Agricultural communes will be established when the peasants themselves see the feasibility of transitioning to them. The second phase of communism is more likely to correspond to the commune than to the agricultural artel. An artel requires commodity turnover, and, at least for now, it does not allow product exchange, let alone direct distribution.

(Product exchange is still an exchange, while direct

distribution is distribution based on needs.) As long as commodity production exists, we must deal with it. The artel is connected with buying and selling, and direct distribution will occur in the second phase of communism. When the agricultural artel will transform into a commune is hard to say. As long as commodity production exists, we must cope with it. It cannot be definitively stated that the second phase of communism will already begin when communes appear. However, it is also risky to say that transitioning to the second phase of communism is impossible without communes.

The transition to the second phase of communism cannot be envisioned in a pedestrian way. There will be no special “entry” into communism. Gradually, without realizing it, we will enter communism. It is not like “entering the city”: “the gates are open — enter.” Currently, in some collective farms, female members already advocate freeing themselves from the shackles of household chores, and transferring livestock to collective farms to receive meat and dairy products from the collective farm. However, they are not yet ready to give up poultry. These are just individual facts, the sprouts of the future. Currently, the agricultural artel is not at all an obstacle to the development of the economy. In the first phase of communism, the artel will gradually transition to the commune. A sharp boundary cannot be drawn here.

We need to gradually bring collective farm production closer to nationwide ownership. There are many complex issues here. We need to encourage collective farmers to think more about public affairs. Currently, the collective farm does not want to know anything other than its own economy. There is currently no union of collective farms on the scale of districts and regions. Shouldn't we move from the top down here to create a nationwide economic body that takes into account the production of both state enterprises

and collective farms? It is necessary to start here with accounting for the production of both state enterprises and collective farms, and then move on to the distribution of only surplus production. Funds that are not distributed and funds subject to distribution need to be established. Gradually, collective farmers will need to be accustomed to thinking about the interests of the entire nation. But this is a long road, and there is no need to rush here. There is no rush. Our affairs are going well. The goal is correct. The paths are clear and are all marked.

Q. Why is the term “monetary economy” in “Remarks on Economic Issues Related to the November 1951 Discussion” in quotation marks?

A. Since there is commodity turnover, there must be money. In the capitalist countries, the monetary economy, including banks, contributes to the ruin of the working class and the impoverishment of the people, enriching the exploiters. Money and banks under capitalism serve as a means of exploitation. Our monetary economy is not ordinary but different from the capitalist monetary economy. In our case, money and the monetary economy serve the cause of strengthening the socialist economy. Our monetary economy is an instrument that we have adopted and use in the interests of socialism. Quotation marks are used to avoid confusing our monetary economy with the monetary economy under capitalism. The terms “value” and “forms of value” are used by me without quotation marks. This also applies to money. The law of value determines much for us; it indirectly influences production and directly affects circulation. But its sphere of action is limited. It does not lead to ruin. The most difficult thing for the capitalists is the realization of the social product, the transformation of the commodity into money. It happens with a creak, accompanied by the ruin of the working class. In our case, this realization happens eas-

ily and smoothly. Both money and banks have different functions for us.

Q. What is the content of the law of planned, proportional development of the economy?

A. There is a difference between the law of planned development of the national economy and planning. Plans may not take into account what should have been considered in accordance with this law, with its requirements. For example, if the production of a certain quantity of cars is planned but the corresponding amount of sheet metal is not planned, by mid-year, it will be found that automobile plants must delay production. If the production of a certain number of cars is planned but the production of the corresponding amount of gasoline is not planned, this will also mean a disruption in the links between these industries. In these cases, the law of planned, proportional development of the national economy seriously makes itself felt. When it is not violated, it sits quietly, and its address is unknown; it is everywhere and nowhere. In general, all laws make themselves felt when they are violated, and this does not go unpunished. The law of planned development of the national economy reveals inconsistencies between industries. It requires that all elements of the national economy be in mutual correspondence, developing in accordance with each other, proportionally. And the law of planned, proportional development of the national economy corrects the allowed gaps in planning.

Q. How should we currently understand the main economic task of the USSR? Should we, in determining this task, base it on per capita capitalist production in 1929, or should we take the modern level of capitalist production for comparison, which, for example, in the USA, is higher than in 1929 due to the militarization of the economy? Is it correct to consider, as is often done in the press and in lectures, that achieving the production levels mentioned in the speech of February 9, 1946,

means solving the main economic task of the USSR and entering the second phase of communism?

A. The method of calculations based on per capita production retains its validity. Per capita production is the main measure of a country's economic power; there is no other measure, and it thus remains the standard. We should not base it on the 1929 level but on contemporary production. New calculations are needed. We need to compare our per capita production with modern figures from capitalist countries.

(Reply from Comrade B.*: You cannot take what is convenient. We must start from real data).

The figures I presented in 1946 do not mean solving the main economic task and transitioning to the second phase. Achieving these production figures will make us stronger. This will protect us from contingencies, from dangers and will allow us not to fear the enemy's attacks, attacks of capitalism. But solving the tasks set in the 1946 speech does not yet mean the second phase of communism. Some comrades are too hasty about the transition to the second phase of communism. This transition cannot be excessively accelerated, just as laws cannot be created. A third phase of communism is being invented. The measure remains the same; we must compare it with the country that is richer, take the modern data. This means moving forward.

(Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B) and the Council of Ministers of the USSR: 1945-1953, pp. 359-364)

* A.V. Bolgov, Scientific Secretary of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences — *Ed.*

**LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF
“PRAVDA” REGARDING THE
NOVEL “TO THE NEW SHORE”
BY V. LATSIS**

February 25, 1952

Recently, an article-correspondence by M. Zorin from Riga entitled “Discussion of V. Latsis’ Novel *To the New Shore*” appeared in the *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (December 15, 1951).

As is known, V. Latsis’ novel was published in Russian in three issues of the journal *Zvezda* in 1951.

In his correspondence, M. Zorin reports on the discussion organized in Riga by the Art Council of the Latvian State Publishing House, where the novel faced sharp criticism. The correspondent presents the negative statements of the participants in the discussion, and the correspondent himself outwardly refrains from intervening in it. However, this is the author’s trick. In reality, judging by the selection of facts and his emphasis on certain moments of the discussion, the correspondent expresses his own negative views on Latsis’ novel. The discussion is simply an external pretext for this. M. Zorin needed this petty trick to absolve himself of responsibility.

M. Zorin claims that the main character of the novel is Aivar, the adopted son of the kulak Taurin, who broke ties with the Taurin family and sided with the people, making Aivar the axis of the novel. This is incorrect.

Regardless of one’s approach, whether from the perspective of the number of pages dedicated to Aivar or in terms of the role assigned to Aivar in the novel, he cannot be considered the main character. If we are talking about the main character of the novel, it would

most likely be Jan Lidum, the old Bolshevik from the farmhands, who surpasses Aivar in understanding social affairs, authority among the people and weight in party circles. Trust in Aivar within the party is far from complete. He is given various assignments, but he constantly works under the watchful eye of the party activists. And only after Aivar successfully completes tasks related to draining the swamp and deals with his former adoptive father, the kulak Taurin, who happened to be at hand — only then does the question of admitting Aivar to the party arise in the party activists' discussions.

But the main merit of Latsis' novel lies not in the portrayal of individual characters but in the fact that the main and authentic hero of the novel is the Latvian people, the common working people who, just yesterday, were intimidated and downtrodden but today have risen in spirit and are creating a new life. Latsis' novel is an epic of the Latvian people who have broken with the old bourgeois order and are building a new socialist order.

M. Zorin further asserts that the discord in the kulak Taurin's family and Aivar's separation from Taurin are accidental phenomena, insignificant episodes that should not be made the basis of the novel. This is also incorrect.

Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Aivar's break with the kulak Taurin is neither the basis nor a significant moment in Latsis' novel. Aivar's separation from Taurin is just one moment in the novel. The foundation of the novel lies in the popular movement of the Latvian peasantry towards the collective farm system in the village.

Secondly, it is entirely incorrect to consider the discord in the kulak Taurin's family and Aivar's separation from this family as if it were a random phenomenon, an insignificant episode. In his novel, V. Latsis depicts the transitional period from bourgeois-nation-

alist rule in Latvia to the Soviet order, from individual peasant farming to collective farming in the village. The distinctive feature of this period is that it breaks the old orders, old norms, old customs, pits brother against brother, children against fathers and breaks up families, including kulak families. Therefore, there is nothing accidental about the fact that the storm of the new popular movement burst into the family of the kulak Taurin and disintegrated it. And not only into the family of the kulak Taurin but also into the family of the middle-class farmer — the subkulak Paseplis, tearing away his son Jean and daughter Anna and involving them in the popular movement. Only people who are ignorant of life and believe in the omnipotence of kulaks can think that kulak and subkulak families can withstand the blows of the popular movement, that during the period of breaking with the old, families of kulaks and subkulaks can supposedly remain intact. No, the disruption of the family life of kulaks and subkulaks during the growth of the collective farm movement is not a random phenomenon or a simple episode but a law of life. That is precisely why V. Latsis, as a good connoisseur of life and a great artist, could not avoid depicting in his novel the process breaking down the family life of kulaks and subkulaks.

After what has been said, the emptiness of M. Zorin's remarks about the "ideological flaws" and "ideological failure" of the novel *To the New Shore* becomes evident. To convince anyone of the validity of such accusations, one needs to have something more serious in their arsenal than superficial and ambiguous correspondence from Riga. Leftist attacks on V. Latsis cannot be considered arguments. On the contrary, such attacks indicate a lack of any substantial arguments.

We believe that V. Latsis' novel *To the New Shore* is a significant achievement of Soviet artistic literature, ideologically and politically consistent from beginning

to end.

We would like *Pravda* to express its opinion on V. Latsis' novel.

*Reader Group**

(*Pravda*, February 25, 1952)

* The review was written by L.F. Ilyichev (then the chief editor of *Pravda*) under the dictation of Stalin and signed "Reader Group" after Ilyichev refused to sign it, as dictated, "L. Ilyichev, J. Stalin."

**TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
OF THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, COMRADE Y.
TSEDENBAL**

February 27, 1952

Ulan-Bator

On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation between our countries, I send my congratulations and best wishes to the Mongolian people and the government of the Mongolian People's Republic.

J. Stalin

(*Unen*, February 27, 1952)

ANSWERS TO FOUR QUESTIONS FROM A GROUP OF EDITORS OF AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS

March 31, 1952

Q. Is a third world war presently as near as two or three years away?

A. No, it is not.

Q. Would a meeting of heads of state of the great powers be useful?

A. Possibly, it would be useful.

Q. Are you of the opinion that the present times are appropriate for Germany's unification?

A. Yes, I am of that opinion.

Q. On what basis is it possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side?

A. It is possible for capitalism and communism to live side by side if both sides wish to cooperate and the readiness to do so exists, to fulfil the duties they have taken on themselves, if its basis is complete equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

J. Stalin

(*Unity*, May 5, 1952, p. 417)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE HUNGAIAN
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, ISTVAN
DOBI**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of Hungary by the Soviet Army*

April 1952

I ask the government of the People's Republic of Hungary and you, Comrade Prime Minister, to accept my sincere congratulations on the occasion of your national day of celebration. I wish the Hungarian people further success in the building of a new, free Hungary.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 82, April 5, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, BOLESŁAW BIERUT

On the occasion of his 60th birthday

April 18, 1952

To the President of the Republic of Poland, Comrade Bolesław Bierut.

Permit me to greet you on your 60th birthday, Comrade President, as the great builder and leader of a new, united and independent Polish people's democracy.

I wish you good health and success in your labour for the well-being of the fraternal Polish people and in the further strengthening of the friendship between the Polish Republic and the Soviet Union, in the interests of world peace.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 93, April 20, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE POLISH
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, JOSEF
CYRANKIEWICZ**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Soviet-
Polish Treaty of Friendship*

April 1952

I ask the government of the Polish Republic and you, Comrade Prime Minister, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Polish Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Help and Cooperation after the war, to accept my greetings and sincere wishes for your future success.\

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 95, April 23, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME
MINISTER OF THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO
GROTEWOHL**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of the German people from the fascist tyranny*

May 8, 1952

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

I ask the government of the German Democratic Republic and you personally, Comrade Prime Minister, to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the German people from the fascist tyranny.

I wish the German people and the government of the German Democratic Republic, success in the struggle for an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and the departure of the occupying forces from Germany in the interests of Germany and of world peace.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 109, May 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, PETRU GROZA, AND
THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE ROMANIAN WORKERS'
PARTY, GHEORGHIU-DEJ**

*On the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the
proclamation of an independent Romanian state*

May 10, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic, Comrade Petru Groza, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party, Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej.

I ask the government of the Romanian People's Republic, the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party and you personally to accept my thanks for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the proclamation of an independent Romanian state.

I wish the Romanian people, the government of the People's Republic of Romania and the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party further success in the building of a new, free Romanian people's democracy.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 111, May 11, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN
REPUBLIC, ANTONIN
ZAPOTOCKY**

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation
of the Czechoslovakian Republic by the Soviet Army*

May 10, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Comrade Antonin Zapotocky.

On the occasion of the Czechoslovakian national day of celebration — the seventh anniversary of the liberation from the Hitler occupation — please accept, Comrade Chairman, my friendly congratulations and wishes for the future success of the Czechoslovakian people in the building of a new Czechoslovakian people's democracy.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 111, May 11, 1952)

GREETINGS LETTER TO THE YOUNG PIONEERS OF THE SOVIET UNION

*On the occasion of 30 years of existence of the V.I. Lenin
Pioneer Organization of the Soviet Union*

May 20, 1952

To the Young Pioneers of the Soviet Union.

I wholeheartedly greet the Young Pioneers and pupils on the 30 years of existence of the V.I. Lenin Pioneer Organization.

I wish the Pioneers and pupils health and success in their studies, in their work and in their social endeavours.

May the Pioneer Organization continue in the future to educate the Pioneers and become true sons of Lenin and our great Motherland.

J. Stalin

(Pravda, May 20, 1952)

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF SOCIALISM IN THE USSR

February-May 1952

REMARKS ON ECONOMIC QUESTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE NOVEMBER 1951 DISCUSSION

I have received all the materials on the economic discussion arranged to assess the draft textbook on political economy. The material received includes the "Proposals for the Improvement of the Draft Textbook on Political Economy," "Proposals for the Elimination of Mistakes and Inaccuracies" in the draft, and the "Memorandum on Disputed Issues."

On all these materials, as well as on the draft textbook, I consider it necessary to make the following remarks.

1. CHARACTER OF ECONOMIC LAWS UNDER SOCIALISM

Some comrades deny the objective character of laws of science, and of laws of political economy particularly, under socialism. They deny that the laws of political economy reflect law-governed processes which operate independently of the will of man. They believe that in view of the specific role assigned to the Soviet state by history, the Soviet state and its leaders can abolish existing laws of political economy and can "form," "create," new laws.

These comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is evident that they confuse laws of science, which reflect objective processes in nature or society, processes which take place independently of the will of man, with the

laws which are issued by governments, which are made by the will of man, and which have only juridical validity. But they must not be confused.

Marxism regards laws of science — whether they be laws of natural science or laws of political economy — as the reflection of objective processes which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them, study them, reckon with them in his activities and utilize them in the interests of society, but he cannot change or abolish them. Still less can he form or create new laws of science.

Does this mean, for instance, that the results of the action of the laws of nature, the results of the action of the forces of nature, are generally inavertible, that the destructive action of the forces of nature always and everywhere proceeds with an elemental and inexorable power that does not yield to the influence of man? No, it does not. Leaving aside astronomical, geological and other similar processes, which man really is powerless to influence, even if he has come to know the laws of their development, in many other cases man is very far from powerless, in the sense of being able to influence the processes of nature. In all such cases, having come to know the laws of nature, reckoning with them and relying on them, and intelligently applying and utilizing them, man can restrict their sphere of action, and can impart a different direction to the destructive forces of nature and convert them to the use of society.

To take one of numerous examples. In olden times the overflow of big rivers, floods, and the resulting destruction of homes and crops, was considered an inavertible calamity, against which man was powerless. But with the lapse of time and the development of human knowledge, when man had learned to build dams and hydro-electric stations, it became possible to protect society from the calamity of flood which had formerly seemed to be inavertible. More, man learned to curb

the destructive forces of nature, to harness them, so to speak, to convert the force of water to the use of society and to utilize it for the irrigation of fields and the generation of power.

Does this mean that man has thereby abolished laws of nature, laws of science, and has created new laws of nature, new laws of science? No, it does not. The fact is that all this procedure of averting the action of the destructive forces of water and of utilizing them in the interests of society takes place without any violation, alteration or abolition of scientific laws or the creation of new scientific laws. On the contrary, all this procedure is effected in precise conformity with the laws of nature and the laws of science, since any violation, even the slightest, of the laws of nature would only upset matters and render the procedure futile.

The same must be said of the laws of economic development, the laws of political economy — whether in the period of capitalism or in the period of socialism. Here, too, the laws of economic development, as in the case of natural science, are objective laws, reflecting processes of economic development which take place independently of the will of man. Man may discover these laws, get to know them and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society, impart a different direction to the destructive action of some of the laws, restrict their sphere of action, and allow fuller scope to other laws that are forcing their way to the forefront; but he cannot destroy them or create new economic laws.

One of the distinguishing features of political economy is that its laws, unlike those of natural science, are impermanent, that they, or at least the majority of them, operate for a definite historical period, after which they give place to new laws. However, these laws are not abolished, but lose their validity owing to the new economic conditions and depart from the scene in

order to give place to new laws, laws which are not created by the will of man, but which arise from the new economic conditions.

Reference is made to Engels' *Anti-Dühring*, to his formula which says that, with the abolition of capitalism and the socialization of the means of production, man will obtain control of his means of production, that he will be set free from the yoke of social and economic relations and become the "master" of his social life. Engels calls this freedom "appreciation of necessity."²² And what can this "appreciation of necessity" mean? It means that, having come to know objective laws ("necessity"), man will apply them with full consciousness in the interests of society. That is why Engels says in the same book:

"The laws of his own social action, hitherto standing face to face with man as laws of nature foreign to, and dominating him, will then be used with full understanding, and so mastered by him."²³

As we see, Engels' formula does not speak at all in favour of those who think that under socialism existing economic laws can be abolished and new ones created. On the contrary, it demands, not the abolition, but the understanding of economic laws and their intelligent application.

It is said that economic laws are elemental in character, that their action is inavertible and that society is powerless against them. That is not true. It is making a fetish of laws, and oneself the slave of laws. It has been demonstrated that society is not powerless against laws, that, having come to know economic laws and relying upon them, society can restrict their sphere of action, utilize them in the interests of society and "harness" them, just as in the case of the forces of nature and their laws, just as in the case of the overflow of big rivers cited in the illustration above.

Reference is made to the specific role of Soviet government in building socialism, which allegedly enables it to abolish existing laws of economic development and to “form” new ones. That also is untrue.

The specific role of Soviet government was due to two circumstances: first, that what Soviet government had to do was not to replace one form of exploitation by another, as was the case in earlier revolutions, but to abolish exploitation altogether; second, that in view of the absence in the country of any ready-made rudiments of a socialist economy, it had to create new, socialist forms of economy, “starting from scratch,” so to speak.

That was undoubtedly a difficult, complex and unprecedented task. Nevertheless, the Soviet government accomplished this task with credit. But it accomplished it not because it supposedly destroyed the existing economic laws and “formed” new ones, but only because it relied on the economic law that the relations of production *must necessarily conform* with the character of the productive forces. The productive forces of our country, especially in industry, were social in character, the form of ownership, on the other hand, was private, capitalistic. Relying on the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, the Soviet government socialized the means of production, made them the property of the whole people, and thereby abolished the exploiting system and created socialist forms of economy. Had it not been for this law, and had the Soviet government not relied upon it, it could not have accomplished its mission.

The economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces has long been forcing its way to the forefront in the capitalist countries. If it has failed so far to force its way into the open, it is because it is encoun-

tering powerful resistance on the part of obsolescent forces of society. Here we have another distinguishing feature of economic laws. Unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part. A force, a social force, capable of overcoming this resistance, is therefore necessary. In our country, such a force was the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, who represented the overwhelming majority of society. There is no such force yet in other, capitalist countries. This explains the secret why the Soviet government was able to smash the old forces of society, and why in our country the economic law that the relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces received full scope.

It is said that the necessity for balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy in our country enables the Soviet government to abolish existing economic laws and to create new ones. That is absolutely untrue. Our yearly and five-yearly plans must not be confused with the objective economic law of balanced, proportionate development of the national economy. The law of balanced development of the national economy arose in opposition to the law of competition and anarchy of production under capitalism. It arose from the socialization of the means of production, after the law of competition and anarchy of production had lost its validity. It became operative because a socialist economy can be conducted only on the basis of the economic law of balanced development of the national economy. That means that the law of balanced development of the national economy makes it *possible* for our planning bodies to plan social production correctly. But *possibility* must not be confused with actuality. They

are two different things. In order to turn the possibility into *actuality*, it is necessary to study this economic law, to master it, to learn to apply it with full understanding, and to compile such plans as fully reflect the requirements of this law. It cannot be said that the requirements of this economic law are fully reflected by our yearly and five-yearly plans.

It is said that some of the economic laws operating in our country under socialism, including the law of value, have been “transformed,” or even “radically transformed,” on the basis of planned economy. That is likewise untrue. Laws cannot be “transformed,” still less “radically” transformed. If they can be transformed, then they can be abolished and replaced by other laws. The thesis that laws can be “transformed” is a relic of the incorrect formula that laws can be “abolished” or “formed.” Although the formula that economic laws can be transformed has already been current in our country for a long time, it must be abandoned for the sake of accuracy. The sphere of action of this or that economic law may be restricted, its destructive action — that is, of course, if it is liable to be destructive — may be averted, but it cannot be “transformed” or “abolished.”

Consequently, when we speak of “subjugating” natural forces or economic forces, of “dominating” them, etc., this does not mean that man can “abolish” or “form” scientific laws. On the contrary, it only means that man can discover laws, get to know them and master them, learn to apply them with full understanding, utilize them in the interests of society, and thus subjugate them, secure mastery over them.

Hence, the laws of political economy under socialism are objective laws, which reflect the fact that the processes of economic life are law-governed and operate independently of our will. People who deny this postulate are in point of fact denying science, and,

by denying science, they are denying all possibility of prognostication — and, consequently, are denying the possibility of directing economic activity.

It may be said that all this is correct and generally known; but that there is nothing new in it, and that it is therefore not worth spending time reiterating generally-known truths. Of course, there really is nothing new in this; but it would be a mistake to think that it is not worth spending time reiterating certain truths that are well known to us. The fact is that we, the leading core, are joined every year by thousands of new and young forces who are ardently desirous of assisting us and ardently desirous of proving their worth, but who do not possess an adequate Marxist education, are unfamiliar with many truths that are well known to us, and are therefore compelled to grope in the darkness. They are staggered by the colossal achievements of Soviet government, they are dazzled by the extraordinary successes of the Soviet system, and they begin to imagine that Soviet government can “do anything,” that “nothing is beyond it,” that it can abolish scientific laws and form new ones. What are we to do with these comrades? How are we to educate them in Marxism-Leninism? I think that systematic reiteration and patient explanation of so-called “generally-known” truths is one of the best methods of educating these comrades in Marxism.

2. COMMODITY PRODUCTION UNDER SOCIALISM

Certain comrades affirm that the Party acted wrongly in preserving commodity production after it had assumed power and nationalized the means of production in our country. They consider that the Party should have banished commodity production there and then. In this connection they cite Engels, who says:

“With the seizing of the means of production by society, production of commodities is done away with, and, simultaneously, the mastery of the product over the producer.”²⁴

These comrades are profoundly mistaken.

Let us examine Engels’ formula. Engels’ formula cannot be considered fully clear and precise, because it does not indicate whether it is referring to the seizure by society of *all* or only part of the means of production, that is, whether *all* or only part of the means of production are converted into public property. Hence, *this* formula of Engels’ may be understood either way.

Elsewhere in *Anti-Dühring* Engels speaks of mastering “*all* the means of production,” of taking possession of “*all* means of production.” Hence, in this formula Engels has in mind the nationalization not of part, but of all the means of production, that is, the conversion into public property of the means of production not only of industry, but also of agriculture.

It follows from this that Engels has in mind countries where capitalism and the concentration of production have advanced far enough both in industry and in agriculture to permit the expropriation of *all* the means of production in the country and their conversion into public property. Engels, consequently, considers that in *such* countries, parallel with the socialization of *all* the means of production, commodity production should be put an end to. And that, of course, is correct.

There was only one such country at the close of the last century, when *Anti-Dühring* was published — Britain. There the development of capitalism and the concentration of production both in industry and in agriculture had reached such a point that it would have been possible, in the event of the assumption of power by the proletariat, to convert *all* the country’s means of production into public property and to put an end to

commodity production.

I leave aside in this instance the question of the importance of foreign trade to Britain and the vast part it plays in her national economy. I think that only after an investigation of this question can it be finally decided what would be the future of commodity production in Britain after the proletariat had assumed power and *all* the means of production had been nationalized.

However, not only at the close of the last century, but today too, no country has attained such a degree of development of capitalism and concentration of production in agriculture as is to be observed in Britain. As to the other countries, notwithstanding the development of capitalism in the countryside, they still have a fairly numerous class of small and medium rural owner-producers, whose future would have to be decided if the proletariat should assume power.

But here is a question: what are the proletariat and its party to do in countries, ours being a case in point, where the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power by the proletariat and the overthrow of capitalism, where capitalism has so concentrated the means of production in industry that they may be expropriated and made the property of society, but where agriculture, notwithstanding the growth of capitalism, is divided up among numerous small and medium owner-producers to such an extent as to make it impossible to consider the expropriation of these producers?

To this question Engels' formula does not furnish an answer. Incidentally, it was not supposed to furnish an answer, since the formula arose from another question, namely, what should be the fate of commodity production after *all* the means of production had been socialized.

And so, what is to be done if *not all*, but only part of the means of production have been socialized, yet the conditions are favourable for the assumption of power

by the proletariat — should the proletariat assume power and should commodity production be abolished immediately thereafter?

We cannot, of course, regard as an answer the opinion of certain half-baked Marxists who believe that under such conditions the thing to do is to refrain from taking power and to wait until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium producers and converting them into farm labourers and in concentrating the means of production in agriculture, and that only after this would it be possible to consider the assumption of power by the proletariat and the socialization of *all* the means of production. Naturally, this is a “solution” which Marxists cannot accept if they do not want to disgrace themselves completely.

Nor can we regard as an answer the opinion of other half-baked Marxists, who think that the thing to do would be to assume power and to expropriate the small and medium rural producers and to socialize their means of production. Marxists cannot adopt this senseless and criminal course either, because it would destroy all chances of victory for the proletarian revolution, and would throw the peasantry into the camp of the enemies of the proletariat for a long time.

The answer to this question was given by Lenin in his writings on the “tax in kind” and in his celebrated “cooperative plan.”

Lenin’s answer may be briefly summed up as follows:

a) Favourable conditions for the assumption of power should not be missed — the proletariat should assume power without waiting until capitalism has succeeded in ruining the millions of small and medium individual producers;

b) The means of production in industry should be expropriated and converted into public property;

c) As to the small and medium individual produ-

cers, they should be gradually united in producers' cooperatives, *i.e.*, in large agricultural enterprises, collective farms;

d) Industry should be developed to the utmost and the collective farms should be placed on the modern technical basis of large-scale production, not expropriating them, but on the contrary generously supplying them with first-class tractors and other machines;

e) In order to ensure an economic bond between town and country, between industry and agriculture, commodity production (exchange through purchase and sale) should be preserved for a certain period, it being the form of economic tie with the town which is *alone acceptable* to the peasants, and Soviet trade — state, cooperative, and collective-farm — should be developed to the full and the capitalists of all types and descriptions ousted from trading activity.

The history of socialist construction in our country has shown that this path of development, mapped out by Lenin, has fully justified itself.

There can be no doubt that in the case of all capitalist countries with a more or less numerous class of small and medium producers, this path of development is the only possible and expedient one for the victory of socialism.

It is said that commodity production must lead, is bound to lead, to capitalism all the same, under all conditions. That is not true. Not always and not under all conditions! Commodity production must not be identified with capitalist production. They are two different things. Capitalist production is the highest form of commodity production. Commodity production leads to capitalism only *if* there is private ownership of the means of production, *if* labour power appears in the market as a commodity which can be bought by the capitalist and exploited in the process of production, and *if*, consequently, the system of exploitation of wage-

workers by capitalists exists in the country. Capitalist production begins when the means of production are concentrated in private hands, and when the workers are bereft of means of production and are compelled to sell their labour power as a commodity. Without this there is no such thing as capitalist production.

Well, and what is to be done if the conditions for the conversion of commodity production into capitalist production do not exist, if the means of production are no longer private but socialist property, if the system of wage labour no longer exists and labour power is no longer a commodity, and if the system of exploitation has long been abolished — can it be considered then that commodity production will lead to capitalism all the same? No, it cannot. Yet ours is precisely such a society, a society where private ownership of the means of production, the system of wage labour, and the system of exploitation have long ceased to exist.

Commodity production must not be regarded as something sufficient unto itself, something independent of the surrounding economic conditions. Commodity production is older than capitalist production. It existed in slave-owning society, and served it, but did not lead to capitalism. It existed in feudal society and served it, yet, although it prepared some of the conditions for capitalist production, it did not lead to capitalism. Why then, one asks, cannot commodity production similarly serve our socialist society for a certain period without leading to capitalism, bearing in mind that in our country commodity production is not so boundless and all-embracing as it is under capitalist conditions, being confined within strict bounds thanks to such decisive economic conditions as social ownership of the means of production, the abolition of the system of wage labour, and the elimination of the system of exploitation?

It is said that, since the domination of social owner-

ship of the means of production has been established in our country, and the system of wage labour and exploitation has been abolished, commodity production has lost all meaning and should therefore be done away with.

That is also untrue. Today there are two basic forms of socialist production in our county: state, or publicly-owned production and collective-farm production, which cannot be said to be publicly owned. In the state enterprises, the means of production and the product of production are national property. In the collective farm, although the means of production (land, machines) do belong to the state, the product of production is the property of the different collective farms since the labour, as well as the seed, is their own, while the land, which has been turned over to the collective farms in perpetual tenure, is used by them virtually as their own property, in spite of the fact that they cannot sell, buy, lease or mortgage it.

The effect of this is that the state disposes only of the product of the state enterprises, while the product of the collective farms, being their property, is disposed of only by them. But the collective farms are unwilling to alienate the products except in the form of commodities in exchange for which they desire to receive the commodities they need. At present the collective farms will not recognize any other economic relation with the town except the commodity relation — exchange through purchase and sale. Because of this, commodity production and trade are as much a necessity with us today as they were, say, 30 years ago, when Lenin spoke of the necessity of developing trade to the utmost.

Of course, when instead of the two basic production sectors, the state sector and the collective-farm sector, there will be only one all-embracing production sector, with the right to dispose of all the consumer goods produced in the country, commodity circulation, with its

“money economy,” will disappear, as being an unnecessary element in the national economy. But so long as this is not the case, so long as the two basic production sectors remain, commodity production and commodity circulation must remain in force, as a necessary and very useful element in our system of national economy. How the formation of a single and united sector will come about, whether simply by the swallowing up of the collective-farm sector by the state sector — which is hardly likely (because that would be looked upon as the expropriation of the collective farms) — or by the setting up of a single *national* economic body (comprising representatives of state industry and of the collective farms), with the right at first to keep account of all consumer product in the country, and eventually also to distribute it, by way, say, of products-exchange — is a special question which requires separate discussion.

Consequently, *our* commodity production is not of the ordinary type, but is a special kind of commodity production, commodity production without capitalists, which is concerned mainly with the goods of associated socialist producers (the state, the collective farms, the cooperatives), the sphere of action of which is confined to items of personal consumption, which obviously cannot possibly develop into capitalist production, and which, together with its “money economy,” is designed to serve the development and consolidation of socialist production.

Absolutely mistaken, therefore, are those comrades who allege that, since socialist society has not abolished commodity forms of production, we are bound to have the reappearance of all the economic categories characteristic of capitalism: labour power as a commodity, surplus value, capital, capitalist profit, the average rate of profit, etc. These comrades confuse commodity production with capitalist production, and believe that once there is commodity production there must also be

capitalist production. They do not realize that our commodity production radically differs from commodity production under capitalism.

Further, I think that we must also discard certain other concepts taken from Marx's *Capital* — where Marx was concerned with an analysis of capitalism — and artificially applied to our socialist relations. I am referring to such concepts, among others, as “necessary” and “surplus” labour, “necessary” and “surplus” product, “necessary” and “surplus” time. Marx analysed capitalism in order to elucidate the source of exploitation of the working class — surplus value — and to arm the working class, which was bereft of means of production, with an intellectual weapon for the overthrow of capitalism. It is natural that Marx used concepts (categories) which fully corresponded to capitalist relations. But it is strange, to say the least, to use these concepts now, when the working class is not only not bereft of power and means of production, but, on the contrary, is in possession of the power and controls the means of production. Talk of labour power being a commodity, and of “hiring” of workers sounds rather absurd now, under our system: as though the working class, which possesses means of production, hires itself and sells its labour power to itself. It is just as strange to speak now of “necessary” and “surplus” labour: as though, under our conditions, the labour contributed by the workers to society for the extension of production, the promotion of education and public health, the organization of defence, etc., is not just as necessary to the working class, now in power, as the labour expended to supply the personal needs of the worker and his family.

It should be remarked that in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, where it is no longer capitalism that he is investigating, but, among other things, the first phase of communist society, Marx recognizes labour

contributed to society for extension of production, for education and public health, for administrative expenses, for building up reserves, etc., to be just as necessary as the labour expended to supply the consumption requirements of the working class.

I think that our economists should put an end to this incongruity between the old concepts and the new state of affairs in our socialist country, by replacing the old concepts with new ones that correspond to the new situation.

We could tolerate this incongruity for a certain period, but the time has come to put an end to it.

3. THE LAW OF VALUE UNDER SOCIALISM

It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist.

In our country, the sphere of operation of the law of value extends, first of all, to commodity circulation, to the exchange of commodities through purchase and sale, the exchange, chiefly, of articles of personal consumption. Here, in this sphere, the law of value preserves, within certain limits, of course, the function of a regulator.

But the operation of the law of value is not confined to the sphere of commodity circulation. It also extends to production. True, the law of value has no regulating function in our socialist production, but it nevertheless influences production, and this fact cannot be ignored when directing production. As a matter of fact, consumer goods, which are needed to compensate the labour power expended in the process of production, are produced and realized in our country as commodities coming under the operation of the law of value. It

is precisely here that the law of value exercises its influence on production. In this connection, such things as cost accounting and profitableness, production costs, prices, etc., are of actual importance in our enterprises. Consequently, our enterprises cannot, and must not, function without taking the law of value into account.

Is this a good thing? It is not a bad thing. Under present conditions, it really is not a bad thing, since it trains our business executives to conduct production on rational lines and disciplines them. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to count production magnitudes, to count them accurately, and also to calculate the real things in production precisely, and not to talk nonsense about "approximate figures," spun out of thin air. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives to look for, find and utilize hidden reserves latent in production, and not to trample them under foot. It is not a bad thing because it teaches our executives systematically to improve methods of production, to lower production costs, to practise cost accounting, and to make their enterprises pay. It is a good practical school which accelerates the development of our executive personnel and their growth into genuine leaders of socialist production at the present stage of development.

The trouble is not that production in our country is influenced by the law of value. The trouble is that our business executives and planners, with few exceptions, are poorly acquainted with the operations of the law of value, do not study them, and are unable to take account of them in their computations. This, in fact, explains the confusion that still reigns in the sphere of price-fixing policy. Here is one of many examples. Some time ago it was decided to adjust the prices of cotton and grain in the interest of cotton growing, to establish more accurate prices for grain sold to the cotton growers, and to raise the prices of cotton delivered to the state. Our

business executives and planners submitted a proposal on this score which could not but astound the members of the Central Committee, since it suggested fixing the price of a ton of grain at practically the same level as a ton of cotton, and, moreover, the price of a ton of grain was taken as equivalent to that of a ton of baked bread. In reply to the remarks of members of the Central Committee that the price of a ton of bread must be higher than that of a ton of grain, because of the additional expense of milling and baking, and that cotton was generally much dearer than grain, as was also borne out by their prices in the world market, the authors of the proposal could find nothing coherent to say. The Central Committee was therefore obliged to take the matter into its own hands and to lower the prices of grain and raise the prices of cotton. What would have happened if the proposal of these comrades had received legal force? We should have ruined the cotton growers and would have found ourselves without cotton.

But does this mean that the operation of the law of value has as much scope with us as it has under capitalism, and that it is the regulator of production in our country too? No, it does not. Actually, the sphere of operation of the law of value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds. It has already been said that the sphere of operation of commodity production is restricted and placed within definite bounds by our system. The same must be said of the sphere of operation of the law of value. Undoubtedly, the fact that private ownership of the means of production does not exist, and that the means of production both in town and country are socialized, cannot but restrict the sphere of operation of the law of value and the extent of its influence on production.

In this same direction operates the law of balanced (proportionate) development of the national economy, which has superseded the law of competition and an-

archy of production.

In this same direction, too, operate our yearly and five-yearly plans and our economic policy generally, which are based on the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy.

The effect of all this, taken together, is that the sphere of operation of the law of value in our country is strictly limited, and that the law of value cannot under our system function as the regulator of production.

This, indeed, explains the “striking” fact that whereas in our country the law of value, in spite of the steady and rapid expansion of our socialist production, does not lead to crises of overproduction, in the capitalist countries this same law, whose sphere of operation is very wide under capitalism, does lead, in spite of the low rate of expansion of production, to periodical crises of overproduction.

It is said that the law of value is a permanent law, binding upon all periods of historical development, and that if it does lose its function as a regulator of exchange relations in the second phase of communist society, it retains at this phase of development its function as a regulator of the relations between the various branches of production, as a regulator of the distribution of labour among them.

That is quite untrue. Value, like the law of value, is an historical category connected with the existence of commodity production. With the disappearance of commodity production, value and its forms and the law of value also disappear.

In the second phase of communist society, the amount of labour expended on the production of goods will be measured not in a roundabout way, not through value and its forms, as is the case under commodity production, but directly and immediately — by the amount of time, the number of hours, expended on the production of goods. As to the distribution of labour,

its distribution among the branches of production will be regulated not by the law of value, which will have ceased to function by that time, but by the growth of society's demand for goods. It will be a society in which production will be regulated by the requirements of society, and computation of the requirements of society will acquire paramount importance for the planning bodies.

Totally incorrect, too, is the assertion that under our present economic system, in the first phase of development of communist society, the law of value regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why our light industries, which are the most profitable, are not being developed to the utmost, and why preference is given to our heavy industries, which are often less profitable, and sometimes altogether unprofitable.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why a number of our heavy industry plants which are still unprofitable and where the labour of the worker does not yield the "proper returns," are not closed down, and why new light industry plants, which would certainly be profitable and where the labour of the workers might yield "big returns," are not opened.

If this were true, it would be incomprehensible why workers are not transferred from plants that are less profitable, but very necessary to our national economy, to plants which are more profitable — in accordance with the law of value, which supposedly regulates the "proportions" of labour distributed among the branches of production.

Obviously, if we were to follow the lead of these comrades, we should have to cease giving primacy to the production of means of production in favour of the production of articles of consumption. And what would be the effect of ceasing to give primacy to the produc-

tion of the means of production? The effect would be to destroy the possibility of the continuous expansion of our national economy, because the national economy cannot be continuously expanded without giving primacy to the production of means of production.

These comrades forget that the law of value can be a regulator of production only under capitalism, with private ownership of the means of production, and competition, anarchy of production, and crises of overproduction. They forget that in our country the sphere of operation of the law of value is limited by the social ownership of the means of production, and by the law of balanced development of the national economy, and is consequently also limited by our yearly and five-yearly plans, which are an approximate reflection of the requirements of this law.

Some comrades draw the conclusion from this that the law of balanced development of the national economy and economic planning annul the principle of profitability of production. That is quite untrue. It is just the other way round. If profitability is considered not from the standpoint of individual plants or industries, and not over a period of one year, but from the standpoint of the entire national economy and over a period of, say, 10 or 15 years, which is the only correct approach to the question, then the temporary and unstable profitability of some plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of stable and permanent profitability which we get from the operation of the law of balanced development of the national economy and from economic planning, which save us from periodical economic crises disruptive to the national economy and causing tremendous material damage to society, and which ensure a continuous and high rate of expansion of our national economy.

In brief, there can be no doubt that under our present socialist conditions of production, the law of value can-

not be a “regulator of the proportions” of labour distributed among the various branches of production.

4. ABOLITION OF THE ANTITHESIS BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY, AND BETWEEN MENTAL AND PHYSICAL LABOUR, AND ELIMINATION OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THEM

This heading covers a number of problems which essentially differ from one another. I combine them in one section, not in order to lump them together, but solely for brevity of exposition.

Abolition of the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, is a well-known problem which was discussed long ago by Marx and Engels. The economic basis of this antithesis is the exploitation of the country by the town, the expropriation of the peasantry and the ruin of the majority of the rural population by the whole course of development of industry, trade and credit under capitalism. Hence, the antithesis between town and country under capitalism must be regarded as an antagonism of interests. This it was that gave rise to the hostile attitude of the country towards the town and towards “townfolk” in general.

Undoubtedly, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system in our country, and with the consolidation of the socialist system, the antagonism of interests between town and country, between industry and agriculture, was also bound to disappear. And that is what happened. The immense assistance rendered by the socialist town, by our working class, to our peasantry in eliminating the landlords and kulaks strengthened the foundation for the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, while the systematic supply of first-class tractors and other machines to the peasantry and its collective farms converted the al-

liance between the working class and the peasantry into friendship between them. Of course, the workers and the collective-farm peasantry do represent two classes differing from one another in status. But this difference does not weaken their friendship in any way. On the contrary, their interests lie along one common line, that of strengthening the socialist system and attaining the victory of communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that not a trace remains of the former distrust, not to speak of the former hatred, of the country for the town.

All this means that the ground for the antithesis between town and country, between industry and agriculture, has already been eliminated by our present socialist system.

This, of course, does not mean that the effect of the abolition of the antithesis between town and country will be that "the great towns will perish."* Not only will the great towns not perish, but new great towns will appear as centres of the maximum development of culture, and as centres not only of large-scale industry, but also of the processing of agricultural produce and of powerful development of all branches of the food industry. This will facilitate the cultural progress of the nation and will tend to even up conditions of life in town and country.

We have a similar situation as regards the problem of the abolition of the antithesis between mental and physical labour. This too is a well-known problem which was discussed by Marx and Engels long ago. The economic basis of the antithesis between mental and physical labour is the exploitation of the physical workers by the mental workers. Everyone is familiar with the gulf which under capitalism divided the physical workers of enterprises from the managerial personnel. We

* Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 412.

know that this gulf gave rise to a hostile attitude on the part of the workers towards managers, foremen, engineers and other members of the technical staff, whom the workers regarded as their enemies. Naturally, with the abolition of capitalism and the exploiting system, the antagonism of interests between physical and mental labour was also bound to disappear. And it really has disappeared in our present socialist system. Today, the physical workers and the managerial personnel are not enemies, but comrades and friends, members of a single collective body of producers who are vitally interested in the progress and improvement of production. Not a trace remains of the former enmity between them.

Of quite a different character is the problem of the disappearance of distinctions between town (industry) and country (agriculture), and between physical and mental labour. This problem was not discussed in the Marxist classics. It is a new problem, one that has been raised practically by our socialist construction.

Is this problem an imaginary one? Has it any practical or theoretical importance for us? No, this problem cannot be considered an imaginary one. On the contrary, it is for us a problem of the greatest seriousness.

Take, for instance, the distinction between agriculture and industry. In our country it consists not only in the fact that the conditions of labour in agriculture differ from those in industry, but, mainly and chiefly, in the fact that whereas in industry we have public ownership of the means of production and of the product of industry, in agriculture we have not public, but group, collective-farm ownership. It has already been said that this fact leads to the preservation of commodity circulation, and that only when this distinction between industry and agriculture disappears, can commodity production with all its attendant consequences also disappear. It therefore cannot be denied that the disappearance of

this essential distinction between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance for us.

The same must be said of the problem of the abolition of the essential distinction between mental labour and physical labour. It, too, is a problem of paramount importance for us. Before the socialist emulation movement assumed mass proportions, the growth of our industry proceeded very haltingly, and many comrades even suggested that the rate of industrial development should be retarded. This was due chiefly to the fact that the cultural and technical level of the workers was too low and lagged far behind that of the technical personnel. But the situation changed radically when the socialist emulation movement assumed a mass character. It was from that moment on that industry began to advance at accelerated speed. Why did socialist emulation assume the character of a mass movement? Because among the workers whole groups of comrades came to the fore who had not only mastered the minimum requirements of technical knowledge, but had gone further and risen to the level of the technical personnel; they began to correct technicians and engineers, to break down the existing norms as antiquated, to introduce new and more up-to-date norms, and so on. What should we have had if not only isolated groups, but the majority of the workers had raised their cultural and technical level to that of the engineering and technical personnel? Our industry would have risen to a height unattainable by industry in other countries. It therefore cannot be denied that the abolition of the essential distinction between mental and physical labour by raising the cultural and technical level of the workers to that of the technical personnel cannot but be of paramount importance for us.

Some comrades assert that in the course of time not only will the essential distinction between indus-

try and agriculture, and between physical and mental labour, disappear, but so will *all* distinction between them. That is not true. Abolition of the essential distinction between industry and agriculture cannot lead to the abolition of all distinction between them. Some distinction, even if inessential, will certainly remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work in industry and in agriculture. Even in industry the conditions of labour are not the same in all its branches: the conditions of labour, for example, of coal miners differ from those of the workers of a mechanized shoe factory, and the conditions of labour of ore miners from those of engineering workers. If that is so, then all the more must a certain distinction remain between industry and agriculture.

The same must be said of the distinction between mental and physical labour. The essential distinction between them, the difference in their cultural and technical levels, will certainly disappear. But some distinction, even if inessential, will remain, if only because the conditions of labour of the managerial staffs and those of the workers are not identical.

The comrades who assert the contrary do so presumably on the basis of the formulation given in some of my statements, which speaks of the abolition of the distinction between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour, without any reservation to the effect that what is meant is the abolition of the *essential* distinction, not of all distinction. That is exactly how the comrades understood my formulation, assuming that it implied the abolition of all distinction. But this indicates that the formulation was unprecise, unsatisfactory. It must be discarded and replaced by another formulation, one that speaks of the abolition of essential distinctions and the persistence of inessential distinctions between industry and agriculture, and between mental and physical labour.

5. DISINTEGRATION OF THE SINGLE WORLD MARKET AND DEEPENING OF THE CRISIS OF THE WORLD CAPITALIST SYSTEM

The disintegration of the single, all-embracing world market must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the Second World War and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

The Second World War was itself a product of this crisis. Each of the two capitalist coalitions which locked horns in the war calculated on defeating its adversary and gaining world supremacy. It was in this that they sought a way out of the crisis. The United States of America hoped to put its most dangerous competitors, Germany and Japan, out of action, seize foreign markets and the world's raw material resources, and establish its world supremacy.

But the war did not justify these hopes. It is true that Germany and Japan were put out of action as competitors of the three major capitalist countries: the USA, Great Britain and France. But at the same time China and other, European, people's democracies broke away from the capitalist system and, together with the Soviet Union, formed a united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism. The economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another.

It should be observed that the USA, and Great Britain and France, themselves contributed — without themselves desiring it, of course — to the formation and consolidation of the new, parallel world market. They imposed an economic blockade on the USSR, China and the European people's democracies, which did not

join the “Marshall plan” system, thinking thereby to strangle them. The effect, however, was not to strangle, but to strengthen the new world market.

But the fundamental thing, of course, is not the economic blockade, but the fact that since the war these countries have joined together economically and established economic cooperation and mutual assistance. The experience of this cooperation shows that not a single capitalist country could have rendered such effective and technically competent assistance to the people’s democracies as the Soviet Union is rendering them. The point is not only that this assistance is the cheapest possible and technically superb. The chief point is that at the bottom of this cooperation lies a sincere desire to help one another and to promote the economic progress of all. The result is a fast pace of industrial development in these countries. It may be confidently said that, with this pace of industrial development, it will soon come to pass that these countries will not only be in no need of imports from capitalist countries, but will themselves feel the necessity of finding an outside market for their surplus products.

But it follows from this that the sphere of exploitation of the world’s resources by the major capitalist countries (USA, Britain France) will not expand, but contract; that their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate, and that their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market.

This is felt by the capitalists themselves, for it would be difficult for them not to feel the loss of such markets as the USSR and China. They are trying to offset these difficulties with the “Marshall plan,” the war in Korea, frantic rearmament, and industrial militarization. But that is very much like a drowning man clutching at a

straw.

This state of affairs has confronted the economists with two questions:

a) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Stalin before the Second World War regarding the relative stability of markets in the period of the general crisis of capitalism is still valid?

b) Can it be affirmed that the thesis expounded by Lenin in the spring of 1916 — namely, that, in spite of the decay of capitalism, “on the whole, capitalism is growing far more rapidly than before”²⁵ — is still valid?

I think that it cannot. In view of the new conditions to which the Second World War has given rise, both these theses must be regarded as having lost their validity.

6. INEVITABILITY OF WARS BETWEEN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the USA has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the foremost capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again — and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but

they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Outwardly, everything would seem to be “going well”: the USA has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the USA and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to “go well” for “all eternity,” that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

Take, first of all, Britain and France. Undoubtedly, they are imperialist countries. Undoubtedly, cheap raw materials and secure markets are of paramount importance to them. Can it be assumed that they will endlessly tolerate the present situation, in which, under the guise of “Marshall plan aid,” Americans are penetrating into the economies of Britain and France and trying to convert them into adjuncts of the United States economy, and American capital is seizing raw materials and markets in the British and French colonies and thereby plotting disaster for the high profits of the British and French capitalists? Would it not be truer to say that capitalist Britain, and, after her, capitalist France, will be compelled in the end to break from the embrace of the USA and enter into conflict with it in order to secure an independent position and, of course, high profits?

Let us pass to the major vanquished countries, Germany (Western) and Japan. These countries are now languishing in misery under the jackboot of American imperialism. Their industry and agriculture, their trade, their foreign and home policies, and their whole life are fettered by the American occupation “regime.” Yet only yesterday these countries were great imper-

ialist powers and were shaking the foundations of the domination of Britain, the USA and France in Europe and Asia. To think that these countries will not try to get on their feet again, will not try to smash the U.S. "regime," and force their way to independent development, is to believe in miracles.

It is said that the contradictions between capitalism and socialism are stronger than the contradictions among the capitalist countries. Theoretically, of course, that is true. It is not only true now, today; it was true before the Second World War. And it was more or less realized by the leaders of the capitalist countries. Yet the Second World War began not as a war with the USSR, but as a war between capitalist countries. Why? Firstly, because war with the USSR, as a socialist land, is more dangerous to capitalism than war between capitalist countries; for whereas war between capitalist countries puts in question only the supremacy of certain capitalist countries over others, war with the USSR must certainly put in question the existence of capitalism itself. Secondly, because the capitalists, although they clamour, for "propaganda" purposes, about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, do not themselves believe that it is aggressive, because they are aware of the Soviet Union's peaceful policy and know that it will not itself attack capitalist countries.

After the First World War it was similarly believed that Germany had been definitely put out of action, just as certain comrades now believe that Japan and Germany have been definitely put out of action. Then, too, it was said and clamoured in the press that the United States had put Europe on rations; that Germany would never rise to her feet again, and that there would be no more wars between capitalist countries. In spite of this, Germany rose to her feet again as a great power within the space of some 15 or 20 years after her defeat, having broken out of bondage and taken the path of independ-

ent development. And it is significant that it was none other than Britain and the United States that helped Germany to recover economically and to enhance her economic war potential. Of course, when the United States and Britain assisted Germany's economic recovery, they did so with a view to setting a recovered Germany against the Soviet Union, to utilizing her against the land of socialism. But Germany directed her forces in the first place against the Anglo-French-American bloc. And when Hitler Germany declared war on the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French-American bloc, far from joining with Hitler Germany, was compelled to enter into a coalition with the USSR against Hitler Germany.

Consequently, the struggle of the capitalist countries for markets and their desire to crush their competitors proved in practice to be stronger than the contradictions between the capitalist camp and the socialist camp.

What guarantee is there, then, that Germany and Japan will not rise to their feet again, will not attempt to break out of American bondage and live their own independent lives? I think there is no such guarantee.

But it follows from this that the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries remains in force.

It is said that Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably generates war must now be regarded as obsolete, since powerful popular forces have come forward today in defence of peace and against another world war. That is not true.

The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism — it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs

from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a *particular* war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a *particular* peace, in the resignation of a bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force — and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

7. THE BASIC ECONOMIC LAWS OF MODERN CAPITALISM AND OF SOCIALISM

As you know, the question of the basic economic laws of capitalism and of socialism arose several times in the course of the discussion. Various views were expressed on this score, even the most fantastic. True, the majority of the participants in the discussion reacted feebly to the matter, and no decision on the point was indicated. However, none of the participants denied that such laws exist.

Is there a basic economic law of capitalism? Yes, there is. What is this law, and what are its characteristic features? The basic economic law of capitalism is such a law as determines not some particular aspect or particular processes of the development of capitalist production, but all the principal aspects and all the principal processes of its development — one, consequently, which determines the essence of capitalist production, its essential nature.

Is the law of value the basic economic law of capitalism? No. The law of value is primarily a law of commodity production. It existed before capitalism, and, like commodity production, will continue to exist after the overthrow of capitalism, as it does, for instance, in our country, although, it is true, with a restricted sphere of operation. Having a wide sphere of operation in capitalist conditions, the law of value, of course, plays a big part in the development of capitalist production. But not only does it not determine the essence of capitalist production and the principles of capitalist profit; it does not even pose these problems. Therefore, it cannot be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

For the same reasons, the law of competition and anarchy of production, or the law of uneven development of capitalism in the various countries cannot be the basic economic law of capitalism either.

It is said that the law of the average rate of profit is the basic economic law of modern capitalism. That is not true. Modern capitalism, monopoly capitalism, cannot content itself with the average profit, which moreover has a tendency to decline, in view of the increasing organic composition of capital. It is not the average profit, but the maximum profit that modern monopoly capitalism demands, which it needs for more or less regular extended reproduction.

Most appropriate to the concept of a basic economic law of capitalism is the law of surplus value, the law

of the origin and growth of capitalist profit. It really does determine the basic features of capitalist production. But the law of surplus value is too general a law that does not cover the problem of the highest rate of profit, the securing of which is a condition for the development of monopoly capitalism. In order to fill this hiatus, the law of surplus value must be made more concrete and developed further in adaptation to the conditions of monopoly capitalism, at the same time bearing in mind that monopoly capitalism demands not any sort of profit, but precisely the maximum profit. That will be the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

The main features and requirements of the basic economic law of modern capitalism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum capitalist profit through the exploitation, ruin and impoverishment of the majority of the population of the given country, through the enslavement and systematic robbery of the peoples of other countries, especially backward countries, and, lastly, through wars and militarization of the national economy, which are utilized for the obtaining of the highest profits.

It is said that the average profit might nevertheless be regarded as quite sufficient for capitalist development under modern conditions. That is not true. The average profit is the lowest point of profitability, below which capitalist production becomes impossible. But it would be absurd to think that, in seizing colonies, subjugating peoples and engineering wars, the magnates of modern monopoly capitalism are striving to secure only the average profit. No, it is not the average profit, nor yet super-profit — which, as a rule, represents only a slight addition to the average profit — but precisely the maximum profit that is the motor of monopoly capitalism. It is precisely the necessity of securing the maximum profits that drives monopoly capitalism to such risky undertakings as the enslavement and systematic plunder of

colonies and other backward countries, the conversion of a number of independent countries into dependent countries, the organization of new wars — which to the magnates of modern capitalism is the “business” best adapted to the extraction of the maximum profit — and, lastly, attempts to win world economic supremacy.

The importance of the basic economic law of capitalism consists, among other things, in the circumstance that, since it determines all the major phenomena in the development of the capitalist mode of production, its booms and crises, its victories and defeats, its merits and demerits — the whole process of its contradictory development — it enables us to understand and explain them.

Here is one of many “striking” examples.

We are all acquainted with facts from the history and practice of capitalism illustrative of the rapid development of technology under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as the standard-bearers of the most advanced techniques, as revolutionaries in the development of the technique of production. But we are also familiar with facts of a different kind, illustrative of a halt in technical development under capitalism, when the capitalists appear as reactionaries in the development of new techniques and not infrequently resort to hand labour.

How is this howling contradiction to be explained? It can only be explained by the basic economic law of modern capitalism, that is, by the necessity of obtaining the maximum profit. Capitalism is in favour of new techniques when they promise it the highest profit. Capitalism is against new techniques, and for resort to hand labour, when the new techniques do not promise the highest profit.

That is how matters stand with the basic economic law of modern capitalism.

Is there a basic economic law of socialism? Yes,

there is. What are the essential features and requirements of this law? The essential features and requirements of the basic law of socialism might be formulated roughly in this way: the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society through the continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques.

Consequently: instead of maximum profits — maximum satisfaction of the material and cultural requirements of society; instead of development of production with breaks in continuity from boom to crisis and from crisis to boom — unbroken expansion of production; instead of periodic breaks in technical development, accompanied by destruction of the productive forces of society — an unbroken process of perfecting production on the basis of higher techniques.

It is said that the law of the balanced, proportionate development of the national economy is the basic economic law of socialism. That is not true. Balanced development of the national economy, and hence, economic planning, which is a more or less faithful reflection of this law, can yield nothing by themselves, if it is not known for what purpose economic development is planned, or if that purpose is not clear. The law of balanced development of the national economy can yield the desired result only if there is a purpose for the sake of which economic development is planned. This purpose the law of balanced development of the national economy cannot itself provide. Still less can economic planning provide it. This purpose is inherent in the basic economic law of socialism, in the shape of its requirements, as expounded above. Consequently, the law of balanced development of the national economy can operate to its full scope only if its operation rests on the basic economic law of socialism.

As to economic planning, it can achieve positive

results only if two conditions are observed: a) if it correctly reflects the requirements of the law of balanced development of the national economy, and b) if it conforms in every way to the requirements of the basic economic law of socialism.

8. OTHER QUESTIONS

1) Extra-economic coercion under feudalism.

Of course, extra-economic coercion did play a part in strengthening the economic power of the feudal landlords; however, not it, but feudal ownership of the land was the basis of feudalism.

2) Personal property of the collective-farm household.

It would be wrong to say, as the draft textbook does, that “every household in a collective farm has in personal use a cow, small livestock and poultry.” Actually, as we know, it is not in personal use, but as personal *property* that the collective-farm household has its cow, small livestock, poultry, etc. The expression “in personal use” has evidently been taken from the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel. But a mistake was made in the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel. The Constitution of the USSR, which was drafted more carefully, puts it differently, viz.:

“Every household in a collective farm... has as its personal property a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements.”

That, of course, is correct.

It would be well, in addition, to state more particularly that every collective farmer has as his personal property from one to so many cows, depending on local conditions, so many sheep, goats, pigs (the number also depending on local conditions), and an unlimited quan-

tity of poultry (ducks, geese, hens, turkeys).

Such detailed particulars are of great importance for our comrades abroad, who want to know what exactly has remained as the personal property of the collective-farm household now that agriculture in our country has been collectivized.

3) Total rent paid by the peasants to the landlords; also total expenditure on the purchase of land.

The draft textbook says that as a result of the nationalization of the land, "the peasantry were released from paying rent to the landlords to a total of about 500 million rubles annually" (it should be "gold" rubles). This figure should be verified, because it seems to me that it does not include the rent paid over the whole of Russia, but only in a majority of the Russian *gubernias*. It should also be borne in mind that in some of the border regions of Russia rent was paid in kind, a fact which the authors of the draft textbook have evidently overlooked. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the peasants were released not only from the payment of rent, but also from annual expenditure for the purchase of land. Was this taken into account in the draft textbook? It seems to me that it was not; but it should have been.

4) Coalescence of the monopolies with the state machine.

The word "coalescence" is not appropriate. It superficially and descriptively notes the process of merging of the monopolies with the state, but it does not reveal the economic import of this process. The fact of the matter is that the merging process is not simply a process of coalescence, but the subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies. The word "coalescence" should therefore be discarded and replaced by the words "subjugation of the state machine to the monopolies."

5) Use of machines in the USSR

The draft textbook says that "in the USSR ma-

chines are used in all cases when they economize the labour of society.” That is by no means what should be said. In the first place, machines in the USSR always economize the labour of society, and we accordingly do not know of any cases in the USSR where they have not economized the labour of society. In the second place, machines not only economize labour; they also lighten the labour of the worker, and accordingly, in our conditions, in contradistinction to the conditions of capitalism, the workers use machines in the processes of labour with the greatest eagerness.

It should therefore be said that nowhere are machines used so willingly as in the USSR, because they economize the labour of society and lighten the labour of the worker, and, as there is no unemployment in the USSR, the workers use machines in the national economy with the greatest eagerness.

6) Living standards of the working class in capitalist countries.

Usually, when speaking of the living standards of the working class, what is meant is only the standards of employed workers, and not of what is known as the reserve army of unemployed. Is such an attitude to the question of the living standards of the working class correct? I think it is not. If there is a reserve army of unemployed, whose members cannot live except by the sale of their labour power, then the unemployed must necessarily form part of the working class; and if they do form part of the working class, then their destitute condition cannot but influence the living standards of the workers engaged in production. I therefore think that when describing the living standards of the working class in capitalist countries, the condition of the reserve army of unemployed workers should also be taken into account.

7) National income.

I think it *absolutely* necessary to add a chapter on

national income to the draft textbook.

8) Should there be a special chapter in the textbook on Lenin and Stalin as the founders of the political economy of socialism?

I think that the chapter, "The Marxist Theory of Socialism. Founding of the Political Economy of Socialism by V.I. Lenin and J.V. Stalin," should be excluded from the textbook. It is entirely unnecessary, since it adds nothing, and only colourlessly reiterates what has already been said in greater detail in earlier chapters of the textbook.

As regards the other questions, I have no remarks to make on the "Proposals" of Comrades Ostrovityanov, Leontyev, Shepilov, Gatovsky, etc.

9. INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE OF A MARXIST TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

I think that the comrades do not appreciate the importance of a Marxist textbook on political economy as fully as they should. It is needed not only by our Soviet youth. It is particularly needed by communists and communist sympathizers in all countries. Our comrades abroad want to know how we broke out of capitalist slavery; how we rebuilt the economy of our country on socialist lines; how we secured the friendship of the peasantry; how we managed to convert a country which was only so recently poverty-stricken and weak into a rich and mighty country; what are the collective farms; why, although the means of production are socialized, we do not abolish commodity production, money, trade, etc. They want to know all this, and much else, not out of mere curiosity, but in order to learn from us and to utilize our experience in their own countries. Consequently, the appearance of a good Marxist textbook on political economy is not only of political importance

at home, but also of great international importance.

What is needed, therefore, is a textbook which might serve as a reference book for the revolutionary youth not only at home, but also abroad. It must not be too bulky, because an over-bulky textbook cannot be a reference book and is difficult to assimilate, to master. But it must contain everything fundamental relating both to the economy of our country and to the economy of capitalism and the colonial system.

During the discussion, some comrades proposed the inclusion in the textbook of a number of additional chapters: the historians — on history, the political scientists — on politics, the philosophers — on philosophy, the economists — on economics. But the effect of this would be to swell the textbook to unwieldy dimensions. That, of course, must not be done. The textbook employs the historical method to illustrate problems of political economy, but that does not mean that we must turn a textbook on political economy into a history of economic relations.

What we need is a textbook of 500 pages, 600 at most, no more. This would be a reference book on Marxist political economy — and an excellent gift to the young communists of all countries.

Incidentally, in view of the inadequate level of Marxist development of the majority of the communist parties abroad, such a textbook might also be of great use to communist cadres abroad who are no longer young.

10. WAYS OF IMPROVING THE DRAFT TEXTBOOK ON POLITICAL ECONOMY

During the discussion some comrades “ran down” the draft textbook much too assiduously, berated its authors for errors and oversights, and claimed that the draft was a failure. That is unfair. Of course, there are

errors and oversights in the textbook — they are to be found in practically every big undertaking. Be that as it may, the overwhelming majority of the participants in the discussion were nevertheless of the opinion that the draft might serve as a basis for the future textbook and only needed certain corrections and additions. Indeed, one has only to compare the draft with the textbooks on political economy already in circulation to see that the draft stands head and shoulders above them. For that the authors of the draft deserve great credit.

I think that in order to improve the draft textbook, it would be well to appoint a small committee which would include not only the authors of the textbook, and not only supporters, but also opponents of the majority of the participants in the discussion, out-and-out critics of the draft textbook.

It would also be well to include in the committee a competent statistician to verify the figures and to supply additional statistical material for the draft, as well as a competent jurist to verify the accuracy of the formulations.

The members of the committee should be temporarily relieved of all other work and should be well provided for, so that they might devote themselves entirely to the textbook.

Furthermore, it would be well to appoint an editorial committee, of say three persons, to take care of the final editing of the textbook. This is necessary also in order to achieve unity of style, which, unfortunately, the draft textbook lacks.

Time limit for presentation of the finished textbook to the Central Committee — one year.

February 1, 1952

REPLY TO COMRADE ALEXANDER ILYICH

NOTKIN

Comrade Notkin,

I was in no hurry to reply, because I saw no urgency in the questions you raised. All the more so because there are other questions which are urgent, and which naturally deflected attention from your letter.

I shall answer point by point.

The first point.

There is a statement in the "Remarks" to the effect that society is not powerless against the laws of science, that man, having come to know economic laws, can utilize them in the interests of society. You assert that this postulate cannot be extended to other social formations, that it holds good only under socialism and communism, that the elemental character of the economic processes under capitalism, for example, makes it impossible for society to utilize economic laws in the interests of society.

That is not true. At the time of the bourgeois revolution in France, for instance, the bourgeoisie utilized against feudalism the law that relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the feudal relations of production, created new, bourgeois relations of production, and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces which had arisen in the bosom of the feudal system. The bourgeoisie did this not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The feudal lords put up resistance to this not from stupidity, but because they were vitally interested in preventing this law from becoming effective.

The same must be said of the socialist revolution in our country. The working class utilized the law that the

relations of production must necessarily conform with the character of the productive forces, overthrew the bourgeois relations of production, created new, socialist relations of production and brought them into conformity with the character of the productive forces. It was able to do so not because of any particular abilities it possessed, but because it was vitally interested in doing so. The bourgeoisie, which from an advanced force at the dawn of the bourgeois revolution had already become a counter-revolutionary force offered every resistance to the implementation of this law — and it did so not because it lacked organization, and not because the elemental nature of economic processes drove it to resist, but chiefly because it was to its vital interest that the law should not become operative.

Consequently:

1. Economic processes, economic laws are in one degree or another utilized in the interests of society not only under socialism and communism, but under other formations as well;

2. The utilization of economic laws in class society always and everywhere has a class background, and, moreover, always and everywhere the champion of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society is the advanced class, while the obsolescent classes resist it.

The difference in this matter between the proletariat and the other classes which at any time in the course of history revolutionized the relations of production consists in the fact that the class interests of the proletariat merge with the interests of the overwhelming majority of society, because proletarian revolution implies the abolition not of one or another form of exploitation, but of all exploitation, while the revolutions of other classes, which abolished only one or another form of exploitation, were confined within the limits of their narrow class interests, which conflicted with the inter-

ests of the majority of society.

The “Remarks” speak of the class background of the utilization of economic laws in the interests of society. It is stated there that “unlike the laws of natural science, where the discovery and application of a new law proceeds more or less smoothly, the discovery and application of a new law in the economic field, affecting as it does the interests of obsolescent forces of society, meets with the most powerful resistance on their part.”* This point you missed.

The second point.

You assert that complete conformity of the relations of production with the character of the productive forces can be achieved only under socialism and communism, and that under other formations the conformity can only be partial.

This is not true. In the epoch following the bourgeois revolution, when the bourgeoisie had shattered the feudal relations of production and established bourgeois relations of production, there undoubtedly were periods when the bourgeois production relations did fully conform with the character of the productive forces. Otherwise, capitalism could not have developed as swiftly as it did after the bourgeois revolution.

Further, the words “full conformity” must not be understood in the absolute sense. They must not be understood as meaning that there is altogether no lagging of the relations of production behind the growth of the productive forces under socialism. The productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production. They undeniably move in advance of the relations of production even under socialism. Only after a certain lapse of time do the relations of production change in line with the character of the productive

* See p. 607 this book.

forces.

How, then, are the words “full conformity” to be understood? They are to be understood as meaning that under socialism things do not usually go to the length of a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces, that society is in a position to take timely steps to bring the lagging relations of production into conformity with the character of the productive forces. Socialist society is in a position to do so because it does not include the obsolescent classes that might organize resistance. Of course, even under socialism there will be backward, inert forces that do not realize the necessity for changing the relations of production; but they, of course, will not be difficult to overcome without bringing matters to a conflict.

The third point.

It appears from your argument that you regard the means of production, and, in the first place, the implements of production produced by our nationalized enterprises, as commodities.

Can means of production be regarded as commodities in our socialist system? In my opinion they certainly cannot.

A commodity is a product which may be sold to any purchaser, and when its owner sells it, he loses ownership of it and the purchaser becomes the owner of the commodity which he may resell, pledge or allow to rot. Do means of production come within this category? They obviously do not. In the first place, means of production are not “sold” to any purchaser, they are not “sold” even to collective farms; they are only allocated by the state to its enterprises. In the second place, when transferring means of production to any enterprise, their owner — the state — does not at all lose the ownership of them; on the contrary, it retains it fully. In the third place, directors of enterprises who receive means

of production from the Soviet state, far from becoming their owners, are deemed to be the agents of the state in the utilization of the means of production in accordance with the plans established by the state.

It will be seen, then, that under our system means of production can certainly not be classed in the category of commodities.

Why, in that case, do we speak of the value of means of production, their cost of production, their price, etc.?

For two reasons.

Firstly, this is needed for purposes of calculation and settlement, for determining whether enterprises are paying or running at a loss, for checking and controlling the enterprises. But that is only the formal aspect of the matter.

Secondly, it is needed in order, in the interests of our foreign trade, to conduct sales of means of production to foreign countries. Here, in the sphere of foreign trade, but *only in this sphere*, our means of production really are commodities, and really are sold (in the direct meaning of the term).

It therefore follows that in the sphere of foreign trade the means of production produced by our enterprises retain the properties of commodities both essentially and formally, but that in the sphere of domestic economic circulation, means of production lose the properties of commodities, cease to be commodities and pass out of the sphere of operation of the law of value, retaining only the outward integument of commodities (calculation, etc.).

How is this peculiarity to be explained?

The fact of the matter is that in our socialist conditions economic development proceeds not by way of upheavals, but by way of gradual changes, the old not simply being abolished out of hand, but changing its nature in adaptation to the new, and retaining only its form; while the new does not simply destroy the old, but infil-

trates into it, changes its nature and its functions, without smashing its form, but utilizing it for the development of the new. This, in our economic circulation, is true not only of commodities, but also of money, as well as of banks, which, while they lose their old functions and acquire new ones, preserve their old form, which is utilized by the socialist system.

If the matter is approached from the formal angle, from the angle of the processes taking place on the surface of phenomena, one may arrive at the incorrect conclusion that the categories of capitalism retain their validity under our economy. If, however, the matter is approached from the standpoint of Marxist analysis, which strictly distinguishes between the substance of an economic process and its form, between the deep processes of development and the surface phenomena, one comes to the only correct conclusion, namely, that it is chiefly the form, the outward appearance, of the old categories of capitalism that have remained in our country, but that their essence has radically changed in adaptation to the requirements of the development of the socialist economy.

The fourth point.

You assert that the law of value exercises a regulating influence on the prices of the “means of production” produced by agriculture and delivered to the state at the procurement prices. You refer to such “means of production” as raw materials — cotton, for instance. You might have added flax, wool and other agricultural raw materials.

It should first of all be observed that in this case it is not “means of production” that agriculture produces, but only one of the means of production — raw materials. The words “means of production” should not be juggled with. When Marxists speak of the production of means of production, what they primarily have

in mind is the production of implements of production, what Marx calls “the instruments of labour, those of a mechanical nature, which, taken as a whole, we may call the bone and muscles of production,” which constitute the “characteristics of a given epoch of production.”²⁶ To equate a part of the means of production (raw materials) with the means of production, including the implements of production, is to sin against Marxism, because Marxism considers that the implements of production play a decisive role compared with all other means of production. Everyone knows that, by themselves, raw materials cannot produce implements of production, although certain kinds of raw material are necessary for the production of implements of production, while no raw material can be produced without implements of production.

Further: is the influence of the law of value on the price of raw materials produced by agriculture a *regulating* influence, as you, Comrade Notkin, claim? It would be a regulating one if prices of agricultural raw materials had “free” play in our country, if the law of competition and anarchy of production prevailed, if we did not have a planned economy, and if the production of raw materials were not regulated by plan. But since all these “ifs” are missing in our economic system, the influence of the law of value on the price of agricultural raw materials cannot be a regulating one. In the first place, in our country prices of agricultural raw materials are fixed, established by plan, and are not “free.” In the second place, the quantities of agricultural raw materials produced are not determined spontaneously or by chance elements, but by plan. In the third place, the implements of production needed for the producing of agricultural raw materials are concentrated not in the hands of individuals, or groups of individuals, but in the hands of the state. What then, after this, remains of the regulating function of the law of value? It

appears that the law of value is itself regulated by the above-mentioned factors characteristic of socialist production.

Consequently, it cannot be denied that the law of value does influence the formation of prices of agricultural raw materials, that it is one of the factors in this process. But still less can it be denied that its influence is not, and cannot be, a regulating one.

The fifth point.

When speaking, in my “Remarks,” of the profitability of the socialist national economy, I was controverting certain comrades who allege that, by not giving great preference to profitable enterprises, and by tolerating the existence side by side with them of unprofitable enterprises, our planned economy is killing the very principle of profitability of economic undertakings. The “Remarks” say that profitability considered from the standpoint of individual plants or industries is beneath all comparison with that higher form of profitability which we get from our socialist mode of production, which saves us from crises of overproduction and ensures us a continuous expansion of production.

But it would be mistaken to conclude from this that the profitability of individual plants and industries is of no particular value and is not deserving of serious attention. That, of course, is not true. The profitability of individual plants and industries is of immense value for the development of our industry. It must be taken into account both when planning construction and when planning production. It is an elementary requirement of our economic activity at the present stage of development.

The sixth point.

It is not clear how your words “extended production in strongly deformed guise” in reference to capital-

ism are to be understood. It should be said that such production, and extended production at that, does not occur in nature.

It is evident that, after the world market has split, and the sphere of exploitation of the world's resources by the major capitalist countries (USA, Britain, France) has begun to contract, the cyclical character of the development of capitalism — expansion and contraction of production — must continue to operate. However, expansion of production in these countries will proceed on a narrower basis, since the volume of production in these countries will diminish.

The seventh point.

The general crisis of the world capitalist system began in the period of the First World War, particularly due to the falling away of the Soviet Union from the capitalist system. That was the first stage in the general crisis. A second stage in the general crisis developed in the period of the Second World War, especially after the European and Asian people's democracies fell away from the capitalist system. The first crisis, in the period of the First World War, and the second crisis, in the period of the Second World War, must not be regarded as separate, unconnected and independent crises, but as stages in the development of the general crisis of the world capitalist system.

Is the general crisis of world capitalism only a political, or only an economic crisis? Neither the one, nor the other. It is a general, *i.e.*, all-round crisis of the world capitalist system, embracing both the economic and the political spheres. And it is clear that at the bottom of it lies the ever increasing decay of the world capitalist economic system, on the one hand, and the growing economic might of the countries which have fallen away from capitalism — the USSR, China and the other people's democracies — on the other.

April 21, 1952

***CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF COMRADE L.D.
YAROSHENKO***

Some time ago the members of the Political Bureau of the CC, CPSU(B) received a letter from Comrade Yaroshenko, dated March 20, 1952, on a number of economic questions which were debated at the November discussion. The author of the letter complains that the basic documents summing up the discussion, and Comrade Stalin's "Remarks," "contain no reflection whatever of the opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko. Comrade Yaroshenko also suggests in his note that he should be allowed to write a "Political Economy of Socialism," to be completed in a year or a year and a half, and that he should be given two assistants to help him in the work.

I think that both Comrade Yaroshenko's complaint and his proposal need to be examined on their merits.

Let us begin with the complaint.

Well, then, what is the "opinion" of Comrade Yaroshenko which has received no reflection whatever in the above-mentioned documents?

I

COMRADE YAROSHENKO'S CHIEF ERROR

To describe Comrade Yaroshenko's opinion in a couple of words, it should be said that it is un-Marxist — and, hence, profoundly erroneous.

Comrade Yaroshenko's chief error is that he forsakes the Marxist position on the question of the role of the productive forces and of the relations of production in the development of society, that he inordinately

overrates the role of the productive forces, and just as inordinately underrates the role of the relations of production, and ends up by declaring that under socialism the relations of production are a component part of the productive forces.

Comrade Yaroshenko is prepared to grant the relations of production a certain role under the conditions of “antagonistic class contradictions,” inasmuch as there the relations of production “run counter to the development of the productive forces.” But he confines it to a purely negative role, the role of a factor which retards the development of the productive forces, which fetters their development. Any other functions, positive functions, of the relations of production, Comrade Yaroshenko fails to see.

As to the socialist system, where “antagonistic class contradictions” no longer exist, and where the relations of production “no longer run counter to the development of the productive forces,” here, according to Comrade Yaroshenko, the relations of production lose every vestige of an independent role, they cease to be a serious factor of development, and are absorbed by the productive forces, becoming a component part of them. Under socialism, Comrade Yaroshenko says, “men’s production relations become part of the organization of the productive forces, as a means, an element of their organization.”*

If that is so, what is the chief task of the “Political Economy of Socialism”? Comrade Yaroshenko replies: “The chief problem of the Political Economy of Socialism, therefore, *is not* to investigate the relations of production of the members of socialist society; *it is* to elaborate and develop a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces in social production, a theory

* Comrade Yaroshenko’s letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

of the planning of economic development.**

That, in fact, explains why Comrade Yaroshenko is not interested in such economic questions of the socialist system as the existence of different forms of property in our economy, commodity circulation, the law of value, etc., which he believes to be minor questions that only give rise to scholastic disputes. He plainly declares that in his Political Economy of Socialism “disputes as to the role of any particular category of socialist political economy — value, commodity, money, credit, etc., — which very often with us are of a scholastic character, *are replaced* by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production, by a scientific demonstration of the validity of such organization.”**

In short, political economy without economic problems.

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that it is enough to arrange a “rational organization of the productive forces,” and the transition from socialism to communism will take place without any particular difficulty. He considers that this is quite sufficient for the transition to communism. He plainly declares that “under socialism, the basic struggle for the building of a communist society reduces itself to a struggle for the proper organization of the productive forces and their rational utilization in social production.”**** Comrade Yaroshenko solemnly proclaims that “Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production.”

It appears, then, that the essence of the communist

*** Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech in the Plenary Discussion.

** Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech at the Discussion Working Panel.

**** Comrade Yaroshenko’s speech in the Plenary Discussion.

system begins and ends with the “rational organization of the productive forces.”

From all this, Comrade Yaroshenko concludes that there cannot be a single political economy for all social formations, that there must be two political economies: one for pre-socialist social formations, the subject of investigation of which is men’s relations production, and the other for the socialist system, the subject of investigation of which should be not the production, *i.e.*, the economic, relations, but the rational organization of the productive forces.

Such is the opinion of Comrade Yaroshenko.

What can be said of this opinion?

It is not true, in the first place, that the role of the relations of production in the history of society has been confined to that of a brake, a fetter on the development of the productive forces. When Marxists speak of the retarding role of the relations of production, it is not all relations of production they have in mind, but only the old relations of production, which no longer conform to the growth of the productive forces and, consequently, retard their development. But, as we know, besides the old, there are also new relations of production, which supersede the old. Can it be said that the role of the new relations of production is that of a brake on the productive forces? No, it cannot. On the contrary, the new relations of production are the *chief* and decisive force, the one which in fact determines the further, and, moreover, powerful, development of the productive forces, and without which the latter would be doomed to stagnation, as is the case today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our Soviet industry has made tremendous strides in the period of the five-year plans. But this development would not have occurred if we had not, in October 1917, replaced the old, capitalist relations of production by new, socialist relations of production.

Without this revolution in the production, the economic, relations of our country, our productive forces would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Nobody can deny that the development of the productive forces of our agriculture has made tremendous strides in the past 20 or 25 years. But this development would not have occurred if we had not in the '30s replaced the old, capitalist production relations in the countryside by new, collectivist production relations. Without this revolution in production, the productive forces of our agriculture would have stagnated, just as they are stagnating today in the capitalist countries.

Of course, new relations of production cannot, and do not, remain new forever; they begin to grow old and to run counter to the further development of the productive forces; they begin to lose their role of principal mainspring of the productive forces, and become a brake on them. At this point, in place of these production relations which have become antiquated, new production relations appear whose role it is to be the principal mainspring spurring the further development of the productive forces.

This peculiar development of the relations of production from the role of a brake on the productive forces to that of the principal mainspring impelling them forward, and from the role of principal mainspring to that of a brake on the productive forces, constitutes one of the chief elements of the Marxist materialist dialectics. Every novice in Marxism knows that nowadays. But Comrade Yaroshenko, it appears, does not know it.

It is not true, in the second place that the production, *i.e.*, the economic, relation lose their independent role under socialism, that they are absorbed by the productive forces, that social production under socialism is reduced to the organization of the productive forces. Marxism regards social production as an integral whole

which has two inseparable sides: the productive forces of society (the relation of society to the forces of nature, in contest with which it secures the material values it needs), and the relations of production (the relations of men to one another in the process of production). These are two different sides of social production, although they are inseparably connected with one another. And just because they constitute different sides of social production, they are able to influence one another. To assert that one of these sides may be absorbed by the other and be converted into its component part, is to commit a very grave sin against Marxism.

Marx said:

“In production, men not only act on nature but also on one another. They produce only by cooperating in a certain way and mutually exchanging their activities. In order to produce, they enter into definite connections and relations with one another and only within these social connections and relations does their action on nature, does production, take place.”²⁷

Consequently, social production consists of two sides, which, although they are inseparably connected, reflect two different categories of relations: the relations of men to nature (productive forces), and the relations of men to one another in the process of production (production relations). Only when both sides of production are present do we have social production, whether it be under the socialist system or under any other social formation.

Comrade Yaroshenko, evidently, is not quite in agreement with Marx. He considers that this postulate of Marx is not applicable to the socialist system. Precisely for this reason he reduces the problem of the Political Economy of Socialism to the rational organization of the productive forces, discarding the produc-

tion, the economic, relations and severing the productive forces from them.

If we followed Comrade Yaroshenko, therefore, what we would get is, instead of a Marxist political economy, something in the nature of Bogdanov's "Universal Organizing Science."

Hence, starting from the right idea that the productive forces are the most mobile and revolutionary forces of production, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the idea to an absurdity, to the point of denying the role of the production, the economic, relations under socialism; and instead of a full-blooded social production, what he gets is a lopsided and scraggy technology of production — something in the nature of Bukharin's "technique of social organization."

Marx says:

"In the social production of their life [that is, in the production of the material values necessary to the life of men — *J. St.*], men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness."²⁸

This means that every social formation, socialist society not excluded, has its economic foundation, consisting of the sum total of men's relations of production. What, one asks, happens to the economic foundation of the socialist system with Comrade Yaroshenko? As we know, Comrade Yaroshenko has already done away with relations of production under socialism as a more or less independent sphere, and has included the little that remains of them in the organization of the pro-

ductive forces. Has the socialist system, one asks, its own economic foundation? Obviously, seeing that the relations of production have disappeared as a more or less independent factor under socialism, the socialist system is left without an economic foundation.

In short, a socialist system without an economic foundation. A rather funny situation...

Is a social system without an economic foundation possible at all? Comrade Yaroshenko evidently believes that it is. Marxism, however, believes that such social systems do not occur in nature.

It is not true, lastly, that communism means the rational organization of the productive forces, that the rational organization of the productive forces is the beginning and end of the communist system, that it is only necessary to organize the productive forces rationally, and the transition to communism will take place without particular difficulty. There is in our literature another definition, another formula of communism — Lenin's formula: "Communism is Soviet rule plus the electrification of the whole country."²⁹ Lenin's formula is evidently not to Comrade Yaroshenko's liking, and he replaces it with his own homemade formula: "Communism is the highest scientific organization of the productive forces in social production."

In the first place, nobody knows what this "higher scientific" or "rational" organization of the productive forces which Comrade Yaroshenko advertises represents, what its concrete import is. In his speeches at the Plenum and in the working panels of the discussion, and in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko reiterates this mythical formula dozens of times, but nowhere does he say a single word to explain how the "rational organization" of the productive forces, which supposedly constitutes the beginning and end of the essence of the communist system, should be understood.

In the second place, if a choice must be made between the two formulas, then it is not Lenin's formula, which is the only correct one, that should be discarded, but Comrade Yaroshenko's pseudo formula, which is so obviously chimerical and un-Marxist, and is borrowed from the arsenal of Bogdanov, from his "Universal Organizing Science."

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that we have only to ensure a rational organization of the productive forces, and we shall be able to obtain an abundance of products and to pass to communism, to pass from the formula, "to each according to his work," to the formula, "to each according to his needs." That is a profound error, and reveals a complete lack of understanding of the laws of economic development of socialism. Comrade Yaroshenko's conception of the conditions for the transition from socialism to communism is far too rudimentary and puerile. He does not understand that neither an abundance of products, capable of covering all the requirements of society, nor the transition to the formula, "to each according to his needs," can be brought about if such economic factors as collective farm, group, property, commodity circulation, etc., remain in force. Comrade Yaroshenko does not understand that before we can pass to the formula, "to each according to his needs," we shall have to pass through a number of stages of economic and cultural re-education of society, in the course of which work will be transformed in the eyes of society from only a means of supporting life into life's prime want, and social property into the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

In order to pave the way for a real, and not declaratory transition to communism, at least three main preliminary conditions have to be satisfied.

1. It is necessary, in the first place, to ensure, not a mythical "rational organization" of the productive

forces, but a continuous expansion of all social production, with a relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of means of production. The relatively higher rate of expansion of production of means of production is necessary not only because it has to provide the equipment both for its own plants and for all the other branches of the national economy, but also because reproduction on an extended scale becomes altogether impossible without it.

2. It is necessary, in the second place, by means of gradual transitions carried out to the advantage of the collective farms, and, hence, of all society, to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, and, also by means of gradual transitions, to replace commodity circulation by a system of products-exchange, under which the central government, or some other social-economic centre, might control the whole product of social production in the interests of society.

Comrade Yaroshenko is mistaken when he asserts that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces of society under socialism. Of course, our present relations of production are in a period when they fully conform to the growth of the productive forces and help to advance them at seven-league strides. But it would be wrong to rest easy at that and to think that there are no contradictions between our productive forces and the relations of production. There certainly are, and will be, contradictions, seeing that the development of the relations of production lags, and will lag, behind the development of the productive forces. Given a correct policy on the part of the directing bodies these contradictions cannot grow into antagonisms, and there is no chance of matters coming to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, such as that which Comrade Yaroshenko recommends.

In that case conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production might become a serious brake on the further development of the productive forces.

The task of the directing bodies is therefore promptly to discern incipient contradictions, and to take timely measures to resolve them by adapting the relations of production to the growth of the productive forces. This, above all, concerns such economic factors as group, or collective-farm, property and commodity circulation. At present, of course, these factors are being successfully utilized by us for the promotion of the socialist economy, and they are of undeniable benefit to our society. It is undeniable, too, that they will be of benefit also in the near future. But it would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the full extension of government planning to the whole of the national economy, especially agriculture. There is no doubt that these factors will hamper the continued growth of the productive forces of our country more and more as time goes on. The task, therefore, is to eliminate these contradictions by gradually converting collective-farm property into public property, and by introducing — also gradually — products-exchange in place of commodity circulation.

3. It is necessary, in the third place, to ensure such a cultural advancement of society as will secure for all members of society the all-round development of their physical and mental abilities, so that the members of society may be in a position to receive an education sufficient to enable them to be active agents of social development, and in a position freely to choose their occupations and not be tied all their lives, owing to the existing division of labour, to some one occupation.

What is required for this?

It would be wrong to think that such a substantial

advance in the cultural standard of the members of society can be brought about without substantial changes in the present status of labour. For this, it is necessary, first of all, to shorten the working day at least to six, and subsequently to five hours. This is needed in order that the members of society might have the necessary free time to receive an all-round education. It is necessary, further, to introduce universal compulsory poly-technical education, which is required in order that the members of society might be able freely to choose their occupations and not be tied to some one occupation all their lives. It is likewise necessary that housing conditions should be radically improved and that real wages of workers and employees should be at least doubled, if not more, both by means of direct increases of wages and salaries, and, more especially, by further systematic reductions of prices for consumer goods.

These are the basic conditions required to pave the way for the transition to communism.

Only after *all* these preliminary conditions are satisfied in their entirety may it be hoped that work will be converted in the eyes of the members of society from a nuisance into "life's prime want" (Marx),³⁰ that "labour will become a pleasure instead of being a burden" (Engels),³¹ and that social property will be regarded by all members of society as the sacred and inviolable basis of the existence of society.

Only after *all* these preliminary conditions have been satisfied in their entirety will it be possible to pass from the socialist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his work," to the communist formula, "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."

This will be a radical transition from one form of economy, the economy of socialism, to another, higher form of economy, the economy of communism.

As we see, the transition from socialism to commun-

ism is not such a simple matter as Comrade Yaroshenko imagines.

To attempt to reduce this complex and multiform process, which demands deep-going economic changes, to the “rational organization of the productive forces,” as Comrade Yaroshenko does, is to substitute Bogdanovism for Marxism.

II

OTHER ERRORS OF COMRADE YAROSHENKO

1. From his incorrect opinion, Comrade Yaroshenko draws incorrect conclusions relative to the character and province of political economy.

Comrade Yaroshenko denies the necessity for a single political economy for all social formations, on the grounds that every social formation has its specific economic laws. But he is absolutely wrong there, and is at variance with such Marxists as Engels and Lenin.

Engels says that political economy is “the science of the conditions and forms under which the *various human societies* have produced and exchanged and on this basis have distributed their products.”³² Hence, political economy investigates the laws of economic development not of any one social formation, but of the various social formations.

With this, as we know, Lenin was in full agreement. In his critical comments on Bukharin’s *Economics of the Transition Period*, he said that Bukharin was wrong in restricting the province of political economy to commodity production, and above all to capitalist production, observing that in doing so Bukharin was taking “a step backward from Engels.”³³

Fully in conformity with this is the definition of political economy given in the draft textbook, when it says that political economy is the science which studies

“the laws of the social production and distribution of material values *at the various stages* of development of human society.”

That is understandable. The various social formations are governed in their economic development not only by their own specific economic laws, but also by the economic laws that are common to all formations, such as, for instance, the law that the productive forces and the relations of production are united in one integral social production, and the law governing the relations between the productive forces and the relations of production in the process of development of all social formations. Hence, social formations are not only divided from one another by their own specific laws, but also connected with one another by the economic laws common to all formations.

Engels was quite right when he said:

“In order to carry out this critique of bourgeois economy completely, an acquaintance with the capitalist form of production, exchange and distribution did not suffice. The forms which had preceded it or those which still exist alongside it in less developed countries had also, at least in their main features, to be examined and compared.”³⁴

It is obvious that here, on this question, Comrade Yaroshenko is in tune with Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko declares that in his “Political Economy of Socialism,” “the categories of political economy — value, commodity, money, credit, etc., — *are replaced* by a healthy discussion of the rational organization of the productive forces in social production,” that, consequently, the subject of investigation of *this* political economy will *not* be the production relations of socialism, *but* “the elaboration and development of a scientific theory of the organization of the productive forces, theory of economic planning,

etc.,” and that, under socialism, the relations of production lose their independent significance and are absorbed by the productive forces as a component part of them.

It must be said that never before has any retrograde “Marxist” delivered himself of such unholy twaddle. Just imagine a political economy of socialism without economic, production problems! Does such a political economy exist anywhere in creation? What is the effect, in a political economy of socialism, of replacing economic problems by problems of organization of the productive forces? The effect is to abolish the political economy of socialism. And that is just what Comrade Yaroshenko does — he abolishes the political economy of socialism. In this, his position fully gibes with that of Bukharin. Bukharin *said* that with the elimination of capitalism, political economy would also be eliminated. Comrade Yaroshenko does not say this, but he *does* it; he does abolish the political economy of socialism. True, he pretends that he is not in full agreement with Bukharin; but that is only a trick, and a cheap trick at that. In actual fact he is doing what Bukharin preached and what Lenin rose up in arms against. Comrade Yaroshenko is following in the footsteps of Bukharin.

Further, Comrade Yaroshenko reduces the problems of the political economy of socialism to problems of the rational organization of the productive forces, to problems of economic planning, etc. But he is profoundly in error. The rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, etc., are not problems of political economy, but problems of the economic policy of the directing bodies. They are two different provinces, which must not be confused. Comrade Yaroshenko has confused these two different things, and has made a terrible mess of it. Political economy investigates the laws of development of men’s relations of production. Economic policy draws practical conclu-

sions from this, gives them concrete shape, and builds its day-to-day work on them. To foist upon political economy problems of economic policy is to kill it as a science.

The province of political economy is the production, the economic, relations of men. It includes: a) the forms of ownership of the means of production; b) the status of the various social groups in production and their interrelations that follow from these forms, or what Marx calls: “they exchange their activities”;³⁵ c) the forms of distribution of products, which are entirely determined by them. All these together constitute the province of political economy.

This definition does not contain the word “exchange,” which figures in Engels’ definition. It is omitted because “exchange” is usually understood by many to mean exchange of commodities, which is characteristic not of all, but only of some social formations, and this sometimes gives rise to misunderstanding, even though the word “exchange” with Engels did not mean only commodity exchange. As will be seen, however, that which Engels meant by the word “exchange” has been included, as a component part, in the above definition. Hence, this definition of the province of political economy fully coincides in content with Engels’ definition.

2. When speaking of the basic economic law of some particular social formation, the presumption usually is that the latter cannot have several basic economic laws, that it can have only some one basic economic law, which precisely for that reason is the *basic* law. Otherwise we should have several basic economic laws for each social formation, which would be contrary to the very concept of a basic law. But Comrade Yaroshenko does not agree with this. He thinks that it is possible to have not one, but several basic economic laws of socialism. It is incredible, but a fact. At the Plenary Discus-

sion, he said:

“The magnitudes and correlations of the material funds of social production and reproduction are determined by the available labour power engaged in social production and its prospective increase. This is the basic economic law of socialist society, and it determines the structure of socialist social production and reproduction.”

That is one basic economic law of socialism.

In this same speech Comrade Yaroshenko declared:

“In socialist society, the correlations between Departments I and II are determined by the fact that production must have means of production in quantities sufficient to enlist all the able-bodied members of the population in social production. This is the basic economic law of socialism, and it is at the same time a demand of our Constitution, following from the right to work enjoyed by Soviet citizens.”

That, so to speak, is a second basic economic law of socialism.

Lastly, in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau, Comrade Yaroshenko declares:

“Accordingly, the essential features and requirements of the basic economic law of socialism may, it seems to me, be roughly formulated as follows: the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of life of society.”

Here we have a third basic economic law of socialism.

Whether all these laws are basic economic laws of socialism, or only one of them, and if only one of them, which exactly — to these questions Comrade Yaroshenko gives no answer in his last letter addressed

to the members of the Political Bureau. When formulating the basic economic law of socialism in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau he “forgot,” it is to be presumed, that in his speech at the Plenary Discussion three months earlier he had already formulated two other basic economic laws of socialism, evidently believing that nobody would notice this dubious manoeuvre, to say the least of it. But, as we see, he miscalculated.

Let us assume that the first two basic economic laws of socialism formulated by Comrade Yaroshenko no longer exist, and that from now on he regards as the basic economic law of socialism the third one, which he formulated in his letter to the members of the Political Bureau. Let us turn to this letter.

Comrade Yaroshenko says in this letter that he does not agree with the definition of the basic economic law of socialism which Comrade Stalin gave in his “Remarks.” He says:

“The chief thing in this definition is ‘the securing of the maximum satisfaction of... the requirements of the whole of society.’ Production is presented here as the means of attaining this principal aim — satisfaction of requirements. Such a definition furnishes grounds for assuming that the basic economic law of socialism formulated by you is based not on the primacy of production, but on the primacy of consumption.”

It is evident that Comrade Yaroshenko has completely failed to understand the essence of the problem, and does not see that talk about the primacy of consumption or of production has absolutely nothing to do with the case. When speaking of the primacy of any social process over another, it is usually assumed that the two processes are more or less homogeneous in character. One may, and should, speak of the pri-

macy of the production of means of production over the production of means of consumption, because production is involved in both cases, and they are therefore more or less homogeneous. But one cannot speak, and it would be wrong to speak, of the primacy of consumption over production, or of production over consumption, because production and consumption are two entirely different spheres, which, it is true, are connected with one another, but which are different spheres all the same. Comrade Yaroshenko obviously fails to realize that what we are speaking of here is not the primacy of consumption or of production, but of what *aim* society sets social production, to what *purpose* it subordinates social production, say under socialism. So that when Comrade Yaroshenko says that “the basis of the life of socialist society, as of all other society, is production,” it is entirely beside the point. Comrade Yaroshenko forgets that men produce not for production’s sake, but in order to satisfy their needs. He forgets that production divorced from the satisfaction of the needs of society withers and dies.

Can we speak in general of the aims of capitalist or socialist production, of the purposes to which capitalist or socialist production are subordinated? I think that we can and should.

Marx says:

“The direct aim of production is not the production of goods, but the production surplus value, or of profit in its developed form; not the product, but the surplus product. From this standpoint, labour itself is productive only in so far as it creates profit or surplus product for capital. In so far as the worker does not create it, his labour is unproductive. Consequently, the sum-total of applied productive labour is of interest to capital only to the extent that through it — or in relation to it — the sum-total

of surplus labour increases. Only to that extent is what is called necessary labour time necessary. To the extent that it does not produce this result, it is superfluous and has to be discontinued.

“It is the constant aim of capitalist production to produce the maximum surplus value or surplus product with the minimum of capital advanced; in so far as this result is not attained by overworking the labourer, it is a tendency of capital to seek to produce a given product with the least expenditure — economizing labour power and costs...

“The labourers themselves figure in this conception as what they actually are in capitalist production — only means of production; not an aim in themselves and not the aim of production.”³⁶

These words of Marx are remarkable not only because they define the aim of capitalist production concisely and precisely, but also because they indicate the basic aim, the principal purpose, which should be set for socialist production.

Hence, the aim of capitalist production is profit-making. As to consumption, capitalism needs it only in so far as it ensures the making of profit. Outside of this, consumption means nothing to capitalism. Man and his needs disappear from its field of vision.

What is the aim of socialist production? What is that main purpose to which social production should be subordinated under socialism?

The aim of socialist production is not profit, but man and his needs, that is, the satisfaction of his material and cultural requirements. As is stated in Comrade Stalin’s “Remarks,” the aim of socialist production is “the securing of the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.”*

* See p. 639 of this book.

Comrade Yaroshenko thinks that what he is confronted with here is the “primacy” of consumption over production. That, of course, is a misapprehension. Actually, what we have here is not the primacy of consumption, but the *subordination* of socialist production to its principal aim of securing the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society.

Consequently, maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of the whole of society is the *aim* of socialist production; continuous expansion and perfection of socialist production on the basis of higher techniques is the *means* for the achievement of the aim.

Such is the basic economic law of socialism.

Desiring to preserve what he calls the “primacy” of production over consumption, Comrade Yaroshenko claims that the “basic economic law of socialism” consists in “the continuous expansion and perfection of the production of the material and cultural conditions of society.” That is absolutely wrong. Comrade Yaroshenko grossly distorts and vitiates the formula given in Comrade Stalin’s “Remarks.” With him, production is converted from a means into an end, and the maximum satisfaction of the constantly rising material and cultural requirements of society is thrown out. What we get is expansion of production for the sake of expansion of production, production as an aim in itself; man and his requirements disappear from Comrade Yaroshenko’s field of vision.

It is therefore not surprising that, with the disappearance of man as the aim of socialist production, every vestige of Marxism disappears from Comrade Yaroshenko’s “conception.”

And so, what Comrade Yaroshenko arrives at is not the “primacy” of production over consumption, but something like the “primacy” of bourgeois ideology

over Marxist ideology.

3. A question by itself is Marx's theory of reproduction. Comrade Yaroshenko asserts that the Marxist theory of reproduction is a theory of capitalist reproduction only, that it contains nothing that might have validity for other social formations, the socialist social formation in particular. He says:

“The extension of Marx's scheme of reproduction, which he elaborated for the capitalist economy, to socialist social production is the fruit of a dogmatic understanding of Marx's theory and runs counter to the essence of his theory.”*

He further asserts: “Marx's scheme of reproduction does not correspond to the economic laws of socialist society and cannot serve as a basis in the investigation of socialist reproduction.”*

Concerning Marx's theory of simple reproduction, which establishes a definite correlation between the production of means of production (Department I) and the production of means of consumption (Department II), Comrade Yaroshenko says:

“In socialist society, the correlation between Departments I and II is not determined by Marx's formula $v+m$ of Department I and c of Department II.³⁷ There should be no such interconnection in development between Departments I and II under socialist conditions.”**

He asserts: “The theory of the correlation between Departments I and II worked out by Marx is not applicable in our socialist conditions, since Marx's theory is

* Comrade Yaroshenko's speech in the Plenary Discussion.

** Comrade Yaroshenko's speech in the Plenary Discussion.

based on capitalist economy and its laws.”***

That is how Comrade Yaroshenko makes mince-meat of Marx’s theory of reproduction.

Of course, Marx’s theory of reproduction, which was the fruit of an investigation of the laws of the capitalist mode of production, reflects the specific character of the latter, and, naturally, is clothed in the form of capitalist-commodity value relations. It could not have been otherwise. But he who sees in Marx’s theory of reproduction only its form, and does not observe its fundamentals, its essential substance, which holds good not only for the capitalist social formation alone, has no understanding whatever of this theory. If Comrade Yaroshenko had any understanding at all of the matter, he would have realized the self-evident truth that Marx’s scheme of reproduction does not begin and end with a reflection of the specific character of the capitalist mode of production, that it at the same time contains a whole number of fundamental tenets on the subject of reproduction which hold good for all social formations, particularly and especially for the socialist social formation. Such fundamental tenets of the Marxist theory of reproduction as the division of social production into the production of means of production and the production of means of consumption; the relatively greater increase of production of means of production in reproduction on an extended scale; the correlation between Departments I and II; surplus product as the sole source of accumulation; the formation and designation of the social funds; accumulation as the sole source of reproduction on an extended scale — all these fundamental tenets of the Marxist theory of reproduction are at the same time tenets which hold good not only for the capitalist formation, and which no socialist

*** Comrade Yaroshenko’s letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee.

society can dispense with in the planning of its national economy. It is significant that Comrade Yaroshenko himself, who snorts so haughtily at Marx's "schemes of reproduction," is obliged every now and again to call in the help of these "schemes" when discussing problems of socialist reproduction.

And how did Lenin and Marx view the matter?

Everyone is familiar with Lenin's critical comments on Bukharin's *Economics of the Transition Period*. In these remarks, as we know, Lenin recognized that Marx's formula of the correlation between Departments I and II, against which Comrade Yaroshenko rises in arms, holds true both for socialism and for "pure communism," that is, for the second phase of communism.

As to Marx, he, as we know, did not like to digress from his investigation of the laws of capitalist production, and did not, in his *Capital*, discuss the applicability of his schemes of reproduction to socialism. However, in Chapter XX, Vol. II of *Capital*, in the section, "The Constant Capital of Department I," where he examines the exchange of Department I products within this department, Marx, as though in passing, observes that under socialism the exchange of products within this department would proceed with the same regularity as under the capitalist mode of production. He says:

"If production were socialized, instead of capitalistic, it is evident that these products of Department I would just as regularly be redistributed as means of production to the various lines of production of this department, for purposes of reproduction, one portion remaining directly in that sphere of production which created it, another passing over to other lines of production of the same department, thereby entertaining a constant mutual exchange between the various lines of production of this department."³⁸

Consequently, Marx by no means considered that his theory of reproduction was valid only for the capitalist mode of production, although it was the laws of the capitalist mode of production he was investigating. We see, on the contrary, that he held that his theory of reproduction might be valid also for the socialist mode of production.

It should be remarked that, when analysing the economics of socialism and of the transitional period to communism in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, Marx proceeds from the fundamental tenets of his theory of reproduction, evidently regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

It should also be remarked that when Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, criticizes Dühring's "socialitarian system" and discusses the economics of the socialist system, he likewise proceeds from the fundamental tenets of Marx's theory of reproduction, regarding them as obligatory for the communist system.

Such are the facts.

It appears, then, that here too, in the question of reproduction, Comrade Yaroshenko, despite his sneering attitude towards Marx's "schemes," has again landed on the shoals.

4. Comrade Yaroshenko concludes his letter to the members of the Political Bureau with the proposal that the compilation of the "Political Economy of Socialism" be entrusted to him. He writes:

"On the basis of the definition of the province of the political-economic science of socialism outlined by me at the plenary meeting, in the working panel, and in the present letter, and utilizing the Marxist dialectical method, I could, with the help of two assistants, work out in the space of one year, or a year and a half at most, the theoretical solution of the basic problems of the political economy of socialism, that is, expound the Marxist, Leninist-Stalinist theory of the political economy

of socialism, a theory which would convert this science into an effective weapon of the struggle of the people for communism.”

It must be confessed that modesty is not one of Comrade Yaroshenko’s failings — “even the other way round,” it might be said, borrowing the style of some of our writers.

It has already been pointed out above that Comrade Yaroshenko confuses the political economy of socialism with the economic policy of the directing bodies. That which he considers the province of the political economy of socialism — rational organization of the productive forces, economic planning, formation of social funds, etc. — is the province of the economic policy of the directing bodies, and not of the political economy of socialism.

I say nothing of the fact that the serious blunders committed by Comrade Yaroshenko, and his un-Marxist “opinion” do not incline one to entrust him with such a task.

* * *

Conclusions:

1) The complaint Comrade Yaroshenko levels at the managers of the discussion is untenable, since they, being Marxists, could not in their summarizing documents reflect his un-Marxist “opinion”;

2) Comrade Yaroshenko’s request to be entrusted with the writing of the political economy of socialism cannot be taken seriously, if only because it reeks of Khlestakovism.³⁹

May 22, 1952

***REPLY TO COMRADES A.V. SANINA AND V.G.
VENZHER***

I have received your letters. It can be seen from them that their authors are making a profound and serious study of the economic problems of our country. There are quite a number of correct formulations and interesting arguments in the letters. But alongside of these, there are some grave theoretical errors. It is on these errors that I propose to dwell in this reply.

1. CHARACTER OF THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SOCIALISM

Comrades Sanina and Venzher claim that “only because of the conscious action of the Soviet citizens engaged in material production do the economic laws of socialism arise.” This opinion is absolutely incorrect.

Do the laws of economic development exist objectively, outside of us, independently of the will and consciousness of man? Marxism answers this question in the affirmative. Marxism holds that the laws of the political economy of socialism are a reflection in the minds of men of objective laws existing outside of us. But Comrades Sanina’s and Venzher’s formula answers this question in the negative. That means that these comrades are adopting the position of an incorrect theory which asserts that under socialism the laws of economic development are “created,” “transformed” by the directing bodies of society. In other words, they are breaking with Marxism and taking the stand of subjective idealism.

Of course, men can discover these objective laws, come to know them and, relying upon them, utilize them in the interests of society. But they cannot “create” them, nor can they “transform” them.

Suppose for a moment that we accepted this incorrect theory which denies the existence of objective laws of economic activity under socialism, and which proclaims the possibility of “creating” and “trans-

forming” economic laws. Where would it lead us? It would lead us into the realm of chaos and chance, we should find ourselves in slavish dependence on chances, and we should be forfeiting the possibility not only of understanding, but of simply finding our way about in this chaos of chances.

The effect would be that we should be destroying political economy as a science, because science cannot exist and develop unless it recognizes the existence of objective laws, and studies them. And by destroying science, we should be forfeiting the possibility of foreseeing the course of developments in the economic life of the country, in other words, we should be forfeiting the possibility of providing even the most elementary economic leadership.

In the end we should find ourselves at the mercy of “economic” adventurers who are ready to “destroy” the laws of economic development and to “create” new laws without any understanding of, or consideration for objective law.

Everyone is familiar with the classic formulation of the Marxist position on this question given by Engels in his *Anti-Dühring*:

“Active social forces work exactly like natural forces: blindly, forcibly, destructively, so long as we do not understand, and reckon with, them. But when once we understand them, when once we grasp their action, their direction, their effects, it depends only upon ourselves to subject them more and more to our own will, and by means of them to reach our own ends. And this holds quite especially of the mighty productive forces of today. As long as we obstinately refuse to understand the nature and the character of these productive forces — and this understanding goes against the grain of the capitalist mode of production and its defenders —

so long these forces are at work in spite of us, in opposition to us, so long they master us, as we have shown above in detail. But when once their nature is understood, they can, in the hands of the producers working together, be transformed from master demons into willing servants. The difference is as that between the destructive force of electricity in the lightning of the storm, and electricity under command in the telegraph and the voltaic arc; the difference between a conflagration, and fire working in the service of man. With this recognition, at last, of the real nature of the productive forces of today, the social anarchy of production gives place to a social regulation of production upon a definite plan, according to the needs of the community and of each individual. Then the capitalist mode of appropriation, in which the product enslaves first the producer and then the appropriator, is replaced by the mode of appropriation of the products that is based upon the nature of the modern means of production; upon the one hand, direct social appropriation, as means to the maintenance and extension of production — on the other, direct individual appropriation, as means of subsistence and of enjoyment.”⁴⁰

2. MEASURES FOR ELEVATING COLLECTIVE-FARM PROPERTY TO THE LEVEL OF PUBLIC PROPERTY

What measures are necessary to raise collective-farm property, which, of course, is not public property, to the level of public (“national”) property?

Some comrades think that the thing to do is simply to nationalize collective-farm property, to proclaim it public property, in the way that was done in the past in

the case of capitalist property. Such a proposal would be absolutely wrong and quite unacceptable. Collective-farm property is socialist property, and we simply cannot treat it in the same way as capitalist property. From the fact that collective-farm property is not public property, it by no means follows that it is not socialist property.

These comrades believe that the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property is the only, or at any rate the best, form of nationalization. That is not true. The fact is that conversion into state property is not the only, or even the best, form of nationalization, but the initial form of nationalization, as Engels quite rightly says in *Anti-Dühring*. Unquestionably, so long as the state exists, conversion into state property is the most natural initial form of nationalization. But the state will not exist forever. With the extension of the sphere of operation of socialism in the majority of the countries of the world the state will die away, and, of course, the conversion of the property of individuals or groups of individuals into state property will consequently lose its meaning. The state will have died away, but society will remain. Hence, the heir of the public property will then be not the state, which will have died away, but society itself, in the shape of a central, directing economic body.

That being so, what must be done to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property?

The proposal made by Comrades Sanina and Venzher as the chief means of achieving such an elevation of collective-farm property is to sell the basic implements of production concentrated in the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, thus releasing the state from the necessity of making capital investments in agriculture, and to make the collective farms themselves responsible for the maintenance and development of the machine and tractor stations. They

say:

“It is wrong to believe that collective-farm investments must be used chiefly for the cultural needs of the collective-farm village, while the greater bulk of the investments for the needs of agricultural production must continue as hitherto to be borne by the state. Would it not be more correct to relieve the state of this burden, seeing that the collective farms are capable of taking it entirely upon themselves? The state will have plenty of undertakings in which to invest its funds with a view to creating an abundance of articles of consumption in the country.”

The authors advance several arguments in support of their proposal.

First. Referring to Stalin’s statement that means of production are not sold even to the collective farms, the authors of the proposal cast doubt on this statement of Stalin’s by declaring that the state, after all, does sell means of production to the collective farms, such as minor implements, like scythes and sickles, small power engines, etc. They consider that if the state can sell such means of production to the collective farms, it might also sell them other means of production, such as the machines of the machine and tractor stations.

This argument is untenable. The state, of course, does sell minor implements to the collective farms, as, indeed, it has to in compliance with the Rules of the Agricultural Artel and the Constitution. But can we lump in one category minor implements and such basic agricultural means of production as the machines of the machine and tractor stations, or, let us say, the land, which, after all, is also one of the basic means of production in agriculture? Obviously not. They cannot be lumped in one category because minor implements do not in any degree decide the fate of collective-farm production, whereas such means of production as the ma-

chines of the machine and tractor stations and the land entirely decide the fate of agriculture in our present-day conditions.

It should not be difficult to understand that when Stalin said that means of production are not sold to the collective farms, it was not minor implements he had in mind, but the basic means of agricultural production: the machines of the machine and tractor stations, the land. The authors are playing with the words “means of production” and are confusing two different things, without observing that they are getting into a mess.

Second. Comrades Sanina and Venzher further refer to the fact that in the early period of the mass collective-farm movement — end of 1929 and beginning of 1930 — the CC, CPSU(B) was itself in favour of transferring the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property, requiring them to pay off the cost of the machine and tractor stations over a period of three years. They consider that although nothing came of this at the time, “in view of the poverty” of the collective farms, now that they have become wealthy it might be expedient to return to this policy, namely, the sale of the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms.

This argument is likewise untenable. A decision really was adopted by the CC, CPSU(B) in the early part of 1930 to sell the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms. It was adopted at the suggestion of a group of collective-farm shock workers as an experiment, as a trial, with the idea of reverting to the question at an early date and re-examining it. But the first trial demonstrated the inadvisability of this decision, and a few months later, namely, at the close of 1930, it was rescinded.

The subsequent spread of the collective-farm movement and the development of collective-farm construction definitely convinced both the collective farmers

and the leading officials that concentration of the basic implements of agricultural production in the hands of the state, in the hands of the machine and tractor stations, was the only way of ensuring a high rate of expansion of collective-farm production.

We are all gratified by the tremendous strides agricultural production in our country is making, by the increasing output of grain, cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc. What is the source of this increase? It is the increase of up-to-date technical equipment, the numerous up-to-date machines which are serving all branches of production. It is not a question of machinery generally; the question is that machinery cannot remain at a standstill, it must be perfected all the time, old machinery being scrapped and replaced by new, and the new by newer still. Without this, the onward march of our socialist agriculture would be impossible; big harvests and an abundance of agricultural produce would be out of the question. But what is involved in scrapping hundreds of thousands of wheel tractors and replacing them by caterpillar tractors, in replacing tens of thousands of obsolete harvester-combines by more up-to-date ones, in creating new machines, say, for industrial crops? It involves an expenditure of billions of rubles which can be recouped only after the lapse of six or eight years. Are our collective farms capable of bearing such an expense, even though their incomes may run into the millions? No, they are not, since they are not in the position to undertake the expenditure of billions of rubles which may be recouped only after a period of six or eight years. Such expenditures can be borne only by the state, for it, and it alone, is in the position to bear the loss involved by the scrapping of old machines and replacing them by new; because it, and it alone, is in a position to bear such losses for six or eight years and only then recover the outlays.

What, in view of this, would be the effect of sell-

ing the machine and tractor stations to the collective farms as their property? The effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow up the development of collective-farm production.

The conclusion therefore is that, in proposing that the machine and tractor stations should be sold to the collective farms as their property, Comrades Sanina and Venzher are suggesting a step in reversion to the old backwardness and are trying to turn back the wheel of history.

Assuming for a moment that we accepted Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's proposal and began to sell the basic implements of production, the machine and tractor stations, to the collective farms as their property. What would be the outcome?

The outcome would be, first, that the collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production; that is, their status would be an exceptional one, such as is not shared by any other enterprise in our country, for, as we know, even the nationalized enterprises do not own their instruments of production. How, by what considerations of progress and advancement, could this exceptional status of the collective farms be justified? Can it be said that such a status would facilitate the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property, that it would expedite the transition of our society from socialism to communism? Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?

The outcome would be, secondly, an extension of the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, because a gigantic quantity of instruments of agricultural production would come within its orbit. What do Com-

rades Sanina and Venzher think — is the extension of the sphere of commodity circulation calculated to promote our advance towards communism? Would it not be truer to say that our advance towards communism would only be retarded by it?

Comrades Sanina's and Venzher's basic error lies in the fact that they do not understand the role and significance of commodity circulation under socialism; that they do not understand that commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospective transition from socialism to communism. They evidently think that the transition from socialism to communism is possible even with commodity circulation, that commodity circulation can be no obstacle to this. That is a profound error, arising from an inadequate grasp of Marxism.

Criticizing Dühring's "economic commune," which functions in the conditions of commodity circulation, Engels, in his *Anti-Dühring*, convincingly shows that the existence of commodity circulation was inevitably bound to lead Dühring's so-called "economic communes" to the regeneration of capitalism. Comrades Sanina and Venzher evidently do not agree with this. All the worse for them. But we, Marxists, adhere to the Marxist view that the transition from socialism to communism and the communist principle of distribution of products according to needs preclude all commodity exchange, and, hence, preclude the conversion of products into commodities, and, with it, their conversion into value.

So much for the proposal and arguments of Comrades Sanina and Venzher.

But what, then, should be done to elevate collective-farm property to the level of public property?

The collective farm is an unusual kind of enterprise. It operates on land, and cultivates land which has long been public, and not collective-farm property.

Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of the land it cultivates.

Further, the collective farm operates with basic implements of production which are public, not collective-farm property. Consequently, the collective farm is not the owner of its basic implements of production.

Further, the collective farm is a cooperative enterprise: it utilizes the labour of its members, and it distributes its income among its members on the basis of workday units; it owns its seed, which is renewed every year and goes into production.

What, then, does the collective farm own? Where is the collective-farm property which it disposes of quite freely, at its own discretion? This property of the collective farm is its product, the product of collective farming: grain, meat, butter, vegetables, cotton, sugar beet, flax, etc., not counting the buildings and the personal husbandry of the collective farmers on their household plots. The fact is that a considerable part of this product, the surplus collective-farm output, goes into the market and is thus included in the system of commodity circulation. It is precisely this circumstance which now prevents the elevation of collective-farm property to the level of public property. It is therefore precisely from this end that the work of elevating collective-farm property to the level of public property must be tackled.

In order to raise collective-farm property to the level of public property, the surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity circulation and included in the system of products-exchange between state industry and the collective farms. That is the point.

We still have no developed system of products-exchange, but the rudiments of such a system exist in the shape of the "merchandising" of agricultural products. For quite a long time already, as we know, the products of the cotton-growing, flax-growing, beet-growing

and other collective farms are “merchandised.” They are not “merchandised” in full, it is true, but only partly, still they are “merchandised.” Be it mentioned in passing that “merchandising” is not a happy word, and should be replaced by “products-exchange.” The task is to extend these rudiments of products-exchange to all branches of agriculture and to develop them into a broad system, under which the collective farms would receive for their products not only money, but also and chiefly the manufactures they need. Such a system would require an immense increase in the goods allocated by the town to the country, and it would therefore have to be introduced without any particular hurry, and only as the products of the town multiply. But it must be introduced unswervingly and unhesitatingly, step by step contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation and widening the sphere of operation of products-exchange.

Such a system, by contracting the sphere of operation of commodity circulation, will facilitate the transition from socialism to communism. Moreover, it will make it possible to include the basic property of the collective farms, the product of collective farming, in the general system of national planning.

That will be a real and effective means of raising collective-farm property to the level of public property under our present-day conditions.

Will such a system be advantageous to the collective-farm peasantry? It undoubtedly will. It will, because the collective-farm peasantry will receive far more products from the state than under commodity circulation, and at much cheaper prices. Everyone knows that the collective farms which have products-exchange (“merchandising”) contracts with the government receive incomparably greater advantages than the collective farms which have no such contracts. If the products-exchange system is extended to all the collective farms in

the country, these advantages will become available to all our collective-farm peasantry.

May 22, 1952

(Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Peking 1972)

**TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE
POLISH REPUBLIC, COMRADE J.
CYRANKIEWICZ**

July 22, 1952

On the occasion of the national holiday of the Polish people, the Day of the Rebirth of Poland, accept, Comrade Prime Minister, along with the government of the Polish Republic, my friendly congratulations and best wishes for the fraternal Polish people. I wish you further success in building a new, free, people's democratic Poland.

J. Stalin

(Tribuna Ludu, July 22, 1952)

**TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
COMRADE MAO ZEDONG**

July 30, 1952

Beijing

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the heroic People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China, accept, Comrade Chairman, my heartfelt congratulations and wishes for its further strengthening in the interests of peace and security.

J. Stalin

Moscow,
July 30, 1952

(People's China, August 10, 1952)

**GREETINGS LETTER TO THE
CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL
PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of
the Chinese People's Liberation Army*

August 1, 1952

Comrade Chairman, please accept my sincere greetings on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. In the interests of peace and security, I wish the further strengthening of the Chinese People's Army.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 179, August 1, 1952)

**GREETINGS TELEGRAM TO
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
CABINET OF MINISTERS OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, KIM IL
SUNG**

*On the occasion of the national day of celebration of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

August 15, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kim Il Sung.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the national day of celebration of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, my sincere congratulations, together with the wish for the further success of the Korean people in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 192, August 15, 1952)

DECISION OF THE CC OF THE CPSU(B) TO CALL THE 19TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU(B) ON OCTOBER 5, 1952

August 20, 1952

On Wednesday, August 20, 1952, "Pravda" published the following message:

To all Organizations of the CPSU(B):

Today in Moscow there was a Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). The Central Committee of the CPSU(B) has decided to call the 19th Party Congress of the CPSU(B) on October 5, 1952.

Agenda for the 19th Party Congress :

I. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B). Report to be given by Comrade Malenkov.

II. Report of the Central Revision Commission of the CPSU(B). Report to be given by the Chairman of the Revision Commission, Comrade Moskatov.

III. Guidelines of the 19th Party Congress for the fifth Five-Year Plan for the development of the USSR in the years 1951-1955. Report to be given by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Comrade Saburov.

IV. Alterations in the Statutes of the CPSU(B). Report to be given by the Secretary of the Central Committee, Comrade Khrushchev.

V. Elections to the Central Party Organs. Rules for the procedure of election of delegates to the Party Congress:

Rules for the procedure of election of delegates to the Party Congress:

1. One delegate with a deciding vote for every 5,000 Party members.

2. One delegate with an advisory vote for every 5,000 Party candidates.

3. That delegates to the 19th Party Congress in agreement with the Party statutes, are elected by secret ballot.

4. The Party Organizations of the Russian, Socialist, Federative, Soviet Republics to elect delegates to the Party Congress from areas, provinces and autonomous Republics. In the remaining Soviet Republics, the delegates to be elected on the judgement of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics at regional conferences, or on Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

5. The Communists in the Party Organizations of the Soviet Army, Navy and the Border Units of the Ministry of State Security to elect their delegates to the 19th Party Congress with the rest of the Party Organizations of the areas, respectively district Party conferences or at the Party Congresses of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics.

J. Stalin
Secretary of the CC, CPSU(B)

(*New Germany*, Berlin ed., No. 196, August 21, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC, GHEORGHIU-DEJ**

*On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation
of Romania from the fascist yoke*

August 23, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Romanian People's Republic, Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration — Liberation Day — please accept, Comrade Chairman, and the government of the Romanian People's Republic, my sincere congratulations and friendly wishes for new success of the Romanian people in the building of a Romanian people's democracy.

J. Stalin

(*New Germany*, Berlin ed., No. 199, August 24, 1952)

ANSWERING TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO ZEDONG

*On the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory
over Japanese imperialism*

September 2, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my thanks for the expression of your feelings on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism by the Soviet people and the Soviet Army.

In this historic victory, the Chinese people and their People's Liberation Army played a great role by their heroism and sacrifices in the smashing of Japanese aggression.

The great friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is a sure guarantee against the danger of a new aggression, a mighty bulwark of peace in the Far East and the whole world.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of Japanese imperialism, the good wishes of the Soviet Union.

Long live the unbreakable friendship between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union!

Long live the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China!

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(*New Germany*, Berlin ed., No. 208, September 4, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF BULGARIA, VALKO
CHERVENKOV**

*On the occasion of the eighth anniversary of the liberation
of Bulgaria*

September 9, 1952

To the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Valko Chervenkov.

On the national day of celebration of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere greetings and wishes for the further success of the fraternal Bulgarian people in the building of a new Bulgarian people's democracy.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 213, September 10, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
MAO ZEDONG**

*On the occasion of the third anniversary of the
proclamation of the People's Republic of China*

October 1, 1952

To the Chairman of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Comrade Mao Zedong.

Please accept, Comrade Chairman, my sincere congratulations on the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China.

I wish the great Chinese people, the government of the People's Republic of China and you personally, new success in the building of a mighty, people's democratic Chinese state.

May the great friendship between the People's Republic of China and the USSR, the firm bulwark of peace and security in the Far East and in the whole world, thrive and grow stronger.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 231, October 1, 1952)

TELEGRAM TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, OTTO GROTEWOHL

*On the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of
the German Democratic Republic*

October 7, 1952

To the Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic, Comrade Otto Grotewohl.

On the occasion of the national day of celebration — the third anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic — I send the German people, the government and you personally, Comrade Prime Minister, my congratulations. Please accept my wishes for further success in the great work of creating an united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 236, October 7, 1952)

**TELEGRAM TO THE CHAIRMAN
OF THE CABINET OF MINISTERS
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, KIM IL
SUNG**

*On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*

October 1952

To the Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

Comrade Chairman, please accept the thanks of the Soviet government and myself for your friendly congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the USSR.

I wish the Korean people, who courageously defend their national rights, success in their struggle for the freedom and independence of their homeland.

J. Stalin

(New Germany, Berlin ed., No. 41, October 13, 1952)

SPEECH TO THE 19TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

October 14, 1952

Comrades!

Permit me, in the name of our Party Congress, to express our thanks to all fraternal parties and organizations whose representatives have honoured our Party Congress by their presence, or who have sent our Party Congress greetings of friendship, for their wishes for our further success and for their confidence. (*Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation.*)

For us, this trust is especially valuable as it signifies their readiness to support our Party in its struggle for a better future for the people, in its struggle against war, in its struggle to keep peace. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

It would be a mistake to believe that our Party, which has become a mighty power, does not need more support. That would be wrong. Our Party and our country need the continuous trust, sympathy and support of fraternal peoples outside our borders, and will always need it.

The special quality of this support lies in that every support of the peace endeavours of our Party by each fraternal party, simultaneously signifies the support of their own people in their struggle to keep peace. As the English workers in the years 1918-1919, during the armed attack of the English bourgeoisie on the Soviet Union, organized their struggle against the war under the slogan "Hands off Russia!," was a support, it was above all a support of the struggle of their own people for peace, and then, also, a support of the Soviet Union. If Comrade Thorez or Comrade Togliatti declare that

their people do not want to be led into a war against the people of the Soviet Union (*stormy applause*) — then that is a support, above all a support for the French and Italian workers and peasants who struggle for peace, and then, also, a support of the peace endeavours of the Soviet Union. The special quality of the present support is thus explained, that the interests of our Party are not only not against the interests of the peace-loving people, but on the contrary, blend with them. (*Stormy applause.*) Where the Soviet Union is concerned, its interest in the matter of world peace cannot be separated from the cause of peace in the whole world.

It is understood that our Party must do its duty by its fraternal parties and support them and their peoples in the struggle for liberation and in their struggle for keeping peace. This is what the Party does. (*Stormy applause.*) After the seizure of power by our Party in 1917, and after our Party took real measures to eliminate the yoke of capitalists and landlords, the representatives of the fraternal parties, inspired by our daring and the success of our Party, gave it the name “Shock Brigade” of the revolutionary movement and the workers’ movement of the world. Thereby they expressed the hope that the success of the “Shock Brigade” would alleviate the sufferings of the people in the situation of being under the capitalist yoke. I think that our Party has fulfilled these hopes, especially in the time of the second world war, as the Soviet Union smashed the German and Japanese fascist tyranny and liberated the European and Asian peoples from the danger of fascist slavery. (*Stormy applause.*)

Of course it was very difficult to fulfil this honourable task as long as there was only one “Shock Brigade,” as long as it stood alone, the avantgarde in the fulfillment of this task. But that is in the past. Now it is completely different. Now, from China and Korea to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, new “Shock Brigades”

have appeared on the map, in the form of people's democracies; now the struggle has been eased for our Party and also the work proceeds better. (*Stormy, prolonged applause.*)

Special attention must be paid to the communist, democratic or worker and peasant parties that are not yet in power and which must carry out their work under the yoke of strict, bourgeois rule. Of course, their work is more difficult. But their work is not so difficult as it was for us Russian communists in the time of the Tsar, as the smallest step forward was declared a serious crime. The Russian communists nevertheless held firm, did not retreat from difficulties and came to victory. The same will be the case with these parties.

Why is it that these parties do not have such difficult work as the Russian communists had in the times of Tsarism?

Because, first of all, they have the example of the struggle and success, as in the Soviet Union and in the people's democratic countries, before them. Consequently, they can learn from the mistakes and successes of these countries and thus ease their work.

Because, secondly, the bourgeoisie itself, the arch-enemy of the freedom movement, has become different, has essentially changed, has become more reactionary, has lost the cooperation of the people and thus has been weakened. It is understood that these circumstances must likewise ease the work of the revolutionary and democratic parties. (*Stormy applause.*)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie presented themselves as liberal, they were for bourgeois democratic freedom and in that way gained popularity with the people. Now there is not one remaining trace of liberalism.

There is no such thing as "freedom of personality" anymore — personal rights are now only acknowledged by them, the owners of capital — all the other citizens are regarded as raw materials that are only for exploit-

ation. The principle of equal rights for people and nations is trodden in the dust and it is replaced by the principle of full rights for the exploiting minority and the lack of rights of the exploited majority of the citizens. The banner of bourgeois democratic freedom has been flung overboard. I think that you, the representatives of communist and democratic parties must pick up this banner and carry it forward if you want to gain the majority of the people. There is nobody else to raise it. (*Stormy applause.*)

Earlier, the bourgeoisie, as the heads of nations, were for the rights and independence of nations and put that "above all." Now there is no trace left of this "national principle." Now the bourgeoisie sells the rights and independence of their nations for dollars. The banner of national independence and national sovereignty has been thrown overboard. Without doubt, you, the representatives of the communist and democratic parties must raise this banner and carry it forward if you want to be patriots of your countries, if you want to be the leading powers of the nations. There is nobody else to raise it. (*Stormy applause.*)

That is how matters stand at present.

It is understood that all these circumstances must ease the work of the communist and democratic parties that are not yet in power.

Consequently, there is every ground for the success and victory of the fraternal parties in the lands of capitalist rule. (*Stormy applause.*)

Long live our fraternal parties! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Long life and health to the leaders of the fraternal parties! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Long live the peace between the peoples! (*Prolonged applause.*)

Down with the arsonists of war! (*Everyone stood up. Stormy, prolonged applause that became an ovation. There were shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the*

great leader of the working people of the world, Comrade Stalin!” “The great Stalin!” “Long live peace between the peoples!”)

(Speech at the 19th Congress of the CPSU, Berlin 1952, pp. 5-15)

SPEECH AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU*

October 16, 1952

So, we have held the party congress. It went well, and it may seem to many that we have complete unity. However, we do not have such unity. Some express disagreement with our decisions.

They say: why did we significantly expand the composition of the Central Committee? But isn't it clear that the Central Committee needed to incorporate new forces? We, the old ones, will all die, but we need to think about to whom, in whose hands, we will entrust the future of our great cause. Who will carry it forward? For this, we need younger, devoted people, political activists. And what does it mean to raise a political, state figure? This requires significant efforts. It will take 10, no, 15 years to raise a state figure.

But desire alone is not enough for this. Ideologically resilient state figures can only be nurtured in practical affairs, in everyday work to implement the party's general line, in overcoming the resistance of various hostile opportunist elements seeking to slow down and sabotage the construction of socialism. And political figures of Leninist experience, educated by our party, will have to break these hostile attempts in the struggle and achieve complete success in realizing our great goals.

Isn't it clear that we need to elevate the role of the party, its party committees? Can we forget about

* Recorded by Efremov Leonid Nikolaevich — a delegate of the 19th Congress of the CPSU, and a prominent Party and state figure. The record was clarified with the author on November 16, 2005.

improving the party's work among the masses, as Lenin taught? All this requires an influx of young, fresh forces into the Central Committee, the leading headquarters of our party. So, we did it, following Lenin's instructions. That is why we expanded the composition of the Central Committee. And the party itself has grown significantly.

They ask, why did we relieve prominent party and state figures from important positions as ministers? What can be said on this matter? We relieved Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others of their duties and replaced them with new workers. Why? On what basis? The work of a minister is a peasant's work. It requires great strength, specific knowledge and health. That is why we relieved some distinguished comrades of their duties and appointed new, more qualified, initiative workers in their place. They are young people, full of strength and energy. We must support them in responsible work.

As for the prominent political and state figures themselves, they remain prominent political and state figures. We transferred them to work as deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. So, I don't even know how many deputies I have now.

We cannot overlook the improper behavior of some prominent political figures when it comes to unity in our affairs. I mean comrades Molotov and Mikoyan.

Molotov is a dedicated person to our cause. Call him, and without doubt, he will give his life for the party. But we cannot pass by his unworthy actions. Comrade Molotov, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, while being under chartreuse at a diplomatic reception, agreed to allow the English envoy to publish bourgeois newspapers and magazines in our country. Why? On what basis was such consent required? Isn't it clear that the bourgeoisie is our class enemy, and disseminating the bourgeois press among the Soviet people will bring

nothing but harm? Such an erroneous step, if allowed, would have a harmful, negative impact on the minds and worldviews of the Soviet people, lead to the weakening of our communist ideology and strengthening bourgeois ideology. This is Comrade Molotov's first political mistake.

And what about Comrade Molotov's proposal to transfer Crimea to the Jews? This is a gross mistake by Comrade Molotov. Why did he need this? How can this be allowed? On what basis did Comrade Molotov make such a proposal? We have the Jewish Autonomous Oblast — Birobidzhan. Isn't that enough? Let this republic develop. Comrade Molotov should not advocate for illegal Jewish claims to our Soviet Crimea. This is Comrade Molotov's second political mistake. Comrade Molotov is behaving incorrectly as a member of the Political Bureau. We categorically rejected his fanciful proposals.

Comrade Molotov respects his wife so much that we can't make a decision in the Political Bureau on any important political issue without it quickly becoming known to Comrade Zhemchuzhina. It is as if an invisible thread connects the Political Bureau with Molotov's wife, Zhemchuzhina and her friends. And she is surrounded by friends who cannot be trusted. Clearly, such behaviour by a member of the Political Bureau is unacceptable.

Now about Comrade Mikoyan. He, you see, objects to raising the agricultural tax on peasants. Who is he, our Anastas Mikoyan? What is unclear to him here?

The peasant is our debtor. We have a strong alliance with the peasants. We have permanently secured the land for the collective farms. They must repay the debt owed to the state. Therefore, we cannot agree with Comrade Mikoyan's position.

A.I. Mikoyan justifies himself on the podium, referring to some economic calculations.

Stalin (interrupting Mikoyan): Here is Mikoyan — a newly emerged Frumkin. You see, he confuses himself and wants to confuse us in this clear, principled matter.

V.M. Molotov acknowledges his mistakes on the podium, justifies himself, and assures that he has been and remains a faithful disciple of Stalin.

Stalin (interrupting Molotov): Nonsense! I have no disciples. We are all disciples of the great Lenin.

Stalin then said that the Plenum needs to resolve an organizational issue — to elect the governing bodies of the party. He proposed electing the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU instead of the Political Bureau, in a significantly expanded composition. The election procedure was quite specific. Stalin, taking a piece of paper from the pocket of his French coat, said: “For the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, we could elect, for example, such comrades — Comrade Stalin, Comrade Andrianov, Comrade Aristov, Comrade Beria, Comrade Bulganin, Comrade Voroshilov, Comrade Ignatiev, Comrade Kaganovich, Comrade Korotchenko, Comrade Kuznetsov, Comrade Kuusinen, Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Malyshov, Comrade Melnikov, Comrade Mikoyan, Comrade Mikhailov, Comrade Molotov, Comrade Pervukhin, Comrade Ponomarenko, Comrade Saburov, Comrade Suslov, Comrade Khrushchev, Comrade Chesnokov, Comrade Shvernik and Comrade Shkiriyatov.” He listed candidates for members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, including Comrade Brezhnev, Comrade Vyshinsky, Comrade Zverev, Comrade Ignatov, Comrade Kabanov, Comrade Kosygin, Comrade Patolichev, Comrade Pegov, Comrade Puzanov, Comrade Tevosyan and Comrade Yudin. Then Stalin pulled another piece of paper from the side pocket of his French coat and said: “Now about the Secretariat of the Central Committee. We could elect as secretaries

of the Central Committee, for example, such comrades — Comrade Stalin, Comrade Aristov, Comrade Brezhnev, Comrade Ignatov, Comrade Malenkov, Comrade Mikhailov, Comrade Pegov, Comrade Ponomarenko, Comrade Suslov and Comrade Khrushchev.” In total, Stalin proposed 36 people for the Presidium and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. At the same time, he emphasized: “The list includes all members of the old Political Bureau, except Andreyev. As for the esteemed Comrade Andreyev, everything is clear: completely deaf, can’t hear anything, can’t work. Let him get treatment.”

Voice from the floor: We need to elect Comrade Stalin as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Stalin: No! Release me from the duties of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

G.M. Malenkov at the podium: Comrades! We must unanimously and wholeheartedly ask Comrade Stalin, our leader and teacher, to continue being the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

L.P. Beria also spoke in support of this proposal.

Stalin at the podium: Applause is not needed at the Plenum of the Central Committee. We need to address issues without emotion, in a business-like manner. And I ask to be released from the duties of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. I am already old. I don’t read papers. Elect another secretary for yourselves.

S.K. Timoshenko: Comrade Stalin, the people won’t understand this. We all, as one, elect you as our leader — the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. There can be no other decision.

Everyone stands and applauds enthusiastically, supporting Timoshenko. Stalin stood for a long time, look-

ing at the hall, then waved his hand and sat down.

(L.N. Efremov, *On the Roads of Struggle and Labour*, pp. 12-16)

SPEECH AT THE MEETING OF THE BUREAU OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU*

October 27, 1952

Our propaganda is poorly conducted, like some kind of mess, not propaganda at all. Everyone is dissatisfied with the state of affairs in propaganda. There is not a single member of the Political Bureau who is satisfied with the work of the Propaganda Department. Our cadres, especially the youth, lack deep knowledge of Marxism. Our older generation was strong because we knew Marxism well, political economy. Propaganda, especially in newspapers, is particularly poorly organized, notably in *Pravda*. The editor of *Pravda*, Ilyichev, is weak. He is simply not up to the task. It is necessary to appoint a chief editor of *Pravda* stronger than him, and let him learn.

Pravda is the newspaper of newspapers. It should summarize the experience of all newspapers. It should reprint good articles and excerpts from other newspapers. *Pravda* should be the main base for the work of the Propaganda Department. Well, who do you propose to appoint as the chief editor of *Pravda*? It cannot be postponed for a hundred years, can it? Everyone was silent. — Yes, you don't know people.

We also need to think about better leadership in industry. We need a unified Department of Industry and Transport and to appoint a prominent person at its head. It is necessary to control personnel, study them and promote youth to leadership positions in a timely manner. We have a lot of capable youth, but we do

* Record of D.T. Shepilov and P.F. Yudin.

not know the young cadres well. And if you appoint a person to a certain job and he stays in that job for 10 years without further advancement, he stops growing and disappears as a worker. We have lost many people because they were not promoted in time.

Things are going badly in agriculture. Party workers do not know the history of agriculture in Europe, do not know how animal husbandry is conducted in the United States. They only sign papers and ruin the cause.

Our young cadres are weakly prepared theoretically; they need help to grow. Lectures are, of course, a useful thing, but printed propaganda should play the main role in cadre growth.

To lead all ideological work of the party, a permanent commission on ideological issues should be created under the Presidium of the Central Committee. The commission should select 10-20 qualified workers — the commission's apparatus. People with language skills — English, German, French (now less common), Spanish (spoken by more than 120 million people) — should be included in the commission. It is necessary to find someone who knows the Chinese language well. Maybe take Fedorenko? They all need to be provided with good salaries.

The commission on ideological issues should help improve the printed propaganda of Marxism. The journal *Bolshevik* should serve as the basis for the work of this commission. The journal is poorly managed, with a narrow focus. It needs to be positioned in a way that other journals take it as an example. The composition of the editorial board of the journal needs to be reconsidered. Why do we need Ilyichev? There, it is even possible to have two editors.

In *Bolshevik*, reviews and critical articles on local journals should be provided, criticizing them and helping them improve their work. The commission should

take under its supervision the work of journals such as *Questions of Philosophy*, *Questions of Economics*, *Questions of History* and perhaps some other journals. It is time to put an end to the shameful practice of reprinting various party and government resolutions in theoretical journals because it means trailing events.

Political economy and philosophy propaganda should be seriously addressed. However, we should not get carried away with the unity of opposites; this is Hegelian terminology.

The Americans refute Marxism, slander us and try to discredit us. We must expose them. People need to be familiarized with the ideology of the enemies, criticize this ideology, and this will arm our cadres.

Now we are not only pursuing a national policy but also conducting world politics.

The Americans want to subordinate everything to themselves. But America is not respected in any capital of the world.

In *Pravda* and party journals, we need to broaden the horizons of our people, take a wider perspective; we are a global power. Do not delve into trivial issues. People are afraid to write on matters of foreign policy; they wait for instructions from above.

We need popular brochures on various topics. In the old days, there were brochures like "Who Lives By What?" or "What Every Worker Needs to Know." Many workers began their political-economic education with such brochures. Now we need more serious, deeper but still popular brochures.

Our lectures lack depth, but they provide something. Sometimes we need to go to different places for lectures. Generally, for ideological work and inspections, one should go to the field for two weeks.

(*Questions of History*, 1998, No. 7, pp. 33-34)

**TO THE CHAIRMAN OF
THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S
GOVERNMENT OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
COMRADE MAO ZEDONG**

November 19, 1952

I request you, Comrade Chairman, and the government of the People's Republic of China to accept my deep gratitude for the friendly congratulations and kind wishes on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

I am confident that the unbreakable Soviet-Chinese friendship will continue to strengthen in the interests of peace and global security.

J. Stalin
Chairman of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR

(Izvestia, November 7, 1952)

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT JAMES RESTON OF “THE NEW YORK TIMES”

December 21, 1952

Q. As the New Year approaches and a new administration takes office in the United States, do you still hold to your belief that the Soviet Union and the United States can live peacefully in the coming years?

A. I continue to believe that a war between the United States of America and the Soviet Union cannot be considered inevitable and that our countries can continue to live in peace.

Q. In your opinion, what are the sources of contemporary international tension?

A. Everywhere and in everything where aggressive actions of the “cold war” policy against the Soviet Union are manifested.

Q. Would you welcome diplomatic negotiations with representatives of the new Eisenhower administration to discuss the possibility of a meeting between you and General Eisenhower to address the issue of reducing international tension?

A. I view such a proposal positively.

Q. Will you cooperate in any new diplomatic initiative aimed at ending the war in Korea?

A. I am willing to cooperate, as the USSR is interested in the liquidation of the war in Korea.

(Pravda, December 26, 1952)

CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR OF ARGENTINA, LEOPOLDO BRAVO

February 7, 1953

Stalin inquires how long the ambassador has been away from the USSR and whether Moscow has changed during this time.

Bravo responds that he has been absent from the USSR for four years and notes significant changes in Moscow. There is massive construction underway.

Bravo continues, stating that Argentine President Peron has entrusted him with conveying warm regards to Generalissimo Stalin. He adds that Argentina wishes to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, particularly in developing trade relations.

Stalin assures there are no objections from our side.

Bravo expresses that visiting Generalissimo Stalin is an immense honour and great pleasure for him, and this visit will remain in his memory for his entire life.

Stalin acknowledges that receiving ambassadors is his duty and obligation. He asks Bravo about potential trade between Argentina and the USSR, inquiring what Argentina would like to purchase and sell.

Bravo replies that the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided the Soviet ambassador, Rezanov, with a memorandum listing the goods Argentina would like to procure from the Soviet Union and those it could supply. Primarily, Argentina wishes to buy drilling equipment for the oil industry, oil and agricultural machinery from the USSR. In return, Argentina could offer leather, wool, vegetable oil and other products.

Stalin states that the Soviet government will consider this proposal, emphasizing the USSR's interest in trade with Argentina.

Bravo mentions his long-standing interest in the Soviet Union since childhood, having read books about the USSR. Therefore, he personally wishes to foster good relations with the USSR. *Bravo* expresses admiration for the extensive construction and remarkable industrialization achievements in the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that people cannot be forced to build by force, but the Soviet people themselves want to build, which makes construction easier.

Bravo notes that Argentine President Peron has also initiated a movement for the country's independence.

Stalin asks, isn't Argentina an independent country now?

Bravo responds that Argentina is an independent country, but there were many foreign imperialist monopolies in the country that dominated crucial sectors of the Argentine economy. President Peron began a campaign to nationalize foreign enterprises and has already nationalized some, including railways, ports, the electric industry, urban transport and meatpacking plants. He states that without economic independence, there is no freedom.

Stalin agrees with this. He says that the Americans know well that those who control a country's economy control its independence, and it will be good for Argentina if its economic independence is affirmed, even gradually.

Bravo mentions that this is precisely what Peron and his supporters are currently doing: seeking economic independence to achieve political independence. He declares that Argentina would like to strengthen cultural ties with the USSR and also establish connections on sports matters.

Stalin welcomes this proposal. He remarks that Spaniards used to be excellent athletes and asks how developed sports are in Argentina.

Bravo responds that football is very developed in

Argentina. Argentina is interested in the its football team visiting the USSR and the Soviet team visiting Argentina.

Stalin says that this matter can be discussed and asks about the official language of Argentina. Is Spanish the official language?

Bravo confirms that Spanish is the official language in Argentina.

Stalin mentions that, as far as he remembers, a few years ago, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina was Bramuglia, noting that there are two villages in the Caucasus called Bramuglia.

Bravo confirms that indeed Bramuglia was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina. He mentions that currently, Bramuglia is a university professor.

Stalin mentions that during the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish ambassador in Moscow was Pasqua. Noting that this surname is also frequently found in the Caucasus, he talks about some linguistic similarities between the peoples inhabiting the Caucasus and Spain.

Bravo agrees and mentions that this summer he intends to visit the Caucasus because he believes that the customs of the Caucasus peoples are close to the customs of his country.

Stalin notes that in ancient times, many peoples sought refuge from enemies in the Caucasus mountains. The remains of these peoples were deposited as geological layers. To this day, remnants of the Basques, Sarmatians, Avars and vanished peoples are preserved in the Caucasus. Therefore, ethnographically, the Caucasus is of great interest. A scholar who begins to study the ethnographic composition of the Caucasus will find a lot of interesting material. In Dagestan, for example, in 3-4 gorges located close to each other, there are peoples speaking different languages who do not understand each other.

He asks the ambassador about the situation regard-

ing Mexico's economic independence.

Bravo responds that, in his opinion, Mexico cannot develop freely due to a strong dependence on the United States.

Stalin says that is correct.

Bravo mentions that in all Latin American countries, a movement for economic independence is currently developing. The people of Argentina have great sympathy for the Soviet Union, seeing it as a vanguard in the struggle for the independence of nations. A delegation of 40 people representing various political parties, religious beliefs and professions, including workers, attended the Congress of Nations in Defence of Peace from Argentina. Fifteen members of this delegation visited the Soviet Union. These delegates visited the ambassador and shared their immense impressions of their stay in the Soviet Union and their tours of Moscow enterprises, especially at the Stalin Factory, where they witnessed the assembly of automobiles.

Stalin states that the strength of the Anglo-Americans lies in the fact that while Spain, for example, was primarily concerned with Catholicism, they sought to develop their industry. He notes that to become independent, one must have its industry.

Bravo fully agrees with this, stating that this is precisely why they are fighting for economic independence in Argentina and have achieved some success in this matter.

Stalin says that independence cannot be achieved without this condition.

Bravo reports that this year Argentine factories, for the first time, provided the country's agriculture with tractors and trucks of their own production.

Stalin asks if Argentina has oil.

Bravo responds that they have oil but lack equipment for drilling oil wells.

Stalin inquires about the availability of specialists

for the oil industry.

Bravo answers that such specialists are available. He also notes that the oil industry in Argentina is nationalized and belongs to the state.

Stalin says that this is good, very good.

Bravo, noting that his next statement will be unofficial, shares that a few years ago, England received Argentine meat for free because the meatpacking plants, railways and the fleet belonged to England. Argentina even had to pay extra for meat exported to England.

Stalin asks if this will continue in the future.

Bravo replies that this will not continue because currently, the railways, meatpacking plants and ports are state-owned. However, he points out that Argentina faces a shortage of wagons and railway equipment.

Stalin says that we will find wagons and machines for Argentina.

Bravo expresses gratitude.

Stalin asks to convey thanks to President Peron of Argentina and wishes success in Argentina's struggle for independence.

Bravo warmly thanks him and assures that he will promptly inform Peron about this.

Stalin says that in the old days, during the Tsarist era, for instance, all of Leningrad's industry and the entire Baltic Fleet depended on English coal, but now it is not the case anymore because we have expelled the English. That is why they criticize us.

Bravo agrees with this.

Stalin states that the Anglo-Saxons like to ride on other people's backs. We need to put an end to this.

Bravo says that fortunately, in all countries, there is a movement for national independence, and soon England will have to stay in its own home.

Stalin: Let it stay in its own home, and we have no intention of invading its home.

Bravo believes that currently, due to the growth of

the national liberation movement worldwide, England no longer dares to invade other countries.

Stalin: No, there are areas where England invades, like Malaya, Africa and other places. He points out that English interests are also strong in Belgium and the Netherlands. He notes that there are still places in the world that England could plunder, but their number is decreasing every day.

Bravo hopes that soon there will be no such places left.

Stalin says that every nation, even the smallest, wants to live its own life.

Bravo fully agrees, stating that every nation has such a desire.

Stalin suggests that Latin American countries should unite. He remarks that perhaps Latin American countries should form something like the United States of South America?

Bravo says that fortunately, there is a unification movement against foreign imperialism in Latin American countries, and Argentina sets an example in achieving economic independence.

Stalin says that it is necessary to create some a of Latin American countries for positive purposes, for economic development, and not just for organizing resistance. He asks whether Latin American countries would want to form such a union.

Bravo says that it seems like Latin American countries have such a desire, but as soon as any country starts to fight for economic independence, the U.S. raises a hostile campaign in the press against that country, seeking to accuse it of communism and dependence on the Soviet Union.

Stalin says that it only reveals the poverty of the minds of the leaders of the United States, who have a lot of money but little intelligence. He notes that American presidents, as a rule, do not like to think and prefer to

rely on “brain trusts.” Roosevelt and Truman in particular had such trusts, and apparently believed that if they had money, they did not need to be smart.

He asks if the ambassador has any other issues to discuss.

Bravo says that he has no other questions. He would like to express his immense pride and gratitude for being allowed to convey his respect to Generalissimo Stalin, and he will forever cherish the memory of this visit.

Stalin responds that if necessary, he is ready to receive the ambassador again, as it is his duty.

Bravo says he is very pleased to see Generalissimo Stalin in good health, cheerful and lively.

Stalin asks what could cause such joy and what benefit he has brought to Argentina.

Bravo says that Stalin is a person everyone in the world thinks about, not just among the communists. He is a person everyone is interested in, whose books are read and whose statements are followed.

Stalin jokingly remarks that some praise him, others criticize, like Churchill.

Bravo thanks him again for the honour and says he is filled with joy at the opportunity to see and speak with Generalissimo Stalin.

The conversation, which lasted 40 minutes, concluded. The Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyshinsky, was present during the conversation. The conversation was recorded by Vyshinsky and Kolosovsky.

(*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 4, 2003)

ENDNOTES

1 The indisputable merits of G.K. Zhukov as a military leader and as the Deputy Supreme Commander during the period of the Great Patriotic War were duly appreciated by the Motherland. The title of Marshal of the Soviet Union, thrice the Hero of the Soviet Union (a distinction shared with only two others in the country, the aviators A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub) and two Orders of Victory — these are just a few visible accolades. It is more challenging to scrutinize the qualities of Zhukov as a person and a politician, and unfortunately, they occasionally let the Marshal down.

Appointed as the commander of the Odessa Military District, Zhukov became the target of party criticism, particularly regarding moral and domestic aspects.

The party found itself compelled to combat instances of acquisition and a desire for trophy enrichment, referred to as “property growth,” among the victors. This malady affected a portion of the party-economic elite and the military. Zhukov, who brought seven train cars of furniture from Germany for his family, also succumbed to this trend. In the war-torn country, people had to cope with the influx of parcels from ordinary soldiers and officers to their relatives abroad. These were poor people trying to assist others in need. As for the well-off, for whom the Soviet authorities, due to their high qualifications and achievements, created exceptional conditions, Stalin, a man indifferent to personal possessions, viewed their “grabby instincts” with open contempt.

On January 20, 1948, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) adopted a resolution titled “On Comrade G.K. Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union,” stating:

“The Central Committee of the CPSU(B), having heard the report of the commission consisting of comrades Zhdanov, Bulganin, Kuznetsov, Suslov and Shkiryatov, appointed to examine the materials received by the Central Committee regarding the unworthy behaviour of Comrade G.K. Zhukov, the commander of the Odessa Military District, determined the following:

“Comrade Zhukov, while serving as the supreme

commander of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, committed acts that disgraced the high rank of a member of the CPSU(B) and the honour of the commander of the Soviet Army. Despite being fully provided for by the state, Comrade Zhukov abused his official position, engaging in marauding by appropriating and exporting from Germany for personal use a large quantity of various valuables.

“In pursuit of these goals, Comrade Zhukov, yielding to unrestrained greed, employed his subordinates who, carrying favour with him, committed blatant crimes such as seizing paintings and other valuable items from palaces and mansions, breaking into a safe in a jewellery store in Lodz, and so on.

“As a result of all this, Zhukov misappropriated up to 70 valuable gold items (pendants and rings with precious stones, watches, diamond earrings, bracelets, brooches, etc.), up to 740 pieces of silver tableware and silverware, and additionally, up to 30 kilograms of various silver items, up to 50 expensive carpets and tapestries, over 600 paintings of significant artistic value, about 3,700 metres of silk, wool, satin, velvet and other fabrics, over 320 valuable fur skins, and so forth.

“When summoned to the commission to provide explanations, Comrade Zhukov behaved inappropriately for a party member and a commander of the Soviet Army. In his explanations, he was insincere and attempted to conceal and obscure the facts of his anti-Party behaviour.

“The mentioned actions and Zhukov’s behaviour during the commission characterize him as a person who has degenerated politically and morally.

Considering all the above, the Central Committee of the CPSU(B) resolves:

“1. Recognizing that Comrade G.K. Zhukov deserves exclusion from the Party and trial for his actions, issue a final warning to Comrade Zhukov, providing him with a last chance to correct himself and become an honest party member worthy of a commanding rank.

“2. Remove Comrade Zhukov from the position of commander of the Odessa Military District, appointing him as the commander of one of the smaller districts.

“3. Oblige Comrade Zhukov to immediately surrender to

the state fund all unlawfully appropriated precious items and belongings.” (Y.N. Zhukov, *Stalin: Secrets of Power*, pp. 424-426).

However, Zhukov’s disgrace, this time appointed as the commander of the “deep” Ural Military District, was short-lived. A sign of the beginning of his “rehabilitation,” according to historian Y.N. Zhukov, was his inclusion, alongside Molotov, in the government delegation to celebrate the Revival Day of Poland (July 1951) (See: *Stalin: Secrets of Power*, p. 560). Later, Zhukov was elected as a delegate to the 19th Congress of the CPSU(B) and became a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1952).

Undoubtedly, Zhukov’s alignment with Khrushchev after Stalin’s death was a factor in the turbulent course of politics, actively supporting the latter with his military authority in the sharp turns of the policy. Three such turns can be mentioned at least. The first is the role played by Georgy Konstantinovich during Beria’s arrest in June 1953. The second is the Marshal’s solidarity with the debunking of Stalin after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, expressed in eagerness not according to reason: intending to speak on this topic at the next Central Committee Plenum, Zhukov sent his speech, written in the spirit of the prevailing trend, to Khrushchev. The Marshal was fortunate; the plenum did not take place. However, the text, extracted from the archive, was eventually published.

Finally, the third risky moment in Khrushchev’s political fate was the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1957 when he clung to power only thanks to Zhukov’s actions, relying on the military districts and the MGK apparatus (E.A. Furtsev).

All three episodes are comparable in structure, dynamics and content to political upheavals. It is too early to make a final judgement on this, but it is impossible to ignore the specific attitude towards Zhukov from the “democrats.” The glorification of the “Marshal of Victory” in connection with the 50th anniversary of the final defeat of Nazi Germany in 1995 helped the Yeltsin authorities “downplay” the role of the Communist Party and Stalin, as well as the role of the people in the Great Patriotic War, overshadowing the exploits of the “Stalinist Suvorov” K.K. Rokossovsky and the

entire brilliant constellation of military leaders during that challenging period. A monument to Zhukov was erected near the Kremlin, and an order and a medal were established in his honour. At one time, Zhukov had to bitterly regret more than once for allowing the adventurer Khrushchev to exploit his illustrious name. However, even with his current fame, as a communist, he would hardly be pleased.

2 On September 6, 1946, the Political Bureau approved the “Message of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party to Soviet and Party leadership organizations.” It stated that due to unfavourable climatic conditions causing drought, the grain harvest of 1946 was 200 million poods less than expected under average conditions. Therefore, the cancellation of the rationing system for food products had to be postponed from 1946 to 1947. The message announced the adoption of a resolution by the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party to increase prices for rationed food (bread, flour, cereals, meat, oil, fish, sugar, salt) by 2-3 times and reduce commercial prices for industrial goods. In connection with this, cash allowances were provided to low-paid workers and employees (earning no more than 900 rubles per month), unemployed pensioners and families of servicemen receiving benefits, as well as to students. The last paragraph in the draft message stated: “Finally, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee deemed it necessary to prohibit any direct or indirect increase in established salaries and wage rates in enterprises, institutions, transport, state farms, machine and tractor stations, trade, public and other institutions and organizations, as well as to prohibit any increase in established norms of food rationing and norms of reverse sale of goods from September 16 of this year.” This paragraph was crossed out when the message was approved by the Political Bureau (RGASPI, F. 17, Op. 163, D. 1489, L. 4-14). On the same day, Beria submitted to Stalin the required draft with the following cover note (*Ibid.*, D. 1490, L. 71):

“To Comrade Stalin,

“In accordance with your instructions, I am submitting for your approval a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Central Committee of the

Communist Party on the prohibition of wage increases and norms of food and industrial supply in state, cooperative and public enterprises, institutions and organizations.

“The draft resolution was developed jointly with Comrades Mikoyan, Malenkov, Kosygin, Zverev, Lyubimov (Ministry of Trade of the USSR) and Saburov (State Planning Committee).

“September 12, 1946. *L. Beria*”

The Political Bureau approved this resolution on September 16, 1946 (*Ibid.*, L. 70).

3 In 1948, Y.A. Zhdanov held the position of the head of the science sector of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee. He recalls: “...Over several months, I formed a picture of the state of affairs in the field of biology, different from what Stalin described...

“Fuelled by youthful enthusiasm, on April 10, 1948, I spoke at a seminar for lecturers of regional committees and city committees of the CPSU(B) in the Polytechnic Museum with a lecture on the topic ‘Controversial Issues of Modern Darwinism,’ in which, among other things, I said the following: ‘It is incorrect to say that there is a struggle between two biological schools here, one representing the Soviet point of view and the other bourgeois Darwinism. I think it is necessary to reject such opposition because the dispute is between scientific schools within Soviet biological science, and none of the conflicting schools can be called bourgeois.

“‘Incorrectly, it is claimed in Soviet biological science two schools are in conflict and opposing each other. Usually, it is said by Lysenko’s school and the school of Lysenko’s opponents. This is not accurate. We have a number of different schools and directions that align on some issues and diverge on others. In this specific case, it is impossible to divide all Soviet biologists into two camps. Those who attempt to do so pursue narrow group interests rather than scientific interests and deviate from the truth.’

This lecture had the most unexpected consequences for the lecturer.

In June of the same year, at a meeting of the Political Bureau attended by the invited Y.A. Zhdanov, the following occurred:

The issue of awarding annual Stalin prizes was under consideration. D.T. Shepilov, the immediate superior of Zhdanov, delivered the report. "When the report came to an end, Stalin stood up and unexpectedly said in a low voice:

"Here, one comrade delivered a lecture against Lysenko. He left nothing standing. The Central Committee cannot agree with such a position. This erroneous performance has a right, conciliatory character in favour of formal geneticists."

"I tried to explain myself," Y.A. Zhdanov writes further, "and said that I presented only my personal scientific point of view, not the position of the Central Committee."

The response:

"The Central Committee can have its position on scientific issues. What are we going to do? What is the position of the Propaganda Department in this matter?"

"Shepilov: 'We overlooked it, Comrade Stalin.'

"Stalin: 'We need to exchange opinions'" (*Ibid.*, pp. 256-257).

Zhdanov wrote an explanatory letter to Stalin in which, nevertheless, critical remarks about Lysenko were repeated, and practical achievements of contemporary geneticists were once again mentioned. "And he did not yield in the main point: he did not agree that the Morganist-Mendelists were bought-out people, did not descend to the vulgar-sociological point of view that there are two biologies: bourgeois and socialist. He did not yield to the assessment of geneticists expressed in a conversation in Sochi" (*Ibid.*, p. 257).

A month later, on July 23 of the same year, on the eve of the session of the V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences (July 3 -August 7), Academician T.D. Lysenko appealed to Stalin with a request to "review the report I wrote, 'On the State of Soviet Biological Science.'" "I tried my best to present the state of the issue from a scientific perspective truthfully," Lysenko wrote. "I formally bypassed Comrade Yuri Zhdanov's report, but the factual content of my report is, to a large extent, a response to his incorrect speech, which has become quite widely known..."

Stalin responded to the academician's request. The manuscript of the report is covered with his edits. In one place, he ridicules the notion that "every science is class-based": "HA-HA-HA... What about mathematics? What

about Darwinism?” In another place, he notes in the margins: “And the shortcomings of Darwin’s theory?” In the section containing criticism of neo-Darwinism, Stalin inserted an entire paragraph:

“Firstly, the well-known provisions of Lamarckism, which recognize the active role of environmental conditions in shaping a living body and the inheritance of acquired properties, in contrast to the metaphysics of neo-Darwinism (Weismannism) — are by no means vicious but, on the contrary, completely true and entirely scientific.

“Secondly, the Michurin direction can by no means be called neo-Lamarckian... [it] represents creative Soviet Darwinism... rejecting the errors of both and free from the mistakes of Darwin’s theory regarding the Malthusian scheme accepted by Darwin.

“It cannot be denied that in the dispute that flared up in the early 20th century between Weismannists and Lamarckists, the latter were closer to the truth because they defended the interests of science, while Weismannists turned to mysticism and broke with science” (Quoted from: *Izvestiya of the Central Committee of the CPSU*, 1991, No. 7, pp. 120-121).

Obviously, for Stalin, the development of Soviet science proper had lasting importance. The Soviet Union had just started catching up with highly developed countries in terms of the level and culture of production. The urgent need for qualitative scientific leaps, not only in biology, was on the agenda; otherwise, especially in the conditions of increasing political isolation, there was no need to talk about building socialism in the coming decades. This explains Stalin’s close intertwining of his scientific approach with his ideological approach.

It would be foolish to portray Stalin as a kind of political Cerberus advocating for the absolute ideologization of science: remember his remarks about its class essence. In this regard, his reasoning about the party nature of scientists in 1951 is indicative. Commenting on a large number of conversations and letters about the party nature of science (in connection with the above-mentioned August 1948 session of the V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences), he said: “Important questions that require clarity are raised in the letters. Thus, comrades often fervently advocate for

partisanship: this means that non-partisan is a derogatory word. Non-partisanship was such when non-partisanship covered up, evaded the struggle and masked its retreat to the bourgeoisie.

“We have developed new relations between party and non-party. Among advanced scientists, there are both party members and non-party members. Let’s remember Michurin, Lysenko and Pavlov — they have all been non-party members. Party and non-party members equally work for the benefit of the people.

“Partisanship can be understood in a broad sense, as a struggle for materialism, advanced worldview. But it is better to speak of communist ideology” (Y.A. Zhdanov, *A Look into the Past*, pp. 260).

It is not Stalin’s fault that Lysenko, a unique empirical scientist, for various reasons and personal qualities, did not meet the challenges of his time. Realizing this, Stalin, for whom the interests of the cause were always above personal biases, gives a directive to G.M. Malenkov in the summer of 1952: to eliminate Lysenko’s monopoly in biological science, create a collegial presidium of the V.I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences and introduce opponents of Lysenko into the presidium, primarily Tsitsin and Zhebrak (*Ibid.*).

4 Y.A. Zhdanov, at that time the head of the science sector of the CC of the CPSU(B), recalls: “The issue of building a new complex of buildings for Moscow State University was considered in the Political Bureau. Rector of MSU Academician Alexander Nikolaevich Nesmeyanov and I were present. The Moscow authorities proposed to build a four-storey town for MSU in the area near Vnukovo airport. After a pause, Stalin turned to Beria:

“What is planned to be built on Leninsky Gory?”

“A residential high-rise complex, Comrade Stalin,” explained Beria.

“Then we need to replan and build the university there. This task should be entrusted to Comrade Komarovsky.”

Komarovsky was the largest builder in Beria’s system at that time. And credit must be given to him: he coped excellently with the task” (Y.A. Zhdanov, *A Look into the Past*, pp. 295-296). See: Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR “On Strengthening the Construction of Moscow

State University and a 32-Storey Administrative Building in Zaryadye” dated October 14, 1948.

On April 8, 1949, the Council of Ministers of the USSR awarded the Stalin Prize of the first degree for creating the project of the 26-storey building of Moscow State University on the Leninsky Gory to a group of architects by Resolution No. 1395.

5 The occasion for the telegram was Mao Zedong’s message on July 4, 1948: “The state of my health, compared to two months ago, is significantly better. I have decided to come to you soon. There are three ways to get to you: by air, by sea and by land. But in all cases, we must pass through Harbin because I need to talk to some responsible comrades from Manchuria... We hope that the plane will arrive in Weixian around the 25th of this month... If you decide to transport us by sea, we hope that the ship will come to the designated port at the end of this month... If air and sea routes are not possible for our transportation, we are still leaving around the 15th of this month to the north.” Mao Zedong mentioned that 20 people would travel with him and requested two planes if they chose to travel by air.

It is known that Stalin’s response displeased Mao. A.Y. Orlov wrote to Moscow: “Mao Zedong did not take seriously the references to the busy schedules of Soviet leaders with regards to grain procurement. ‘Could it be that in the USSR they attach such great importance to grain procurement that the leading figures of the party go out for them?’ he said. As far as I have known Mao Zedong for more than six years, his smile and the words ‘hao, hao — good, good’ when he listened to the translation by no means meant that he was pleased with the telegram. It was quite clear. In my personal opinion, Mao Zedong believed that, at worst, he would be denied the dispatch of an aircraft or a ship. But even this was unlikely for him, especially since the aircraft was offered from Moscow. He was sure that he would go now. He eagerly awaited an answer... Mao Zedong’s suitcases were packed, even leather shoes were bought (he, like everyone here, wears cloth slippers), a cloth coat was sewn. The question was not only about the trip itself but also about the timing; it had been decided for him. Only the way to go remained. He is now externally calm, polite and attentive, kindly in the Chinese

manner...”

Meanwhile, Mao sent the following telegram to Moscow: “Comrade Stalin. I agree with your opinion expressed in the telegram of July 14. Let’s postpone the trip to you until the end of October or beginning of November.”

6 Stalin expresses surprise here at the posture of complete submission of the Chinese communists to Soviet decisions, but this posture stems from the instructions of Mao Zedong and is expressed in the report of the CC of the CPC delegation transmitted to the CC of the CPSU(B) on July 4, 1949. “Regarding the relationship between the CPC and the CPSU(B),” this document says, “Comrade Mao Zedong and the CC of the CPC believe:

“The CPSU(B) is the main headquarters of the international communist movement, while the CPC represents only the headquarters of one direction. The interests of individual parts must be subordinated to international interests; therefore, the CPC adheres to the decisions of the CPSU(B), although the Comintern no longer exists, and the CPC is not part of the Information Bureau of European Communist Parties. (Stalin, reading the report, wrote in this place: “No!” — *Ed.*) If there are disagreements on some issues between the CPC and the CPSU(B), then the CPC, after presenting its point of view, will submit and decisively implement the decisions of the CPSU(B). (Stalin: “No!” — *Ed.*) We believe that it is necessary to establish as close mutual ties as possible between the two parties, mutually exchange suitable politically responsible representatives to address issues of interest to our two parties and, furthermore, achieve greater mutual understanding between our parties. (Stalin: “Yes!” — *Ed.*)

“...We wish for the CC of the CPSU(B) and Comrade Stalin to constantly and without any hesitation provide their instructions and criticize the work and policies of the CPC.” (A.M. Ledovsky, *USSR and Stalin in the fate of China*, pp. 102-103).

The conversation mentions a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of the CPSU(B) on July 11, 1949, in which the delegation of the CC of the CPC, led by Liu Shaoqi, participated and presented reports on the military-political and economic situation in China.

From the beginning of 1947 to the end of 1949, the trip of Mao Zedong to the USSR was planned and postponed (See: Telegrams to A.Y. Orlov on June 15 and July 1, 1947, July 14, 1948, Telegrams to Mao Zedong on April 29 and May 10, 1948). There was regular correspondence between Mao and Stalin, conducted through radio communication, and it was top secret. Neither the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor the Soviet Embassy in China knew about it. Stalin proved to be a very experienced conspirator, meeting with Mao not as a partisan, insurgent leader but as the leader of the victorious Chinese revolution, the chairman of the newly born People's Republic of China. The substantive presentation of their conversations during Mao Zedong's visit to the USSR on December 16-February 17, 1950 is given in the aforementioned book by A.M. Ledovsky (pp. 119-140). Also of interest is a fragment of Stalin's theoretical reasoning in a conversation with Mao, quoted (based on V.M. Zhukray's materials in V.V. Vakhania's book *Stalin's Personal Secret Service*, pp. 414-416):

“You talk about some kind of Sinified socialism, but there is no such thing in nature. There is no Russian socialism, English socialism, French socialism, German socialism, Italian socialism, nor Chinese socialism. There is only one Marxist-Leninist socialism. However, when building socialism, it is necessary to take into account the specific features of a particular country. But socialism is a science, necessarily having, like any science, general laws, and as soon as you deviate from them, the construction of socialism is doomed to inevitable failure.

“What are these general laws in building socialism?

“1. This is primarily the dictatorship of the proletariat — the state of workers and peasants, a special form of union of these classes with the obligatory leading role of the most revolutionary class in history — the working class. Only this class is capable of building socialism, suppressing the resistance of exploiters and the petty bourgeoisie.

“2. Public ownership of the main means of production. The expropriation of all large factories and plants and their management by the state.

“3. Nationalization of all capitalist banks, merging them into one state bank, and strict control over its activities by the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

“4. Scientific, planned management of the national economy from one main centre. Mandatory application of the principle in building socialism: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his work,” distributing material goods depending on the quality and quantity of each person’s work.

“5. Mandatory dominance of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

“6. Creation of armed forces that would allow defending the achievements of the revolution, always remembering that a revolution is worthwhile only if it can and knows how to defend itself.

“7. Ruthless armed suppression of counter-revolutionaries and foreign agents.

“These, to say briefly, are the basic laws of socialism as a science, requiring it to be treated as such. If you understand this, everything with the construction of socialism in China will go well. If you do not understand, you will bring much harm to the world communist movement. In the Communist Party of China, as far as I know, there is a thin layer of the proletariat, and nationalist sentiments are very strong. If you do not conduct a scientific, genuinely Marxist-Leninist class policy, do not fight against bourgeois nationalism, the nationalists will crush you. Then not only will socialist construction be disrupted, but China may turn into a dangerous tool in the hands of American imperialists. I strongly recommend that you, in building socialism in China, more fully use Lenin’s wonderful work *On the Tasks of the Soviet Government*. This is the key to success.”

7 Response to Y.A. Zhdanov’s note:

“To Comrade J.V. Stalin,

“In these days, the entire country is widely celebrating the centenary of the birth of Academician Pavlov. In articles and speeches, much is said about the significance of his great doctrine. However, the question is completely avoided: Is the development of Pavlov’s legacy proceeding correctly in our country? Facts indicate that we have a serious problem in this matter. About 300 research medical institutions are involved in physiology to some extent, but the successes of medicine are more than modest, clearly not corresponding to such enormous efforts and resources. One reason for this, as it seems to me, lies in the weak utilization of Pavlov’s ideas,

in a series of attempts to reject and refute his doctrine.

“I would ask you, Comrade Stalin, to familiarize yourself with my note dedicated to this important issue.”

Further in the note, the views of some researchers who took anti-Pavlovian positions are considered. In the first place, it is about the works of I. Beritov and L. Stern. The position of Academician L.A. Orbeli is also criticized, who, in developing the study of the autonomic nervous system and sense organs, moved away from Pavlov’s fundamental problems in the field of higher nervous activity of animals, primates, and, most importantly, humans, his signaling systems and neuro-mental clinics.

At present, according to Y.A. Zhdanov, extremely important work initiated by Pavlov on the higher nervous activity of anthropoid apes is not being carried out. In the Soviet Union, there is currently only one anthropoid ape — the chimpanzee Paris, located in the Moscow Zoo, while the herd of chimpanzees belonging to the American psychologist Yerkes, an opponent of Pavlov’s teaching, has reached hundreds. As specialists point out, acquiring anthropoid apes, especially orangutans and gibbons, is not so difficult.

In the opinion of Y.A. Zhdanov, the current situation required the following measures for the development of Pavlov’s doctrine:

1. Subject attempts to revise or belittle Pavlov’s teaching to deep criticism. To achieve this, convene a meeting of physiologists where the enemies of Pavlov would be exposed. Academician Bykov could make a report at such a meeting.

2. Expand the scope of Pavlov’s teaching, making it primarily the heritage of a wide range of medical workers. Review university programs to strengthen the teaching of Pavlov’s doctrine.

3. Closer linkage of scientific work with medical practice, primarily with psychoneurological clinics. Intensify work on the physiology of speech.

4. Eliminate the monopolistic position of Academician Orbeli in the leadership of physiological institutions.

8 Stalin’s addition to the text of the report, the preparation of which was entrusted to G.M. Malenkov.

The strong emphasis made on the role of the German Democratic Republic, declared a few days ago in the former

Soviet occupation zone, was caused by another twist in the explosive confrontation with Western powers in Europe. The USA, Great Britain and France, initiating the creation of the FRG in their zones of responsibility in the spring-summer of 1949, grossly violated the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The Parliament of the GDR on October 7, 1949, in its Manifesto declared: the goals of creating the republic are the restoration of the unity of Germany “by eliminating the West German state, cancelling the Ruhr status, cancelling the autonomy of Saar, and by forming an all-German government of the German Democratic Republic; the quickest conclusion of a just peace treaty with Germany; the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany.”

The historical parallels drawn by Stalin very clearly characterize the USSR’s position in the situation that has developed. The Soviet leadership, forced by the aggressive policy of Westerners to a retaliatory step — ensuring the creation of the East German republic — did not deviate an inch from the agreements concluded in Yalta and Potsdam, from the commitments it had undertaken. The now commonplace accusations against it of intentionally dividing postwar Germany and disrupting the “democratic processes” taking place in it do not correspond to reality. On the contrary, as in the case of the prewar policy of restraining the aggressor, these steps of the Soviet leadership cannot but be recognized as singularly principled and consistent.

9 Stalin’s essay *Marxism and Problems of Linguistics* was published in *Pravda* on June 20, 1950. Prior to this, there had already been discussion on Soviet linguistic problems in *Pravda*. This essay by Comrade Stalin is in reply to questions put to him by a group of Soviet students in connection with the discussion, and to essays published in *Pravda’s* columns. The titles of these latter were “On the Path of Materialist Linguistics” by member of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Bulakhovsky, “The History of Russian Linguistics and Marx’s Theory” by Nikiforov, “On the Problem of the Class Character of Language” by Kudriavtsev and others.

10 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1958, Vol. 3, p. 212.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 411-12.

12 *Ibid.*, 1957, Vol. 2, p. 351.

13 Paul Lafargue (1842-1911), well-known activist of French and international workers' movements, and outstanding Marxist propagandist and publicist. He was one of the founders of the French Workers' Party, student and comrade-in-arms of Marx and Engels, and husband of Marx's daughter Laura.

14 V.I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," *Selected Works in Two Volumes*, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1952, Vol. I, Part 2. pp. 318-19.

15 J.V. Stalin, "The National Question and Leninism," *Works*, Eng. ed., Moscow, 1954, Vol. II, p. 353.

16 Arakcheyev regime, named after the reactionary politician Count Arakcheyev, was an unrestrained dictatorial police state, warlord despotism and brutal rule enforced in Russia in the first quarter of the 19th century. Stalin uses the term here to indicate Marr's overriding domination in Soviet linguistic circles.

17 Four-element analysis — Marr asserted that pronunciation of mankind's primitive language was evolved from the four syllables *sal, her, yon* and *rosh*.

18 "Proto-language" theory — the doctrine of the Indo-European school which holds that a linguistic family consists of a group of *patois* (dialects), split from a common primitive "parent language." For example, modern Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian are sister languages derived from Latin, and were originally only different *patois*. However, as there is no documentary evidence for the existence of a "parent language" of most of the dialects or languages, the Indo-European scholars have worked out a hypothetical "parent language," their main aim being to facilitate explanation of the rules of phonetic changes, but there is no way to prove the extent of the truth.

19 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, Ger. ed., Berlin, 1958, Vol. 3, pp. 432 and 430.

20 Response from Mao Zedong:

"Your telegram of October 1, 1950, has been received. Initially, we planned to move several volunteer divisions to north Korea to assist our Korean comrades when the enemy advances north of the 38th parallel.

"However, upon careful consideration, we now believe that such actions could have extremely serious consequences.

“Firstly, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean issue with just a few divisions (our troops are poorly equipped, and there is no confidence in the success of a military operation against American forces); the enemy may force us to retreat.

“Secondly, it is most likely that this will provoke an open confrontation between the United States and China, as a result of which the Soviet Union may also be drawn into the war, making the issue extremely significant.

“Many comrades in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China believe that caution is necessary in this matter.

“Of course, not sending our troops to provide assistance is very bad for our Korean comrades currently in such a difficult situation, and we ourselves are deeply concerned about this. However, if we deploy a few divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat, in addition to causing an open confrontation between the United States and China, our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely disrupted, and many in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by war are not healed; peace is needed).

“Therefore, it is better to endure for now, not to deploy troops, actively prepare forces, which will be more favourable during the war with the enemy.

“Korea, having temporarily suffered a defeat, will shift the form of struggle to guerrilla warfare.

“We are convening a meeting of the Central Committee, which will be attended by responsible comrades from various bureaus of the Central Committee. A final decision has not yet been made on this issue. This is our preliminary telegram; we want to consult with you. If you agree, we are ready to immediately send comrades Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao by plane to your place of rest, discuss this matter with you and report on the situation in China and Korea.

“Awaiting your response.

“Mao Zedong. October 2, 1950.”

21 In this conversation, members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) participated: L.P. Beria, N.A. Bulganin, L.M. Kaganovich, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov, N.S. Khrushchev, specialists A.A. Arakelyan,

Z.V. Atlas, A.V. Bolgov, V.Y. Vasilyeva, L.M. Gatovsky, A.D. Gusakov, G.A. Kozlov, I.I. Kuzminov, I.D. Laptev, L.A. Leontiev, N.I. Lyubimov, M.V. Nechkina, K.V. Ostrovityanov, A.I. Pashkov, V.I. Pereslegin, M.I. Rubinstein, D.T. Shepilov and P.F. Yudin.

Another version of the document has been preserved, compiled based on and taking into account the notes of those present (RGASPI, F. 83, Op. 1, D. 8, L. 103-114). The main differences between this version and the published one are as follows:

In the third paragraph starting with “In addition,” after the first sentence, the words follow: “They will understand that everything in the textbook is defined by Stalin.”

In the tenth paragraph “A. No. If something is a commodity...” after the fourth sentence, the words follow: “The law of value affects the production of means of production through the realization of consumer goods.”

In the sixteenth paragraph “A. The concepts...” the next sentence looks like this: “Is what goes to enlightenment, to defence, not a necessary product? Isn’t the worker interested in this?”

Finally, in the thirty-seventh paragraph “We need to gradually bring collective farm production...” in the sixth sentence after the words “to create,” the words are inserted: “an All-Union economic body from representatives of industry and agriculture, taking into account the production of both industry and collective farms.”

22 Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 158.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 392-93.

24 *Ibid.*, p. 392.

25 V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1969, p. 151.

26 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Chapter 5, Section I.

27 Karl Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital,” *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, p. 63.

28 Karl Marx, “Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*”, *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House,

Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, pp. 328-29.

29 V.I. Lenin, "Our Foreign and Domestic Position and the Tasks of the Party", *Collected Works*, Russian ed., Vol. 31.

30 Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. 2, p. 23.

31 Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 408.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 208.

33 V.I. Lenin, *Critical Comments on Bukharin's "Economics of the Transition Period,"* Russian ed.

34 Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 209.

35 Karl Marx, "Wage Labour and Capital," *Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1951, Vol. I, p. 83.

36 Karl Marx, "Theory of Surplus Value," Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Works*, German ed., Vol. 26, Part 2, Chapter 18.

37 Here "V" stands for varied capital, "M" for surplus value and "C" for constant capital. For the formula, see Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. 2, Chapter 20.

38 Karl Marx, *Capital*, Eng. ed., Vol. 2, Chapter 20, Section 6.

39 After the central figure, Khlestakov, in the play *The Inspector General* by Nikolai Gogol, meaning an impostor and a braggart.

40 Frederick Engels, *Anti-Dühring*, Eng. ed., Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, pp. 387-88.



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